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FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

EASTERN AFFAIRS

PART XXXVIII

JANUARY TO JUNE 1936

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CONFIDENTIAL.

Further Correspondence respecting Eastern Affairs.

PART XXXVIII—JANUARY TO JUNE 1936.

CHAPTER I.—ARABIA.

[E 6836/318/25]

No. 1.

Mr. Eden to Sir A. Ryan (Jedda).

(No. 7.)
Sir,

Foreign Office, January 4, 1936.

IN proposing the formal prolongation of the Treaty of Jedda of 1927 the Saudi Government have raised, among other points, the question of amending article 10 of the present treaty with a view to establishing the completely equal status of the English and Arabic versions of the text. This article at present runs as follows:—

“The present treaty has been drawn up in English and Arabic. Both texts shall be of equal validity; but in case of divergence in the interpretation of any part of the treaty the English text shall prevail.”

2. The draft note to prolong the Treaty of Jedda which the Deputy Saudi Minister for Foreign Affairs handed to you for consideration on the 30th March last (a copy of which was enclosed in your despatch No. 113 of the 11th April) contained the following paragraph:—

“(6) The text of article 10 of the Treaty of Jedda, providing that the English text shall prevail in case of divergence, does not imply discrimination between the Arabic and English languages, the equal validity of which is established by the said article, but is a matter of scientific facility when it may be necessary for authorised persons to make comparison between the texts. I therefore wish to receive from your Excellency confirmation of the fact that the Arabic and English texts are of equal validity in sense and in interpretation, and that neither of the two texts has preference over the other.”

The comment on this proposal in your covering despatch was that, while Fuad Bey's actual formula seemed unduly complicated, you considered that the principle of full equality between the two languages might well be accepted by His Majesty's Government in deference to the strong motive of *amour-propre* and national sentiment which animated the Saudi Government in the matter. You recalled that other Powers, such as France and Italy, had accepted the full equal validity of the Arabic version of their treaty with Saudi Arabia, whereas His Majesty's Government had even gone so far as to admit the sole validity of the Arabic text of the Anglo-Yemeni Treaty of 1934 (although, as was explained to Fuad Bey, this had only been conceded in view of the very special and primitive circumstances prevailing in the Yemen, where there was no official with a proper knowledge of English).

3. You will recollect that an allusion to the question of language was subsequently made in the course of the general discussion on the arrangements

for renewing the Treaty of Jedda at the fourth meeting with Fuad Bey Hamza at the Foreign Office on the 5th July last.⁽¹⁾ Fuad Bey was inclined on that occasion to try to make capital out of the example of the Anglo-Yemeni Treaty, but Mr. Rendel informed him of the very special circumstances existing in that case and made it clear that it could in no circumstances be regarded as a precedent. Mr. Rendel added that the amendment of the present language of article 10 was mainly a formal and technical point on which the competent authorities would have to be consulted in due course.

4. The general practice of His Majesty's Government (following a rule laid down by Mr. Canning and Lord Palmerston) has always been that bilateral treaties should be in two texts, viz., in English and in the language of the other contracting party, except in the rare cases where the other contracting party assented to the use of English alone. Further, the two texts were to be regarded as of equal validity. In the case of treaties with *Arab States*, however, the practice in the past has normally been to have both English and Arabic texts, with the English text prevailing in case of divergence. It was therefore in accordance with precedent that it was provided in article 10 of the Treaty of Jedda that in case of doubt as to the interpretation of the treaty the English text should prevail. At the same time the attempt was made to soften this apparent discrimination against Arabic by providing that "both texts shall be of equal validity . . ." with the result that, although it cannot be doubted that the English text should prevail in case of a divergence of opinion, the phraseology of article 10 is to some extent contradictory.

5. I consider that in modern conditions it is no longer practicable in all cases to insist upon the rule formerly observed with *Arab States*. In recent years relatively large and important independent *Arab States* have arisen, such as Iraq and Saudi Arabia, which must be treated in the matter of the language of treaties on an equal footing with other independent sovereign States. A precedent has already been established in this sense in the case of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of Alliance of 1930, which does not provide for either language prevailing in case of doubt, but lays it down that any dispute as to interpretation is to be dealt with by negotiation or through the League of Nations.

6. I accordingly authorise you to inform the Saudi Government that His Majesty's Government are prepared to accede to their desire to secure equality for the Arabic version of the Treaty of Jedda, and to provide, in any eventual exchange of notes formally prolonging the treaty, for the necessary amendment of the existing article 10. You should add, however, that His Majesty's Government consider that this amendment can most conveniently and accurately be made not by adopting the formula proposed in the draft note communicated by Fuad Bey on the 30th March, but by providing for the deletion of the words after the semicolon in the second sentence of article 10, so as to leave the operative portion of the article to run as follows without any risk of ambiguity:—

"The present treaty has been drawn up in English and Arabic. Both texts shall be of equal validity."

I consider that this modification could best be effected by means of an explanatory paragraph in the eventual exchange of notes prolonging the Treaty of Jedda, which would put on record the agreed amendment and set out the revised wording of the article.

7. In view of the fact that (as you yourself reported in your despatch No. 113 of the 11th April) there has hitherto been no dispute over the interpretation of the actual wording of the treaty, I consider that it would be both unnecessary and undesirable to embark on a possibly difficult attempt to find a formula providing for any such dispute to be settled by arbitration or any other means. You should therefore avoid raising on your account the question of the inclusion of any provision of this nature.

I am, &c.
ANTHONY EDEN.

⁽¹⁾ See Part XXXVII, No. 7.

[E 205/205/25]

No. 2.

High Commissioner for Palestine to Mr. Thomas (Communicated by Colonial Office, January 13, 1936.)

Sir,

Jerusalem, November 29, 1935.

I HAVE the honour to refer to my telegram No. 309 of the 14th November, 1935, and connected correspondence regarding a conference between representatives of Palestine, Syria and Saudi Arabia on the subject of the reconditioning of the Hejaz Railway, and to transmit herewith two copies in English of the minutes of the conference, which was held at Haifa from the 10th to the 17th October.

2. I regret that it has not been possible to send these minutes to you earlier. The delay has been due to the desire of the principal Syrian delegate to introduce minor amendments into the record after it had been endorsed by the representative of Saudi Arabia. M. Vasselet has now expressed his agreement with the minutes.

3. To avoid further delay I transmit the minutes to you without comment. I will address you further if I wish to submit any observations on the conclusions reached by the conference.

4. I am sending a copy of this despatch, with its enclosures, to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Jedda.

I have, &c.

(For High Commissioner for Palestine),
J. HATHORN HALL.

Enclosure in No. 2.

Agenda.

1. Examination of the Degree of Reconditioning which the Railway requires.
2. Preparation of an Estimate of the Cost of the Necessary Work.
3. Establishment of the Manner in which the Necessary Expense is to be met.
4. Consideration of a Project for the Organisation of a Train Service along the whole length of the Railway.
5. Consideration of a Project for the eventual Distribution of Rolling-Stock among the different Sections of the Line.

DELEGATES.

Syria—

- M. Vasselet, Inspector-General of Concessionary Companies and of Public Works at the Haut-Commissariat, First Delegate.
- M. Lalanne, Inspector in the Administration and Control of Concessionary Companies, Second Delegate.
- M. Gasc, Senior Official of the Chemin de Fer du Hedjaz, Syria, Expert.

Saudi Arabia—

- Fuad Bey Hamza, First Delegate.
- Khalid Bey Hakim, Second Delegate.
- Assad Eff. Fajih, Secretary to the Saudi Arabia Delegation.
- Mohammed Eff. Kanaan, Engineer, Expert.

Palestine—

- Mr. C. R. Webb, General Manager, Palestine Railways.
- Mr. H. A. Cotching, Chief Mechanical Engineer, Palestine Railways.
- Mr. F. Abcarius, Senior Assistant Treasurer, Palestine Government.

SECRETARY.

Mr. C. W. Bridgen, Palestine Railways.

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SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS.

Item 1.—*Examination of the Degree of Reconditioning which the Railway requires.*

The Conference considered that the line should be repaired to the minimum compatible with safety, bearing in mind the regular running of one train a week and additional trains when required, especially during the five months of the heavier traffic. It was considered that this minimum reconditioning should include the reconstruction of bridges but it should eliminate all stations except those required for water, engine changing and train crossing purposes.

Item 2.—*Preparation of an Estimate of the Cost of the Necessary Work.*

The approximate estimates of reconstruction in the degree recommended under Item 1 are £P. 35,000 for the Maan-Mudawara section and £P. 125,000 for the Mudawara-Medina section. To these figures should be added 20 per cent. for the transport of materials and contingent and unforeseen expenditure, giving figures of £P. 42,000 and £P. 150,000 or a total for the whole work of £P. 192,000.

The conference emphasised that this estimate was based on present conditions and information and should only be considered as approximate.

Item 3.—*Establishment of the Manner in which the Necessary Expense is to be met*

While recording the proposal of Fuad Bey Hamza to the effect that the reconstruction of the sections damaged should be effected at the expense of the line as a whole, the conference regretted that it had not been able to reach an agreed resolution on this important question. In these circumstances, the conference could only commend the matter to the consideration of the Governments concerned.

(La conférence ne peut que laisser aux Gouvernements intéressés le soin de poursuivre l'aboutissement de cette question.)

Item 4.—*Consideration of a Project for the Organisation of a Train Service along the whole length of the Railway.*

The conference considered that in the first place it would be sufficient to arrange for one mixed train a week in each direction between Maan and Medina, this train to connect with existing services on the Hejaz Railway in Transjordan, Syria and Palestine.

Additional trains to be arranged as required in the five months of Rajab, Ramadan and the Pilgrimage.

Item 5.—*Consideration of a Project for the eventual Distribution of Rolling-Stock among the different Sections of the Line.*

The conference considered that, as in the division of stock between the Syrian, Transjordan and Palestine sections of the railway in 1926, the stock on the whole railway according to the last inventory before the 30th October, 1918, should be distributed in accordance with article 108 of the Treaty of Lausanne 1923, namely, on the length of track and the nature and amount of the traffic as represented by the train kilometrage on each section operated in August 1914.

[E 7575/318/25]

No. 3.

Mr. Eden to Sir A. Ryan (Jedda).

(No. 25.)
Sir,

Foreign Office, January 23, 1936.

I HAVE had under consideration your despatch No. 353 of the 10th December last, on the subject of your negotiations with the Saudi Government, in paragraph 2 of which you suggest that, if and when you are able to dispose of the question of slavery, you should proceed, on the lines indicated in paragraph 12 of my predecessor's despatch No. 311 of the 24th October last, with the

prolongation of the Treaty of Jedda by an exchange of notes which, after providing for the renunciation by both parties, for a period of years, of their right under article 8 of the treaty to denounce the treaty at six months' notice, should confine itself to dealing with the proposed abandonment by His Majesty's Government of their right of manumission, with the question of the supply of arms and munitions to Saudi Arabia, and with that of the prevailing language of the treaty.

2. I now have to inform you that, subject to the considerations set out in my telegram No. 6 of the 15th January, I approve your proposal. As regards the duration of the proposed prolongation, while, as indicated in paragraph 12 of my predecessor's despatch No. 311 of the 24th October, I should still prefer this period to be limited to seven years, I am prepared to authorise you, if the Saudi Government press strongly for the longer period, to agree to the prolongation of the treaty for the full period of ten years for which Fuad Bey asked in the course of the discussion of this question at the Foreign Office on the 18th July last.

I am, &c.

ANTHONY EDEN.

[E 486/486/25]

No. 4.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. Eden.—(Received January 27.)

(No. 3. Confidential.)
Sir,

Jedda, January 2, 1936.

I HAVE the honour to submit herewith the Jedda report for December 1935.

2. Copies have been distributed as in the case of the report for August, and in addition a copy has, for the first time, been sent to the Commander-in-chief, East Indies Station, Colombo.

I have, &c.

ANDREW RYAN.

Enclosure in No. 4.

JEDDA REPORT FOR DECEMBER 1935.

I.—*Internal Affairs.*

384. The fast of Ramadan, which had begun on the 28th November, lasted until the 27th December. Thus the ensuing Moslem festival followed immediately on Christmas, a fact which intensified the general holiday feeling in Jedda. These facts contributed to the calm which prevailed throughout the month. So far as is known, the King and the Heir Apparent did not stir out of Riyadh. The Amir Feisal stayed there, contrary to expectation, until after Sir Andrew Ryan's departure, but he left early in the month and got back on the 9th to Mecca, where he has since remained. Fuad Bey Hamza also left Riyadh early in December, but he visited Hail and Medina and did not arrive in Jedda until the 20th, having been delayed on the road from Medina to Jedda by heavy rains. He stayed in Jedda until the 22nd and then went on to Mecca. He did not return up to the end of the month, but his voice was heard on the telephone. There is joy in the Hamza family over the birth of a son to Fuad Bey at Beirut on or about the 17th December.

385. No internal events of political importance came to the notice of the Legation during the month. It is expected that, when the King visits Hasa early in January, he will confirm Saud, the son of the late Abdullah-bin-Jiluwi (paragraph 359 of the last report) as successor to the governorship. He was Acting Governor when Sir Andrew Ryan passed through in November, and created on him a most unfavourable impression, but, as this was due partly to a horrible squint and partly to manners which may have been due to awkwardness, it is too soon to judge of his capacity.

386. A Saudi aeroplane from Taif visited Jedda at the beginning of the month, but stayed only a few days.

387. It was reported on good authority early in the month that the Saudi Government had received by a ship which arrived on the 11th December samples

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of pistols from the Steyr-Solothurn Waffen-A.G. of Zurich. It was suggested that these would be followed by samples of rifles and machine guns.

388. The December calm did not infect Mr. Twitchell of the Saudi Arabian Mining Syndicate (paragraph 362 of the last report). He dashed hither and thither with amazing energy during the greater part of the month, reinforced from the 11th December onward by his wife, who arrived in Jedda on that day. Mr. Van de Poll returned from leave on the 15th December, and at least three new experts also arrived during the month. It is becoming urgent to determine the areas which can be worked profitably, as they must be fixed, and subsidiary exploitation companies formed, within two years of the coming into force of the original concession. It appears to be intended to form a subsidiary in the near future for the Mahd adh-Dhahab, where some twenty-five Europeans or Americans and over 700 workmen are already employed. There is much prospecting to be done elsewhere, and at the end of the year arrangements were being made for four distinct units to explore the districts of Wejh and Yanbu, and two others more difficult to identify. There is reason to believe that difficulty has arisen with the Saudi authorities over at least one of the latter, owing to a doubt as to whether it is in the area covered by the original concession, in defining which there was apparently some error due to a miscalculation of the position of the Mahd.

389. The local papers continue to publish optimistic accounts of the progress of the oil-diggers in Hasa. One of the authorities quoted is Seyyid Hashim (paragraph 223 of the report for July), who has recently been back in the Hejaz.

390. Talaat Pasha Harb (paragraph 325 of the report for October) is expected to revisit Jedda, again by air, early in January. It seems fairly certain that his conversations with the Saudi Minister of Finance, when the latter visited Egypt, have led to business. The Pasha himself said in a statement to the Egyptian press, published in *Al Ahram* of the 13th December, that arrangements had been made to repair certain roads, notably that between Safa and Marwa in Mecca, and to build an embankment there to protect the Haram from floods, and that permission had been given for the conveyance of pilgrims to Medina by air. He referred also to new financial arrangements for Egyptian pilgrims, but not to a concession, which he apparently hopes to obtain, for the provision of a public electricity supply at Mecca.

391. The further parcel of 400,000 rupees mentioned in paragraph 364 of the last report duly arrived from India in the first week of December. The purchase in India is understood to have been financed by Haji Abdullah Ali Reza and Co.

392. The value of the Saudi rial has been fairly well sustained since paragraph 290 of the report for September was written. It declined somewhat in the course of Ramadan, contrary to the usual movement. Nothing more has been heard of the proposed importation of £90,000 worth of rials from London, but there are rumours of new rials being provided by the Banque Misr or by the Italians.

393. The new X-ray plant mentioned in paragraph 221 of the report for July was on its way to Riyadh when Sir Andrew Ryan's party passed through Ashaira on the 2nd December.

II.—Frontier Questions and Foreign Relations in Arabia.

394. A report from Cairo that a treaty of alliance had been concluded between Iraq and Saudi Arabia was promptly contradicted in Bagdad, where it was admitted that negotiations of more moderate scope were in contemplation. See the *Times* of the 3rd and 4th December. It was known from more confidential sources that Nuri Pasha was thinking of visiting the Hejaz in February–March, but the fact that on the 31st December Sheikh Yusuf Yasin unexpectedly applied for a visa for Palestine, with a view to proceeding thither via Iraq, suggests that it may be intended to conduct the next stage of the negotiations at Bagdad.

395. The one commission known to have proceeded to the Saudi-Yemen frontier (paragraph 366 of the last report) to take part in the delimitation of it consists of Sheikh Muhammad Suleyman and Talaat Wafa. They were apparently in Najran on the 27th December but no news of the progress made with the delimitation is available.

396. Further enquiries have convinced the British authorities concerned that no aircraft from Transjordan can have entered Saudi Arabia in August as alleged by the Saudi Government (paragraph 331 of the report for October). The Saudi Government are being so informed.

397. As regards Saudi relations with Koweit see paragraph 401 below.

III.—Relations with Powers outside Arabia.

398. As no full information regarding Sir Andrew Ryan's proceedings was available when paragraph 367 of the last report was written, a summary account is given here. Leaving Cairo on the 11th November, he was conveyed in aircraft of the R.A.F. to Bagdad, arriving the same evening; to Koweit on the 14th November; and to Bahrein on the 17th November. At all these places he exchanged views on matters of common interest and at Bahrein he conferred with the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, who had come from Bushire. He crossed to Uqair on the 20th November in a launch provided by the Saudi Government and reached Hofuf by car that evening. He stayed that night in the citadel at Hofuf and, though received very scurvily by the Acting Governor, Saud-bin-Jiluwi, was excellently looked after by Sheikh Muhammad-at-Tawil, Director of Customs, &c., in Hasa. The three days' car journey to Riyadh was arduous and damaged Sir Andrew Ryan slightly, though Captain de Gaury, who accompanied him throughout the journey from Cairo to Jedda, arrived intact.

399. The Minister and his party, reinforced at Riyadh by Mr. A. C. Oppenheim and Mr. C. Ousman, from the Legation in Jedda, stayed in a new annex to the Badia Palace some four miles from Riyadh, from the 23rd to the 29th November. They were treated with the utmost consideration by the King, the Crown Prince and the other Saudi personages, who included the Amir Feisal, Fuad Bey Hamza and Sheikh Yusuf Yasin. On the 25th November Sir Andrew Ryan presented to Ibn Saud in an official manner the Insignia of an Honorary Knight Grand Cross of the Bath. The King expressed his gratitude in cordial terms. At two other audiences, the question of the eastern and south-eastern frontiers was discussed, but Ibn Saud left the details of that question and all other business discussion to Fuad Bey.

400. Sir Andrew Ryan was authorised to lay before the King a new and generous proposal by His Majesty's Government for the settlement of the frontier question. His Majesty recognised the good spirit animating this proposal but rejected it and asked for more. He was peculiarly insistent on his claim to the Jebel Naksh in the south-west of the Qatar Peninsula.

401. Two other questions outstanding between His Majesty's Government and the Saudi Government were the Koweit Blockade (paragraph 335 of the report for October) and a proposed settlement regarding slavery, which would pave the way for a prolongation of the validity of the Treaty of Jedda. It need only be recorded that Fuad Bey abandoned the position that a guarantee by the Koweit Government to prevent all smuggling must be a *conditio sine qua non* of any agreement to terminate the blockade. He asked for other guarantees in addition to those already offered by Koweit.

402. On the 28th November Fuad Bey engaged Sir Andrew Ryan in a long conversation about the position of Saudi Arabia *vis-à-vis* Italy and Great Britain respectively. The essential part of what he said was that the Italian Government had made a proposal to the Saudi Government, amounting to the offer of a very large gift, mostly in the shape of arms; that Ibn Saud suspected Italian policy profoundly and had no mind to accept unless he must do so for safety's sake; but that he needed reassurance under stated heads as to what support he could expect if Italy menaced Arabia, *i.e.*, as was later elucidated, menaced Saudi Arabia directly or indirectly by action in the Yemen.

403. The Legation party left Riyadh early on the 29th November and reached Jedda without difficulty on the 3rd December. The only incident worth recording in a short summary is that the Minister of Finance, who was still in charge of Fuad Bey's post at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, came out from Mecca to Sharayya to greet the Minister.

404. This unusual journey did much both to emphasise the special nature of Ibn Saud's relations with His Majesty's Government, in spite of all differences, and to increase personal touch between British authorities on both sides of Arabia.

405. The results of the business conversations at Riyadh were reported in a comprehensive series of telegrams and despatches to the Foreign Office after the return of the party to Jedda. The most immediate subject for consideration has naturally been that mentioned in paragraph 402 above. The assurances desired by Ibn Saud would, if given, amount to an undertaking to protect Saudi Arabia and the Yemen against an Italian menace in all contingencies. This could not be given, but on the 22nd December Sir Andrew Ryan made, under instructions, a statement to Fuad Bey designed to reassure the King as far as possible and to warn him of the danger of committing himself to the Italian Government.

406. Fuad Bey gave as a reason for delaying his return to Jedda his wish to postpone any reply to the Italian offer until His Majesty's Government had had time to consider the King's representations. There was, in fact, no sign during December of any developments in Saudi-Italian relations.

407. The staff of the Italian Legation was strengthened on 22nd December by the arrival of Comm. L. F. Bellini, a senior member of the dragoman service of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, a gentleman who, after long service in Egypt and Tunis, has been employed for five years at Bagdad.

408. On the 24th December the Italian Legation distributed free copies of an Arabic paper appearing in Tripoli, *Al-Adl* of the 23rd November. This is noteworthy as a first example of overt local propaganda in Jedda. The issue circulated by the Italian Legation contains matter designed to glorify the treatment accorded to Islamic institutions, including schools, in Libya, and also contains a strong and calumnious attack on British policy in Egypt.

409. It may be observed that the Italians in Jedda have been at pains to maintain punctilious relations with the British. We never speak about war or Geneva. There are perhaps slight signs of fundamental reserve on the part of the Italian Chargé d'Affaires, but the Odellos are all things to all men. If Mr. Odello is not an inspiring figure on social occasions, his wife and daughter are very much in the picture and are cultivated by all without political prejudice. It is even said that one non-Italian young gentleman has been questioned by Mme. Odello as to his intentions in regard to her daughter; but it must be admitted that he is the citizen of a State which does not belong to the League of Nations.

410. The French Chargé d'Affaires still tarries in Syria. It is probably for this reason that no official announcement has been made locally of the elevation of his consulate to the status of a Legation, although this was provided for in a French law of last July.

411. The Soviet Minister, accompanied by his wife, left Jedda for good on the 15th December, bequeathing the sinecure of doyen of the diplomatic body to Sir Andrew Ryan. Of all the Russians enumerated in paragraph 29 of the report for January, only one male remains to sweep and garnish the Legation for M. Khakimov, who preceded M. Turakoulov as consul-general in Jedda and who after an absence of eight years is now to succeed him as Minister.

412. The local press announced on the 24th December the arrival at Medina early in Ramadan of a party of Egyptian experts to carry out repairs in the Haram.

413. That very devout Moslem, the Afghan Minister, moved to Mecca for Ramadan, soon after the arrival recorded in paragraph 376 of the last report.

414. Fuad Bey Hamza mentioned to Sir Andrew Ryan at Riyadh the negotiations with Ethiopia referred to in paragraph 372 of the last report and earlier. It appeared that the Saudi Government were inclined to place relations with Abyssinia on a treaty basis by an exchange of notes, if not by a treaty of friendship, subject to some doubt lest this should be construed as an unneutral act. Meanwhile, the Ethiopian delegates were kept waiting in Jedda until Fuad Bey got back. They are an amiable but uncommunicative pair and it is not yet known what passed after Fuad Bey's return. They left Jedda on the 29th December.

IV.—Miscellaneous.

415. H.M.S. *Weston*, Commander J. H. Bowen, arrived in Jedda on the 4th December and left on the 6th. A French warship, the sloop *Bougainville*, arrived almost simultaneously with H.M.S. *Weston* on the 4th December, but stayed one day longer.

416. Lady Ryan returned to Jedda, via Port Sudan, on the 11th December. Captain de Gaury left the same day on termination of his appointment as honorary attaché.

417. Mr. and Mrs. Philby reached Jedda on the 10th December, thus completing a very remarkable car journey from England, via France, Spain, Tangier and overland to Egypt, Damascus, Hail and Riyadh. Some anxiety was felt regarding their safety, when it was thought that they were several days overdue at Hail, but Mr. Philby scouts the idea that there was any real delay.

418. The annual handicap Golf Tournament for the "Agent's Tankard," presented by Mr. W. L. Bond, when he held the post of agent and consul in 1929-30, was played on the 19th December and the three following days. Several of the sixteen entrants were hampered by the rule that no handicap may exceed 36, but the Dutch Chargé, M. Adriaanse, one of the 36-men, won the cup, with Lady Ryan (24) as runner-up.

419. December was marked by some very hot weather and by unusual rain storms, one on the 18th December, following on dust storms and generally unsettled weather, another on Christmas night and Boxing Day. The rains were followed by very pleasant cool spells but the earlier part of the month did much to justify the following quotation from Doughty on the Legation Christmas card:—

"I asked what were the heat of Jidda? 'Ouf,' he answered, 'insufferable.' 'Khalil hast thou not heard what said Saud-bin-Saud when he laid siege to Jidda (1803), and could not take the place: 'I give it up then, I cannot fight against such a hot town: surely, if this people be not fiends, they are nigh neighbours to the devil.'"

420. The remains of an elderly Italian passenger were landed for burial in the European cemetery at Jedda on the 28th December. Mr. A. C. Oppenheim represented His Majesty's Minister at the funeral, a gesture for which the Italian Chargé expressed no little gratitude.

421. The local press announced on the 27th December that the number of pilgrims who had arrived by sea up to date was 6,420. It is thought that the total number of overseas pilgrims to stand on Arafat on the 2nd or 3rd March will fall short of that of last year. It is noticeable that the Indian ships have brought far fewer pilgrims from Afghanistan and Central Asia, who are apt to be early comers, than had arrived at the same period of the season in recent years. Rumours of war do not, however, seem to be affecting the movement of pilgrims towards the Red Sea as much as might have been expected.

422. The position as regards the manumission of slaves by the British Legation was as follows:—

On hand at the beginning of the month: Nil.
Took refuge in December: Nil.
Manumitted and repatriated: Nil.
Locally manumitted: Nil.
On hand at the end of the month: Nil.

[E 490/56/25]

No. 5.

(No. 7.)
Sir,

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. Eden.—(Received January 27.)

Jedda, January 4, 1936.

WITH reference to your telegram No. 139 of the 17th December, relative to the negotiations between Saudi Arabia and Ethiopia, I have the honour to state that the two Abyssinian delegates, who had waited until the 20th December for Fuad Bey Hamza's return, left for their country via Port Sudan on the 29th December.

2. Both Mr. Calvert and I saw the delegates more than once in December, but up to the last they were very uncommunicative as to the objects and results of their mission, and confined themselves on the eve of their departure to a vague intimation that they had effected something.

3. Fuad Bey Hamza was more informative when I broached the subject during his visit to me on the 2nd January. He said that the Saudi Government

had thought it inadvisable to conclude a treaty with Ethiopia at the present time, but had expressed readiness to receive an Abyssinian consul, if the Government of Ethiopia wished to appoint one, and to extend to Ethiopian subjects the same treatment as to those of Powers with whom they were in relations. I asked whether this had been effected by the exchange of notes, which he had foreshadowed in his conversation with me at Riyadh. He replied in the negative. He said that the delegates had brought two letters, and I gathered that what had been arranged had been embodied in a reply to one or both of these.

4. Although it was I and not Fuad Bey, who had reverted to the matter, I thought it would do no harm to mention that I had consulted His Majesty's Government on the question of international law, which he had put to me in Riyadh, and that their reply bore out generally the personal opinion I had expressed. I added a phrase in the sense of the last words of the first paragraph of your telegram under reference. Inspired by the second paragraph of the same telegram, I observed, without stressing the point, that any extension of the friendships of Ethiopia would be welcomed at a time when she so sorely needed friends.

5. In view of the comparative unimportance at the present time of the relations between Saudi Arabia and Ethiopia, and the meagreness of the outcome of the negotiations, I have not thought it necessary to telegraph further on the subject. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Addis Ababa.

I have, &c.
ANDREW RYAN.

[E 600/67/25]

No. 6.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. Eden.—(Received February 3.)

(No. 20.)

HIS Majesty's Minister at Jedda presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit to him the annual report on heads of foreign missions in Jedda.

Jedda, January 13, 1936.

Enclosure in No. 6.

Report on Heads of Foreign Missions in Jedda.

(Paragraphs marked with an asterisk are reproduced from the previous reports indicated at the end of each. Those marked with a dagger are revised versions of earlier reports brought up to date.)

Afghanistan.

Sheikh Muhammad Sadiq-al-Mujaddidi, then the Afghan Minister in Egypt, was appointed to the additional post of Minister in Jedda early in 1935. He was already well known in the Hejaz as he had come annually on pilgrimage. He presented his credentials as Minister to Ibn Saud on the 1st April. Soon after the Afghan Government, who regarded the unwillingness of the Egyptian Government to maintain a permanent representative at Kabul as a grievance and had considered alternative means of showing their displeasure, closed their Legation in Cairo temporarily, put Afghan interests in Egypt under the charge of their Embassy in Angora and left Al Mujaddidi with the sole post of Minister in Jedda. He belongs to a family enjoying great religious consideration in Afghanistan, where his brother is or was Minister of Justice. They are understood to be eminent in the Nakshibandi order of dervishes. The Minister in Jedda is a devout Moslem and has so far spent more of his time in the Hejaz in the Holy Cities than in Jedda. He is, in fact, much more of the ecclesiastical than the diplomatic type and he presents no appearance of political capacity or interest in politics. On the rare occasions when we have met he has been very amiable but intercourse is hampered by the fact that he speaks no European

language. He takes no part in the foreign social life of Jedda but is punctilious in his attendance at official functions, when he is here. On such occasions he wears curious adaptations of European dress, with a turban. He has a wife and several children somewhere but not in Jedda. His staff consists of two secretaries and a nebulous Afghan clerk of sorts. Both secretaries know French and one of them, who is thought to be an Egyptian, speaks moderate English as well.

Belgium.

Colonel Ibrahim Depui, an Islamised French ex-officer, was appointed honorary Belgian consul in Jedda by a Royal decree of the 30th January, 1935. He was already well known here, having been attached in some capacity to the Jedda branch of the French military mission in Egypt and been subsequently employed at French consul under the Hashimite régime. After vacating that post he paid frequent visits to the Hejaz and was supposed to be interested in various commercial schemes. He appeared to be a free lance, though he was not actually placed on the French retired list until September 1934. His formal appointment as Belgian consul was made after he had failed in an attempt towards the end of 1934 to assert a right to the post on the ground that he had held it when he was the French representative and had never vacated it. After he had regularised his position he came back to Jedda but, after a short stay, he disappeared again for the remainder of the year, leaving the head of the local Italian firm of shipping agents in charge. He has the reputation of loving to pose as a man of mystery and is probably neither very serious nor very trustworthy. He nevertheless made an agreeable personal impression on me on the occasion of our only meeting, when he called on me in February. He made much of his British connexions in the past, having at one time acted as a French liaison officer with British forces. He must be regarded less as the representative of a Government having any important interest in the Hejaz than as a person who has, for his own ends, induced that Government to give him an official status.

Egypt.

†Abdul Hamid Munir Effendi, who had been appointed Egyptian consul in Jedda in August 1934, lingered long in his former post at Madrid and did not arrive in this country until the 2nd June, 1935. He was employed as Chancelier in the consulate at Geneva in 1923, served subsequently as vice-consul at Lyons and Rome and was appointed attaché at the Legation in Madrid in 1928. He is said to be 36 but looks younger. So far as our very limited intercourse has gone, I should judge him to be very amiable but rather ineffective. He would be far more at home in Europe than in Jedda or even, I think, in Egypt. He may be oppressed by the fact that he not only represents a country having no official relations with Saudi Arabia but a country whose commercial magnates of the Banque Misr group are the real exponents of Egyptian interests in the Hejaz. He speaks English, French and Spanish. He is unmarried.

France.

†M. Roger Maigret has held since the 29th April, 1929, the anomalous position of permanent Chargé d'Affaires at the head of a consulate. He hoped in December 1934 to become Minister Resident with a Legation as from the 1st January, 1935. It is now understood that the Legation was created by a French law of last July but no official announcement has been made here pending M. Maigret's return from an absence in Syria. He has had a long career in the French Near East service. He was employed in Morocco for many years prior to 1921, and appears to have had only a moderate reputation there. He was subsequently consul-general in Iraq. He is intelligent and witty, has a considerable knowledge of Arab countries, and used to boast in his lighter moments of an equal knowledge of the Parisian underworld, as a result of having cultivated apaches in his conscript days. When I first knew him he was always very ready to talk about Morocco, which we both knew, but he has always, notwithstanding great professions of friendship, been uncommunicative about affairs nearer to us. He has been, for the most part, very much of a recluse in Jedda, partly because of ill-health, but he has occasionally come out of his shell. He does not appear to carry much weight either with the Saudi Government or with his own and has many more attachés in Syria than in France. He has a considerable book-knowledge of English and some of Arabic. I used to exaggerate his age, which is probably still a little under 60. He is separated from a Spanish

or half-Spanish wife, but his *ménage* in Jedda has included for long periods a lady guest, who is produced discreetly in general company on certain social occasions. M. Maigret may be summed up as an unsatisfactory colleague, who is nevertheless very pleasant to meet.

Germany.

The German consulate has remained unoccupied since the departure in 1933 of M. Heinrich De Haas, the honorary consul appointed in 1931.

Iraq.

The Iraqi Government is at present represented in Jedda only by a Hejazi clerk in the Legation. I do not think it necessary to reproduce or supplement the account previously given of the titular Chargé d'Affaires, Sayyid Kamil-al-Gilani, who left for Bagdad in April, as it has become practically certain that he will not return to his post here, although he still held it as recently as November last. It is only fair to state, however, that, after writing my last report, I found Sayyid Kamil much more forthcoming than might be expected from my then impression of him. He became, indeed, both very friendly and very communicative.

Italy.

†Signor G. Persico has been Chargé d'Affaires in Jedda since March 1934, when he came here from a post in the Italian Ministry for Foreign Affairs. His earlier career was spent largely in Russia, but he had also been employed in various other places, including Istanbul, Cairo and South America. His age is probably about 40. It was thought that he might be promoted Minister, as soon as the situation between Saudi Arabia and the Yemen should have become easier than it was when he arrived, but this expectation was not realised. During the acute stage of that situation he impressed Saudi officials by his moderation and readiness to see their point of view. As a diplomatic colleague, he has always shown himself agreeable, and on occasion helpful. He is intelligent and humorous. His natural inclination is for a quiet life, and his chief consolation in Jedda has been the creation of strips of garden outside and opposite his Legation. This hobby has cost him a great deal, as he has imported much of the material from Eritrea, Egypt and elsewhere, but he can afford the expense the more easily as he has no wife in Jedda (he may have a separated one elsewhere) and entertains hardly at all. He has shown signs of discomfort during the recent crisis in Italy's relations with the rest of the world, being probably somewhat out of sympathy with the policy of his Government, a little sensitive about the reserve with which he imagines himself to be regarded in non-Italian European circles here and none too happy in his relations with some of the Italians. One of these, an ostensible merchant named Odello, seems to represent the Italian Government in a truer sense than their official representative and tends therefore to overshadow him. M. Persico speaks good French, has a moderate knowledge of English and appears to know Russian also fairly well.

Netherlands.

*M. C. Adriaanse, who succeeded M. van der Meulen as Chargé d'Affaires in 1931, is, like him, a member of the Dutch East Indian civil service. He is large, loose-limbed and a good fellow. He does not speak English as well as his predecessor, but has quite an adequate command of it. He has made a serious study of classical Arabic at the feet of Professor Snouck Hurgronje, and acted as general secretary to the Orientalists' Conference at Leiden. He can get on in the spoken language. Although far from brilliant, he makes a very good colleague and maintains the traditional good relations between the British and Dutch missions in Jedda.

*M. Adriaanse has a wife and family in Holland, but has lived a consistently bachelor life in this country. (Written in January 1933.)

There is still nothing to add to the above account of M. Adriaanse, except that, as stated in the last report, his visits to Sana have become annual and that in 1935 he was given the additional post of Netherlands Chargé d'Affaires in Bagdad.

Persia.

The Iranian representative in Jedda has become a joke. Mohamed Ali Khan Mogaddam, the Minister of whom an account was given in the last report, left Jedda early in April, but was careful not to announce officially that he was going

on leave, owing to some fiction that he would manage it from the Lebanon. It became known in July that the Iranian Government had decided to create a Legation at Bucharest for the Balkan States and to attach their Legation here to that in Cairo, and they apparently proceeded in due course to appoint Mohamed Ali Khan to the new post at Bucharest. No announcement was, however, made to his foreign colleagues here, who can only suppose that his ghost is still at the head of the Legation in Jedda. For practical purposes, it is being run by a very junior secretary.

Soviet Union.

The former Soviet Minister, M. Nezir Turakoulov, left Jedda for good on the 15th December. He is to be succeeded by M. Kerim Khakimov, who was consul or consul-general here from 1924 to 1928. This gentleman had then the name of being an ardent anti-British propagandist, a hard drinker and a man who could do nothing in moderation. He was employed as trade agent in the Yemen from 1929 to 1932, since when he has been in Russia. As he has not yet arrived, I prefer to postpone any further account of him. The Legation is at present in charge of a vice-consul, also a Moslem.

Turkey.

*Celâl Bey has been Turkish Chargé d'Affaires for a little over a year, in which time he has spent about eight months here. He was formerly an army officer and did part of his service in the Yemen up to the time of the Turco-Italian War. He is now a man of perhaps 45 or more. He seems to know Arabic well, and, I believe, speaks Italian, but his French is elementary. He entered the Turkish foreign service some years ago and before coming to Jedda had held consular posts at Rhodes, Damascus, Cyprus and, I think, Alexandropol. From the little I know of him I should judge him to be a pleasant and easy-going man, a superficially modernised example of the old Turkish school, not highly competent in any direction. If he has any impetuosity, he shows it in the handling of his wireless sets, which are powerful but very apt to go wrong under his management. His wife, a good example of the modern Turkish woman, not spoilt by progress, could not bear Jedda. Though apparently quite attached to him, she fled after a stay of barely a month to superintend the education of their son in Istanbul, and left Celâl Bey to lead the life of an *ancien militaire*. This dispenses him from making any attempt to entertain while in Jedda, though he is reputed to be quite well off. (Written in January 1934.)

†Celâl Bey has changed in no important respect. He continues to interest himself largely in wireless and in the precautions which he thinks necessary to preserve his apparently excellent health. Islam sits lightly on him, as on most Moslem foreign representatives in this country. In 1935 he adopted the surname of Arat, which I understand to be a good old Turkish word for "courageous." He is an extremely friendly colleague and showed on the 31st December that he could be embarrassingly so when convivial, though he is rarely seen to exceed, and had on this occasion the happy theme of knowing that his Government had intimated their intention of standing by His Majesty's Government. His wife has never again faced up to Jedda, but his prolonged absences enable him to see much of her elsewhere.

[E 601/271/25]

No. 7.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. Eden.—(Received February 3.)

(No. 21.)
Sir,

Jedda, January 13, 1936.

WITH reference to Mr. Calvert's despatch No. 339 of the 26th November, I have the honour to state that, in view of the great development of the operations of the Saudi Arabian Mining Syndicate (Limited) during my absence from Jedda last year, I requested Mr. Calvert to prepare a general memorandum on the position reached by the end of 1935. Although this memorandum includes certain information which has already been reported to your Department, it adds a good deal that has come to the knowledge of the Legation since the date of the despatch under reference and gives a useful comprehensive picture of what has become the most important industrial enterprise in the west of Saudi Arabia. I therefore enclose a copy of it.

2. Most of the information collected by Mr. Calvert is fairly generally known here, but I would ask that section (c) should be regarded as confidential, especially as the map mentioned in the third sentence was shown privately to the member of my staff concerned by a subordinate employee of the syndicate, who thought afterwards that he had committed an indiscretion. The Legation has to reckon with the fact that Mr. Twitchell, the general manager, is a somewhat secretive person, who might easily make it more difficult to obtain information, if he thought it were likely to be made public.

3. Work on the road from Jedda to the Mahd is still in progress, and I understand that as far as approximately 72 miles from Jedda the road may be described, from the point of view of light motor transport, as good. The central portion of the total distance still presents difficulty, but the syndicate are now equipped with modern road-making machinery. Activity also continues at the Jedda "terminal" of the road, where the construction of the compound referred to in paragraph 4 of the despatch under reference, on an area now stated to be 300 by 150 yards, is proceeding steadily.

4. I am sending copies of this despatch and enclosure to the Department of Overseas Trade and to his Excellency the High Commissioner for Transjordan. I have, &c.

ANDREW RYAN.

Enclosure in No. 7.

Memorandum respecting the Saudi Arabian Mining Syndicate, (Limited), Mining Concession.

(Confidential.)

(a) *Areas being worked, or about to be worked (or prospected in the near future).*

THE operations of the Saudi Arabian Mining Syndicate commenced in March 1935 at the Mahd-adh-Dhahab (position according to latest estimates at 23 degrees 30 minutes north by 41 degrees east) and near Yanbu'. The latter workings, where Mr. Shanks was engaged, were abandoned in the early summer, but the former have continued and have been developed with considerable prospects of success.

Under the terms of the original concession reported to the Foreign Office by Sir Andrew Ryan's despatch No. 56 of the 24th February, 1935, by which areas which it is desired to prospect further should be designated within one year, and areas for exploitation must be fixed and subsidiary exploitation companies formed within two years of the date of the concession, it is becoming a matter of urgency to determine the areas which can be worked profitably.

Mr. Shanks has been away prospecting for the past two months or more (he returned on the 21st December, 1935), but had not had much success. His prospecting trip is believed to have taken him in an easterly and north-easterly direction, well into Nejd, almost but not quite as far as the Jebel Hilit (see below). At the end of 1935 arrangements were stated to be under way for four separate prospecting parties to go out into the concessionary area, the districts to be explored being, it is said, Yanbu' (in spite of previous failure in that neighbourhood), Wejh and two others not at present definitely known. M. Van de Poll left for Wejh about the end of December in this connexion.

(b) *Facts known as regards handing over the Mahd to an Exploitation Company.*

The little we know on this subject may be summarised as follows. The first mention, I believe, was by a member of the Saudi Arabian Mining Syndicate to a member of the Legation early in August, 1935. This was reported to the Foreign Office in our despatch No. 227 of the 6th August, 1935. Towards the end of October, 1935, another member of the Saudi Arabian Mining Syndicate stated that the syndicate had given "the new company" one square mile to survey, a conversation which was reported in our despatch No. 339 of the 26th November, 1935, paragraph 5.

It is difficult to determine from these brief references whether the Mahd itself is to be turned over to the subsidiary (it seems most probable), or whether an adjacent area is being made over to it, or both.

(c) *Facts known or surmised regarding Difficulties with the Saudi Arab Government.*

Difficulties are believed to have arisen with the Saudi Arab Government over the definition of the boundaries to the original concession. These boundaries are given at paragraph 2 of the enclosure to Sir Andrew Ryan's despatch to the Foreign Office No. 56 of the 24th February, 1935, and were published in the *Umm-al-Qura* of the 12th February, 1935. In December 1935 a member of the Legation staff had access for a short time to a map in possession of the Saudi Arabian Mining Syndicate, on which a boundary line was traced. This was observed to run as follows: Birk-Raghdan-Barq Samuda (not on Hunter's map, but about 21 degrees 30 minutes by 41 degrees 30 minutes)-Ashaira-Marran-Iqbah-Point 7 miles east of Mahd-adh-Dhahab-Amaq-Hanakiya-Hadiya-2500 mark of Hunter's map on Transjordan frontier near Itraif, thence along the *de facto* Hejaz-Transjordan frontier to Aqaba. The difference between this alignment and the published version relates principally to the area in the neighbourhood of the Mahd. It would appear that the Saudi Arabian Mining Syndicate are likely to lose, owing to miscalculation of the position of the Mahd and/or Jureysiya, a considerable slice of territory. The extent of this loss is not altogether clear although it probably forms a salient into the concessionary area, but whether of 7 miles depth or a larger area, due to an important inaccuracy in fixing the position of the Mahd, is not apparent.

This is, of course, the main difficulty. Related to it, and indeed perhaps part of it, is the difficulty recorded in my minute of the 21st December, 1935, where it is described how Mr. Shanks was not permitted by an obstructive Amir of Medina to prospect as far east as the Jebel Hilit, an area, however, I should have thought would under any interpretation be well outside the Saudi Arabian Mining Syndicate concession.

Minor difficulties have been experienced and smoothed away, *e.g.*, over employing Nejdi as well as Hejazi labour.

(d) *New Recruits, with general Idea of Distribution.*

Staff arrivals and departures have been recorded pretty faithfully in our despatches to the Foreign Office. Since the last one (No. 339 of the 26th November, 1935), the following have arrived:—

S. C. Bullock—(British), arrived December 21, 1935.

J. Walker—(American), arrived December 15, 1935.

? Shaw—(American), arrived ? December 29, 1935.

? Cezanne—(? French), arrived ? December 29, 1935.

The total strength of the syndicate's personnel is now approximately twenty-five Europeans and Americans, the majority of whom are employed at the mine or prospecting, and over 700 labourers, &c., at the Mahd-adh-Dhahab. The composition of the European and American personnel of the syndicate, by nationalities, may be of some interest and is, approximately, as follows:—

British	8
Swedes	6 (or ? 7 or 8).
American	5 (or ? 6).
Dutch	2
German	1
Greek	1
French	1
							24

A. S. C.

January 11, 1936.

[E 81/57/25]

No. 8.

Mr. Eden to Sir A. Ryan (Jedda).

(No. 38. Confidential.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, February 6, 1936.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 12 of the 27th January last and to previous correspondence on the subject of the possible admission of Saudi Arabia to membership of the League of Nations, I transmit to you the accompanying six copies of the amended text of the Covenant of the League, together with a specimen of the usual *questionnaire* (as used in the case of the application of Afghanistan) on the basis of which the Sixth Committee of the League considers and reports on application for membership.⁽¹⁾

2. The question of the possible admission of Saudi Arabia to membership of the League has received further careful consideration in the light of the arguments advanced in your telegram No. 4 of the 3rd January last, but, as stated in my telegram under reference, the opinion of His Majesty's Government on this question remains unchanged. The example of Abyssinia has demonstrated the potential embarrassment to the League of having backward and undeveloped countries as members, and from the point of view of the League itself it is clear that the admission of Saudi Arabia would, in present circumstances, be of very doubtful advantage.

3. While it cannot be doubted that a settlement of the question of the South-East Arabian frontier and the enactment by King Ibn Saud of satisfactory slavery legislation would greatly facilitate the candidature of Saudi Arabia, there would be grave objections to any attempt to link up the enquiry of Fuad Bey Hamza reported in your telegram No. 3 of the 3rd January with the desiderata of His Majesty's Government in the matter of the frontiers or in that of slavery. Apart from other obvious objections, any such attempt would commit His Majesty's Government in a most undesirable way to a measure of support for Saudi Arabia should she eventually apply for membership of the League.

4. But while the arguments against the admission of Saudi Arabia to the League in present circumstances still appear the stronger, it is necessary to proceed with great caution in discouraging the Saudi Government from pursuing this suggestion. It is important, in particular, that the Saudi Government should not be allowed to think that His Majesty's Government are seeking in any way to prevent them from joining the League for fear lest their admission might involve His Majesty's Government in a commitment to protect them in certain eventualities. This is, of course, not the case.

5. You will appreciate from the above considerations that there is, unfortunately, no alternative but for you to continue to adopt a non-committal, though sympathetic, attitude on the question, leaving, so far as possible, all initiative to the Saudi Government, and making it clear, if necessary, that the question of making any application for membership of the League is one which His Majesty's Government must leave entirely to the Saudi Government to decide.

I am, &c.

ANTHONY EDEN.

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

[E 1010/486/25]

No. 9.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. Eden.—(Received February 24.)

(No. 38.)

Sir,

Jedda, February 2, 1936.

1 HAVE the honour to submit herewith the Jedda report for January 1936.

2. Copies have been distributed as in the list in paragraph 41 of this report.

I have, &c.

ANDREW RYAN.

Enclosure in No. 9.

JEDDA REPORT FOR JANUARY 1936.

I.—Internal Affairs.

IBN SAUD left Riyadh for Hasa on the 31st December. He returned on the 14th January, but left again for Koweit on the 26th (see below). Apart from a false rumour that the heir apparent was to visit Bahrein, there is nothing to record about the other members of the Royal family, except the Amir Feisal. This prince visited Jedda twice; once when he came for the celebration of the King's accession on the 8th January, held receptions, including one for the foreign representatives, and presided at a dinner, to which also they were invited; and again on the 22nd January to present to His Majesty's Minister the condolences of the Saudi Government on the death of His late Majesty, King George V. Fresh rumours reached the Legation in January of friction between the Amirs Saud and Feisal, especially when the latter was in Riyadh in the late autumn. *Inter alia*, it is said that the heir apparent is pro-Italian, and that Feisal has gone against the Syrian element and is pro-British. Such tales are worthy of little credence. There may be more truth in a story that Feisal having in the end married the daughter of Nura (paragraph 4 of the report for January 1935), was very discontented when his new mother-in-law came to Mecca, as she made him wait on her like a slave, took her daughter back to Riyadh, and told him he must live three months a year there in future.

2. Fuad Bey Hamza visited Jedda four times. Early in the month it was still thought in certain quarters that he was cast for the rôle of Governor, combining it with his present post. Fuad Bey himself reacted almost resentfully to this suggestion when Sir Andrew Ryan mentioned it to him at dinner on the 8th January. There are indications that all is not well between him and the Amir Feisal. It is possible that he is disgruntled over the appointment as legal adviser or assistant in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of a Hejazi, trained in Egypt, named Jamil Daud, which is attributed to the Amir's influence.

3. The Saudi aircraft made no appearance in Jedda during January.

4. The Saudi Government seem to be still interested in samples of arms, &c. News was received in January that a small parcel of 800 Astra cartridges had been shipped at Antwerp by a Spanish firm of Guernica.

5. A rumour was current early in the month in Mecca that 7,000 troops had been despatched to reduce rebellious tribes in the highlands of Asir. If there is any truth at all in this, it is probably greatly exaggerated.

6. The Mecca police were very active during the month in measures to reduce the number of possible undesirables and persons without papers, including pilgrims, who have made their way irregularly to the Holy Land. This may be part of a general policy (*cf.* paragraphs 304 and 340 of the reports for September and October), or it may be due to a desire to obviate any repetition of the attempt on the King's life on the 15th March, 1935.

7. Mr. Twitchell, of the Saudi Arabian Mining Syndicate, set in motion early in January the four prospecting parties mentioned in paragraph 388 of the report for December. One of them was reported later to have got into trouble, but whether with a car or with Bedouin or with the sticky Amir of Medina is not clear. At the end of the month it was learnt that an English expert, who had been working at the Cot of Gold Mine, was to proceed to Taif, a move which suggests that Mr. Twitchell still has hopes of that area, which was investigated long before he got his concession (see paragraph 167 of the report for May and June 1932), but seemed to have been abandoned.

8. The California Arabian Standard Oil Company (paragraph 389 of the last report) hope soon to start another well not far from the first at Jebel Dhahran. Although the first well has given promising results, the working of it is hampered by difficulty resulting from the relative positions of layers of gas and petroleum.

9. Talaat Pasha Harb (paragraph 390 of the last report) arrived by air on the 9th January, preceded by nine experts who had come by sea and accompanied (at least as far as Wejh, where one of his two aeroplanes broke down) by more. While he was in Mecca, from the 10th to the 15th January, his aeroplane flew to

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Medina and back with the Egyptian consul as a passenger. It left Jedda on the 12th and returned on the 14th. An aerodrome had been prepared just outside the town. This first civil flight to one of the Holy Cities of the Hejaz marks an epoch in the history of aviation in Arabia. On the 17th Talaat Pasha himself flew to Medina, accompanied by the Saudi Minister of Finance. He returned to Egypt on the 20th, leaving behind Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman, who went off presently to the Saudi Arabian Mining Syndicate's gold mine.

10. When Talaat Pasha called at the British Legation on the 16th January, he was not very communicative about his plans generally, but gave Sir Andrew Ryan one or two interesting bits of information. He considered road-making too costly to be undertaken on any great scale in the near future, although the worst parts of the road to Medina might be repaired. He was considering, therefore, the use of vehicles with outsize tyres on the existing roads. He stated categorically that an order for new Saudi riyals (see paragraph 392 of the report for December) had been placed in Birmingham through the intermediary of his bank and the National Bank of Egypt.

11. It seems probable that Talaat Pasha's larger negotiations have advanced considerably. It is doubtful whether agreement has actually been reached on all the subjects enumerated in the Cairo *Ahram* of the 21st January, although that paper represented them as having been definitely settled, and some of the projects as being already in process of execution. The list is sufficiently interesting, however, if only as a programme, to make the heads worth reproducing briefly as follows: (1) Water supply for houses in Mecca; (2) electric lighting of Mecca; (3) workshop in Mecca for various industries; (4) repairs to the sacred precincts at Mecca, with the participation of the Moslem world; (5) asphalt roads between Jedda, Mecca and Medina; (6) cars with specially adapted wheels; (7) hotels at Mecca and Medina; (8) air service between Egypt and the Hejaz; (9) air service between Jedda and Medina; (10) orphanage at Medina; (11) hospital for surgical work at Medina; (12) date packing factory at Medina; (13) electrical plant for Medina; (14) supply of silver coinage of fixed value under the joint auspices of the Saudi Government and the Banque Misr. It was stated that work had already been started on (1), (2), (3) and (5); and that (10) to (13) inclusive would be financed by charitable funds collected in Egypt for the poor of Medina.

12. The Amir Feisal is said to have called for a report on the operation of the legislation against the holding of real property by foreigners in the Hejaz. Little has been heard of this since paragraph 305 of the report for September was written. The Amir would do better to let this sleeping dog lie if it cannot be buried.

13. Urban development is in the air in Jedda. We are promised two new boulevards, and Fuad Bey Hamza, our premier advocate of modernity, is said to have even larger schemes. Meanwhile, January witnessed one achievement, the creation of miniature Champs Elysées, without the trees, outside the Medina gate. Two parallel roads, 200 or 300 yards long, marked out with oil drums and neatly bordered with drains, were made to carry traffic, one-way of course, to and from the desert. They were oddly set with reference to the gate and they have not so far been surfaced, but they are, in the words of the Michael and George motto, *Auspiciis melioris aevi*.

II.—Frontier Questions and Foreign Relations in Arabia.

14. It became known at the beginning of the month that, in pursuance of a recent agreement between the two Governments, Sheikh Yusuf Yasin was to proceed from Riyadh to Bagdad in connexion with the Saudi-Iraqi negotiations mentioned in paragraph 394 of the report for December. He reached Bagdad about mid-January. This speeding up of negotiations, which, it was previously supposed, were not to be resumed until Nuri Pasha-as-Said should visit the Hejaz for the pilgrimage, seemed significant enough in itself. Its significance was greatly increased by the receipt of a despatch from His Majesty's Ambassador in Bagdad, a copy of which reached Jedda on the 19th January. Nuri Pasha had shown to Sir A. Clark Kerr on the 6th January a draft treaty which, if concluded, would not only create a strong alliance between the parties, but provide for the possible accession of other States for a good deal of intermeddling in the

affairs of other Arab countries and for joint efforts to promote Arab national aspirations. Sir A. Clark Kerr expressed his intention of drawing Nuri Pasha's attention without delay to various grave objections to such a treaty. His Majesty's Government endorsed his views and pointed out still further objections which should be brought to the notice of the Iraqi Government, without the appearance, however, of any attempt to stand in the way of a legitimate rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iraq. The Legation in Jedda is not yet aware of the progress of Sheikh Yusuf Yasin's negotiations, or of the reaction of the Iraqi Government to His Majesty's Government's remonstrances.

15. It also became known on the 6th January that Ibn Saud intended to visit Koweit. Such a visit has been vaguely contemplated in principle since the Sheikh of Koweit visited Riyadh in March 1932. Considerable surprise was caused, however, by the sudden announcement that it was to be made at this juncture, and, so far as any British authority knew, at such short notice as to make the King's attitude seem cavalier. The King, as stated above, left Riyadh on the 26th January. When Fuad Bey informed the Legation of this he said that the King would go easy and would not arrive at Koweit before the 1st February at the earliest. He, in fact, arrived on the 30th January and was warmly received. No further details of the visit are yet known in Jedda, but it has been made clear that it is to be regarded as one of a private nature.

16. The Legation received on the 12th January translations of letters exchanged in November between Ibn Saud and the Sheikh of Koweit regarding the enforcement of the local tribal law known as Arafah for the settlement of frontier disputes about camels. It was Ibn Saud who broached the subject and his reasons for doing so were not clear, as the customary law is well known and commonly applied (*cf.* paragraph 30 of the report for March-April 1931). The Sheikh agreed to the King's proposal.

17. The Saudi Government published on the 17th January, with the consent of His Majesty's Government and the Government of Bahrein, the notes exchanged on the 16th-17th November regarding transit dues and connected subjects.

III.—Relations with Powers outside Arabia.

18. Sir Andrew Ryan had business conversations with Fuad Bey Hamza on the 2nd and 11th January. At the first meeting he gave Fuad Bey such further reassurance as was possible, without committing His Majesty's Government to any definite future course of action, regarding the view they would take of any attempt by the Italian Government to establish themselves on the Red Sea coast of Arabia. Fuad Bey again asseverated on behalf of the King that His Majesty had never had and still had not any intention of selling himself to the Italians; but he intimated, more clearly than he or Sheikh Yusuf Yasin had previously done, that the Saudi Government had committed themselves definitely in the autumn to supply the whole of the 12,000 camels mentioned on various previous occasions, and that they were now being subjected to strong Italian pressure to complete the execution of the contract. Both on the 2nd and 11th January the question of a possible Saudi candidature for membership of the League of Nations, which Fuad Bey had broached in earlier conversations, was the subject of some further discussion between His Majesty's Minister and Fuad Bey, but all discussions so far on this subject have been non-committal on both sides and merely exploratory.

19. On the 4th January Sir Andrew Ryan informed Fuad Bey by a personal letter that His Majesty's Government were willing to accept the application of the regulations mentioned in paragraph 337 of the report for October to the Government of India dispensaries in the Hejaz, but he raised certain points of detail with the object of making the future position slightly more secure, and more especially of facilitating the transition from the old system to the new. During the remainder of the month the Saudi Government showed themselves unexpectedly dilatory and almost obstructive, with the result that on the 31st January urgently required medical supplies were still lying in customs and the way was not yet clear for the opening of the no less urgently required branch dispensary at Mecca.

20. In pleasing contrast with the attitude just described, Ibn Saud and his Government manifested the utmost concern and friendly solicitude in connexion

with the illness and death of His late Majesty King George V, and the utmost goodwill towards our new Sovereign. The various courtesies need not be enumerated in detail, but it is deserving of record that, when the Amir Feisal came specially from Mecca on the 22nd January to offer condolences, he came to the Legation attended by several other high official personages. The visit was returned the same day with equal ceremony, Sir Andrew Ryan being accompanied by all his career staff and all heads of special sections of the Legation.

21. The Saudi Government addressed a note to the British and French Legations on the 28th January regarding the means of overcoming the difficulties in connexion with the reopening of the Hejaz Railway as a through line, which were revealed at the conference held at Haifa in October.

22. The French Chargé d'Affaires returned to Jedda on the 18th January, but left again on a quick trip to Sana on the 26th January. He now has the rank of Minister, and will probably present his letters of credence when the King returns to the Hejaz late in February. He will then doubtless notify his colleagues officially of his promotion and of the new status of his post (paragraph 247 of the report for October). He is to present to the King the Grand Cordon of the Legion of Honour, and also, it is less certainly reported, an aeroplane.

23. Apart from the matter of the camels, mentioned in paragraph 18 above, no new development in Saudi-Italian relations came to the notice of the Legation in January. On the 24th January the Italian Chargé d'Affaires left at short notice for Cairo. As M. Persico dislikes Jedda and has for some time shown signs of moral as well as physical discomfort, there is no present reason to suppose that he undertook this journey except to get a "breather."

24. More importance may attach to the departure for Asmara on the 26th of M. Odello, the Italian contractor and buying agent mentioned on several previous occasions. During the preceding days he had had at least one confabulation with Fuad Bey Hamza, who is widely believed in Mecca and Jedda to be hand in glove with the Italians, despite the assurances to the contrary which he lavished on Sir Andrew Ryan in Riyadh in November. It is less certainly suggested that Odello's object in going to Asmara was to get building material needed to carry on work at the Jedda quay, where he is putting up new buildings; also that he will go on from Asmara to Rome. His intention to return to Jedda may be inferred from the fact that he has left behind his wife and daughter, whose name, by the way, is Ninny, so spelt on his visting card.

25. News has been received from the Government of British Somaliland through the Foreign Office that Caro Caglieri, who left Jedda in October or earlier (paragraph 351 of the report for that month), and was supposed to be going to Berbera, had not reached British Somaliland up to the 29th November.

26. Colonel Ibrahim Depui, the honorary Belgian consul, returned to Jedda after a very long absence (paragraph 95 of the report for March) on the 24th January.

27. The new Minister of the U.S.S.R. (paragraph 411) arrived in Jedda on the 21st January with a new secretary, also a Moslem, like himself, M. Khakimov, who had in the past the name of being *remuant*, has not yet had time to make himself felt.

28. The Egyptian experts, mentioned in paragraph 412 of the report for December, were doubtless part of Talaat Pasha Harb's party (paragraph 9 above). As regards quasi-official Saudi-Egyptian relations, it is said that, although the Egyptian consul did not attend the Amir Feisal's reception for foreign representatives on Accession Day and did not fly his flag, he had a long private interview that morning with the Amir. He was present at the dinner at which the Amir presided in the evening, an occasion which is regarded as not strictly official, and was treated in the same way as other foreign heads of mission of minor rank.

29. Talaat Pasha Harb's party (paragraph 9) included a bacteriologist, who is said to have been lent by the Egyptian Government to test the water supply at Mecca and report on means of improvement.

30. The late Persian Minister, who left Jedda last May without officially announcing his departure, and who was later known to have been appointed to the new Persian Legation to the Balkan States, at last regularised the position in Jedda by writing from Bucharest to his colleagues here on the 7th January, expressing regret that he could not take leave of them in person. It was understood last summer that the Legation in Jedda was to be made a dependency

of that in Cairo. The late Minister referred in his circular to his successor, "His Excellency Rad," but it is not known whether this is the Minister in Cairo, or, contrary to expectation, a new titular of the Jedda post as such.

31. The Ethiopian delegates, poor men, had to pass through Jedda port again on the 8th-9th January, having found at Port Sudan no convenient steamer for Aden other than one that was to call here (see paragraph 414 of the report for December). They did not land.

IV.—Miscellaneous.

32. The universal sorrow caused by the death of His late Majesty King George was generally shared in Jedda and in informed circles in Mecca. Among the expressions of sympathy received were many from Indians in both places. The increased use of wireless made it possible to follow the late King's illness closely and to hear the reading of the proclamation of the new King at St. James's Palace on the 22nd January. No religious service could be held in Jedda, but most of the Legation staff, some members of the European British community and the Netherlands Chargé d'Affaires gathered at the British Legation on the 28th January to hear the broadcast of the funeral service at Windsor.

33. Dr. Abdul Hamid, the Indian medical officer of the Legation, returned on the 5th from a period of study-leave in the United Kingdom, where he completed a short course of some three months at the School of Tropical Medicine in the University of Liverpool. It is recorded with pleasure that he obtained a well-merited diploma of tropical medicine.

34. The French sloop *D'Iberville* arrived in Jedda on the 18th January, with Rear-Admiral Rivet on board, but stayed only a few hours after landing the French Chargé d'Affaires and a secretary, whom she had brought as passengers from Port Sudan.

35. On hearing of the serious illness of the doctor of the Italian Legation on the 4th January, the British Legation offered good offices to facilitate his removal to the Port Sudan hospital if he could not be sent to Massawa. He left for Port Sudan on the 5th January, with the kind consent of the authorities in the Sudan.

36. Few European visitors of importance are known to have come to Jedda in January. A French official of the *Crédit foncier d'Algérie et de Tunisie* arrived for banking purposes connected with the North African pilgrimage, in accordance with standing arrangements. Two unusual pilgrims arrived: an American lady named Sterling from Tangier and a Scotsman named McBryan, who has a Malay wife and is said to have been formerly in the Sarawak service. Ibn Saud, who has never seen the Islam of Woking and Wandsworth, is reported to have grown even more suspicious than before of converts bound for Mecca, and to have made a new rule that applicants must have been Moslems for not less than four years and produce a certificate of having lived virtuously in the faith during that period. This is not confirmed.

37. The total number of overseas pilgrims up to date was given in the press on the 31st January as 11,003. Three shiploads arrived from India in January, bringing the total carried up to date to 3,835 Indians and non-Indians. Two hundred and sixty-nine Malays have arrived so far.

38. On the 3rd January, as the result of an exchange of views with the Legation, the Saudi Government published an official *démenti* of a peculiarly pernicious report published in India, to the effect that Ibn Saud had invited 1,000 Indians to make the pilgrimage as his guests and had promised to pay all expenses from landing to re-embarkation. This was taken up by the organisers of the Khaksar movement, encouraged by Ismail Ghuznavi, and presumably other seditionists. The propagators of the lie persisted in it after the Government of India had published a denial based on the result of oral enquiries in Jedda some time ago. Hence the need for a completely authoritative further contradiction.

39. A movement, not yet very coherent, is on foot to merge the golf course at Jedda, which is not officially a club, in a general sports club with European and some native participation. The idea of a social club even has been whispered. These signs of the growing community spirit in Jedda must be regarded with misgiving in view of the sad fate of the Jedda club founded for recreational purposes in 1930 and liquidated, to the relief of all concerned, in January 1932.

40. The position as regards the manumission of slaves by the British Legation was as follows:—

On hand at the beginning of the month: Nil.
Took refuge in January: 1 male, 1 female.
Manumitted and repatriated: Nil.
Locally manumitted: Nil.
Left voluntarily: 1 male.
On hand at the end of the month: 1 female.

41. Copies of this report have been distributed as follows:—

The High Commissioner, Cairo.
The Governor-General, Khartum.
The Commissioner, Port Sudan.
His Majesty's Minister at Addis Ababa.
The Governor of Nigeria, Lagos (2).
The High Commissioner, Jerusalem (2).
His Majesty's consul-general at Beirut.
His Majesty's consul at Damascus.
His Majesty's Ambassador at Bagdad (2).
His Majesty's consul at Basra.
The Political Agent, Koweit.
The Political Agent, Bahrein.
The Political Resident, Bushire.
His Majesty's Chief Commissioner, Aden.
The Viceroy of India, New Delhi.
The Governor of the Straits Settlements, Singapore.
The High Commissioner, Kuala Lumpur.
The Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean Station.
The Commander-in-chief, East Indies Station.
The Governor of British Somaliland, Sheikh.
The Senior Naval Officer, Red Sea Sloops.
The Air Officer Commanding, Palestine and Transjordan.

[E 1133/205/25]

No. 10.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. Eden.—(Received March 2.)

(No. 49.)
Sir,

Jedda, February 16, 1936.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 41 of the 4th February, I have now the honour to forward a translation of the note addressed by the Saudi Government to the British and French Legations here regarding the outcome of the technical conference held at Haifa last October to consider questions concerning the Hejaz Railway. This translation was agreed with that made in the French Legation. My French colleague now tells me that he has not found it necessary to amend the latter, except in the matter of French phraseology. The enclosed translation may, therefore, be regarded as similar, allowing for the difference between the two languages, to that which will be submitted to the French Government in the near future.

2. You will observe that the Saudi Government make capital, under the third heading in their note, out of a statement made by the principal French delegate at the meeting of the Haifa Conference on the 17th October. They conveniently ignore the fact that, while the Lausanne Declaration did, as M. Vasselet stated, provide that surplus profits accruing from particular sections should be devoted to the upkeep and improvement of the whole railway, the Declaration did not in any way contemplate an unification of the various sections for all purposes, but very much the contrary. It appears to me that the Saudi Government's suggestion that the railway should be considered a single entity is merely a particular application of their old thesis that the railway is one because it was in their view a Wakf.

3. My French colleague expressed general agreement with the view stated in the last sentence of the preceding paragraph when I discussed the matter with him on the 13th February. He showed, however, very little interest in any aspect of the question. He said that when he left Jedda early in October it was intended that he should attend the Haifa Conference. In the event he did not do so. He had not even read the minutes in Syria nor had he received them here. His attitude was that all proposals with a view to reconditioning the line for through services were so impractical as not to be worth bothering about. I may add that he was equally contemptuous of the idea that motor-services from Damascus to Medina could be successfully organised by any inland route, although he thought that a coastal route from Aqaba might be practical politics. I quote these views, not because the personal views of my French colleague count for much, but because they probably reflect the opinion of the French authorities in Syria with whom he is in much closer touch than he is with the French Government at home.

4. I am sending copies of this despatch and enclosure to Jerusalem, Beirut and Damascus and a copy of the Arabic text also to the first-named post.

I have, &c.

ANDREW RYAN.

Enclosure in No. 10.

Translation of Note from Saudi Government to British and French Legations.

*Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Mecca,
Dhu'l Qa'da 4, 1354.
(January 20, 1936).*

Your Excellency,

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that I have received a copy of the minutes of the meetings of the conference of Haifa which was held from the 10th to the 17th October, 1935, and was attended by representatives of the Saudi Arab, British and French Governments. I am glad to inform you of the following:—

Firstly.—The conference held five meetings. Its discussions were technical, as was determined prior to the meeting, and in accordance with the following agenda:—

1. Examination of the degree of reconditioning which the railway requires.
2. Preparation of an estimate of the cost of the necessary work.
3. Establishment of the manner in which the necessary expense is to be met.
4. Consideration of a project for the organisation of a train service along the whole length of the railway.
5. Consideration of a project for the eventual distribution of rolling-stock among the different sections of the line.

Secondly.—I am glad to state that the conference succeeded in drawing up a basis of agreement in respect of items 1, 2, 4 and 5 of the agenda, as you may observe from the report; but it is regretted that the conference declared its failure to reach an agreed solution in respect of item 3, regarding expenses and how to cover them, and left the question of raising funds to the Governments themselves.

Thirdly.—I give you hereunder a copy of the text of the paragraph in the report regarding the decision of the conference about item 3:—

“While recording the proposal of Fuad Bey Hamza to the effect that the reconstruction of the damaged sections should be effected at the expense of the line as a whole, the conference regretted that it had not been able to reach an agreed resolution on this important question. In these circumstances, the conference could only commend the matter to the consideration of the Governments concerned.”

I also wish to mention the reply given by the representative of the French Government to his colleagues in the conference concerning the conditions on

which he believes it would be possible for one portion of the line to help the other in its expenses. The text is as follows:—

"M. Vasselet, speaking for the Syrian section, said that contribution by this section to expenditure in respect of sections situated outside its territory was envisaged by the Lausanne (Bompard) Declaration. At the present time, however, the conditions provided by that Declaration had not been realised. During recent years, far from realising any profit and despite the reduction in expenditure which had now reached its lowest limit, the working of the section had resulted in a deficit. The settlement of the question submitted to the conference must, therefore, necessarily be sought in a different manner to that which has been proposed."

Fourthly.—The Government of His Majesty the King appreciate the many economic advantages which would accrue to this country, and all other countries through which the line passes, as a result of the reopening of the unserviceable section. They therefore wish to draw the attention of the French and British Governments to the only solution which would, in practice, assist in the reopening of that part, viz., the line should be considered as one and should bear as a whole the expenses to be incurred on the damaged sections south of Ma'an.

In the event of your Excellency's Government agreeing to accept this fundamental principle now, there will naturally be occasion to discuss how the necessary funds should be raised for the repairs, whether by loan or by other means, to be studied later.

I shall be glad if your Government will assist in the settlement of this outstanding question by agreeing to the principle of the unity of the line, as mentioned above.

I am sending a true copy of this note to your French colleague.

With highest respects,
FEYSAL.

[E 1467/377/91]

No. 11.

Sir G. Clerk to Mr. Eden.—(Received March 18.)

(No. 369.)

HIS Majesty's representative at Paris presents his compliments to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit to him copy of a note from the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs, dated the 9th March, 1936, respecting the use by French aircraft of the aerodrome at Gwadar, in territory of the Sultan of Muscat and Oman.

Paris, March 17, 1936.

Enclosure in No. 11.

Note from the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

PAR une note du 24 décembre 1935, l'Ambassade de Grande-Bretagne a bien voulu faire parvenir au Ministère des Affaires étrangères des exemplaires des Règlements de Navigation aérienne pris par le Sultan de Mascate et d'Oman, en signalant que la Compagnie Air-France devra, conformément à ces textes, solliciter pour ses appareils de la ligne d'Extrême-Orient l'autorisation de survoler le territoire de Mascate et d'atterrir sur l'aérodrome de Gwadar.

L'Ambassade indique que, par décision du Sultan et en conséquence de la délégation que ce dernier a accordée au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté en toutes questions relatives à la navigation aérienne, les correspondances et négociations touchant cet objet devront nécessairement passer par l'entremise du consul général de Grande-Bretagne à Bouchir, qui est également Résident politique britannique dans le golfe Persique.

Le Ministère des Affaires étrangères a l'honneur d'accuser réception de cette communication, dont il a transmis le contenu à la Compagnie Air-France, en l'invitant à présenter sa demande de survol au Sultan de Mascate par l'obligeante entremise du consul d'Angleterre à Bouchir.

Le Ministère tient toutefois à préciser que les instructions ainsi données à la compagnie française pour répondre au désir du Gouvernement du Sultan ne sauraient être considérées comme affectant les obligations qui résultent pour les Gouvernements britannique et français de la déclaration du 10 mars 1862 confirmant l'indépendance du Sultanat de l'Oman. En particulier l'observation par la Société Air-France de la procédure ci-dessus visée ne devra pas être interprétée comme impliquant, de la part du Gouvernement français, reconnaissance d'une modification quelconque à l'état de droit défini par ladite déclaration, laquelle conserve pleine force et valeur.

Paris, le 9 mars 1936.

[E 1529/1529/25]

No. 12.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. Eden.—(Received March 21.)

(No. 52.)

Sir,

Jedda, February 26, 1936.

WITH reference to Mr. Calvert's despatch No. 337 of the 26th November, I have the honour to state that the Mecca newspaper *Umm-al-Qura* announced on the 21st February the completion of the work of the commissions appointed for the delimitation of the Saudi-Yemen frontier in pursuance of article 4 of the Treaty of Taif of May 1934. The announcement is in the form of a news item, but is doubtless inspired by the Government. As it refers both to the Tihama and the mountains, it presumably relates to both pairs of commissions, each of which was described as a joint Saudi-Yemeni commission in the enclosure in Mr. Calvert's despatch.

2. After Mr. Calvert's despatch was written, the Legation had heard nothing about the delimitation in the Tihama. As regards the inland area, you will have seen by paragraph 393 of the Jedda report for December that two Saudi commissioners, Sheikh Muhammad Suleyman, who is related to the Minister of Finance, and an officer named Talaat Wafa, were believed to have been in Najran on the 27th December. My Indian vice-consul, who is a friend of Talaat Wafa, subsequently received a letter from him dated from Dhahran on the 17th December. It would therefore appear that the commissioners inland worked both in the mountains and in Najran, but no separate reference is made to the latter area in the recent announcement in the *Umm-al-Qura*.

3. The recent announcement states that the delimitation was effected in the most friendly manner, and that no disputes arose. It adds that the members of the commissions have now returned and submitted the result of their labours to their Governments, who have approved of the delimitation agreed upon by the commissions.

4. I hope for an opportunity of obtaining confirmation and any further information from Fuad Bey Hamza, but, as this may not arise until after the approaching Moslem festival, which should end on the 7th March, I prefer not to delay this report.

5. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Government of India and Aden.

I have, &c.

ANDREW RYAN.

[E 1530/1529/25]

No. 13.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. Eden.—(Received March 21.)

(No. 53.)

Sir,

Jedda, February 27, 1936.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 52 of the 26th February, I have the honour to state that Fuad Bey Hamza told me on the 26th February that the recent delimitation of the Saudi-Yemen frontier had been effected in respect of the whole boundary described in article 4 of the Treaty of Taif of 1934, including the boundary of Najran. The commissions, he said, had not worked further to the east.

2. Talaat Wafa, the Saudi commissioner mentioned in my despatch under reference, is now back in Mecca and has given my Indian vice-consul some interesting particulars of his impressions. He had been employed on a commission of reorganisation in Najran and Asir before serving on the Delimitation Commission. He gave a glowing account of the fertility of Najran, saying that he had ridden for a full half-day on camel back through long lines of palm trees. He deplored, however, the sloth of the local inhabitants.

3. Talaat Wafa described the state of the area as peaceful, but said that the commissioners had encountered much difficulty in settling claims and counter-claims between the inhabitants of the frontier district. He showed to Khan Bahadur Ihsanullah maps indicating the boundary, but was not parting with any of them.

4. It may be of interest to add that Talaat Wafa, who had taken numerous photographs, showed the vice-consul one of a brass lion, said to date from the time of the Roman invasion of Najran. He said that excavations were being carried on with a view to the discovery of objects of historical interest.

5. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Government of India and Aden.

I have, &c.

ANDREW RYAN.

[E 1537/1283/25]

No. 14.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. Eden.—(Received March 21.)

(No. 61. Confidential.)

Sir,

Jedda, February 28, 1936.

WITH reference to Mr. Calvert's despatch No. 276 of the 8th October last, I have the honour to state that I had an interesting conversation on the 27th February with Mr. W. J. Lenahan, the local representative of the California Arabian Standard Oil Company, about the position in regard to the company's concession in Hasa. Mr. Lenahan had offered spontaneously to come and tell me all he could. Although he made no secret of what he had to say, I would ask you to regard this record as confidential and not for the information of rival industrial interests.

2. Mr. Lenahan referred to the recent creation of a new company, technically British, under the name of the "California Standard Oil Company (Limited)." Its head office is in San Francisco, and the directors are all United States citizens, except one Frenchman and a London solicitor, Mr. H. R. Ballantyne, of whom the other interested parties think very highly. The moving spirit in London is Mr. L. N. Hamilton, with whom I am on very friendly terms.

3. Mr. Lenahan explained that the new company would deal with the marketing of Bahrein oil, and would also act as a "service unit" for the Bahrein Oil Company, i.e., attend to their supplies and the recruitment of their rapidly increasing imported personnel. It would in due course perform the same functions for the California Arabian Standard Oil Company.

4. Mr. Lenahan spoke of the relations of his company with the Saudi Government. They had found Sheikh Muhammad Tawil, the Director of Finance, &c., in Hasa, most obstructive. They now have nothing more to do with him, except as regards certain customs matters, and they are greatly pleased with the special official, Seyyid Hashim, who was sent to Hasa to look after their business last July (see paragraph 223 of Jedda report for July). This gentleman is now in the Hejaz, but his employment in Hasa is of a permanent nature and he will soon be going back there.

5. Mr. Lenahan gave me an account of the position at Jebel Dhahran, the only place in which wells have been sunk. I was not able to take in all the technical details, but I reproduce what I understood.

6. The Jebel Dhahran is not a single eminence, but an "anticline" measuring very roughly 10 miles by 4. This is similar in essentials to the structure at Bahrein, and the nature of the operations in the Jebel has been based on this analogy. Well No. 1 was sunk at the apex of the anticline. Oil at the rate of 100 barrels a day was struck at a depth of 1,979 feet. Lower down,

I understand, difficulty was encountered owing to the great volume of gas. In this connexion Mr. Lenahan mentioned, I think, a figure of 80 million cubic feet of gas at a depth of 2,400 feet, but I am not clear as to the significance of this figure. Practicable oil may be struck at greater depths. Drilling was recently resumed, and some days ago the depth was 2,365 feet, "deep-drilling through a cement plug." Preparations were being made "to run a 6½-inch casing."

7. In view of their experience with Well No. 1, the company decided to start Well No. 2 in the same anticline, hoping that the oil, the existence of which has been proved by the partial success of No. 1, might there be more workable. This new well is 1,800 metres to the south and 900 metres to the west of No. 1. It had reached a depth of 430 feet some days ago, but, when Mr. Lenahan spoke to me on the 27th, he had heard unofficially that the latest depth was over 500 feet.

8. Mr. Lenahan spoke with definite, though guarded, optimism of the prospects in the Jebel Dhahran. He told me that the company's geologists were still busy prospecting in the coastal area further north, and, I gathered, inland. One of the areas he mentioned was that round Jubail.

9. Some of the above information has already been recorded, but, as Mr. Lenahan was good enough to give me a connected account, I have thought it best to report it in a self-contained form.

10. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Department of Overseas Trade, Bushire, Bahrein and the Government of India.

I have, &c.

ANDREW RYAN.

[E 1704/486/25]

No. 15.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. Eden.—(Received March 30.)

(No. 66.)

Sir,

Jedda, March 4, 1936.

I HAVE the honour to submit herewith the Jedda report for February 1936.

2. Copies have been distributed as in the list in paragraph 41 of the report for January.

I have, &c.

ANDREW RYAN.

Enclosure in No. 15.

JEDDA REPORT FOR FEBRUARY 1936.

I.—Internal Affairs.

41A. As stated in the last report, Ibn Saud arrived at Koweit on the 30th January. He had an illness on the road thither, but was, according to the new political agent, in a "romping" and jovial mood during his stay. He got back to Riyadh on or about the 9th February. He left again for Mecca on the 19th and arrived on the 22nd. Early on the 25th he came to Jedda for the inside of two days, mainly for the purpose of receiving the credentials of new Ministers (see below). He received most of the foreign representatives *in corpore* on the morning of his arrival and appeared to be in good health and spirits. He expatiated on the excellence of the rains throughout his northern dominions. Next day he received various foreign representatives in private audience. These included Sir Andrew Ryan, who presented to him Mr. Maxwell Darling, an officer of the Sudan Department of Agriculture, now engaged in locust research under the auspices of the Economic Advisory Council. His Majesty discoursed about locusts with great liveliness. He adheres, as a good Moslem, to the traditional belief that they originate in the interior of a fish, which spews them out on to an island or islands, whence they fly to the mainland; but he had a good word to say for modern science.

42. The heir apparent left Riyadh a day after the King and accompanied him to Jedda. He, too, received the foreign representatives on the 25th February.

It is noteworthy, as a sign of his enhanced position, that he did not hold his reception at the King's palace, but independently at the Kandara villa, which is often used for ceremonies, &c. The Amir Feisal and some of the junior princes were also in attendance on the King, but none of His Majesty's brothers apparently.

43. Fuad Bey Hamza paid few visits to Jedda during the month. Sheikh Jamil Daud (paragraph 2 of the last report) has taken up his duties at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

44. No news of importance reached the Legation regarding the situation in the provinces. The Mecca and Jedda authorities continued to pursue actively and with some harshness the measures against potential undesirables, which were mentioned in paragraph 6 of the report for January. Late in February reports were afloat of the movements in various directions of suspect Yemenis. These reports and the prospect of a large Yemeni attendance at the pilgrimage (see paragraph 73) created a good deal of uneasiness among the inhabitants of Mecca. The gossips also reported the King to be nervous and full of precaution, but there is no present reason for believing this talk.

45. There have been signs of considerable rivalry between the Amir Feisal and the Minister of Finance. The struggle appears to turn partly on the wish of each of them to control both the army and the police. The reorganisation of the former is at present in the hands of Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman as Deputy Minister for Defence. The police are under the Amir as Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior. The roots of the quarrel probably go much deeper.

46. Nothing was seen in Jedda of the Saudi Air Force. It is reported that the student aviators in Italy have completed their training and are coming back. It is also said that the Saudi Government or the Arab Aeronautical Society (paragraph 81 of the report for March 1935) intend to buy two aeroplanes for civil flying, which, with that presented by the French Government (see below), will make three available for this purpose.

47. Two "crimes passionnels" were reported from Mecca. In one case a pilgrim woman from the Punjab was stated to have been the victim of a murderous attack by a fellow pilgrim, a rejected lover. The other was that of a Syrian friend of Fuad Bey Hamza, who was alleged to have murdered his wife and taken refuge with Fuad Bey. Very embarrassing for a junior statesman, if true.

48. A local merchant, likely to be well informed, stated on the 11th February that the new rials ordered by the Saudi Government (paragraph 10 of the last report) were to be similar in everything except the superscription to the Indian rupee. He added that they would be exchangeable at 20 to the gold pound. He thought that the quantity ordered, 1 million rials, would suffice for all requirements, and that the present rials would probably be withdrawn.

49. Early in the month there were further rumours of mishaps, &c., to the prospecting parties of the Saudi Arabian Mining Syndicate (paragraph 7 of the last report). All of them, including that of the death of the Islamised Dutchman Van de Poll, proved to have been false or exaggerated. Mr. Twitchell goes his energetic way regardless of everything. It appears that the prospecting party which he sent to Taif early in February is to investigate the whole of the southern portion of the conceded area.

50. The hostility excited in certain quarters by the granting of the mining concession to a non-Moslem syndicate has had repercussions in India. Ibn Saud's action has been criticised in the press there and by a body called the Ahrar-al-Islam, who decided to send a deputation on pilgrimage to lay their views before the King. There appear, however, to be differences of opinion among the persons in India who have interested themselves in the matter. When the Ahrar deputation arrived in Jedda on the 27th February, there were on board the same ship others who had come to combat their efforts to convince the King of the wrongness of "selling the Holy Land to the British."

51. The California Arabian Standard Oil Company, having resumed the work on their first well in the Jebel Dhahran, had reached a depth of 2,365 feet just before the 24th February. The second well, mentioned in paragraph 8 of the last report, lies 1,800 metres south and 900 metres west of the first in the same Jebel, which is not a single peak, but an "anticline" measuring roughly 10 miles by 5. This well had reached a depth of some 700 feet by the end of the month.

52. The French group mentioned in paragraph 112 of the report for April are said to be still interested in the Jedda-Mecca railway scheme.

53. The account of Talaat Pasha Harb's projects, which was summarised in paragraph 11 of the last report, appears to have been exaggerated or, at least, premature. The enterprises most definitely in view are now believed to be the provision of electricity and a house-water supply in Mecca. The Pasha has not been able to arrange this year for his hoped-for air service for pilgrims between Jedda and Medina, but four or five aeroplanes, probably carrying pilgrims, were expected to arrive in Jedda from Egypt on the 1st-2nd March.

54. Talaat Pasha Harb was stated in February to have given two cars, a motor cycle and other gifts to the Saudi First Aid Society (paragraph 261 of the report for August).

55. Little progress has been made with the urban development of Jedda mentioned in paragraph 13 of the last report, but some levelling, possibly to provide the site of a café, was done at one end of the "Champs Elysees" and it looked on the 29th February as though preparations were being made to prolong the avenues at the other. Work on the new buildings on the quay (paragraph 24 of the last report) continues desultorily.

II.—Frontier Questions and Foreign Relations in Arabia.

56. Full information is not available in Jedda regarding the treaty negotiations between Saudi Arabia and Iraq. The draft mentioned in paragraph 14 of the last report was modified in a manner which removed many of the British objections to it. It is not clear, however, how far both sides were parties to the new draft communicated to Sir G. Clerk Kerr on the 4th February. Anyhow, Fuad Bey Hamza informed Sir Andrew Ryan on the 26th February that no final agreement had been reached and that as none could now be reached before the Moslem festival beginning on the 4th March, Sheikh Yusuf Yasin had been given leave to proceed to Syria. The treaty could not, therefore, be concluded for some time; "if ever" or "if at all" Fuad Bey added significantly. The idea that Nuri Pasha should visit the Hejaz for the pilgrimage has lapsed, not necessarily because of the delay in the negotiations so much as because of injuries sustained by his son in a flying accident, which caused the Pasha to desist for a time from official work and finally compelled him to take his son to London for treatment.

57. The Saudi press stated on the 21st February that 1,054 pilgrims had arrived by the Nejef-Medina motor route. It is not known how much the track has been improved in Saudi territory. The brother of the Nawab of Rampur (see paragraph 75) was so much impressed by the difficulties of the route that he contemplated taking his party back to India by sea. Another pilgrim compared the Saudi rolling-stock from Medina on very unfavourably with the Iraqi cars used as far as Medina.

58. According to information from Koweit Ibn Saud's visit to the sheikh was a great success and his lavishness was much appreciated. He is said to have married two new wives there, including the lowly but beautiful daughter of his own commercial agent. It was learnt from Saudi sources that the King was greatly pleased with his reception, and had instructed his Ministry for Foreign Affairs to do everything possible to expedite a settlement of the blockade question. According to a telegram from Koweit dated the 29th February, the sheikh is prepared to accept in principle the Saudi suggestions made to Sir Andrew Ryan in Riyadh (paragraph 401 of the report for December).

59. There have recently been signs of trouble in regard to the lie of the frontier between Transjordan and the Hejaz. On the 6th January the Saudi Government complained of visits by the Transjordan Desert Patrol to various places, which they alleged to be in their territory. The Legation could not identify these, but they seemed to be in the Jebel Tubaik area. The Saudis again protested on the 1st March about alleged encroachments at two places even more difficult to locate. On the other hand, information was received from Transjordan during the month regarding the proceedings of Saudi authorities at various places in territory claimed as Transjordanian, more particularly in the area east of Aqaba.

60. It was announced on the 21st February that the commissions appointed to delimit the Saudi-Yemen frontier (paragraph 395 of the report for December)

had completed their task. It is understood that the delimitation applies to the whole frontier laid down in article 4 of the Treaty of Taif and that maps have been prepared, although they are probably more in the nature of sketches than of real maps. The press announcement emphasises the complete harmony which prevailed. This is borne out by private information, except that one of the commissioners told a member of the Legation that there had been much difficulty in adjusting claims and counter-claims by inhabitants of the frontier area. The same informant was eloquent about the fertility of Najran, but deplored the sloth of the inhabitants. He stated that the authorities there were interesting themselves in archaeological research.

III.—Relations with Powers outside Arabia.

61. No progress was made during the month with the negotiations of any of the major outstanding questions between His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Saudi Government. The weary business of making all clear for the opening of the Government of India dispensary at Mecca was at last completed early in the month and the dispensary was opened on the 9th February. On the 3rd February Sir Andrew Ryan spoke strongly to Fuad Bey Hamza about the attitude of the Saudi Government, with special reference to the dilatory and apparently obstructive attitude of the Saudi authorities after His Majesty's Government had accepted the application of their regulations (paragraph 19 of the last report). The interview, though unpleasant, seems to have produced one of the objects aimed at by the Minister, namely, that the Saudi authorities should refrain from undue interference with the work of the dispensary in Mecca this season.

62. It is amusing to relate that, when the Indian medical officer arrived in Mecca on the 7th February, almost his first patient was a daughter of Sheikh Yusuf Yasin, who has fought so hard to assert the right of the Saudi Government to control the Government of India dispensaries. She had been under the care of the Director-General of Public Health with unsatisfactory results. Dr. Abdul Hamid could not resist her mother's tears and prescribed. The Saudi hospital was unable to make up the prescription for lack of supplies.

63. Although Fuad Bey visited Jedda more than once later in the month, he presented the appearance of avoiding personal interviews to discuss business with Sir Andrew Ryan. Nevertheless, he showed studied politeness and a desire to be helpful in minor matters, which formed the subject of telephone conversations and one short interview on the 26th February.

64. On the 11th February the French Chargé returned from Sana, whither he had been accompanied by Rear-Admiral Rivet, in the warship *Bougainville*. It is now known that negotiations for a Franco-Yemeni Treaty of Friendship have been in progress for some time, but the treaty has not been signed. On the 25th February, M. Maigret presented to Ibn Saud his letters of credence as Minister Resident. Next day he presented the Grand Cordon of the Légion d'Honneur. The report that the French Government are also giving Ibn Saud an aeroplane on this occasion is confirmed (see paragraphs 22 and 34 of the last report).

65. The Saudi Government defined their attitude towards sanctions in a note to the League of Nations dated the 28th January, the first news of which reached the Legation by wireless on the 17th February. The full text of the note has not yet been received, but its substance appears to have been that the heavy responsibilities which would be entailed on the Saudi Government by participation in sanctions made it imperative for them to observe strict neutrality in the Italo-Ethiopian conflict, unless measures were taken to accord to States not members of the League the same rights and privileges as those enjoyed by member States. No developments in Saudi-Italian relations came to the knowledge of the Legation locally.

66. It is now evident that there had been considerable friction between the Italian Chargé and Signor Odello before they both left Jedda towards the end of January (paragraphs 23 and 24 of the last report). This invests the Chargé's departure with an appearance of greater importance than at first, especially as he is understood to have visited Rome in the course of a tour which took him not only to Egypt, but to Palestine and perhaps Syria. He is not now expected

back before the 8th March. Odello also went to Rome, and it is not certain that he visited Asmara at all after landing at Massawa. His ladies remain in Jedda, but are not seen as much in public as before. An amusing tale was heard early in the month of how Fuad Bey Hamza and a high official of the Ministry of Finance had dined with them, taking, it was said, special precautions to enter the house without attracting attention. Another, but perhaps independent, sign of disarray in Italian circles in Jedda has been the dismissal of the local manager of the Italian shipping firm, Lazzerini Brothers.

67. The new Soviet and Iranian Ministers presented their letters of credence to Ibn Saud on the 25th February (paragraphs 27 and 30 of the last report). The Iranian Minister, who arrived in Jedda on the 2nd February, proves to be M. Soltan Ahmad Khan Rad, who continues to hold the post of Minister in Cairo and does not intend to devote much of his time to Jedda.

68. The Mecca newspaper *Saut-al-Hejaz* published a leading article on the 4th February emphasising the anomaly of the present absence of normal relations between Egypt and Saudi Arabia. In addition to the more familiar arguments used against the continuance of the present state of affairs the writer spoke of Egypt as a country in which the Islamic and modern systems of education combined in a brilliant synthesis, while Saudi Arabia was a young country and stood in need of Egyptian education, products and learned men.

IV.—Miscellaneous.

69. As stated in paragraph 64 the French sloop *Bougainville* arrived in Jedda from Hodeida on the 11th February. She left next day.

70. The climate of Jedda was very variable during the month. Parts of it were excellent, e.g., after another great rainstorm on the 2nd February. The unusual rains of this winter have made the wilderness even more verdant than last year. Many of the elements of a positively pastoral scene can be observed within 3 or 4 miles of the town.

71. The small number of European visitors during the month included Mr. Maxwell Darling (paragraph 41 above), who arrived on the 21st February and is staying in the Legation. He hopes to explore the coastal area southward as far as Jizan and perhaps further.

72. On the 21st February the *Umm-al-Qura* put the number of sea-borne pilgrims up to date at 20,414. No later figures have appeared in the press, but the total should well exceed 25,000. As regards arrivals by the motor route from Nejed, see paragraph 57 above. Twenty-five Indians are known to have travelled by it and there may have been more. According to information from Bagdad 170 Afghans were waiting at Nejed towards the end of January to use the route.

73. Certain pilgrims, especially those of the poorer class, have encountered unusual difficulty this year. Apart from the measures mentioned in paragraph 44 above the Saudi authorities have enforced rigorously the rule against proceeding to Medina on foot and the rule that the bulk of the charges for the pilgrimage must be paid before leaving Jedda. The enforcement of the rule against pedestrianism seems to have led to one serious fracas at or outside Rabigh late in January. Various versions of the affair gained currency, but the suggestion that some pilgrims had been shot down was probably exaggerated. Floods on the road from Rabigh to Medina also caused difficulty and probably some loss of life, but the details are not certainly known. The Legation had to deal with one case of six pilgrims in Jedda who were unable or unwilling to pay dues, and were held prisoner for some days by the local agent of their pilgrim guide.

74. Yemeni pilgrims are expected to be numerous this year. It was stated at one moment that the use of the inland route had been prohibited by Ibn Saud and that all pilgrims must collect at Jizan. It was said later that permission had been given for 7,000 to travel overland from Khamis Musheyh near Abha.

75. The most notable pilgrim of the year is the Princess Khadija of Egypt, sister of the late Khedive and widow of the late Abbas Halim Pasha, formerly well known in Constantinople. This lady was a passenger on board the *Kawsar* of the Misr Navigation Company, which ran on to a reef when attempting to enter the harbour at Jedda on the 28th February. The pilgrims were brought ashore, but the ship was still stranded on the 1st March. Princess Khadija is

to proceed to Medina and thence home to Egypt by air. There are a fair number of important, but less conspicuous, pilgrims, including a brother of the Nawab of Rampur, Fawwaz-ash-Shaalan, now the King's brother-in-law, two sons of the Sheikh of Bahrein and a sister of the Prime Minister of Iraq.

76. It is confirmed (paragraph 36 of the last report) that stringent rules have been adopted to prevent occidentals professing Islam from going to Mecca without satisfying the authorities that they have been Moslems and practised as such for a stated period. Permission was refused to Mrs. Sterling, who seems to be an unbalanced woman and who left Jedda towards the end of the month. Mr. Abdur Rahman McBryan was kept on tenter-hooks until the last moment, but was finally authorised to proceed. The European Moslems have included a Greek and a Pole, who, after pestering half the foreign missions and vowing that he was neither Jew nor Moslem, was seen gaily starting for Mecca in ihram.

77. The position as regards the manumission of slaves was as follows:—

On hand at the beginning of the month: 1 female.

Took refuge in February: 1 female.

Manumitted and repatriated: Nil.

Locally manumitted: 1 female.

On hand at the end of the month: 1 female.

The Legation has had to concern itself with the unusual case of an attempt by the former owner of a slave locally manumitted under the auspices of the Legation to prevent her from marrying the man of her choice. The case was still pending at the end of the month.

[E 1942/44/91]

No. 16.

Sir S. Barton to Mr. Eden.—(Received April 14.)

(No. 81.)

Sir,

Addis Ababa, March 16, 1936.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 206 of the 20th December, 1935, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a despatch⁽¹⁾ No. C. 373 of the 18th February, which I have received from the Resident at Aden, and with which is enclosed a translation, from the Arabic of the Yemeni newspaper the *Iman*, of the Yemen-Ethiopia Treaty of the 22nd March, 1935, ratifications of which were exchanged on the 21st September, 1935. I forward the translation as received, with the exception of the Ethiopian names, the spelling of which I have taken the liberty to change to accord with custom.

2. The Ethiopian Minister for Foreign Affairs promised me the Amharic text of the treaty in January last, but, owing to pressure of work, his Excellency has so far failed to produce it. I will, however, remind him of his promise at an early date.

3. The question of whether a grant of extra-territorial jurisdiction is or is not implied under the most-favoured-nation clause in article 3 may one day arise, but is not of immediate importance under present conditions.

4. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Jedda.

I have, &c.

S. BARTON.

Enclosure in No. 16.

Treaty of Friendship and Commerce between the Ethiopian and Yemeni Governments.

HIS Majesty the King of Kings of Ethiopia Haile Sellasi I the Great and His Majesty the King, the absolute monarch of the Yemen, Imam Yahya-bin-Muhammad Hamid-un-Din;

Being desirous of establishing and strengthening cordial and friendly relations between the two High Governments on the basis of the general international rulings;

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

Have decided to conclude a treaty of friendship and commerce and have for this purpose appointed as their plenipotentiaries:

For His Majesty the Emperor of Ethiopia:

His Excellency Sahafi-Teezaz (Wolde) Maskal,
The Honourable Lij Andargé Messai;

For His Majesty the King of the Yemen:

His Excellency Qadhi Muhammad Raghib-bin-Rafiq;

who, having communicated their full powers found in good order and due form, have agreed as follows:—

ARTICLE 1.

There shall be perpetual peace and complete and absolute friendship between the Empire of Ethiopia and the Kingdom of the Yemen.

ARTICLE 2.

The two high contracting parties agree to strengthen their friendly relations and commerce and to facilitate commercial exchanges between their respective countries.

ARTICLE 3.

The subjects of the Empire of Ethiopia and the Kingdom of the Yemen shall be free to enter and reside for trading purposes in the territories of the other. The two high contracting parties agree to treat them and their trade in accordance with the local rules and to grant them similar treatment to that enjoyed by the subjects of the most-favoured Power.

ARTICLE 4.

The subjects of each of two high contracting parties shall in all their affairs and business transactions be amenable to the laws and decrees of the courts in force in the country in which they reside.

ARTICLE 5.

Each of the two high contracting parties shall in due course and in mutual agreement establish Legations and consulates and pending the establishment of diplomatic and consular relations, they agree that the subjects of each Government living in the territories of the other shall be given the necessary assistance and protection.

ARTICLE 6.

By this treaty the two high contracting parties shall not allow or connive at any action directed against their sincere friendship. They will endeavour to be in a closer contact than hitherto in as far as assistance is concerned and in strengthening their relations. Any agreements and treaties that may be concluded in future shall be framed in the spirit of this treaty.

ARTICLE 7.

The treaty shall remain in force for a period of five years commencing from the date of exchange of ratifications and shall be automatically renewed for further period of five years if neither of the two contracting parties denounce it six months before its expiry.

The instruments of ratifications shall be exchanged at Sana as early as possible. All previous treaties are cancelled by this treaty.

And in witness thereof the plenipotentiaries referred to above have signed the present treaty and have thereto affixed their seals.

[14214]

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This treaty is done in two originals in the Amharic and Arabic languages, and as the origin and source of both languages is identical the interpretation of the Arabic text shall be relied upon when necessity arises.

Done at Sana in the Yemen this seventeenth day of Al Hijja 1353 (corresponding with the 22nd March, 1935).

MUHAMMAD RAGHIB-BIN-RAFIQ.
SAHAFI-TEEZAZ (WOLDE) MASKAL
LIJ ANDARGE MESSAI.

(Ratifications exchanged at Sana on the 23rd Jumad, Thank, 1354
(21st September, 1935).)

[E 1974/52/25]

No. 17.

Sir A. Clark Kerr to Mr. Eden.—(Received April 15.)

(No. 174.)
Sir,

Bagdad, April 8, 1936.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 80 of the 4th April, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a translation of the Treaty of Alliance between Iraq and Saudi Arabia which was signed at Bagdad on the 2nd April, together with a translation of the notes concerning article 1 which were exchanged at the time of signature. You will observe that the recommendations made in your telegram No. 43 of the 24th February regarding article 4 (c), and in your telegram No. 54 of the 11th March regarding article 5 (2), have been adopted. The text of the protocol on arbitration mentioned in article 2 has not yet been agreed upon.

2. After the signature of the treaty, congratulatory telegrams were exchanged between King Ghazi and King Abdul Aziz and Nuri Pasha and the Emir Feisal. The text was published simultaneously in Bagdad and Mecca on the 6th April and, according to the newspapers, was well received in both places.

3. The treaty was at once submitted to the Iraqi Parliament, and is likely to be passed through all its stages during the next few days. Ratifications are to be exchanged as soon as possible, either in Mecca or Bagdad. After ratification, the Iraqi Government will register the treaty with the League of Nations.

4. During the treaty negotiations discussions took place between Sheikh Yusuf Yasin and the Iraqi Government concerning—

- (1) The demarcation of the frontier between Iraq and Saudi Arabia.
- (2) The division of the neutral zone.
- (3) Extradition.
- (4) Residence.
- (5) The Dahamshah tribe.
- (6) The reciprocal exemption of the subjects of each country from visas when entering the country of the other.

5. According to information given to Mr. Bateman by Nuri Pasha on the 6th April, the idea of demarcating the frontier on the ground has been dropped. It has been suggested to Sheikh Yusuf Yasin that, as the questions that have arisen concern a number of watering places through which the Uqair line passes, some attempt should be made to decide which tribes are entitled to use individual wells in any given area. The centres in question are generally situated at the points where salients occur on the frontier. They are by no means well defined, and comprise a number of wells covering an area of 4 or 5 square miles. Access to these wells is of great importance to the Bedouin tribes, and the Iraqi Government have suggested that they should be partitioned on the basis of established tribal rights. They are willing that King Abdul Aziz should, in the first place, decide to what tribe or tribes individual wells belong. The Iraqi Government are fairly confident that most of the wells will be found to belong to Iraqi tribes.

6. As regards point (2), Nuri Pasha has indicated in a letter to Sheikh Yusuf Yasin that it is impossible to divide up the neutral zone, as many of the wells south of a line drawn across the centre belong traditionally to Iraqi tribes

(principally the Dhafir). He suggested that, in order to maintain order in the zone, a mixed Iraqi-Saudi Administration should be set up to keep the peace.

7. As regards extradition, the Saudi Government had asked that better arrangements should be made for the working of the Extradition Agreement of April 1931. Since this agreement came into force, the Iraqi Government have not addressed a single demand for extradition to the Saudi Government. The Saudi Government have made six. Of the nine persons involved in the Saudi demands, five have not been traced, one has been handed over, the surrender of one has been refused for lack of evidence and of two on the ground that the persons concerned were Iraqis. Any alteration of the agreement seemed, therefore, to be of very little practical urgency. Nuri Pasha has, however, suggested to Sheikh Yusuf Yasin that, as most of the cases for which extradition was demanded were of a tribal character, they should be dealt with, in accordance with the Tribal Civil and Criminal Disputes Regulations, by the Tribal Department of the Ministry of the Interior.

8. Points (4) and (6) have been left for further discussion in a year's time, and point (5) has been allowed to drop.

9. I am sending copies of this despatch and its enclosures to His Majesty's Minister at Jedda and to His Majesty's consul-general at Beirut.

I have, &c.
(For the Ambassador),
C. H. BATEMAN.

Enclosure 1 in No. 17.

The New Treaty between Iraq and Saudi Arabia.

(In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate!)

HIS Majesty the King of Iraq and His Majesty the King of Saudi Arabia, In view of the ties of the Islamic faith and of racial unity which unite them; desirous of safeguarding the integrity of their territories; and having regard to the necessity which they feel for mutual co-operation and understanding in regard to matters affecting the interests of their kingdom;

Have agreed to conclude a Treaty of Arab Brotherhood and Alliance, and for this purpose have appointed as their plenipotentiaries:—

His Majesty the King of Iraq:

His Excellency Nuri Pasha El Said, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Iraq, Order of the Rafidain First Class Military;

His Majesty the King of Saudi Arabia:

His Excellency Sheikh Yusuf Yasin, Private Secretary to His Majesty and Director of the Political Section of the Royal Diwan;

Who, having reciprocally communicated their full powers, found in due form, have entered into an alliance and have concluded the following treaty:—

ARTICLE 1.

(a) Each of the high contracting parties reciprocally undertakes not to enter with any third party into any understanding or agreement over any matter whatever of a nature prejudicial to the interests of the other high contracting party or to his country or its interests, or of a nature calculated to expose to danger or harm the safety or interests of his country.

(b) The two high contracting parties shall consult together when necessary with a view to furthering the objects set forth in the preamble to this treaty.

ARTICLE 2.

The high contracting parties undertake to settle any disputes arising between them by means of friendly negotiations, and, in the event of the settlement of any such dispute by the said method proving difficult, to resort to the methods to be laid down in a protocol to be annexed to this treaty and to be agreed to as soon as possible after the exchange of ratifications of this treaty.

ARTICLE 3.

Should any dispute between either high contracting party and a third State produce a situation involving a threat of war, in that case the high contracting parties shall jointly endeavour to settle such dispute by peaceful means in accordance with such international undertakings as may be applicable to the case.

ARTICLE 4.

(a) In the event of an act of aggression being committed against either high contracting party by a third State notwithstanding efforts exerted in accordance with the provisions of article 3 above, and similarly in the event of the occurrence of a sudden act of aggression which does not leave time for the application of the provisions of article 3 referred to above, the high contracting parties shall consult together regarding the measures which shall be taken with the object of concerting their efforts in a useful manner to repel the said aggression.

(b) The following shall be deemed acts of aggression:—

- (1) The declaration of war.
- (2) The seizure by an armed force of a third State of territory belonging to either high contracting party, even without a declaration of war.
- (3) An attack on the territory, vessels or aircraft of either high contracting party by the land, naval or air forces of a third State, even without a declaration of war.
- (4) Direct or indirect support or assistance to the aggressor.

(c) The following shall not be deemed acts of aggression:—

- (1) The exercise of the right of legitimate defence, i.e., resisting any act of aggression as defined above.
- (2) Action taken in enforcement of article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.
- (3) Action taken in pursuance of a decision emanating from the League of Nations or the Council of the League of Nations, or in enforcement of clause 7 of article 15 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, provided that in the last case action is directed against the State which was the first to attack.
- (4) Assistance by a third State to another State attacked or whose territory is invaded by one of the high contracting parties contrary to the provisions of the Treaty for the Renunciation of War, signed at Paris on the 27th August, 1928, to which both high contracting parties have adhered.

ARTICLE 5.

In the event of the outbreak of disturbances or disorders in the territory of one of the high contracting parties, each of them undertakes reciprocally as follows:—

(1) To take all possible measures—

- (a) To make it impossible for insurgents to utilise his territory against the interests of the other high contracting party, and
- (b) To prevent his subjects from taking part in the disturbances or disorders or from helping or encouraging the insurgents, and
- (c) To prevent any kind of help being given to the insurgents either directly from his own territory or otherwise.

(2) In the event of insurgents from the territory of one of the high contracting parties taking refuge in the territory of the other high contracting party, the latter shall immediately disarm them and remove them to an area from which it shall be impossible for them to do any harm to the country of the other high contracting party until such time as the two high contracting parties shall have reached a decision regarding their future.

(3) If circumstances should necessitate the adoption of joint measures to suppress disturbances or disorders, the two high contracting parties shall consult with each other concerning the policy of co-operation which shall be followed for this purpose.

ARTICLE 6.

Having regard to the Islamic brotherhood and Arab unity which unite the Kingdom of the Yemen to the high contracting parties, they shall both endeavour to secure the accession of the Government of the Yemen to this treaty. Any other independent Arab State shall on request be permitted to accede to this treaty.

ARTICLE 7.

The two high contracting parties will co-operate with a view to unifying the Islamic and Arab culture and the military systems of their two countries by means of the exchange of educational and military missions to study the system followed in their respective countries and as far as possible to co-ordinate these systems and to seek to obtain reciprocal benefit from their respective educational and military institutions and the training and instruction which is available in them. The number of persons to compose each mission shall be determined by discussion between the high contracting parties from time to time.

ARTICLE 8.

The diplomatic and consular representatives of either high contracting party may if requested undertake the representation of the interests of the other high contracting party in foreign countries where such other party has no representatives; provided that this shall not in any way affect the freedom of such other party to appoint separate representatives of his own should he so desire.

ARTICLE 9.

It is agreed by the high contracting parties that there is nothing in the present treaty to prejudice the rights and undertakings of the Government of Iraq under the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Treaty of Alliance concluded between Iraq and Great Britain on the 30th June, 1930. The high contracting parties further agree to carry out the provisions of article 17 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, and to observe the principles of the Treaty for the Renunciation of War, signed at Paris on the 27th August, 1928, to which both high contracting parties have adhered.

ARTICLE 10.

If one of the high contracting parties commits an act of aggression against another State, the other high contracting party may denounce this treaty without previous warning. This denunciation shall not affect the friendship which links their two countries, and shall not affect the treaties and conventions mentioned in article 11 of this treaty.

ARTICLE 11.

All provisions of the following treaties concluded between the two kingdoms which do not conflict with the provisions of the present treaty shall remain in force until they are amended or cancelled by other treaties:—

- (1) Treaty of Mohammerah, dated 7 Ramadan, 1340, of the Hijra corresponding to the 5th May, 1922 of the Christian era.
- (2) Uqair Protocol No. 1, dated 12 Rabi-al-Thani, 1341, of the Hijra corresponding to the 2nd December, 1922, of the Christian era.
- (3) Uqair Protocol No. 2, dated 12 Rabi-al-Thani, 1341, of the Hijra corresponding to the 2nd December, 1922, of the Christian era.
- (4) Bahra Agreement, dated 14 Rabi-al-Thani, 1344, of the Hijra corresponding to the 1st November, 1925, of the Christian era.
- (5) Treaty of Friendship and "Bon-Voisinage" and the Protocol of Arbitration, dated 20 Al-Qada, 1349, of the Hijra corresponding to the 7th April, 1931, of the Christian era.
- (6) Extradition Treaty, dated 21 Al-Qada, 1349, of the Hijra corresponding to the 8th April, 1931, of the Christian era.

ARTICLE 12.

The high contracting parties undertake within one year from the date of coming into force of the present treaty to start negotiations for the conclusion of agreements on the following subjects:—

- (1) Residence, passports and *laissez-passer*.
- (2) Economic, financial and customs affairs.
- (3) Organisation of means of communication.

ARTICLE 13.

This treaty shall come into force from the date of the exchange of ratifications.

ARTICLE 14.

The present treaty shall remain in force for a period of ten years from the date of its coming into force, and it shall be deemed to have been renewed for a further period of ten years, unless notice of desire to terminate it shall have been given by either high contracting party to the other one year prior to the date of expiry of its period.

Done at Bagdad on the 10th day of Muharram-al-Haram in the year 1935 of the Hijra corresponding to the 2nd day of April in the year 1936 of the Christian era.

Enclosure 2 in No. 17.

Notes exchanged at the Time of the Signature of the Iraq-Saudi Arabia Treaty of Alliance.

(1)

Nuri Pasha to Sheikh Yusuf-al-Yasin.

Your Excellency,

Bagdad, April 2, 1936.

WITH reference to article 1 of the Treaty of Alliance and Arab Brotherhood signed by us to-day, I have the honour to explain that it is understood by the high contracting parties that the term "understanding and agreement with a third State" does not cover economic and financial affairs.

NURI SAID.

(2)

Sheikh Yusuf-al-Yasin to Nuri Pasha.

Bagdad, April 2, 1936.

(Muharram 10, 1355).

Your Excellency,

With reference to your Excellency's letter dated the 2nd April, 1936, in which you explain that the term "understanding and agreement with a third State" occurring in article 1 of the Treaty of Alliance signed to-day by myself and your Excellency does not cover economic and financial affairs, I concur in this interpretation of yours, and agree that what is intended by this term is an understanding or agreement affecting the existence and safety of the State.

Please accept, &c.

YUSUF-AL-YASIN.

[E 2100/90/25]

No. 18.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. Eden.—(Received April 20.)

(No. 89.)

Sir,

Jedda, March 28, 1936.

SINCE I wrote my despatches Nos. 46 and 94 of the 17th February and the 26th March, 1935, this Legation has had no occasion to address any special report to your department regarding the progress of aviation in this country. The matter has been touched on in various passages in the monthly Jedda reports and in semi-official letters, but I think that the time has now come for a more connected, though summary, account of the position. In order to make this despatch self-contained, I am including in it some of the more important facts that have been recorded elsewhere.

2. Comparatively little has been seen in Jedda of the existing Saudi Air Force since February of last year, when its base was transferred to Taif. This makes it difficult to follow its fortunes as closely as I would wish. There has, however, been no material change in the equipment or personnel of the force. The aircraft taken over from the Hashimite régime can be dismissed as completely valueless. Two certainly, and possibly one other, of the Wapitis bought under the auspices of His Majesty's Government in 1929-30, are in working condition. I have heard lately of some idea of attempting to recondition the fourth, which crashed in the lagoon just north of Jedda in September 1931, but I doubt the feasibility of this. The personnel of the force still consists of "White" Russians, originally recruited in the circumstances described in the correspondence ending with Sir Miles Lampson's despatch from Cairo, No. 51 of the 17th January, 1935. There may have been slight changes in the composition of the party, but its character remains unchanged. Some are at Taif. The mechanical engineer, Maximoff or Maxim, remains in Jedda, and appears to be employed for miscellaneous purposes.

3. The press has published from time to time optimistic accounts of the progress of the Saudi student-aviators, whose departure for Italy was reported in my despatches under reference. Private information is less glowing. According to my Italian colleague, they made a very poor impression in Italy. One showed promise, but the rest were found to be incapable, quarrelsome and undisciplined. Ibn Saud himself expressed a very moderate opinion of their progress in conversation with Captain de Gaury at Riyadh last July. It would probably, he thought, take much longer than had been expected to make them efficient, but he hoped eventually to use the two best of them for a weekly air service between the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea via Riyadh.

4. These young men recently completed their training in military aviation, and were then, according to the local press, to go for a month to a school of marine aviation. They sailed from Naples, homeward bound, on the 8th March, and are expected to arrive in Jedda from Massawa on the 3rd April. It is anticipated that a rousing reception will be given to "Our Eagles," as the local papers love to call them.

5. I now come to the development which has most immediately impelled me to write this despatch. When reporting the presentation by my French colleague on the 25th February of his credentials as Minister Resident, I confirmed a previous report that the French Government were presenting an aeroplane to Ibn Saud. It was announced in due course that this would arrive on the 20th March. Arrangements were made for it to be met by Amir Feisal on that date, and for the King to come to Jedda to receive the gift next day. It was not, however, until the 25th March that the aeroplane actually arrived, having come from France via North Africa and Egypt and landed at Yanbu the previous day. Royalty adapted its plans to those of the French staff-work. Ibn Saud arrived in Jedda early on the 26th March, and in the course of the day received my French colleague, together with a colonel from the French Air Ministry and the pilot. He does not seem to have visited the aeroplane.

6. The new aeroplane is, I understand, an ambulance machine refitted for royal use. It can accommodate three passengers besides the pilot. It is described to me as a Caudron-Renault "Pelican" monoplane, bearing the number C. 510 and the identification letters F-AONS. It has an inverted engine, similar in size and appearance to a "Gipsy Major."

[14214]

D 4

7. The heir apparent is understood to be anxious to fly in the new aeroplane to Riyadh, and may be accompanied by the Amir Feisal. I gather that, if this flight takes place, the aeroplane will be driven by the French pilot who brought it out. The King himself, so Mr. Philby tells me, has no inclination whatsoever to take to the air.

8. In the earlier of my despatches under reference I mentioned the renewed activity of the promoters of the Arab Aeronautical Society. Some further information on this subject came to my notice shortly after I wrote that despatch, but it was not worth sending home in a separate despatch. The society was active in collecting funds during the 1935 pilgrimage season and received some handsome donations from notable pilgrims. Little further was heard of the society until a short time ago, when it became known that the Saudi Government or the society contemplated buying two aeroplanes suitable for civil flying. The funds of the society may now be adequate for this purpose, as it claimed early last year, at the outset of its fresh burst of energy, to have already collected during the earlier phase of its existence £2,094. Paragraph 73 of the Jedda report for January to March 1932 suggests some doubt, however, as to whether this amount was actually paid up.

9. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Department of Overseas Trade, Cairo, Bagdad, Jerusalem, Bushire and Aden.

I have, &c.

ANDREW RYAN

P.S.—Since drafting this despatch I have learnt that the officer who came with the French aeroplane is a Colonel Pitault. I also now understand that the King is very reluctant to allow the Amir Saud to fly in the aeroplane to Riyadh
A. R.

[E 2106/1041/25]

No. 19.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. Eden.—(Received April 20.)

(No. 95 E.)

Sir,

Jedda, March 29, 1936.

YOU are aware that the currency situation in this country has undergone many vicissitudes since Ibn Saud conquered the Hejaz. These have been particularly marked since early in 1931, owing to the breakdown in practical application of the regulations enclosed in Mr. Bird's despatch No. 12 of the 20th January, 1928, and the further confusion entailed by the suspension of the gold standard in Great Britain in the autumn of that year. The English gold pound has remained throughout the main basis of the Saudi currency system, but the market value of the Saudi silver riyal was, in and after 1931, far below the official parity of 10 riyals to the gold pound, established by the regulations of 1928.

2. It may be well to recall very briefly the genesis of the system established by the regulations of 1928. The main elements in the pre-war Turkish currency were the Turkish gold pound, similar in fineness to, but about .9 per cent. of the weight, of the English sovereign; and the famous silver coin called the mejidie which, though it had depreciated somewhat, stood for many years in a fixed relation to gold. The Turkish gold pound was divided theoretically into 100 gold piastres, although the gold piastre did not exist as a coin. It ensued from this that the English gold pound was worth 110 gold piastres. The mejidie and its sub-divisions, which included a current silver piastre, had various values according to the uses to which it was put, but for official purposes it was reckoned at about 102 piastres to the Turkish gold pound and about 112 piastres to the English gold pound. The market rate was lower. I quote these figures from memory, but they are sufficiently accurate for my present purpose.

3. The Saudi regulations of 1928 substituted for the mejidie and its sub-divisions Saudi silver riyals of exactly the same size, weight and silver content and established the legal parity, already mentioned, of 10 riyals to the English gold pound, which had more or less superseded the Turkish gold pound. By an adaptation of the old Turkish rates for gold, they provided that the English gold pound and the riyal, respectively, should be divided into 110 and 11 theoretical piastres called "miri," which corresponded to the Turkish "gold piastres," and into 220 and 22 current piastres, which came to be known as Saudi.

4. From 1931 to 1934 the Saudi riyal fluctuated greatly, the general tendency being in the direction of depreciation, subject to seasonal variations in the opposite sense. Last year, however, the riyal, while still well below its legal value in terms of gold, showed a tendency to appreciate. There appeared to be a shortage of silver currency, and early in the autumn the Saudi Government cast about for means of remedying the situation. They had already begun to import large quantities of Indian rupees, mainly for use in Nejd, where the Saudi riyal had never been popular and had never ousted the Maria Theresa dollar. They also contemplated a new issue of silver riyals, a project which has forced the subject of correspondence ending with my Chancery's letter to the Eastern Department of the 1st February last. I may add that after that letter was written, I had reason to suppose that the new riyals were to be similar, except for the Saudi superscription, to the Indian rupee; that the quantity ordered, including presumably silver sub-divisions, was 1 million riyals, and that the parity of the new riyal would be fixed at 20 riyals to the gold pound. One informant suggested to me that the existing riyals would be withdrawn and that the new issue would suffice for all requirements, a thing which I find it difficult to believe unless the rupees from India are used to eke out the official currency not only in Nejd but in the Hejaz.

5. Pending the issue of the new riyals, of which I have heard nothing further, the Saudi Ministry of Finance has sprung a fresh surprise on the public by publishing on the 23rd March a notice, which I enclose in translation. Its main effects appear to be to establish a new legal parity of the existing riyal at the rate of 20 to the gold pound for the purpose of transactions with the Government; to abolish the "miri" piastre; to readjust the relation between Saudi piastres and the other elements in the currency by calculating the gold pound at 220 Saudi piastres, the riyal at 11 piastres and the nickel piastre at half a Saudi piastre. Paragraph 4 provides that payments to the Government hitherto fixed in miri piastres shall be payable in Saudi piastres to double the number of miri piastres shown in the tariffs, &c. Thus the English gold pound remains the basis of currency as before but the existing riyal is officially devalued to a rate approximating to that to which it had fallen, though with variations, in the market.

6. I prefer to postpone further comment on the new arrangements until I know more of their practical application. They produced some emotion in the markets of Jedda and Mecca for a day or two, but this seems to have died down, on its being discovered that market transactions in riyals are not necessarily effected though they may be influenced by the Government arrangements. The first effect in the local money markets was a marked fall in the value of the riyal. The permanent effect is difficult to estimate. It is possible that the whole thing is a prelude to the issue of the new riyals, but I confess my inability to see at present what the *modus operandi* is likely to be, if this should be the case.

7. I am sending copies of this despatch and enclosure to the Department of Overseas Trade, the Government of India and Cairo.

I have, &c.

ANDREW RYAN.

Enclosure in No. 19.

Instructions from the Ministry of Finance concerning Rates of Exchange, enacted with a view to Stabilising the Saudi Arab Currency.

(Translation.)

THE piastre known as the gold piastre shall be deemed to be out of use and shall be superseded by the Saudi piastre.

2. The Saudi riyal shall be deemed to be equal to 11 Saudi piastres, and the small nickel coins shall be calculated at the rate of 2 piastres to 1 Saudi piastre.

3. The English gold pound shall be accepted at the rate of 220 Saudi piastres in selling and buying.

4. As certain revenues are based on the gold piastre, the amount specified therein shall be doubled when calculated in Saudi piastres.

5. As to the revenues originally based on the Saudi piastre, they shall be received on the same basis, namely at the rate of 220 Saudi piastres to 1 gold

English pound and 11 piastres to 1 Saudi riyal, and 2 piastres of the nickel coins to 1 piastre.

6. The Ministry of Finance, its branches and the revenue departments shall accept such revenues in the different kinds of coins officially defined, namely: the English gold pound, the Saudi riyal and the nickel piastres at the rates now decided as they may be offered to them from the people concerned in payment of Government revenues.

7. This decision shall come into force as from the beginning of Muharram, 1355 (the 23rd March, 1936).

[E 2490/486/25]

No. 20.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. Eden.—(Received May 4.)

(No. 108. Confidential.)

Sir,

Jedda, April 18, 1936.

I HAVE the honour to submit herewith the Jedda report for March 1936. I regret that it has been unavoidably delayed on this occasion.

2. Copies have been distributed as in the list in paragraph 41 of the report for January.

I have, &c.

ANDREW RYAN.

Enclosure in No. 20.

JEDDA REPORT FOR MARCH 1936.

I.—Internal Affairs.

78. After his return from Jedda to Mecca on the 26th February, Ibn Saud was busy with the pilgrimage until some little time after Haj Day, which fell on the 3rd March. It appears to be true that unusual precautions were taken to prevent any repetition of the incident of last year and that unauthorised persons were kept at a distance. Otherwise, however, the King seems to have observed his usual routine. He gave his usual dinner for notable pilgrims on the evening of the 29th February. Admission was to be by invitation, but gate-crashers considerably augmented the 350 guests who were said to have been invited. The King's speech as reported in the press presented few features of interest. He preached unity among Moslems, and particularly Arabs; reproached them with talking much but doing little, and suggested that they should not, like Jews and Christians, let their conduct belie their words; and made a friendly reference to Iraq. Ismail Ghuznavi (paragraph 116 below) translated the speech into Urdu.

79. The Amir Feisal was to come to Jedda on the 20th March to meet the French aeroplane (paragraph 84), and the King was to follow on the 21st March to receive the French Minister and the officers detailed to bring it to Jedda. Owing to a delay in the arrival of the aeroplane, both high personages were left goose-stepping in Mecca for five days, but in due course the Amir arrived on the 25th March and the King on the 26th. Although the visit of His Majesty was not official, he brought an unusually large train, including two or three of his wives, and a posse of princes headed by the heir apparent. What with the King in his palace, the ladies at the Kandara villa and the two eldest sons at houses in the town, Jedda saw much of royalty. Even the desert swarmed with princelings, and it was difficult to play golf or even to putt mildly on the little course reserved for that purpose without being watched by them and their retainers. According to Fuad Bey, Hamza Ibn Saud now has twenty-five sons, the number having increased of late at the rate of two or three per annum. Some must be babies still, but the number of sons and grandsons in Jedda was impressive. On the afternoon of the 28th they were taken for short trips in the new aeroplane.

80. The Royal party was gay. It is said that on the 26th March an evening party at the Deputy Governor's, where the Amir Feisal was staying, ended like a bump supper, so numerous were the daggers and chairs that flew about. The senior princes and other personages dined with Mr. and Mrs. Philby on the 28th March. All the European ladies who could be mobilised were present and

some diplomatic representatives. There were nearly forty guests and a good time was had by all, despite the absence of the British Legation party owing to mourning.

81. The senior princes returned to Mecca after the Philby party, but on the 31st March the King, his ladies and several of his younger sons were still in Jedda for the sea breezes, which blew abominably from the north on that day after blowing even more disagreeably from the south during the preceding days. It says much for Ibn Saud's kindness as a husband and father that he has stood the climate for longer than he has done for several years.

82. Fuad Bey Hamza was in Jedda from the 14th to 18th March and from the 23rd March to the end of the month. He appears to be *au mieux* with the French and spent the night of the 15th March aboard the French steamship *Sinaia*. On the 28th March he installed the Jedda branch of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in the former Persian Legation, a roomier house than its previous squalid habitation, but in a very inconvenient position in the south of the town. Fuad Bey has had two or three recurrences of the liver or heart complaint from which he has long suffered. He was to leave for Syria in April and to go on to Europe for a cure, perhaps at Karlsbad, though he also thinks of Harrogate. His programme was altered early in April to include an important visit to Cairo to negotiate the settlement of all outstanding questions.

83. Important aerial developments occurred during the month. On the 29th February an aeroplane arrived from Egypt to take the Princess Khadija Halim (paragraph 75 of the last report) back after the pilgrimage. She left Jedda on or about the 7th for Medina. Three smaller aeroplanes arrived from Egypt on the 1st March, the survivors of a party of four which had left Cairo with two cadets of the Egyptian Royal Family and some others. One machine, and it is thought one cadet, got no further than Wejh or Yanbu. Thus the pilgrimage by air is an accomplished fact, but for Egyptians the gilt is a little taken off the gingerbread owing to the enforcement of quarantine at Tor, which makes the return journey nearly, if not quite, as long as that by sea.

84. The crowning glory, perhaps, was the arrival on the 25th March, five days behind the advertised date, for some unknown reason, of the aeroplane presented by the French Government to Ibn Saud (see paragraph 64 of the last report and paragraph 79 above). The machine is a Caudron-Renault Pelican four-seater, apparently an ambulance refitted for Royal use.

85. The student aviators sent to Italy last year left Naples on the 7th March and were expected here before the end of March, but their return via Massawa was delayed and they did not actually arrive until the 4th April. It is more than ever the fashion in the press to acclaim these lads as "eagles." Mr. Philby suggests that the word used more properly means "vultures," but the balance of evidence is that the local journalists know their own language even better than Mr. Philby.

86. The Advisory Legislative Council completed another session on the 23rd March and was reconstituted for a further period as from the 24th March, the beginning of the Moslem year. The King opened the new session on the following day and foreshadowed legislation for the creation of an assembly of representatives from every district in the kingdom, to meet annually at pilgrimage time, with a view to strengthening the relations between the people and the Government. This recalls the experiment of June 1931 (paragraph 19 of the report for May-June of that year) when the King convened a council of representatives of the Hejaz towns. That also was to be held annually, but this council was somewhat censorious and the experiment was not repeated.

87. The most interesting new appointment to the Legislative Council was that of Abdur-Rauf Sabban, who was one of the most active conspirators abroad some years ago, but who made his peace with the King last year after the proclamation of the "amnesty" of January 1935. Two other repentant ex-conspirators of note were rewarded at the same time: Tahir-ad-Dabbagh with the post of Director of Education, and Muhammad Sadiq with that of Assistant Director of Awkaf.

88. Fiscal measures of considerable importance were announced in the press on the 27th March, in the almost casual manner in which so much Saudi legislation is promulgated. Three notices appeared under a general heading stating that they had been sanctioned by high decree. One imposed a licence system for the importation of tea and sugar, which aimed apparently at assigning quotas to

merchants, but was suspected by some to be a step in the direction of a monopoly. Another effected important changes in the customs tariff. The third provided for a 5 per cent. tax on rents, payable by the landlord, subject to an exception in favour of owners occupying their own property. A separate notice published by the Ministry of Finance made the Saudi silver riyal exchangeable for transactions with the Government at the rate of 20 to the English gold pound and effected certain other changes in the currency system. On paper this meant a devaluation of the riyal to half its former legal value of 10 to the gold pound, but as that rate had long ceased to be effective, the change amounted to little more than a belated adaptation of the previous legal situation to conditions already prevailing. For a day or two there was emotion in Jedda and Mecca, but when it was discovered that the stabilisation was for Government purposes only and that market transactions were not affected, the emotion quickly subsided. The new riyals (paragraph 48 of the last report) do not seem to have yet arrived.

89. There has been again much talk of new economic developments. A concession for electricity in Jedda has been given to two local merchants who appear to be in touch with M. Ydlibi of Manchester (paragraph 112 of the report for April 1935).

90. This is the first recent occasion on which an important concession has been given to local interests. The concessionnaires realise that they will need foreign capital and technical assistance, but it is understood that the proportion of foreign capital is to be limited to 45 per cent. M. Ydlibi himself arrived in Jedda on the 29th March. His main objectives this year are to make a fresh effort to secure the oil concession for the Koweit Neutral Zone, and to get the other oil concession of which he spoke hopefully last year (*ibidem*) for the whole Red Sea littoral. For the latter purpose he and his associates are now working on behalf of Petroleum Concessions (Limited), a new company similar in composition to the Iraq Petroleum Company.

91. Another notable concession-hunter is Colonel P. T. Etherton, of Central Asian fame. He came out ostensibly in connexion with a scheme for organising transport in Saudi Arabia, which was the subject of a puff preliminary in the *Times* of the 10th March. He seems to have, in fact, looked into the transport proposition after his arrival on the 22nd March, but with unpromising results. He has been pursuing larger ideas of an oil concession, apparently for the same area as that which M. Ydlibi has in view, and a gold concession, apparently outside the limits of the prospecting area of the Saudi Arabian Mining Syndicate. As a side-line, he is interested in trying to market a curious weapon invented by an officer who took part in the Mount Everest expedition, with which Colonel Etherton was associated some time ago. Colonel Etherton professes to be representing a powerful group in England, but little is known as to the true nature of his backing. Although he came out under the auspices of Mr. Philby and was that gentleman's guest over the end of the month, their relations have been singularly strained.

92. French groups, of which much less is known, are also interesting themselves in Saudi Arabia. One known as Mekpel ran a large pilgrim ship, the *Sinaia*, for North Africans in 1935 and again this year. They are understood to be still interested in the Mecca-Jedda Railway project (paragraph 112 of the report for April 1935) and in some sort of irrigation scheme. Fuad Bey told Sir Andrew Ryan on the 30th March that a representative of another French group was expected to visit the Farsan Islands in connexion with oil.

93. Meanwhile, the two established concerns, the Saudi Arabian Mining Syndicate and the California Arabian Standard Oil Company, are still going strong. Oil wells Nos. 1 and 2 in Hasa (paragraph 51 of the last report) had on the 14th March reached depths of 2,655 and 1,207 feet respectively and an encouraging showing of oil was discovered during the previous weeks' drilling at well No. 1.

II.—Frontier Questions and Foreign Relations in Arabia.

94. The negotiations between Saudi Arabia and Iraq were resumed on Sheikh Yusuf Yasin's return to Bagdad on the 26th March. Notwithstanding the remarks by Fuad Bey quoted in paragraph 56 of the last report, they proceeded with such celerity that the treaty, described as one of "Arab Brotherhood and Alliance" was expected to be signed on the 30th or 31st March. There was a

slight delay, due apparently to some last-minute hesitation on the part of Ibn Saud, but the treaty was in fact signed on the 2nd April. It will be dealt with further in the report for April.

95. On the 1st March the Saudi Government formulated a fresh protest (*cf.* paragraph 59 of the last report) regarding alleged violations of their territory by Transjordan patrols. The places claimed by both sides are so marginal that disputes can only be avoided by a settlement of the general question of the lie of the frontier, which will be referred to below. No reply has been returned so far to the specific complaints of the Saudi Government.

96. On the 29th February the Political Agent in Koweit telegraphed that the sheikh had accepted in principle the proposals made by Fuad Bey to Sir Andrew Ryan at Riyadh in November (paragraph 399 of the report for December). Fuad Bey was so informed in due course, but the question of further procedure to give effect to the proposals is still outstanding.

97. The Legation has had confidential access to a tracing of the map prepared by the Saudi-Yemen frontier commissioners (paragraph 60 of the last report). As a geographical document it is quite valueless, but it contains a wealth of names on either side of the boundary shown in it and should, therefore, be useful for the solution of any future differences.

III.—Relations with Powers Outside Arabia.

98. Sir Andrew Ryan called on Fuad Bey on the 16th March and made a series of statements to him regarding the most important questions outstanding between His Majesty's Government and the Saudi Government, viz., (a) the future of the Treaty of Jedda and the questions connected with the proposal to extend its operation for a term of years, the most important of which are that of slavery and a new formula regarding the trade in arms from the United Kingdom; (b) the eastern and south-eastern frontiers; and (c) the Transjordan-Nejd frontier. The question of the Koweit blockade (see paragraph 96 above) was also discussed, and Sir Andrew Ryan adverted to that of air facilities on the Hasa Coast, which has been left in abeyance pending the discussion of other questions. He further threw out feelers regarding Saudi-Italian relations and the latest attitude of the Saudi Government in regard to a possible entry into the League of Nations.

99. Fuad Bey's reactions were for the most part very guarded, but the conversations were continued on the 28th and 30th March. Some progress was made with the subjects at (a) and (c) above, but the general impression left in Sir Andrew Ryan's mind was that the Saudi Government are no longer keen on expediting the settlement of any of the major questions pending a clarification of the European situation.

100. The presentation of an aeroplane to Ibn Saud by the French Government has been recorded above. The press announced during the month that a sum of 50,000 fr., apparently the revenue of Haramayn Wakfs, in Tunis had been forwarded to the Hejaz with a letter from the bey.

101. The Italian Chargé d'Affaires remained absent throughout the month. He would appear to have won all along the line in his struggle against Signor Odello. It became pretty clear during the month that Signor Odello would not return. His ladies hung on, but their house was relet to the Afghan Legation as from the 24th March and mother and daughter receded into a small portion of it, pending their departure. There has been no sign of any development in Saudi-Italian relations. The Saudi Government seemed to be determined to adhere to the policy of neutrality defined in their note of the 28th January to the League of Nations (paragraph 65 of the last report). It may be mentioned that in that note they laid special stress on their position as a Moslem Power and custodians of the Holy Places, as making it incumbent on them to maintain friendly relations with all Powers having Moslem subjects.

102. Arrangements were made in March for the despatch of a stallion and three mares as a gift from Ibn Saud, or theoretically, it would appear, from the Amir Saud, as a gift to the Queen of the Netherlands.

103. The Diplomatic Corps in Jedda continues to dwindle. The Turkish representative left on the 1st March, the Iranian on the 25th March. The Belgian consul went off to Brussels on the 20th March. A young but enterprising local merchant, Muhammad Abdullah Alireza, has become honorary Czechoslovakian consul.

104. The Saudi Government declined politely on the 29th February an invitation from His Majesty's Government to attend the Chemical Engineering Congress of the World Power Conference to be held in London in June.

IV.—Miscellaneous.

105. H.M.S. *Londonderry*, Captain H. B. Jacomb, visited Jedda from the 1st to the 8th March. Twelve Moslem ratings were given the opportunity of making the pilgrimage.

106. The French warship *d'Iberville* arrived on the 4th March and left on the 8th March.

107. The annual Haj Regatta was held on the 5th March. For the first time in recent years the aggregate of non-British ships in port exceeded that of British ships, of which there were only three. The others included the French ships *Sinaia* (see paragraph 92 above) and the *Ville de Beyrouth*, which, however, was chartered by the Khedivial Mail Line and officered by them. Only the British ships took any effective part in the regatta, but the French Legation, inspired doubtless by its rise in life and the presence of three vessels flying the French flag, passed remarks of some acerbity about the organisation of the regatta. The incident was liquidated in a quick orgy of reconciliation, and Sir Andrew and Lady Ryan were among the guests at an informal but sumptuous lunch on board the *Sinaia* on the 7th March. It then came out that, although the *d'Iberville* had arrived too late to put boats in the water for the regatta and the *Sinaia* had professed inability to do so, they had had their own rowing races before the luncheon. French victories were thus assured.

108. Mr. Maxwell Darling (paragraph 71 of the last report) left for Jizan on the 17th March and, to anticipate, returned on the 1st April after an instructive investigation of the locust position in the coastal region. Fuad Bey Hamza was extremely helpful in obtaining the King's permission for this—for a European—unusual journey and in connexion with the motor transport arrangements for Mr. Darling and his servants. Mr. Darling left Jedda for Cairo on the 3rd April to attend the postponed Locust Conference there.

109. Pilgrimage Day fell on the 3rd March. According to the published statistics the total number of sea-borne pilgrims this year was 30,966 adults and 1,035 children. These included from India, 8,231 adults and 208 children; from the Dutch East Indies 5,109 adults and 337 children; and from Egypt 5,617 adults and 106 children. 1,829 pilgrims were stated to have used the overland route from Nejef, including a still uncertain number of Indians and 200 Afghans. It is estimated that from 60,000 to 70,000 persons were present at Arafat on the great day. The overland contingent from the Yemen is thought not to have exceeded 1,000 to 1,500. Contradictory accounts had been received before the pilgrimage of the attitude of the Saudi authorities towards intending Yemeni pilgrims, especially as regards the route which they would be allowed to follow. Certain restrictions would appear to have been enforced, but it is not clear whether they were due to police precautions or to the new policy of discouraging pilgrims without means to pay dues, &c.

110. Rain fell in Mecca on the evening of the 2nd March and pilgrims were incommode at Arafat by a violent dust-storm on the afternoon of the 3rd March, which was followed by more rain and a climatic improvement. The sanitary state of the pilgrimage left nothing to be desired, with the result that ships returning southward were again exempted from calling at Kamaran, and the Alexandria Quarantine Board pronounced the pilgrimage clean on the 18th March. The defects of the motor transport service provided under the new arrangements described in paragraph 148 of the report for last May gave rise to numerous complaints. Camels were also said to be in short supply at Mecca. Congestion and mismanagement at Jedda, when the first ships were leaving, also caused a good deal of trouble and some clashes between pilgrims and the local authorities for two or three days. Generally speaking, however, the conditions of the 1936 pilgrimage were good.

111. The Saudi Government furnished the Legation on the 31st March with the names of five Punjabi pilgrims who lost their lives in the floods inland from Rabigh (paragraph 73 of the last report) and next day they added two Bahreinis to the list.

112. The Egyptian pilgrim ship *Kawsar*, which ran aground on a reef on the 28th February, was refloated by a salvage vessel on the 10th March after abortive efforts by the *Zamzam*, also owned by the Misr Navigation Company, to get her off. Her bottom was not seriously damaged and she was able to go to sea again on the 16th March.

113. The initiation of the pilgrimage by air from Egypt is described in paragraph 83 above. No general service has been started so far.

114. Several other pilgrims of some distinction came on pilgrimage, including Fawwaz-bin-Shalan, whose sister married Ibn Saud some months ago. The other sister, Fauza, who was said to have jibbed at a Royal alliance, would appear to have relented and was to leave Damascus on the 30th March to become the wife of the Amir Saud.

115. The King himself reversed the decision mentioned in paragraph 76 of the last report regarding would-be pilgrims recently converted to Islam. Mrs. Sterling was its only victim. The King's new attitude enabled Mr. MacBryan and two other Europeans, a Pole and a Hungarian (not a Greek, as previously stated), to go to Mecca. It is proposed in future to require pilgrims of this kind to sojourn for three months in Jedda under the tutelage of a religious committee, whose favourable report will be considered to qualify them for access to the Holy Places. Mr. MacBryan, by the way, is not Scotch, but a native of Bath of Irish origin. He still resides in Sarawak as a stockbroker.

116. The Saudi authorities refused to take part this year in the informal committee, which has sat annually for some years under the presidency of the Indian vice-consul, to assign return passages to Indian pilgrims. This was attributed to the activities of that fanatic and ill-conditioned Indian Ismail Ghuznavi, who serves as a Saudi pilgrimage propagandist in India. He denies this particular charge, but he has been in many ways an unmitigated nuisance for some time past. Sir Andrew Ryan, at the instance of the Government of India, made strong representations about him to Fuad Bey Hamza on the 16th March. This produced a partial change in Ghuznavi's own attitude and a disarming reply from Fuad Bey on the 30th.

117. Another matter of interest in connexion with the Indian pilgrimage is a project of the Government of Hyderabad to light the Haram at Medina by electricity and to enclose certain venerated cemeteries there, perhaps also at Mecca. The Legation is concerned in these matters, but the Hyderabad Government also sent a surveyor on pilgrimage to look into the practical aspects of the matter.

118. The Saudi Government, who remain invincibly hostile to international sanitary arrangements connected with the pilgrimage, sent a doctor of sorts to Tor this year to study the conditions there.

119. The position as regards the manumission of slaves by the Legation in March was as follows:—

On hand at the beginning of the month: One female.
Took refuge in March: Nil.
Manumitted and repatriated: Nil.
Locally manumitted: Nil.
On hand at the end of the month: One female.

[E 2491/202/25]

No. 21.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. Eden.—(Received May 4.)

(No. 109.)
Sir,

Jedda, April 18, 1936.

WITH reference to my printed despatch No. 103 of the 13th April, enclosing translations of telegrams exchanged between the Saudi and Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs regarding the impending negotiations between their Governments, I have the honour to state, as already mentioned in telegrams on other subjects, that Fuad Bey Hamza left Jedda for Cairo on the 14th April, a day later than he had originally intended. He was accompanied by Taufiq Hamza and Muhammad Shaikho, who are employed in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and

also by two well-known local Syrian merchants, Huseyn Awayni and Ibrahim Shakir. It was understood at first that the last-named two gentlemen were members of the Saudi delegation. This suggested that they might be intended to take part in any commercial negotiations ancillary to the main subjects to be discussed. When, however, I mentioned this idea of mine to Fuad Bey in the course of general conversation on the 13th April, he said that the two gentlemen were merely personal friends of his, who were taking the opportunity of accompanying him to Cairo, but would not be making any long stay there.

2. As you are aware, the greatest obstacle to the establishment of normal relations between Saudi Arabia and Egypt has been the personal reluctance of King Fuad to recognise Ibn Saud. This will doubtless be one of the first subjects of negotiation. It has, indeed, been suggested to me that recognition has already been accorded by the use of full titles in the telegrams enclosed in my despatch under reference, but I doubt this. The nearest precedent I can recall is that of Saudi Arabia and Iraq, in which case it was held that the use of titles in correspondence exchange in 1930 had constituted recognition and that no further preliminary of the kind was required for the completion of the negotiations, which culminated in the Saudi-Iraq Treaty of the 7th April, 1931. The correspondence in question was, however, between the rulers of the two countries.

3. In any case the question of recognition is unlikely to cause any further difficulty between Saudi Arabia and Egypt. It is very significant that the negotiations between them have been initiated so soon after the conclusion of the Saudi-Iraq Treaty of Islamic Brotherhood and Alliance of the 2nd April, to which it is hoped to make the Yemen also an acceding party; and at a time when the French Government have been negotiating with a Syrian Nationalist delegation; not to mention the fact, probably of less importance in this connexion, that His Majesty's Government also are engaged in negotiations of capital importance with the Egyptian Government. Everything points to the conclusion that the Saudi Government, influenced doubtless by the course of events in Europe and the hope that European difficulties may rebound to the advantage of the Arab cause generally, have plumped for the policy of something in the nature of an alliance of independent Arab States, which might, in favourable circumstances, concern itself with the affairs of other Arab countries. It is true that the clauses, which pointed most clearly in the latter direction, were omitted from the recent Saudi-Iraq Treaty; but this does not exclude the possibility of attempts to increase the influence of the independent States in the affairs of countries like Syria, possibly even Palestine, Koweit and the States in the east and south-east of Arabia. I do not suggest that such developments are imminent, and I still rely a good deal on Ibn Saud's native caution, but I do consider that the whole movement calls for great watchfulness on the part of His Majesty's Government.

4. I am sending copies of this despatch to Cairo, Bagdad, Jerusalem, Bushire and Aden.

I have, &c.

ANDREW RYAN.

[E 2828/152/91]

No. 22.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. Eden.—(Received May 19.)

(No. 116.)

HIS Majesty's Minister at Jedda presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit to him the record of a conversation with Sheikh Yusuf Yasin on the 23rd April, 1936.

Jedda, April 23, 1936.

Enclosure in No. 22.

Anglo-Saudi Negotiations: Eastern and South-Eastern Frontiers of Saudi Arabia.

I HAVE recorded separately the portion of my first formal conversation with Sheikh Yusuf Yasin yesterday, in which we resumed the discussion of the proposed prolongation of the Treaty of Jedda and connected questions. I have explained in that record that I did not wish Sheikh Yusuf to think that I was confining my attention to that subject because I had taken it first; and that I therefore purposely went on to the question of the eastern and south-eastern frontiers.

2. I reminded Sheikh Yusuf that, when discussing the frontier question with me at Riyadh, Fuad Bey had invoked an agreement between Ibn Saud and the Sheikh of Qatar prior to the Anglo-Qatar Treaty of 1916 and had held that, whatever the position might be now, the sheikh was then a free international agent. He had said that by the alleged agreement Ibn Saud had recognised the sheikh's right to the Jebel Dukhan and the Arai, but that the Jebel Naksh had been left to Ibn Saud. Fuad Bey's contention as to the sheikh's position before 1916 raised a very difficult legal issue, but my Government, as practical people, wished in the first instance to be informed on the simple question of fact. The Sheikh of Qatar had no recollection of any such agreement. His Majesty's Government would like particulars of it and a copy. I had put this to Fuad Bey on the 16th March. He had not reverted to the subject. This astonished me. Surely, if the agreement existed, it could be produced at short notice. We had given all our agreements with the Persian Gulf rulers to the Saudi Government and were justified in expecting the information for which I had asked.

3. Sheikh Yusuf was most evasive. It became clear in the ensuing conversation that he knew very little about what Fuad Bey had said and equally little about the whole business. He suggested at an early stage that the King might have "allowed" the sheikh to have certain places. I retorted sharply that I took exception to language of this sort, used as though it rested with Ibn Saud to determine the sheikh's rights. The sheikh was an independent ruler, who had confided the charge of his foreign affairs to His Majesty's Government. He was not Ibn Saud's vassal.

4. At a later stage Sheikh Yusuf tried to make out that the authority of the Sheikh of Qatar did not extend beyond what he called the Safhat-al-Qatar. This expression being new to me, I asked whether the Safhat included the Jebel Dukhan and the Arai. Sheikh Yusuf replied in the negative, and tried to make out that Ibn Saud exercised authority in those two areas. I expressed amazement. Fuad Bey had said that the King had ceded those two areas over twenty years ago. Sheikh Yusuf now accused the King of having hung on to them ever since.

5. Sheikh Yusuf invited me to ask the Sheikh of Qatar whether it was not a fact that Ibn Saud held the areas in question. I said that I should not like to ask the sheikh to bring such an accusation, which I was sorry to hear from the lips of Sheikh Yusuf. As regards the main issue, the sheikh had already been questioned. He held in principle that his rights extended to Salwa, but he was not now claiming that place, as Ibn Saud had taken it. He claimed most emphatically the Jebel Dukhan and the Jebel Naksh, as being in relation to Qatar and the Jebel Dukhan "as the nose is to the face."

6. Under further pressure to produce the alleged agreement, Sheikh Yusuf suggested that Fuad Bey would have to be asked about it. I scouted this. Fuad Bey had invoked an agreement, and I presumed it was either in the archives of the King's diwan or those of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

7. After some more wrangling, Sheikh Yusuf asked whether the frontier question was to be settled on the basis of Saudi proposals or our proposals, or on what basis. I recited with what patience I could the main stages during the past year. Fuad Bey had informed me of the Saudi desiderata on the 3rd April, 1935. The subject had been discussed in London in June-July. I had taken new proposals to Riyadh. These had been rejected. One of the Saudi objections to them was that our proposed boundary ran south of the Jebel Naksh, and Fuad Bey had invoked the agreement for which I was asking. The negotiations must

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proceed on the same basis as that on which I was about to leave Sheikh Yusuf: one foot before the other, step by step, and not by a flying leap from one end of the room to the other.

8. I was deliberately provocative in this conversation, which I have described only in its main outlines. I irritated Sheikh Yusuf all the more as it was very late and he was longing to get rid of me. He is notoriously most difficult in negotiation and it is desirable sometimes to go for him hot and strong. He irritated me too, so that the conversation, though most friendly in form, was acid at times and sub-acid throughout. My objects were threefold, viz.: (a) that stated in the first paragraph above; (b) to keep it well before Sheikh Yusuf, without making it a main point, that we controlled the foreign relations of Qatar; and (c) to press him as hard as possible about the alleged pre-1916 agreement.

ANDREW RYAN.

April 23, 1936.

[E 2838/608/25]

No. 23.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. Eden.—(Received May 19.)

(No. 128.)
Sir,

Jedda, May 1, 1936.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 58 of the 30th April, I have the honour to forward herewith a more detailed record of my conversation with Sheikh Yusuf Yasin on the 29th April regarding Haj Amin Huseini's appeal to Ibn Saud to help the Arabs of Palestine in their struggle against what he described in his telegram as British Zionist policy. Even this record omits a good deal of what passed in so discursive a private conversation, in which my object was not merely to discourage the King from concerning himself with Palestine affairs, but to warn him, without using express language, of the danger of meddling in the affairs of Arab countries generally, in which His Majesty's Government have a special interest. I referred in passing to my knowledge that there had at one stage been some idea of inserting clauses in the Saudi-Iraqi treaty of alliance suggestive of the possibility of such meddling.

2. Like other officers in the Near East, I have of late been much impressed by the activities of those who wish to create an Arab *bloc* in the hope of promoting, *inter alia*, the independence of Arab countries under different forms of European tutelage. Sheikh Yusuf Yasin's communication took me, however, by surprise and I trust that you will not disapprove of the line I took on the spur of the moment. I am conscious of some temerity in speaking as I did of the present situation in Palestine, but I was careful to disclaim any knowledge of the most recent developments, except what I had derived from wireless broadcasts, and what I said seemed to me to be a useful way of leading up to my main thesis that Ibn Saud would do well not to encourage advances like that of Haj Amin. I am afraid that, despite all professions of his desire to avoid anything that might indispose His Majesty's Government, Ibn Saud would dearly like to feel that his influence counted for something in Palestine, both for general political reasons and because of the religious appeal which Jerusalem, the "First Qibla of Islam," makes to Moslem sentiment.

3. I am sending copies of this despatch and enclosure to Jerusalem, Cairo, Bagdad, Aden, Bushire, the Government of India and Beirut.

I have, &c.

ANDREW RYAN.

Enclosure in No. 23.

Record of Conversation between Sir Andrew Ryan and Sheikh Yusuf Yasin on April 29, 1936.

Ibn Saud and Palestine.

SHEIKH YUSUF YASIN, acting under instructions from the King, spoke to me privately on this subject yesterday afternoon. The following is a mere outline of our conversation, which was long and at times repetitive:—

2. Sheikh Yusuf reminded me of the constant desire of the King to take his cue from His Majesty's Government in international questions. In regard to the affairs of the East, His Majesty wished to avoid anything which might disturb his relations with His Majesty's Government. He desired in Arab affairs to follow in consultation with them a path of safety and not to interfere in matters concerning them. He had now instructed Sheikh Yusuf to consult me about a telegram which he had received on the 28th April from Haj Amin Huseini. Sheikh Yusuf gave the telegram to my interpreter to translate for me.

3. The gist of the telegram was that "Arab Palestine" had been upset a week ago by the British Zionist policy, which was calculated to destroy the Arab nation. All parties had united to organise a strike which would go on until that policy was changed for one which would guarantee the safety of the Arabs. Haj Amin invoked the help of Ibn Saud to save "this sacred country" and realise its aims.

4. Sheikh Yusuf said that no reply had been sent to the telegram as yet. He sought my advice.

5. I said that I could give no personal advice. I did not, like the King, Sheikh Yusuf and most high personages in this country, know Haj Amin. Moreover, I had no complete information regarding recent events in Palestine. Haj Amin spoke of a union of all parties. No one knew better than the King that there was no real union among them. He had publicly reproached them with this. I knew about the strike and the parties might have united for that purpose. I did not know the reasons for the strike. The Colonial Secretary had agreed to receive a deputation of the Arab leaders. The Arabs, though divided, had up to recently been less hostile to the proposal for a Legislative Council than the Jews. His Majesty's Government had had to defend themselves in the House of Commons against the accusation of following too pro-Arab a policy. Haj Amin's telegram was very definite. The King said he did not wish to interfere. Haj Amin asked him categorically to interfere. It appeared to me that the obvious line to take was one of politeness to a personal friend, but of refusal to interfere.

6. Sheikh Yusuf professed to have little personal knowledge of present affairs in Palestine, though he knew of the High Commissioner's communication to the Arab leaders (meaning, I think, the intimation that the Colonial Secretary would receive a deputation). His object was to consult me as to the best means of avoiding interference and at the same time to maintain Ibn Saud's prestige in the Arab world. There was always a general Arab feeling to be considered. It had been the basis of the negotiations with the Yemen and Iraq and those now proceeding with Egypt. It had to be considered also in relation to Palestine, a country for whose welfare the King must wish. I think it was at this point that Sheikh Yusuf referred to religious interest in Palestine. Anyhow he referred to it more than once, but I refrained from any comment on this aspect of the matter.

7. I told Sheikh Yusuf that he was using dangerous language. He had spoken of the rapprochements with three independent Arab countries, and had gone straight on to speak of Palestine. As regards Ibn Saud's relations with his independent neighbours, the policy of His Majesty's Government, so far as they were concerned, had been clear and consistent. I analysed at some length, and with frequent references to past conversations, &c.; the attitude of His Majesty's Government in regard to the relations of Saudi Arabia with the Yemen, Iraq and Egypt, showing that His Majesty's Government had never stood in the way of rapprochement with these countries, but had in all cases favoured peaceful settlements and in the case of Iraq and Egypt had promoted them. I spoke of the increase of the King's prestige in the Arab world, resulting from the policies he had followed. There remained two important countries in Northern Arabia,

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Syria and Palestine, both under mandate. The King had in a recent interview applauded the wisdom of the French Government, whom he had described as his friends, in negotiating with the Syrians. It was clear from his language that he had no intention of interfering in Syria. Indeed, the French High Commissioner there had stated publicly some time ago that Ibn Saud had given assurances in this sense. Surely, he should observe the same attitude in regard to Palestine. He should not encourage any hope that he might interfere in the affairs of that country, which were affairs for His Majesty's Government to deal with. The King must choose. Did he wish to be the ruler of a great country or did he wish to yield to the solicitations of those who wished him to aspire to the Empire of Arabia?

8. By these and similar arguments I led up to a conclusion which I stated twice in express terms: the King would neither increase his friendship with Great Britain nor his prestige in the Arab world by concerning himself with the affairs of Palestine.

9. Sheikh Yusuf got back to Haj Amin's telegram and his request for advice as to the reply to be returned. He harped on the fact that the King did not wish to interfere in the affairs of Palestine. I said I had accepted this assurance at the outset. My point was that he should not encourage hopes in other quarters that he might do so. I would not advise in any positive way as to the terms of a reply to Haj Amin, but I had stated my personal views. After some further talk of less importance, I urged prudence above all. Towards the end Sheikh Yusuf suggested that the reply to Haj Amin might take the form of a friendly message wishing the Arabs well or something of the sort. I still refused to be drawn into any positive expression of opinion regarding the terms of the reply.

10. I was careful to emphasise the private character of the conversation, the personal character of my own views and the fact that I was not concerned with the affairs of Palestine as such. At one point I told Sheikh Yusuf that I had conducted the conversation on the assumption that he, too, was speaking privately. I could not have listened to him at all, had he been speaking officially.

ANDREW RYAN.

April 30, 1936.

[E 2980/202/25]

No. 24.

Sir M. Lampson to Mr. Eden.—(Received May 25.)

(No. 539. Confidential.)

Sir,

Cairo, May 12, 1936.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 404 of the 8th May, I have the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a decree, published in the *Journal officiel* of the 11th May, promulgating the Treaty of Friendship concluded between Egypt and Saudi Arabia, together with a copy of the text of the treaty, and of the telegrams exchanged on the subject between His Majesty King Abdel Aziz and Aly Maher Pasha.

2. Nahas Pasha, the new Prime Minister, had an interview with Fuad Bey Hamza before the latter's departure and, according to the press, discussed with him certain questions outstanding between the two countries.

3. I have forwarded a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Jedda.

I have, &c.

MILES W. LAMPSON,

High Commissioner.

Enclosure in No. 24.

(Traduction.)

Décret portant Promulgation du Traité d'Amitié conclu entre le Royaume d'Egypte et le Royaume de l'Arabie séoudite.

LE Conseil des Ministres,

Agissant en vertu de l'article 55 de la Constitution;

Sur la proposition du Ministre des Affaires étrangères;

Décète :

Article 1^{er}.—Le Traité d'Amitié, dont le texte est annexé au présent décret, conclu entre le Royaume d'Egypte et le Royaume de l'Arabie séoudite et dont les instruments de ratification ont été échangés au Caire le 8 mai 1936, produira son plein et entier effet à partir du 8 mai 1936.

Art. 2.—Le Ministre des Affaires étrangères est chargé de l'exécution du présent décret.

Fait à la Présidence du Conseil des Ministres, le 17 safar 1355 (8 mai 1936).

Le Président du Conseil des Ministres,
Ministre de l'Intérieur, des Affaires
étrangères et de l'Hygiène publique p.i.,
ALY MAHER.

Le Ministre de la Justice et des Wakfs,
AHMED ALY.

Le Ministre des Travaux publics,
HAFEZ HASSAN.

Le Ministre de l'Instruction publique,
MOHAMED ALY ALLOUBA.

Le Ministre des Communications et du
Commerce et de l'Industrie,
HASSAN SABRY.

Le Ministre des Finances,
AHMED ABDEL WAHAB.

Le Ministre de l'Agriculture,
SADEK WAHBA.

Le Ministre de la Guerre et de la Marine,
ALY SEDKY.

(Traduction.)

Traité d'Amitié entre le Royaume d'Egypte et le Royaume de l'Arabie séoudite.

Le Conseil des Ministres du Royaume d'Egypte, exerçant les pouvoirs constitutionnels de Sa Majesté le Roi d'Egypte,

et

Sa Majesté le Roi de l'Arabie séoudite,

Pénétrés du désir sincère de renforcer entre eux les liens d'amitié, ont résolu de conclure un traité destiné à consacrer les règles de leurs relations cordiales et ont, à cet effet, désigné comme leurs plénipotentiaires :

Le Conseil des Ministres du Royaume d'Egypte :

Son Excellence Aly Maher Pacha, Président du Conseil des Ministres,
Ministre des Affaires étrangères;

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Sa Majesté le Roi de l'Arabie séoudite :

Son Excellence Fouad Hamza Bey, Sous-Secrétaire d'Etat aux Affaires étrangères;

Lesquels, après s'être communiqué leurs pleins pouvoirs, trouvés en bonne et due forme, sont convenus des dispositions suivantes :

ARTICLE 1^{er}.

Le Gouvernement égyptien reconnaît que le Royaume de l'Arabie séoudite constitue un Etat libre, souverain et jouissant d'une indépendance complète et absolue.

ARTICLE 2.

Il y aura paix durable et amitié sincère entre le Royaume d'Egypte et le Royaume de l'Arabie séoudite ainsi qu'entre les citoyens des deux Etats.

Chacune des hautes parties contractantes s'engage à entretenir avec l'autre des relations amicales et à prendre toutes mesures pour prévenir, sur son territoire, la perpétration d'actes illicites dirigés contre la paix ou la tranquillité de l'autre partie.

ARTICLE 3.

Il sera établi entre le Royaume d'Egypte et le Royaume de l'Arabie séoudite des relations diplomatiques et consulaires.

Les représentants diplomatiques et consulaires accrédités par l'une des hautes parties contractantes ou nommés par elle auprès de l'autre, jouiront à titre de réciprocité du traitement consacré par les principes du droit international public.

ARTICLE 4.

Sa Majesté le Roi de l'Arabie séoudite s'engage à faciliter aux sujets égyptiens musulmans l'accomplissement du pèlerinage et des rites religieux islamiques. Sa Majesté déclare qu'ils jouiront durant leur séjour au Hedjaz de la sécurité quant à leurs biens et à leurs personnes, de la liberté personnelle dans les limites du Charéi et en général du traitement et des droits accordés ou reconnus aux sujets de la nation la plus favorisée.

ARTICLE 5.

Animée de l'esprit de solidarité et de collaboration islamiques, Sa Majesté le Roi de l'Arabie séoudite consent à permettre au Gouvernement égyptien de procéder à la remise en état des deux mosquées de La Mecque et de Médine ainsi qu'à l'organisation des services qui s'y rattachent toutes les fois que le Gouvernement égyptien le jugera utile dans l'intérêt des pèlerins et des visiteurs de Médine. Sa Majesté consent également à donner toutes les facilités nécessaires en vue de l'exécution des travaux à entreprendre à cet effet par le Gouvernement égyptien.

Les services visés ci-dessus comprennent notamment l'aménagement des routes empruntées par les pèlerins et les visiteurs, l'éclairage des deux mosquées et de leurs environs, la fourniture de l'eau potable ainsi que tous autres travaux ou établissements destinés à assurer la commodité du séjour des pèlerins et des visiteurs ou la protection de leur santé.

Les deux Gouvernements se mettront, au préalable, d'accord sur les plans relatifs aux travaux précités.

ARTICLE 6.

Les hautes parties contractantes s'engagent à procéder le plus tôt possible, après la signature du présent traité, à des négociations amicales en vue du règlement des questions pendantes entre elles, de la conclusion de conventions douanières, postales et maritimes et de la solution des autres problèmes qui intéressent leurs deux Etats.

ARTICLE 7.

Le présent traité est rédigé en double original en langue arabe; il sera ratifié par les hautes parties contractantes aussitôt que faire se pourra; il entrera en vigueur immédiatement après l'échange des instruments de ratification.

Fait au Caire, le 16 safar 1355 (7 mai 1936).

ALY MAHER.

FOUAD HAMZA.

Traduction des deux Dépêches échangées le 8 Mai 1936 entre Sa Majesté le Roi Abdel Aziz, du Royaume arabe séoudien, et son Excellence Aly Maher Pacha, Président du Conseil des Ministres.

Son Excellence Aly Maher Pacha,

Président du Conseil des Ministres,

Le Caire.

Nous avons pris connaissance du texte du traité, formé de sept articles, que vous avez signé avec notre plénipotentiaire, Fouad Hamza.

En reconnaissance de notre approbation, nous vous adressons cette dépêche et prions Dieu de faire que le succès soit notre partage à tous et que la conclusion de ce traité inaugure une ère de bonheur pour les deux pays.

ABDEL AZIZ.

Sa Majesté le Roi,

La Mecque.

Je suis très heureux de recevoir la dépêche de votre Majesté ratifiant le traité qui, nous l'espérons, raffermira les relations amicales entre les deux pays et facilitera à tous les musulmans le pèlerinage de La Mecque.

Je prie votre Majesté d'agréer les très hautes assurances de mes remerciements et de mes vœux les plus sincères.

ALY MAHER.

Traduction des deux Dépêches échangées le 8 Mai 1936 entre son Excellence le Ministre séoudien des Finances et son Excellence Aly Maher Pacha, Président du Conseil des Ministres.

Son Excellence Aly Maher Pacha,

Président du Conseil des Ministres,

Le Caire.

Mes félicitations cordiales à votre Excellence en cette heureuse occasion, dont tout l'honneur vous revient.

Puisse le Très-Haut en faire l'augure d'une ère glorieuse entre nos deux nations sœurs sous l'égide de leurs Majestés leurs Rois bien-aimés et faire que le succès soit toujours votre partage!

Le Ministre séoudien des Finances.

Son Excellence

le Ministre séoudien des Finances,

Djeddah.

Je remercie votre Excellence pour son aimable dépêche et je prie le Tout-Puissant de maintenir la cordialité entre les deux peuples frères et leur prospérité sous l'égide de leurs Majestés les deux Rois bien-aimés et de faire que le succès et le bonheur soient le partage de leurs Majestés et de leurs peuples.

ALY MAHER.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. Eden.—(Received June 3.)

(No. 131.)

Sir,

Jedda, May 4, 1936.

I HAVE the honour to submit herewith the Jedda report for April 1936.

2. Copies have been distributed as in the list in paragraph 41 of the report for January.

I have, &c.

ANDREW RYAN.

Enclosure in No. 25.

JEDDA REPORT FOR APRIL 1936.

I.—Internal Affairs.

120. IBN SAUD left Jedda on the 2nd April, but stayed in Mecca only until the 19th April, when he moved with a large party, including his heir, to Ashaira (an early stage on the road to Riyadh) for country air and hunting. He apparently intended to make that place his base for some weeks and make extensive excursions therefrom. It is uncertain whether he will in due course proceed to Riyadh without revisiting Mecca. Anyhow, he attended a farewell party in Mecca on the 15th April as though he were leaving for Nejd. He made a speech at this banquet, consisting mostly of religious exhortations, but he spoke also of his wish for closer contact with his people in order that they should express to him their desires and know about his acts and intentions. He gave an open invitation to all and sundry to visit him any time, or, in his absence, the Amir Feisal, at a stated daily hour. The press recorded later what may have been another speech of the same character or a further version of the same. In this he preached concord.

121. Taken in conjunction with the announcement mentioned in paragraph 86 of the last report, and with the prolonged stay of the heir apparent in the Hejaz, these Royal utterances have some significance as indications of the King's desire to popularise his régime and perhaps even to broaden its basis, although autocracy is still essential to its preservation. It is stated that the Amir Saud has become very affectionate with his relatives, and that his (Saud's) visit to Europe has greatly broadened his outlook. He has had private cinema shows in Mecca and very audible music from the wireless close to the Haram. These proceedings cause some little scandal to the unco' guid, but may increase his popularity with the local inhabitants.

122. The most important Royal statement was an interview given by the King to the correspondent of the Cairo *Ahram* and published in the local press also on the 16th April. He expressed high hopes of the beneficial consequences to the Arab nation of the recent Saudi-Iraq Treaty (paragraph 140 ff. below). He hoped that other Arab countries would join the alliance. The correspondent added a gloss to the effect that he understood the King to be referring to Egypt, Transjordan, Palestine and Syria. As regards the present international crisis, the King hoped that "wisdom would overcome recklessness." He advised Arabs to keep calm and not to meddle in matters of no concern to them. He applauded the wisdom of the French Government, his friends, in negotiating with the Syrians. Turning to a completely different subject, he defended his action in giving a concession to the Saudi Arabian Mining Syndicate.

123. There was much talk over a year ago about dissension between the King and his sons and his brothers and their families (paragraph 4 of the report for January 1935). The situation seems to have eased. The King's brother Muhammad appears to live remote but unambitiously, much concerned with religious interests. This brother's son Khalid was one of the Royal party which came to Jedda in March (paragraph 79 ff. of the last report). There has been a rapprochement between the King and his perhaps more ambitious brother Abdullah, with whom His Majesty had definitely quarrelled, although Mr. Philby attributes the breach to a quite minor dispute.

124. The second granddaughter of Nuri-ash-Shalan (paragraph 114 of the last report) arrived early in April and was duly married to the Amir Saud. Both sisters and their brother Fawwaz seem to enjoy great consideration. Fawwaz left Jedda by sea on the 15th April.

125. The Amir Feisal stayed in Mecca after the King's departure for Ashaira. He has since moved the seat of Government in the Hejaz to Taif, the summer capital, looking in at Ashaira on the way.

126. Fuad Bey Hamza left for Egypt on the 14th April in the circumstances to be described below. His place is taken as usual by Sheikh Yusuf Yasin, who reached Mecca from Bagdad on the 9th April. This great little Arab nationalist has since shown symptoms of swelled head, due no doubt to his success in Iraq and to his having heard much hot gossiping in Syria during the pause in his negotiations.

127. Various administrative changes were announced in April. The most important were the supersession of Sheikh Muhammad Tawil (paragraph 328 of the report for October 1935) by a new Director of Finance (the official appointed last year to look after the business of the California Arabian Standard Oil Company), and a new Director of Customs in Hasa; the retirement on grounds of health of the fanatical "acting" Governor of Medina, who went back there contrary to expectation last summer and autumn (paragraph 184 of the report for June 1935); and the appointment in his place of Abdullah-as-Sdayry, which should increase the King's hold on the key-posts in his dominions, as the Sdayry family are closely connected with His Majesty by marriage.

128. Wahhabism still has some kick in it. On the 29th April, it is said, the Committee of Virtue in Jedda, incensed by a recrudescence of veneration for the tomb of a Yemeni holy man and reputed miracle worker, who died many years ago, razed it to the ground and removed the skeleton to a common cemetery.

129. The establishment of a new wireless station at Qariya in Hasa was announced in April. That at Uqair seems to have been suppressed, but at what date is not known.

130. A project of the Director-General of Police to establish a school in Mecca for destitute and disabled children from 8 to 15 years was announced on the 24th April. The curriculum is to include industrial training.

131. Some attention has been attracted by the arrival in Jedda not long ago of a party from Jizan, who were conveyed in an unusual manner to Mecca. This appears to have been responsible for a rumour that an important member of the Idrisi family had been surrendered or had submitted to Ibn Saud. It now seems probable that this Idrisi has been in Mecca for some considerable time, and that the other party consisted of important Asiri sheikhs concerned in a quarrel between the local inhabitants and the Saudi authorities at Jizan.

132. Air matters continue to excite interest. The "Eagles" from Italy duly arrived in Jedda on the 4th April, all but one or two, who are said to have remained behind. Those who returned were warmly fêted in Jedda and Mecca. The King and his elder sons received them and gave them much good advice. They have not yet had much chance of showing their quality, as they are apparently not to fly the Wapitis of the Saudi Air Force at present. They, however, made a good many short flights over Jedda on the 27th April ff. in the new French monoplane (paragraph 84 of the last report) under the supervision of the Russian pilots, or pilot, for it is thought that only one remains besides a mechanic in Jedda. Fuad Bey Hamza is understood to be arranging for the purchase of two aircraft for training. A subscription has been opened in certain towns to finance the purchase of three further machines, to be called *Mecca*, *Jedda* and *Riyadh*. The sums collected up to the 28th April were stated to be approximately £gold 540 for *Mecca*, 1,000 for *Jedda* and 1,200 for *Riyadh*. The Italian Government may also lend a hand in providing aircraft for training purposes and civil aviation, but this information is at present most confidential. An Italian air pilot arrived in Jedda by sea on the 29th April.

133. The Saudi Arabian Mining Syndicate have been allowed to import an aeroplane for their own use, which was brought in parts from the United States and assembled in Egypt. Piloted by a Mr. Mountain, it arrived in Jedda on the 29th April and landed on a private ground laid out by the syndicate near their compound outside the town. It is a Bellanca monoplane similar in type to the machine presented to Ibn Saud by the French Government, but bigger and better.

134. A portion, if not all, of the rials minted for the Saudi Government in Birmingham (paragraph 88 of the last report) would appear to have arrived in Jedda about the end of the month. It remains to be seen how they are to be floated and whether the Government can call in the existing rials and stabilise the new ones at twenty to the gold pound. If they can get back any considerable quantity of old rials, they should make a handsome profit, as the respective silver contents would appear to be 642 ounces in the old rial and 346 ounces in the new coin modelled on the Indian rupee.

135. The rivalry for the Red Sea Oil Concession (paragraph 90 of the last report) continues. The eternal optimist, M. Ydlibi, has more than once postponed his departure but was still confident on the 21st April, when he called on Sir Andrew Ryan for the second time. Colonel Etherton broke finally with Mr. Philby on the 14th April and has since been negotiating direct with the Saudi officials, increasing his offers for the Red Sea concession to figures which sound extravagant and eliciting even more extravagant demands. His prospects of success seem poor and his prospects of a gold concession even poorer. Nothing more of a definite kind had been heard up to the 30th April about the Frenchman who was to visit the Farsan Islands. There is no reason to suppose that the Standard Oil Company of California are interested in the Red Sea area, although Sheikh Yusuf Yasin appears to have tried to get them to nibble and to have told M. Ydlibi that they were, in fact, nibbling.

136. Work proceeds at the two wells in the Jebel Dhahran (paragraph 93 of the last report). Superabundance of gas has again created great difficulty at well No. 1 but No. 2 is going fine, according to the Jedda representative of the California Arabian Standard Oil Company.

137. Nothing more has been heard of Colonel Etherton's interest in transport or of his combined grenade thrower, machine gun and revolver. Other parties in England seem to be interested in the possibility of a transport monopoly in Saudi Arabia, among them the Dunlop Rubber Company, who have been in touch with Abboud Pasha of Egypt and whose representative, a Mr. C. H. Tancered, visited Jedda in April but only for a few days. He was also considering the possibility of a monopoly for tyres, which would appear to be barred by the Sharqieh concession, and of marketing out-size tyres in which Dunlops specialise.

138. Meanwhile, the existing native monopoly (paragraph 148 of the report for May 1935) has published a statement of accounts for its first year of working. It shows a net profit of 793,595 gold piastres, a figure which would be more impressive were not 309,466 gold piastres of the receipts shown as being due by the Government. The administration proposed to pay a dividend of £gold 1½ in cash on the 5,000 £10 shares, to hold a substantial sum over for repairs in the following year, and to pass 110,000 gold piastres to reserve plus a further 220,000 gold piastres credited to reserve out of sums due by the Government.

139. Minor economic matters must be passed over but attention may be drawn to the increasing tendency to float small native companies for various purposes.

II.—Frontier Questions and Foreign Relations in Arabia.

140. Even before it had been approved by the Iraqi Parliament, which, however, accepted it unanimously on or before the 9th April, the conclusion of the Saudi Iraqi "Treaty of Arab Brotherhood and Alliance," signed at Bagdad on the 2nd April (paragraph 94 of the last report), was widely advertised by both sides, with special reference to its importance as a great step forward towards the union of all Arabs. The text was made public in Mecca and Bagdad on the 6th April and was communicated the same day by the Saudi Ministry for Foreign Affairs to the foreign missions in Jedda.

141. No full account of the treaty can be given here but the following are the main heads of what was agreed upon:—

- (1) Neither party to enter into any commitment towards a third Power which might prejudice the interests of the other.
- (2) All disputes to be settled by friendly negotiation, or failing this, under the new arbitration protocol to be negotiated in due course.
- (3) Joint efforts to be made to settle peacefully any dispute between either party and any third party, involving danger of war.

- (4) Joint efforts to be made to repel any aggression against either party. Definition of aggression.
- (5) Stated measures to be taken by each party in the event of disorder in the territory of the other.
- (6) Efforts to be made to secure the accession of the Yemen to the treaty. More general provision for the possible accession of any other independent Arab State, at the request of such State.
- (7) Exchange of educational and military missions.
- (8) Each party to be free but not bound to request the other to undertake its diplomatic and consular representation abroad.
- (9) Caveat in favour of Iraqi obligations under the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930. Both parties to carry out the provisions of article 17 of the Covenant and to observe the principles of the Kellogg Pact of 1928.
- (10) Either party to be free to denounce the treaty without notice, in the event of aggression by the other against a third party. Friendship not to be impaired by such denunciation.
- (11) Preservation of previous treaties between the two parties, where they do not conflict with the present treaty.
- (12) Negotiation of subsidiary agreement on stated subjects to be begun within one year.
- (13) (14) Treaty to come into force on exchange of ratifications and to remain in force for ten years and a further similar period, failing notice of termination one year before the expiration of the first period.

142. The definition of aggression under (4) is modelled on that in the Turco-Iraqi-Iranian Pact of Non-Aggression initialled at Geneva last autumn. The Saudi Government have no present intention, however, of joining in that pact. Special interest attaches to the references to the Covenant of the League of Nations in the definition of aggression and at (9). Fuad Bey Hamza told Sir Andrew Ryan on the 13th April that the two Kings were informing the King of the Yemen that day of the conclusion of the treaty. He did not feel assured that the Yemen would eventually accede to it, as the Imam Yahya might hesitate over certain clauses, *e.g.*, those referring to the Covenant of the League.

143. The celerity with which the treaty with Iraq was negotiated reflects the eagerness of certain Arab statesmen to get their countries together in a *bloc*, which might take advantage of trouble in Europe. The Saudi negotiations with Egypt (paragraph 150 below) have been expedited in the same spirit, which is further reflected in the recent unrest in Syria and Palestine and in such minor events as the despatch of Yemeni students to Iraq, the tours of Iraqi Members of Parliament, &c. Most of these matters are outside the scope of this report, but it is significant that on the 29th April Sheikh Yusuf Yasin consulted Sir Andrew Ryan confidentially under instructions about a telegram from the President of the Supreme Moslem Council in Palestine, invoking Ibn Saud's support for the latest Arab anti-British movement there. Sheikh Yusuf expatiated on the King's eagerness to avoid anything which might embarrass His Majesty's Government or cloud his relations with them; but he spoke in the same breath of the importance to his master of maintaining his prestige in the Arab world. Sir Andrew Ryan said all he could to dissuade the King from encouraging hopes that he would concern himself in Palestinian affairs.

144. No further clashes between patrols have been reported from the Trans-jordan frontier. The Saudi complaints (paragraph 95 of the last report) still remain unanswered. The general question of the frontier is dealt with in paragraph 146 below.

145. It has now been arranged that the Koweit Government shall formulate their own proposals for giving effect to the desiderata expressed by Fuad Bey to Sir Andrew Ryan in November (paragraph 96 of the last report).

III.—Relations with Powers outside Arabia.

146. Various reasons prevented Fuad Bey and Sir Andrew Ryan from resuming their official conversations (paragraphs 98 and 99 of the last report) before Fuad Bey left for Cairo. A fresh start had to be made with Sheikh Yusuf Yasin. Although he is notoriously a difficult negotiator, it is fair to say that

he showed much greater keenness to get on with the work than Fuad Bey had done. A fresh series of official conversations began on the 22nd April and is still continuing. They have related principally to the connected questions of slavery and the prolongation of the Treaty of Jedda, but in the first conversation Sir Andrew Ryan pressed Sheikh Yusuf strongly to produce an agreement which, according to a statement made by Fuad Bey at Riyadh in November, was concluded between Ibn Saud and the Sheikh of Qatar before the date of the Anglo-Qatar Treaty of 1916 and which Fuad Bey invoked in support of the Saudi claim to the Jebel Nakhsh (paragraph 400 of the report for December). On the 28th April Sir Andrew Ryan addressed a long personal letter to Sheikh Yusuf stating the latest proposals of His Majesty's Government for a settlement regarding the Transjordan-Nejd frontier. The position in regard to the Koweit blockade question is mentioned in paragraph 145 above. Certain other matters have been left in abeyance.

147. The French Minister was absent most of the month, having left for Hodeida in the *Bougainville* on the 17th April in order to complete his treaty negotiations at Sana.

148. The Italian Chargé d'Affaires at last returned to Jedda on the 16th April. The Odello ladies had left on the previous day and M. Persico now speaks freely of the difficulties which Odello created for him before they both left in January. He had arranged in Rome that Odello should not again get a visa for Jedda, but there is no confirmation of reports that Odello has been run in at home on charges of peculation. M. Persico's relations with the Saudi Government appear to be friendly.

149. The horses for the Queen of the Netherlands (paragraph 102 of the last report) sailed in the same ship as Fuad Bey on the 14th April. Opinions vary greatly as to their quality. The Dutch Chargé left three days later.

150. On the 8th April Fuad Bey informed Sir Andrew Ryan privately that, as a result of telegrams between Cairo and Mecca, negotiations for a settlement of all outstanding questions between Saudi Arabia and Egypt were about to take place. This apparently sudden development was made public on the 10th April and Fuad Bey, with a small staff, left for Cairo on the 14th April. There appears to be no longer any obstacle to the recognition of Ibn Saud by the King of Egypt and it seems probable that this may be accorded, whether the treaty negotiations succeed or fail. These appear to be proceeding satisfactorily, but the vexed question of the Sacred Caravan presents difficulty, and, judging by a recent observation by Sheikh Yusuf Yasin to Sir Andrew Ryan, it may prove to be an even greater difficulty than would appear from telegrams from His Majesty's High Commissioner in Cairo to the Foreign Office. Nevertheless, the Saudi Government are now extremely eager for a complete settlement with Egypt. The implications of this attitude are glanced at in paragraph 143 above.

151. The news of King Fuad's death on the 28th April created little apparent emotion in the Hejaz, but the Amir Feisal telegraphed condolences to the Prime Minister of Egypt, and Sheikh Yusuf was one of the first callers at the Egyptian consulate in Jedda.

152. The Saudi Minister in London was among the representatives of States, not members of the League of Nations, to whom the Foreign Office communicated early in April the recent London Naval Treaty. The Saudi Government might take the opportunity of drawing attention to their admirable record as regards the limitation, both quantitative and qualitative, of naval armaments.

IV.—Miscellaneous.

153. The French warship *Bougainville* arrived at Jedda on the 11th April to convey the French Minister to Hodeida (paragraph 147 above). He left on the 17th April. Courtesies were exchanged on this occasion between the ship and the British Legation. Lady Ryan attended a reception on board on the 14th April. The officers and the French Legation party visited the British Legation next day. It was noticed that the officers included one of apparently equal rank with the commander, viz., a chef de bataillon de l'infanterie coloniale.

154. Various European visitors to Jedda have been mentioned earlier. The only name that need be added is that of Mr. V. Hadkinson, the export manager in

Egypt of the British-American Tobacco Company. His visit was apparently connected with the new arrangements in the office of Messrs. Lazzerini (paragraph 66 of the report for February), who act as intermediaries between the company and their native distributors. Mr. Hadkinson spoke of the market for cigarettes in the Hejaz as good, the *per capita* consumption being greater than that of Egypt.

155. Mr. A. C. Oppenheim, His Majesty's vice-consul, left Jedda for good on the 16th April after over three years of most meritorious service in the Legation. His place is taken by Mr. J. B. T. Judd.

156. Other departures have been fairly numerous. Mr. Philby followed the King to Ashaira. It is strongly rumoured, but not yet confirmed, that he is about to undertake another considerable journey of exploration, perhaps in the south-west of the peninsula. His wife went home in April.

157. The dispersal of the pilgrimage proceeded normally during the month and is now nearly complete. General health conditions in the Hejaz, especially in Mecca, have deteriorated since the pilgrimage, but on the whole natives seem to have been affected more than pilgrims. There was no evidence whatsoever in support of a rumour of cholera in Mecca. Smallpox has created some little anxiety, owing especially to the death of several Sudani pilgrims, who developed the disease on the road from Medina. All were, however, from the same place in the Sudan and formed part of a single party. There are no signs of a general epidemic, but the situation is being watched carefully.

158. The position as regards the manumission of slaves by the Legation during April was as follows:—

On hand at the beginning of the month: One female.

Took refuge in April: Nil.

Manumitted and repatriated: One female.

On hand at the end of the month: Nil.

[E 3194/141/25]

No. 26.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. Eden.—(Received June 3.)

(No. 141.)
Sir,

Jedda, May 13, 1936.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 64 of the 13th May, I have the honour to enclose a copy of the personal letter which I addressed to Sheikh Yusuf Yasin on the 28th April, regarding the question of the Transjordan-Nejd frontier, in accordance with an understanding we had reached some days before. I made this letter very full and as self-contained as possible, as I had a strong suspicion that Sheikh Yusuf might have little knowledge of the earlier discussions with Fuad Bey Hamza.

2. It was not until the 9th May that I was able to discuss the subject systematically with Sheikh Yusuf. You will see by the enclosed record of what passed that I had not exaggerated the difficulty likely to arise from the sheikh's ignorance of the subject.

3. I am sending copies of this despatch and enclosures to his Excellency the High Commissioner for Transjordan at Jerusalem.

I have, &c.

ANDREW RYAN.

Enclosure 1 in No. 26.

Sir A. Ryan to Sheikh Yusuf Yasin.

Jedda, April 28, 1936.

My dear Sheikh Yusuf Yasin,
IN our conversation on the 25th April I promised to give your Excellency in a personal letter an account of the position reached by Fuad Bey and myself in discussions regarding the Transjordan-Nejd frontier and of the latest proposals of my Government for the settlement of this question.

2. As you are aware, this subject was discussed with his Excellency Fuad Bey in London on the 15th July last and the results were summed up in a letter

addressed to him by Mr. Rendel on the 19th July. It may be convenient to reproduce here the paragraphs in that letter summing up the various proposals which emerged in the course of the discussion.

3. The paragraphs describing the two proposals made by Mr. Rendel read as follows:—

Paragraph 5. "In these circumstances, I suggested two alternative possibilities. The first was that we should agree to let this matter stand over until further progress had been made with regard to the settlement of other outstanding questions, when we might be better able to deal with the present question with the thoroughness which it required. Alternatively, if your Government felt it necessary to try to clear up the whole question without further delay, I suggested that we should review the whole question of the Transjordan-Nejd frontier, as established by the Hadda Agreement, and that, for this purpose, it would be necessary to take the following steps:—

Paragraph 6. "In the first place it would be necessary to obtain full and detailed information as to the actual geographical facts, *i.e.*, where the various physical features really lie, and how far those marked on the Hadda map can be identified, and this would involve a new and detailed survey of the whole frontier area on both sides of the frontier, for which, of course, we should need the co-operation of the Saudi Government. Hitherto, we had been most careful to avoid crossing into what was recognised as Saudi territory and had, therefore, only carried out a fragmentary and limited survey on the Transjordan side of the frontier which was insufficient to establish all the relevant facts.

Paragraph 7. "Secondly, it would be necessary, in our view, to come to some agreement as to the principles which should be followed in interpreting the line laid down by the Hadda Agreement in the light of the new situation revealed by the inaccuracy of the map. For this purpose I suggested that it would be essential to be guided by the known intentions of the negotiators. You will remember that we had some discussion as to these intentions, and that I expressed the view that it was clear that the broad intentions underlying the Hadda settlement were that King Abdul Aziz should retain the whole of the Wadi Sirhan up to and including Qaf, with its date gardens and salt pans, and including its projecting edges, to the south of parallel 31 degrees 25 minutes north; while it was equally clear that Sir G. Clayton had pressed for and secured a line running as far to the east and south as it did (*i.e.*, to the east of the crossing of the Carruthers and Shakespeare tracks, and well to the south of the Jebel Waila) in order to retain the Jebel Tubeik, and the tracks passing round to the east and south-east of it, within Transjordan territory."

4. After discussion of the above proposals, Fuad Bey made two counter-proposals, which Mr. Rendel summed up as follows:—

Paragraph 10. "You then made two proposals. The first was that the frontier should be delimited on the ground purely in the light of the description by geographical co-ordinates, *i.e.*, by latitude and longitude only, as given in article 1 of the Hadda Agreement.

Paragraph 11. "Alternatively, you suggested that each recognisable feature in the neighbourhood of the frontier should be allotted to Transjordan or to Saudi Arabia, as the case might be, simply according to whether it appeared on the Transjordan or the Saudi side of the frontier as drawn on the 1918 map, irrespective of its true position."

5. It was understood that both parties would submit the various proposals for further consideration by their higher authorities, and on the 16th March, under instructions from my Government, I asked Fuad Bey what views the Saudi Government had formed regarding the proposals made by Mr. Rendel. I explained that if these were unacceptable to them, I should be prepared to examine with Fuad Bey the possibility of overcoming the difficulties which Fuad Bey's counter-proposals had presented in the eyes of my Government.

6. On the 30th March Fuad Bey made a communication to me on behalf of the Saudi Arab Government. We did not pursue the discussion of Mr. Rendel's

first proposal, the adoption of which might be rendered difficult by certain minor incidents which have occurred on the frontier during recent months. Fuad Bey suggested, however, an attempt to combine part of Mr. Rendel's second proposal with one or both of his own counter-proposals. He insisted that any solution must rest on the actual text of the Hadda Agreement. His new suggestion was that the Governments should proceed first to ascertain the actual geographical facts in the manner described in the first sentence of paragraph 6 of Mr. Rendel's letter of the 19th July, 1935; and that the next step should be a delimitation of the frontier on the basis of the counter-proposal summed up in paragraph 10 of that letter or rather, as he explained later, on a combination of his two counter-proposals.

7. I received further instructions a few days before Fuad Bey left Jeddah for Cairo, but we were unable to continue our discussions. I therefore now communicate to your Excellency the views formed by my Government after studying my report of my conversation with his Excellency on the 30th March.

8. My Government agree that the only legally correct interpretation of the Hadda Agreement is that the frontier must be fixed on the basis of the map of 1918 to which it refers. In view of the inaccuracies which have been discovered in that map, they would have welcomed the acceptance by the Saudi Government of the principles suggested in paragraph 7 of Mr. Rendel's letter. As, however, the Saudi Arab Government feel unable to agree to this, my Government have considered sympathetically the views expressed by Fuad Bey in our conversation of the 30th March. They are still unable to accept the proposal by Fuad Bey, which was summed up in paragraph 10 of Mr. Rendel's letter of the 19th July, 1935, and they do not consider that any combination of that with the proposal summed up in the following paragraph is possible, as the two proposals seem to them to be incompatible and mutually exclusive. On the other hand, if the Saudi Government are prepared to abandon definitely the proposal summed up in paragraph 10, my Government would on their side be willing to proceed forthwith in agreement with the Saudi Arab Government, to arrange for a frontier delimitation commission to carry out the survey suggested in the first sentence of paragraph 6 of Mr. Rendel's letter and then to proceed to the delimitation of the frontier on the basis of the proposal by Fuad Bey, which was summed up in paragraph 11 of that letter.

9. In his conversation with me of the 30th March Fuad Bey referred to the possibility of its being eventually necessary for each side to concede particular places to the other, on a basis of mutual accommodation or bargaining. My Government do not consider that under their present proposals there would be any occasion for bargaining, as it would be merely a question of establishing on the ground a frontier line drawn so that the physical features should be allotted to Transjordan or Saudi Arabia, as the case may be, according as they appear on the Transjordan or Saudi side of the frontier as drawn in the 1918 map. They recognise, however, that if this frontier should prove to be inconveniently distorted, there might be room for some adjustment with mutual advantage.

10. My Government add that, now that they have gone so far to meet the views of the Saudi Arab Government, this difficult question may be settled without further delay and that a possible source of future friction and difficulty between the two Governments may thus be eliminated.

Yours sincerely,

ANDREW RYAN.

Enclosure 2 in No. 26.

Record of Conversation between Sir A. Ryan and Sheikh Yusuf Yasin on May 9, 1936.

SHEIKH YUSUF came to see me yesterday, unaccompanied. Mr. Judd and Ismail Effendi were present. The greater part of the conversation was devoted to the Transjordan-Nejd frontier question. I had given Sheikh Yusuf a very full statement of the position in my letter of the 28th April.

2. Sheikh Yusuf confessed that Fuad Bey had given him no full account of the previous negotiations. This was no understatement, as it soon became evident

that his knowledge of the subject was very limited. He was completely vague as to what had passed between us and Fuad Bey in London and here, and he had not assimilated my letter of the 28th April.

3. In these circumstances the conversation consisted mostly of attempts by Sheikh Yusuf to get the hang of the question and by me to enlighten him on points clearly stated in my letter. He constantly came back to the same points, very unintelligently but with great consciousness of the delicacy of the question and with some suspicion as to what we were at on our side. It would be useless to try to record all that passed. I need only mention the principal matters which arose, making them as coherent as possible, without too much regard to the details or order of the conversation.

4. Sheikh Yusuf reminded me that the Saudi delegates had wished to raise the question of the frontier during the Saudi-Transjordan negotiations in 1933, when the Transjordan delegates had said that it was not within the scope of what they were authorised to discuss. I admitted this and reminded him that I myself had there recognised that the question could be raised at another time and place. (As a matter of fact, what the Saudi delegates were most anxious to discuss in 1933 was Aqaba-Maan, whereas what we are now dealing with is the Transjordan-Nejd frontier, a fact of which I reminded Sheikh Yusuf in the course of our conversation, adding that the Saudi Arab Government had expressed unwillingness to discuss in any way the Transjordan-Hejaz frontier, unless the Aqaba-Maan question could be settled.)

5. I expressed generally to Sheikh Yusuf the difficulties connected with the 1918 map, due to the displacement of the whole of the area shown, in its relation to the graticule and to the further fact that the positions of particular physical features in relation to each other were inaccurate. The map, I said, had proved quite unreliable as a geographical document, but it was important as a political document. In due course I illustrated my explanation by showing him the map.

6. Sheikh Yusuf referred to alleged encroachments on Saudi territory. I told him that the complaints were by no means one-sided. I reminded him of Mr. Calvert's representations nearly two years ago of the incursion of the Governor of Kaf and another person into Transjordan, which had remained unanswered. I did not wish to go back to that now, but we too could formulate protests regarding more recent incidents, as the Saudi Arab Government had done. We preferred to seek a general settlement.

7. Sheikh Yusuf was completely muddled about the proposals summed up in Mr. Rendel's letter of the 19th July last. I explained that I had not pursued with Fuad Bey in March the proposal in the second sentence of paragraph 5 of that letter, for the simple reason that incidents had occurred in the interval owing to meetings of patrols in places claimed by both sides. As for Mr. Rendel's second proposal, Fuad Bey had finally agreed to a mixed commission but not to the suggestions in paragraph 7 of the letter as to the principles to be applied in order to reach a settlement.

8. Sheikh Yusuf was anxious to know how far Fuad Bey had committed himself to the proposal for a mixed commission. I said that he had accepted it but that this acceptance was subject to an understanding as to the second stage after the commission had established the geographical facts. He had proposed a second stage based on the proposal summed up in paragraph 10 of Mr. Rendel's letter, or, as he afterwards said, on a combination of that and the proposal summed up in paragraph 11. I had not fully understood his proposal, but I had understood it enough to indicate its general nature to His Majesty's Government. I explained that His Majesty's Government did not consider that the proposal in paragraph 10 would lead us anywhere, but they were willing to adopt that in paragraph 10, on the understanding that the geographical facts were first established. It was easy to trace the frontier on the 1918 map as it stood by drawing in the lines mentioned in article 1 of the Hadda Agreement. Certain features were marked in this map and some could be allotted without more ado in accordance with Fuad Bey's second proposal, *e.g.*, Haxim and Maizila. Others were tracts rather than specific places like the Wadi Sirhan and the Jebel Tubaik. Many places that had become the subject of controversy were not marked in the map. The work of the joint commission would be to locate as many places as possible and then to relate them to the map, without reference to its inaccuracies, so as to see to which side they should be severally allotted, having regard to the frontier as traced on it by co-ordinates.

9. I mentioned what Fuad Bey had said about the possibility of eventual bargaining. His Majesty's Government did not like this word, but they had admitted that there might be room for eventual "mutual adjustments" to prevent the frontier, as arrived at by the commission, from zigzagging too much. I did not personally see much difference between this and what Fuad Bey had foreshadowed, but our proposal did not include any present provision for eventual adjustments. For the moment we stopped at a second stage on the lines of paragraph 11 of Mr. Rendel's letter.

10. Sheikh Yusuf eventually threw out an idea of his own, admitting that it was purely tentative. He suggested that the Governments might appoint a joint commission, which, armed with the 1918 map, article 1 of the Treaty of Hadda and the necessary instruments, should be instructed to study the frontier area on the ground in the light of the map and the treaty and to report on the positions of various "points." Both parties might then proceed to allot the points so determined to Saudi Arabia or Transjordan as the case might be. The frontier resulting from this allocation would hold good, unless it were altered after it had been determined by any new mutual adjustments agreed between the parties. (It is difficult to give the exact sense of what Sheikh Yusuf said, as he was formulating his ideas without real knowledge of the question and used the word "point" apparently with reference to any place that might be doubtful, whether a more or less extensive physical feature or a particular spot. He did, however, appear to contemplate that the commission should do survey work only and that the Governments should do the rest.)

11. I observed that Sheikh Yusuf's suggestion did not meet the difficulty created by the fact that we had to determine the frontier with reference to the 1918 map, an inaccurate geographical document, which, as I had said, retained its importance as a political document, owing to the King's insistence on the point that the frontier must be determined with reference only to the text of the Hadda Agreement and the map and without reference to the intentions of the original negotiators. We were willing to follow the King, but it would be useless to go to the trouble and expense of a joint commission without having a clear idea of the second stage. We had made our proposal regarding this, basing ourselves on Fuad Bey Hamza's second alternative. I was inclined to agree with Sheikh Yusuf that, if there had to be a third stage of "mutual adjustments," this might be left for settlement, after the commission had reported to the Governments.

12. I finally suggested that Sheikh Yusuf should study the matter further in the light of my letter of the 28th April and the explanations I had given him. He agreed.

13. In the course of the conversation I gave Sheikh Yusuf a strong hint that I should like him to consult the King, as Fuad Bey had taken His Majesty's instructions before speaking to me on the 30th March.

ANDREW RYAN.

May 10, 1936.

[E 3322/56/25]

No. 27.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. Eden.—(Received June 8.)

(No. 146. Confidential.)

Jedda, May 17, 1936.

Sir,

IN my telegram No. 63 of the 13th May, I had the honour to submit a summary of the account given me by Sheikh Yusuf Yasin of the visit of my Italian colleague to Ibn Saud's camp at Ashaira on the 10th May and of what passed between M. Persico and the King. I do not think it necessary to send you a full record of my conversation with Sheikh Yusuf, but I may supplement my telegram by mentioning three points of some importance which I omitted from it, as follows:—

- (a) My Italian colleague, according to Sheikh Yusuf, began his statement to the King by thanking him for having observed neutrality in the Italo-Abyssinian war and for not having taken part in sanctions. The King replied that he had adopted his attitude for the sake of friendship with all concerned.

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- (b) M. Persico stressed the friendly dispositions of his Government towards the Arab nations and their readiness to give any required assurances in this respect.
- (c) At the end of the private conversation, in which the sheikh engaged me after he had carried out his instructions to inform me of what had passed at Ashaira, he threw out a question regarding reports that His Majesty's Government might withdraw from the League of Nations and regarding the consequences of such a step, if it were taken.

2. I did not comment on (a) or (b) above. As regards (c), I took the general line that I knew of no pronouncement by any responsible person which could lend support to the reports in question; that many people, it was true, thought that the League should be reorganised to make it more useful; but that, whatever happened (and no one could foresee what would happen), it would astonish me greatly if Great Britain abandoned or despaired of the League. I adduced various considerations in support of my opinion, making it clear, of course, that I was only expressing my private views as between two friends, in accordance with Sheikh Yusuf's request.

3. Mr. Philby, who was at Ashaira during M. Persico's visit, spent the evening at my house on the 13th May. His account of the audience, based on what he had heard from his friends, and possibly from the King himself, was generally similar to that given me by Sheikh Yusuf, though not so complete and more loosely put together. He was even more outspoken than the sheikh about the perturbation caused in the King's mind by the outcome of the Italo-Abyssinian war. The reason for the King's reaction was, he said, his concern for British prestige. I could not get him to say definitely why the maintenance of that prestige should interest the King so greatly, but the implications of his language were clearly these: Reliance on Great Britain was the corner-stone of Ibn Saud's policy. Great Britain had failed to oppose a successful resistance to Italy in the case of Abyssinia and had, in fact, let that country down. How, then, could the King have confidence in the will or ability of His Majesty's Government to resist Italian ambitions in the Red Sea? Like Sheikh Yusuf, Mr. Philby spoke particularly of the Yemen, saying that, when referring to the intended negotiations between Italy and the Yemen, my Italian colleague had spoken of a "strengthening" of the relations between the two countries.

4. Mr. Philby is, as you are aware, not in the innermost secrets of Ibn Saud, and his language is very apt to be coloured by his personal sentiments. Nevertheless, I think that what he told me on the 13th May faithfully represents Ibn Saud's present outlook. The King watches, as best he can, events in Europe, but he has little true comprehension of them, much less of such concepts as that of collective security or any sort of security upheld by moral force. He has little real interest in Abyssinia, and has seen in the recent conflict not so much a war between Italy and an African Power as a struggle between Italy and Great Britain. He sees in the result a sweeping victory for Italian force in this struggle. Obsessed, as he has been for years, with the fear of Italian ambitions in the Red Sea, he fears that that force may in the future be turned against the Arabian Peninsula. As a Moslem ruler still engaged in consolidating his position in Arabia and jealous of his hardly-won independence, he has no genuine love for Great Britain, a Power which blocks his way in various directions, *e.g.*, in the east and south of the peninsula, but he has much less to fear from British policy on this side of it than he thinks he has to fear from that of Italy.

5. The only fortunate feature of this is that Ibn Saud probably believes that it was not so much the ability as the will to save Abyssinia that was wanting in the attitude of His Majesty's Government as conceived by his simple mind. He probably still believes that a breach with them would be fatal to him, and hopes against hope that they would see him through in the event of a breach between him and any other European Power. He dare not go against Great Britain. He dare not offend Italy. "Neutrality" is more than ever his slogan, because, as I have said, he has seen not a war in Africa, but a conflict, not yet ended, between Great Britain and Italy. He does not yet know what its effects in Arabia may be, and it is with reference to this struggle that he clings to the slogan.

I have, &c.

ANDREW RYAN.

[E 3733/486/25]

No. 28.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. Eden.—(Received June 23.)

(No. 168. Confidential.)
Sir,

Jedda, June 2, 1936.

I HAVE the honour to submit herewith the Jedda Report for May 1936.
2. Copies have been distributed as in the list in paragraph 41 of the report for January.

I have, &c.

ANDREW RYAN.

Enclosure in No. 28.

JEDDA REPORT FOR MAY 1936.

I.—Internal Affairs.

159. Ibn Saud remained in camp at Ashaira (paragraph 120 of the last report) until the 18th May, when he left for Nejd without returning to Mecca. He did little or no hunting from there but may have got some on his leisurely progress to Riyadh, where he did not arrive until the 26th May. His Heir Apparent, who had left about the same time as his father with various other princes, reached Riyadh some days earlier. There was some gossip at the beginning of the month about his marriage with the second Sha'lan girl. He had looked forward to it greatly and had been at pains to provide a worthy house for her in Mecca, first trying unsuccessfully to get hold of one occupied by the Minister of Finance and then falling back on one belonging to his uncle Muhammad. He was disappointed, however, to find that the lady was "an ugly-looking fat woman with green tattooed marks all over her face like those of the Bedouin women," unlike the sister originally destined for him, who, arriving first, was given to the King and who is described as very beautiful. The Amir, unable to remedy a political marriage by divorce, was said to have taken to loose and lonely ways, displeasing to his father. Whatever the truth of these tales, the Prince slipped off to Mecca on the 1st May. On the following days he inspected the police headquarters and the barracks, but where he spent his evenings is not stated.

160. The Amir Feisal, now again Viceroy of the Hejaz, seems to have spent most of his time at Ashaira until the King left, when he went a good part of the way with His Majesty. He is now settled at Taif.

161. Ashaira is a very agreeable spot and Ibn Saud had plenty of society there, both male and female. His official preoccupations, however, followed him and the charms of the camp were a little diminished not only by snakes and scorpions but for a short time by rain. On one wet night the King had to assemble all the ladies in the only tent in their separate camp which was weatherproof and to retire himself to the male quarters.

162. Sheikh Yusuf Yasin, having installed his family in the new quarters of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs at Jedda (paragraph 82 of the last report), has spent most of his time here since the 19th April, one of his principal objects being to continue intensively conversations with His Majesty's Minister, which will be mentioned below.

163. No news of importance has been received regarding the interior, but a report from Bahrein dated the 31st March speaks of great discontent in Hasa over heavy taxation, including customs duties and a tax in lieu of military service. There may be some connexion between this and the dismissal of Sheikh Muhammad Tawil, who was mentioned in paragraph 127 of the last report. The new Governor of Medina, theoretically acting for the King's son Khalid, was installed with some ceremony in May, when an official from Mecca read a Royal rescript, enjoining docility on the population and promising them justice, &c. It may be that Medina is to be modernised. A certain gentleman went to Egypt in May to buy a printing-press, with which to start a paper there.

164. Breezes in the Central Government were rumoured during the month. The most substantial of the stories related to a quarrel between At-Tabaishi, the

King's chamberlain and a man of power, as he looks after the comforts of the King and his ladies, and the Deputy Minister of Finance, who is the brother of the Minister. The Deputy Minister is said to have been disgraced, but to have been begged off by Sheikh Abdullah Suleyman, who humbled himself on this occasion but who remains very influential.

165. More importance attaches to information given to Sir Andrew Ryan by Sheikh Yusuf Yasin on the 23rd May regarding a new administrative system for the whole of the northern frontier. It is to be divided into three sectors, to be managed by inspectors with wide powers. This interests His Majesty's Government, more particularly as regards the frontier area adjoining Transjordan, where the inspector, directly responsible to the Viceroy of the Hejaz, is to be Sheikh Abdul Aziz-bin-Zeyd, a man who in the past has had good relations with Major Glubb. This arrangement promises well, especially as a new Governor has been appointed to Kaf, in succession to one who lost no chance of outraging the feelings of the authorities of Transjordan.

166. Abdul Hamid-al-Khatib, yet another of the Hejazi exiles who were so actively intriguing abroad against Ibn Saud some time ago, has made his submission and returned to the fold. He was a leading personage in anti-Saudi circles in Egypt.

167. Developments connected with aviation (paragraph 132 of the last report) continue to merit attention. It appears that the "eagles" who returned from Italy in April numbered eight only. They came back full of admiration of Italy but they have done little here since their return, have lost much of their initial smartness and are said to be very discontented with their low pay and general treatment, being regarded as little more than chauffeurs. It has been ascertained that the "White" Russian air personnel now consists of one pilot and two mechanics. Subscriptions for the aeroplanes to be named after towns are still being collected and Medina has joined its sister cities in this movement. Fuad Bey seems to have interested himself greatly in Cairo in enquiries as to the types of aeroplanes best suited to Saudi requirements and resources; but it is improbable that any decision has been taken. Meanwhile, Italy has come to the help of the Saudi Government with the gift of aircraft which will be dealt with in paragraph 187 below.

168. The aeroplane imported by the Saudi Arabian Mining Syndicate has been sent to Wejh, complete with a lady wireless operator, the pilot's wife. The syndicate is very active in various directions, and has made further additions to its personnel, including an Indian doctor. It has suffered one severe loss by the death in Jedda on the 3rd May of Mr. H. Ballard, whose remains were interred in the European cemetery next day. This event caused much painful emotion in local European circles. Mr. Ballard had been working principally on the new direct road to the Mahd-adh-Dhahab mine, which is now nearly complete. Mr. G. F. Laycock, a director of the syndicate and of various companies interested in it, arrived in Jedda on the 27th May and is visiting the areas in which the syndicate is operating.

169. A notice published on the 28th April explained that the new licence duties on tea and sugar are not payable until after the goods have arrived. This tends to confirm the view that it is not intended to restrict imports, but merely to levy a disguised surtax (paragraph 88 of the report for March).

170. The new rials mentioned in paragraph 134 of the last report are now in circulation, but no steps have been taken to call in the old, and though the silver content of the latter is nearly double that of the new coins, both circulate side by side. No general rate of exchange has been fixed officially, but the market rate tends to approximate to that fixed for transactions with the Government, viz., 20 to the gold sovereign. The Government are said to have opened a shop in Mecca where silver can be exchanged for gold. This may be a means of drawing old rials into the Treasury, with consequent profit, when new rials are issued in their place. The whole position is still, however, very obscure.

171. No one has yet got the Red Sea concession (paragraph 135 of the last report). Mr. Ydlibi left on the 1st May. Colonel Etherton, still optimistic, followed on the 27th May. Both gentlemen hoped, if successful, to market the concession to Petroleum Concessions (Limited), a new concern formed under the auspices of the Iraq Petroleum Company and practically identical with it in composition. Petroleum Concessions (Limited) have now, however, decided to send out a representative of their own. Not one, but two, Frenchmen, said to

represent the Société française des Pétroles, arrived on the 2nd May in the French sloop *Bougainville*, and have the backing of the French Government for a concession in the Farsan Islands. They are still here, but Ibn Saud professes great eagerness to do business with British interests or, failing an all-British concern, with the Iraq Petroleum Company group.

172. The California-Arabian Standard Oil Company has made further progress in Hasa. Well No. 2, which had reached a depth of 2,175 feet about the middle of May, is yielding about sixty barrels an hour of what is said to be an oil of unusually high quality.

173. Some progress has been made with the urban developments in Mecca and Jedda (paragraph 55 of the report for February). Mecca is said now to possess a beautiful and prolific public garden, made by the Minister of Finance, with the help of Indian experts and money. The large space between the custom-house in Jedda and the town is being actively laid out as a square, which will be overlooked by the house of the Minister of Finance, a Treasury office, which is under construction, and the house now occupied by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

174. Minor economic items must again be passed over, but mention may be made of the grandiosely named "Arab Press and Publications Company (Limited)," formed about a year ago with a capital of 22,000 Saudi piastres, half paid up. The company published its first report on the 28th April, showing a handsome profit, but the shareholders were asked to pay up the other moiety and a new issue was to be made, all with the object of buying one new printing-press. The principal business is the production of the *Saut-al-Hejaz* newspaper.

175. The long-awaited X-ray plant for use in Mecca arrived early in May. As regards the provision of expert personnel, see paragraph 191 below.

II.—Frontier Questions and Foreign Relations in Arabia.

176. Little need be said about Saudi-Iraq relations in view of the lull which has followed the conclusion of the Saudi-Iraq Treaty (paragraph 140 ff. of the last report). The Legation received in May from His Majesty's Embassy in Bagdad the text of an agreement, previously unknown to it, regarding the exchange of wireless messages between Iraq and Saudi Arabia (*cf.* paragraph 126 of the report for April 1935). The agreement was signed in Bagdad on the 6th October, 1935, and was presumably completed subsequently in Mecca. It was to come into force on the 14th October.

177. An amusing story came from Ashaira early in the month. The King, it was said, produced an astrological prophecy of the deaths of the Kings of Egypt and the Yemen within the year. Having seen this half fulfilled, he spoke with great friendship of the Imam Yahya, whose demise he would regret; but he is stated to have expressed indiscreet joy at that of the late King Fuad and to have consigned him confidently to eternal perdition. Meanwhile, the King of the Yemen is reported to have despatched presents of horses for Ibn Saud and the Saudi princes.

178. There are few signs of any active general interest in the Hejaz in the situation in Palestine. A belated mention may be made of a confidential conversation between Sheikh Yusuf Yasin and His Majesty's Minister on the 29th April, when the former produced a telegram from Haj Amin Huseini to Ibn Saud informing him of the Arab strike in Palestine and invoking his help for the Arab cause there. Sir Andrew Ryan urged the importance of no action being taken by the King, which might excite hopes of his concerning himself with the affairs of Palestine.

179. The Koweit proposals (paragraph 145 of the last report) had not reached Jedda up to the end of May.

180. Attention has been drawn to a mistake in paragraph 75 of the report for February, in which it was stated that two sons of the Sheikh of Bahrein had come on pilgrimage this year. The party, in fact, consisted of the widow of the present sheikh's father accompanied by two second cousins of the sheikh.

III.—Relations with Powers outside Arabia.

181. The appointments of Sir Andrew Ryan to His Majesty's Legation in Albania and that of Mr. R. W. Bullard to succeed him as Minister in Jedda were officially announced on the 21st May. Sir Andrew and Lady Ryan expect to leave

Jedda on the 14th or 15th June. Mr. Bullard has had much Arabian experience, having been employed in Iraq from 1914 to 1921, and served as Agent and consul in Jedda from 1923 to 1925. He will probably arrive in Jedda in September.

182. Sheikh Yusuf Yasin and Sir Andrew Ryan had no less than fourteen meetings from the 22nd April to the 30th May to discuss Anglo-Saudi questions, besides meeting three or four times for more private conversations. The important outstanding questions discussed officially so far have been those of the extension of the validity of the Treaty of Jedda and connected matters, notably slavery, on which an agreement was reached, subject to the approval of the Secretary of State, on the 23rd May, the Transjordan-Nejd frontier and the eastern and south-eastern frontiers of Saudi Arabia, two subjects regarding which no conclusion has been arrived at.

183. The local press reported in May that a committee to promote the study of English in primary schools had been formed in Mecca under the auspices of Jamil Daud, the new assistant to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (see paragraph 2 of the report for January).

184. The French Minister returned from Sana on the 2nd May in the *Bougainville*, having concluded the Franco-Yemen Treaty (paragraph 147 of the last report), but without apparently having induced the Imam to discuss other matters in which the French are interested. Since his return he has been very little in evidence in Jedda.

185. The Italian Chargé d'Affaires, who had been absent during the King's visit to Jedda this year, applied insistently after his return for an audience. According to Sheikh Yusuf, Ibn Saud was very unwilling to receive him, but consented under pressure. M. Persico left Jedda on the 9th May and returned early on the 11th, having spent two nights on the road and a few hours only at Ashaira on the afternoon of the 10th, when he had an audience. Arrangements were made as for a formal reception with princes and others present, but the Italian Chargé made various statements to the King about Italian policy and received, according to Sheikh Yusuf, who was instructed by the King to give Sir Andrew Ryan confidentially an account of what had passed, very guarded replies.

186. Rumours again gained some currency in May that a close understanding or alliance between Saudi Arabia and Italy was in contemplation. Fuad Bey Hamza's name has again been mentioned in this connexion (paragraph 24 of the report for January). All the serious indications are, however, that Ibn Saud is determined to stick to his neutrality, technically as between Italy and Ethiopia, but really in what he conceives as a struggle between Italy and Great Britain. The Saudi Government appear to have been very guarded in their reception of an intimation by M. Persico, made orally at first and confirmed later in writing, regarding the Italian annexation of Abyssinia. It is understood that they invoked their neutrality orally and returned no written reply.

187. One transaction, however, affords ground for surmise as to its true nature. Some little time ago the Italian Government undertook, spontaneously according to Sheikh Yusuf, to present six aeroplanes to the Saudi Government, three for training purposes, three for civil use. They sought nothing in return and, again according to Sheikh Yusuf, represented the gift as being inspired solely by their interest in the development of aviation, to which they had already contributed by training Saudi students in Italy. The offer was accepted "in order not to offend the Italians." Three instructional aircraft arrived in cases from Massawa on the 29th May. It is not yet known who came with them; possibly the two remaining Saudi students from Italy, who were known to be on their way back; possibly two Italians, who have appeared in Jedda and may have come to assemble the aircraft; possibly all four. As for the Italian pilot mentioned in paragraph 132 of the last report, he was to serve as an instructor, but he contracted jaundice and had to be sent home. A substitute is being arranged for.

188. It became known on the 31st May that the present Italian Chargé d'Affaires had been promoted to the rank of Minister. The choice of this moment may be significant, but it was understood, when M. Persico came, that he would be appointed in due course to the higher rank. There are signs of disintegration in the lower ranks of the Italian Legation. The senior member of the staff left as soon as possible after M. Persico's return, hoping never to come back. Two married juniors are also craving to depart for good. Incidentally, M. Barattini,

the Italian mentioned in the last sentence of paragraph 66 of the report for February, left on the 3rd March.

189. In the third week of May the Italian Legation again distributed free copies of the Tripolitan paper *Al Adl* (paragraph 408 of the report for December) and a pamphlet showing the atrocities committed by raiding parties of Abyssinians on peaceful Italian workmen before the outbreak of the war. The pamphlet is copiously illustrated by gruesome photographs.

190. A treaty between Saudi Arabia and Egypt was signed by Fuad Bey Hamza and the Egyptian Prime Minister on the 7th May, and was published in a special number of the *Umm-al-Qura* on the 9th May. Both parties were eager and agreed to postpone difficult questions, including that of the Sacred Caravan. The most important provisions in the treaty are as follows: By article 1 the Egyptian Government recognise Saudi Arabia as a sovereign and independent State. Under article 5, the Saudi Government agree to the reconditioning by the Egyptian Government of the mosques at Mecca and Medina and to their undertaking other works in the interest of pilgrims, including road construction, the lighting of the mosques and the provision of water. Article 6 contemplates the conclusion of further agreements on customs, postal and maritime matters and the settlement of other questions of common interest.

191. A Saudi mission of four persons left for Egypt early in May to study the use of Rontgen rays.

192. There has been serious tension between the Afghan Minister and the Saudi Government. The Minister, who is of great religious consequence in Afghanistan as one of the chiefs of the Nakshibandi sect of dervishes, is a very devout Moslem and seemed at first to be no more than an "amiable pietist" as he was called in one report from the British Legation. He has, however, proved pretentious and fussy over protocol. What is worse, he appears to have given great offence to the Saudi Government by his attitude in pilgrimage matters, especially by one vigorous note in which he contested on religious grounds, with texts in support of his thesis, their right to hold up a party of Afghan pilgrims who could not or would not pay their dues.

193. The worst quarrel has been about a house. The following account of this affair cannot be guaranteed in every particular, but is correct as regards the main facts: The Minister rented a house in Taif, without assuring himself that the Saudi Government would allow him to reside there. He took possession and moved in some furniture, then went off to fetch his family. The Saudis staged a comedy, which consisted in a hunt for a house for the father of the Amir Feisal's favourite wife. The hunt ended at that which the Afghan Minister had rented and the Amir's servants incontinently occupied it. This may have been the Amir's revenge for the offensive note. Anyhow, the Minister was treated with no consideration and got no satisfaction when he protested. He was told that the Government had a prior right to the house and that the owner was aware of the fact; also that foreign representatives were not allowed to reside elsewhere than in Jedda.

194. The Minister magnified a more general grievance, which is reasonable enough in itself and which he shares with all his colleagues. He was inclined to claim liberty of movement for diplomats, and tried hard to involve His Majesty's Minister, as doyen, without telling him the whole story of the house. Having failed, he apparently means to go to Egypt. If he should not return, it will at least have the advantage that he will not himself succeed to the post of doyen, which normally involves very little responsibility in Jedda, but in which a man at once so ignorant and so self-important as M. Mojaddidi might easily make himself a great nuisance.

IV.—MISCELLANEOUS.

195. The French warship *Bougainville* returned to Jedda on the 2nd May, bringing the French Minister and the two oil-concession hunters mentioned above. She left next day.

196. Mr. Philby (paragraph 156 of the last report) started for Abha about the same time that the King left Ashaira. When in Jedda shortly before he was reticent as to his plans, but it seemed probable that he will visit Najran and perhaps explore further south. He may run into a party of Egyptian archaeologists, who were reported recently to have proceeded to Hodeida and to contemplate research in Najran.

197. The unsatisfactory health conditions in Mecca, referred to in paragraph 157 of the last report, caused considerable alarm, and for a time a somewhat heavy death rate. It was stated early in May that the supply of labour had been affected and there were complaints that the King had made things worse by taking too many doctors to Ashaira. Little has been heard of the sanitary situation since the first week in May; nor have there been any further signs of abnormal disease among pilgrims, the great majority of whom have now left the country.

198. New regulations on mutawwifs or pilgrim guides were promulgated in May, but it has not yet been possible to study them in the Legation.

199. An Indian notable is said to have offered 25,000 rupees for the construction of a mosque on the site of the Prophet's birthplace in Mecca. It is stated that this offer was refused, but that the King promised that the Saudi Government would themselves build a library on the spot. On the other hand, the Saudi Government have accepted the offer of the Government of Hyderabad to light the Haram at Medina (paragraph 117 of the report for March) subject to the consideration of certain questions, notably that of the cost of future upkeep. The Legation has not so far taken up with the Saudi Government the more delicate question of the enclosing of tombs.

200. The position as regards the manumission of slaves by the Legation during May was as follows:—

On hand at the beginning of the month: Nil.
Took refuge during the month: 1 male.
On hand at the end of the month: 1 male.

[E 3951/90/25]

No. 29.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. Eden.—(Received June 29.)

(No. 176.)

Sir,

Jedda, June 8, 1936.

IN my despatch No. 89 of the 28th March I gave some account of the position regarding aviation in this country. Before leaving Jedda for good, I have the honour to bring the subject up to date to the best of my ability.

2. It has now been ascertained that three of the Wapitis bought by the Saudi Government in 1929-30 are in useable condition, although there would appear to be a deficiency of spare parts. I have heard nothing more of the idea of reconditioning the fourth machine, parts of which have, I understand, been used to supplement deficiencies in the others.

3. The White Russian personnel recruited in 1934 has now been reduced to three persons, who remain from the original party. These are:—

Nicholas Nadenhoff, pilot.
Maximoff, chief mechanic.
L. Koujlavsky or V. Makouetsky, second mechanic.

The first named is normally stationed at Taif, but, with his wife and the remaining personnel, is reported to be at present in Jedda.

4. Eight of the students recently trained in Italy returned to Jedda on the 4th April and came back here after a visit to Mecca, where the King and others showed them great attention. They have not apparently had anything to do with the Wapitis. Indeed, they have done very little flying of any sort, excepting some trial trips, made under the direction of the Russian pilot, towards the end of April in the aeroplane presented by the French Government in March. When they first got back they presented a smart appearance, but they seem now to have reverted a good deal to local habits, and are more often seen in native dress than in their quasi-European uniform. They came back full of the praises of Italy, and have been in some sort propagandists on behalf of that country. They are exceedingly discontented with their treatment here after having been rather spoilt abroad. They are accommodated in the local Government hotel, but they are ill-paid. They do not seem to have shown much efficiency during their trial flights, but could plead that the machine was unfamiliar to them. The remaining two students arrived in Jedda on the 31st May.

5. The new French aeroplane has not been seen in Jedda for some time, and I do not know what, if any, use is being made of it. When flown here in April it seemed to take the air well, but I think that the Saudis were from the outset

disappointed at its small size. The idea that the Heir Apparent might fly back in it to Riyadh was dropped in deference to the King's objections.

6. I have reported separately on the offer of the Italian Government to supply six aeroplanes for training purposes and civil use. I informed you in my telegram No. 75 of the 1st June of the arrival of three of them, packed in cases, from Massawa. I have not so far obtained any particulars of them, except that they are small instructional machines; nor do I know what arrangements have been made for assembling them. So far as I know, the new instructor to replace the officer mentioned in the telegram just referred to is still awaited; but two Italians, stated to be mechanics, who are staying in the local hotel, may have come in connexion with the aircraft presented by their Government.

7. I have adverted in other reports to the efforts which are being made by the Saudi Government, jointly with the Arab Aeronautical Society, to secure further aircraft. These fall under two heads, viz. (a) the enquiries made by Fuad Bey Hamza in Egypt, of which I had some anticipatory knowledge, but which are dealt with more fully in the telegram from the Air Officer Commanding, Middle East, to the Air Ministry of the 23rd April, a copy of which you sent me under cover of your printed despatch No. 130 of the 14th May; and (b) the collection of subscriptions in Mecca, Jedda, Riyadh and Medina for the purchase of aircraft to be called after these cities. The local press announces periodically the amounts collected up to date. The latest totals I have seen mentioned work out approximately as follows, after converting sums stated in other currencies to gold pounds:

	£ gold.
Mecca	584½
Jedda	399
Riyadh	1,218

The figures for Medina have not yet been published.

8. It is worth noting that the efforts of the Arab Aeronautical Society to get funds have extended beyond Saudi Arabia. Subscriptions have been obtained from notable pilgrims, and you will have seen from the Koweit Intelligence Summary No. 5/1936 of the 6th April, that appeals have been launched in Koweit and probably in other Arab countries.

9. It will be seen from the foregoing account that the idea of civil aviation has definitely caught on in Saudi Arabia. Further developments may be expected, especially if the Banque Misr group, and possibly other foreigners, e.g., in India, succeed in due course in organising air services for pilgrims, which would help to impress the Saudi Government and the local public with the advantages of aerial transport. I fear, however, that the progress of local aviation will be slow and unsatisfactory, until it is realised that success can be achieved only by co-ordinating carefully the arrangements for both aircraft and personnel, and by being prepared for considerable expenditure on upkeep, &c., after both have been provided in the first instance. On the other hand, there is no reason to suppose that young men recruited in the Hejaz and Nejd, with others from Syria and other Arab countries, could not be trained to be reasonably efficient pilots and mechanics. They at least have the necessary intrepidity.

10. To make this and my despatch under reference self-contained, I may remind you that there are now two foreign-owned aeroplanes in the country, that of the California Arabian Standard Oil Company, which operates in and about Hasa, and the Bellanca four-seater, imported by the Saudi Arabian Mining Syndicate (Limited). The latter arrived in Jedda on the 29th April, but is now based on Wejh, where the syndicate are busy prospecting. It is piloted by a United States citizen named Mountain, who previously worked for nearly a year for the California Arabian Standard Oil Company in Hasa. His wife is employed as wireless operator. The mechanic is another American named Dissel. You will remember that the Minister of Finance seemed at one time to be interested in American aircraft for this country. The introduction of two American machines by commercial firms may possibly be a stimulus in this direction, unless the Italians, having trained pilots and given some aircraft for nothing, sweep the board altogether.

11. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Department of Overseas Trade, Cairo, Bagdad, Jerusalem, Bushire and Aden.

I have, &c.

ANDREW RYAN.

CHAPTER II.—IRAQ.

[E 172/172/93]

No. 30.

Sir A. Clark Kerr to Mr. Eden.—(Received January 13.)

(No. 1.)

Sir,

Bagdad, January 1, 1936.

WITH reference to your circular despatch of the 28th May, I have the honour to transmit herewith a proof of a revised report on the leading personalities of Iraq for the year 1935.

I have, &c.

ARCHIBALD CLARK KERR.

Enclosure in No. 30.

Records of Leading Personalities in Iraq.

THE ROYAL FAMILY.

1. *Ghazi, King of Iraq.*

Youngest child and only son of King Feisal. Born in the Hejaz at Mecca in 1911. Came to Bagdad in 1923 with his mother and sisters. Was educated first by an English governess, and later at Harrow, where he made little progress, owing to the inadequate preparation which he had received before entering the school. On his return to Iraq he went through the normal course of training at the Iraqi Military Cadet College. He learnt to be a good horseman, but was a poor student of military science. Left the college early in 1933 and became aide-de-camp to his father, King Feisal. Acted as Regent during King Feisal's absence from Iraq in the summer of 1933. Succeeded to the throne on King Feisal's death on the 8th September, 1933. Soon after his accession he was betrothed to Aliyah, the eldest daughter of his uncle, ex-King Ali of the Hejaz. A son was born in May 1935 and named Feisal, after his grandfather. King Ghazi has to shoulder heavy responsibilities for one who has so little experience of affairs and so far shows no aptitude.

2. *Abdul Illah, His Highness the Amir.*

Only son of Ali-bin-Hussein, ex-King of the Hejaz, who died in 1935. Born in the Hejaz 1912. Came to Bagdad as a child with father in 1926 after the latter's expulsion from the Hejaz. Educated partly at home and partly at a private school in England. Amiable and anæmic, he takes no part in public life.

3. *Zaid, His Highness the Amir.*

Born in Constantinople in 1900. Youngest son of the late King Hussein of the Hejaz. Half-brother of King Ali, King Feisal and the Amir Abdullah (of Transjordan). His mother was a Turk. Educated in Constantinople. Fought with the Arab Nationalist forces during the Great War, and won the good opinion of the British officers with the Shereefian army.

Came to live in Iraq in 1922, and was commissioned in the Iraqi cavalry. Acted as Regent for a short time in 1924 during King Feisal's absence.

In 1925 he went to England and studied agriculture at Oxford for nearly three years. During this period he took an active part in the social life of the university and rowed in the torpids for Balliol. In 1928 he joined his father in Cyprus and remained there until King Hussein's death in 1931. Appointed Iraqi Minister at Angora in January 1932.

In 1933 it became known that one of his sisters had contracted a clandestine marriage with Atta Beg Amin, some time first secretary at the Iraqi Legation at Angora (and later at the Legation in London). The Royal Family were indignant.

and Zaid was transferred to Cairo in January 1934 as the first Iraqi Minister at King Fuad's Court. He did not, however, proceed to this post, which he ultimately refused to accept. At the end of 1934 he was busy in Athens engaged in litigation concerning extensive properties which he claims to have inherited in Greece. Appointed Iraqi Minister at Berlin in September 1935.

He is a pleasant, well-mannered man, and speaks excellent English and Turkish. Is generally regarded as the pick of the Hashimites.

OTHER PERSONALITIES.

1. *Abbas-i-Mahmud Agha.*

Chieftain of the Pizhder tribe (Kurdish) (see Babekr Agha). Generally on the side of disorder when trouble is brewing. Maintains a tradition of being at feud with Babekr Agha, but both take care that this enmity shall not weaken the strength of the tribe.

2. *Abbas Mahdi.*

Shiah. Born 1898. Secretary to Iraqi Legation in Tehran 1931. Minister for Education, November 1932. Resigned with Cabinet in March 1933. Appointed Director-General of Tapu in October 1933.

Became Minister for Economics and Communications in February 1934, but resigned with Jamil-al-Madfa'i's Cabinet in August 1934. Reappointed Director-General of Tapu, December 1934.

3. *Abdul Aziz Bey Al Mudhaffar, M.B.E.*

Sunni of Bagdad. Born 1897. Speaks English, German and French well. Served as superintendent in Deputy Military Governor's Office, Bagdad Rasafah, under the Government of Occupation from March 1917, and in 1919 became Mudir of Rasafah. Secretary to the Ministry of Interior, December 1920, and Director of the Press Bureau in 1922. Director of Census Department 1927.

Appointed Mutessarif of Mosul, May 1931. Withdrawn September 1931 for incompetence and tried for misappropriation of public funds. Found not guilty and appointed to be member of Muntafiq Land Court. Lost this post when the court was abolished in June 1932. In the summer of 1933 was appointed first secretary to the Iraqi Legation at Tehran, and in May 1934 was transferred to be consul-general in Beirut.

Appointed counsellor to the Iraqi Legation in Paris, May 1935.

4. *Abdul Aziz-al-Qassab.*

Sunni of Bagdad. Ka'imakam of Kut under the Naqib's Provisional Government and did very well. In October 1921 he was appointed Mutessarif of Mosul on probation for six months, but refused to go without the salary of a full mutessarif. In the beginning of 1922 he went as Mutessarif of Karbala, was transferred to Muntafiq in January 1923, and to the Ministry of Interior as Director-General of General Administration in June of the same year. Appointed Mutessarif of Mosul in January 1924. A capable and well-intentioned official without much strength of character. Minister of Interior, January 1928. Minister for Justice, November 1929.

Went out of office with the resignation of Naji Pasha's Cabinet in March 1930. Has not held any other Cabinet post since. Has an adequate pension. Appointed Chief Administrative Inspector, Grade I, November 1933.

He was appointed Minister for the Interior in the Cabinet formed by Jamil-al-Madfa'i in March 1935, but resigned with all his colleagues twelve days later. Elected a Deputy for Bagdad in the general elections of August 1935.

5. *Abdul Ghafur-al-Badri.*

Ex-cadet in the Turkish army and second lieutenant in the Shereefian army. Since 1920 has been editor of extremist Nationalist newspaper, the *Istiqlal*. This journal has been suspended many times for its violent attacks on the British Government and on British officials in Iraq.

Elected Deputy for Diyala 1933. Re-elected for Kut in the general election of 1934.

Lost his seat in August 1935.

6. *Abdul Husain Chalabi-bin-Ali-al-Hujaiji.*

Shiah of Kadhimain. Elder brother of Abdul Ghani Chalabi and representative of the house. Wealthy landowner of Kadhimain, born 1877. He took a somewhat passive part in the anti-mandate agitation of 1922, but went to Persia on business in July 1922 before the crisis. He returned in November 1922. Minister of Education, November 1922, and subsequently has frequently held this portfolio in different Cabinets. He has little influence in politics, but is usually included in Cabinets as an amenable Shiah.

Minister for Education in Nuri Pasha's Cabinet which came into office in March 1930. Resigned with Nuri Pasha in October 1932. Appointed Senator, November 1933. Again appointed Minister for Education in Ali Jaudat's Cabinet in August 1934.

He resigned with the Prime Minister in February 1935, but was again made Minister for Education in the succeeding Cabinet formed by Jamil-al-Madfai in March. Twelve days later this Cabinet resigned, and since then Abdul Husain has taken no part in public life.

7. *Abdul Latif Nuri.*

Born in Bagdad 1888. Gazetted as officer in the Turkish army in 1908. Joined the Iraqi army in 1921. Promoted Aqid (lieutenant-colonel) in 1926 and brigadier-general (Zaim) in 1929. He has held the command of the Northern and Southern Districts, and has passed the senior and junior officers courses, and was posted to the Northern District in 1933. Promoted Amir Liwa (major-general) in 1932. A close friend of Nuri Pasha.

Placed on pension early in 1935.

8. *Abdul Mahdi (Saiyid).*

Shiah of Shutia (Muntafiq). Born about 1894.

Belongs to an influential family and owns a large estate (Abu Hawan Muqatah). Deputy for Kerbala in Turkish Parliament, and has sat in Iraqi Chamber since 1927. Minister for Education under Rashid Ali-al-Gilani, March-October 1933. Lost his seat in the Chamber in the election of 1934.

Since 1930 he has been a strong partisan of Yassin Pasha and a member of the Executive Committee of the party of National Brotherhood (Hizb-al-Ikha-al-Watani).

9. *Abdul Qadir-al-Rashid.*

Sunni of Bagdad, related to the Gilani family. Born 1894. Speaks English well.

Appointed secretary to the Council of Ministers in 1924 in succession to Hussein Afnan. Remained in that post, the duties of which he discharged with noteworthy tact and efficiency until November 1932, when he was appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs in Naji Shaukat's Cabinet. Resigned with Cabinet in March 1933. Was appointed an assistant manager in the Rafidain Oil Company in October 1933.

10. *Abdul Wahid, Sheikh.*

Chief of the Fatlah tribe, son of Haji Sikkar, once the most powerful sheikh on the Euphrates. Abdul Wahid cultivates extensive properties on the left bank of the Mishkab from Abu Sukhair to the Ibrahim. Throughout recent years he has steered his course with a view to maintaining to the utmost his political and tribal influence. His support and loyalty were carefully cultivated by King Feisal, and all political parties have thought it worth while to try to make him an adherent. On the whole he tends to stand in mostly with Yassin Pasha and the Ikha-al-Watani party. He has many friends and many bitter enemies, and is reputed to deal harshly with his fellaheen.

He was prominent as a leader of discontent in the Middle Euphrates area in the spring of 1935, working with Rashid Ali-al-Gilani to overthrow Ali Jaudat's Cabinet.

11. *Abdullah-al-Damluji.*

Formerly called Abdullah Said Effendi. Born 1895. A native of Mosul. Studied medicine in Constantinople and calls himself doctor, though it is believed that he did not graduate. Seems to have been serving in the Turkish army when Ibn Saud occupied Hassa in 1913, and to have transferred his allegiance to Ibn Saud. Soon rose to a position of influence in Ibn Saud's Court, and came to

Bagdad as his unofficial representative in 1921. Was Ibn Saud's Minister for Foreign Affairs in 1922 and signed the Uqair Protocol. Went with the Amir Feisal-al-Saud to London in 1926, and took part in the negotiations leading to the conclusion of the Treaty of Jeddah in 1927. After this his influence waned owing to the intrigues of Fuad Hamza and Yusuf Yasin.

In August 1928 he represented the Court of Nejd, the Hejaz and its dependencies at the Medina Railway Conference at Haifa. The conference was abortive, and when it terminated, instead of returning to the Hejaz, Abdullah Damluji came to Bagdad, posting his resignation to Ibn Saud. Arrived Bagdad, September 1928. Appointed Iraqi consul-general, Cairo, in 1930, recalled October 1930, and appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs. This at first was resented by Ibn Saud, and for a short time Damluji's presence at the head of the Iraqi Ministry for Foreign Affairs seemed likely to embarrass Nejd and Iraqi relations, but when Nuri Pasha visited Jeddah in April 1931 Ibn Saud stated that he no longer wished to raise any objection to Damluji's appointment. Was left out of office when Nuri Pasha reformed his Cabinet in October 1931. Appointed Director-General of Health, July 1932, and succeeded Safwat Pasha as Court Chamberlain at the end of 1933.

Returned to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Jamil-al-Madfai's second Cabinet in February 1934; resigned in July and was reappointed Director-General of Health in September.

He was suspended in 1935 and tried for misappropriation of public funds. He was acquitted and reinstated in his post at the end of December.

12. *Ahmad, Sheikh of Barzan.*

A chieftain of the Kurdish Zibar tribe. Headquarters at Barzan at the foot of the Chia-i-Shirin. Exercised powerful influence over the Barosh and Mazuri Bala areas to the north-west of Rowanduz. Friendly relations were established with him in 1919, but no administrative control was exercised in his tribal area. In 1920 he was implicated in the murder of two British officials. He and Faris Agha of Bera Kapra were declared outlaws with a price on their heads, and Barzan was destroyed by troops, but his country was not occupied. In 1922 he welcomed Turkish agents into Barosh and Mazuri Bala, and in September 1922 his men made an abortive attack on Amadiyah. A month later Barzan was again destroyed by the Royal Air Force co-operating with Assyrian irregulars. In 1923, the Turks having been driven from Rowanduz, Sheikh Ahmad turned on their retreating columns and came into Agra to make peace with the Anglo-Iraqi authorities. His outlawry was cancelled, and he was permitted to continue in unmolested control of his tribal villages and mountains. In the summer of 1931 he began a private war with a neighbouring chieftain of Baradost, Sheikh Rashid of Lolan. He was everywhere successful, drove Sheikh Rashid to flight into Persia and set fire to his villages. Government intervention became necessary to restore order. Iraqi troops were concentrated early in 1932, and after some sharp fighting followed by intensive air action by the Royal Air Force, Sheikh Ahmad was defeated and driven across the Turkish border in June. He and his two brothers, Muhammad Sadiq and Mulla Mustafa, were interned for a time in Turkey, but the two latter contrived to find their way back into their old haunts in the following winter. After holding out in the mountains for some months they surrendered and were pardoned in July 1933 and allowed to return to their villages. A short time afterwards the Turks surrendered Sheikh Ahmad to the Iraqi Government on condition that his life should be spared. For a little over a year he lived in comfortable and honourable detention in Mosul, but in November 1934 it was found that he was in collusion with Khalil Khushawi, who was disturbing the peace of the Barzan area, and he was thereupon removed to Hillah.

Permitted to come to Bagdad in April 1935.

13. *Ahmad-al-Sheikh Daud, Saiyid.*

Sunni of Bagdad. Born about 1875. He comes of a family of learned men, his father was a well-known teacher in Bagdad, under whom most of the men of Sheikh Ahmad's generation studied. In the early days of the occupation he was a prominent Nationalist. He was arrested and deported to Henjam in August 1920, but was allowed to return to Bagdad in February 1921. Elected to the Constituent Assembly in March 1924, he opposed the treaty of 1922 and

voted against it. Failed to secure a seat in the subsequent general election, but was successful at a by-election. In October 1925 he became pro-treaty, but in January 1926 voted against ratification of the extension of the treaty period. Minister for Aqaf under Abdul Muhsin Beg in January 1928, but resigned office April 1929. Elected to the Chamber as Deputy for Bagdad in October 1933, and retained this seat in the elections of 1934.

Lost his seat in August 1935.

14. *Ahmad Beg I Taufiq Beg.*

A Kurdish notable of Suleimani, born 1898, who has had the advantage of a better education than most of his contemporaries. He has held a number of administrative appointments since the first days of the occupation of the Suleimani Liwa. Was appointed mutessarif after the reoccupation of Suleimani in 1924. The Iraqi Government have several times endeavoured to replace him by others less sympathetic to Kurdish aspirations, but those chosen have not been successful. Ahmad Beg has now (1933) been mutessarif without interruption since 1930. He is connected by marriage with the ruling families of the Pizhder tribe, and owns property in the Surdash nahiyah. A pleasant and presentable man, who has always been popular with British civil and military officers.

Transferred as mutessarif to Arbil in April 1935.

15. *Ajil-al-Yawar.*

Paramount Sheikh of the Shammar Jarba (Arab) tribe of Iraq.

His tribal authority is exercised over the Northern Jazirah from the Sinjar to the Aqarquf depression to the west of Bagdad. A fine man physically, who has cleverly adapted himself to the changing political conditions which have followed the British occupation of Iraq. For some years after the division of the Jazirah between the British and French mandates, tribal troubles were caused by his rivalry with Diham-al-Hadi, the chief of the Shammar, whose territory now lies in Syria. Latterly (1933), however, both Diham and Ajil have settled down to a mutual acceptance of the division of the tribes, and have seemingly agreed to leave each other in peace. Ajil is eager to adopt modern methods of cultivation, and has a number of irrigation pumps.

His eldest son, Sufuq, was educated at the American college at Beirut, but has now finished his schooling and has returned to live with the tribe. He is a great help to his father.

16. *Ali Jaudat.*

Sunni, of humble Mosul origin. Born 1886. Officer in the Turkish army, fought at Shuaibah; subsequently surrendered to the British and spent most of 1915 at Basra. Was there employed to encourage Turkish officer prisoners to join the Sharif. He was a member of the Ahd-al-Iraqi. After the war he was Military Governor of Aleppo following the resignation of Jafar Pasha early in 1920, and was subsequently in Dair. Returned to Bagdad with the Amir Feisal in June 1921, and in October 1921 was given the post of Mutessarif of Hillah, which he held till September 1922. He took a very active part in the anti-mandate agitation, and was finally dismissed (on the advice of the High Commissioner) for defrauding the Treasury by underestimating revenue demands on supporters of his political views. In January 1923 he was appointed Mutessarif of Karbala in the hope that he might be able to reconcile the mujtahids. He was unsuccessful, and in May was transferred to Muntafiq, where he did very well. Minister of Interior in the Askari Cabinet, November 1923-July 1924, and voted for the treaty. Appointed Mutessarif of Diyala, and later of Basra. In early 1930 was made Director of the Ministry of the Interior. Minister for Finance under Nuri Pasha, March 1930. Resigned from Nuri Pasha's Cabinet in September 1930, as a protest against the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of that year, and his seat in the Chamber in 1931, together with Rashid Ali-al-Gilani and Yassin-al-Hashimi in March 1932. Re-elected for Mosul 1933. Appointed principal private secretary to the King, March 1933. Became Prime Minister and Acting Minister of the Interior in August 1934. Was forced to resign in February 1935 on account of the agitation worked up against him throughout the country by Yassin-al-Hashimi and Rashid Ali-al-Gilani. He was made President of the Chamber in March 1935 and appointed Iraqi Minister in London in August 1935.

17. *Ali Mahmud.*

Sunni, lawyer. Extreme Nationalist, probably at heart pro-Turk; was one of the lawyer group who organised the disturbances during the debates on the treaty, the attack on Addai and Salman-al-Barrak, and the subsequent campaign of intimidation. A frequent contributor of anti-British articles to Nationalist newspapers. Deputy for Kut in elections 1933. Not re-elected in the elections of 1934, but was again returned for the Chamber in August 1935 as a Deputy for Bagdad.

18. *Ali Sulaiman, Sheikh.*

The most influential chieftain of the Dulaim tribe. He has represented the Dulaim constituency since the first Chamber in 1924. He is interested in developing his properties with modern machinery, and has installed a number of irrigation pumps. These interests ensure his support for law and order. His tribe have their area on the right bank of the Euphrates from Ramadi to the Syrian frontier at Albu Kamal. He is very fond of horse-racing, and is friendly to British interests.

19. *Arshad-al-Umari.*

Of the well-known Umari family of Mosul. Born 1888. Trained as an engineer in the days of the Turk. Municipal engineer in Constantinople. Staff officer during the war. Member of the first Iraqi Parliament and supporter of Abdul Muhsin Beg. Appointed by latter first Iraqi Director-General of Posts and Telegraphs. Made Amin-al-Asimah (Mayor of Bagdad), November 1931, and during his two-year tenure of that appointment did much for the improvement of the amenities of Bagdad. Was appointed Director of Irrigation in November 1933. Speaks French and understands some English. His brother is Mayor of Mosul. Joined Ali Jaudat's Cabinet in August 1934 as Minister for Economics and Communications. Resigned with the Cabinet in February 1935 and since then has been offered no post.

20. *Ata Beg Al Amin.*

Born 1897. Appointed secretary to the Iraqi Legation in London, September 1932, on transfer from a consular post at Angora.

In the summer of 1933 it was discovered that he had, while in Turkey, married one of the sisters of the Amir Zaid, the Iraqi Minister in Angora and younger brother of King Feisal. This was regarded as a scandal, and, although he was temporarily retained in his post in London, Ata Beg's position in the public service became insecure. Appointed first secretary to the Iraqi Legation at Rome, October 1934. Transferred to London as counsellor in August 1935.

21. *Babekr Agha.*

A powerful chief of the Pizhder (Kurdish) tribe of Qalah Diza (on the Lesser Zab River, north of Suleimani). Has always been honest and friendly in his dealings with the Government, whether British or Iraqi. An able and most estimable man, who has been liked and respected by all who have had close contact with him.

His rival for tribal influence is Abbas Mahmud Agha, who has always tended to be against the Government. Both, however, visited Bagdad in October 1933 and protested their loyalty and obedience to the Iraqi Government.

22. *Bakr Sidqi-bin-Shauqi.*

Born in Bagdad, 1890, of Kurdish parents. Passed out of the Turkish Military Cadet College in Constantinople in 1908. During the war attained the rank of colonel, and was appointed to the General Staff. Joined the Iraqi army in 1921, and was promoted aqid (lieutenant-colonel) in 1923. In the same year he was appointed G.S.O. 1, Operations Branch, in the Ministry of Defence. At times he has expressed both pro-Turkish and pro-Kurdish opinions. Commanded 2nd Cavalry Regiment 1930. Promoted zaim (brigadier-general) in 1931, and posted to command the Northern District. Studied at the Staff College at Camberley in 1932, and was well reported on. In the summer of 1933 he was in command of the troops which first opposed the Assyrians who were returning from Syria to Iraq, and afterwards indulged in the massacre of Assyrians at Simel. It was, however, never established that he issued the orders for this massacre. Shortly afterwards he was promoted amir liwa (major-general), and, following a period of leave, he was, in December 1933, posted to

command the Eastern District, with headquarters at Kirkuk. He is probably the best commander in the Iraqi army. He was given supreme command of the forces concentrated on the Euphrates to suppress the tribal insurrection in April-May 1935, and again proved his efficiency.

23. *Daud Pasha Al Haidari.*

Sunni of Bagdad. Born about 1880. Son of Ibrahim Effendi, ex-Sheikh-al-Islam. The family comes from Arbil, where Ibrahim Effendi has a small property. Daud Pasha was a Deputy and an aide-de-camp to the Sultan Abdul Hamid. Speaks Turkish better than Arabic. He was in Constantinople during the war, and returned to Bagdad in 1921. Appointed, in October 1922, Amin-al-Umana (Chamberlain) in the King's palace. Quiet, well-mannered, insignificant, moderate man. Member for Arbil in the Constituent Assembly, March 1924, and Vice-President. Voted for the treaty 1924. Hazb-al-Shab and opposed treaty of 1926. Minister for Justice under Taufiq Suwaidi, April-November 1929. Disliked and distrusted in Arbil.

Re-elected to Chamber of Deputies to represent Arbil in general election of 1930, but has not held Cabinet appointment since Taufiq Suwaidi's Cabinet resigned in August 1929. In 1930 became lawyer for the British Oil Development Company in Bagdad, and has done quite well out of this work. Was not elected to the Chamber in the elections of 1934.

24. *Daud-al-Sadi, Saiyid.*

Sunni of Bagdad. Born about 1887. Prominent extremist. Lawyer. Usually connected with all Nationalist agitations and intrigues. Elected to the Chamber for Hillah in August 1935.

25. *Fahmi Beg Mudarris Zadah.*

Born about 1874. Superintendent of the Government press under the Turkish régime. Joined the Amir Feisal in Syria, and was with him in London in 1920. Appointed Chamberlain on King Feisal's accession. Was in close touch with the extreme Nationalists in 1922, and at the High Commissioner's request was dismissed from the Palace. In June 1924 he was appointed rector of the Al-al-Bait Theological College, but lost this post in 1930 when the college was closed. In March 1932 he was expelled from Bagdad to Arbil on account of his subversive political activities, but was permitted to return to the capital a month later. Since then he has not been prominent in politics, but frequently contributes articles to the press in which he expounds Nationalist views.

26. *Fakhri-al-din-Pasha Jamil Zadah.*

Sunni of Bagdad. Born 1879. Since the death of his cousin, Abdul Rahman, in 1919, he is the head of one of the most distinguished families of Bagdad. They have large estates on the Tigris and Khalis. Related to the Umari of Mosul. Fakhri's father, who was President of the Board of Public Instruction, had a great reputation. Fakhri is a moderate Nationalist, but he is a man of no moral courage; his opinions flicker in the wind of his fears. He was appointed Minister without portfolio in the Naqib's Provisional Government in November 1920, an office which he held till the termination of the Provisional Government on the King's coronation in September 1921. He was piqued at not receiving Cabinet office in the next Government. In July 1922 he took a leading part in forming the Hizb-al-Hurr, under the presidency of Sayyid Mahmud Gilani, and remained with it until its collapse in 1924. He was consistently against the treaty of 1922, but was reduced to such a state of abject terror by the intimidation of the lawyer group (see Ali Mahmud), that he did not attend when the final vote was taken, and immediately afterwards removed himself into the safe retreat of the Lebanon. Member of Parliament. Kept in touch with Jafar-al-Askari in the hope that, should Jafar be called upon to form a Cabinet, he might have a chance of a seat in it. Finding Jafar Pasha unlikely to return, he attached himself to Yassin Pasha and the Hizb-al-Shab. Senator 1927. Elected to the Chamber in 1934 for Bagdad, but lost his seat in August 1935.

27. *Dr. Faig Shakir.*

Born 1893. Became Deputy in the elections of 1930, and supported Nuri Pasha's Cabinet vigorously. Director-General of Posts and Telegraphs, November 1931. Transferred to be Medical Officer of Health, Kirkuk, in September 1934. Transferred to Bagdad in June 1935.

28. *Faris Agha.*

Chieftain of the Zibar tribe (Kurds), who lives at Huki in the Aqra district. From the time of the British occupation of the Mosul liwa in 1918-19 until 1923, he has a stormy record of hostility towards the authority of the Government. Since 1923 he has been quieter, though he and his tribesmen are always a perpetual danger to the peace of the Aqra district, and the local authorities have little real authority among his villages. He has an old feud with Ahmad of Barzan, whose territory lies adjacent to that of Faris on the opposite side of the Greater Zab River.

29. *Hamdi-bin-Abdul Wahab-bin-Haji Mahmud Pachahji.*

Sunni of Bagdad. He was at one time held in much esteem by the advanced party of young Bagdadi Nationalists. Arrested in August 1922 for organising anti-British demonstrations and interned in Henjam; returned in April 1923 on a guarantee that he would refrain from politics. In spite of this, he worked surreptitiously against the first elections in accordance with the Shiah mandates. Since then he has changed a good deal and takes a more moderate view. Was one of the original concessionnaires of the Asfar Concession. Sat in the Chamber from 1925 to 1930, and once held the portfolio of Auqaf. For several years he took no part in politics, but in August 1935 he was again elected to the Chamber for the Bagdad Constituency.

30. *Hanna Khaiyat.*

Syrian Catholic of Mosul. Born 1884. Medical diploma at Beirut and Paris, much medical and administrative experience and extremely able on both sides. Head of the Mosul Hospital under the Government of Occupation. Appointed Minister of Health 1921. When the Ministry was abolished in 1922 he accepted the post of Director of Medical Services. Speaks excellent French. Appointed Director-General in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs October 1931. Appointed Inspector-General of Health in 1933. Became director of the Bagdad General Hospital and dean of the Royal Medicine College in September 1934.

31. *Hikmat Bey Ibn Suleiman.*

Sunni. Born 1886. Well-mannered and cynical. Director of Education in Bagdad under the Turks. Also Assistant Governor. Member of C.U.P. Was in Constantinople at the time of the occupation. Returned in January 1921 and was a candidate for the Ministry of Education. Made Director of Posts in April 1922 and Director-General of Posts and Telegraphs in April 1923. Minister of Interior in the second Sadun Cabinet. Lost his seat in the Chamber in the general election of 1930, but became Minister for Interior in March 1933. Resigned from Cabinet with Rashid Ali in October 1933, and from Chamber in November 1933. He played an active part in organising intensive opposition to Ali Jaudat's Cabinet in the early months of 1935, but refused office in the Cabinet formed by Yassin Pasha after Ali Jaudat's fall. Paid a long visit to Turkey in the summer of 1935 and returned full of praise for modern Turkish methods. In the autumn of 1935 he was offered the portfolio of the Ministry of Justice, but did not accept it. Is very influential in political circles, where his intelligence is much respected.

32. *Husain Afnan Saiyid.*

Grandson on the maternal side of Baha Ullah, the Persian reformer. Born at Acre in 1889; educated at the Quaker School at Brumana, the American College, Beirut, and Cambridge, where he graduated. Freethinker, but very proud of his grandfather. Appointed Secretary to the Council of Ministers in November 1920, which post he filled with distinction until dismissed in 1924 by Yassin Pasha. He then took up commerce in partnership with Shafiq Haddad, but failed. In 1928 he was appointed "chef de protocol," and in January 1930 secretary to the Iraqi Legation in London. Transferred in September 1932 as secretary to the Legation at Ankara, but the post was abolished soon after his appointment. In May 1934 he was given a minor post in the Railways Directorate.

33. *Husain-al-Naini (Mirza).*

A leading Shiah divine (mujtahid) of Najaf. Like most of the mujtahids, he has latterly kept clear of political entanglements.

34. Ibrahim Hilmi-al-Umar.

Sunni of Bagdad. Born 1895. Clever writer and experienced journalist. Was in Syria during the war and at one time worked for T. E. Lawrence. Came back to Bagdad in 1921 and started the *Lisan-al-Arab* on pro-Feisal and pro-British lines. A year later he changed sides and joined the Shiah agitation against the first elections. Went to Persia with the Ulema and attacked British policy in the Persian press. Returned to Bagdad in March 1923, and in May 1924 became editor of the *Mufid*, a newspaper run by Jafar Pasha. Continued active in journalism until 1931, when he was made Superintendent of the Press Bureau in the Ministry of the Interior. Since then he has kept quiet. Ibrahim Hilmi is a thoroughly worthless and contemptible character, who will do anything (or anybody) for money or drink. Appointed Acting Director of the Department of Propaganda and Publicity in the Ministry of Interior in June 1935.

35. Ibrahim Kamal-bin-Ahmed Mukhtar.

Sunni. Born 1895. Captain in the Shereefian army. A very good officer in the field, where he commanded a battalion. Wounded at the first battle of Maan. Legal officer to O.C., Damascus, under Feisal's régime. Came to Iraq with Jamil-al-Madfai in 1919 making propaganda for the Shereefians. Was afterwards at Dair, but not known to have participated in the attack on Tall Afar. He was in Damascus in April 1921, but subsequently returned to Iraq, and was said to be engaged in inciting people against any form of British control. Was appointed commandant of police, Bagdad, on the resignation of Abdul Latif Felahi. He did well in some ways and kept excellent discipline, but was removed after innumerable complaints of various kinds. After leaving the police he took up the legal profession. Entered Parliament as a Nationalist, but later gave up politics for a well-paid and influential post in the Ministry of Finance. Since then he has given no trouble. Appointed Director-General of Customs and Excise in June 1934.

36. Jafar Pasha Al Askari.

Major-General; Bagdadi, son of a mukhtar; born 1885; studied in Turkish Military School and Staff College, and also in Berlin; served in Turkish, German armies, and with the Senussi in 1916. He was taken prisoner by the Dorset Yeomanry while with the Senussi; changed his allegiance and joined the Arab army under the Emir Feisal. Active service: Balkans, Yemen, Mesopotamia, Dardanelles, Libya and Arabia; speaks Arabic, Turkish, Kurdish, Armenian, Persian, German, French and English. Of unwieldy physique, he is by nature moody, well-meaning and good-tempered, though too lethargic to face the truth when it is unpleasant; inclined to take the line of least resistance and hope for the best. Has no aptitude for intrigue and is easily hoodwinked; is a good speaker; a fine tactician (no strategist), brave and alert in battle. G.O.C., Arab army, 1917-18; decorations: C.M.G., D.S.O., Iron Cross (1st Class), Croix de Guerre (Palms), Legion of Honour (officer), Osmanieh, Majidieh, Ordre pour le Mérite (Turk), Nadhahal Arab (1st Class). Military Governor of Aleppo till beginning of 1920. Then military member of Feisal's Council of Advisers in Damascus; was a member of the convention which elected Emir Abdullah King of Iraq in March 1920. Returned to Bagdad October 1920. Minister of Defence in the Naqib's Provisional Government October 1920-September 1921. Attended the Cairo Conference March 1921. Minister of Defence under King Feisal till November 1922, when, prior to the dissolution of the Naqib's second Cabinet, he left for London to attend the Lausanne Conference, and held no office in the Cabinet headed by Muhsin Beg, with whom he was not on the best of terms. Remained in London as the King's personal representative, and while there began to read for the Bar. He was called in 1931. Returned to Bagdad in September 1923, and in November was persuaded to accept the post of Mutessarif of Mosul. He was made O.C. of the Iraq army in Mosul in addition to his civil duties. In November, on the resignation of Muhsin Beg, became Prime Minister. Member of the Constituent Assembly March 1924, sitting for Diyala. He and his Cabinet accomplished the ratification of the treaty and resigned on the dissolution of the Assembly in July 1924. Elected Deputy for Bagdad, but resigned, and became the Iraq diplomatic representative in London. Recalled in November 1926 by His Majesty to form a Government on the resignation of Abdul Muhsin Beg's Cabinet. Proved incapable of controlling the discordant elements of which his Cabinet was composed, and resigned in January 1928. At Council meetings he

was a cypher, and only kept his Cabinet together by giving way to any Minister whose support he wished to retain. He was then appointed Iraqi Minister in London. Recalled in 1930 to go to Tehran as Iraq's first Minister Plenipotentiary at the Imperial Court. Did not take up this post, but became instead Minister for Defence in Nuri Pasha's Cabinet in March 1930. Elected President of Chamber November 1930, resigned December 1930 and early in 1931 was reappointed Iraqi Minister in London. Recalled to Bagdad October 1931 and appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs and Defence in Nuri Pasha's Cabinet. Prefers London to all other cities, and has many friends in the British army. Returned as Iraqi Minister Plenipotentiary to the Court of St. James December 1932. Received G.C.V.O. during King Feisal's State visit to London in the summer of 1933. He resigned his post in London on appointment to the Senate in December 1934. Became Minister for Defence in Yassin Pasha's Cabinet in March 1935. He and Nuri Pasha have married each other's sisters and always stand together in politics.

37. Jafar Ataifah, Sayyid.

Shiah of Kadhiman, of Arab birth. Rais Baladiyah of the town in Turkish times and after the occupation. A very rich landowner. He was one of the Haityat Muslihah (Conciliatory party) sent to Najaf by the Turks after the trouble there of April-May 1915. Friendly, hospitable, pro-British. He led the movement for the presentation of a madhbatah in favour of British protection in January 1919, and remained staunch through the troubles of 1920 though often in great trepidation. His personal popularity stood him in good stead, and his loyalty to the British did him no harm, since in 1922, when a mayor was chosen by election, he headed the poll. He was still mayor in 1930. Forced to resign in February 1932 and was succeeded by a palace nominee, Mahmud Astarabadi. Is now bitter because he was not helped to keep his post by the Residency.

38. Jafar Chalabi Hafidh-al-Haji Daud, Abu Timman.

Shiah of Bagdad. Born about 1885. Well educated, with a good deal of influence. Always a strong Nationalist, he joined with Yusuf Suwaidi, Muhammad Sadr, Sheikh Ahmad Daud and Ali Bazirgan in the independence movement of 1920 and actively incited the tribes to rebellion. He evaded an attempted arrest in August 1920 and fled from Bagdad to Najaf. Returned in September 1921 and was energetic in promoting all extreme Nationalist movements, especially the anti-mandate agitation. Minister of Commerce from April 1922 till the end of June, when he resigned after a prolonged opposition to the terms of the treaty. He then organised the Hizb-al-Watani (Nationalist party), of which he became general secretary. He was subsequently arrested and deported to Henjam, where he remained till May 1923. On his return to Bagdad he relapsed for a time into private life, and refused to join the Shiah Hizb-al-Nahdhah. Returned to politics on his election to the Chamber in a Bagdad by-election June 1928. Reformed the Hizb-al-Watani (Nationalist party) September 1928. Telegraphed congratulations to the Labour party on their success in the general election in England in 1929. Lost his seat in the Chamber in the election of 1930, but remained active as the secretary-general of the Nationalist party. Resigned from the Nationalist party in October 1933, declaring that he was withdrawing from politics until there should be a change of heart among those in public life. He returned to active politics in January 1935 and joined with Yassin-al-Hashimi and Rashid Ali-al-Gilani in attacking Ali Jaudat's Cabinet. He did not, however, join them in the Cabinet formed after the latter's resignation, and seems once more to have withdrawn from politics. Elected president of the Bagdad Chamber of Commerce in November 1935.

39. Jallal Beg Baban.

Kurd of the Baban family. Born 1892. In early days of British occupation he was actively associated with extreme Nationalists and was deported to Henjam in 1920. Released in 1921. Appointed kaimakam in 1923 and continued to serve in the civil administration, holding the posts of mutessarif in Nasiriyah, Karbala and Arbil until November 1932, when he became Minister for Economics and Communications in Naji Shaukat's Cabinet. Became Minister for Defence under Rashid Ali-al-Gilani in March 1933. Resigned with the latter in October 1933. Appointed Minister for

Education in February 1934, resigned with Jamil-al-Madfai's Cabinet in August 1934, and was appointed Director-General of the Ministry of Finance in December 1934. Transferred to be Director-General of the Ministry of Economics and Communications in June 1935.

40. *Jamal Baban.*

A Kurdish lawyer. Born 1890. Served for some time as a judge in the Northern Liwas. Became Deputy for Arbil in the general election of 1928. Appointed Minister for Justice in Nuri Pasha's Cabinet March 1930. Resigned with Nuri Pasha in October 1932. Reappointed Minister for Justice in Jamil Madfai's Cabinet in November 1933. Retained his portfolio when Jamil-al-Madfai reformed his Cabinet in February 1934 and remained at the Ministry of Justice in Ali Jaudat's Cabinet formed in August 1934. Resigned with the whole Cabinet in February 1935, and in October joined the party organised by Jamil-al-Madfai to oppose Yassin Pasha. Owes his continued presence in successive Cabinets perhaps more to the tradition that each Cabinet must have one Kurd than to his personal abilities.

41. *Jamil Pasha Rawi.*

A Bagdadi; born 1892, officer in the Turkish army. Served in the Shereefian forces during the Arab revolt. Chief aide-de-camp to King Ali in Jedda, and came to Iraq with His Majesty after Ibn Saud's conquest of the Hejaz. Protégé of the palace. Elected Deputy for Dulaim in the general election of 1928, became vice-president of the Taqaddum party and Vice-President of the Chamber of Deputies. Minister for Communications and Works in Nuri Pasha's Cabinet formed in March 1930. Became Minister for Defence in January 1931, but lost his portfolio when Nuri Pasha reformed his Cabinet in October 1931. Appointed Mutessarif of Kirkuk July 1932. Transferred to Kut in October 1935.

42. *Jamil-bin-Muhammad Agha Al Nainawi (Jamil Madfai).*

Of Mosul. Led the party which in June 1920 came from Dair and called upon the tribes to rise against the British in the name of the Shereef. Entered Tall Afar after the murder of Captain Stuart, which he had instigated. Styled himself leader of the Northern Mesopotamian army. On the approach of British troops from Mosul returned to Dair. Returned to Iraq 1923. Soon after, appointed mutessarif and saw service in a number of different liwas. His early record as an official is not satisfactory, but latterly he has given no cause for complaint. Appointed Minister for the Interior under Nuri Pasha in March 1931. Became President of the Chamber in December 1930, following Jafar Pasha's resignation. Resigned October 1931, at the same time resigning from Nuri Pasha's party as a protest against the high-handed actions of Muzahim Beg Al Pachachi, then Minister for the Interior. Composed his quarrel with Nuri Pasha in November and was re-elected President of the Chamber on the 30th November. Again elected President in November 1932 and March 1933. Became Prime Minister in November 1933. Resigned in February 1934, but resumed office with a reformed Cabinet about ten days later. Resigned again in August 1934, but accepted portfolio of Defence in Cabinet which was then formed by Ali Jaudat. Became Prime Minister in March 1935, but was forced to resign by Yassin Pasha's agitation in the Euphrates after being in office for only twelve days. In October 1935 revived the party of National Unity as an opposition to Yassin Pasha's Cabinet, but received little support.

Although a very competent soldier he is entirely lacking in administrative ability and is a mere figurehead in the political world. Is generally popular because he expresses his opinions in an honest, downright manner.

43. *Jamil Beg Al Wadi.*

Sunni of Bagdad. Brother of Hamid-al-Wadi, aide-de-camp to the Amir Abdullah, and Shakir-al-Wadi, formerly aide-de-camp to the late King Feisal.

Appointed a judge in 1923 and became director of the Land Registry Department (Tapu) in 1931.

Appointed Minister for Justice November 1932. Resigned with Cabinet in March 1933. Appointed Director-General of State Domains Lands (in the Ministry of Finance) October 1933. Returned to the Ministry of Justice in June 1934 as member of the Court of Cassation, and a month later was appointed Chief Public Prosecutor. Appointed Director-General of Posts and Telegraphs in April 1935.

44. *Kadhim Dujailli, Sheikh.*

Shiah of Bagdad. Born 1887. A man of considerable literary gifts. In the early days of the occupation of Iraq he played a minor rôle in politics, but took no part in the Nationalist movement of 1920. Later seemed completely to have abandoned politics, and in the autumn of 1923 went to London as a teacher in the School of Oriental Languages. In autumn 1929 resigned his post in School of Oriental Languages and returned to Bagdad. Appointed supervisor of Iraqi students in England October 1931. Appointed Iraqi consul at Mohammerah in summer of 1933, but has remained in London at the Iraqi Legation apparently doing nothing. Appointed vice-consul, Haifa, in July 1935.

45. *Khalid Sulaiman.*

Brother of Hikmat Sulaiman (*q.v.*). Born 1877. Returned from Constantinople, where he had spent most of his life in commerce, in 1926. Was Minister for Education under Taufiq Suwaidi in April 1929. In the reshuffle of portfolios which followed Abdul Muhsin Beg's suicide in November 1929, Khalid Beg was made Minister for Irrigation and Agriculture under Naji Pasha Suwaida. A pleasant, honest and likeable man, but has no influence in politics. Appointed Director-General, Public Works Department, January 1932. Transferred to be Director-General of Posts and Telegraphs in September 1934. Appointed Iraqi Minister at Tehran March 1935.

46. *Khalil Zaki.*

Born in Kirkuk of Kirkukli parents 1886. Served in the Turkish army and became a cavalry captain in 1906. Also saw service on the General Staff. Joined Iraqi army in 1921 and reached the rank of zaim (brigadier-general) in 1928. Has passed junior officers' course and cavalry course. Officer Commanding Northern District 1927-30. Officer Commanding Southern District 1930-31. Officer Commanding Eastern District 1931-33. Reposted to Southern District December 1933.

A good officer and firm disciplinarian. Generally liked by the British officers of the military mission.

Retired on pension in summer of 1934. Elected Deputy for Kirkuk in December 1934 and August 1935.

47. *Khushaba, Malik.*

Assyrian chieftain of the Lower Tiari tribe, aged about 55. Presbyterian, and generally in disagreement with Mar Shimun. Well educated by American missionaries at Urumia. A striking personality with a romantic record as fighter and leader. Supported the Iraqi Government in their efforts to settle the Assyrians satisfactorily in Iraq and thereby incurred the bitter enmity of Mar Shimun. Many of his followers were, however, quite innocently massacred in August 1933 in spite of their friendly attitude towards the Iraqi Government. He desires to leave Iraq, but does not wish to be resettled in the same place as Mar Shimun.

48. *Mahmud Subhi Daftari.*

Sunni of Bagdad. Lawyer. Born 1890. Went with his father to Constantinople during the occupation and returned in 1919. Pleasant, well intentioned and noticeably more moderate in politics than in his earlier days. Appointed Amin-al-Asimah (Mayor of Bagdad) April 1930, but was dismissed in September 1931. Appointed principal of the Law School November 1931, but resigned immediately after his appointment. Became Director-General of Tapu December 1932 and Amin-al-Asimah October 1933.

49. *Mahrut-bin-Hadhdhal, Sheikh.*

Chief of the Amarat, Anaiza (Arab) tribe of Iraq. He succeeded his father in 1927. Born about 1896. Intensely proud, but wiser than he appears. He has endeavoured to maintain good relations with the Iraqi Government, though the Nationalist element in Bagdad regard him with some suspicion on account of his father's close friendship with the British. His tribal area is from the Euphrates southwards to the Nejd border.

50. *Mahmud, Sheikh.*

Of the family of Barzinja Sayyidis. He has inherited from his father and grandfather great tribal and religious influence throughout Southern Kurdistan.

He was made Hukumdar of Suleimani in 1918, shortly after the British occupation. In June 1919 he revolted against British authority, was wounded and deported to Henjam Island in the Persian Gulf. He was reinstated as Hukumdar of Suleimani in 1922, after the Turks had forced the British political officers there to withdraw. In 1923 armed action had to be taken against him to check his endeavours to establish his influence in the Kirkuk and Arbil Provinces. Suleimani was reoccupied in 1924, but Sheikh Mahmud was not brought to terms until 1927. These were that he was to abstain from politics and live outside Iraq in one of his Persian villages close to the border. He chose Piran and stayed there quietly until 1930, when an outbreak of Kurdish Nationalist feeling in Suleimani again tempted him into the political arena. Air and ground forces had again to be sent against him, and on the 31st May he surrendered at Panjwin. He was granted an allowance and sent to live at Hilla. From there he was later removed to Ramadi, and in the summer of 1933 he was permitted to take a house in Bagdad. He receives an allowance of 900 rupees per mensem from the Iraq Government. He has three sons, Rauf, Baba Ali and Latif. Rauf is quiet and industrious and lives in Suleimani. Baba Ali, after completing his secondary schooling at Victoria College in Alexandria, has been sent to Columbia University, New York, to study political economy. Latif is the pet of his father, and will follow closely in his footsteps, if he has a chance to do so.

51. *Mar Shimun.*

Eshai, Mar Shimun, Patriarch of the Assyrians (Catholicos of the Church in the East).

Born about 1909. Succeeded to the patriarchate in 1920 when a child. Educated in England at a seminary in Canterbury. Since coming of age and assuming the authority of his position, Mar Shimun has actively fostered discontent among the Assyrians. Whatever his position as the head of a spiritual community, his temporal authority is not acknowledged by a large number of Assyrians, estimated at a maximum at 12,000. His aim has been to establish the whole community in a compact enclave under his own spiritual and temporal authority. He was the inspirer of the mutiny of the levies in 1932 and of the exodus to Syria in 1933. Deported by the Iraq Government in the summer of 1933, he was given an asylum in Cyprus, where his father David and his aunt Surma joined him. In October 1933 he went to Geneva to protest to the League of Nations against the massacre of Assyrians which followed the Assyrian attack on the Iraq army at Dairabun (Faishkhabur) in August 1933, and in November went to England to obtain support from friends and sympathisers there. On his deportation King Feisal granted him and his family a provisional allowance of £780 a year, subject to his correct behaviour. This allowance was stopped by King Ghazi in the summer of 1934 on account of the propaganda which Mar Shimun persistently carried on against Iraq.

While paying lip service to the League of Nations and always ready to petition that body on behalf of the Assyrians, he has proved disloyal to its decisions whenever they have conflicted with his personal ambition. By preferring temporal power to spiritual leadership, he has been the means of inflicting much needless suffering on a deserving people. During the year 1934 he was mostly in England, paying several visits to Geneva when Assyrian affairs were under discussion. He remained in Europe throughout 1935, spending much time in London.

52. *Maulad, Pasha Al Mukhlis.*

Sunni. Born about 1875. A fine soldier, he behaved with great gallantry with the Shereefian army and was badly wounded. His exploits do not lose in the telling. Served in Syria and was sent in 1920 to Dair, where the agreement between the British Government of Occupation and the Arab Government was reached under his auspices in April. A hot Nationalist, he continued to spread anti-British propaganda among the tribes until he was recalled by King Feisal in June. Remained in Syria after the fall of the Arab Government and returned to Bagdad in July 1921. He lost no time in joining the extreme Nationalist group. There was no post to offer him in the Iraq army, but he was given some land near Tikrit and settled down to cultivate it, with occasional visits to Bagdad and Mosul to take part in Nationalist activities. In May 1923 he was appointed Mutessarif of Karbala, to deal with the Ulema. He is no administrator, but he

kept things quiet at the time of the exodus of the mujtahids. An impulsive man, who allows his anti-British sentiment to rule his actions. Has been a Senator since 1925.

53. *Muaffaq-al-Alousi.*

Born about 1894. Belongs to a learned family of Bagdad. He is a graduate of the Sorbonne whence he returned to Bagdad in 1926. Was appointed a professor in the law school and afterwards in 1928 Director-General in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Two years later he quarrelled with the Minister, Abdullah Damluji, and withdrew to Beirut. In 1931 he accompanied Nuri Pasha to Mecca to negotiate the Iraq-Nejd "Bon-Voisinage" Agreement. In the autumn of 1932 he went again to Mecca, this time to take up a post as judicial adviser to King Abdul Azziz-al-Saud. He remained in Arabia for about a year and then returned to Bagdad. In May 1934 he was appointed first secretary in the Iraqi Legation in Tehran. Transferred to be consul at Beirut in May 1935.

54. *Muhammad Amin Zaki Beg.*

A Kurd of Sulaimani. Born 1880. Well educated and speaks French, German and English. Formerly staff officer in Turkish army. Was made Minister for Communications and Works in November 1926, and subsequently held the portfolios of Education and Defence. Exerted little influence in the Cabinets in which he has held office. His policy is to try to please the Kurds by supporting Kurdish Nationalists while avoiding compromising his position with the Arabs. Lost his seat in the Chamber in the general election of 1930. Again Minister for Economics and Communications July 1931. Resigned October 1932. Appointed Director-General of Economics and Communications March 1933, but became unemployed when this post was abolished in September 1934. Became Minister for Economics and Communications in March 1935 in Yassin Pasha's Cabinet.

56. *Muhammad Husain Qashif-al-Ghata (Saiyid).*

Shiah Alim of Najaf. One of the few Arab Divines of importance.

Attended the Moslem Conference at Jerusalem in 1931 as Iraqi delegate. Visited Persia on a prolonged tour in the summer of 1933, and returned to Iraq in February 1934. In the spring of 1935 he took a prominent part in the tribal insurrections on the Euphrates, and gave his full support to the tribes which took up arms against Yassin Pasha's Government. He hoped to persuade them to make a united front with the Ulama in an attempt to force on the Government a series of sectarian demands intended to secure for the Shiah community a greater share in the government of the country. He was only partially successful and, after the defeat of the tribes by the army, he wisely withdrew to silence in the shrines of Najaf.

57. *Muhammad Ridha-al-Shabibi.*

Shiah of Bagdad, born about 1880. Belongs to a well-known family. Member of Constituent Assembly and Minister for Education in Yassin Pasha's Cabinet in 1924. Again given the portfolio of Education in the Cabinet formed by Yassin Pasha in March 1935. His reactionary views soon brought him into conflict with his colleagues and with the chief permanent officials of his Ministry, and he resigned in September 1935.

58. *Muhammad Salih-al-Qazzaz.*

Bagdad mechanic. Born about 1898. Has recently come into prominence as a labour leader and agitator. A professional demagogue, he always thrusts himself in the van of any bazaar troubles, and has been especially conspicuous in encouraging discontent among the labour employed by the foreign companies operating in Iraq. Played a leading part in organising the boycott of the Bagdad Electric Light Company in the autumn and winter of 1933.

59. *Muhammad-bin-Hasan-al-Sadr, Sayyid.*

Born about 1885. An influential Shiah divine of Kadhmain. Was a violent Nationalist in the early days of the British occupation, and played a prominent part in the insurrection of 1920. He fled to Syria when the insurrection was put down, but returned with the Amir Feisal in June 1921. Took an active part in the anti-mandate controversy of 1922, but after the proclamation of the Constitution in 1924 greatly modified his views. Appointed a Senator in 1925 and elected President of the Senate in 1929. He has subsequently been re-elected to this position at each new session.

60. *Muhammad Zaki.*

Basra lawyer. Born 1895. Close supporter of Yassin-al-Hashimi, and often elected Deputy for Basra. Returned to the Chamber in election of 1933, and became Minister for Justice in Cabinet of Rashid Ali-al-Gilani in March 1933. Resigned with Rashid Ali in October 1933. Elected to the Chamber in 1934, and was appointed Minister for Justice in March 1935. Resigned on being elected President of the Chamber in August 1935. Re-elected President in November 1935.

61. *Musa Shabandar.*

Bagdadi Sunni, born 1899.

Elder son of Mahmud Shabandar, a wealthy land and property owner of Bagdad.

Went to Berlin soon after the armistice, and has since been living in Europe, mostly in Zurich and Berlin. Has frequently contributed anti-British articles to the Bagdad press, using the pen-name of "Alwan Abu Sharara." Believed to be in touch with the League against imperialism.

Came to Bagdad in autumn of 1932, and in January 1933 was appointed secretary of the permanent Iraqi delegation at the League of Nations.

Speaks English, French and German. Appointed first secretary to the Iraqi Legation in Berlin in October 1935.

62. *Muzahim-al-Amin Pachahji.*

Sunni of Bagdad. Born 1888, a lawyer. Elected Deputy for Hillah in the Constituent Assembly, March 1924, and sat in the first Chamber in 1925. Minister of Communications and Works in the Hashimi Cabinet, August 1924. In 1927, while in London, he made a close study of English politics. Recalled to Bagdad in February 1928 and joined the active Nationalists. His ideas seemed to be tinged with communism. Was prominent in anti-Zionist manifestations in summer of 1929. Became Minister of Economics and Communications in January 1931 and shortly after Minister for the Interior, in which post he unexpectedly gave satisfaction to his British advisers. Resigned in October 1931 on account of a difference with his colleagues regarding his dismissal of the Amin-al-Asimah. Towards the end of May 1932 he was charged with complicity in the circulation of scurrilous anonymous letters, making allegations against the personal honour of the King. Resigned his seat in the Chamber and was committed for trial with four others by Bagdad magistrate's court. Acquitted in October 1932. In October 1934 he was appointed Minister at Rome and permanent delegate at Geneva. In November 1935 he was released of his duties at Geneva.

63. *Dr. Naji-al-Assil.*

Bagdadi, born 1895. First became prominent in 1922 as semi-official Hashimite representative in London. Continued to represent Hashimite interests in London until final conquest of the Hejaz by Ibn Saud. Dr. Naji then became destitute in England, and was deported to Iraq in October 1925. In Iraq he was soon employed under the Ministry of Defence in the Iraqi Military Medical Service. Appointed Iraqi consul-general and Chargé d'Affaires in Jedda in August 1931. Returned to Bagdad in June 1932 to be present during the visit of the Amir Feisal, son of King Abdul Aziz-al-Saud. Appointed consul, Mohammerah, October 1932. Acting Director-General in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs April 1933. Appointed counsellor in the Legation at Tehran April 1935.

64. *Naji Beg Ibn Shaukat Pasha.*

Sunni of Bagdad, born 1891. Studied in Constantinople and became a reserve officer. Joined the Sharif and was at Aqabah with Colonel Lawrence, for whom he has a great admiration. Returned to Bagdad in 1919. Early in 1921 he was given an appointment under the Mutessarif of Bagdad, and subsequently became mutessarif. He showed considerable administrative ability, and maintained cordial relations with his British advisers. He was appointed Mutessarif of Kut in October 1922, of Hillah in 1923, and of Bagdad in 1924. Minister for Interior, June 1928, Minister for Justice, September 1929, and reverted to Interior in the changes which followed Abdul Muhsin's suicide. Appointed Iraqi Minister at Angora in September 1930. Recalled to Bagdad in October 1931 to take up portfolio of Interior. Became Prime Minister in November 1932.

Received the Order of Grand Officer of the Crown of Italy in January 1933. Resigned premiership March 1933. Minister for the Interior in November 1933, resigned February 1934. Again appointed Minister at Angora April 1934.

65. *Naji Pasha Ibn Yusuf Suwaidi.*

Born in Bagdad 1883. Educated at Bagdad and in the school of law at Constantinople. Speaks French and English. Public Prosecutor in the Yaman 1905; president of the Commercial Tribunal, Basra, 1908; member of the Bagdad Court of Appeal 1910; Kaimakam of Kadhmain 1910-11; of Najaf 1911; and of Hindiyah 1912; Civil Inspector for Diarbekr, Urfa and Mardin, 1913; Inspector for the Eastern Region (Adana to Mosul) 1915; Civil Inspector of the Adana Vilayet 1916, whence he was transferred to Konia; Civil Inspector in the Ministry of the Interior, Constantinople, 1917. Returned to Syria after the armistice and was appointed Deputy Military Governor of Bagdad, but resigned the appointment after a few days and returned to his former post in Aleppo. Returned to Bagdad in March 1921, and was active in the preparations for the reception of the Amir Feisal. Was appointed Minister of Justice in September 1921 and held the post till November 1923, having served for a short time also as Minister of Interior. Deputy for Bagdad in the Constituent Assembly, March 1924. He opposed the treaty and voted against it. Became Prime Minister in November 1929. His Cabinet resigned in March 1930. Re-elected for Bagdad in the general election of 1930, but resigned his seat in March 1931 as a protest against the alleged unconstitutional conduct of the Government. Accompanied King Feisal to Tehran in April 1932. Appointed Senator January 1933. Joined Jamil Madfai's Cabinet in February 1934 as Minister for Finance, and resigned with his colleagues in August 1934.

66. *Naqib Zadah of Bagdad, Mahmud-bin-Abdul Rahman.*

Naqib of Bagdad, born 1867. Son of Saiyid Abdul Rahman, the first Prime Minister of Iraq. Succeeded his father in June 1927. As the Keeper of the Mosque and Shrine of Sheikh Abdul Qadir he controls large waqfs and is revered by adherents of the Qadiriyyah sect throughout the Islamic world. Many pilgrims come to visit him from all parts of India and especially from the North-West Frontier Provinces.

He has, however, little or no political influence in Iraq.

67. *Nasrat-al-Farsi.*

Minister for Finance November 1932. Lawyer of Bagdad about 1890. In early days of Iraq Government held somewhat extreme Nationalist views, which he voiced as a Deputy in the Chamber. Was later given an appointment in the Ministry of Justice, where he served diligently for a number of years. Steady and intelligent, but inclined to be obstructive.

Resigned with Naji Beg Shaukat in March 1933. Appointed Minister for Finance in Jamil Beg Al Madfai's Cabinet in November 1933. Resigned in February 1934. Appointed Director-General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in April 1935.

68. *Nishat Beg Sanawi.*

Sunni of Bagdad, born 1893. Studied in the School of Law, Constantinople. He was in Bagdad before the occupation, went to Mosul with the Turks, and was employed in various capacities there. Returned after the armistice and took service under the British Administration. Was appointed Director of the Law School when it was reopened in 1919; criminal magistrate, February 1922; judge in the Court of Appeal, March 1923. Amin-al-Asimah, Bagdad, 1925-30. Appointed Director-General in the Ministry of the Interior in April 1930, and became Principal of the Law School, February 1931. Reappointed Director-General in the Ministry of the Interior, November 1931. Appointed Administrative Inspector, November 1933. Became Director-General of Municipalities in June 1935.

69. *Nuri Pasha Said.*

Sunni of Bagdad, born 1888, son of an accountant of Mosul descent. Educated in Constantinople, speaks Turkish, German, French and English. Served in Balkan War. He was one of the founders of the Ahd in 1913, and came from Constantinople to Iraq in order to start branches there. He was in Basra at the time of the occupation as a patient in the American hospital;

joined the Arab army in the Hejaz in June 1916, and commanded the troops till the arrival of Jafar Pasha (his brother-in-law); served as C.G.S. till the fall of Damascus. A good strategist very receptive of ideas, clever, hard-working, rash and hot-headed under fire. A modernist with an exceptionally alert intelligence. Was awarded the D.S.O. 1917 and the C.M.G. 1919, and accompanied Feisal in London, Paris and Syria in 1919 and 1920. He always wished for a reasonable rapprochement between the French and the Arabs, and dissuaded King Feisal from offering resistance to the French on the ground that he could not hope for support from the British. When the break came in July 1920 he went with Feisal to England. Returned to Bagdad in February 1921 and took charge of the Ministry of Defence during the absence of Jafar Pasha at the Cairo Conference. On his return he became C.G.S. and Director-General of Police, and held these appointments till October 1922. Acting Minister of Defence from November 1922 to November 1923. Held the same portfolio in Jafar Pasha's Cabinet. Minister of Defence again in November 1926, and retained that portfolio with only short intervals out of office until he became Prime Minister in March 1930. Negotiated and signed the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of June 1930. Visited Jedda in 1931 to negotiate a "Bon-Voisinage" Treaty with Nejd and the Hejaz. Resigned with the whole Cabinet the 19th October, 1931, but reaccepted office on the same day in a reformed Cabinet. Visited Ankara with King Feisal July 1931, and again in December-January 1931-32. During latter visit he signed with Turkish Government an Extradition Treaty, a Treaty of Commerce and a Residence Convention. Resigned premiership in October 1932. Appointed Minister at Rome, February 1933, but did not proceed. Became Minister for Foreign Affairs in Cabinet of Rashid Ali Gilani in March 1933. Resigned with Rashid Ali in October 1933 and accepted portfolio of Foreign Affairs and Defence under Jamil-al-Madfai in November 1933. Resigned in February 1934, but returned to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in August 1934 under Ali Jaudat's premiership. Resigned with Ali Jaudat in February 1935, but retained the portfolio of Foreign Affairs in the succeeding Cabinet formed by Jamil-al-Madfai, and returned again to the Ministry in the Cabinet formed by Yassin Pasha in March 1935.

70. *Rashid-bin-Saiyid Abdul Wahab, known as Rashid Ali Beg Al Gilani.*

Sunni of Bagdad, born 1892. A distant relation of the Naqib. In Turkish times was Bash Katib of Waqf. Strong C.U.P. man, unpopular with the Naqib Zadah. Fleed to Mosul with the Turks on the capture of Bagdad, and after the fall of Mosul was appointed Mudir Auqaf under the British Administration. Practised as a lawyer, and in May 1931 was appointed a judge in the Court of Appeal. Became a professor in the Bagdad Law School. His work as a judge won him the good opinion of his advisers. Was appointed Minister of Justice in Yassin Pasha's Cabinet in 1924. Resigned over the signing of the Turkish Petroleum Company's Concession in March 1925, which, at Yassin Pasha's instigation, he strongly opposed. Became Minister of Interior in the second Saduniyah Cabinet in June 1925, but resigned almost immediately on being elected President of the Chamber of Deputies. From November 1926 to January 1928 was Minister of the Interior. Re-elected to the Chamber of Deputies in the general election of 1930, but resigned his seat in March 1931, in company with Yassin-al-Hashimi, Naji Suwaidi and Ali Jaudat as a protest against the conduct of Nuri Pasha's Government. Became a prominent leader of the Hizb-al-Ikha-al-Watani (the party of National Brotherhood). He encouraged the general strike in July 1931, hoping thereby to embarrass Nuri Pasha's Cabinet. Appointed Rais of the Royal diwan (chief private secretary to the King) in July 1932. Became Prime Minister in March 1933. Resigned October 1933. Appointed Senator in summer of 1934. Helped to organise the disturbances on the Euphrates which forced Ali Jaudat to resign in March 1935 and, as Minister for the Interior, joined the Cabinet then formed by Yassin-al-Hashimi.

71. *Rashid Beg Al Khojah.*

Sunni of Bagdad. Born 1884. Staff officer in Turkish army. Came to Damascus after the armistice. Prominent member of the Ahd-al-Iraqi. He returned to Bagdad in November 1920 and was appointed mutessarif in January 1921. He is weak and much under the thumb of the extreme National group. In February 1922 he was appointed Mutessarif of Mosul, where he was completely under the influence of Mustafa Sabunji. As his presence in a frontier division

was considered inexpedient by the Iraqi Government, he was removed and reappointed Mutessarif of Bagdad. Appointed Iraqi consul-general at Cairo October 1928, and Director-General of Education January 1930. Consul-general, Beirut, August 1931. Chargé d'Affaires and consul-general at Jedda, August 1933, but did not take up post. Appointed Minister for Defence under Naji Shaukat, November 1932. Resigned with Naji Shaukat's Cabinet in March 1933. Elected President of the Chamber of Deputies November 1933 after resignation of Jamil-al-Madfai. Reappointed Minister for Defence in February 1934, resigned with Jamil-al-Madfai's Cabinet in August 1934. Re-elected President of the Chamber in December 1934. Again appointed Minister for Defence in Jamil-al-Madfai's Cabinet in March 1935, but resigned with the whole Cabinet after being only twelve days in office. Elected to the Chamber in August 1935 and joined the Opposition led by Jamil-al-Madfai.

72. *Rauf-al-Bahrani.*

A Shiah of Bagdad, born about 1897. Graduated at the Bagdad Law School and was appointed to a clerical post in the Ministry of Finance, where he rose to be Accountant-General (not altogether by merit). Appointed Minister for Finance in Yassin Pasha's Cabinet in March 1935.

73. *Rauf Beg Chadirji.*

Sunni of Bagdad. He was Mayor of Bagdad at the time of the cutting of New Street and earned a great deal of personal unpopularity thereby. Left for Berlin shortly before the occupation, and subsequently went to Switzerland, returning to Bagdad in the summer of 1920, up to which time permission to return had been refused him. Speaks French perfectly, English and German well. He set up practice as a barrister and consorted much with British officials. He took no part in the Nationalist agitation; nevertheless, when his father was deported to Constantinople in August, he was asked to return with him. He came back in 1921 and resumed his legal work without taking any part in politics. He has most of the business of foreign firms in his hands owing to his knowledge of English. He was in England on a visit during the summer of 1923, returning home in September. A retiring man of modernist opinions. Deputy for Hillah in the Constituent Assembly in March 1924. He was strongly opposed to the passage of the treaty without amendments and voted against it. Chosen director of the law school August 1924. Minister of Finance, Second Saduniyah Cabinet, and afterwards became Minister of Justice in Jafar Pasha's Cabinet in November 1926. Iraqi Minister to Angora autumn 1929. One of the most refined and most likeable men in Bagdad. Resigned post as Minister at Angora in December 1930, and returned to Bagdad as legal adviser to the Iraq Petroleum Company.

74. *Rauf Beg Al Kubaisi.*

Sunni; of Kubaisah origin. Born 1885. He was commandant of gendarmerie in Aleppo under Jafar Pasha in 1919 and did useful work in keeping order before the advent of the French in July 1920. Refused office under the French and returned to Bagdad in February 1921. He was appointed Kaïmakam of Suq in November 1921, but was removed in June. He then for a time joined the extreme Nationalist group in Bagdad. Appointed Director-General of Jails in 1924 and subsequently played no part in politics. Appointed Mutessarif of Basra January 1930. Dismissed for incompetence, April 1931. Appointed Director-General of Auqaf in summer of 1933.

75. *Rustam Beg Haidar.*

Shiah of Baalbak (Syria), where his family owns considerable estates. Born 1889. Well educated, speaks excellent French and English. Pleasant mannered, quiet and well bred. He came to Iraq with the Amir Feisal in June 1921, and after the coronation was appointed head of the King's diwan. Appointed Minister for Finance November 1930, in Nuri Pasha's Cabinet. Acted as Prime Minister twice during Nuri Pasha's absence from Iraq. Went to Europe with King Feisal in summer of 1931. Resigned from the Ministry of Finance when Nuri Pasha's Cabinet fell in October 1932. Became Minister for Economics and Communications in March 1933. Resigned with Rashid Ali in October 1933, and was reappointed to the same Ministry under Jamil Madfai in November 1933. Resigned in February 1934, and returned to the Palace as Rais of the Royal diwan in November 1934.

76. *Sabih Najib*.

Born 1892. Gazetted to the Turkish army in 1912. Joined Iraqi army 1921, and reached the rank of lieutenant-colonel 1929. Passed a staff course in England, and for some time was Commandant of the Iraqi Staff College in Bagdad. Speaks excellent English and French and some German. Appointed Director-General of Police in March 1931. Represented Iraq on the Syrio-Iraq Frontier Delimitation Commission in 1933. Appointed counsellor, Berlin, June 1935. Transferred to Geneva as Iraqi delegate to the League of Nations in November 1935.

77. *Sadiq-al-Bassam*.

Shiah of Bagdad. Born 1895. Graduated at the Bagdad Law School, and for several years practised as a lawyer. Deputy for Kut 1930-34. In the Chamber he gave steady support to Yassin Pasha, and was a member of the Ikha-al-Watani party. In June 1935, as a reward for his political services, he was appointed Director-General of Government Lands and Properties in the Ministry of Finance, and became Minister of Education in Yassin Pasha's Cabinet in September 1935.

78. *Said Beg Ibn Ali Beg*.

Mir (chief) of the Yazidis. Lives at Baidra near Mosul. Weak character, drinks heavily and indulges in every sort of vice. Much under the control of his mother, Maiyana, who is a woman of personality and was at one time a noted beauty. The Yazidis are dissatisfied with Said Beg on account of his profligate living, and from time to time there is a movement to dispose him and substitute another member of the ruling family. So far, however, traditional loyalty has been stronger than their critical faculty, and Said Beg has succeeded in retaining his position.

79. *Salih Jabr*.

Young Shiah lawyer of Najaf employed for some time as a judge. Elected Deputy February 1930 and resigned from the bench. Acquired notoriety in the Chamber as a persistent asker of questions and ready speaker. Appointed Minister for Education under Jamil Madfai November 1933. Resigned February 1934. Elected Deputy for Muntafiq December 1934. Appointed Mutessarif of Karbala in April 1935.

80. *Taha-al-Hashimi Pasha*.

Brother of Yassin Pasha Al Hashimi (*q.v.*). Born 1888. Served in Turkish army and was employed in Arabia and the Yemen during the war. Was given a post on the Turkish General Staff in Constantinople in 1920, but returned to Bagdad in 1922 to join the Iraqi army, and was at once appointed Officer Commanding Troops in Mosul. Appointed chief of the General Staff and came to Bagdad in 1923. Was attached to Sir Percy Cox in May 1924 for the boundary negotiations with the Turkish Government which followed the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne. The post of chief of the General Staff was abolished shortly after his return in August 1924, and for a while he acted as tutor to the (then) Crown Prince Ghazi. Appointed chief of the Census Department in 1926 and Director of Education in 1928. In 1930 he returned as chief of the General Staff to the Ministry of Defence, and was promoted Fariq (general). In 1931 he visited the Imam Yahiyah of the Yemen and concluded a treaty of friendship between the Yemen and Iraq.

He is popular with the British officers of the military mission. In September 1935 he was appointed Acting Director-General of Education in addition to his other duties.

81. *Tashin Qadri*.

Sunni of Damascus. Born 1893. Was with Feisal in Damascus and accompanied him to Europe in July 1920. Came with him to Bagdad in June 1921, and was appointed an A.D.C. to the King in August. Married the daughter and heiress of Abdul Wahhab Pasha Qartas of Basra. Speaks English and French. Pleasant and clever. Appointed Master of Ceremonies in the palace March 1932. Accompanied King Feisal on his State visit to England in 1933 and received the K.C.V.O.

82. *Talib Mushtaq*.

Sunni of Bagdad, born 1900. Father was head clerk in Baquba. Took part in the anti-mandate agitation of 1922 and in the spring of 1923 was one of

those responsible for anti-British posters issued over the signature of the Supreme Committee of Iraq Secret Societies. Appointed Inspector of Schools in 1924 and held a variety of appointments under the Ministry of Education until November 1931 when he was appointed first secretary to the Iraqi Legation at Ankara. Appointed Director of the Consular Department in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in November 1935.

83. *Taufiq-bin-Yusuf Suwaidi*.

Born 1889. Studied law in Bagdad and Constantinople and international law in Paris. In 1913 became first interpreter to the Ministry of Education, Constantinople. Represented Iraq at the Arab Conference held in Paris in July 1913. After the armistice went to Syria and was appointed peace judge in Damascus. Returned to Bagdad in October 1921 and in November was appointed Assistant Government Counsellor and Director of the Law School. Minister for Education January 1928. Prime Minister 1929. President of the Chamber 1929. Iraqi Minister at Tehran March 1931. Joined Jamil-al-Madfai's Cabinet in July 1934 as Minister for Foreign Affairs, but resigned with the whole Cabinet in August. Held Cabinet office for twelve days as Minister for Justice in Jamil-al-Madfai's short-lived Cabinet in March 1935, and in October was appointed Comptroller-General of Accounts.

84. *Thabit Abdul Nur*.

Born 1890. Son of Aziz Abdul Nur, a prominent Jacobite Christian of Mosul. He was christened Nikole. Was an officer in the Turkish army, embezzled money and fled to Syria to join Shereefian cause. At this time he changed his name to Thabit, became a Moslem and performed the pilgrimage to Mecca. Came to Bagdad in November 1921 and became prominent in extreme Nationalist politics. Elected Deputy for Mosul in general election of 1930, and appointed Director of Oil Affairs in the Ministry of Economics and Communications in June 1931. The post was abolished in March 1933. Tried in 1932 for misappropriating the funds of the Agricultural Exhibition (April 1932), but acquitted.

Appointed counsellor in the Iraqi Legation in London December 1933. This post was abolished and he was appointed Iraqi Oil Representative in London in July 1934. Appointed Director of Oil Affairs in the Ministry of Economics and Communications in June 1935.

85. *Yassin Pasha Al Hashimi*.

Sunni; born 1884. Of Kirkuk origin and probably Turkish (Saljuq) descent. His father was a Mukhtar of Bagdad. Yassin saw military service in Mosul in 1913 and was the founder and organiser of the local branch of the Ahd. G.O.C. at Salt and Amman in 1918, where, in the spring, he proved a good strategist. After General Allenby's defeat of the Turkish armies in Palestine he fell sick, was made a prisoner of war and interned in Haifa. There he learnt to know the English and began to study their language. After the armistice he was released and joined King Feisal in Damascus. He was made C.G.S. of the Arab army in Syria, a post he held till November 1919. In July 1920 he was appointed Prime Minister at Damascus, but held the appointment only for a few days. Remaining at Damascus, after the fall of the Arab Government, he dissipated in unsuccessful commerce the money which he had amassed while in office. Returned to Bagdad in March 1922. At first he kept out of all politics, but in June, at the King's insistent request, he accepted the post of Mutessarif of Muntafiq. In November 1922 he became Minister of Communications and Works in Abdul Muhsin Beg's Cabinet. Able in his Ministry he was unfailingly obstructive in the Cabinet, especially in regard to those parts of the Treaty of 1922, which dealt with the employment of British officials. He resigned office in November 1923, but joined the Constituent Assembly March 1924, where he persistently opposed the ratification of the treaty. Was Premier and Minister of Defence in 1924 and 1925. From June 1925 to November 1926 he headed an Opposition party. In November 1926 he again accepted office as Minister of Finance, and remained in this post until the Cabinet resigned in January 1928. Was once more Minister for Finance in Naji Suwaidi's Cabinet of November 1929, but resigned office in March 1930. Re-elected to the Chamber of Deputies in the general election of 1930, and led the Opposition to Nuri Pasha's Cabinet together with Rashid Ali-al-Gilani. Resigned his seat in March 1931 in company with

Naji Suwaidi, Rashid Ali and Ali Jaudat. Played a leading part in giving political encouragement to the general strike in Bagdad in July 1931, hoping through the strike to deal a blow at Nuri Pasha's Cabinet. King Feisal was anxious to make him Prime Minister in October 1932, when Nuri Pasha resigned, but he would not accept the King's condition that he should announce his acceptance of the Treaty of Alliance of 1930. Became Minister of Finance in Cabinet of Rashid Ali-al-Gilani in March 1933. Resigned with Rashid Ali in October 1933 and did not join Cabinet formed by Jamil Madfai. In the early months of 1935 he was active with Rashid Ali-al-Gilani in stirring up hostility to Ali Jaudat's Cabinet, and in March was invited by the King to form a Cabinet. This he accepted, and formed one of the best Governments which Iraq has seen. He has given up his former hostility to the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of Alliance of 1930.

86. Yusuf Ghanimah.

An intelligent and hardworking Chaldean Catholic of Bagdad; born about 1890. Diminutive and unimpressive, he mixes freely with Moslems and was made Minister for Finance in January 1928, after having shown industry and ability as *rapporteur* of the Finance Committee of the Chamber. Has sat in Parliament for Bagdad since the first election. Lost his seat in the Chamber in the general election of 1930, and then began to take part in the activities of the two Opposition parties, the Hizb-al-Watani (Nationalist party) and the Hizb-al-Ikha-al-Watani (the Party of National Brotherhood). Appointed Director-General of Revenues in the Ministry of Finance, December 1932, and Director-General of the Ministry in 1933. Became Minister for Finance in Ali Jaudat's Cabinet in August 1934. Resigned with the whole Cabinet in February 1935. Appointed Director-General of Finance in June 1935.

Obituary.

The following persons, formerly included in this report, died during the course of 1935:—

- (1) Ali, ex-King of the Hejaz (Royal family).
- (2) Haji Kadhim Hashimoff.

[E 173/173/93]

No. 31.

Sir A. Clark Kerr to Mr. Eden.—(Received January 13.)

(No. 2. Confidential.)

Sir,

Bagdad, January 2, 1936.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith my report on the heads of foreign missions in Iraq for 1935.

I have, &c.

ARCHIBALD CLARK KERR

Enclosure in No. 31.

Report on Heads of Foreign Missions at Bagdad.

Iran.

Inayatullah Khan Samii came to Bagdad as Minister Plenipotentiary in January 1934 to assume a post he had held in 1929, when he signed the Perso-Iraqi "Accord provisoire."

He followed Saiyid Baqir Khan Kazemi, who was disliked and mistrusted, and, although Samii has probably succeeded in winning for himself some personal sympathy, he has been able to do little to dispel the suspicions felt by the Iraqis of Iranian policy in general. At the time of the rising on the

Euphrates in the early summer, Samii's Legation was blamed for every intrigue that emerged from Kerbala and Nejef. The Iraqis know well that all that Samii does is dictated from Tehran, and for this reason he does not carry much weight. He speaks fluent French and is a friendly and pleasant man.

Turkey.

Tahir Beg Lutfi has been Turkish Minister in Bagdad since January 1930. Hitherto he had served mainly in the Balkans.

He is an agreeable but rather slow-witted Turk, who finds it difficult to keep pace with the reforms that are being introduced into his country. His relations with the Iraqi Government seem to be good. His wife is popular in British circles.

United States of America.

Mr. Paul Knabenshue has been in Bagdad as Minister Resident since November 1932. It is his first diplomatic post. He came from Beirut, where he had been consul-general. Before that he had served in Jerusalem and Cairo. He likes to talk of the happy times he had at both these places and of his close personal relations with His Majesty's High Commissioners. His father was consul-general at Belfast, and it was there that he met and married his Irish wife.

As American colleagues go, Mr. Knabenshue is, I should say, on the whole a good one. He is always friendly and ready to pass on any information that has reached him, and when, in his turn, he comes to the Embassy to seek it, his enquiries are invariably discreet and reasonable. I confess that I do not find him stimulating, but his views seem to be shrewd and his judgment sound enough. His interests in Iraq are of necessity restricted, and he appears to be mainly absorbed in the building of a new Legation, which is to be modelled upon the White House.

Last year he paid an official visit to Muscat in order to convey to the sultan the good wishes of the President on the occasion of the 100th anniversary of the Treaty of Friendship and Commerce between the United States and Muscat, America's oldest treaty, he tells me. But it was said at the time that he was more interested in oil in the Persian Gulf than in the treaty.

He and his wife have won some popularity in the rather narrow and critical European society of Bagdad, and this is no mean achievement. The Iraqis seem to like him, and *they* were not unduly shocked when he allowed his daughter to appear at the opening of Parliament in a pair of her father's flannel trousers. He educates his children in England and professes great faith in British institutions in general.

France.

M. Paul Lépiessier was appointed French Chargé d'Affaires in June 1930. He came from Beirut, where he had been for five years secretary to the High Commissioner. He can have no very happy memories of that time, for he is a harsh critic of the way in which the internal affairs of Syria are conducted, and he declares that it is high time for the French Government to follow the example set by ourselves in Iraq.

M. Lépiessier does not hesitate to blame Beirut for the present unsatisfactory relations between Syria and this country, and to say that any efforts which he makes to improve them are defeated by the influences which hedge the High Commissioner about. These influences are, he claims, strong enough to make the Quai d'Orsay—otherwise at all times a completely reasonable institution—give way to Beirut whenever he ventures to appeal to Paris. As M. Lépiessier has made it clear to the Iraqis that no attention is paid in Syria to his reports on Iraq, and that even Paris does not give him all the support he deserves, it is not surprising that the Iraqi Government do not consider him to be a person of much account, or that little or no progress is made with the half-dozen draft agreements between Syria and Iraq, which would do so much towards disposing of the quite unnecessary difficulties which encumber the relations between the two countries.

M. Lépiessier is intelligent and well informed, and, I am told, a good Arabic scholar. But he has to face life with an uncommon share of physical handicaps. He stands no more than five feet high. His face and body are subject to a painful nervous twitching, which, willynilly, one is obliged to watch when attention should be upon what he is saying. He seems to set much store by the rank of

Ambassador, and to keep for its holders (and, I am bound to say, for his small fringy-pawed dog, which he calls now Bulbul and now Pansy), a special version of his somewhat unusual manner, still more fervid and caressing (even to the laying on of hands) than that with which he normally approaches the world. I confess that at first I found it irksome to be patted, cooed at and danced round for the little I had been able to do to help him out of his difficulties. But I have got used to all this as I have got used to the twitching, and I like M. Lépiessier, for he is, indeed, my only interesting colleague.

He is married to a pleasant woman who is as calm as he is nervous, and who shares with him the hope that one day his rank will be raised to that of a Minister.

Egypt.

The post of Egyptian Minister is vacant, and the Legation is in charge of Hafidh Bey Amir, who was appointed in October 1934.

He is an elderly man, probably of Turkish origin. He speaks English and likes to come from time to time and give his views on the mistakes of British policy in Egypt, about which he expresses great concern, claiming to be an ardent believer in an Anglo-Egyptian alliance. He professes to be in very close touch with Abidin Palace. An agreeable man with some sense of humour.

Germany.

Dr. Fritz Grobba came to Bagdad as Chargé d'Affaires in March 1932, and was promoted to be Minister Plenipotentiary in December of that year. Before then he had served as consul at Jerusalem, Minister at Kabul, in the Eastern Department of the German Foreign Office, and, during the war, with the Turkish armies in Palestine. This means that he has a fairly wide experience of the Middle East.

I should say that he is a man of some ability. He is certainly zealous and energetic in pushing German interests in this country. Buttoned rather tightly into his somewhat old-fashioned black cutaway coat, which he seems always to wear, he suggests at first glance a typical middle-class German official of before the war—wooden, correct, formal and a little inhuman. But most of this soon passes, and, when he unbuttons (still, I am bound to say, very correctly), he reveals a geniality and humour that seem to be genuine and are quite pleasing. He has shown himself to be a friendly colleague, and is always ready to talk freely about current events in Iraq, upon which he seems to be well informed, and about his own difficulties.

He went on leave last summer for the first time for four years. He told me that he had no particular wish to go to Germany, but that he had been told to do so by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Berlin, in order that he might get into personal touch with his new masters and acquire something of what he described as the "atmosphere" of nazism. What change this may have wrought in him I cannot say, for he has not yet returned.

He stands well with the Iraqis, and he and his wife, who are both at ease in the English language, move freely amongst the British colony, by whom they are liked.

Italy.

M. Mario Porta was appointed Chargé d'Affaires in November 1932, before which time he had served in Latin America and Abyssinia.

He seems to be an unhappy man, mainly, I gather, because he is obliged not only to serve in Bagdad, and to do so as Chargé d'Affaires rather than as Minister, but also because he is by nature over-sensitive. He attaches an exaggerated importance to the little privileges that fall to heads of missions, and takes it much to heart that they are denied to him because of his rank. He spends much of his time biting his thumbs over such things as this. For that reason he is over-watchful for slights and prone to take offence and to sulk. He is, therefore, constantly at sixes and sevens with the protocol section of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and with his colleagues, and people tend to laugh at him and to make jokes about "Porta's latest." All this is to be regretted, because he is by no means a fool.

In his relations with this Embassy he has always been correct. I doubt if he is trustworthy.

Since the beginning of the war in Ethiopia he has been active in putting the Italian case before the Iraqi public, and for this purpose he has had a small newspaper in his pay. But he has not met with any success. He has also divorced himself completely from the official and social life of Bagdad.

His wife is English and he speaks her language fluently.

Saudi Arabia.

Sheikh Ibrahim-bin-Muammar came to Bagdad in June 1933 as the first Chargé d'Affaires of Saudi Arabia. A pleasant man with courtly manners, he comes into a room like a galleon under full sail.

A little more than a year ago he got himself into trouble with the Iraqi Government for encouraging the Wahabi tendencies of certain young Moslem organisations in Bagdad, and a protest was made at Jedda, but this affair has now blown over, and I should say that his official relations with the Iraqis were quite good.

He speaks nothing but Arabic.

Austria (non-resident).

Herr Carl Buchberger, who is Austrian Minister at Angora, where he lives, and at Tehran, presented his letter of credence in October 1934. He made a short stay here and has not since returned. He was my colleague in Stockholm, and I have pleasant memories of his intelligence, friendship and agreeable manners.

Poland (non-resident).

Dr. Stanislas Hempel became Polish Minister in May 1933. He represents his country also in Tehran, where he lives. I have not yet met him.

Sweden (non-resident).

Baron Eric Gyllenstierna was appointed in October 1934, when the Crown Prince and Princess of Sweden visited Iraq. He occupies the same post in Moscow and Tehran, between which places he divides most of his time.

I met him when he paid a short visit to Bagdad a few weeks ago in order to sign a commercial agreement. His visit was, however, long enough to persuade me that Bagdad lost but little by his prolonged absences.

Belgium (non-resident).

M. Robert van de Kerchove d'Hallebast was appointed in May 1933. He lives in Beirut, where he is consul-general. He paid a short visit to Bagdad soon after I arrived.

I am told that he is intelligent and well informed on the affairs of the Middle East, where he has spent many years. He passes, too, for being a good talker, but it was my misfortune only to hear him describing the excruciating pain of a well-developed Bagdad boil, for which he had recently found a cure, and this, after the first slight freezing of the blood which was natural to a newcomer, quickly became tedious.

Czechoslovakia (non-resident).

Dr. Vladimir Fric was appointed in December 1934. He is also in charge of the Czechoslovak Legation in Tehran, where he lives. I have done no more than meet him for a few minutes when he passed through Bagdad a few weeks ago on his return to Iran from leave of absence.

Netherlands (non-resident).

M. C. Adriaanse was appointed in May last. He came from Jedda, where he is also accredited and where he lives. He stayed no more than a few days in Bagdad, but he liked it and told me that he hoped to persuade his Government to transfer his headquarters from Arabia to Iraq.

SETTLEMENT OF THE ASSYRIANS OF IRAQ.

Report by the Trustee Board to the Committee of the Council of the League of Nations on the 1936 Budget.—(Received in Foreign Office, January 24.)

Geneva, January 20, 1936.

THE Trustee Board devoted the greater part of its first session to a careful examination of the financial situation of the settlement scheme, in the light of the decisions of the Assembly and the Council (see Annexes I and II).

The Trustee Board wishes first of all to draw the Council Committee's attention to certain considerations and to certain new facts which may or should involve an increase in a number of items as compared with the figures contemplated by the Assembly and the Council :—

	Possible or necessary increase in the Expenditure estimated for the operation as a whole.
(a) The number of Assyrians likely to leave Iraq may be estimated at 21,000, or 6,000 more than in September	French francs. 6,000,000
(b) Hitherto allowance has been made for the transport of only a very small number of animals. There is reason to believe, however, that the Assyrians in question possess about 100,000 head of cattle, sheep, &c. It will be well to transport all the animals which can be fed on the spot without additional expense	182,000
(c) The area of 8,500 hectares which had been provided for provisional settlement in the vicinity of the Gharb is no longer available. Negotiations are in progress with the local authorities and with landowners. The Board has thought it necessary to increase the original credit by ... for it considers that any increase in the area above the 4,000 hectares at present available would be an advantage from the point of view of the credit provided for supplies.	200,000
(d) At the formal request of the High Commissioner's representative, the Board has had to allow a credit for the police of ...	672,000

(e) The budget of the Assembly estimated receipts of 3 million in respect of payments to be made by the Assyrians.

As regards the tax of 1 dinar to be paid by each Assyrian before his departure, the Board considers that it would be impossible to charge this sum without refusing access to Syria to any person not able to pay the sum in question. Experience has shown that it is practically impossible to distinguish between the needy and those possessing personal means. The committee will no doubt wish to give a decision on this question, which is outside the province of the Trustee Board.

Possible or
necessary
increase in the
Expenditure
estimated for
the operation as
a whole.

As regards the deduction from the wages of the Assyrians employed on the reclamation works, the Board will do all in its power to find a solution favourable to the finances of the settlement scheme, but it wishes to point out that it will be very difficult to make the deduction in question both owing to the low rate of wages (a maximum of 4 fr. a day for labourers) and owing to the difficulty of discrimination in the matter of food supplies.

The Board therefore considers that it would be prudent to reduce the estimated receipts by ...

(f) For an operation of this scope a credit should be provided for unforeseen expenditure amounting to 10 per cent. of the total. As compared with the Assembly's estimates, the item for unforeseen expenditure should therefore be increased by a sum of, roughly ...

Total ... 9,654,000

Lastly, the Board wished to recall that the budget, in the preparation of which its chairman took part last August, was reduced by 10 per cent. before being submitted to the Assembly, and that all the cuts which were then made will not be practicable.

Fully realising its responsibilities, the Board therefore endeavoured to effect all possible savings on the work of settlement, since the estimates for the improvement works in the plain of the Gharb apparently cannot be touched.

It came first of all to the conclusion that for the moment it must confine itself to basing its estimates on the transport of the 15,000 Assyrians estimated last September, and that even if this operation could be fully carried out this year, which seems very doubtful, the transfer of the whole mass of 15,000 persons would involve expenditure which would be avoided by a better distribution of convoys. If transports were spread over two years, those who arrived first could prepare the settlement of the subsequent convoys. For example, they could begin cultivating the soil, which would enable large savings to be made in 1937 in respect both of food and of the straw essential for the construction of houses. The Board is convinced that the spreading of the transport over two years will give the operation a sounder and more rational basis, and therefore a more economical one.

As regards the objections which might be made to the spreading of departures from Iraq over a longer period, the Board feels that it may ignore them as far as it is concerned. It is convinced that, while it is essential to start the operation as soon as possible, it cannot for various reasons be completed this year whatever the amount of the funds available.

The budget is therefore calculated on the following basis :—

	Number of Assyrians transported.
1936—	
On the Gharb	6,000
On the Khabur, to join certain tribes already provisionally settled	2,500
1937—	
On the Gharb	7,000
Total	15,500 ⁽¹⁾

The Board has endeavoured to effect all the economies which can be made without compromising the execution of the plan adopted by the Council and the

⁽¹⁾ The total number of Assyrians to be transferred exceeds by 500 the figure adopted by the Assembly of the League of Nations.

Assembly. While it thinks it would be dangerous to reduce any further the credits which it is submitting to the committee for approval, it none the less hopes that careful management will allow it to keep expenditure below the estimates.

Under article 12 of the Financial Regulations, the Board therefore has the honour to submit to the Secretary-General, for transmission to the committee of the Council of the League of Nations, the draft budget for 1936, divided between the two half-yearly periods (Annexes III and IV). At the same time, in order to facilitate comparisons with the previous estimates—which were based on the assumption that all the Assyrians would be transported in 1936—the committee is also submitting, purely as an indication, the figures at present considered for 1937.^(*)

As regards later financial periods, the Board feels it must voice its apprehensions regarding the possibility of keeping the total expenditure within the limit of the figures submitted to the Assembly, for the reasons given at the beginning of the present section of its report. It will naturally make every possible effort to economise on the budget estimates, and thus to reduce the initial deficit of the operation. From 1940 onwards, moreover, the first payments made by the Assyrians towards the purchase of the land allotted to them should help to offset the expenditure.

It is, nevertheless, important to take immediate steps to increase the financial resources available, both in order to permit the transport of all the Assyrians wishing to settle in Syria, and to remedy the deficiencies already noted, and be prepared for grave eventualities, such as bad harvest, which might so easily occur in the course of an operation which will cover a period of several years.

Furthermore, the Board must draw the committee's attention to two questions which might affect the budget, and regarding which it is not competent to take any action.

The first question relates to the transport of the Assyrians on the Turkish section of the railway between Nissibin and Muslimieh. The Board is convinced that the Turkish Government will make all the necessary arrangements for allowing the transit of trains without formalities or charges, but the necessary steps must be taken sufficiently in advance. Further, no credit appears in the budget for the hire of tents from the French army. Would not the French Ministry of War consent to lend this material if the committee asked it for this favour? We hope so, since otherwise a supplementary credit will have to be provided.

Lastly, the Board has not thought it proper to submit any proposals as regard its own budget, which constitutes a special chapter. It therefore confines itself to pointing out that the figures contemplated at the time of the Assembly correspond to an organisation different from that which has been set up by the Council of the League of Nations, and that an increase in the credits seems inevitable.

Beirut, January 13, 1936.

(*) Comparison between the present proposals and the Assembly's figures:—

	Assembly.	Present proposals.
Khabur and Gharb (excluding salaries, &c., of Trustee Board itself)	15,000 persons	15,500 persons
1936	9,527,700	7,924,870
1937	5,186,950	7,789,120
Total	14,714,650	15,713,990

The Board is convinced that the Turkish Government will make all the necessary arrangements for allowing the transit of trains without formalities or charges, but the necessary steps must be taken sufficiently in advance. Further, no credit appears in the budget for the hire of tents from the French army. Would not the French Ministry of War consent to lend this material if the committee asked it for this favour? We hope so, since otherwise a supplementary credit will have to be provided.

Annex I.

SETTLEMENT OF THE ASSYRIANS OF IRAQ.

Credits provided by the Assembly of the League of Nations.

I.—Settlement in the Ghab—

1. Administration	1,931,600
2. Land	450,000
3. Transport	270,000
4. Supplies	8,000,000
5. Sanitary service	1,800,000
6. Live-stock, agricultural machinery	3,000,000
7. Establishment	1,000,000
8. Education, &c.	225,000
9. Miscellaneous	1,213,003

Total 17,889,603

II.—Arrears 1,410,397

III.—Settlement on the Khabur 5,700,000

IV.—Administrative expenditure 2,025,000

General total 27,025,000

V.—Public Works (net) 33,500,000

Grand total 60,525,000

Contribution of mandated States 28,500,000
(6,500,000 repayable)

Total cost of the operation 89,025,000

Annex II.

Revenue and Expenditure (in thousands of French francs).

Revenue.		Expenditure.	
Contributions—		Reclamation of the Ghab ...	62,000
United Kingdom and Iraq	37,500	Settlement of 15,000 Assyrians	27,025
League of Nations	6,500		
Assyrians	3,000		
Mandated States	22,000		
Advance payment of the mandated States—to be refunded	6,500		
Total	75,000		
Deficit	13,525		
	89,025		89,025

Annex III.

Budget concerning the Settlement of 13,000 Assyrians in the Ghab (based on 6,000 Emigrants in 1936, 7,000 in 1937).

Part I.—Current Expenditure.

	1936. ^(*)		Total, 1937. ^(*)	
	First six months.	Second six months.		
I.—Administration—				
(a) Control	6,000	6,000	12,000	12,000
(b) Office staff	22,500	26,100	48,600	52,200
(c) Supervision of works	18,300	33,600	51,900	67,200
(d) Office expenses, travelling, &c.	22,000	22,500	44,500	45,000
II.—Land	250,000	...	250,000	100,000
III.—Transport—				
(a) Persons	74,000	37,000	111,000	123,000
(b) Animals	20,000	78,000	98,000	114,000
IV.—Food supplies	300,000	1,086,000	1,386,000	3,613,500
V.—Sanitary Service—				
(a) Staff	9,933	19,907	29,800	40,400
(b) Current supplies (including medicines and anti-malaria campaign), upkeep	119,115	120,315	239,430	379,100
(c) Building, motor transport, technical supplies	161,070	...	161,070	...
VI.—Upkeep of plant, petrol, oil, repairs, seed, &c.—				
(a) Staff	30,000	40,800	70,800	81,600
(b) Travelling	1,000	2,000	3,000	4,000
(c) Supplies, petrol, &c.	85,000	80,000	165,000	190,000
(d) Seed	10,000	150,000	160,000	160,000
VII.—Educational, public worship, &c.	9,500	9,500	100,000
VIII.—Police	22,000	50,000	72,000	100,000

Part II.—Capital Expenditure.

IX.—Buildings	300,000	325,000	625,000	475,000
X.—Plant, Live-stock, &c.—				
(a) Agricultural implements	397,250	130,000	527,250	75,000
(b) Motor lorries, motor cars, &c.	246,000	20,000	266,000	...
(c) Live-stock	10,000	20,000	30,000	25,000

Part III.—Unforeseen Expenditure.

XI.—Miscellaneous and unforeseen expenditure	125,000	200,000	325,000	475,000
Total	2,229,168	2,456,882	4,685,850	6,234,000

(*) The apportionment of expenditure between the two half-years is based on the assumption that unexpended balances at the end of the first half-year will be carried forward to the corresponding items in the second half-year.

(*) Given only as an indication.

Annex IV.

Budget for the Settlement of 8,500 Assyrians in the Khabur.

Part I.—Current Expenditure.

	1936. ^(*)		Total, 1937. ^(*)	
	First six months.	Second six months.		
I.—Administration—				
(a) Control
(b) Office staff	13,800	13,800	27,600	27,600
(c) Supervision of works	37,800	37,800	75,600	57,600
(d) Office expenses, travelling, &c.	4,000	4,000	8,000	8,000
II.—Land	36,000	...	36,000	...
III.—Transport	12,500	12,500	...
IV.—Food supplies	810,000	645,000	1,455,000	590,000
V.—Sanitary Service—				
(a) Staff	14,700	14,700	29,400	29,400
(b) Supplies	20,300	20,300	40,600	20,600
VI.—Upkeep of plant—				
(a) Staff	25,000	35,000	60,000	51,800
(b) Removals	500	500	1,000	1,000
(c) Supplies, oil, &c.	50,000	50,000	100,000	120,000
(d) Seed	25,000	75,000	100,000	50,000
VII.—Education	5,000	5,000	10,000	12,500
VIII.—Police	50,000	50,000	100,000	100,000

Part II.—Capital Expenditure.

IX.—Buildings	80,000	90,000	170,000	...
X.—Plant, live-stock, &c.—				
(a) Agricultural implements	85,000	...	85,000	...
(b) Motor lorries	28,000	...	28,000	...
(c) Live-stock	12,500	...	12,500	...
(d) Hydraulic installations	250,000	345,000	595,000	350,000

Part III.—Unforeseen Expenditure.

XI.—Miscellaneous and unforeseen expenditure	153,760	138,860	292,620	136,620
Total	1,701,360	1,537,460	3,238,820	1,555,120

(*) and (*) See footnote on p. 102.

[E 483/201/93]

No. 33.

Sir A. Clark Kerr to Mr. Eden.—(Received January 27.)

(No. 31.)

Sir,

Bagdad, January 14, 1936.

WITH reference to the first paragraph of my telegram No. 285 of the 9th December last, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a translation of the reply which Nuri Pasha has now sent to my letter on the subject of the incidents which accompanied the suppression of the recent insurrection in the Jebel Sinjar.⁽¹⁾ A copy of this letter has, I believe, also been sent to the permanent Iraqi delegate at Geneva in order to supply him with material for replies to any further enquiries which League officials make concerning these events.

2. Nuri Pasha's account of the circumstances in which these disturbances took place is, I believe, substantially true, but he makes no serious endeavour to disprove with evidence the ugly stories, repeated on all sides, of the manner in which they were suppressed. He dismisses these stories as false merely because those who, it is suggested, have communicated them to the world are probably not particularly concerned to save Iraq's reputation from the consequences of the folly of her officials.

(¹) Not printed.

3. I confess, however, that I can see little prospect of being able to persuade the Iraqi Government to do much more than they have already done to right the wrongs which have been committed. Any sort of enquiry into the conduct of the troops or disciplinary action against those responsible for excesses appears quite out of the question, and the most that can be hoped for is that before long an amnesty will be declared and that the 400 Yazidis now in prison will be allowed to return to their homes. I am urging upon both the King and the Minister for Foreign Affairs the wisdom of mercy and I am not without hope that, in the near future, possibly at the next Id, in about two months' time, my advice will bear fruit.

4. If His Majesty's Government are of the opinion that some further action is essential, I would suggest that the possibility of bringing into operation the machinery of the League of Nations should be carefully considered. It is not, I submit, expedient that we should try to bear alone the whole burden of the protection of minorities in this country, and I fear that an attempt to do so may have undesirable consequences, both for the minorities themselves and for British interests in the Middle East.

I have, &c.

ARCHIBALD CLARK KERR.

[E 574/4/93]

No. 34.

Record of the Sixty-fourth and Sixty-fifth Meetings of the Assyrian Committee of the Council of the League of Nations, held at Geneva on January 24, 1936.

(NOTE.—(1) The discussion at these two long meetings ranged over the same agenda and is therefore summarised in a single record.

(2) "Francs" in this record are *French* francs in default of a statement to the contrary.)

THE principal item on the agenda of the meetings was a report by the Trustee Board of the 13th January forwarding a draft budget for the Assyrian settlement operation in 1936 (document C./Min./Ass./177).⁽¹⁾

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Bieler gave a short account of his mission to Syria. He arrived at Beirut on the 24th December and immediately got into touch with the French mandatory authorities and with M. Burnier, the settlement expert. M. Cuénod arrived shortly afterwards from Iraq accompanied, in an unofficial capacity, by Major Thomson, and on the 31st December Sr. Barcenas arrived from Geneva. On the 2nd January Mr. Bieler saw the French High Commissioner, who designated Major Duprez, an officer in a regiment of Algerian cavalry seconded to the cadre of the "Services Spéciaux," as his representative on the Trustee Board. The Board was thus officially constituted and it proceeded to hold meetings twice a day up to Mr. Bieler's departure on the 14th January. The report of the 13th January (document C./Min./Ass./177) and the draft budget were prepared in close collaboration with Mr. Bieler.

Mr. Bieler said that the budgets (which had been drawn up so as to separate as far as possible current from capital expenditure) had been worked out with great care and the utmost regard for economy, and he was convinced that they represented the bare requirements for the settlement operation. In addition to preparing draft budgets for 1936, the Board had prepared figures serving as an "indication" of the budgets likely for 1937, and these figures were included in the report for the information of the committee. In addition, the Board had worked out a revised budget for the total cost of the whole settlement operation in the light of developments since the estimates appended to the committee's report to the Council of the 12th November were prepared. The result of these rough calculations showed that even if the number of Assyrians to be moved from Iraq did not exceed the 15,500 on which the Board was at present basing its

⁽¹⁾ See No. 32.

estimates, there would, nevertheless, be an excess of approximately 2,150,000 fr. over the total expenditure envisaged in the report of the 12th November. In arriving at this figure the Board had taken account of likely additional expenditure shown under sub-paragraphs (b), (c), (d) and (f) in paragraph 2 of the report to the committee of the 13th January; but if, as was suggested in sub-paragraph (e), it proved impossible to extract more than 1 million francs in all from the Assyrians themselves, the excess cost of the settlement would be increased to over 4 million francs, i.e., the total deficit on the whole settlement operation would be in the neighbourhood of 17½ million francs, without taking account of further numbers of Assyrian emigrants over and above the total of 15,500 plus the 6,200 already on the Khabur. Although it seemed very probable that 6,000 more Assyrians than the number originally contemplated would require to be moved, Mr. Bieler thought that in the present financial uncertainty the Board had adopted the right course in basing its estimates for 1936 and its "indications" for 1937 on a total figure of 15,500, or approximately that on which the previous estimates had been based. The expected further 6,000, who would probably turn out to be drawn from among the mountain elements whom it was at present impossible to consult, would have to be left out of account for the moment so far as the budget was concerned. Moreover, he was convinced that the Board had taken the best course in proposing not to transfer the total number of 15,500 Assyrians to Syria in the present year, but only to send 6,000 to the Ghab and a further 2,500 to complete the tribal groups settled on the Khabur. The advantages and economy resulting from this course were explained in the Board's report, and were now even greater since the land which it had been hoped to obtain for temporary settlement in the immediate vicinity of the southern end of the Ghab marsh was no longer available, and it would apparently be very difficult to obtain temporary land which could grow enough to feed more than 6,000 people. The further increase in the settlement on the Khabur was dictated both by the desirability of keeping the tribal groups together and by the economy of spreading temporarily as many Assyrians as possible among the existing settlers, who were steadily becoming self-sufficient in food.

The President thanked Mr. Bieler for the useful work which he had performed at Beirut. He proposed that the individual chapters in the budget should now be taken, and he invited Mr. Bieler to introduce these in each case with the necessary explanatory remarks.

The draft budget for the settlement in the Ghab area was first considered.

Chapter I.—Administration.

Mr. Bieler explained that these credits did not include the salaries and allowances for members of the Trustee Board as the Board had preferred to leave these to the Committee of Six. As regards *sub-head (a)*, M. Cuénod was anxious to provide for independent control of the Board's expenditure. It would have been necessary to pay a high salary to find an official of the necessary calibre for such work, but it had happily been possible to find a solution which would put at the disposal of the Board the services of a first-class financial official for a comparatively small expense; the High Commissioner had agreed to allow M. Bressier of his financial service to act on a part-time basis as financial controller of the Board's commitments and expenditure. The High Commissioner undertook that M. Bressier should have all the time he required to carry out his work for the Board, and in return he would only receive an annual indemnity of 12,000 fr. M. Bressier would perform his work for the Board in complete independence of the High Commission and his other activities.

As regards *sub-head (b)*, Mr. Bieler explained that the Board contemplated engaging at a salary of 24,000 fr. a capable secretary-accountant who would reside in the Ghab district, making the necessary payments and behaving generally as the responsible local representative of the Board; such an arrangement was necessary owing to the distance between Beirut and the Ghab. The other expenditure under this sub-head would be for an accountant at the Beirut office of the Board (estimated salary, 15,000 fr.) and minor staff. It has been possible to secure two rooms for offices in a building conveniently close to the High Commission in Beirut.

The expenditure contemplated under *sub-head (c)* would be made up by an agricultural engineer (salary, 31,200 fr.), a supervisor (18,000 fr.), and two interpreters (9,000 fr. each).

(NOTE.—As the majority of this and other personnel will not be engaged from the beginning of 1936, only a proportion of their full annual salaries will require to be met in 1936.)

Sub-head (d) included the travelling expenses of the clerical personnel, usual office expenses and an annual payment of 18,000 fr. to the High Commission in respect of the extra work devolving in connexion with their custody and administration of the funds of the Trustee Board. This item had been fixed at 54,000 fr. in the original plan prepared in August 1935, but the subsequent decision that the actual responsibility for incurring expenditure should be exercised by the Board itself had permitted a large reduction.

M. Charron, of the financial section of the League Secretariat (who was present at the meeting in an advisory capacity), expressed doubts whether the four persons provided for under *sub-head (c)* would be sufficient to carry out the difficult and laborious work of the actual settlement.

Mr. Bieler said that the Board had deliberately kept their personnel as small as possible in the interests of economy and that for this reason they had decided not to engage a second agricultural engineer or supervisor. M. Burnier, with his experience, apparently considered that the personnel proposed would be sufficient.

The President thought it could safely be left to the Board to refer back to the committee if extra personnel were subsequently discovered to be necessary.

Mr. Bieler explained that, if it was necessary to increase expenditure under any *sub-head*, it would not be possible to draw on another chapter without a *virement* approved by the committee.

The committee approved the chapter.

Chapter II.—Land.

Mr. Bieler explained that this allocation was intended to cover the rent of the necessary lands to accommodate the Assyrians temporarily pending their final settlement; the original estimate submitted to the Assembly in September 1935 was for 450,000 fr.

The estate of 8,500 hectares lying conveniently around the southern end of the Ghab marsh which had originally been intended for the temporary accommodation of the Assyrians was, unfortunately, no longer available; he did not know exactly why, but, as the land had previously been seized by the State in respect of unpaid taxes, the owners had now presumably been able to redeem it. The Board had been obliged to fall back upon a less satisfactory arrangement; they proposed to rent an area of about 3,000 hectares of good wheat land in the Jebel Zawiya hills, about 18 kilom. north of Acharné, plus a small estate of about 800 hectares, on which it might be possible to practise intensive cultivation by irrigation. Crops on the larger estate would depend on rainfall, and it would be necessary for the Assyrians to proceed to it by lorry, as it was not suitable for their temporary villages. It was proposed to build a hospital in the foothills of the Jebel Ansarieh, and the Governor of Lattaqia had further promised to provide free pasturage for about 10,000 animals in the Jebel Ansarieh itself.

These lands could be rented at a total annual cost of about 50,000 fr., but an opportunity had now arisen to buy the village of Tell Salhab, at the southern end of the proposed Acharné dam, and about 800 hectares of surrounding land. This estate had come into the hands of the Algerian Land Bank and, according to a telegram which had just been received from Beirut, it could be purchased for a total of 290,000 fr. This would mean that it would be necessary to increase Chapter II by at least 100,000 fr.

A long discussion then took place upon the question of whether it was desirable or practicable for the Board to purchase land. The French Representative thought that it would be most unfortunate if the Board engaged in what must amount to speculation in land, and Mr. Bieler expressed fears that

the bank owning the land in question might be taking advantage of the Board's urgent need for land to quote an inordinate price. It appeared, moreover, that a considerable part of the land in question was covered by water at certain seasons of the year, whereas a small part would, in any case, eventually be covered by the proposed artificial lake. It was eventually decided that the Secretariat should send a personal telegram to Sr. Barcenas, who was acting in this matter on behalf of the Board of Trustees, suggesting that it might be possible to rent the estate in question, with an option to purchase. Meanwhile, the committee reserved this chapter for further consideration.

In the course of this discussion The President raised the question of the exact responsibility of the committee in regard to the Board's activities. He thought that it should be decided definitely to what extent the committee should intervene in the details of the Board's budget and to what extent the Board should be entirely responsible for incurring expenditure. It was clearly impossible for the committee at Geneva to decide whether or not a certain piece of land in Syria should be purchased or rented.

The United Kingdom Representative suggested that, once the budgets had been fixed, the position would be that the Board had sole and complete authority within the credits provided in the various chapters. As regards the question of the Board's authority to purchase land, article 2 (1) of its statutes provided that the Board should be "competent to hold and alienate property of all kinds."

It was agreed that the Secretariat should include in the eventual draft containing the committee's observations on the budget a passage making it clear that the responsibility of the committee in approving the budget was limited to its agreeing that the proposed expenditure was such as it would be legitimate to incur for the purposes of the settlement and that the amounts provided for in the various chapters appeared to be reasonable.

Chapter III.—Transport.

Mr. Bieler explained that the estimate under *sub-head (a)* was based on the total of 6,000 Assyrians whom the committee proposed to transfer to the Ghab in 1936. He thought that the total estimate would not be spent, since it was proposed to use the Board's own lorries for transporting the emigrants from railhead at Hama to the Ghab. The estimate provided for two persons, a responsible agent of the Board and an interpreter, accompanying each convoy from Iraq to Hama.

Sub-head (b) was considerably greater than the total of 30,000 fr. allowed for transport of animals in the original estimates, based upon the proposals in the last paragraph of Section IX of the report by Mr. Hill and M. Cuénod of August 1935; but the increase was more than set off by the provision of only 30,000 fr. in Chapter X (c) for the purchase of live-stock, whereas this item had originally been fixed at 440,000 fr. The enhanced credits provided for 1936-37 were calculated with a view to providing free transport for about 10,000 animals, including a fair proportion of cattle; this was one-tenth of the total number of animals the Assyrians were estimated to possess.

The President expressed the view that the committee would have to accept the arrangement proposed for dividing the Assyrian emigration between two years.

The French Representative pointed out, however, that the total period would in effect be at least three years, since the Board had made no provision for the emigration in 1936-37 of the 6,000 further Assyrians. The committee had issued a message to the Assyrians in which it expressed the hope that "the great majority would be transferred in 1936."

The United Kingdom Representative said that it appeared essential not to delay the consultation of the autochthonous Assyrians in the mountains, since it would be both unfair and risky to give them the impression that they were being prejudiced by comparison with the other Assyrians. At the same time he thought that the committee could not be accused of bad faith if it failed to transport an actual majority of the emigrants in 1936, since the message, as well as the actual estimates, had been based upon a total Assyrian emigration of about 21,000.

After further discussion the committee agreed to qualify its approval of the Board's programme of transfer by drawing attention to the desirability, in conformity with the terms of the message to the Assyrians, of transferring, if possible, a majority of the total number of would-be emigrants in 1936; and by stating that it was in any case essential to complete the transfer of the Assyrians before the end of 1937.

In regard to *sub-head (b)*, the *United Kingdom Representative* expressed the view that it was hardly necessary to have gone beyond the proposals made in the report by Mr. Hill and M. Cuénod. He did not see why the rich Assyrians should not sell a proportion of their animals to pay for the transport of the rest; at the same time, in view of the great reduction in Chapter X (*c*), he did not think that this credit could be strongly opposed.

Mr. Bieler said that the Board feared that if they did not give a greater contribution towards the transport of live-stock, the Assyrians would sell their animals in Iraq and pocket the money, with the result that the Board would eventually be obliged to re-equip them with live-stock in Syria.

The *Iraqi Representative* could not understand why arrangements were not made for all the flocks and herds to be sent across on hoof. There had been excellent rainfall in the desert this winter and the animals would find grazing all the way to Western Syria; moreover, large quantities of live-stock were moved every year in this way, particularly from Mosul to Aleppo, without the least trouble or danger. If this were done in the case of the Assyrians' animals, a large saving could be effected.

Mr. Hill (Acting Secretary of the Committee) said that Major Wilson had made this point in Beirut during the discussions with the French High Commission in August 1935. The High Commissioner had, however, reacted unfavourably on the ground that owing to the opposition to Assyrian settlement which must be expected from the Moslem element in Syria, the transport of large numbers of animals would either be most risky or else entail heavy expenditure on guards and bribes to the Syrian Bedouin. Moreover, there was some long-standing convention by which Aleppo merchants had a sort of monopoly over the grazing on the northern trans-desert route; if the Assyrians were allowed to bring their animals over it, the grazing would be severely depleted.

It was agreed to approve the credits proposed for the transport of animals, but to remind the Trustee Board of the original proposals, to suggest that the credit should be confined to assisting the poorest emigrants and, finally, to suggest that the possibility of bringing animals across on hoof might again be examined.

Chapter IV.—Food Supplies.

Mr. Bieler explained that the estimate was based on supplying food to 6,000 Assyrians during seven months at a flat rate of 1·10 fr. per head per day.

Mr. Hill pointed out that this calculation was not in accordance with the policy of the committee. In the original report on the Ghab plan it had been proposed to allot food to the Assyrians in the first years of the settlement without discrimination, but the committee had subsequently adopted the principle that Assyrians with private resources must contribute towards their subsistence, and on this assumption the original estimate of 9 million francs mentioned in the report of the 12th September to the Council had been subsequently reduced in agreement with the French authorities to 8 million francs. Moreover, the committee was at that very moment considering the issue to the Assyrians of a message making it quite plain that all those who possessed adequate means were expected to contribute as largely as possible towards their subsistence. At the same time there was no doubt that the members of the Trustee Board and the local committee in Iraq considered it very difficult to compel Assyrians to contribute towards their subsistence; M. Burnier had told Mr. Hill that he had never discriminated among the Armenian refugees whom he had settled in Syria, nor among the original Assyrian emigrants on the Khabur, and that he did not propose to do so among the other Assyrians. He understood that the present system of feeding the settlers was by means of large local contracts and the distribution of supplies by weight to every household.

The general feeling of the committee was that the credit could not be accepted as it stood, but it was decided to leave the matter over until a later meeting with a view to its further study by members of the committee and the Secretariat.

Chapter V.—Sanitary Services.

Mr. Bieler explained that the sanitary estimates had been compiled by Colonel Martin, the principal French medical officer in Syria. The Board of Trustees thought it advisable to leave the local medical authorities the widest discretion in utilising these credits in view of the latter's responsibility for the health of the settlement.

The committee agreed with this view and approved the credits proposed.

Chapter VI.—Upkeep of Plant, Running Expenses of Motor Vehicles, Seed, &c.

Mr. Bieler said that *sub-head (a)* allowed for the engagement of one chief mechanic, fifteen motor drivers and twenty tractor drivers. *Sub-head (b)* covered the expenses of drivers compelled to make long journeys.

It had been necessary to increase *sub-head (c)* since, contrary to the Board's hope, the High Commissioner did not feel able to agree to accord exemption from customs duty on petrol, oil, spare parts, &c., required for the Board's motor vehicles.

The *United Kingdom Representative* drew attention to article 7 of the Statutes of the Trustee Board, in which it was provided that "the Board shall be exempt from all taxes and charges, whether general or local, in respect of all operations and property of the Board. . . . The French Government had subsequently made a declaration on behalf of the Mandated Territories that the necessary measures would be taken to ensure to the Board the "legal character, power and privileges set out in the Statutes of the Board."

The *President* thought it preferable not to risk unpleasantness with the High Commission at this early stage by adopting a legalistic attitude. He thought another attempt should be made to persuade the High Commissioner to grant the desired concession on his own initiative.

Mr. Bieler said that the High Commissioner's representative on the Board had already made a personal appeal to M. de Martel, but without success; it appeared that there was particular difficulty in granting a rebate of customs duty in the case of petrol.

The committee agreed that in approving this chapter of the budget it would invite the Board to make another attempt to secure more favourable treatment in respect of its purchases of imported goods.

Chapter VII.—Education, &c.

Mr. Bieler said that expenditure under this head would be nominal in the first year.

Approved without discussion.

Chapter VIII.—Police.

Mr. Bieler and the *French Representative* explained that the genesis of this credit (which also appeared in the budget for the Khabur settlement) was in certain incidents which had occurred on the Khabur between the Assyrians and local indigenous tribes who claimed land occupied by the Assyrians. When these incidents had occurred the mandatory authorities had sent a force of ordinary police to the scene; this force, however, was composed of similar tribal elements to those which had attacked the Assyrians, and had accordingly sided with the aggressors. The High Commissioner's representative on the Board, who was specially concerned with the protection aspect, therefore considered it necessary to send special police forces (apparently Circassians) to the settlements, and had made a formal demand for the provision of the necessary credits.

The President felt obliged to express his personal reserves. He did not wish to criticise the High Commissioner, but he felt that provision for police should devolve upon the State, and not upon the settlers it had agreed to receive. He appreciated the argument that, as the Assyrians were exempt from taxes for five years, they were not contributing towards the administrative services in Syria, but this relief from taxes was, after all, designed to help the settlement, and its effect would be impaired if heavy credits were to be necessary for police. He asked M. Charron whether he knew of any precedent, e.g., during his own settlement work in Greece and Bulgaria.

M. Charron said that the settlements in Greece and Bulgaria were not comparable with those of the Assyrians, since they were composed of nationals of the country of settlement. Nevertheless, there had been frequent incidents between the new settlers and the resident population of the area in which they were placed. He did not know what was done in the case of the Armenian settlement in Syria.

The Danish Representative pointed out that local discontent at the arrival of the Assyrians might conceivably lead to large-scale disturbances necessitating even military operations by the mandated authorities. According to the principle adopted by the High Commissioner, the cost of such operations would devolve on the settlement funds.

The French Representative said that the difficulty lay in the mandate; the High Commissioner was afraid of arousing local agitation by increasing the police budget in Syria solely on account of the presence of the Assyrians.

The President pointed out that the mandated territories were doing quite well out of the Assyrians' settlements, which brought new money and property to Syria, and would finally develop a new source of tax revenue. He thought that opposition in Syria was purely political in nature.

The Iraqi Representative expressed the view that, once across the frontier of Iraq, the Assyrians would come within that general security which the Syrian authorities ought to maintain, and that it was not right to discriminate against them.

The question was raised whether an economy might not be effected by recruiting the police from among the Assyrians. It was agreed, however, that, apart from the obvious difficulty of such a course, it would prejudice the whole attitude of the committee to admit by such action that they had any responsibility in the matter.

On the suggestion of the *French Representative*, it was agreed that the best course would be formally to reserve this chapter of the budget and to explain the committee's point of view to the Board with a view to their discussing the matter again with the High Commissioner.

Chapter IX.—Construction of Houses, &c.

Mr. Bieler explained that this credit had been slightly increased over that originally proposed since the Board intended to proceed almost at once to the construction of the final villages as well as those for the temporary settlement. Moreover, it was essential to build a house in the Ghab area suitable for housing the members of the Board and any visitors.

The credit was approved without discussion.

Chapter X.—Plant, Live-stock, &c.

Mr. Bieler said that sub-head (a) provided *inter alia* for ten Diesel-engined tractors (260,000 fr.), ten large ploughs and other agricultural machinery including a thresher and corn mill (200,000 fr.).

Sub-head (b) allowed for the purchase of three motor cars (48,000 fr.), twelve lorries (168,000 fr.) and a number of carts and miscellaneous machinery.

Mr. Bieler explained that tractors were in any case imported into Syria in franchise and that he thought it probable that the Board would also be allowed to import motor vehicles free of duty; this concession had already been granted in

respect of the Khabur settlement. The Board estimated that the heavy expenditure on lorries would prove a saving in the long run since it would be possible to use them, e.g., for transporting the emigrants from railhead at Hama and also for taking labourers to their work on the outlying lands acquired for the temporary settlement.

As the committee had already debated the question of exemption from customs duty, this chapter was adopted without further discussion.

Chapter XI.—Miscellaneous and Unforeseen Expenditure.

Mr. Bieler pointed out that this chapter had been kept very low and did not amount to 10 per cent. of the total budget.

Budget for the Settlement on the Khabur.

Mr. Bieler said that it had been possible to budget much more exactly for this settlement than for that in the Ghab since experience had already been acquired. The budget allowed for the arrival of a further 2,500 Assyrians to complete the tribal groups already established. He gave the following additional details of the budget:—

Chapter I: Sub-head (b) (office staff) included one resident secretary accountant at a salary of 24,000 fr.

Sub-head (c) included one agricultural engineer, one supervisor of works, one chief mechanic and one interpreter.

Chapter III: Transport.—This credit was low as it was intended that live-stock brought from Iraq should proceed on hoof.

Chapter IV: Food supplies.—This was calculated on the basis of a payment of 70 centimes per head per day for eight months to 6,000 Assyrians already established, and 1 fr. per head per day for five months to the 2,500 new arrivals.

Chapter VIII: Police.—In connexion with this credit, Mr. Bieler disclosed that payments had already been made from settlement funds to the High Commission in respect of police.

Chapter X: Sub-head (a) included two tractors; *sub-head (b)* two lorries. *Sub-head (d)* included 185,000 fr. for the completion of hydraulic installations in the course of construction and 410,000 fr. in respect of new installations.

The committee agreed that except in the case of Chapters IV and VIII, to which the same considerations applied as in the case of the corresponding chapters in the Ghab budget, there would probably be few qualifications to attach to the approval of this budget. It was decided, however, to defer definite approval until further progress had been made on outstanding points in the Ghab budget. Meanwhile, the Secretariat would proceed immediately to draft a communication from the committee to the Trustee Board containing the necessary modifications and observations on the budgets.

General Observations by the Trustee Board.

The committee then proceeded to discuss certain points raised in the Board's covering report of the 13th January, which had not been dealt with under the various chapters of the budget.

The committee noted that the Board thought it would be impossible to recover from the Assyrians 2 out of the 3 million francs anticipated in respect of the payment of 1 dinar per emigrant and of deductions from the wages of Assyrians employed on the reclamation works in the Ghab.

Mr. Bieler said that he understood the estimates for the reclamation works had been drawn too fine and that to avoid excess expenditure it would be necessary to use machinery in the place of Assyrian labourers. At the same time, speaking as a member of the League Treasury, he felt that every effort should be made to obtain as great a financial contribution as possible from the Assyrians. The deficit on the total settlement budget was steadily growing larger and the High Commissioner had declared that he would not in any circumstances allow any further financial commitment to be accepted by the Mandated Territories.

The United Kingdom Representative saw no reason for deviating from the arrangements proposed in the original settlement plan of August last that about two-fifths of the wages of the Assyrian labourers might be deducted in respect of the cost of their maintenance and housing.

The French Representative entirely agreed. He considered that the situation would be serious if no attempt was made to recover money from the wages of Assyrians who were also being fed by the Board. He feared M. Burnier's general outlook on the settlement, which would not permit him to consider discriminating between relatively rich and poor Assyrians.

It was finally agreed after further discussion to include in the committee's observations on the Board's report a reminder that the committee still maintained its point of view that both equity and financial necessity compelled it to insist so far as possible upon a deduction being made from the wages of Assyrian labourers in respect of their subsistence and that it relied upon the Trustee Board to carry out this policy. As regards the contribution of 1 dinar per emigrant, the committee had already made its view clear to the local committee in Iraq.

Permission required from the Turkish Government for the Transit of Assyrians through Turkey.

The President explained that he had made representations on this point to the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs and had handed him an aide-memoire. His reception had not been very favourable, and M. Aras had expressed the view that Turkey would be unable to waive any of the customary transit charges. M. Aras had finally mentioned something about the possibility of collective passports for the Assyrians, and had undertaken to refer the matter to the competent Turkish authorities.

The question of the transport of Assyrian animals and property through Turkey had not been discussed, and M. Oliván considered it might be left on one side until the main question had been settled.

Provision of Tents for the Temporary Assyrian Settlements in the Ghab.

Mr. Bieler said that he had been told at Beirut that this would have to be taken up with the Ministry of War in Paris. *The French Representative* said he would see that the necessary representations were made; he thought that it might be possible to obtain the tents on loan without payment.

Appointment of Third Member of the Trustee Board.

Mr. Bieler said that, in accordance with instructions, he had gone carefully into the question of this appointment during his stay at Beirut. He had come to the conclusion that much the best appointment would be that of Mr. Bayard Dodge, the President of the American University at Beirut. This gentleman, aged about 46, was a man of intelligence and charm, who was quite widely known in the United States, a fact which might eventually be useful in connexion with an appeal to private charity. He had been treasurer of the Near East relief fund, and thus possessed useful experience. Moreover, he had private means and would be prepared to serve without salary. The High Commissioner had a very high opinion of Mr. Dodge and had urged his appointment on Mr. Bieler. The only difficulty was that Mr. Dodge would have to go to America fairly frequently in connexion with the business of his university, and Mr. Bieler had ascertained that he would stipulate as a condition of his service that a permanent substitute should be appointed for him in the person of Professor Ritscher, a former member of the American consular service now employed at the university as Professor of Political Science. Mr. Ritscher seemed, on the whole, quite suitable and he would be prepared to serve in return for some 500 fr. per month to cover his expenses.

The committee agreed that Mr. Dodge should be invited to serve with Professor Ritscher as substitute from the 1st March, 1936, and the secretary was instructed to despatch the necessary telegram of invitation.

Provision of Substitute for M. Cuénod in Syria.

Mr. Bieler said that M. Cuénod hoped that when the consultation in Iraq upon which he was at present engaged finished in the middle of February he

would be able to remain continuously in Syria. Mr. Bieler thought that the Czechoslovak consul in Beirut, M. Bayer, would make an admirable substitute for M. Cuénod on the Trustee Board if necessary.

The committee decided that no action was required for the present.

Rules of Procedure adopted by the Trustee Board.

The committee took note of these rules (circulated as document C./Min./Ass./178), which had been forwarded to it by the Board in accordance with article 8 of the Statutes of the Trustee Board.

Budget in respect of the Trustee Board itself.

Mr. Bieler pointed out that the Board had invited the committee in its report to draw up this budget, which would inevitably exceed the 250,000 fr. provisionally inserted in the estimates attached to the report to the Council of the 12th November, 1935. (There would, however, be a decrease after 1936, as the salary of the French member would not fall on the settlement fund in subsequent years.) Moreover, it would be necessary to consider the question of insurance for members of the Board and M. Burnier; it was a rule that all League officials had to be covered by insurance against death or permanent disablement.

The committee considered that in principle the Board should have prepared their own draft budget, but that as a matter of convenience the work could be undertaken on this occasion in Geneva.

The committee decided to provide in this budget 120,000 fr. for M. Cuénod's salary (the sum fixed at its 63rd meeting, in accordance with the Council's authority); 60,000 fr. for the representative of the High Commissioner; 6,000 fr. for the substitute for the third member (on the assumption that Mr. Dodge would accept the invitation to serve); and a sum of 50,000 fr. for miscellaneous and unforeseen expenditure, in which would be included the expenses of Sr. Barcenás (fixed at 40 Swiss francs a day), special missions and other items, including insurance if it should be decided after further study of the question by the Secretariat that this was essential.

As regards M. Burnier's emoluments, the committee decided that, while they should technically have been fixed by the Board, it would be preferable to include them in the special budget for the Trustee Board. M. Burnier had hitherto drawn the bulk of his salary (17,200 Swiss francs) from the Nansen Office, and this had recently been supplemented by an allowance of 6,000 Swiss francs from the Assyrian settlement funds in respect of his work on the Khabur. The proposal now was that the Trustee Board should pay M. Burnier from the 1st January, 1936, the salary he had been receiving from the Nansen Office, the latter being only responsible in future for the supplemental 6,000 Swiss francs. This arrangement was understood to be satisfactory to the Nansen Office and M. Burnier himself, and a credit for 86,000 fr. was accordingly inserted in the budget.

It was decided that the Secretariat should prepare the necessary draft budget and covering remarks for inclusion in the main communication from the committee in reply to the Board's report of the 13th January.

Contributions from Private Charity.

Mr. Hill informed the committee that his further study of this question had convinced him that there was no possibility of making any real progress until an appeal had been successfully launched in the United Kingdom.

The French Representative said that the difficulty in his country was to make a start in the absence of any suitable organisation to launch an appeal. Moreover, the victims of the recent floods in France would, he feared, claim French charity for some time to come.

The United Kingdom Representative gave the committee in confidence information about the progress which had been made by the Archbishop of Canterbury in organising his appeal. A representative meeting had been held at Lambeth Palace of persons interested in the Assyrians and a strong executive committee had been set up under the chairmanship of Mr. Amery. His Grace proposed to launch the appeal in the course of a debate in the House of Lords

towards the middle of February, and to support it by a series of meetings throughout the country.

The matter was not further pursued on account of lack of time, but the feeling of a majority of the committee was clearly that it would be useless to go ahead with any attempt to raise funds in other countries until the example could be held up of a successful appeal in the United Kingdom.

Claim of the Nansen Office in respect of Indemnity paid to M. Burnier in March 1935.

Mr. Hill said that the Nansen Office had paid M. Burnier 720 fr. as an indemnity for attending conversations at Paris in March 1935 in respect of Assyrian settlement in Syria, although he was at the time on sick leave.

The committee took the view that such expenditure was comparable to that incurred on the special missions to Brazil and Guiana, and that it would therefore be correct for the sum in question to be refunded to the Nansen Office from the settlement funds.

January 31, 1936.

J. G. WARD.

[E 579/461/93]

No. 35.

Sir A. Clark Kerr to Mr. Eden.—(Received February 3.)

(No. 39.)

Sir,

Bagdad, January 20, 1936.

WITH reference to Mr. Bateman's despatch No. 492 of the 12th September, I have the honour to report that, in the course of a speech which he made in the Chamber of Deputies on the 31st December last when introducing the budget estimates for 1935, the Prime Minister announced a reduction of 15 per cent. in the Fao Bar dredging dues. He stated that this reduction had been made in pursuance of the Government's policy, adopted as from the 1st April, 1935, under which dredging dues to be levied from shipping passing through the Rooka Channel, in transit, should not be in excess of those admissible by international practice, subject to the condition that the amount thereby collected should not be less than the necessary expenditure incurred for the maintenance and improvement of the channel and its approaches to a depth and breadth adequate for the bulk of the shipping making use of it.

2. The wording used by the Prime Minister differs slightly in two respects from that approved by the Council of Ministers last March:—

(a) Instead of saying that the Iraqi Government would be "guided by international practice," the Prime Minister definitely declared that the dues would "not be in excess of those admissible by international practice."

(b) The Prime Minister added the words "in transit."

In the first case, the wording used by the Prime Minister is an improvement from the point of view of British interests. In the second, the phrase added by the Prime Minister would not appear to affect the sense of the declaration.

I have, &c.

ARCHIBALD CLARK KERR.

[E 663/4/93]

No. 36.

Record of the Sixty-Sixth Meeting of the Assyrian Committee of the Council of the League of Nations, held at Geneva on January 29.—(Received in Foreign Office, February 6.)

(NOTE.—"Francs" in this record are French francs.)

Procedure for the Consultation of the autochthonous Assyrians.

THE Iraqi delegate to the League of Nations had communicated, on the instructions of his Government, a copy of a letter from the president of the Local Assyrian Committee in Iraq (document C/Min. Ass./179), to the effect that, if it was necessary for the consultation of those Assyrians at present isolated in the

mountains to be performed by the local committee acting as a body, the departure of emigrants due to leave for Syria in the spring and early summer would be delayed. A draft reply to this letter was circulated at the meeting. It reminded the Iraqi Government that it was the policy of the Council Committee that the consultation of the Assyrians should be carried out by the local committee acting as a corporate body. At the same time the Council Committee fully appreciated that it was essential to release a member of the local committee to supervise the departures of convoys to Syria, and it therefore proposed that the consultation in the mountains should be performed by two members of the local committee acting together, one of whom, however, should always be its own representative in Iraq. The draft added that the committee had under consideration the question of appointing a substitute for M. Cuénod in Iraq, since his presence would doubtless be required at Beirut during the period of the consultation.

The President assured the Iraqi representative that the committee's decision that its own representative ought to be present during the whole of the consultation was not due to any lack of confidence in the Iraqi authorities, but was simply considered appropriate in view of the responsibility which the committee of the Council had assumed for the consultation of the Assyrians. The position was complicated by the fact that it was necessary for M. Cuénod to resume his duties as chairman of the Trustee Board in Beirut on the conclusion (probably about the middle of February) of the consultation actually proceeding in Iraq. It would be most undesirable if he was obliged to interrupt his work in Beirut once more, and it had been suggested that Sr. Barcenas, who was at present acting as temporary third member of the Trustee Board, might be invited to act as his substitute on the local committee in Iraq for about two months from the 1st March, the date on which he would probably be relieved by Mr. Dodge on the Trustee Board itself.

The United Kingdom Representative said that there were two alternatives. There would doubtless be advantage in M. Cuénod carrying through the whole of the consultation in view of the experience he had now acquired of the Assyrians in Iraq, and it might be possible to use the services of Sr. Barcenas as a substitute for him in Beirut. On the other hand, it obviously was not essential to have M. Cuénod for the final consultation, and there was much to be said for allowing him to continue uninterruptedly as president of the Trustee Board once the consultation on which he was now engaged had finished. In the circumstances, it seemed desirable to consult M. Cuénod himself in the first instance.

Mr. Bieler recalled that M. Cuénod had already expressed the view that it would not be necessary for him to return to Iraq after his present visit. Mr. Bieler felt very strongly that it was essential for M. Cuénod not to be disturbed a second time if he was to exert any influence as president of the Trustee Board.

The committee approved the terms of the draft reply to the Iraqi Government (document C/Min. Ass./183). On the subsidiary point arising out of M. Cuénod's dual rôle, it came to the conclusion that on balance it would be preferable that M. Cuénod should stay in Syria, but that he might be replaced by Sr. Barcenas in Iraq until the final consultation had been carried out. The acting secretary was accordingly instructed to inform M. Cuénod by telegram that the committee attached importance to his remaining at Beirut, but that it wished its representative to be present during the final consultation, and was proposing to invite Sr. Barcenas to replace him on the local committee in Iraq from the beginning of March. It was also agreed that a telegram should be sent to Sr. Barcenas enquiring whether he would be prepared to serve in Iraq if invited.

Consideration of the Draft Budgets for 1936 submitted by the Trustee Board.

The consideration of outstanding points in the draft budgets was resumed.

Ghab Settlement Budget: Chapter IV (Food Supplies).

After further discussion the committee came to the conclusion that it would be desirable to emphasise its criticism of this credit being based upon a flat rate per settler by reducing the amount provided for in the draft budget. The original estimate for food supplies for the whole Ghab settlement had been reduced in September 1935 from 9 to 8 million francs, i.e., a reduction of about 12 per cent., and the committee decided that it would be suitable to reduce the proposed credit

for 1936 by 10 per cent., transferring the reduction effected to the chapter for miscellaneous and unforeseen expenditure. If the revised credit proved eventually to be insufficient, it would be possible for the saving to be transferred back to Chapter IV with the consent of the committee.

Chapter V (Sanitary Services).

The committee understood from Mr. Bieler that the Board proposed to leave the free disposal of the credits it was providing under this head to the French medical authorities. The committee approved this arrangement, but felt that it might be risky to express its approval in writing, since the principle by which the committee produced funds and the French authorities spent them might be cited as an argument by the High Commissioner in favour of the arrangement he was proposing for the police service in the settlements (see the discussion of Chapter VIII of the Ghab budget in the record of the sixty-fourth and sixty-fifth meetings).

Khabur Settlement Budget: Chapter X.

Since the last meeting members of the committee had been struck by the large provision which was being made in this chapter for capital expenditure on hydraulic installations, although the settlement on the Khabur was intended to be only temporary.

Mr. Bieler explained that of the total credits requested 185,000 fr. referred to the completion of installations in the course of construction.

The French Representative feared that this large provision for further capital expenditure reflected the desire at the back of M. Burnier's mind to retain the Khabur settlement for an indefinite period. Once the money had been spent there would be a powerful argument in favour of continuing, and even extending, the settlement on the Khabur, whereas there were very strong political reasons for bringing it to an end as soon as possible.

The committee agreed that its reluctance to contemplate further capital expenditure on the temporary Khabur settlement should be explained to the Board. The credit (185,000 fr.) required for completing installations in the course of construction would be approved, but the credit of 410,000 fr. for new machinery would be reserved pending further explanations from the Board.

Additional Message to the Assyrians in regard to their Subsistence in Syria.

A draft reply was circulated at the meeting to the letter from the Iraqi Government (document C/Min. Ass./176) requesting that the committee should prepare the text of a supplementary message to the Assyrians to clear up the doubts about the conditions on which they would be fed in Syria. The draft letter to the Iraqi Government and the terms of the message to the Assyrians enclosed in it reflected the view which the committee have held throughout, namely, that Assyrians with private resources must be expected to contribute as largely as possible towards their subsistence. While insisting that this principle should be respected, the committee expressed its readiness at the same time to leave the local settlement authorities as wide a discretion as possible for allotting supplies to the Assyrians.

The question was also raised of distributing the new message among the Assyrians already on the Khabur. It was felt that it might be difficult to do this, as a great majority of those Assyrians had come into Syria in a completely destitute state and had hitherto been receiving their food supplies without discrimination. At the same time the message would, of course, reach the 2,500 new settlers whom it was proposed to bring to the Khabur in 1936.

The draft message to the Assyrians and the draft covering letter to the Iraqi Government (C/Min. Ass./181) were approved with minor modifications and are annexed to this record.

J. A. WARD.

[C./Min. Ass./181.]

Annex.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Settlement of the Assyrians of Iraq.

Geneva, January 31, 1936.

Letter of January 30, 1936, from the Secretary-General to the Minister for Foreign Affairs in Iraq, transmitting a Message from the Council Committee to the Assyrians of Iraq on the subject of their subsistence in Syria.

Geneva, January 30, 1936.

Sir,

The Committee of the Council for the Settlement of the Assyrians of Iraq has had under consideration your Excellency's letter of the 2nd January, forwarding copies of correspondence with the president of the local committee in Iraq for the emigration of the Assyrians, in which the question was raised of a further message to the Assyrians in regard to their subsistence in Syria.

The Council Committee is not disposed in principle to modify the view which it expressed on the question of the subsistence of Assyrian settlers in Syria in the last three paragraphs of my letter to M. Cuénod of the 14th December, and, in a more general way, in the fourth paragraph of my letter to your Excellency of the same date. It notes, moreover, from your Excellency's letter of the 2nd January to the president of the local committee in Iraq that the Iraqi Government is substantially in agreement with its attitude, and it trusts that the Iraqi Government will therefore be prepared to instruct its own representative on the local committee in a sense similar to the instructions already sent to M. Cuénod.

At the same time the Council Committee observed that the local committee is anxious that any statement to the Assyrians about their subsistence in Syria should take the form of a specific message from the Council Committee, and it appreciates the advantage which would lie in making the position in this respect as clear as possible before the departure of any further Assyrians to Syria. The Council Committee considers, however, that such a message should be in the form of a *démenti* of the incorrect rumours which are current as to the conditions under which food may be allowed to the Assyrian settlers, since a positive statement by the committee of what these conditions are might be held by some, however unjustifiably, as a reversal of previous policy.

The Council Committee has accordingly prepared the annexed draft text of such a message, and requests that if the Iraqi Government concurs in its terms it will forward it to the local committee forthwith, with a view to its communication to the Assyrians during the course of the consultation. While it considers that strong pressure should be put on those Assyrians with means to contribute towards their subsistence to the utmost of their capacity, the committee appreciates at the same time that it must allow a considerable latitude in the enforcement of this policy to the authorities concerned.

I have, &c.

(For the Secretary-General),

F. P. WALTERS, *Under-Secretary-General,*
Director of the Political Section.

Sub-Annex.

Message from the Council Committee to the Assyrians of Iraq.

The Committee of the Council of the League of Nations for the Settlement of the Assyrians of Iraq has learnt that certain misapprehensions exist among the Assyrians in regard to the arrangements contemplated for their maintenance in food after their transfer to Syria. In particular, it understands that rumours are current to the effect that the Assyrians will be maintained unconditionally for a number of years after their arrival in Syria at the sole expense of the funds raised by the committee for their settlement.

The committee of the Council must point out that such rumours are entirely false, and it desires to emphasise that it has always been intended that those Assyrians who possess resources of their own or are in receipt of money wages should contribute as largely as their means permit towards their own subsistence

in food. This principle was laid down in a statement made by the president of the Council Committee to the Sixth Committee of the Assembly of the League of Nations on the 18th September, 1935. It is a principle which is obviously just and must be strictly observed.

The Assyrians must realise that the funds available for their settlement in Syria are extremely limited. In the interests of the success of the whole operation, it is essential that they should co-operate willingly with the settlement authorities and freely accept the obligation to contribute, as far as their resources permit, to their own maintenance.

When the first year in Syria is over, it will only be possible to make an extremely limited allocation for supplies of food to those Assyrians who are unable to provide for themselves, and after 1939 all settlers will be expected to maintain themselves without any outside aid whatsoever.

[E 673/4/93]

No. 37.

(C./Min.Ass./184.)

LEAGUE OF NATIONS: SETTLEMENT OF THE ASSYRIANS OF IRAQ.

Budget for 1936 relating to the Settlement Operation.—(Received in Foreign Office, February 6.)

Geneva, January 30, 1936.

I.—*Observations of the Committee of the Council for the Settlement of the Assyrians of Iraq, on the Budget for the Year 1936, submitted to it by the Assyrian Settlement Trustee Board.*

THE Committee of the Council for the settlement of the Assyrians of Iraq has considered the budget for 1936 submitted to it by the Trustee Board in accordance with the second paragraph of article 12 of the Financial Regulations (document C.454.M.236.1935.VII) and conveys its approval of that budget in accordance with the third paragraph of the same article, subject to certain modifications and observations set out below, and to the terms of article 3 of the statutes of the Board (document C.485(1).M.261(1).1935.VII). This approval is understood to mean that the committee is of the opinion that the estimates which are contained in the budget relate to expenditure within the framework of the settlement plan, as submitted to the Assembly and the Council, and that it considers that, so far as it can judge from the information placed at its disposal, the credits envisaged appear to be reasonable in amount, having regard to the programme contemplated for 1936, and the funds at present available.

Before proceeding to deal seriatim with the various chapters and items of the draft budget, the committee wishes to make certain general observations on the covering report of the 13th January submitted to it by the Board.

In the first place it wishes to express its appreciation of the evident care and thoroughness with which the Board has drawn up its budget, and it notes with satisfaction the effort that the Board has made to keep its proposed expenditure as low as possible.

The committee's task was facilitated by the explanations regarding the different items of the budget which Mr. Bieler was able to give it. As the Board will doubtless have more time at its disposal when drawing up its future budgets, the committee would be grateful if it would append to such budgets detailed explanations of the credits asked for.

The committee notes that the Board anticipates that it will be necessary eventually to take account of the fact that about 6,000 more Assyrians are likely to express the wish to leave Iraq than the total taken as a basis in the estimates submitted in the committee's report to the Council on the 12th November, 1935. At the same time the committee agrees with the Board that in view of the present uncertainty, and until the final result of the consultation is known, it is preferable to continue for the present to base the calculations of the cost of the settlement operation on the number of Assyrians taken as a basis in that report.

The committee fully appreciates the arguments, and in particular the argument of economy, advanced by the Board in support of its proposal to limit to 8,500 the number of Assyrians to be brought to the Levant States in 1936, but

it feels that its approval of this proposal must be qualified by the following observations.

In the message communicated to the Assyrians in December last, the committee expressed the hope that it would be possible for the great majority of the Assyrians anxious to leave Iraq to do so in 1936. Until the consultation has been completed and the final number of Assyrians to be transferred is known, the committee does not think it necessary to suggest any increase in the quota proposed for 1936; but it considers that it would be desirable for a majority of the total number to be transferred in 1936, and that it is in any case essential to complete the transfer before the end of 1937.

The position is, therefore, that, while the committee approves the programme submitted to it in respect of 1936, it does not wish to exclude the possibility of eventually increasing the quota of Assyrians to be transferred in the current year. The additional funds necessary to meet such an increase could be made available when the time comes by means of a supplementary estimate submitted by the Board to the committee.

The committee notes that the Trustee Board considers that it would be prudent to reduce by 2 million French francs the estimate for incidental receipts from the Assyrians themselves, amounting to 3 million French francs, which figured in the original general budget for the whole settlement operation.

On the question of the tax of 1 dinar to be levied on the Assyrians before their departure from Iraq, directions have already been given to the Local Committee in Iraq, which has been left full latitude to deal with such special cases as may arise. The Council Committee is further of opinion that the present financial situation, as well as considerations of equity, debar it from deviating from the arrangements originally proposed for making a deduction, in respect of maintenance, from the wages of such Assyrians as may be employed on the Ghab reclamation scheme, and it trusts that the Board, in conjunction with the High Commissioner, will do all in its power to maintain this source of revenue.

The committee further trusts that the Board will make every possible effort to engage its necessary personnel from among the Assyrians.

In accordance with the suggestion contained in the penultimate paragraph of the Board's report, the committee has approached the Turkish Government with the request that the necessary authorisation should be given for the Assyrians to pass through Turkish territory in transit by train to Syria, and that the usual charges on travellers should be waived in their respect. It has also asked the French Government whether it could see its way to lending tents free of charge for the purpose of the temporary installation of the Assyrians. The committee will communicate to the Board in due course the result of these representations.

The individual chapters and items of the draft budget (annex 1)(¹) will now be examined.

(Part I.) (A)—*Budget for the Settlement in the Ghab.*

I. *Administration.*—No observations.

II. *Land.*—In the course of its session the committee was informed by the Trustee Board that it proposed to purchase some 800 hectares of land at Tell Salhab for the purposes of temporary settlement, and that it recommended on this account an increase in the credit provided in this chapter by 100,000 French francs. The committee was also informed that the Health Service of the High Commission considered the occupation of this land to be possible within the scope of the health measures provided for.

The committee is opposed in principle to an increase in capital expenditure in connexion with the temporary settlement; it accordingly enquired whether the Board had contemplated leasing the land in question with an option to purchase. The Trustee Board replied that the purchase price would be approximately equal to rent for five years, and that, in agreement with the High Commission, it recommended purchase.

In these circumstances, the committee acquiesced in the proposal of the Board, and fixed the credit for this chapter at 350,000 French francs.

(¹) The budget as approved by the committee is given in Part II of this document.

III. Transport: (a) *Persons*.—No observations.

(b) *Animals*.—The committee appreciates that the Board is proposing more generous conditions in regard to payment for the transport of animals from Iraq with a view to increasing the number of live-stock available in the settlement, and that it has felt able on this account to effect a considerable reduction in the credit originally provided for the purchase of live-stock. It still feels, however, that, in accordance with the suggestion contained in paragraph IX of Annex 3 of its report of the 12th September, 1935, the Assyrians should be required to pay as far as possible for the transfer of their live-stock, and that the more generous treatment which the Board now contemplates should be confined to assisting the poorest elements.

The committee further suggests that the Trustee Board should reconsider whether arrangements could not still be made for live-stock to be brought from Iraq to the Ghab as far as possible on hoof. The committee understands that specially favourable facilities for grazing are likely to be available this spring on the route to be traversed, and that large numbers of animals are regularly brought on hoof from Iraq to North-Western Syria. It is understood that the mandatory authorities in the Levant States, when approached on the subject last autumn, were, for various reasons, reluctant to agree to such a course; but in view of the economies which would result, the committee would suggest that the Trustee Board should consider making further representations to the High Commissioner on this matter.

IV. *Supplies*.—The committee understands that this item has been calculated on the basis of a flat rate per settler sufficient to cover the minimum rations required. It would, however, point out that in September last it proposed a reduction of more than 10 per cent. in the original estimate calculated on the same basis on account of the saving which it was felt might be expected in view of the known capacity of a certain proportion of the Assyrians to provide for themselves from the beginning. The committee is still of the opinion that the principle that Assyrians with resources of their own or in receipt of wages should contribute as largely as possible to their own maintenance should be strictly observed. It has, therefore, thought it desirable to reduce this chapter by 10 per cent., or 138,600 French francs, which sum it has transferred to chapter XI (miscellaneous and unforeseen).

The views of the committee on this point are more fully set out in a message (a copy of which is annexed hereto),^(*) which is being communicated to the Assyrians at the request of the Local Committee in Iraq.

V. *Sanitary Services*.—No observations.

VI. *Upkeep of Plant, Petrol, Oil, Repairs, Seed*.—The committee understands that, while tractors and probably motor vehicles for the purpose of the settlement can be imported free of customs duty, the High Commissioner sees difficulty in according exemption from customs duty in respect of petrol and other imported supplies purchased by the Trustee Board. In view of the important saving which would result to the limited funds at its disposal, the Council Committee much hopes that the High Commissioner will feel able to reconsider the matter with a view to a general exemption being granted in respect of supplies imported for the purposes of the Assyrian settlement. Even if this is not possible, it would be of the greatest value if exemption from customs duty could be obtained in respect of petrol and oil utilised in connexion with the settlement operation.

VII. *Education*.—No observations.

VIII. *Police*.—The committee, having always been of the opinion that the responsibility for the maintenance of order could not and ought not in any way to devolve upon the Trustee Board, considers that there is no justification in the present circumstances for the insertion in the budget of a credit for police service. In the first place, it suggests that responsibility for the police service should devolve on the public authorities of the State receiving the Assyrians as settlers. In the second place, it derives the impression from the plan submitted by the French Government on the 28th August, 1935, that the High Commissioner undertook to provide for the safety of the Assyrians, and did not propose to claim for meeting the cost of the police service involved.

(*) Annex 2.

(Part II.)

IX. *Buildings*.—No observations.

X. *Plant, Live-stock, &c.*—See observations as under chapter VI.

(Part III.)

XI. *Miscellaneous and Unforeseen Expenditure*.—In accordance with the modification introduced in chapter IV above, this chapter has now been increased from 325,000 to 463,600 French francs.

The committee considers that this chapter might be drawn upon without further reference to itself for any expenditure on unforeseen items for which no credit exists in the budget, provided the sum in question does not exceed 25,000 French francs. Should it be found indispensable to supplement existing chapters of the budget, the committee is of opinion that the matter should be brought to its attention, with a view to the approval of a transfer, unless the amount involved is less than 25,000 French francs, in which case it would be permissible for the transfer to be approved *ex post facto*.

(B)—*Budget for the Settlement on the Khabur.*

The committee has no observations to make on chapters I, II, III, V, VII, IX. In regard to chapters IV, VI, VIII and XI, it would draw attention to its remarks in respect of the corresponding chapters in the budget relating to the settlement in the Ghab.

For the reasons set out in connexion with the corresponding chapter in the Ghab budget, the committee has transferred from chapter IV to chapter XI the sum of 37,500 French francs, corresponding to 10 per cent. of the amount provided for the subsistence of the 2,500 Assyrians who are to be settled on the Khabur in 1936.

The committee notes that chapter X provides for a further considerable capital expenditure on hydraulic installations, &c. It recognises that it is essential to complete the installations in course of construction, but it is reluctant to authorise fresh commitments of this kind. As the Board is aware, there are serious political objections to the maintenance of any Assyrian settlement on the Khabur for more than a short period. The committee fears that it would be impossible to recover more than a small part of such capital expenditure on the final liquidation of the settlement.

In these circumstances, the committee provisionally fixes the credit provided in item (d) for hydraulic installations at 185,000 French francs, the sum required for completing the pumping station in course of construction, and reserves the balance of the amount included in the budget under this sub-head pending the receipt of fuller information from the Board.

(C)—*General Expenditure: Budget of the Trustee Board, &c.*

In the last paragraph of its report of the 13th January, 1936, the Board stated that it did not feel able to submit any proposals with regard to its own budget, which is shown in a separate chapter of the general estimate appended to the report of the Council Committee, dated the 12th November, 1935. In view of the autonomous character of the Trustee Board, the committee considers that the Board should in future prepare and administer its own budget, which should be shown as a separate part of the settlement budget.

On the basis of the information at its disposal, the committee adopted this budget in the following form:—

	Fr.
(a) Salaries and allowances	285,000
(b) Miscellaneous expenses (telegrams, insurance, special missions, &c.)	50,000
	335,000

Further, in the absence of any item for expenditure by the League of Nations in connexion with the Assyrian settlement scheme other than the lump sum voted by the Assembly as a contribution towards the cost of the scheme (of which the

proportion available in 1936 is 400,000 Swiss francs), the committee has decided to allocate under an item (c), "Expenditure of the Council Committee and of the Secretariat of the League of Nations," a sum of 25,000 fr. for the purpose of meeting the cost of such extraordinary expenses as may have to be incurred from Geneva.

Annex 1.

Budget relating to the Settlement Operation submitted by the Trustee Board.(A)—*Budget for the Settlement in the Ghab.*

Part I.— <i>Current Expenditure.</i>	1936.		Total.
	First six months.	Second six months. (French francs.)	
I.—Administration—			
(a) Control	6,000	6,000	12,000
(b) Office staff	22,500	26,100	48,600
(c) Supervision of works	18,300	33,600	51,900
(d) Office expenses, travel- ling, &c.	22,000	22,500	44,500
II.—Land	250,000	...	250,000
III.—Transport—			
(a) Persons	74,000	37,000	111,000
(b) Animals	20,000	78,000	98,000
IV.—Supplies	300,000	1,086,000	1,386,000
V.—Sanitary Service—			
(a) Staff	9,933	19,867	29,800
(b) Current supplies (including medicines and anti- malaria campaign), up- keep	119,115	120,315	239,430
(c) Building, motor transport, technical supplies	161,070	...	161,070
VI.—Upkeep of plant, petrol, oil, repairs, seed, &c.—			
(a) Staff	30,000	40,800	70,800
(b) Travelling	1,000	2,000	3,000
(c) Supplies, petrol, &c.	85,000	80,000	165,000
(d) Seed	10,000	150,000	160,000
VII.—Educational, Public Wor- ship, &c.	9,500	9,500
VIII.—Police	22,000	50,000	72,000
Part II.— <i>Capital Expenditure.</i>			
IX.—Buildings	300,000	325,000	625,000
X.—Plant, live-stock, &c.—			
(a) Agricultural implements	397,250	130,000	527,250
(b) Motor lorries, motor cars, &c.	246,000	20,000	266,000
(c) Live-stock	10,000	20,000	30,000
Part III.— <i>Unforeseen Expenditure.</i>			
XI.—Miscellaneous and unforeseen expenditure	125,000	200,000	325,000
Total	2,229,168	2,456,682	4,685,850

(B)—*Budget for the Settlement on the Khabur.*

Part I.— <i>Current Expenditure.</i>	1936.		Total.
	First six months.	Second six months. (French francs.)	
I.—Administration—			
(a) Control
(b) Office staff	13,800	13,800	27,600
(c) Supervision of works	37,800	37,800	75,600
(d) Office expenses, travel- ling, &c.	4,000	4,000	8,000
II.—Land	36,000	...	36,000
III.—Transport	12,500	12,500
IV.—Supplies	810,000	645,000	1,455,000
V.—Sanitary Service—			
(a) Staff	14,700	14,700	29,400
(b) Supplies	20,300	20,300	40,600
VI.—Upkeep of plant—			
(a) Staff	25,000	35,000	60,000
(b) Removals	500	500	1,000
(c) Supplies, oil, &c.	50,000	50,000	100,000
(d) Seed	25,000	75,000	100,000
VII.—Education	5,000	5,000	10,000
VIII.—Police	50,000	50,000	100,000
Part II.— <i>Capital Expenditure.</i>			
IX.—Buildings	80,000	90,000	170,000
X.—Plant, live-stock, &c.—			
(a) Agricultural implements	85,000	...	85,000
(b) Motor lorries	28,000	...	28,000
(c) Live-stock	12,500	...	12,500
(d) Hydraulic installations	250,000	345,000	595,000
Part III.— <i>Unforeseen Expenditure.</i>			
XI.—Miscellaneous and unforeseen expenditure	153,760	138,860	292,620
Total	1,701,360	1,537,460	3,238,820

Annex 2.

Message from the Council Committee to the Assyrians of Iraq.

The Committee of the Council of the League of Nations for the settlement of the Assyrians of Iraq has learnt that certain misapprehensions exist among the Assyrians in regard to the arrangements contemplated for their maintenance in food after their transfer to Syria. In particular, it understands that rumours are current to the effect that the Assyrians will be maintained unconditionally for a number of years after their arrival in Syria at the sole expense of the funds raised by the committee for their settlement.

The committee of the Council must point out that such rumours are entirely false, and it desires to emphasise that it has always been intended that those Assyrians who possess resources of their own or are in receipt of money wages should contribute as largely as their means permit towards their own subsistence in food. This principle was laid down in a statement made by the president of the Council Committee to the Sixth Committee of the Assembly of the League of Nations on the 18th September, 1935. It is a principle which is obviously just and must be strictly observed.

The Assyrians must realise that the funds available for their settlement in Syria are extremely limited. In the interests of the success of the whole operation it is essential that they should co-operate willingly with the settlement authorities and freely accept the obligation to contribute, as far as their resources permit, to their own maintenance.

When the first year in Syria is over it will only be possible to make an extremely limited allocation for supplies of food to those Assyrians who are unable to provide for themselves, and after 1939 all settlers will be expected to maintain themselves without any outside aid whatsoever.

II.—Budget for 1936 relating to the Settlement Operation as approved by the Council Committee.

(A)—Budget for the Settlement in the Ghab.

1936.			
Part I.	First six months.	Second six months.	Total.
(French francs.)			
I.—Administration—			
(a) Control	6,000	6,000	12,000
(b) Office staff	22,500	26,100	48,600
(c) Supervision of works	18,300	33,600	51,900
(d) Office expenses, travelling, &c.	22,000	22,500	44,500
II.—Land	350,000	...	350,000
III.—Transport—			
(a) Persons	74,000	37,000	111,000
(b) Animals	20,000	78,000	98,000
IV.—Supplies	270,000	977,400	1,247,400
V.—Sanitary Service—			
(a) Staff	9,933	19,867	29,800
(b) Current supplies (including medicines and anti-malaria campaign), upkeep	119,115	120,315	239,430
(c) Building, motor-transport, technical supplies	161,070	...	161,070
VI.—Upkeep of plant, petrol, oil, repairs, seed, &c.—			
(a) Staff	30,000	40,800	70,800
(b) Travelling	1,000	2,000	3,000
(c) Supplies, petrol, &c.	85,000	80,000	165,000
(d) Seed	10,000	150,000	160,000
VII.—Educational, Public Worship, &c.	9,500	9,500
Part II.			
VIII.—Buildings	300,000	325,000	625,000
IX.—Plant, live-stock, &c.—			
(a) Agricultural implements	397,250	130,000	527,250
(b) Motor lorries, motor cars, &c.	246,000	20,000	266,000
(c) Live-stock	10,000	20,000	30,000
Part III.			
X.—Miscellaneous and unforeseen expenditure	155,000	308,600	463,600
Total	2,307,168	2,406,682	4,713,850

(B)—Budget for the Settlement on the Khabur.

1936.			
Part I.	First six months.	Second six months.	Total.
(French francs.)			
I.—Administration—			
(a) Control
(b) Office staff	13,800	13,800	27,600
(c) Supervision of works	37,800	37,800	75,600
(d) Office expenses, travelling, &c.	4,000	4,000	8,000
II.—Land	36,000	...	36,000
III.—Transport	12,500	12,500
IV.—Supplies	810,000	607,500	1,417,500
V.—Sanitary Service—			
(a) Staff	14,700	14,700	29,400
(b) Supplies	20,300	20,300	40,600
VI.—Upkeep of plant—			
(a) Staff	25,000	35,000	60,000
(b) Removals	500	500	1,000
(c) Supplies, oil, &c.	50,000	50,000	100,000
(d) Seed	25,000	75,000	100,000
VII.—Education	5,000	5,000	10,000
Part II.			
VIII.—Buildings	80,000	90,000	170,000
IX.—Plant, live-stock, &c.—			
(a) Agricultural implements	85,000	...	85,000
(b) Motor lorries	28,000	...	28,000
(c) Live-stock	12,500	...	12,500
(d) Hydraulic installations	185,000	...	185,000
Part III.			
X.—Miscellaneous and unforeseen expenditure	153,760	176,360	330,120
Total	1,586,360	1,142,460	2,728,820

(C)—General Expenditure: Budget of the Trustee Board, &c.

1936.			
(French francs.)			
(a) Salaries and allowances	285,000
(b) Miscellaneous expenses (telegrams, insurance, special missions, &c.)	50,000
(c) Expenditure of the Council Committee and of the Secretariat of the League of Nations	25,000
Total	360,000

[E 795/4/93]

No. 38.

Note on the Plan for Settling the Assyrians in the Ghab District in the French Mandated Territories of the Levant.

Part I.—The Preliminary Reclamation and Development Works.

THE plain known as the Ghab is situated on the middle course of the River Orontes in that part of the Levant loosely described as Syria. It lies in an extensive valley, about 38 miles long and from 5 to 7 miles broad at a height of over 500 feet above the sea level. On the west it is shut off from the Mediterranean

—only 20 miles away—by the Jebel Ansariyeh mountains (the northern continuation of the Lebanon range) with an average height of about 4,500 feet; on the east it is separated from the Syrian desert by hills of varying height.

2. The Ghab is traversed from south to north by the Orontes, which has transformed it for a great part into a marsh interspersed with sheets of open water. This is due partly to the presence of a natural dam of basalt at the northern end of the plain which prevents the proper drainage of surplus water; partly to the presence of numerous springs, the waters of which are unable to drain into the river on account of the height at which its banks now lie above the plain; and partly to extensive periodical flooding due to the inadequate size of the river bed. Nevertheless, the alluvial soil in the valley is said to be of great potential richness, and in classical times it is certain that the district was for the most part highly prosperous.

3. In order to make the Ghab Plain (which is at present sparsely populated) available for the Assyrians extensive drainage and irrigation works are necessary. These works, with their estimated cost, are:—

- (1) The construction of an artificial reservoir, with an area of some 30 square miles, at the southern (top) end of the plain. This will make it possible to keep back water which would otherwise flood the plain and, at the same time, to provide a regular supply of water for irrigation during the dry season. (Estimated cost, about £133,000.)
- (2) The piercing of a tunnel through the natural rock dam at the northern end of the Ghab Plain so as to release the water at present penned up in the marsh, and the construction of a regulator dam to hold up water in the dry season. (Estimated cost, about £53,000.)
- (3) The deepening of a section of the River Orontes some 12 miles long so as to enable it to contain its maximum flow of water without flooding. (Estimated cost, £240,000.)

4. The above works form an integral part of the general scheme for the reclamation of the whole plain, and affect a total area of some 100,000 acres capable of being brought under cultivation. In the case of the Assyrians the whole of this area is not required, and could not in any case be made available owing to the high cost of the additional drainage and irrigation works necessary for agricultural purposes. The settlement plan provides for about 37,500 acres of irrigated land being put at the disposal of the Assyrian Committee of the Council, which was considered to be adequate for the total number of 21,000 settlers taken as a basis for the financial estimates of the settlement scheme (additional land for grazing, &c., will also be available for the settlers in the hills on the west side of the plain). As the River Orontes forms the frontier between the Moslem State of Syria and the small separate territory of Lattakia (known to the French as "The State of the Alawites"), with its numerous minorities and a direct French Administration, the plan provides for the Assyrian lands to be kept on the left bank of the river and thus within Lattakia.

5. The further works necessary to develop the area of 37,500 acres for the Assyrians are as follows:—

- (4) A network of drainage canals through the selected area to complete the drainage and lead off the water from the springs at the foot of the mountains. (Estimated cost, about £107,000.)
- (5) A network of irrigation canals (from which water can be taken by gravity) with the necessary ancillary works. (Estimated cost, about £293,000.)

6. The 62 million French francs (about £827,000) for these works will be required in the following proportions:—

	Million Fr.
1935	1
1936	10
1937	21
1938	20
1939	10

7. The execution and financial control of these capital works is being left entirely to the French mandatory authorities, who have agreed to accept liability for any expenditure in excess of the estimated 62 million francs. The task of the

League is limited to finding the funds to meet the fixed balance of 33½ million francs (about £447,000) remaining after taking into account the contribution of 28½ million francs (about £380,000) offered by the French mandated territories towards the cost of the reclamation works. Any saving effected on the estimate of 62 million francs for reclamation will be shared between the mandated territories and the League in proportion to their contributions.

Part II.—*The Actual Settlement of the Assyrians on the Reclaimed Lands.*

8. The Assyrians will be transported from Iraq, together with their personal property and a proportion of their live-stock, by railway to a point not far from the place of settlement, whence they will be taken on in lorries. It is intended that they shall be settled in large villages in the foothills of the Jebel Ansariyeh overlooking the Ghab Plain, where they will have an extensive area of grazing country available behind them in the mountains.

9. Pending the completion of the permanent villages, the settlers will be accommodated at the southern end of the Ghab Plain and land will be leased for cultivation so that as much as possible of their food supplies may be provided by their own labour. The Assyrians at present provisionally settled on the River Khabur in North-Eastern Syria, together with any further emigrants from Iraq who may be added to that settlement as a temporary measure, will be left on the Khabur until the reclamation work in the Ghab Plain has been completed.

10. It is hoped to employ many of the Assyrians on the reclamation works, and their wages should enable them to contribute towards the maintenance in food of the settlement as a whole. The remaining Assyrians will be obliged to work in common on the cultivation of their temporary lands and on the construction of their villages.

11. It is anticipated that the Assyrians will be able to begin to cultivate their permanent lands in 1940. These lands will not become their property until they have paid for them; the cost per acre will be fixed at a very reasonable figure, and settlers will have the option of buying their lands outright or by instalments. It should, therefore, be possible in due course to recover from the Assyrians part of the total cost of the settlement. Moreover, although it is not considered to be practicable at present, it might eventually be possible to base a limited credit operation for the benefit of the settlement fund upon the security of these reimbursements.

12. The net cost of the settlement operation itself, as distinct from the preliminary reclamation and development works, was estimated in the original plan submitted to the League of Nations last September at about £320,000. This total estimate covered provision for administration; transport of the Assyrians from Iraq; food supplies; motor vehicles and tractors; agricultural implements and seed; live-stock; the construction of houses, schools and churches; sanitary services and supplies, &c.

13. The most important of these credits is that for food supplies (about £125,000) during the period before the settlers are able to grow sufficient for their own needs. At the same time it is being made clear to the Assyrians that it has always been intended, and is in any case a just and fair principle, that those among them with resources of their own or in receipt of money wages shall contribute as largely as their means permit towards their subsistence in food.

14. The Committee of the Council and the Trustee Board are fully aware of the importance of the health aspect of the settlement in the Ghab, and substantial credits are provided for sanitary services and supplies. The administration of these credits and the actual organisation of the sanitary side of the settlement is a responsibility which the French authorities in the mandated territories have accepted and will be in the hands of the French Health Service.

15. As the result of a resolution of the Council of the League of Nations, an autonomous Board of Trustees for the Assyrian settlement has been established at Beirut. This board is composed of M. Cuénod (a Swiss expert on the transfer of populations, president), Major Duprez (a representative of the French High Commissioner), and a third temporary member (Sr. de las Barcnas), a member of the Spanish diplomatic service, who will shortly be replaced by a permanent member in the person of the president of the well-known American university at Beirut, Mr. Bayard Dodge, a national of the United States. Its task is to collaborate with the French mandatory authorities in the

administration of the actual settlement operation (as distinct from the reclamation works on the Ghab Plain, the execution of which, as explained above, is being left to the mandatory authorities) and to assume local financial responsibility within the limits of its regular budgets as approved by the League of Nations. The organic statutes of the Trustee Board further provide for the submission by the board to the Council of the League, of periodical reports on the progress of the settlement and the condition of the settlers. Further, the Council may at any time enquire into the manner in which the board is discharging its functions.

16. The Board will rely for the execution of its policy on M. Burnier, a Swiss subject with long experience of refugee work, including the settlement of numerous Armenians in Syria, who has been made available by the Nansen Refugee Office.

17. The French mandatory authorities propose eventually to naturalise the Assyrians *en bloc*, after which they will be in the same position and enjoy the same rights as the other religious minorities in the States covered by the mandate for Syria. During the introductory period before their naturalisation they will be subject to a special régime involving restrictions on their residing outside their place of settlement. They will, however, enjoy all the public liberties permitted by the organic law of the State within which they will be resident and in accordance with the mandate for Syria. In the exercise of their private rights, as in police matters, the Assyrians will normally be subject to the local law, but where their personal status is concerned they will be entitled to apply their own community law.

18. In order to assist their economic development, the Assyrian settlers will be exempt from taxation up to a date which will be in principle five years from the time when the reclaimed lands in the Ghab Plain are handed over to them.

Part III.—The Finance of the Settlement Operation.

19. The total amount required will obviously depend on the number of Assyrians who may express a desire to leave Iraq. An individual consultation of the Assyrians in Iraq is at present being carried out by a local committee, which includes a representative of the League of Nations, but owing to delays due to weather conditions the final results are unlikely to be known for some time. Meanwhile, the financial estimates are based upon a total of 21,000 Assyrian emigrants (including the 6,000 Assyrians already provisionally settled on the River Khabur, who will be moved to the Ghab area when it is ready).

20. On this basis the *net* estimate for the settlement proper is 24 million French francs or about £320,000. The estimate of 62 million francs or about £826,000 for the reclamation works on the Ghab Plain is a fixed total on the basis of the 37,500 acres of drained and irrigated land which are to be made available for the Assyrians (see paragraph 4 above).

21. Towards this *estimated total of 86 million French francs or £1,146,000* the following contributions (given both in French francs and pounds sterling) have been promised:—

	French francs.	£
The French mandated territories		
in the Levant...	28,500,000	380,000
United Kingdom...	18,750,000	250,000
Iraq...	18,750,000	250,000
League of Nations...	6,500,000	86,000
Total...	72,500,000	966,000

22. There is therefore at present a *deficit on the estimated cost of 13,500,000 French francs or £180,000*, but, in view of the danger inherent in delay, the Committee of the Council of the League which is dealing with the question has not felt it possible to wait until this deficit is filled before initiating the operation.

23. The above-mentioned contributions offered by Governments and the League of Nations are fixed and final. The possibility of bridging the gap by means of a credit operation has been considered; but the only security at present available is the partial reimbursement which the Assyrians are eventually expected to make in the form of purchase of their lands (see paragraph 11 above).

This reimbursement, however, will not begin until the Assyrians acquire the reclaimed land in four or five years' time, and in any case it is obviously insufficient as security for a loan to cover the whole *estimated* deficit of £180,000. The only hope, therefore, lies at present in a substantial response to the appeal to private charity which has been made by the League. If the deficit can thereby be reduced to manageable proportions, the greater part of the present risk and uncertainty will be cleared away, and it might be possible to fill the remaining gap by a credit operation.

Foreign Office, February 11, 1936.

[E 461/45/93]

No. 39.

Mr. Eden to Sir A. Clark Kerr (Bagdad).

(No. 86.)

Foreign Office, February 13, 1936.

Sir,

IN the light of the recommendations contained in your Excellency's despatch No. 418 of the 29th July, 1935, and of the inter-Departmental discussions in which you were good enough to take part during your visit to this country on leave of absence, His Majesty's Government have reviewed the principles which they laid down in 1932 to cover the employment of the Royal Air Force in Iraq after the entry into force of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of Alliance of 1930. They concur in your view that, as a result of the experience gained since 1932, the memorandum, a copy of which was enclosed in Colonial Office Secret despatch of the 28th July, 1932, to Sir F. Humphrys, calls for modification in certain particulars and have decided to embody the required modifications in a revised memorandum which has now received their approval. I transmit to you the accompanying copy of this revised memorandum⁽¹⁾ which should now be substituted for the memorandum forwarded to Sir Francis Humphrys in 1932. It should be brought to the notice of all diplomatic officers assuming charge of His Majesty's Embassy in Iraq and to the Air Officers Commanding on appointment.

2. It will probably be well if I summarise briefly in the following paragraphs the actual points of difference between the revised memorandum and that forwarded to your predecessor in 1932 and the general reasons underlying these amendments.

3. In paragraph 1 (e) of the revised memorandum the words "Protection of the essential communications of His Britannic Majesty and security of the British forces in Iraq" have been substituted for "Protection of Imperial air communications and self-defence." His Majesty's Government have considered it desirable that the general heading regarding Imperial communications should be as comprehensive as possible, and for this purpose have decided to adhere to the wording used in article 5 of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930 and to include under the general heading provision for the security of the forces maintained in Iraq for the purpose of safeguarding "the essential communications of His Britannic Majesty." Further reference to this point is made in paragraph 8 below.

4. His Majesty's Government share the view expressed in your despatch under reference that the meaning of paragraph 3 (b) of the 1932 memorandum was obscure, and the sub-paragraph has accordingly been redrafted with a view to making that meaning clear.

5. In the third note enclosed in your despatch you recommended that, before complying with an Iraqi request for the co-operation of the Royal Air Force in the restoration of internal order, His Majesty's Government should consider the feasibility of obtaining from the Iraqi Government satisfactory assurances regarding the subsequent treatment of the insurgents, the redress of grievances, &c. While appreciating the desirability of obtaining such assurances, His Majesty's Government feel that it might be difficult to secure the immediate, or even the ultimate, acceptance by the Iraqi Government of the conditions which it might be desired to impose, that this might involve discussion and negotiation, and that there might be real danger of a serious deterioration in the general situation while

⁽¹⁾ This memorandum was again revised later, and the final version will be found in No. 79.

such discussion or negotiation was in progress. At the same time they felt that in certain circumstances it might be desirable to obtain such assurances in advance, and with this point in mind they have added to the revised memorandum the additional sentence which appears at the end of paragraph 3 (b) (1).

6. Your recommendations for the modification of the 1932 memorandum included a proposal, submitted after consultation with the Air Officer Commanding, Iraq, that if His Majesty's Government should be ready to comply with a request of the Iraqi Government for assistance in the restoration of internal order, the fulfilment of certain purely military conditions should be insisted upon, with a view to rendering the co-operation of the Royal Air Force as effective as possible. His Majesty's Government consider that the military conditions suggested in the second note enclosed in your despatch No. 418 are not entirely appropriate and would certainly be inapplicable in minor cases in which the Iraqi Government might seek the help of the Royal Air Force. His Majesty's Government take the view that everything would depend upon the degree of British participation asked for and sanctioned and have decided that the best method of covering the point would be to insert in the revised memorandum an additional paragraph 3 (b) (2), and for the Air Ministry, in a despatch to the Air Officer Commanding, to outline the form which these conditions might take in certain eventualities. The text of the Air Ministry's despatch is attached as an appendix to the revised memorandum, of which it should be regarded as forming an integral part.

7. His Majesty's Government have considered whether, in view of the change which has taken place since 1932 in the relations between foreign Governments and the Iraqi Government, the retention in the revised memorandum of a paragraph to cover the protection of non-British foreign subjects and commercial interests in Iraq is still called for. They consider that it is only proper that the representative of a foreign Government, if desirous of securing measures of protection for his nationals and interests, should first approach the Iraqi Government rather than yourself. In view, however, of the special position of His Majesty's Government in Iraq they are reluctant to sanction the deletion from the memorandum of the sub-paragraph dealing with this point, but have decided to modify its second sentence as shown in paragraph 3 (d) of the revised memorandum.

8. As explained in paragraph 3 above, His Majesty's Government have decided to amend the wording of paragraph 3 (e) of the 1932 memorandum by replacing "Protection of Imperial communications and self-defence" by "Protection of the essential communications of His Britannic Majesty and security of the British forces in Iraq" in the revised memorandum. A suggestion that the protection of Imperial communications and of Royal Air Force communications should be treated under separate sub-heads was not pursued, in view of the expert opinion expressed that from the military point of view these communications would be difficult to distinguish in practice and that both were equally essential.

9. In paragraphs 7 and 8 of your despatch No. 418, you gave expression to the doubt which you had felt during the recent troubles in the Euphrates area whether the Iraqi railways should be regarded as part of the "essential communications of His Britannic Majesty," and you reported that the Air Officer Commanding had reached the conclusion that, although the railways were cut during the troubles, the "essential communications" of the Royal Air Force were not thereby endangered. His Majesty's Government consider, however, that in the event of future troubles the severing of any means of communication may involve an interference with the "essential communications of His Britannic Majesty," and in view of this they find it desirable to make the field of permissive action under paragraph 3 (e) of the revised memorandum as wide as possible. The sub-paragraph has been redrafted with this object in view.

10. His Majesty's Government concur in your view that no modification of paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 of the 1932 memorandum is called for. These paragraphs have, therefore, been retained textually in the revised memorandum.

11. Finally, His Majesty's Government concur in the view expressed in paragraph 9 of your despatch No. 418 of the 29th July that the oil-fields and the pipe-line of the Iraq Petroleum Company should be regarded as constituting a British commercial interest within the meaning of paragraph 3 (e) of the revised memorandum. It is, therefore, open to you to seek the concurrence of His

Majesty's Government in any measure you may deem necessary for their protection, and more particularly for that of the pipe-line, even if British lives should not be immediately threatened.

I am, &c.

ANTHONY EDEN.

Enclosure in No. 39.

Principles governing the Employment of the Royal Air Force in Iraq.

[FOR FINALLY REVISED VERSION OF THIS MEMORANDUM, SEE No. 79.]

[E 788/4/93]

No. 40.

Record of Sixty-Seventh Meeting of the Assyrian Committee of the Council of the League of Nations held at Geneva on January 30.—(Received in Foreign Office, February 13.)

(NOTE.—"Francs" in this record are "French francs.")

THE committee met at 10.30 A.M. in private in order to have an opportunity for discussion without the Iraqi representative being present.

Procedure for the Council Committee to send Instructions to its Representative on the Local Committee in Iraq.

In the course of a letter of the 2nd January (document C./Min. Ass./176) the Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs had criticised the procedure adopted by the committee in informing its own representative on the Local Committee in Iraq of the policy which it wished to be carried out in regard to the supply of food to the Assyrians after their arrival in Syria. Nuri Pasha had expressed the view that anything in the nature of instructions should always be sent to the Local Committee through the Iraqi Government, who had been responsible for establishing the Local Committee.

A draft reply to the Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs on this point was circulated at the meeting and its despatch approved (document C./Min. Ass./18). This reply pointed out that in informing M. Cuénod of its views the committee had no intention of trying to instruct the Local Committee as a whole. The committee maintained its complete right to instruct its own representative as to the line he should take, and expressed the view that there was no objection to M. Cuénod subsequently proposing to the Local Committee the policy that he had himself been instructed to follow. If the Iraqi representatives on the committee did not feel able to accept M. Cuénod's proposals on their own responsibility they had only to refer to the Iraqi Government for instructions.

Definition of "Assyrians."

The United Kingdom Representative said that he had heard from a reliable source that the Local Committee were already experiencing difficulty in the course of their consultation on the Assyrians in deciding just what constituted the "Assyrians" for the purposes of the emigration to Syria. It appeared that certain elements belonging to well-known Assyrian tribes were Roman Catholics, but that the Local Committee was disposed to take the view that its terms of reference excluded all Assyrians except those of the Nestorian sect. While the committee could afford to wait until it had been officially seized of this difficulty before issuing any instructions to the Local Committee, he thought that this problem of defining the Assyrians for the purpose of emigration would prove to be one of considerable difficulty. Unfortunately the terms of the original report of the 13th October, 1933, to the Council of the League, whose adoption had led to the establishment of the Council Committee, were vague and merely referred to "Assyrians in Iraq" or the "Assyrian population of Iraq." Subsequently the committee had qualified this by deciding that it was not directly concerned with Assyrians of Persian origin, and that the most it could do for them at the moment was to allow their names to be registered. On the other hand, it seemed quite impossible to discriminate among the Assyrians on a religious basis. Apart from the Assyrians who had turned Roman Catholic, either recently or in earlier generations, a considerable number of them had been converted to various forms of protestantism by English and American missionaries.

The position was extremely complicated, since originally the Assyrians and those who were now called Chaldeans had all belonged to the same (Nestorian) church. The modern Chaldeans were the descendants of those who had gone over to Roman Catholicism through their being accessible to missionaries in the towns and plains of Northern Iraq; they had come in the course of time to form a separate community of their own, and were clearly not included in the committee's terms of reference. The question was to decide at what point after his conversion to Roman Catholicism an Assyrian became a Chaldean. He thought that the only solution would be to adopt a tribal criterion, *i.e.*, to establish a list of tribes which would be regarded by the best authorities as "Assyrians" (excluding, of course, the Persian Assyrians); if a person claiming to be an Assyrian could show that he was a member of such a tribe, his personal creed should be a matter of indifference.

The French Representative feared that the Iraqi Government might try to dispose of its Chaldean minority by passing them off as Assyrians; but the United Kingdom Representative thought that although the Iraqis might want to exploit and even persecute the Chaldeans, they had no wish to force them or any other of the docile Christian minorities to leave Iraq, where they were in many ways useful to the Moslem majority.

The Danish Representative thought that it would be quite impossible to attempt to define Assyrians on a strictly juridical basis. The Council Committee had been set up to rescue the Assyrians from further massacres, and he thought that its object should be the removal of all those Assyrians who might be in danger. In any case there could clearly be no discrimination against Assyrians on a religious basis.

The committee agreed that *prima facie* there could be no question of distinguishing amongst the Assyrians on account of their individual religion, and that probably the question of definition would have to be solved on a tribal basis. It was decided to leave the problem over for further discussion if and when it was raised by the Local Committee.

At this stage the meeting became public and was joined by the Iraqi representative.

Consideration of the Draft Budgets for 1936 submitted by the Trustee Board.

The committee had before it a draft of its observations in reply to the Trustee Board's report of the 13th January; this draft had been prepared by the Secretariat on the lines decided at the three previous meetings on the 24th and 29th January.

The committee decided to include in its observations an expression of the hope that Assyrians would be given all possible preference for posts on the staff to be recruited by the Trustee Board.

The committee gave further consideration to Chapter II of the Ghab budget, containing the credits necessary for acquiring temporary land for the Assyrians to inhabit and cultivate pending the reclamation of the Ghab Plain. In reply to the telegram sent to him as a result of the discussion of this chapter at the committee's sixty-fourth and sixty-fifth meetings on the 24th January, Sr. Barcenas had reported that it would be more economical to purchase an estate of some 800 hectares for temporary settlement than to rent it, as the purchase price was equal to the rent over a period of five years.

Since the French High Commissioner apparently agreed with the Trustee Board's view, the committee decided to acquiesce in the proposal for purchase (although it would have preferred to avoid capital expenditure on land) and to raise the credit provided in this chapter to 350,000 fr., so informing Sr. Barcenas by telegram.

This concluded the consideration of the draft budgets and the covering report of the Trustee Board of the 13th January; the committee approved a final draft of its observations and authorised its despatch to the Trustee Board (document C./Min. Ass./184).

Appointment of Third Member of the Trustee Board.

The Acting Secretary read a telegram from Mr. Bayard Dodge accepting on behalf of himself and Professor Ritscher, the invitation to serve on the Trustee Board as third member and permanent substitute respectively.

Budget submitted by the High Commissioner for Syria in respect of the Ghab Reclamation Works.

A copy of a letter from the French High Commissioner to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations forwarding the draft budget for the reclamation works for 1936, together with a statement showing the expenditure incurred in 1935, was circulated to the committee (document C./Min. Ass./185).

The Acting Secretary explained that this document had been received at the beginning of December, but had unfortunately been mislaid in the archives of the Secretariat and had only just come to light. It had now been examined by the technical departments of the League, who had expressed the view that it called for no comments.

The French Representative called attention to the fact that the budget for 1936 exceeded by 600,000 fr. the 10 million francs which had been estimated in the original plan drawn up in August 1935. He appreciated that those 600,000 fr. formed part of the balance remaining over from the 1 million francs paid by the committee to the High Commissioner in October 1935 to permit a start being made with the preliminary work on the reclamation scheme; but he could not see why the High Commissioner should have asked for 1 million francs last autumn if, as it appeared from the annexed statement of expenditure only 180,000 fr. had been required up to the end of 1935. The High Commissioner had elected, contrary to the correct procedure, to send the budget direct to the League of Nations instead of through the French Government, and it had not therefore been possible to obtain any explanations from him. He pointed out that the committee were interested in the budgets for the reclamation works since it stood to benefit by any saving which might be effected in the estimates.

The Acting Secretary thought the explanation about the credit for 1 million francs granted by the committee in October 1935 was that it was destined for study and exploration in respect of three different parts of the reclamation scheme, *i.e.*, the barrage at Acharné, the dredging of the bed of the River Orontes, and the network of irrigation canals. The engineers could only work at one place at a time and the credit would consequently have to be used up in stages.

After some discussion the committee decided that it could only approve the budget submitted by the High Commissioner. At the same time it considered that M. de Martel's attention should be drawn to the fact that if he desired to carry forward into a fresh year a balance remaining from a credit granted in the previous year he should, in accordance with the financial regulations, seek the prior consent of the Council Committee to such a *virement*. The Acting Secretary was accordingly instructed to arrange, in consultation with the League Treasury, for this point to be taken up with the High Commissioner in the letter from the Secretary-General of the League conveying the committee's formal approval of the reclamation budget.

J. G. WARD.

[E 789/4/93]

No. 41.

(Translation.)

LEAGUE OF NATIONS: SETTLEMENT OF THE ASSYRIANS OF IRAQ.

(C./Min. Ass./185.)

Geneva, February 10, 1936.

Budget for the Year 1936 of the Works for the Reclamation of the Ghab.—
(Received in Foreign Office, February 13.)

I

Letter from the High Commissioner to the Secretary-General, November 26, 1935,
forwarding the Draft Budget for 1936.

To the Secretary-General.

Beirut, November 26, 1935.

IN pursuance of the provisions of article 5, paragraph (a), and article 12 of the draft Financial Regulations drawn up by the Special Committee for the settlement of the Assyrians of Iraq in the Ghab region, I have the honour to send

[14214]

K 3

you herewith the draft budget for the studies and works of reclamation to be carried out in 1936.

The budget is distributed over the two half-years in accordance with article 12 of the Financial Regulations in question.

As the grant of one million francs for the preparatory studies has to be used in the years 1935, 1936 and 1937, the scheme for the allocation of the money figures in Chapter I of the 1936 budget: I further annex the budget for the studies in 1935.

I have, &c.
DE MARTEL.

Budget of Studies for the Works for the Reclamation of the Plain of the Ghab.

1935.			
Item.	Nature of Expenditure.	Appropriation for 1935.	
		French Fr.	
1	Staff, salaries and allowances	...	60,000
2	Material	...	65,000
3	Borings	...	30,000
4	Miscellaneous expenditure not coming under any of the preceding items	...	25,000
Total		...	180,000

Budget of Studies and Works to be effected in the Ghab for the Settlement of the Assyrians of Iraq.

1936.				
Item.	Nature of Expenditure.	1st half-year.	2nd half-year.	Total
		Appropriation in French fr.		for 1936.
				French Fr.
Chapter I.— <i>Studies.</i>				
1	Staff, salaries and allowances	230,000	160,000	390,000
2	Material	45,000	15,000	60,000
3	Borings	50,000	...	50,000
4	Miscellaneous expenditure not coming under any of the preceding items ...	50,000	50,000	100,000
	Total, Chapter I ...	375,000	225,000	600,000
Chapter II.— <i>Works.</i>				
1	Staff, salaries and allowances	150,000	300,000	450,000
2	Material	200,000	200,000	400,000
3	Works	2,500,000	6,500,000	9,000,000
4	Miscellaneous expenditure not coming under any of the preceding items ...	50,000	100,000	150,000
	Total, Chapter II ...	2,900,000	7,100,000	10,000,000
	Grand Total, Chapters I and II	3,275,000	7,325,000	10,600,000

II

Letter from the Secretary-General to the High Commissioner of the French Republic for Syria and the Lebanon, dated February 4, 1936, notifying the Approval of the Draft Budget by the Committee of the Council.

Geneva, February 4, 1936.

To the High Commissioner,

I did not fail to communicate to the Committee of the Council for the Settlement of the Assyrians of Iraq your letter No. 2470 of the 26th November, 1935, together with the draft budget for the studies and works for the reclamation of the Ghab to be carried out during 1936, submitted to the Committee of the Council in accordance with articles 5 and 12 of the Financial Regulations for the control of the funds relating to the settlement of the Assyrians. The budget was examined by the Committee of the Council at its present session and approved.

You draw the committee's attention to the fact that, as the appropriations in the 1935 budget for preparatory studies were still in great part available at the end of the financial year, you have carried the balance forward to the two following financial years. The committee raises no objection to this procedure in the present instance.

In accordance with article 12 of the Financial Regulations I have the honour to forward you herewith a copy of the budget in question, together with the budget relating to the settlement of the Assyrians drawn up by the Board of Trustees, as approved by the committee.

I have, &c.

[E 1178/85/93]

No. 42.

Sir A. Clark Kerr to Mr. Eden.—(Received March 3.)

(No. 107.)
Sir,

Bagdad, February 26, 1936.

WITH reference to your telegram No. 29 of the 3rd February regarding the Law Restricting Trades to Iraqis, I have the honour to report that, in accordance with your instructions, I have made clear to the Prime Minister the attitude of His Majesty's Government towards this law.

2. It has now been passed by the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies, and I enclose herein a translation of the full text.

3. The following are the principal amendments which have been made to the draft enclosed in my despatch No. 609 of the 16th November last:—

Article 1.—The words "or managing" are omitted (see my telegram No. 283 of the 9th December, 1935).

Art. 2.—New sentences have been added which—

(a) Provide for the definition by regulation of the shops referred to in article 1 (b).

(b) Give power to the Government to exclude from the provisions of the law certain categories of refugees.

(a) fulfils the promise made by Nuri Pasha mentioned in my telegram No. 283 of the 9th December, 1935.

(b) is intended to enable the Iraqi Government to act in accordance with the recommendations of the League of Nations regarding the treatment of refugees.

Art. 3.—A new sub-paragraph has been added (on the lines reported in my telegram No. 10 of the 13th January) enabling the Government to permit by regulation the practice of prohibited trades and crafts by the subjects of States which permit Iraqis to engage in similar occupations.

4. When the time comes I shall hold the Iraqi Government to their undertaking (see my telegram No. 283 of the 9th December) to give me an opportunity to discuss, before they are brought into force, any regulations to be issued under the law, and to consider sympathetically any representations which I may have to make.

5. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Government of India.

I have, &c.

ARCHIBALD CLARK KERR.

Law for the Restriction of Trades to Iraqis.

Article 1.—Non-Iraqis are prohibited from practising the trades and occupations mentioned below, in accordance with the provisions of this law.

(a) Printing, photography, exhibition of cinematographic films, black-smithery, hairdressing, carpentry, masonry, tailoring, gold and silver-smithery, weaving, singing, dancing, transport of all kinds local and national, loading and unloading of goods, lighting, heating, water supply, permanent employment in motor-car, steam-engine and vehicle driving, manufacture of cigarettes, sidaras, hats or shoes, working in restaurants or bakeries, employment in any other places as a labourer or watchman, and service in any undertakings or establishments such as hotels, clubs, baths, coffee-shops, warehouses, liquor bars and places of entertainment, and such other vocations or trades as may be determined from time to time by special regulations.

(b) A foreigner shall not act as a salesman in a shop or as a pedlar in the streets or engage in brokerage.

Art. 2.—The Government may issue a regulation classifying the trades and occupations mentioned in article 1, limiting the periods within which non-Iraqis may not practise such trades and defining shops covered by the provisions of clause (b) of article 1. They may also specify the refugees who are entitled to engage in the said trades and occupations in accordance with a special regulation.

Art. 3.—(a) The Government may issue a regulation permitting a foreigner to practise certain trades and occupations specified in article 1, or in the regulations that may be issued in accordance with article 2, in the event of such trades and occupations requiring experience, or being in need of improvement, development or special skill and of there being no Iraqis able to perform them, provided that such permission shall be for a period to be determined in the regulations.

(b) They may also issue regulations permitting, on the basis of reciprocal treatment, the practice of all or certain trades by the subjects of States which permit in their territories the practice of such trades by Iraqi subjects.

Art. 4.—Foreigners employed in the manner set out below are exempted from the provisions of this law and the regulation to be issued in accordance with article 2:—

- (1) In undertakings provided for in conventions concluded with companies or covered by special treaties or agreements.
- (2) In employment in foreign Embassies, Legations and consulates.
- (3) In private domestic service.

Art. 5.—(a) Whoever employs a foreigner in contravention of the provisions of this law or of the regulations issued under it shall be punished by a fine not exceeding 100 Iraqi dinars, or by imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months, or by both penalties.

(b) Any foreigner contravening the provisions of this law, or the regulations which may be issued in accordance with it, will be deported at once under the procedure specified by the Residence Law.

Art. 6.—This law shall come into force with effect from the date of its publication in the *Government Gazette*.

Art. 7.—The Minister of Interior is charged with the execution of this law.

[E 1125/4/93]

No. 43.

Foreign Office to League of Nations (Geneva).

Sir,

Foreign Office, March 5, 1936.

I AM directed by Mr. Secretary Eden to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 15th February, regarding the contributions to be paid by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom between the 1st January, 1936, and the 31st March, 1937, towards the settlement of the Assyrians of Iraq.

2. His Majesty's Government decided in the first instance to seek parliamentary sanction during the current financial year for a grant of £60,000, with

the object of bringing the amounts paid by themselves and the Iraqi Government to the same figure before the opening of the financial year 1936-37. It is anticipated that parliamentary approval of the grant will shortly be obtained, and an immediate payment will then be made to you of £10,000. The balance of the total sum of £60,000 will be issued not later than the 31st March, 1936.

3. The question of the contribution to be made available from United Kingdom funds in the financial year 1936-37 has already formed the subject of semi-official correspondence between officers of the Secretariat of the League and of the Foreign Office, and you will be aware from that correspondence that His Majesty's Government have decided, after taking into consideration the latest estimates of expenditure and all relevant circumstances, to make provision in the estimates to be submitted to Parliament for the coming financial year for a sum of £110,000 in respect of Assyrian settlement. Of this sum £40,000 will be included in the "Vote on Account" in order that it may be available in the early months of the year before the Appropriation Act has been passed.

4. In the event of additional credits over and above the present estimates proving essential for the settlement operation during the financial year 1936-37 (whether on account of the settlement programme being advanced or for any other reason), His Majesty's Government will be prepared, on the assumption that the Iraqi Government will be willing to contribute *pari passu*, to present to Parliament during the financial year a supplementary estimate to make available (within the limits of their maximum contribution of £250,000) a further sum from United Kingdom funds.

5. The Secretary of State considers that there will be advantage in establishing a regular procedure for transferring the United Kingdom contribution to the Assyrian settlement fund for the financial year 1936-37 in regular instalments. He notes that the initial payment of £60,000 from United Kingdom funds before the end of the current financial year should suffice—in conjunction with the funds to be made available from other sources—to carry on the settlement operation up to about the end of June 1936, and he therefore proposes that, subject to the necessary parliamentary approval, the first instalment of the United Kingdom contribution for the financial year 1936-37 shall be transferred to you on the 1st June next. If this proposal commends itself to you further instalments might subsequently be paid at intervals of two months, viz., on the 1st August, the 1st October, the 1st December, 1936, and the 1st February and the 31st March, 1937.

6. As it appears from the memorandum enclosed in your letter of the 15th February that the sums required for the settlement operation will vary considerably from month to month throughout the financial year, it would appear preferable to fix the amount to be paid from United Kingdom funds on the occasion of each transfer, and I am to suggest that this could most conveniently be arranged semi-officially between officers of the secretariat and the Foreign Office.

7. Subject to your concurrence, the equivalent of the sterling amounts to be transferred in respect of the United Kingdom contribution to Assyrian settlement will be remitted to you in Swiss francs.

I am, &c.

G. W. RENDEL.

[E 1384/4/93]

No. 44.

Under-Secretary-General, League of Nations, to Mr. Eden.—(Received March 13.)

Sir,

Geneva, March 11, 1936.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 5th March regarding the contributions to be paid by the United Kingdom Government between the 1st January, 1936, and the 31st March, 1937, towards the settlement of the Assyrians of Iraq.

2. It is noted—

(a) That a payment of £10,000 will be made shortly, and that the balance of the grant of £60,000 in respect of the current financial year will be issued not later than the 31st March, 1936;

- (b) That the United Kingdom Government has decided to make provision in the estimates to be submitted to Parliament for the coming financial year for a sum of £110,000 in respect of Assyrian settlement, of which sum £40,000 will be included in the "Vote on Account"; and
- (c) That, in the event of additional credits over and above the present estimates proving essential for the settlement operations during the financial year 1936-37, the United Kingdom Government will be prepared, on the assumption that the Iraqi Government will be willing to contribute *pari passu*, to present to Parliament during the financial year a supplementary estimate to make available a further sum from United Kingdom funds.

3. In view of the assurance mentioned under paragraph 2 (c) above, the sums which the United Kingdom Government has decided to provide in the estimates for the coming financial year would appear to be adequate.

4. I agree with your proposals concerning arrangements for the payments during the financial year 1936-37, but, in all circumstances, I would request that the equivalent of each sterling instalment should be forwarded to the League Treasurer in French francs.

5. I am communicating your letter and my reply to the Iraqi Government.

I have, &c.
F. P. WALTERS,
*Under-Secretary-General, Director
of the Political Section.*

[E 1421/1421/93]

No. 45.

Sir A. Clark Kerr to Mr. Eden.—(Received March 16.)

(No. 118.)

Sir,

Bagdad, March 3, 1936.

I HAVE the honour to report that the Iraqi Government are taking steps for the formation of a small river fleet. This idea may have been suggested to them by the existence of a Persian fleet with its base at Muhammerah, but I have little doubt that they have been brought to the point of action by their experience during the Euphrates rising in the spring, when two armed vessels, which were hastily fitted out by the director of the Port of Basra, rendered considerable assistance to the Government by their successful operations in and about the Hammar Lake.

2. Colonel Ward, who was asked to submit recommendations regarding the type of vessels required, informs me that the Government have now practically decided to purchase five vessels—one 150-ft. quarter-paddle-wheel vessel, two 100-ft. quarter-paddle-wheel vessels, and two 45-ft. motor-boats. The Inspector-General of the Iraqi army was consulted regarding their armament, which will be as follows:—

The 150-ft. vessel—
One 3·7-inch howitzer.
One 12-pounder gun.
Two Stokes mortars with four mountings.
Four machine guns.

Each 100-ft. vessel—
One 12-pounder gun in the bow.
Two mortars with four mountings.
Four machine guns.

Each 45-ft. motor-boat—
Two machine guns.

3. The cost of this fleet, which is estimated at 127,000 I.D., is to be spread over three years, and a draft Bill now before Parliament provides for the allotment of 60,000 I.D. during the coming financial year. Colonel Ward informs me

that this sum will meet the cost of the largest vessel and her armament, and that he is only awaiting the formal sanction of Parliament before calling for tenders.

4. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Tehran and to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

I have, &c.

ARCHIBALD CLARK KERR.

[E 1423/518/65]

No. 46.

Sir A. Clark Kerr to Mr. Eden.—(Received March 16.)

(No. 123 E.)

Sir,

Bagdad, March 4, 1936.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith an extract from the report of His Majesty's consul at Mosul for the period the 9th January to the 9th February, 1936, which is of considerable interest as throwing light upon the trend of transport developments in Northern Iraq, which have already been referred to in my despatch No. 381 E. of the 3rd July last.

2. The information given by Mr. Graffey-Smith makes it clear that merchants are becoming aware of the possibilities of the northern railway connexion, even in the absence of a link between Tel Kotchek, Mosul and Bagdad. Another indication of this is the fact that the growing export trade in poultry and eggs from the Mosul liwa to Palestine is being carried almost exclusively by rail from Tel Kotchek. Some 6,660,000 eggs were exported by this route in the period the 1st December, 1935, to the 13th January, 1936.

3. It would appear that at present the northern route is competing mainly with the trans-desert routes, but, should the railway system be completed southwards, the Port of Basra would be to some extent challenged by the existence of a more rapid and not unduly expensive alternative to the established "long sea" route, along which at present moves almost the whole of the foreign trade of Iraq.

4. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Department of Overseas Trade.

I have, &c.

ARCHIBALD CLARK KERR.

Enclosure in No. 46.

Extract from Mosul Consulate Report No. 1, 1936, for period January 9, 1936, to February 9, 1936.

(B)—Economic.

16. The value of the Tel Kotchek route to merchants was proved in January, when a number of Bagdad traders imported experimentally some 50 tons of mixed merchandise, wood for matches, leather, cheese, chocolates, &c., at a saving of from I.D. 2,000 to I.D. 2,200 per ton, compared to the Rutba route freights. Messrs. Hasse have declared their intention of using the Tel Kotchek route in the future for all imports. An item of over 400 tons of white timber (Roumanian) imported in January by this route for the account of Gharibian of Basra, but disposed of locally in Mosul, constitutes a threat to the Basra route also.

17. Mosul's representatives in Parliament have also been active behind the scenes on behalf of the Rowanduz transit route to North Persia. The local Director of Customs told me recently that his Department had for years worked covertly to obstruct the development of this route, feeling, presumably, that its success would prejudice Bagdad interests; but he was of opinion that this policy would shortly be modified. He foresaw a busy transit trade in piece-goods, tea,

sugar and other articles organised by Syrian merchants, whose activity he praised. It would certainly seem that there is little direct profit to Mosul to be anticipated from increased trade either on the Rowanduz or Tel Kotehek-Bagdad routes, though transport agencies and local middlemen may get some pickings.

18. Statistics of imports via Tel Kotehek are not to be had in Mosul, but there seems to be a steady flow of goods into Iraq along this route. Maamarbashi's imports of benzine and kerosene (23,509 tins and 2,476 tins respectively during the eight months April-December 1935) naturally use this route, as he is not only Autoroutière representative, but represents the Syrian Railways as well, and so can get very favourable terms from the French authorities. He buys Roumanian oil as it suits him, a cargo at a time.

[E 1575/1575/93]

No. 47.

Sir A. Clark Kerr to Mr. Eden.—(Received March 23.)

(No. 127.)

Sir,

Bagdad, March 5, 1936.

I HAVE the honour to report that about the middle of February a fresh outbreak of tribal disorders appeared to be impending in the Shatrah district of the Muntafiq province (Nasiriyah).

2. The tribes concerned were the Hatim, the Bani Rikab and the Khafajah. The causes of the unrest were varied and mixed. The Hatim had a long-standing grievance against a local land-owner, Zamil-al-Manna, who has acquired by dubious means title-deeds to a large part of their lands. Some sections of the Khafajah were annoyed that an unpopular sheikh had been returned to Parliament in the last general election, and were restless because of their poverty caused by the silting up of their canals. The Bani Rikab were disturbed by local developments concerning the age-old struggle between the tribesmen and the Sadun overlords for control of the land. Mixed with these discernible elements of unrest were the perennial tribal intrigues of the Muntafiq and the general disquiet caused by the new national service law.

3. The evidences of threatened disorders took the usual form—tribal concentrations, war dances, refusal to come in to the authorities and neglect of the ordinary daily tasks.

4. The Government acted promptly. Two flights of aeroplanes and a battalion of infantry were sent to Nasiriyah, and other troops were held in readiness.

5. The headmen were then sent for. The Khafajah submitted at once, but the Bani Rikab and the Hatim were at first obdurate. Demonstration flights and a strong police drive through their territory soon, however, broke down their resistance, and by the 1st March their leaders had submitted.

6. I am informed that, as a punishment, it is proposed to levy on them a fine large enough to cover the cost of the troop movements which were made necessary by their defiance of the authorities.

7. About the same time some of the lawless elements in the neighbourhood of Suq-al-Shuyukh also took a hand in the game and shot up the local police post. The responsible leaders were immediately seized and sentenced to long terms of imprisonment, and a fine of ten rifles for every shot fired (I believe twenty-three) was imposed on the tribal sections involved.

8. The Prime Minister has spoken to me with satisfaction of this fresh proof of the strength of the Government, and his pleasure is understandable. The tribes of the Gharraf are among the most unruly in the country. The Turks suffered several crushing defeats in operation against them, and they were a constant embarrassment to the Government even when British influence was paramount in the country. It is no mean achievement for the Iraqi Government to have brought them so quickly to heel.

I have, &c.

ARCHIBALD CLARK KERR.

[E 1579/332/93]

No. 48.

Sir A. Clark Kerr to Mr. Eden.—(Received March 23.)

(No. 133.)

Sir,

Bagdad, March 11, 1936.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith a translation of a short law amending the National Service Law of 1934, which was recently passed by the Chamber of Deputies.⁽¹⁾ The purpose of the first two articles is to make it lawful for conscripted men to be assigned, for their colour service, to a gendarmerie as well as to units of the regular army.

2. There is at present no gendarmerie in Iraq, but a joint committee of military and police officers is now working out a scheme for the creation of a force of this kind. It is intended that this new force shall be trained and commanded by army officers, and that it shall take over much of the work now done by the police, including the patrolling of roads, the rounding up of brigands and armed highway robbers, and operations to deal with minor tribal disturbances. It is proposed that the strength of the gendarmerie shall be about 6,500 men, and that the police shall be proportionately reduced. Their present strength is about 498 officers and 8,646 other ranks.

3. The supporters of the gendarmerie scheme argue that it will produce a better trained and more efficient organisation than the police to keep order in the provinces, and will at the same time bring about considerable economies, since, through the National Service Law, the rank and file of the force will be paid far less than the policemen whom they are to replace. They also believe that, by relieving the police of the semi-military duties which they now carry out, the new scheme will lead to an improvement in the normal work of the force.

4. It seems to me doubtful whether these arguments are sound. On the face of it, it is improbable that raw conscript recruits, who are strangers to the country in which they are working as gendarmes, will be able to carry out at all effectively the tasks which they are to take over from the police. At the same time their military training is likely to make them far less mobile than the police. In the matter of economy also it is doubtful whether much is to be gained, since the additional expenses of maintaining and rationing a military force in barracks is likely to absorb most, if not all, of the saving effected by reducing the pay of the men from 2½ dinars to half a dinar a month.

5. The present proposal is that the gendarmerie should be under the control of the Ministry of the Interior, but I suspect that the sponsors of the scheme (which originated with the Chief of the General Staff) are aiming at the ultimate capture of effective control for the army. If they succeed, the authority of the Ministry of Defence will be very widely extended, and the influence of the army greatly enhanced.

6. Nor can I feel confident that there is not considerable danger that this power will be abused. The conduct of the army, in the several internal punitive operations which it has undertaken since Iraq entered the League of Nations, has shown that it is distressingly prone to bullying and highhandedness. And as their numbers and influence increase I hear more and more of the adoption by Iraqi officers of what has come to be known as Prussian methods.

7. Until recent years the army was not a factor in internal affairs. But, since the Assyrian troubles of 1933, it has begun to develop political importance, and, during the past year, the several tribal operations, followed by periods of martial law, which took place both in the north and the south of the country, gave the army commanders wide opportunities for influencing the internal policy of the Government. The introduction of national service has also given new power to the army over the lives of the people in all parts of the country. If, in addition to this, the army obtains control over the new gendarmerie, the civil executive may become virtually subordinate to the Ministry of Defence, and the consequences may be serious and far reaching.

8. I therefore view with considerable misgivings the changes foreshadowed by the amending law to which I have referred above. I have discussed the scheme with Mr. Edmonds, the adviser to the Ministry of Interior, and I am glad to find that he is urging his Minister to safeguard for the civil authorities effective control over the new force. He is also drawing the Minister's attention to the practical difficulties and disadvantages inherent in the chief of the General Staff's

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

proposals. It is possible, therefore, that he may succeed in bringing about modifications in the scheme which will rob it of some of its dangerous potentialities. I shall, nevertheless, watch this matter with particular care, and shall not fail to keep you informed of all important developments.

9. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran.

I have, &c.

ARCHIBALD CLARK KERR.

[E 1698/1393/93]

No. 49.

Sir A. Clark Kerr to Mr. Eden.—(Received March 30.)

(No. 141 E.)

Sir,

Bagdad, March 18, 1936.

YOU are already aware from paragraph 5 of my despatch No. 404 E. of the 17th July last that, as a result of the political troubles of last spring, the passing of the budget for the year 1935-36 was postponed until the autumn session of Parliament. In the event the budget estimates were not presented to Parliament until the 30th December and were not passed until the tenth month of the financial year which they covered. Meanwhile, in order to meet the situation, the Government adopted the expedient of providing the various departments with monthly allotments of one-twelfth of their budgetary allowance for the previous year.

2. In these circumstances the budget law for 1935-36 was a measure of constitutional rather than of practical importance, and I have not, therefore, considered it necessary to examine it in any great detail. A statement summarising the estimated receipts and expenditure is, however, enclosed herein. You will observe that the two sides are shown to balance almost exactly at a figure of I.D. 4,500,000. There is an increase in both respects over the actual results of 1934-35, when income amounted to I.D. 4,000,940 and expenditure to I.D. 3,735,394. Thus, although, as explained above, the departments were supposed to be working on the basis of their budget allotments for the previous year, allowance has been made for an all-round increase in expenditure. In view of the internal troubles of last year, it is not surprising to find that the estimates of the police and of the Ministry of Defence show a very substantial increase over those of the preceding year, being greater respectively by I.D. 60,280 and I.D. 165,000. The estimates for the Ministry of Education also show a considerable increase.

3. The income of the Government during 1935-36 is estimated at I.D. 4,496,176, which is some 500,000 dinars higher than the previous year. The increase is derived equally from the various sources of income. The estimates from customs and excise and from agricultural and property taxation show very moderate increases, whilst the estimated returns from "miscellaneous revenues" and "other Government services and institutions" are considerably higher for reasons which are not fully explained. The Iraqi Currency Board is expected to contribute in all some I.D. 40,000 to the country's revenue during the year.

4. During the course of the budget debate, the Minister of Finance gave the following statement of what the general financial situation of the Government was expected to be on the 31st March, 1936:—

	I.D.	I.D.
Surplus on the 31st March, 1935	...	1,010,000
Estimated ordinary receipts to the 31st March, 1936	4,500,000	
Sums received from Iraq Petroleum Company	598,000	
		5,098,000
		6,108,000
Estimated ordinary expenditure	4,320,000	
Expenditure on capital works	1,000,000	
		5,320,000
Estimated surplus on the 31st March, 1936	...	788,000

5. As soon as the budget for the year 1935-36 had been disposed of, the estimates for the succeeding year were presented to Parliament. The budget law has already been passed, but, as it has not yet received Royal assent, details are not at present available.

I have, &c.

ARCHIBALD CLARK KERR.

Enclosure in No. 49.

Statement summarising Receipts and Expenditure of the Iraqi Government.

Receipts—		I.D.
Chapter	I.	
"	II. Taxation on agricultural, natural produce, animals and rents of Government properties	748,000
"	III. Property tax, income tax and stamp duty	403,000
"	IV. Miscellaneous revenues	438,090
"	V. Customs and Excise	2,341,100
"	VI. Posts and Telegraphs	200,000
"	Other Government services and institutions	365,980
Total ordinary receipts		4,496,170
Expenditure—		
Chapter	I.	
"	II. Pensions and gratuities	213,600
"	III. Civil list	60,772
"	IV. Parliament	54,824
"	V. Comptroller and Auditor-General	8,455
"	VI. Council of Ministers	19,655
"	VII. Ministry for Foreign Affairs	68,190
"	VIII. Ministry of Finance	302,464
"	VIIA. Customs and Excise	194,982
"	VIII. Ministry of Interior	375,117
"	VIIIA. Iraq Police	629,418
"	VIIIB. Health Services	228,036
"	IX. Ministry of Defence	990,820
"	X. Ministry of Justice	136,370
"	XA. Tapu Department	35,750
"	XI. Ministry of Education	443,126
"	XII. Ministry of Economics and Communications	74,800
"	XIIA. Agriculture and Veterinary Department	92,787
"	XIIB. Irrigation and Public Works	385,430
"	XIIC. Posts and Telegraphs Department	179,900
Total expenditure		4,494,496

[E 1945/201/93]

No. 50.

Sir A. Clark Kerr to Mr. Eden.—(Received April 14.)

(No. 145.)

Sir,

Bagdad, March 20, 1936.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 651 of the 16th December last, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a translation of an official communiqué, which was published in the newspapers on the 16th March, announcing the defeat and death of Khalil Khoshawi in an engagement which took place on the 13th March.

2. This success was the result of the concerted operations undertaken by the Turkish and Iraqi frontier forces, which have been pressing Khalil and his band hotly since the beginning of the new year.

3. According to press reports four Turkish soldiers, who were wounded in the final engagement, have been brought into the Mosul hospital for treatment. They have been shown every kindness and have been visited officially by the mutessarif and the mayor.

4. The elimination of this dangerous band of brigands will, it may be hoped, enable the Government to undertake the much-needed measures for the pacification of the distressed Barzan area.

5. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Istanbul and to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Tehran.

I have, &c.

ARCHIBALD CLARK KERR.

Enclosure in No. 50.

Press Extract of March 16, 1936.

(Translation.)

WE have received the following communiqué from the Department of Propaganda and Publicity for publication:—

"As a result of the pursuit undertaken by the punitive forces in the Barzan district, Khalil and Salim Khoshawi and three other members of the Khoshawi gang were killed in an engagement which took place on the 13th instant. Six other members of the gang were captured. Accordingly the pursuit operations in that district may be considered as having ended with the extermination of this gang."

[E 2042/4/93]

No. 51.

Record of Discussions at Geneva regarding the Policy of the Assyrian Committee of the Council of the League of Nations.

THE question of the line which the United Kingdom representative on the Assyrian Committee of the Council should adopt at the session due to begin at Geneva on the 6th April was discussed in minutes on E 1730/4/93, the conclusions of which were summed up in Mr. Sterndale Bennett's minutes on E 1783/4/93. It was recognised that there were three main questions before the committee, namely:—

- (a) The political situation arising out of the apparent intention of the French Government to abandon the mandate over Syria and its effect on the execution of the Assyrian settlement scheme.
- (b) The difficulties experienced by the Trustee Board in securing lands for temporary settlement in the vicinity of the Ghab.
- (c) What modifications, if any, were necessary in the existing transfer programme for 1936 in view of (b) above.

2. As regards (a) above, the conclusion was that we should endeavour to secure from the French Government an official endorsement of the assurances already given by the High Commissioner for Syria to the president of the Council Committee that political changes in Syria would not be allowed to interfere with the execution of the settlement scheme as approved by the League. It was felt that the necessary assurance might be more easily obtained in an indirect manner by inviting the French Government to concur in the text of a draft message to the Assyrians to allay their anxiety. It was also decided that there would be advantage in the committee making urgent representations to the French Government about (b). As regards (c), our feeling was that much would depend upon the way matters went at Geneva, but that there might be advantage in approving the Board's proposal to advance the transfer of the 2,500 Assyrians who were scheduled to be brought to the Khabur in the autumn, so as to have some concrete achievement to show even if it proved impossible to make a start with the Ghab transfers before the hot weather.

3. On arrival at Geneva on the 6th April I explained our point of view to the secretary of the Council Committee, laying particular stress on the responsibility which the committee would be assuming if it went ahead with the settlement

scheme without obtaining some formal assurance from the French Government about its execution. Mr. Hill agreed generally, and, in accordance with his suggestion, I prepared drafts to the French Government on points (a) and (b) to serve as a basis for discussion; copies of the draft note on (a) to the French Government, and of the draft message to the Assyrians, are attached to this record as Annexes I and II, although they were never actually used.⁽¹⁾

4. Before the first meeting began, Mr. Hill had a discussion with Sr. Oliván and explained to him the line which I was proposing to take. Sr. Oliván agreed with the action proposed in regard to (b), for he considered the land question of the utmost importance. But he did not think it would be expedient to write officially to the French Government on the political question (a), and he was also very dubious as to the desirability of any message to the Assyrians.

5. It will be seen from the record of the opening meeting of the committee on the 6th April (E 2038/4/93) that the president obtained the committee's agreement to the main questions of policy being examined, in the first instance, by a sub-committee composed of himself and the French and United Kingdom representatives on the committee, assisted by the League Secretariat. Sr. Oliván's proposal was inspired by the difference of opinion as regards obtaining an assurance from the French Government and publishing a message to the Assyrians, as well as by the obvious delicacy on the questions of temporary lands and of the transfer programme.

6. On the evening of the 6th April I had an opportunity to explain to Mr. Walters, of the League Secretariat, our point of view and the action we were inclined to propose. Mr. Walters replied that, in his opinion, it would be most unwise to write to the French Government officially on the political aspect. He thought that, however tactfully worded, such a communication would hurt the susceptibilities of the French by conveying the impression that they did not intend to carry out the obligations they had assumed. He remarked that many of our present difficulties seemed to be a legacy of the irritation which the French felt last September, when the financial control of the settlement operation was transferred from the High Commissioner to the autonomous Trustee Board set up by the League. It seemed to him that, however honest their intentions might be, it would be very difficult for the French Government to give an official assurance at the present moment when they were about to begin negotiations with the Syrians; whereas, if they gave an assurance light-heartedly, it would, in any case, have no value. He much preferred to remain satisfied for the present with the assurances given by the High Commissioner to Sr. Oliván, and he thought that the best opportunity to pin down the French Government to the obligations they had assumed would be in the drafting of the report which the committee should present to the Council at its next session. This report, which could lay stress on the High Commissioner's declarations, would have to be approved by the French representative on the committee, and this would imply the approval of the French Government. At the same time, Mr. Walters agreed that a message to the Assyrians would be desirable, and he saw no objection to trying to secure the concurrence of the French Government—through their representative on the committee—to a message in the terms of my draft (Annex II⁽¹⁾), i.e., repeating the substance of M. de Martel's declaration to Sr. Oliván, but in the form of an assurance from the French Government.

7. In view of the attitude adopted by Sr. Oliván and Mr. Walters, I felt it would be useless to persevere with the idea of an official note from the League to the French Government. I therefore consulted Mr. Sterndale Bennett by telephone (E 1883/4/93), and it was agreed that I should not pursue the question of a note, but should concentrate on trying to secure an assurance from the French indirectly by obtaining their concurrence through the French representative on the committee in the terms of a message to the Assyrians.

8. At the first meeting of the sub-committee on the 7th April, the president said that after reflection he was more than ever of the opinion that the one matter of supreme importance at the present moment was the provision of temporary lands near the Ghab. The whole future of the settlement scheme seemed to him at stake; if the lands could not be obtained, the Ghab settlement could not begin, and if the co-operation of the mandatory authorities was not able to resolve this difficulty, he thought it very doubtful, in any case, whether the plan could be

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

carried through at all. He was in favour of tackling the land question immediately and of giving it preference over any question of paper guarantees about the future. Sr. Oliván thought that the declaration made to him by the High Commissioner, and the similar declaration made earlier in March to the Trustee Board, were as much as could be hoped for in the present circumstances. Even if the French Government were prepared to give a further assurance, he did not see how it could be of much value. In any event he regarded the possibility of a further message to the Assyrians with some disquiet. In general he was against the policy of such messages, which were inclined to make promises that could not subsequently be fulfilled and to engage the committee's responsibility too far. He was definitely against any message in the present circumstances on the lines of the draft before the sub-committee: it would convey the impression that there would be no future difficulties, whereas the committee were quite unable to foretell what would happen in the future. An assurance from the French Government and a message to the Assyrians would remain paper documents and it seemed to him that the essential was to leave the realm of paper for that of concrete achievement, and instead of circulating messages to the effect that all would be well, to concentrate on removing the present physical difficulties and on making a start with the Ghab settlement, in other words, to press for guarantees of execution rather than guarantees on paper. When the present land difficulties had been overcome and the scheme was under way, it would be possible to consider what further paper guarantees were required.

9. I repeated my remarks at the opening meeting of the committee's session (record in E 2038/4/93). It seemed to me most desirable to issue a message of a reassuring character to the Assyrians. We knew that there was already anxiety among the Assyrians established on the Khabur and it seemed inevitable that this would spread to the Assyrians in Iraq. Moreover, the final consultation of the mountain Assyrians was about to begin; questions would inevitably be asked about developments in Syria, and it seemed that the local committee in Iraq would be in a very difficult position if they had not some material with which to reply. As regards the procedure for any message, it was clearly impossible to make a pronouncement about the future without obtaining the official assurance of the French Government and without substituting their name for that of the High Commissioner. The High Commissioner had presumably spoken as he had to the Trustee Board and Sr. Oliván on the authority of his Government. There did not, therefore, seem to be any difficulty in stating that the assurance emanated from the French Government. I thought that the French Government would in any case prefer to assume the responsibility explicitly and not to leave the assurances in the form of private remarks of the High Commissioner. It was common knowledge that we had ourselves had an unfortunate experience at the time of the emancipation of Iraq, when the Permanent Mandates Commission had referred its doubts about the future of minorities in Iraq to the High Commissioner and not to His Majesty's Government. It seemed desirable in the present case to avoid any possible repetition of such an incident by referring direct to the French Government. The issue was of the first importance as it concerned the whole future of the settlement scheme; it was therefore only natural, in view of its responsibility, that the committee should like to have the endorsement of the French Government on M. de Martel's declarations.

10. Mr. Walters supported the line which I had taken, but the president was completely unmoved. He repeated his earlier arguments and adduced a further objection to the issue of the message. He thought that a message on the lines of the draft would not in any case meet the Assyrians' requirements, since what they wanted were guarantees not so much about the execution of the plan, but on the score of security. On the other hand, nobody could possibly give a practical guarantee as to their security once the mandatory Power had withdrawn, and the Assyrians knew only too well that paper guarantees had been of no value in Iraq. Sr. Oliván admitted that in the absence of some reassuring message there might be difficulties during the final consultation in Iraq which could obviously not be postponed; but he suggested that the committee could leave it to the local committee in Iraq to raise the question of replying to enquiries by the Assyrians, if and when they materialised. So far the committee had not been officially requested to publish any message.

11. The French representative completely agreed with the president. He quite understood that their experience in Iraq should have made His Majesty's

Government anxious to clarify matters in regard to Syria. At the same time, while he would, of course, submit to his Government any message which the committee might wish to send, he had no doubt whatsoever that their reaction would be most unfavourable. M. de Panafieu, who appeared rather embarrassed at the course the discussion was taking, deprecated any attempt by the committee to take up the question of the future security of the Assyrians. This could not be dissociated from the general security of all minorities in Syria, which would be a matter for the Permanent Mandates Commission before any arrangements for the emancipation of Syria came before the Council and Assembly of the League.

12. At this stage the discussion was interrupted and resumed in the afternoon. The Danish representative (who had now joined the sub-committee) suggested that the difficulty in regard to a message to the Assyrians might be solved by supplying the local committee in Iraq with material, *i.e.*, the declarations made by the High Commissioner, from which they could draw at their own discretion in reply to questions from the Assyrians. Mr. Walters further put forward his idea that the situation could be satisfactorily cleared up in its political aspect by means of a report to the Council at its next session in May. Sr. Oliván was inclined to agree to these proposals, but said that it would be better to defer the drafting of this report until immediately before the Council session, when it was to be hoped that the situation would be much clearer and the present difficulties overcome.

13. The upshot of the sub-committee's discussion on the question of assurances and a message to the Assyrians was, therefore, the compromise proposals described in the immediately preceding paragraph. While a long way from what we would have liked to secure, I felt convinced that it would be a mistake to press our point of view any further, in view of the attitude of the president and the French representative, and the invidious position in which I found myself on account of our own unfortunate experiences in Iraq. I therefore requested that the final decision of the sub-committee should be reserved until the next morning, and in the interval I had the conversation with Mr. Sterndale Bennett recorded in E 1888/4/93. As a result of this conversation, I agreed at the meeting on the morning of the 8th April to the compromise proposals.

14. The discussion regarding the other two main questions (temporary lands and the programme of transfer) was much smoother. The president was strongly opposed to agreeing to the Trustee Board's suggestion (document C/Min.Ass./191) that the programme of transfer might be advanced in the case of the 2,500 Assyrians due to move to the Khabur in the autumn. As he had said in the full committee, he feared that there were many people who were still persuaded that the Khabur was preferable to the Ghab, and that if the committee gave way at the first hitch over the Ghab, it would encourage this state of mind, and make it much more difficult to get the Ghab scheme working. Moreover, the committee were in a position of considerable responsibility. The Ghab scheme had been adopted by the League, and large sums of money had been contributed for its execution. He thought the committee were obliged to make every effort to press on with the Ghab scheme, particularly as the present position was that League money was being paid to the High Commissioner for the reclamation works, while no progress was being made with the settlement, which was, after all, the object for which the contributions had been made. Sr. Oliván suggested that the best procedure would be for the committee to address the French Government urgently about the difficulties in securing temporary lands, explaining how the present situation had come about and asking for urgent measures to be taken to put things right. At the same time, he thought the Iraqi Government should be informed of the reason for the delay in the Ghab settlement and of the action the committee were taking *vis-à-vis* the French Government. The situation should further be explained without delay to the Trustee Board, making it clear why the committee were unable to agree to advance the transfer to the Khabur.

15. The French representative said that he had already spoken by telephone to M. Saint-Quentin at the Quai d'Orsay, and had urged upon him the extreme importance of settling the land question without delay. M. de Panafieu did not personally much like the idea of a letter to the French Government, but he was prepared to agree to its despatch if the rest of the committee thought it necessary. Meanwhile, he saw no reason to adopt any panic decision about the transfers. He thought that the Iraqi insistence on their beginning was inspired

by their desire to get rid as soon as possible of those Assyrians whom they considered to be undesirable elements.

16. I said that I entirely agreed with the president's views on the land situation, and that I was also convinced by his arguments against advancing the transfer to the Khabur. At the same time, if it should unfortunately prove impossible to settle the land question within the next two months, with the result that the hot weather would prevent any transfers to the Ghab before the autumn, I thought it would require consideration whether it would not be better to take the risk of advancing the transfer of the quota to the Khabur. It seemed to me that if nothing whatsoever was done to move any more Assyrians before the autumn, a very unfortunate impression might be caused on public opinion, which it was particularly important to avoid at a time when we were appealing for funds. Moreover, the insistence of the Iraqi Government on the transfers being resumed might lead, if nothing was done to meet their wishes, to their refusing to pay over any more money.

17. The sub-committee's discussions were spread over the whole of the 7th April and the morning of the 8th April. As soon as I was able to agree to the compromise on the assurance question (see paragraph 13 above), there was no difficulty in arriving at agreed proposals, which were put before the full committee at its seventieth meeting the same afternoon and adopted (see record in E 2040/4/93). The sub-committee's recommendations were:—

- (a) To take up urgently with the French Government in an official note the delays in making available lands for temporary settlement near the Ghab.
- (b) To turn down the Trustee Board's proposal to advance the transfer of the autumn quota of 2,500 Assyrians to the Khabur, and to concentrate on trying to set the transfers in motion to the Ghab before the hot weather, explaining the position and the committee's policy to the board and the Iraqi Government.
- (c) To leave over, at least until the next session, or until it was raised by the local committee in Iraq or the Trustee Board, the question of a reassuring message to the Assyrians; but at the same time to draw the attention of the Trustee Board and the local committee in Iraq (through the Iraqi Government) to the declarations made by the High Commissioner (documents C/Min.Ass./192 and 197), with a view to their making use of them if obliged to reply to enquiries by the Assyrians.

The delicate question of an official assurance from the French Government was not touched upon in the recommendations of the sub-committee, as reported by the president to the full committee; but it was understood (see paragraph 12 above) that it would be left over, together with other political considerations, until the time came to draft the report which the committee would submit to the Council at its next session. As regards the proposed new pumping station on the Khabur, the sub-committee were still not convinced that this capital expenditure was justified; they were disposed to invite the Trustee Board to consider whether alternative arrangements might not be made at less cost to extend the area of arable land.

*Eastern Department, Foreign Office,
April 15, 1936.*

J. G. WARD.

E 2038/4/93]

No. 52.

Record of Sixty-Eighth Meeting of the Assyrian Committee of the Council of the League of Nations, held at Geneva on April 6, 1936.

The President recalled that since the committee's last session Mr. Bayard Dodge, president of the American University at Beirut, had taken up his duties as member of the Trustee Board at Beirut on the 1st March, with Professor Ritscher as his permanent substitute. Sr. Barcenas, formerly temporary member of the Trustee Board, was staying on in Beirut for the present at the special request of M. Cuenod, so as to help with the Board's work. The League

Secretariat had arranged with the Iraqi Government that the latter should notify Sr. Barcenas when his presence became essential in Iraq for the consultation of the Assyrians in the mountain villages, which was due to begin in April. It now seemed that this consultation might extend beyond the end of April, the date on which Sr. Barcenas's mandate would expire, and the President accordingly suggested that he should have authority, if necessary, to prolong his period of service until the final consultation had been completed.

The committee agreed to this proposal.

Transit of Assyrian Emigrants through Turkey (see record of sixty-fourth and sixty-fifth meetings, E 574/4/93).

The President drew attention to the satisfactory reply which had now been received from the Turkish Government on this question. The text of this reply was being circulated in document C/Min.Ass./193, together with that of a letter which the Secretariat had sent to the Iraqi Government, requesting them to be good enough to provide collective passports for the Assyrian convoys and veterinary certificates in respect of the flocks and herds due for transfer to Syria by rail.

Turning to the main items on the agenda, Sr. Oliván remarked that there were three important questions before the committee: (1) The effect upon the settlement scheme of the recent political developments in Syria (culminating in the departure of a Syrian delegation to Paris to negotiate the conclusion of a Franco-Syrian treaty for the emancipation of Syria on the lines of that of Iraq); (2) the difficulties experienced by the Trustee Board in acquiring land for temporary cultivation in the Ghab area; and (3) the policy to be adopted in regard to the transfer of the Assyrians, in view of the delays caused by (2) above.

Political Developments in Syria.

The President said that as soon as he heard that the French Government had offered the Syrian Nationalists a treaty on the lines of that between Great Britain and Iraq, he became anxious as to the future of the settlement scheme, particularly as the State of Lattakia was apparently to be included in the new Syrian State. He had accordingly taken advantage of his passage through Paris on his return from the session of the League Council in London to call upon the High Commissioner for Syria. The conversation which resulted was summarised in the circulated document C/Min.Ass./192 (annex to this record). A letter had now come from the Trustee Board in Beirut summarising the conversation which the Board had had with M. de Martel on the same subject on the 6th March, before the latter's departure from Syria (document C/Min.Ass./197). This document confirmed what the High Commissioner had told Sr. Oliván, and it would be noted that M. de Martel had given the Board the impression that they were justified in proceeding with the settlement operation.

Sr. Oliván thought that in the present delicate situation between the French Government and the Syrian Nationalists the committee would have to be content with the assurances given by the High Commissioner.

The United Kingdom Representative said that it seemed essential to issue some sort of reassuring message to the Assyrians. He understood that the Assyrians on the Khabur had already expressed in a petition their anxiety at the prospect of an independent Syria, and it seemed inevitable that the Assyrians in Iraq would now begin to express doubts about the settlement scheme. Moreover, the consultation of the Assyrians in the mountain villages was due to begin, and he thought that the members of the Local Committee in Iraq would be in a very difficult position if they were not authorised to communicate some reassuring statement in reply to the questions they were bound to receive.

The declarations made by the High Commissioner to the President of the Committee and the Board of Trustees were most satisfactory, but he thought that in a matter of this importance it would be necessary to associate the French Government directly with any assurances given in a message to the Assyrians. This did not appear to be a matter of difficulty, since the High Commissioner had presumably made his declarations on the authority of his Government.

The President doubted very much the utility or advisability of a further message to the Assyrians at the present stage. He thought that the question of

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a reassuring message might be left over until the committee's next session, when the political situation had become clearer, and time had shown whether it was really essential to issue such a message.

The Danish Representative suggested that the difficulty about a message was that it would fall into the hands of the Syrian Nationalists, who might well use it against the French Government as an example of their intention to continue to control the Syrian State despite their promise of independence.

On the proposal of *the President*, the committee agreed that the question of an assurance to the Assyrians should be examined privately in the first instance by a sub-committee consisting of the President and the French and United Kingdom representatives.

Temporary Lands in the Ghab Area.

The President recalled that in private letters of the 14th and 20th March (extracts from which had been circulated to members of the committee) M. Cuénod had reported the unfortunate situation of the Trustee Board, who, at the moment when they were due to begin the transfers to the Ghab, found themselves with only 22 hectares of land available for temporary settlement. There was no sign of the allocation to the Board in the near future of any of the Syrian State land in which they were interested, and the privately owned lands they had tried to secure had now escaped them. An official report had just come in from Beirut (document C/Min.Ass./195) which confirmed the position, although it reported that, in reply to the Board's appeal, the Governor of Latakia had "indicated" the possibility of leasing some 2,000 hectares on the left bank of the Orontes.

Sr. Oliván thought that this question of temporary lands was the most important before the committee. The absence of these lands made it impossible to make a start on the Ghab settlement, and if they were not obtained shortly the whole settlement scheme would be endangered.

The committee agreed with the President's view of the importance of the land question; but as it was clearly connected with the general political question, it was agreed to leave its further consideration to the sub-committee which had just been established.

Programme of Transfer.

The President recalled that the Iraqi Government were pressing for the transfers to begin without delay, and that to meet this desire the Trustee Board, seeing that there was no immediate chance of securing the required temporary lands near the Ghab, had proposed to modify the approved programme so as to move forthwith to the Khabur the 2,500 Assyrians who should normally go there in September (document C/Min.Ass./191). This advancement of the Khabur programme would necessitate the transfer of credits from the Ghab to the Khabur budget. The Trustee Board had further reverted to the question of a new pumping station for the Khabur, the credit for which had been reserved by the committee when it approved the 1936 settlement budgets.

Sr. Oliván was very doubtful whether the committee ought to sanction the advancement of the Khabur transfer at the expense of the Ghab programme. He feared that many people connected with Assyrian settlement were still leaning towards the Khabur as a final solution, and the action the Board were now proposing would undoubtedly encourage this school of thought.

The French Representative agreed entirely, and was strongly against further expenditure on pumps for the Khabur, which he considered unjustified in view of the short life those settlements were intended to have.

The United Kingdom Representative said he understood that the Trustee Board had stated in a private letter that it would be eighteen months before the new pumping station could begin to effect a saving to the settlement funds, and that during that period the 2,500 new arrivals would in any case have to receive full food rations. A further six months would be necessary before the capital cost of the station had been economised by the reduction on the daily ration bill, so the pumping station would only begin to pay a dividend after two years. Meanwhile, it seemed quite possible that political developments in Syria might make it desirable to close down the Khabur settlements before the expiry of the four to five years for which they were at present intended to continue.

After further discussion, it was agreed that a final decision on the pump question would have to depend on the line taken over the transfers. Meanwhile, as the transfer problem was bound up with the political and land questions, the committee preferred to leave it to be examined with them by the sub-committee.

Consultation of the Assyrians.

The Secretary explained that a report was expected very shortly from the Iraqi Government on that part of the consultation which had already been carried out. Meanwhile, the only information was contained in a private letter from M. Cuénod, who reported that some 13,400 Assyrians had already opted to leave Iraq, and that scarcely one had expressed the desire to remain.

Appeals to Private Charity (see record of sixty-fourth and sixty-fifth meetings⁽¹⁾).

At the request of the President, the *United Kingdom Representative* described briefly the inauguration at the Mansion House on the 31st March of the "Assyrian Settlement National Appeal" in the United Kingdom. He explained that it was too early to be able to express any opinion as to the success of the appeal, but that the inaugural meeting had gone off well, and the appeal was being organised with zeal and efficiency. He expressed appreciation of the action of the League Secretariat in making available free copies of their pamphlet on the Assyrians, which were proving of great assistance.

The French Representative said that it had been difficult to make progress with any appeal in France since the political world was engrossed in the forthcoming elections. Nevertheless, it had been possible to draw up on paper quite an imposing appeal committee under the presidency of M. Paul-Boncour, and he hoped that he would shortly be able to report some developments.

The Secretary reported that the League Secretariat had already made arrangements for its pamphlet on the Assyrians to be widely distributed in the United States of America, and he hoped that this might be the preliminary to launching an actual appeal in that country.

J. G. WARD.

Annex.

(C/Min.Ass./192.)

SETTLEMENT OF THE ASSYRIANS OF IRAQ.

Note by the President of the Council Committee of the League of Nations.

Geneva, March 31, 1936.

THE President of the Committee has the honour to inform his colleagues that on his return from the Council session in London he took advantage of the presence in Paris of the High Commissioner of the French Republic in Syria and the Lebanon to pay him a visit.

In the course of the conversation, M. de Martel observed that just before he left Beirut he had received the Board of Trustees, who had wished to bring to his attention the apprehensions and uncertainties which existed in the mind of the Assyrians in connexion with the forthcoming negotiations in Paris between the mandatory authorities and a Syrian delegation, it being reported that in the course of these negotiations proposals would be discussed for the drawing up of a new Franco-Syrian Treaty. They had explained to him that the prospect of early changes in the political situation, and of the incorporation of the State of Latakia in the territories affected by these changes, had caused considerable uneasiness amongst the Assyrians.

M. de Martel informed M. Lopez Oliván that, as he had told the Board, there was no ground for such apprehensions. The mandatory authorities would fulfil in their entirety the undertakings into which they had entered, and the situation in this respect would naturally be safeguarded in any treaty which might be drawn up as a result of the forthcoming negotiations. He added that the Nationalist leaders had not raised any objections to the settlement plan.

The President feels that his colleagues will be glad to receive the above information without delay.

⁽¹⁾ See No. 34.

Record of Sixty-Ninth Meeting of the Assyrian Committee of the Council of the League of Nations held at Geneva on April 7, 1936.—(Received in Foreign Office, April 17.)

(NOTE.—“Francs” in this record are French francs.)

The President explained that the sub-committee set up at the last meeting was not yet in a position to report to the committee. He proposed, therefore, that the meeting should be devoted to the consideration of various subordinate matters.

Financial Situation.

Mr. Bieler informed the committee that owing to the difficulties caused by the change-over at the beginning of the year to the new system of financial control the Board had not yet been able to forward any of the monthly financial returns provided for in the financial regulations. These returns were, however, expected shortly in respect of the first two months of 1936.

Meanwhile Sr. Barcenas had given the following figures in a private letter to the Secretariat:—

	Receipts. Fr.	Expenditure. Fr.
January	250,000	72,703.20
February	504,005	385,728.72
March	800,000	464,231.47
Payment from French High Commission	100,000	
	1,654,005	922,663.39
Balance at bank		731,341.61
Total		1,654,005.00

Sr. Barcenas had explained that the large cash surplus was mainly due to the failure of the negotiations for the acquisition of temporary lands, and to bills for the construction of barns and a pumping station on the Khabur not having been presented. The 100,000 fr. received from the High Commission was the amount of an instalment for the completion of the pumping station for which the High Commission were willing to provide the money out of the 1935 budget, although they would not (for technical reasons) charge it to the 1935 accounts. The carrying over to 1936 of the payments for the barns and pumping station had obliged the Trustee Board to ask as a matter of form for additional credits to be provided for in the 1936 budgets (document C/Min.Ass. 194).

As regards receipts, Mr. Bieler explained that the instalments for January and February came from the remainder of the Iraqi contribution of £60,000 paid in the summer of 1935. The March instalment was drawn from the League contribution for 1936, which was consequently reduced to 600,000 fr. The contribution of £60,000 paid over by the United Kingdom at the end of March had not yet been drawn upon. In view of the delays foreseen in the programme of transfer and the resultant temporary reduction in expenditure, the League had not transferred to Beirut the monthly advance for April, which would have amounted to over 1 million francs.

No funds had been paid out by the League during the first quarter of 1936 for the Ghab reclamation works since there was a balance of 800,000 fr. remaining over from the payment of 1 million francs made in October 1935.

The Secretariat had estimated that it would be necessary to transfer the following sums during the second quarter of this year:—

	Fr.
Reclamation works	2,455,000
Settlement	2,520,000

The settlement estimate might, however, be reduced if the delay persisted in the transfer programme.

Meanwhile a letter had been received from the French High Commission which shed new light on the position as regards the repayment of advances made

by the High Commissioner before the 1st July, 1935, which had hitherto been estimated at a total of 1,410,000 fr. The letter requested the immediate repayment of the first instalment of this amount, which had been fixed at 705,000 fr. It went on to explain that the total of the advances had now been found to exceed by some 60,000 fr. the figure adopted up to the present. There would normally have been a balance of 768,000 fr. to meet, but it seemed that over 300,000 fr. had already been refunded to the High Commission from settlement funds during the last half of 1935, a fact which explained the smallness of the sum remaining over at the beginning of 1936. The net balance due to the High Commission on the second instalment of arrears was estimated at 365,875 fr., and the High Commission were asking for this to be refunded before the 30th June, 1936, although the committee had been informed that this second instalment would not be required before 1937 and the budget had been prepared on that basis.

Mr. Bieler concluded with the remark that there were some points in the handling of the settlement finances in 1935 which were not in accordance with strict budgetary procedure. He suggested, however, that in all the circumstances it would not be worth while for the committee to take them up at this stage.

The committee decided that the first instalment should be paid to the High Commissioner immediately, but that the question of liquidating the net balance of the advances should be held over for the present pending further explanations.

The committee approved the provision of additional credits in the 1936 budgets, which the Board had requested for technical reasons in their letters circulated in document C/Min.Ass./194.

Insurance of Members of the Trustee Board and their Staff.

Mr. Bieler recalled that this question had been left over for study at the end of the previous session of the committee (see record of the 64th and 65th meetings,⁽¹⁾ although expenditure under this head had been provisionally covered, among other items, in the additional 50,000 fr. which the committee had added to the personal budget for the Board. The juridical section of the Secretariat had decided that there could be no question of the League assuming any responsibility for members of the Trustee Board or their agents.

The committee requested the secretary to prepare a draft letter to the Trustee Board explaining that the committee accepted in principle to bear the cost of their insurance and inviting them to make suggestions on the subject.

Settlement Budgets for 1936.

The committee considered the rejoinder which had just been received from the Trustee Board (document C/Min.Ass./195) in reply to the “observations” which the committee had made in forwarding to Beirut the settlement budgets for 1936 as approved (document C/Min.Ass.184):—

(1) The committee observed with satisfaction that the Board were now prepared to admit the principle that a contribution towards the cost of their settlement should be made by Assyrians earning wages as labourers on the reclamation works. The Board's suggestion that the contribution should take the form of economising on the food rations to such labourers and their families would clearly be less productive than a cash deduction from the wages they would receive, which had been the original proposal; but the committee felt that it must leave the means of applying the general principle to the Board.

(2) As regards the question of tents for the temporary accommodation of the Assyrian immigrants, the *French Representative* said that he had been informed by the Ministry of War at Paris that the possibility of tents being loaned by the French forces in the Levant would have to be settled direct with the General Officer Commanding at Beirut. The committee decided to ask the Trustee Board to submit estimates of the additional credits which would apparently have to be provided under this head, since no provision was contained in the existing budgets.

(3) The committee agreed to await the proposals of the sub-committee on the question of temporary lands.

(¹) See No. 34.

(4) The committee observed with regret that the Trustee Board had come to a final decision that technical and political difficulties precluded the transport of Assyrian flocks and herds from Iraq to the Ghab on hoof.

The President said that he had heard from Sr. Barcenas that the principal difficulties were the Assyrians' ignorance of the route and the proper way to carry out these desert migrations, the large escorts which would be necessary and the time which the animals would take on the journey. The transfer of animals to the Khabur on hoof had been very unsuccessful, although the distance was much less.

The Iraqi Representative pointed out that the animals were sent across to the Khabur at an unfavourable season. If they were sent over in the near future they would find water and grazing in plenty.

The United Kingdom Representative said that information which the Foreign Office had received from Bagdad seemed to show that transport on the hoof was practicable from a technical point of view. Although the political aspect was solely within the province of the mandatory authorities, he would have thought that adequate security could have been obtained for the flocks and herds by applying the well-known principle of tribal responsibility.

The committee decided reluctantly that it could only concur in the repeated opinion of the authorities in Syria that it would not be possible to bring animals across on hoof.

(5) The committee noted with satisfaction that the Trustee Board felt able to accept the reduction of 10 per cent. which had been effected on the original estimates for food supplies.

(6) The committee noted that a decision in regard to customs franchise for the Board's supplies would have to await the return of the High Commissioner to Syria. At the same time it appeared from a report which the Board had now furnished on the settlement operation for the first quarter of 1936 (document C/Min.Ass.198) that motor lorries and cars ordered by the Board were being imported free of duty.

(7) The committee noted that the cost of the special force of police recruited for the Khabur settlements would have to be charged to the 1936 settlement budgets from the beginning of the year up to the disbandment of the force at the end of February. It was stated in the Trustee Board's quarterly report (referred to above) that the amount in question was 14,598-40 fr.

The President pointed out that the committee had expressed the view in its observations on the budgets for 1936 (document C/Min.Ass.184) that the provision of security should be a charge on the funds of the State receiving the Assyrians as settlers; it had not proposed the suppression of all police in the settlements, which appeared to be what had now been done. He thought that the committee would do well to point this out in replying to the Board.

(8) The committee agreed to leave the question of an additional pumping station for the Khabur to the sub-committee for examination.

It was agreed that the Secretariat should embody the committee's observations in a draft letter to the Trustee Board.

J. G. WARD.

[E 2040/4/93]

No. 54.

Record of the Seventieth Meeting of the Assyrian Committee of the Council of the League of Nations, held at Geneva on April 8, 1936.—(Received in Foreign Office, April 17.)

The President reported to the committee the conclusions reached by the sub-committee set up at the sixty-eighth meeting to examine the important questions of policy on the agenda. These questions were:—

- (1) The difficulties the Board of Trustees were experiencing in finding temporary lands in the Ghab area.
- (2) What amendments, if any, should be made in the existing programme for transferring the Assyrians from Iraq.
- (3) Whether any action should be taken, such as the issue of a reassuring message, to allay the anxieties of the Assyrians at the outcome of the present negotiations at Paris for the emancipation of Syria.

Sr. Oliván said that the sub-committee had come to the conclusion that question (1) was of the greatest immediate importance, since if it could not be settled satisfactorily in the near future the whole settlement scheme as approved by the League of Nations would be in jeopardy. In any case the situation at present was that, while money was being paid out from the settlement fund to the mandatory authorities for the reclamation works, no progress whatsoever was being made with the actual settlement.

The sub-committee had agreed that a letter calling attention to the position should be sent to the French Government and the Secretariat had prepared a draft. He understood, however, that the French representative had been good enough to take the matter up himself with his Government.

The French Representative said that he had telephoned to the Quai d'Orsay immediately after the first meeting of the committee on the 6th April, explaining the committee's concern and drawing attention to the importance of an early solution of the difficulties. He had just received a copy of the telegram which had been despatched to the High Commission at Beirut as a result of his *démarche*. M. de Panafieu proceeded to read out this telegram, which was strongly worded and called upon the Acting High Commissioner to do everything possible to settle the land question, since it was quite inadmissible that the execution of a scheme which had been approved by the League of Nations with the concurrence and collaboration of the French Government should be held up by delay in making available lands belonging to the Syrian State.

The President expressed the appreciation of the committee for the energetic action which M. de Panafieu had taken. He thought, however, that there would still be advantage in addressing a formal letter to the French Government about the land question, and he proposed that the Secretariat should revise the draft, in collaboration with the French representative, so as to take account of the action already taken by the Quai d'Orsay.

The committee agreed to this course.

Turning to question (2), the *President* recalled that the Trustee Board had suggested to the committee (document C/Min.Ass./191) that in order to compensate for the delay in starting the emigration to the Ghab the quota of 2,500 Assyrians, who were destined to go to the Khabur in the autumn, might be moved to Syria forthwith.

The sub-committee had carefully considered all the issues involved and had come to the conclusion that the present difficulties would not justify an advancement of the transfer to the Khabur. The right policy seemed to them to devote every effort to removing the obstacles to the Ghab settlement. The reclamation works had begun in the Ghab and money was being paid out of the settlement fund on their account; to abandon the transfers to the Ghab, even for a few months, and to advance those to the Khabur seemed a most dangerous course since it was tantamount to beginning to abandon the whole settlement "par voie de fait." Moreover, it could only have the worst effect on public opinion; the impression might easily be gained that the committee were giving up the whole Ghab scheme, despite its having been endorsed by the Council and Assembly of the League.

Sr. Oliván thought that the best way to deal with the transfer question would be to write (a) to the permanent delegate of Iraq (in reply to his letter of the 6th April enquiring when the transfers would begin) explaining the delays which had occurred to the Ghab scheme, and the action taken to put matters right; and (b) to the Trustee Board at Beirut explaining the general policy of the committee and why it did not wish to adopt the suggestion for advancing the transfer to the Khabur. As regards the connected question of the board's request for a credit to cover the construction of a new pumping station on the Khabur, Sr. Oliván said that the sub-committee were still not convinced of the necessity for this extra capital expenditure. They recommended continuing to reserve the credit and inviting the Trustee Board to consider whether some less costly alternative arrangements could not be made to increase the area of arable land on the Khabur.

The committee agreed to this procedure.

As regards question (3), the *President* explained that the sub-committee had eventually agreed, after lengthy discussion, that the issue of a reassuring message to the Assyrians on the political issue would not be very opportune in present

circumstances, whatever might be the case later. Such a message could have many disadvantages as well as advantages.

The sub-committee thought that the possibility of a message should therefore be left over, at least until the next session of the committee or until the point was formally raised by the Trustee Board or the Local Committee in Iraq. Meanwhile the sub-committee proposed that the Iraqi Government might be invited to draw the attention of the Local Committee in Iraq to the declarations made by the High Commissioner for Syria to both the Trustee Board and the president of the Council Committee, so that they might be able to reply to enquiries from the Assyrians (particularly from those living in the mountains who were about to be consulted) as to the effect on the scheme for their settlement of the proposed emancipation of Syria. The Trustee Board might be addressed in similar terms, so that they would be in a position to make a statement to the Assyrians on the Khabur if they thought it desirable to do so.

The committee agreed with the conclusions reached by the sub-committee and approved the terms of a draft letter to the Permanent Delegate of Iraq (document C./Min. Ass./200), printed as an annex to this record.

Annex.

Draft Letter to the Permanent Delegate of Iraq.

Geneva, April 8, 1936.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter No. 364 of the 6th April, and to inform you that I have referred its contents to the Committee of the Council for the settlement of the Assyrians of Iraq, which has instructed me to reply in the following terms:—

2. In the first paragraph of your letter the question is raised when the first contingent of Assyrians may be expected to leave Iraq. As you are aware, the budget which the Committee of the Council has approved for the settlement operation in 1936 provides for the transfer to the Levant States under French mandate in the course of that year of a total of 8,500 Assyrians; of these 6,000 would be directed, pending the completion of the reclamation of the Ghab Plain, to temporary settlement sites in the vicinity of that plain, and the remaining 2,500 to temporary settlement sites on the River Khabur. It was provided that the transfer to the Ghab should take place mainly in the spring and summer of this year, and that the movement to the Khabur would not begin until the autumn.

3. Certain difficulties have unfortunately arisen in regard to the provision of cultivable land for the temporary settlement near the Ghab. The Trustee Board has not up to the present been able to secure the minimum area of such land which it considers essential for the 6,000 Assyrians, due to be transferred this year.

The availability of adequate land for the above purpose is of vital importance, since it is essential for the financing of the scheme that, after the first year in Syria, the Assyrian settlers should become rapidly self-supporting in food, and the food rations be drastically reduced accordingly.

4. The board is continuing its efforts to acquire the necessary land, and the Council Committee, impressed by the urgency of the problem, is drawing the attention of the French Government to the position. Until the question has been satisfactorily settled, however, the Trustee Board does not feel able to take the responsibility of beginning the transfer of the Assyrians to the Ghab, and the Council Committee, while greatly regretting the delay to the settlement programme, feels obliged to concur in this opinion.

5. At the same time, the committee hopes that the delay will only be temporary, and it does not consider it necessary or desirable to alter the programme of transfer which it has already approved for this year. Its policy is therefore to aim at beginning the transfer to the Ghab at the earliest possible moment, the detailed arrangements in regard to the composition, numbers, &c., of the convoys to be a matter for arrangement in due course between your Government and the Local Committee at Mosul and the Trustee Board at Beirut, as mentioned in my telegram to the Iraq Minister for Foreign Affairs of the 28th February last.

6. In the second paragraph of your letter you request confirmation in regard to the conditions upon which the forthcoming consultation of the Assyrians living in the mountain villages should be carried out. The committee considers that the supplementary message to the Assyrians concerning their subsistence in Syria (the draft of which was forwarded to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq in my letter of the 30th January, circulated as document C./Min. Ass./181) should be communicated during the course of the consultation, so as to leave those who may opt for transfer to Syria under no doubt as to the conditions governing the supply of free food supplies. The principal basis upon which the consultation will be carried out will, of course, remain the original message to the Assyrians concerning their settlement scheme in the Levant States under French mandate (C.3. Min./Ass./150 as finally modified and already distributed to the Assyrians in the plains).

7. In this connexion the Council Committee desires to call the attention of your Government to the recent declarations made by the High Commissioner of the French Republic in Syria and the Lebanon to the president of the Council Committee and to the Board of Trustees, contained in documents C./Min. Ass./192 and 197 respectively.

In order that the Local Committee may be in a position, if necessary, to reply to enquiries by the Assyrians on the subject dealt with in the above declarations, the Council Committee would be grateful if your Government would communicate the text of those declarations to the Local Committee.

I have, &c.

F. P. WALTERS.

*Under-Secretary-General,
Director of the Political Section.*

[E 2041/4/93]

No. 55.

(Confidential.)

Record of the Seventy-First Meeting of the Assyrian Committee of the Council of the League of Nations, held at Geneva on April 9, 1936.—(Received in Foreign Office, April 17.)

Mr. Walters of the League Secretariat raised two points of procedure connected with the committee's work.

In the first place he thought it would be of general convenience to aim at regular meetings of the committee at fixed times for the transaction of normal business. It would also simplify the work of the Trustee Board if they knew that the committee would be in session at regular intervals, since they would know when to send in their correspondence. He suggested that, without prejudice to extraordinary meetings being summoned if necessary, the committee might meet four times a year at the following times:—

- (1) About three days before the May session of the Council.
- (2) During the Assembly in September.
- (3) Some time in December for consideration of the settlement budgets for the coming year.
- (4) About three days before the January session of the Council in order to approve the final arrangements for the year.

The President agreed with Mr. Walters' suggestion; the committee had a long period of work still ahead of it, and there was every advantage in regularising its procedure. The Trustee Board had wide powers and should be able to conform to a system of regular meetings which would, moreover, have the advantage of introducing more regularity into the Board's correspondence with Geneva.

The committee agreed to the procedure suggested by Mr. Walters.

Mr. Walters said that his second point concerned the documents circulated by the League Secretariat to members of the Council Committee. These had hitherto been circulated in every case in both French and English, but he wondered whether it would not be possible to avoid some of the labour on translation by circulating the documents in the language in which they were received at Geneva.

i.e., in one or other of the two official languages of the League. Mr. Walters explained that important documents emanating from Geneva, such as decisions of policy by the committee and reports to the Council, would in any case continue to be translated and circulated to the committee in both languages.

Replying to the President's enquiry whether there were any precedents for dispensing with circulation in both languages, Mr. Walters said that copies of minority petitions were customarily circulated even to members of the Council in only one language, and were not translated into the other official language unless the petitions were actually put on to the Council's agenda.

The committee were inclined to think that there would be no objection to Mr. Walters' proposal.

The *United Kingdom* and *French representatives* made it clear that their personal approval must be subject to confirmation after reference to the competent authorities in the Foreign Office and the Quai d'Orsay on the point of principle involved.

The committee next proceeded to examine and approve the terms of four further draft letters prepared by the Secretariat, viz., (a) to the French Government on the land question (as revised to take account of the *démarche* already made by the Quai d'Orsay at the instance of the French representative on the committee; document C./Min. Ass./201); (b) to the Trustee Board explaining the committee's policy on the main issues (C./Min. Ass./203); (c) to the Trustee Board on certain minor budgetary and financial points (C./Min. Ass./202); and (d) to the Trustee Board on the insurance question.

Letter (b) is printed as an annex to this record; letter (a) is printed separately [April 17, section 4].

Consultation of the Assyrians.

The committee had only a limited time at its disposal, and was therefore unable to study a report on the first part of the consultation of the Assyrians by the Local Committee in Iraq, which had just arrived from Bagdad under cover of a letter from the Iraqi Government (document C./Min. Ass./199). It instructed the Secretariat to explain to the Iraqi Government that there had not been time to examine their letter closely, but that as it appeared to raise some important questions the committee might have some observations to offer at its next session early in May.

J. G. WARD.

Annex.

C./Min. Ass./203.

Letter addressed to the Trustee Board by the Secretary-General, on behalf of the Council Committee, dealing with the Question of Lands for Temporary Settlement and certain other Questions raised by the Trustee Board.

Geneva, April 9, 1936.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that the Committee of the Council for the Settlement of the Assyrians of Iraq has had under urgent consideration the question of the immediate programme for the transfer of the Assyrians in 1936 in the light of (1) the observations and recommendations contained in the Trustee Board's report of the 24th March (document C./Min. Ass./191); (2) the Board's statement in its further report of the 3rd April in regard to the provision of lands for temporary settlement in the Ghab area (document C./Min. Ass./195); and (3) the letter of the 6th April from the Permanent Delegate of Iraq, a copy of which is enclosed herein.⁽¹⁾

2. The committee is much concerned at the difficulties which continue to be experienced in acquiring adequate lands for temporary settlement and cultivation in the vicinity of the Ghab, and agrees with the Board that it is not possible to begin the transfer of the Assyrians to the Ghab until a minimum area of land is available and satisfactory assurances are forthcoming that further lands can be obtained as the transfer operation proceeds. Nevertheless, the committee, after giving careful consideration to all issues involved, considers

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

that it is essential to adhere if possible to the programme already approved for 1936, *i.e.*, to a transfer of 6,000 Assyrians to the Ghab area beginning in the spring, and a further transfer of 2,500 Assyrians in the autumn to complete the tribal elements in the Khabur settlements. The committee's policy is to make every endeavour to secure an early settlement of the difficulties in regard to land and to aim at beginning the transfer to the Ghab at the earliest possible moment, the detailed arrangements concerning the composition, numbers, &c., of the convoys remaining a matter for arrangement in due course between the Board and the Iraqi Government and the Local Committee in Iraq. A copy is enclosed, for information, of the reply which the Secretary-General, at the instance of the committee, is returning to the enquiry in the letter of the 5th April from the Permanent Delegate of Iraq.⁽¹⁾

3. The committee is accordingly addressing an urgent appeal to the French Government on the question of temporary lands in the Ghab area, and a copy of the relevant letter from the Secretary-General of the League to the French Minister for Foreign Affairs is also attached for information.⁽²⁾ The French representative has informed the committee, moreover, that the French Government has already been good enough to intervene on the subject with the High Commissioner at Beirut, and it much hopes that the situation will become more favourable in the very near future. Meanwhile, it trusts that the Board for its part will examine the possibilities suggested in the letter from the Governor of the State of Lattakia, a copy of which was attached to the Board's report of the 3rd April (document C./Min. Ass./195), while pursuing at the same time the question of the 3,600 hectares of Syrian State lands in the region of Tell Mudik.

4. As stated in paragraph 4 of the letter from the Secretary-General to the French Minister for Foreign Affairs the committee must leave it to the Board to decide on the minimum area of temporary lands necessary. It observes, however, from the Board's letter of the 23rd March to the Governor of Lattakia that it considers a minimum area of 3,500 hectares of arable land as an essential minimum for the 6,000 Assyrians to be transported this year. It presumes, therefore, that the Trustee Board would be prepared to begin the transfer if it could count on securing this amount of land, and could obtain satisfactory assurances that more land will eventually be available to meet the needs of Assyrians to be transferred in subsequent years.

5. The committee notes at the same time that the Board considers a proportion of one hectare of land for temporary cultivations per Assyrian immigrant as the ideal to be aimed at, and that if this proportion is not maintained additional credits will be necessary for food supplies until the permanent lands are occupied in the Ghab. As mentioned above, the committee must naturally accept the final opinion of the Board as to the area which it would be desirable to secure, but it considers that in the present circumstances it would be preferable to proceed with the transfer to the Ghab of the whole quota of 6,000 Assyrians foreseen for 1936, as soon as a *minimum* quantity of land has been secured.

6. In view of the policy described in paragraph 2 above, the committee does not consider it desirable to alter the programme provided for in the settlement budget for 1936 by advancing from next autumn to this spring the transfer of the 2,500 Assyrians destined to be placed provisionally on the Khabur.

7. The committee has again examined the question of the additional pumping station for the Khabur settlements in the light of the further considerations advanced in the Board's report of the 24th March (document C./Min. Ass./191). The committee is still reluctant to sanction this large item of capital expenditure for a settlement which is intended to be purely provisional, particularly as it understands that the saving anticipated as a result of this new installation would not begin to operate until after a period of eighteen months. The committee accordingly prefers to continue to reserve the credit in question while inviting the Board to consider whether some alternative arrangements at less cost might not be made to allow of the extension of the arable land on the Khabur and to report on the matter in due course.

8. The Trustee Board will observe from the enclosed copy of a letter to the Permanent Delegate of Iraq of the 8th April that the committee has requested that the declarations made by the High Commissioner for Syria to the Board

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

⁽²⁾ See No. 56.

itself, as well as to the President of the Committee (documents C./Min. Ass./192 and 197), may be brought to the attention of the Local Committee in Iraq through the Iraqi Government with a view to its being in a position to reply, if necessary, to enquiries by the Assyrians in regard to the effect on the settlement plan of the negotiations now in progress between the French Government and the Syrian delegation.⁽¹⁾ The committee considers that the Board of Trustees might similarly make use of the High Commissioner's declarations in the event of its being called upon to reply to enquiries of the same character by the Assyrians already established in Syria.

I have, &c.

(For the Secretary-General),

F. P. WALTERS,

*Under-Secretary-General, Director of
the Political Section.*

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

[E 2057/4/93]

No. 56.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS: SETTLEMENT OF THE ASSYRIANS OF IRAQ.

C./Min.Ass./201.

Geneva, April 9, 1936.

Letter from the Secretary-General to the French Government, on behalf of the Committee of the Council, regarding the Acquisition of Land for the Temporary Settlement of Assyrians in the Neighbourhood of the Ghab.—(Received April 17.)

To the Minister for Foreign Affairs
of the French Republic.

Geneva, April 9, 1936.

I HAVE the honour, by direction of the Committee of the Council for the Settlement of the Assyrians of Iraq, to inform you that the committee has learned with much concern that the Board of Trustees at Beirut is experiencing difficulties in acquiring sufficient land for the temporary settlement of the Assyrian immigrants in the vicinity of the Ghab area pending the preparation of the sites for their final settlement.

2. As the French Government is aware, the committee has decided to move 6,000 Assyrians to the Ghab this year, beginning in March or April. For the reception of these Assyrians it was recognised that considerable areas of land were necessary, not only for the construction of the temporary villages and for the grazing of live-stock, but also and above all for the cultivation of cereals, in order that the settlers might become self-supporting in food in a short space of time.

The committee was given to understand, last August, when the original plan for the settlement of the Assyrians in the Ghab was presented by your Government, and again in January, when the arrangements for the current year were drawn up, that there were sufficient lands for the above purposes.

3. The report of the Board of Trustees dated the 3rd April (document C./Min.Ass./195) clearly sets forth the unfortunate situation with which the board is now faced. A copy of this document is enclosed,⁽¹⁾ together with a brief historical note indicating how that situation developed. The board finds itself without sufficient cultivable land at its disposal even to begin the transfer to the neighbourhood of the Ghab which, in accordance with the plans approved by the committee, should already be under way. Moreover, unless it obtains adequate lands in the very near future, the board will find it impossible to effect any transfer in the short available period before the hot weather, a development which would seriously compromise the execution of the whole settlement scheme.

You will observe from the document referred to above that the Governor of Latakia, in reply to a representation by the Board of Trustees, was good enough

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

to indicate to it certain properties within the boundaries of Latakia which might be secured by individual arrangement with the proprietors. It would seem, however, that even if these properties could eventually be acquired long negotiations would be inevitable, negotiations in which the Board of Trustees would find itself in an unfavourable bargaining position. Moreover, the total area of the properties in question would in any case appear to be insufficient to meet the immediate needs of the Trustee Board.

4. In these circumstances, the committee was particularly glad to learn, through the representative of France, that the French Government proposed to take the necessary steps to ensure the removal in the very near future of the difficulties with which the Board of Trustees is at present contending in regard to the leasing of the land necessary for the temporary settlement of Assyrians in the Ghab.

5. In view of the delays in the plan of transfer for 1936 which have already arisen on account of these difficulties, the committee would be glad to know as quickly as possible the results of the steps taken by the French Government.

I have, &c.

(For the Secretary-General),

F. P. WALTERS,

*Under-Secretary-General,
Director of the Political Section.*

Enclosure in No. 56.

Historical Account of the Evolution of the Present Situation regarding the Temporary Settlement of the Assyrians in the Ghab Area.

IT was stated in the plan for the settlement of the Assyrians in the Ghab Plain which was communicated by the French Government to the League of Nations on the 28th August, 1935 (document C.352), that it would be necessary to lease 8,500 hectares of land (situated between the villages of Sedjar and Acharné at the southern end of the plain), which, it was estimated, would suffice for temporary villages and cultivation and grazing land for 20,000 Assyrians. The cost of leasing this area during the period of temporary settlement was given as 450,000 fr., plus 150,000 for preparatory work. The representatives of the Council Committee who visited Syria in August 1935 were informed that these 8,500 hectares were reserved for the above purpose.

2. It was further stated in the French Government's report that the Government of Latakia would be willing to place land near the places of permanent settlement at the disposal of those of the Assyrian pastoral tribes who could not find accommodation for their flocks in the main area.

3. The committee was informed by the Board of Trustees in its report of the 13th January (document C./Min.Ass./177) that the 8,500 hectares mentioned in paragraph 1 above were no longer available. The board referred, however, to an area of some 4,000 hectares which was then available, and which the board understood consisted of about 3,000 hectares of Syrian State land, suitable for wheat-growing, in the Jebel Zawiya, about 18 kilom. north of Acharné, and a smaller estate of about 800 hectares adjoining it to the south.

The committee was also informed that a site would be made available for a hospital in the foothills of the Jebel Ansariya, in Latakia, and that the Governor of the State of Latakia had promised to provide free pasturage for 10,000 animals in the Jebel itself. It seemed probable, moreover, that, in addition to the 3,800 hectares mentioned above (which it was proposed to lease), it would be possible to acquire part of the village of Tell Salhab, together with 800 hectares of adjoining land which was in the hands of the Crédit foncier d'Algérie on account of its owner being in default on a mortgage. The Board of Trustees decided that the most economical arrangement would be for this latter estate to be purchased outright, and the committee made provision for the necessary additional credits in the amended budget for 1936 attached to its letter to the Board of Trustees dated the 30th January, 1936 (document C./Min.Ass./184).

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4. The next information received on the subject at Geneva was contained in private letters from M. Cuénod, chairman of the Board of Trustees, dated the 14th and 20th March. M. Cuénod reported in the earlier of these letters that it had still not been possible to lease definitely the 3,800 hectares envisaged for temporary cultivation by the Assyrians. The Board of Trustees had raised the question with the President of the Syrian Republic and the Syrian Prime Minister; both had promised that every possible assistance would be given to the board, but the Prime Minister had added that a very careful study of the matter, to ascertain what existing rights and interests were involved and what compensation was required, would be necessary before any Syrian State land could be granted for the Assyrians even on lease. In these circumstances M. Cuénod considered it unlikely that any definite decision could be reached before the end of April.

5. In his next letter of the 20th March M. Cuénod reported that the property of 800 hectares in and around the village of Tell Salhab, on which it had been intended to erect the temporary villages for the Assyrians, had escaped the Trustee Board at the last moment, the proprietor having suddenly succeeded in acquiring the necessary funds to pay off the arrears due to the bank. M. Cuénod pointed out that as a result of these developments the Board of Trustees found itself, at a time when the first convoys should have been arriving from Iraq, with no land available for the reception of the Assyrians beyond the 22-hectare site destined for the hospital.

6. The Trustee Board officially advised the Council Committee on the 25th March (document C./Min.Ass./191) that for this reason they were not then in a position to carry out the programme for the transfer of 6,000 Assyrians to the Ghab during the current spring.

7. The latest information on this subject received by the Council Committee is contained in the Board of Trustees' report of the 3rd April (document C./Min.Ass./195). The board confirms that the 800 hectares at Tell Salhab are definitely lost, and that no progress has been made in allotting to the board the 3,600 hectares⁽²⁾ of Syrian State land in which it is interested. At the same time the board attaches to its report a correspondence with the Governor of Latakia regarding the possibility of finding lands necessary for the temporary settlement in Latakia. The board enquired of M. Schoeffler whether he would be able to provide the necessary land for the temporary settlement of 6,000 Assyrians in 1936, including a minimum area of 3,500 hectares for the cultivation of cereals.

8. The Governor has replied to this enquiry to the following effect:—

- (1) Sixty hectares of irrigable land belonging to the State of Latakia can be made available after the forthcoming harvest.
- (2) It appears that the representative of the Nansen Office is willing to allow the Board of Trustees to use, for the purpose of a temporary camp for the Assyrians, an area of some 300 hectares of land leased by the State to the Nansen Office. The Governor approves this suggestion.
- (3) As regards land for the cultivation of cereals, the Governor regrets that the State of Latakia cannot furnish the necessary area from its own public lands. He indicates, however, certain villages in the plain south of Tell Salhab where land could probably be leased, this land being mortgaged to the Agricultural Bank of Latakia and to the Crédit foncier d'Algérie. The total area of these lands amounts to 1,950 hectares.

The board reports that suitable sites for the villages could quickly be made available; the Governor, in the letter referred to above, approved these sites, adding that normal pasturage for the Assyrians' live-stock could be found in the neighbourhood.

9. Consequently, according to the communication from the Governor of Latakia, there will definitely be available in that State 60 hectares of irrigable land; 300 hectares may be obtained from the Nansen Office as a site for a camp; a further 1,950 hectares for the cultivation of cereals might possibly be obtainable by individual arrangement. Sites for the villages appear to have been secured.

⁽²⁾ There is a discrepancy in the figures, but it seems that these 3,600 hectares of State land are the same as the 3,800 hectares referred to in earlier correspondence and mentioned above.

10. Besides the area of at least 3,500 hectares of cultivable land which the Board of Trustees requires immediately for the provisional settlement of the 6,000 Assyrians during the current year, additional land will naturally be necessary in 1937 as soon as more Assyrians have been transported to the Ghab area.

Geneva, April 9, 1936.

[E 2115/201/93]

No. 57.

Sir A. Clark Kerr to Mr. Eden.—(Received April 20.)

(No. 158.)

Sir,

Bagdad, March 30, 1936.

FROM time to time since the disturbances in the Sinjar towards the end of last year I have impressed upon the King of Iraq and his Ministers the good sense of granting an amnesty in favour of those Yazidis who were condemned by the military courts for their participation in the affair.

2. In January King Ghazi led me to hope that he was contemplating some such measure on the occasion of the Id-al-Adha early in the present month. When the date of Id passed without the proclamation of an amnesty I mentioned the matter to the Prime Minister. Yassin Pasha said that he himself had been in favour of an amnesty, for a like policy had proved to be successful after the rising on the Lower Euphrates last year. He had, however, met with some resistance from the King, who had lately been lending an ear to tribal promptings that were probably not disinterested and to the advice of his youthful military entourage, which was never good. The King's view was that an amnesty would create the impression that the Government were weak. Yassin suggested that I should find an opportunity to speak to His Majesty again, without mentioning that the Prime Minister had asked me to do so, and to point out the good effect which a show of mercy would have outside Iraq, more particularly at Geneva where there was still some anxiety about the position of minorities in this country.

3. A few days later I was able to speak to the King. He said that it was proposed to pardon a large number of Yazidis on the occasion of his birthday, the 21st March. It was therefore a disappointment to me to find that, when the day came, His Majesty's clemency was confined to those who had been deported from their homes in the Sinjar to other parts of Iraq, some forty in number, while about 280 remained in prison. I shall continue to urge upon the King and the Prime Minister the unwisdom of the present policy.

I have, &c.

ARCHIBALD CLARK KERR.

[E 2117/25/93]

No. 58.

Sir A. Clark Kerr to Mr. Eden.—(Received April 20.)

(No. 160.)

Sir,

Bagdad, April 1, 1936.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 75 of the 1st April reporting the signing of the railway agreement on the 31st March, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the undermentioned documents:—

- (a) The actual text of the agreement in English and Arabic, as signed by Nuri Pasha and myself.
- (b) Two extra copies of the English text of the agreement.
- (c) Certified copies of my notes Nos. 177, 178 and 179 to Nuri Pasha.
- (d) Nuri Pasha's replies in Arabic to my notes Nos. 178 and 179, together with certified English translations.
- (e) Certified copies of my note, No. 176, to Yassin Pasha and his signed reply in Arabic, together with a certified English translation.

2. I did not ask for a reply to my note No. 177, relative to the powers to be given to the board of management, as it contained no proposal to which the agreement of the Iraqi Government was required, but merely a statement of the intentions of His Majesty's Government.

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3 The special wording of my note No. 176, relating to the purchase of railway materials in the United Kingdom, and the reference which it contained to conversations which had taken place and letters which had been exchanged between Yassin Pasha and Mr. Bateman, made it unsuitable to be addressed to Nuri Pasha. I therefore arranged that the Prime Minister should accept this note and sign the reply thereto.

4 As you are aware, it is intended that of the above-mentioned documents only my note No. 179 and Nuri Pasha's reply thereto shall be published with the agreement.

5 The current session of Parliament has been prolonged from the end of March to the 15th April to facilitate the passage of the law for the ratification of the railway agreement, and Nuri Pasha has informed me that the Bill will be sent to the Chamber within the next few days. In order to avoid any delay in the exchange of ratifications once the Iraqi law has received the Royal assent, I shall be grateful to receive the necessary instrument of ratification from His Majesty's Government as soon as possible. I shall be glad to be furnished at the same time with the final text of the note to be addressed to the Iraqi Government at the time of ratification, to which you referred in the last paragraph of your telegram No. 61 of the 26th March.

6 As regards the question mentioned in the last part of your telegram No. 63 of the 26th March, I have made it clear that His Majesty's Government would be unwilling to assent to a method of payment which would entail any appreciable diminution of that part of the liquid resources of the railways which should properly be devoted to renewals, replacement and betterment. As a result of conversations with Colonel Ward and Mr. Hogg, I am satisfied that His Majesty's Government need have no anxiety on this score.

I have, &c.

ARCHIBALD CLARK KERR

Annex I.

Agreement relating to the Railway System of Iraq.

HIS Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India,

And His Majesty the King of Iraq;

Being desirous of settling all questions outstanding between them relating to the railway system of Iraq;

Have decided to conclude an agreement for this purpose, and have appointed as their plenipotentiaries—

His Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India:

For Great Britain and Northern Ireland:

Sir Archibald John Kerr Clark Kerr, Knight Commander of the Most Distinguished Order of Saint Michael and Saint George, his Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary at Bagdad.

His Majesty the King of Iraq:

Nuri Pasha El Said, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Order of the Rafidain I Class Military.

Who, having communicated their full powers found in due form, have agreed as follows:—

ARTICLE 1.

All rights possessed by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland in respect of the ownership of the railway system of Iraq (including all lands in the possession or control of the railway administration and reserve and renewal funds) shall be transferred to the Iraqi Government. The transfer shall take effect as soon as (1) His Majesty's Government shall have received from the Iraqi Government the sum of £400,000 sterling, which is payable twenty days after the entry into force of the present agreement; and (2) the board of management, provided for in article 2, has been duly constituted.

ARTICLE 2.

1. His Majesty the King of Iraq undertakes that for twenty years from the date of the transfer of the railways, under article 1, the management of the railways shall be entrusted to a board of management appointed by the Iraqi Government. The board shall consist of five persons, namely, a Minister of State (who shall be president), the general manager, and three other persons appointed by the Iraqi Government, one of whom shall be a British subject.

2. The board shall be constituted immediately on the entry into force of this agreement, and shall take over the management as from the date of the transfer of the railways.

ARTICLE 3.

The board of management referred to in article 2 shall be constituted and invested by legislation with adequate powers to enable it effectively to control and administer the railways, and shall continue for the period of twenty years to possess such powers. The railway budget shall continue for the same period to be a budget annexed to the general budget.

ARTICLE 4.

For a period of twenty years from the date of the transfer of the railways under article 1, the following posts in the railway shall be filled by British subjects on equitable conditions of service:—

- (a) General manager.
- (b) Inspector-general of traffic.
- (c) Chief engineer.
- (d) Assistant to the chief engineer.
- (e) Chief mechanical engineer.
- (f) Assistant to the chief mechanical engineer.

His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom will, if requested by the Iraqi Government, afford their assistance in the selection of suitable candidates for these posts.

ARTICLE 5.

As from the date of the transfer of the railways, the provisions of paragraph 4 of the notes signed on the 19th August, 1930, on behalf of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Iraqi Government, and containing a separate agreement on financial questions concluded in connexion with the Treaty of Alliance between the high contracting parties, signed on the 30th June, 1930, shall cease to have effect, and the Iraqi Government shall accept responsibility for all liabilities relating to the railways which may have already arisen or which may arise in the future. Provided that if any such liability, the subject-matter whereof existed before the date of the transfer, does not come to light until after that date, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom shall, on being satisfied that that liability has been validly and finally established, refund to the Iraqi Government a sum equal to one-fifth of any irrecoverable disbursements which the Iraqi Government may have had to make in the discharge of any such liability.

ARTICLE 6.

The present agreement shall be ratified, and the ratifications shall be exchanged at Bagdad as soon as possible. It shall come into force on the date of exchange of ratifications.

In witness whereof the respective plenipotentiaries have signed the present agreement and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done at Bagdad in duplicate, in English and Arabic, of which, in the case of divergence, the English text shall prevail, this thirty-first day of March, 1936, of the Christian Era, corresponding to the seventh day of Mouhareem, 1355, of the Hidjrah.

ARCHIBALD CLARK KERR.
NURI SAID.

Annex II.

Exchange of Notes respecting the Personnel of the Railways.

(1)

Sir A. Clark Kerr to Nuri Pasha.

(No. 179.)

Your Excellency,

Bagdad, March 31, 1936.

WITH regard to the agreement which we have signed to-day relative to the Iraqi railways, I have the honour to request that you will be so good as to confirm that the following understanding has been reached respecting the personnel of the railways:—

- (a) That for the period of five years from the date of the transfer the inspector-general of traffic shall perform the executive duties of traffic manager.
- (b) That for the period of ten years from the date of the transfer a British subject shall be employed as chief auditor.
- (c) That for the period of five years from the date of the transfer two British subjects shall be employed as district engineers.
- (d) That if the Iraqi Government should desire to engage the services of non-Iraqi personnel for the Iraqi railways, other than those specified in article 4 of the said agreement and in the two preceding subparagraphs, they will normally engage British subjects, it being understood that the Iraqi Government are free to engage non-British personnel for posts for which suitable British subjects are not available.

I avail, &c.

ARCHIBALD CLARK KERR.

(2)

Nuri Pasha to Sir A. Clark Kerr.

(Translation.)

Your Excellency,

Bagdad, March 31, 1936.

WITH regard to the agreement which we have signed to-day relative to the Iraqi railways, and with reference to your Excellency's note of the 31st March, I have the honour to confirm that the following understanding has been reached respecting the personnel of the railways:—

- (a) That for the period of five years from the date of the transfer the inspector-general of traffic shall perform the executive duties of traffic manager.
- (b) That for the period of ten years from the date of the transfer a British subject shall be employed as chief auditor.
- (c) That for the period of five years from the date of the transfer two British subjects shall be employed as district engineers.
- (d) That if the Iraqi Government should desire to engage the services of non-Iraqi personnel for the Iraqi railways, other than those specified in article 4 of the said agreement and in the two preceding subparagraphs, they will normally engage British subjects, it being understood that the Iraqi Government are free to engage non-British personnel for posts for which suitable British subjects are not available.

NURI SAID.

Annex III.

Exchange of Notes relating to a Possible Claim by the Bagdad Railway Company.

(1)

Sir A. Clark Kerr to Nuri Pasha.

(No. 178. Confidential.)

Your Excellency,

Bagdad, March 31, 1936.

BY the proviso to article 5 of the agreement which we have signed to-day for the transfer to the Iraqi Government of the ownership of the existing railway system in Iraq, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have undertaken to refund to the Iraqi Government a sum equal to one-fifth of any irrecoverable disbursements which the Iraqi Government may be compelled to make in consequence of any liability relating to the railways if the subject-matter thereof was in existence before the date of the transfer and the liability does not come to light until after that date.

2. Your Excellency is aware that the understanding upon which this proviso to article 5 was agreed was that it referred, in fact, only to a possible claim by the Bagdad Railway Company in respect of the section of broad-gauge railway between Bagdad and Samarra, and that, in spite of the more general words used, it is not the intention of the agreement that His Majesty's Government should assume any obligation in respect of any other claim whatsoever. In order that there may be no doubt in future as to the scope of the obligation assumed by His Majesty's Government in article 5 of the agreement, I shall be grateful if your Excellency will be good enough to confirm that the Iraqi Government will not claim that this proviso applies to the claim of any individual or body other than the Bagdad Railway Company.

I avail, &c.

ARCHIBALD CLARK KERR.

(2)

Nuri Pasha to Sir A. Clark Kerr.

(Translation.)

Your Excellency,

Bagdad, March 31, 1936.

BY the proviso to article 5 of the agreement which we have signed to-day for the transfer to the Iraqi Government of the ownership of the existing railway system in Iraq, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have undertaken to refund to the Iraqi Government a sum equal to one-fifth of any irrecoverable disbursements which the Iraqi Government may be compelled to make in consequence of any liability relating to the railways if the subject-matter thereof was in existence before the date of the transfer and the liability does not come to light until after that date.

The understanding upon which this proviso to article 5 was agreed was that it referred, in fact, only to a possible claim by the Bagdad Railway Company in respect of the section of broad-gauge railway between Bagdad and Samarra, and that, in spite of the more general words used, it is not the intention of the agreement that His Majesty's Government should assume any obligation in respect of any other claim whatsoever. I accordingly have the honour to confirm, in reply to your Excellency's note of the 31st March, that the Iraqi Government will not claim that this proviso applies to the claim of any individual or body other than the Bagdad Railway Company.

NURI SAID.

Annex IV.

Exchange of Notes regarding a Preference to British Railway Material.

(1)

Sir A. Clark Kerr to Yassin Pasha.

(No. 176. Confidential.)

My dear Prime Minister,

Bagdad, March 31, 1936.

YOUR Excellency will recollect that, when Mr. Bateman first informed you on the 28th August, 1935, of the new proposals of His Majesty's Government for the transfer to the Iraqi Government of their ownership of the Iraqi railway system, he explained that His Majesty's Government would look to the Iraqi Government, if and when the transfer of the railways has been effected, to give preference as far as possible to British railway material. Mr. Bateman confirmed his remarks on this point in his letter to you of the 31st August, 1935, and in your Excellency's reply to his further note of the 28th September you were good enough to put on record that you regarded the principles and conditions which had been communicated to you as a suitable basis for the final settlement of the railway question.

2. Now that we have happily been able to conclude a formal agreement for the transfer of the railways, I shall be grateful if your Excellency will confirm that, in all cases where United Kingdom manufacturers offer suitable material on reasonable conditions (due regard being paid to factors such as quality, performance and durability, as well as to price and terms of payment), material of United Kingdom manufacture or production will be purchased to meet all future requirements of the railway system.

3. Should there be grounds for supposing that conditions offered by United Kingdom suppliers cannot be considered reasonable, the Iraqi Government will have the right to bring the facts to the notice of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom in order that thorough investigation may be made into the circumstances of any particular case.

I am, &c.

ARCHIBALD CLARK KERR.

(2)

Yassin Pasha to Sir A. Clark Kerr.

(Translation.)

My dear Ambassador,

Bagdad, March 31, 1936.

WITH reference to your letter of the 31st March, I have the honour to confirm that, in all cases where United Kingdom manufacturers offer suitable material on reasonable conditions (due regard being paid to factors such as quality, performance and durability, as well as to price and terms of payment), material of United Kingdom manufacture or production will be purchased to meet all future requirements of the railway system.

Should there be grounds for supposing that conditions offered by United Kingdom suppliers cannot be considered reasonable, the Iraqi Government will have the right to bring the facts to the notice of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom in order that thorough investigation may be made into the circumstances of any particular case.

Yours sincerely,

YASSIN-AL-HASHIMI

Annex V.

*Note regarding the Powers to be accorded to the Railway Board of Management.**Sir A. Clark Kerr to Nuri Pasha.*

(No. 177. Confidential.)

Your Excellency,

Bagdad, March 31, 1936.

ARTICLE 3 of the agreement which we have signed to-day, relative to the transfer to the Iraqi Government of the rights possessed by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom in respect of the ownership of the railway system of Iraq, refers to powers with which the future Board of Management is to be invested by Iraqi legislation.

2. I have been instructed by His Majesty's Government to inform your Excellency that the adequacy of these powers is a matter to which His Majesty's Government attach great importance, and that they will therefore require to be satisfied, before ratifying the agreement, that the relevant Iraqi legislation will in fact give to the board adequate powers effectively to control and administer the railways as provided in article 3 of the agreement.

I avail, &c.

ARCHIBALD CLARK KERR.

[E 2118/25/93]

No. 59.

Sir A. Clark Kerr to Mr. Eden.—(Received April 20.)

(No. 162.)

Sir,

Bagdad, April 2, 1936.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 160 of the 1st April relative to the transfer to the Iraqi Government of the ownership of the Iraqi railway system, I have the honour to report that Lieutenant-Colonel J. Ramsay Tainsh, C.B.E., V.D., left Bagdad on the 31st March on the conclusion of his service as Director of the Iraqi Railways.

2. On the same day a Royal iradah was issued appointing Colonel J. C. Ward, C.M.G., C.I.E., D.S.O., M.B.E., Director of the Railways in addition to his duties as Director of the Port of Basra.

3. Colonel Ward took over his duties on the 1st April in accordance with this iradah.

I have, &c.

ARCHIBALD CLARK KERR.

[E 2467/1393/93]

No. 60.

Sir A. Clark Kerr to Mr. Eden.—(Received May 4.)

(No. 184 E.)

Sir,

Bagdad, April 15, 1936.

WITH reference to paragraph 5 of my despatch No. 141 E. of the 18th March, I have the honour to inform you that the General Budget Law for the financial year 1936-37 received the Royal assent on the 28th March, 1936. Two statements, compiled from the Arabic version of the law, are enclosed herein giving the estimated receipts and expenditure for the financial years 1935-36 and 1936-37 and the actual figures for the financial year 1934-35.

2. The ordinary estimates contain the following summary:—

	I.D.
Revenue	4,728,780
Expenditure	4,727,335
Surplus	1,445

3. The estimates, while not departing from the lines of previous budgets, do not give an entirely accurate picture of the financial position and policy of the country. This can only be obtained by examining them in the light of the recently enacted "Five-Year Plan," which provides for the use of oil revenues,

in meeting part of the cost of the military, educational and health services of the country. In introducing the budget the Minister of Finance said in this connexion that the Government had made up their mind to prepare a definite five years' programme for the three principal services, namely, the army, education and health. This "Five-Year Plan" involves a total expenditure of 4,120,000 I.D., a considerable proportion of which might more naturally have been included in the ordinary yearly budgets. Connected with this plan is a further programme of minor works, in which the total cost of each individual scheme is under 50,000 I.D. This will involve in all an outlay of 761,180 I.D., spread over three years. These "Capital Works" plans will form the subject of a subsequent despatch.

4. As regards the ordinary budget the estimates show a slight increase, both on the revenue and expenditure sides, of about 230,000 I.D., over those for the preceding year. This increase was described by the Minister of Finance as a natural expansion. On the revenue side it is estimated that there will be slight increases in the returns from taxation on agricultural and natural produce and on animals, since there is every indication that the year 1936-37 will be one of good crops and successful breeding. A conservative estimate of the growth in customs and excise receipts is made, there being no reason to expect that the great increase under this head which occurred last year will repeat itself. On the other hand, more stringent measures against smuggling and the proposal to introduce a "banderole" system will, it is thought, lead to some improvement in receipts, apart from any improvement in general trade, which is also not unlikely. Property and income taxes, in view of the more settled conditions prevailing in the country, are expected to show an increase over the figures for the previous year.

5. As regards expenditure, while increases are shown under most heads, "Pensions and Gratuities," "Customs and Excise" and "Police" are lower than in the preceding year. This is to be attributed to the savings resulting from the termination of the contracts of the majority of the foreign officials employed in the Customs Department and the completion of the organisation for the suppression of smuggling, which previously involved the Police Department in abnormal expenditure. The outlay upon the Irrigation and Public Works Department is lower by 25,000 I.D., but this apparent decrease is more than balanced by the provisions made for irrigation schemes and public works in the "Capital Works" plans. The cost of the Ministry of Defence continues its upward climb, its estimates being 1,190,820 I.D. as against 990,820 I.D. in the previous year, and this in spite of the very considerable sum of 1,405,900 I.D. devoted to it in the supplementary "Five-Year Plan." An increase in the cost of the health and educational services is also shown, but here again only part of the story is told by the figures of the ordinary budget, as substantial appropriations are allocated to these services in the "Capital Works" programme. Provision is also made for further expansion in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The Minister of Finance in his speech also foreshadowed the reorganisation of the Bagdad Law School and the restoration of the 2½ per cent. cut in pensions and gratuities. Some advance has been made during the past year towards the improvement of instruction in law, of educational organisation, and of the quality of the Government servants, and it seems that further progress, though slow, may be achieved.

6. The estimates as passed are based upon the actual results of the working of the first nine months of the financial year 1935-36, which were fresh in the minds of the Budget Committee when the present estimates were prepared. The results will, in all probability, approximate fairly exactly to the forecast. It is true that some items which might more properly be classed under the ordinary budget are included in the provisions of extra-budgetary "plans," but these items are in a sense luxuries which Iraq is well able to permit herself from the oil revenues. The general financial position of Iraq remains strong.

7. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Department of Overseas Trade.

I have, &c.

ARCHIBALD CLARK KERR.

Enclosure in No. 60.

Summary of Receipts by Chapter.

Chapter.	Actuals 1934-35. I.D.	Estimates 1935-36. I.D.	Estimates 1936-37. I.D.
I. Taxation on agricultural and natural produce, animals and rents of Government properties	730,303	748,000	767,800
II. Property, income and stamp taxes	336,928	403,000	409,900
III. Miscellaneous revenues	182,916	438,090	438,940
IV. Customs and Excise	2,299,340	2,341,100	2,350,000
V. Posts and Telegraphs	201,178	200,000	211,600
VI. Other Government services and institutions	250,275	365,980	550,540
Total	4,000,940	4,496,170	4,728,780

Summary of Expenditure by Chapter.

Chapter.	Ministries and Departments.	Actuals 1934-35. I.D.	Estimates 1935-36. I.D.	Estimates 1936-37. I.D.
I. Pensions and Gratuities		199,935	213,600	185,600
II. Civil List of His Majesty the King		57,259	60,772	60,800
III. Parliament		42,519	54,824	50,691
IV. Comptroller and Auditor-General		9,179	8,455	9,415
V. Council of Ministers		13,553	19,655	12,229
VI. Ministry for Foreign Affairs		46,241	68,190	82,190
VII. Ministry of Finance		288,153	302,464	312,629
VIIA. Customs and Excise		164,334	194,982	184,290
VIII. Ministry of Interior		321,836	375,117	395,907
VIIIA. Iraq Police		569,590	629,418	583,988
VIIIB. Health Service		211,457	228,036	265,920
IX. Ministry of Defence		834,744	990,820	1,190,820
X. Ministry of Justice		128,651	136,370	143,440
XA. Tapu Department		35,934	35,750	36,025
XI. Ministry of Education		375,205	443,126	490,156
XII. Ministry of Economics and Communications		21,136	74,800	82,690
XIIA. Agriculture and Veterinary		53,595	92,787	92,650
XIIB. Irrigation and Public Works Department		212,160	385,430	360,695
XIIC. Posts and Telegraphs Department		149,883	179,900	187,200
Total		3,735,374	4,494,496	4,727,335

Sir A. Clark Kerr to Mr. Eden.—(Received May 4.)

(No. 187 E.)

Sir,

Bagdad, April 15, 1936.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 184 E. of the 15th April, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith translations of a "Capital Works of Development Five-Year Plan" (Law No. 33 of 1936) and a "Three-Year Works Plan" (Law No. 26 of 1936) as published in the *Official Gazette* of the 31st March last. The Five-Year Plan includes long-term projects involving considerable expenditure, while the Three-Year Plan is limited to works of a total value not exceeding 50,000 I.D., and which can be completed within a year of their inception. The Five-Year Plan involves an expenditure of 4,120,000 I.D., and is to be financed from the revenues forthcoming from the Iraq Petroleum Company during the next five years under clause 8 of the agreement of the 24th March, 1931. The cost of the Three-Year Plan is to be met from the accumulated surplus held by the Iraq Government on the 31st March, 1936, which has been estimated at 788,000 I.D.

2. When the law was being debated in Parliament Yassin Pasha delivered a speech in explanation of the new Five-Year Plan. He said that he recognised that some of the items in the plan were such as ought in normal circumstances to fall within the ordinary budget; but Iraq was built upon the ruins of three neglected and backward vilayets of the ex-Ottoman Empire, and a special effort in the shape of extra-budgetary appropriations was necessary to improve rapidly certain aspects of her organisation the inadequacy of which was due to historical causes. The object of the Iraq Government in producing this scheme of works was to bring the country nearer to present-day standards in such matters as defence, health, education of the country and the relief of cultivators. Some provision for roads and bridges had been made, but a comprehensive road programme must be postponed to some more distant date. Roads certainly made for progress and prosperity, but the most pressing needs of the people of Iraq were the supply of clean drinking water, better housing and adequate medical attention.

3. The Prime Minister admitted that the plan fell short of meeting the recognised needs of Mosul and the Kurdish areas. It contained no actual provision for railway construction because, in the Government's view, this could more properly be carried out by means of a loan or by a company supported by the Government. In any case railway enterprises, if properly run, ought to be self-supporting, and the service of the capital expenditure entailed should be met eventually by the profits earned. The Government were still undecided on the question whether to connect Bagdad and Mosul by a line running through Baiji or Kirkuk. As regards the scheme put forward by the British Oil Development Company to construct a line to Tel Kotchek, he said that if the company actually paid the next dead rent instalment it might be possible to grant them a construction licence. On this point it is fair to add that since Yassin Pasha delivered his speech the company have paid the instalment due, but its position and prospects are so fluid at the moment that it would be wrong to attach undue importance to the Prime Minister's statement.

4. The largest single item in the plan is the heading "Army Buildings and Stores"—for which 1,405,000 I.D. has been allotted. The chapter "Irrigation Works" contains provision for 776,000 I.D. for the completion of the Kut Barrage and Gharraf scheme and for the execution of six minor schemes involving a further expenditure of 200,000 I.D. These are relatively small projects intended to aid cultivators. Schools, village planning, a housing scheme for the poor, hospitals and a health project account for 353,400 I.D. A sum of 250,000 I.D. has been made available for "Government participation in the Iraqi Oil Refinery." It is, however, doubtful whether this scheme will ever materialise, as there are reasons for believing that the Government are now being brought to see that it might not be a profitable undertaking. A further sum of 145,000 I.D. is earmarked for "Industrial Schemes." According to Yassin Pasha the only important project contemplated is the construction of a cement factory, the remainder of this sum being intended for the completion of research work in connexion with industrial undertakings. An Iraqi museum, a new Parliament

building and a broadcasting system are also envisaged. Lastly, a sum of 150,000 I.D. is allotted to the proposed Agricultural-Industrial Bank and 30,000 I.D. to the smaller Mortgage Bank.

5. The Three-Year Plan covers projects not necessarily dissimilar from those of the larger schemes, but of much more modest proportions. Sums varying from 60,000 I.D. to 83,000 I.D. are allotted for the building of hospitals, schools, police barracks and Government offices. Minor irrigation schemes account for 81,500 I.D. The extension of the present telephone system is to cost 12,000 I.D., while a sum of 36,000 I.D. is to be spent on sheep dip and date palm disinfection. A sum of 60,000 I.D. is provided for the purchase of a river fleet of police patrol vessels, and 93,000 I.D. is to be given as grants-in-aid to municipalities. A sum of 125,000 I.D. is allotted for the improvement of existing roads. Many of the works foreseen in this programme have already been begun or have been fully studied and can quickly be undertaken.

6. Of the works provided for in the Five-Year Plan, less than half will involve the use of foreign materials. The greater part of the three-quarters of a million dinars voted for the Gharraf scheme will go to the contractors engaged in the construction of the Kut Barrage, and the sum of 460,000 I.D. allotted for bridges will also go to pay foreign contractors. Arrangements have already been made, I believe, with the Marconi Company for the provision of material for the projected wireless broadcasting station, which will cost some 30,000 dinars. A part of the 1,405,900 I.D. for "Army Buildings and Stores" will doubtless be devoted to the purchase abroad of warlike stores. The rest of the programme consists mainly of building, irrigation or road projects which will call for relatively little imported material. In the unlikely event of the Iraq Government's deciding to build an oil refinery, there would be a considerable expenditure on the necessary equipment, and if a decision is finally taken with regard to a national cement factory, another order of some magnitude for machinery would result.

7. Generally speaking, it may be said that the Three-Year Plan comprises works which will call mainly for local labour and materials. The schemes for sheep-dipping and date palm protection, the extension of the telephone system and minor bridge works will, however, give rise to foreign orders. The extensive building programme contained in both plans will, of course, lead to a certain demand for constructional steelwork and other materials, such as glass, cement, steel windows and builders' hardware, which will have to be obtained outside Iraq.

8. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Department of Overseas Trade.

I have, &c.
(For the Ambassador),
C. H. BATEMAN.

Enclosure 1 in No. 61.

Extract from Al Waqayi' al-'Iraqiyah, dated March 31, 1936.

Capital Works of Development Five-Year Plan: Law No. 33 of 1936.

(Translation.)

ARTICLE 1. A sum of 4,120,000 I.D. shall be allotted for expenditure during the years 1936, 1937, 1938, 1939 and 1940 on capital works of development as per the votes in the schedule attached to this law.

Art. 2. The Minister of Finance may transfer sums from one article to another within the same vote.

Art. 3. The Minister of Finance may distribute the estimates voted among the years mentioned in article 1 above and "make transfers between them."
(3 Transfer estimates from one year to another.—Translator.)

Art. 4. Amounts received from the Iraq Petroleum Company during the years 1936, 1937, 1938, 1939 and 1940 under clause 8 of the agreement dated the 24th March, 1931, shall be allotted for expenditure sanctioned by this law.

Art. 5. The estimates voted by this law (for each year) shall be deemed as supplement to the general budget for the year to which they relate.

Art. 6. Article 4 of Ordinance No. 28 of 1935 is repealed.

Art. 7. This law shall come into force as from the 1st April, 1936.

Art. 8. The Minister of Finance is charged with the execution of this law.

Done at Bagdad, this 8th day of Muharram, 1355, and the 31st day of March, 1936.

GHAZI.

YASIN-AL-HASHIMI,
Prime Minister.

RAUF-AL-BAHRANI,
Minister of Finance.

Annex to Enclosure 1.

SCHEDULE.

Chapter I.—Irrigation Works.

Vote.	Article.	Title of Work.	Dinars.
1		Al Gharraf Scheme...	776,000
2		Nagarat Scheme ...	53,000
3		Howaija Scheme ...	67,500
4		Fawar Scheme ...	20,000
5		Diyala Barrage Scheme ...	20,000
6		Regulation (?) of Shatt-al-Shamiyah Regulators ...	30,000
7		Faisali Canal (Basra) Scheme ...	10,000
Total, Chapter I...			976,500

Chapter II.—Roads, Bridges and "Lines" (?)

8	Roads—		
(1)	Kirkuk-Rania ...	12,000	
(2)	Qaraghan-Qal'at Shirwana Saiyid Ishaq ...	20,000	
(3)	Kirkuk, Altun Kupri, Arbil, Aski Kalak, Mosul ...	20,000	
(4)	Bagdad, Musaiyab, Karbala, Najaf ...	20,000	
(5)	Overland pilgrim route ...	20,000	
(6)	Ramadi, Syrian frontier ...	20,000	
(7)	Gali Ali Beg-Srishma Barzan... ..	20,000	
(8)	Pishdar Road ...	30,000	
(9)	Bagdad-Baquba and Shahraban-Daima roads ...	20,000	
(10)	Kut-Basra Road ...	10,000	
(11)	Qornah-Madina Chabaish Road ...	5,000	
(12)	Baiji-Tel Kotchek Road ...	15,000	
(13)	Kut-Nasiriyah Road ...	5,200	
Total, Vote 8 ...			217,200
9	Bridges—		
(1)	Bagdad bridges (two) ...	400,000	
(2)	Musaiyab, Kufa-Nasiriyah, Abu Sukhair and Qornah bridges ...	60,000	
Total, Vote 9 ...			460,000
10	Wireless broadcasting scheme ...	35,000	
Total, Chapter II ...			712,200

Chapter III.—Buildings and Stores.

Vote.	Article.	Title of Work.	Dinars.
11		Army buildings and stores ...	1,405,900
12		Hospitals—	
(1)		Isolation hospital at Bagdad ...	40,000
(2)		Al Gharraf hospital ...	7,000
Total, Vote 12 ...			47,000
13		Schools—	
(1)		Rural teachers primary school and Bagdad secondary school ...	35,000
14		Iraqi Museum building ...	50,000
15		Parliament House building ...	30,000
Total, Chapter III ...			1,567,900

Chapter IV.—Grants-in-Aid and other Industrial and Development Schemes.

16	Industrial schemes ...	145,000
17	Village planning ...	100,000
18	Workmen and poor-men housing scheme ...	50,000
19	Health scheme ...	138,400
20	Government participation in the Iraqi oil refinery ...	250,000
Total, Chapter IV ...		683,400

Chapter V.—Banking Institutions.

21	Agricultural-Industrial Bank ...	150,000
22	Mortgages Bank ...	30,000
Total, Chapter V... ..		180,000
Grand total ...		4,120,000

Enclosure 2 in No. 61.

Extract from Al Waqayi'-al-'Iraqiyah, dated March 31, 1936.

Three-Year Works Plan: Law No. 26 of 1936.

(Translation.)

WE, King of Iraq,

With the approval of the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies, do hereby order the enactment of the following law:—

Article 1. A sum of 761,180 I.D. shall be allotted for expenditure during the years 1935, 1936 and 1937, as per the votes in the schedule attached to this law.

Art. 2. The Minister of Finance may transfer sums from one article to another within the same vote.

Art. 3. The Minister of Finance may distribute the estimates voted among the years mentioned in article 1 above and "make transfers between them." (?) Transfer estimates from one year to another.—*Translator.*

Art. 4. The estimates voted by this law shall be met from the surplus of receipts over expenditure.

Art. 5. The estimates voted by this law (for each year) shall be deemed as supplement to the general budget for the year to which they relate.

Art. 6. Ordinance No. 26 of 1935 is repealed.

Art. 7. This law shall come into force from the date of its publication in the *Official Gazette*.

Art. 8. The Minister of Finance is charged with the execution of this law.

Done at Bagdad, this 7th day of Muharram, 1355, and the 30th day of March, 1936.

GHAZI.

YASIN-AL-HASHIMI,
Prime Minister.

RAUF-AL-BAHRANI,
Minister of Finance.

Annex to Enclosure 2.

SCHEDULE.

Chapter I.—Buildings.

	Dinars.
Hospitals	81,000
Jails	14,000
Schools	63,000
Government offices and police posts	66,500
Other buildings	98,000
Total, Chapter I	322,500

Chapter II.—Roads, Bridges, "Lines" (?) and River Fleet.

Roads	125,000
Bridges	31,000
Telephone lines and apparatus	12,000
River fleet	60,000
Total, Chapter II	228,000

Chapter III.—Irrigation Schemes.

Irrigation schemes	81,500
Total, Chapter III	81,500

Chapter IV.—Aids to other Schemes.

Grants-in-aid to municipalities	93,180
Advances to victims of date "Mann" pest	20,000
Sheep-dipping scheme	16,000
Total, Chapter IV	129,180
Grand total	761,180

[E 2504/2504/93]

No. 62.

Sir A. Clark Kerr to Mr. Eden.—(Received May 5.)

(No. 196.)

Sir,

Bagdad, April 18, 1936.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith a translation of a law prohibiting the official use of foreign titles in Iraq, which was passed by Parliament towards the end of the session which has just closed. As no titles have ever been conferred on any Iraqi subject by the King of Iraq, the law will in effect abolish the official use of all titles in this country.

2. No official decision has yet been taken, but the Minister for Foreign Affairs tells me that the words "Al Saiyid" will probably be adopted as a general form of address for men. The Prime Minister would thus become Al Saiyid Yasin-al-Hashimi; the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Al Saiyid Nuri-al-Said; and so on.

3. Those who are hereditary saiyyids will retain this distinction in addition to the new form of address. For example, the President of the Senate will become Al Saiyid Saiyyid Muhammad-al-Sadr.

4. I do not know positively from what motives this law has been enacted. There is some reason, however, to suppose that it was prompted by a desire to put a stop to the grant of titles to Iraqis by the Amir Abdullah of Transjordan, though doubtless it was also to a large extent inspired by the example of Turkey and Persia in the matter of the suppression of out-of-date distinctions.

5. The Bill was brought before Parliament quite suddenly towards the end of the session and was passed rapidly through all its readings with very little discussion. It has been well received by the press as an evidence of the truly modern and democratic spirit of the present Government and by the man in the street as an amusing and novel event.

6. I am sending a copy of this despatch and its enclosure to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Tehran.

I have, &c.

ARCHIBALD CLARK KERR.

Enclosure in No. 62.

Law for the Abolition of Titles in Iraq.

(Translation.)

ARTICLE 1.—(1) No title, such as Pasha, Sir or Khan Bahadur, arising from a decoration or an order conferred upon an Iraqi subject by any foreign Government, whether before or after the coming into force of this law, shall be used in Iraq, and the holder of such a decoration or order may not be addressed by the title conferred by it on formal occasions or in newspapers, nor may such a title be attached to his name, even though he may have been duly authorised to wear the insignia.

(2) As regards titles unaccompanied by orders or decorations, granted to Iraqi subjects by foreign Governments, or terms of distinction, such as Pasha, Beg or Effendi, their use is absolutely forbidden.

(3) Any Iraqi subject using any such title in official correspondence or in newspapers shall be liable to a fine not exceeding 2 I.D.

Art. 2. This law shall come into force one month after the date of its publication in the *Official Gazette*.

Art. 3. The Ministers of Interior and Justice are charged with the execution of this law.

Reasons for this Bill.

Iraqi subjects have from time to time been granted titles or orders by heads of foreign Governments. The Iraqi Government, however, have not accepted or officially recognised the principle of the grant of titles and orders. Moreover, it is considered that the use in this country of titles such as Pasha, Beg or Effendi may result in undesirable social distinctions between members of the nation.

[E 2505/2505/93]

No. 63.

Sir A. Clark Kerr to Mr. Eden.—(Received May 5.)(No. 197.)
Sir,*Bagdad, April 18, 1936.*

I HAVE the honour to inform you that the Government have recently concluded a drastic purge of the civil service, which they have carried out under Law No. 46 of 1935 supplemental to the Civil Pensions Law No. 12 of 1930, whereby the Council of Ministers obtained full power to discharge during a period of six months any official considered to be incapable of carrying out his duties.

2. After the enactment of this law on 29th September, 1935, all departments were instructed to prepare lists of their incompetent officials and to submit them to the Council of Ministers for consideration. It is believed that the number of those recommended for discharge reached a total of nearly 600 persons, but in fact only about half of these were actually dismissed.

3. The full figures have not been published, but from newspaper reports it appears that, up to the 29th March last, the numbers dismissed from each of the Ministries were roughly as follows:—

Interior	62
Finance	100
Education	42
Economics and Communications	20
Justice	44
Defence	10
				278

Of these, about fifty belonged to the higher grades. The remainder were mostly employed as teachers and clerks or in other subordinate positions.

4. There was naturally much bitter feeling among those discharged, and one unfortunate man in middle life with a large family was driven by rage and despair to attempt the life of the inspector whom he held responsible for his fall. This incident caused some alarm for the safety of the Ministers, and all the discharged men were bound over on security to keep the peace.

5. The simultaneous dismissal of such a large number of officials has here and there caused a good deal of disorganisation and congestion of work in Government offices. It may be expected, however, that this state of affairs will soon be remedied, as many applicants are certain to be found pressing for appointment to every vacancy.

I have, &c.

ARCHIBALD CLARK KERR.

[E 2506/25/93]

No. 64.

Sir A. Clark Kerr to Mr. Eden.—(Received May 5.)(No. 199.)
Sir,*Bagdad, April 20, 1936.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 82 of the 14th April, I have the honour to furnish you with the following further details of the passage through Parliament of the law for the ratification of the Anglo-Iraqi Railway Agreement signed in Bagdad on the 31st March.

2. In the Chamber the agreement was hotly attacked by two Deputies, Mahmud Ramiz, an ex-Turkish officer on pension, who has been conspicuous for his attacks on the Government throughout the session, and Ali Mahmud, a Nationalist lawyer, Deputy for Bagdad. But the Government were stoutly defended by the Prime Minister and Nuri Said, and the ratification Bill passed its third reading by 65 votes to 3. In the Senate the agreement was also debated with spirit and strongly opposed by Naji Suwaidi, Jamil Madfai and Maulud Mukhlis. Its defenders were again Yassin al-Hashimi and Nuri Said, and on its third reading twelve Senators voted for and three against the ratification Bill.

3. You will remember that Nuri returned to Bagdad from London just before the conclusion of the agreement and signed it at the instance of the Prime Minister. He was not able, therefore, to escape the duty of defending it. But the fulfilment of this duty must have cost him much play-acting, for in his heart he disapproved of the agreement, holding that no payment of any kind should have been made to His Majesty's Government.

4. The chief points of criticism levelled at the Railway Agreement in Parliament were:—

- (1) That effective control still remained in the hands of His Majesty's Government through the posts reserved for British officials.
- (2) That the price of transfer was too high, and that the railways should have been obtained for Iraq without any cash payment at all.
- (3) That the new arrangements concerning the liabilities of the railways (article 5) were far less favourable to the Iraqi Government than those contained in the notes appended to the Treaty of Alliance of 1930.

The Government speakers did not have much difficulty in exposing the hollowness of this criticism.

5. In the press the terms of settlement have been well received, and in some instances applauded as a further success for the Government. Only one paper, the *Bayan*, belonging to Hikmat Sulaiman, attacked the agreement. The arguments used were similar to those which had been voiced in Parliament, and with these there was mixed a good deal of personal criticism of the Prime Minister. Hikmat's paper is, however, of little importance. Only two issues were published during the past year, and after its brief appearance to attack the railway settlement it has again vanished. This evanescent excursion of Hikmat Sulaiman into politics is generally regarded as a rather good joke and was probably not intended to be taken seriously.

6. Public opinion, on the whole, is well satisfied with the agreement, but the more suspiciously inclined are disposed to think that there must be a catch somewhere, because they find it difficult to understand why His Majesty's Government should have consented to dispose of their rights in the railway system for so little.

I have, &c.

(For the Ambassador),

C. H. BATEMAN.

[E 2509/1419/93]

No. 65.

Sir A. Clark Kerr to Mr. Eden.—(Received May 5.)(No. 204.)
Sir,*Bagdad, April 22, 1936.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 192 of the 16th April concerning the prorogation of the Iraqi Parliament, I have the honour to submit the following report on the work accomplished by the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies since the beginning of the present year.

2. During January both Houses were chiefly occupied in discussing the budget for the year 1935-36. As nine months of the year had already passed, the estimates were little more than stopgap figures, but the accompanying debates gave members and Ministers opportunities to discuss all aspects of the Government's policy. One or two Deputies twitted the Prime Minister for doing nothing to amend the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of Alliance of 1930, which, while out of office, he had so scathingly attacked, but Yassin Pasha defended himself vigorously, and his few critics made no impression on the Government's majority.

3. After disposing of the budget for 1935 Parliament gave its attention to a large number of Bills dealing with many different branches of administration. A list of the more important laws passed, with a summary of their purport, is enclosed herein. The greater part of these have formed the subjects of separate despatches.

4. Towards the end of March the budget for 1936-37 came before Parliament, and during the first two weeks of April laws for the ratification

of the Railway Agreement with the United Kingdom and the Treaty of Alliance with Saudi Arabia were passed. These measures have been fully reported on in separate despatches.

5. Two other Bills passed at the end of the session, though not of great administrative importance, were of special interest to His Majesty's Government. One of these was the law enabling the British War Graves Agreement to be brought into force, and the other was a law amending the existing income-tax law. By the latter law, pensioners resident abroad are no longer liable to taxation on the pensions they receive from the Iraqi Government, and an attempt has been made to recast the section dealing with the assessment of non-resident traders so as to exempt them from taxation upon profits arising from trade with Iraq as distinct from trade in Iraq. I shall have the honour to address you on these two subjects when the texts of the two laws appear in the *Official Gazette*.

6. The session as a whole was busy but not eventful. The Government maintained its solid majority and, except for one or two members who made a habit of criticism, it was seldom that a dissenting voice was heard. Two private members' resolutions, however—one prohibiting Iraqis from marrying foreigners and the second abolishing family wakfs—gave rise to spirited debates which were followed with considerable public interest. Both resolutions were defeated, but the debates showed that there is a steadily growing body of public opinion in favour of the extensive reform of social customs by Act of Parliament. In such matters the influence of the progressive movements in Turkey and Persia can clearly be seen, and the many recent newspaper articles advocating legislation to compel the general adoption of European dress no doubt derive their inspiration from the same source.

7. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Tehran.

I have, &c.
(For the Ambassador).
C. H. BATEMAN.

Enclosure in No. 65.

List of some Laws passed by the Iraqi Parliament and their Purport.

<i>Name of Law.</i>	<i>Purpose.</i>
The Legal Interest Law	To limit to 7 per cent. the maximum rate of legal interest on loans.
The Labour Law... ..	To establish general control over labour conditions in Iraq. Drafted largely in accordance with principles recommended by the International Labour Office.
The Antiquities Law	To lay down revised conditions for archaeological expeditions in Iraq, for the control of ancient sites and for trade in antiquities.
Law for the Ratification of the Extradition Treaty concluded between Iraq and the United States of America (signed at Bagdad, January 1935).	
Law amending the National Defence Law of 1934	To provide for the creation of a gendarmerie in which conscripts can be required to serve, and which will take over much of the semi-military work now done by the police.
Law restricting trades and crafts to Iraqis	To exclude foreigners from a large number of trades and crafts. Only to be brought into force gradually by means of regulations issued by the Ministry of the Interior.

<i>Name of Law.</i>	<i>Purpose.</i>
The Five-Year Capital Works Law ...	To provide for the expenditure of £4,120,000 on irrigation works, roads, bridges and public buildings over a period of five years.
The Three-Year Capital Works Law ...	To provide for the expenditure of £761,180 on minor capital works over a period of three years.
Law for the administration of the estates of deceased persons and the properties of minors, absentees and persons of unsound mind	To reorganise and improve the arrangements previously in force for this purpose.
Law amending the Municipal Administration Law of 1931	To reform municipal administration and to give greater powers to the Central Government over municipal councils.
The Natural Produce Exchange Law ...	To create a central exchange for transactions in grain and other natural produce.
Law prohibiting the use of foreign titles	To abolish the titles of Pasha, Beg and Effendi.
Jails Administration Law	To reform and improve the administration of the jails and to bring up to date the legislation on this subject.
Law amending the Martial Law Act of 1935	To provide that no sentence of death by a court martial shall be carried out without confirmation by the King.
The Unhealthy Areas Law	To empower local authorities to compel persons responsible to clean up areas declared to be a menace to public health.
The Diplomatic Missions Law... ..	To define the duties and responsibilities of Iraqi diplomatic missions abroad.

[E 2512/973/93] No. 66.

Sir A. Clark Kerr to Mr. Eden.—(Received May 5.)

(No. 208 E.)
Sir,

Bagdad, April 23, 1936.

WITH reference to your despatch No. 173 of the 26th March, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a memorandum prepared by the commercial secretary summarising the recent evidence of German commercial competition in Iraq.

2. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Department of Overseas Trade.

I have, &c.
(For the Ambassador).
C. H. BATEMAN.

Enclosure 1 in No. 66.

Memorandum respecting German Economic Penetration in Iraq.

GERMAN imports into Iraq have fluctuated rather widely during the last three years as the following table shows:—

	<i>I.D.</i>
1932-33	234,501
1933-34	154,901
1934-35	311,786

[14214]

N 3

A more recent comparison can be made between the first nine months of this financial year and the similar period a year earlier:—

German Imports into Iraq.

First nine months—	I.D.
1934-35	215,571
1935-36	260,957

This shows an increase of 21 per cent. in the last nine months. Total imports have, however, also risen by 19 per cent., and United Kingdom imports by 30 per cent. in the same period. The United Kingdom and German share of Iraqi import trade during this period was United Kingdom 29 per cent., Germany 5 per cent.

The trend of German trade cannot therefore be described as particularly alarming. There are, however, certain factors at work which make the situation worthy of attention.

The most striking development with regard to German trade in recent months has been the appearance of Haavara marks in Iraq. The Haavara organisation is one which is endeavouring to release frozen credits in Germany belonging to immigrants to Palestine. In order to make his assets available, the unfortunate immigrant is glad if he can transfer to Palestine as little as 30 per cent. of his money "frozen" in Germany. The Haavara organisation, having met with opposition in Palestine itself, turned its attention last year to Iraq, and a sum of £165,000 in "Haavara" exchange was allotted to this country. This sum has been exhausted, and a Dr. Livni, a leading figure in the organisation, paid visits to Bagdad in December 1935 and April 1936 to examine the position and prepare further activities. Cement and iron imports and, in all probability a good deal of merchandise, were subsidised by these marks.

In many cases it is difficult to discover whether Haavara or other forms of "compensation" marks or direct subsidies are responsible for the low prices quoted for German products. The agent for M.A.N. has recently been able to undercut United Kingdom prices for electrical generating plant, and has twice obtained contracts (for the Municipalities of Kadhimain and Hasiriyah) for such material, which has previously been entirely supplied from the United Kingdom. Similarly, contracts for water supply equipment—such as pipes and meters—which have in the past been almost exclusively obtained by United Kingdom firms, are increasingly going to German suppliers. This tendency is the more disquieting as Iraq is now entering upon a stage of development in electrical and water supply systems for the provinces which will involve very considerable orders in the next two or three years.

There is reason to believe, however, that the German Government are not entirely pleased with the results of the activity of the Haavara Corporation in Iraq. This country has various natural products, such as wool, hides and casings, which Germany needs. Exports to Germany have shown a rapid growth in the past three years, as follows:—

	£
1932-33	39,000
1933-34	102,000
1934-35	158,000

Transactions effected with Haavara marks do not produce exchange available to pay for Iraqi exports to Germany. The German Minister has, therefore, made tentative efforts to arouse interest in a trade exchange agreement between Germany and Iraq. These efforts have not so far been successful, but the possibility must not be entirely overlooked that the growing desire of Iraq to attain a bilaterally-balanced trade situation with as many countries as possible may eventually favour such an agreement. A propagandist article advocating such an agreement was published in *Al Bilad* of the 7th April, and a translation thereof is appended as illustrative of the arguments used in support of the proposal.

Mention should perhaps also be made of the successful efforts of Bayers to increase the sale of pharmaceutical products in this country. The agent of this firm, partly owing to his own initiative (but largely thanks to the high reputation of the product which he handles and to the generous samples and the skilful

publicity material supplied to him), and favoured by the fact that a number of Iraqi doctors received their training in Germany, or under German doctors in Constantinople, is succeeding in obtaining an increasing share of the trade in medical preparations.

The German Minister is assiduous in his cultivation of local politicians and business men. His relations with German Jews, of whom there are now many in Iraq, do not seem to be hampered by any anti-Semite considerations. Whenever there are Government calls for tenders of more than minor importance, the German Minister is always reported to be very "active" in visiting the Iraqi Ministries or Departments concerned. Exactly what arguments or propaganda he uses on these occasions remain a mystery, and whether his efforts are of any great value is also a question.

The matter of German competition in its different aspects has been recently mentioned in the following despatches from Bagdad to the Department of Overseas Trade:—

- O.T. (B) 214 of December 17 (copy to Eastern Department), regarding Haavara marks.
- O.T. (B) 38 of February 18, regarding Haavara marks.
- O.T. (B) 57 of March 5, regarding Haavara marks.
- O.T. (B) 63 of March 16, regarding pipes.
- O.T. (B) 84 of April 7, regarding pipes.
- O.T. (B) 4 of January 6, regarding water meters.
- O.T. (B) 185 of October 23, 1935, regarding Neo-Salvarsan.

J. P. SUMMERSCALE.

Enclosure 2 in No. 66.

Extract from Al Bilad of April 7, 1936.

IRAQ'S FOREIGN TRADE.

Trade Exchange between Iraq and Other States—Important Accurate Statistics.

(Translation.)

THE Berlin special correspondent of *Al Bilad* discusses Iraq's trade with Germany in an interesting lengthy message of which the following is a summary translation:—

The correspondent starts by pointing out that while writing his message he had before him a report published by the "Foreign Trade Section of the Hamburg and Northern Germany Markets' Bourse" on Germany's trade with Iraq in particular and other countries in general, and other reports on the trade of Turkey and Iran, and that not contented with the contents of these reports, he referred for supplementary information to Messrs. Ambarji and Co., the well-known Iraqi trading firm in Hamburg, who furnished him with their views as to the causes for the decline of Iraq's foreign trade, which, Messrs. Ambarji told him, "led to Iraq's imports amounting to about double her exports during the trade year 1934-35, in which Iraq's exports amounted to 3.9 million dinars and her imports to 6.1 million dinars."

Proceeding, the correspondent states it is true that Iraq's exports have been making appreciable progress from year to year, but, he observes, her imports, even excluding materials for public works such as the Kut Barrage, have been making similar progress, "while transit dues (? the value of transit trade—*Translator*) has been progressively on the decrease, having fallen from 3 million dinars in 1933-34 to 2.9 million dinars."

Continuing, the correspondent refers to the conclusion of the trade treaty between Iraq and Germany, which, he observes, was intended on the part of the Government as a means for the remedying of Iraq's adverse trade conditions, was based on the principle of exchange of trade benefits, and was therefore received with applause by trading interests in Iraq, but the actual fact is that

the treaty in question has proved impossible of application, as will be seen from the accurate statistics carefully prepared (*i.e.*, those given in the report of the Trade Section of the Hamburg and North Germany Markets' Bourse, referred to at the beginning of this message—*Translator*). The German trade method consists of exchanging goods for goods and not for money, since, as is well-known, the export of money from Germany is prohibited, and no trade, finance or Government institutions exist in Iraq capable of concluding trade on this basis of exchange of goods for goods, with the result that the Iraqi trader has been giving up dealings with German markets, while, on the other hand, the German trader has been making progressively increasing use of the Iraqi markets, as will be seen from the report dated the 16th March, 1936, of the Foreign Trade Section of the Hamburg and Northern Germany Markets' Bourse. The economic publication (? economics section of the said report) states:—

"Since the middle of the trade year 1934-35, Germany bought Iraqi goods to the value of 88,958 dinars, while during the corresponding period ending March 1936 she bought Iraqi goods to the value of 20,049 dinars. This means that Iraq's exports to Germany have fallen by 75 per cent. from last year; while the value of Germany's exports to Iraq amounted to 186,785 dinars 'in' [*sic*] the middle of the trade year 1935-36, as against 10,436 dinars for the preceding year, representing an increase of 80 per cent.

"This decline (in Iraq's export trade to Germany) was not due to lack of interest in the markets of Iraq on the part of German traders nor to any obstructions led by the Government. It was only the logical result of the financial system in Germany, which does not permit of the Iraqi exporter being paid in cash for his exported goods, and which has led Iraqi traders to give up exporting goods to Germany because the poor financial position of the Iraqi trader does not enable him to do business on the barter system."

To meet the above handicap confronting Iraqi traders with Germany, the correspondent advocates the adoption by the Iraqi Government of the method adopted by Iran and Turkey to overcome the same difficulty which confronted Iranian and Turkish business men dealing with Germany, which method consists of the establishing of a "clearing bank," a method which the correspondent declares has resulted in the recovery by Turkey and Iran of their export trade to Germany, which had suffered a decline similar to that which Iraq's export trade with Germany is now suffering.

To make the trade treaty with Iraq possible of application to advantage the correspondent suggests that the Iraqi Government should follow up the said treaty with a "Clearing Bank Treaty" and that the Eastern Bank (Bagdad) should act as clearing bank on behalf of Iraq.

Concluding, the correspondent writes:—

"At the same time it is necessary to make a close examination of Germany's exports to Iraq and our exports to Germany. The Haavara Bank, known in Palestine as the 'Templekafulschaft,' has been importing German goods into Iraq and selling them at prices lower than those obtaining in Germany, the bank in question being compelled to import goods from Germany owing to the embargo there on the export of money. The result is that this bank has been selling German goods to Iraq without buying any goods in Iraq to the great detriment of the latter. We would not object to this but for the fact that the bank in question is, like Japan, only a seller to Iraq, buying nothing from it.

"As regards the date trade, the excessive import duty imposed on Iraqi exports by certain States, and the bad reputation of Iraq products abroad, these are matters which we shall discuss in a future message."

[E 2843/1419/93]

No. 67.

Sir A. Clark Kerr to Mr. Eden.—(Received May 19.)

(No. 213 E.)

Sir,

Bagdad, April 25, 1936.

WITH reference to Sir Francis Humphrys's despatch O.T. (A) 26 of the 25th November, 1933, I have the honour to inform you that a Labour Law was passed by the Iraqi Parliament on the 11th April, 1936. The text of the law as

amended by the Senate differs in some particulars from that of the draft of which a copy was sent to you in my predecessor's despatch under reference.

2. Many of the changes which have been made in the original draft are merely matters of drafting. The definitions in Chapter I of the law have been modified and improved. In Chapter II, which remains virtually unaltered, article 2 empowers the Council of Ministers to fix the hours of labour in industrial undertakings. There is, however, no general provision for maximum hours of work. Article 3 of this section has been considerably modified and enlarged to provide for the framing of regulations governing not only hours of rest but periods of leave with pay. The remaining articles of this section, which concern the employment of children, juveniles and women, and the duty of employers to report accidents of a serious nature, are almost identical with those of the original draft.

3. Chapter III, which deals with compensation for death, injury or disease arising out of industrial employment, is substantially the same as the corresponding section of the original draft and preserves, unchanged, article 2 under which the pension and compensation schemes of industrial undertakings, if not less favourable to the worker than that of the Labour Law, are allowed. Such schemes are already in force in the Rafidain Oil Company and Iraq Petroleum Company. They will, therefore, be unaffected by this article.

4. The law departs from the original draft in Chapter IV which contains provisions for the formation of Workers' Associations. No such provisions were originally put forward, and their inclusion is due to criticisms in Parliament and in the press. A proposal to make membership of such associations obligatory on all workers was, however, not pursued. It is clear from the law that the associations will be subject to very close official supervision, and it is unlikely that they will be allowed to attain any great political importance. The other articles of this section permit the Minister of Interior to issue regulations prescribing obligatory contributions to funds to insure workers against unemployment, sickness or injury and for the establishment of employment agencies.

5. The rights and powers of the Minister of the Interior or his representatives to visit and inspect all industrial undertakings are specified in Chapter V of the law. Chapter VI empowers the Minister of the Interior to issue regulations governing working conditions and the provision of safety devices, and—what may be of considerable importance—gives him the power to establish scales of minimum wages for different occupations.

6. The provisions of Chapters II and III (concerning hours of rest and workmen's compensation) come into force fifteen days after the publication of the law in the *Government Gazette*. Most of the remaining provisions are merely permissive. The decision whether or not they are to be put into force will rest with the Ministry of the Interior.

7. The English text of the law will be transmitted to you when it is published in the *Official Gazette*.

8. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Department of Overseas Trade.

I have, &c.
(For the Ambassador).
C. H. BATEMAN.

[E 2546/1575/93]

No. 68.

Sir A. Clark Kerr to Mr. Eden.—(Received May 5.)

(No. 225.)

Sir,

Bagdad, April 30, 1936.

I HAVE the honour to report a fresh outbreak of unrest on the Euphrates between Rumaitha and Samawa.

2. After the disturbances in this area last year an army officer, Abdul Hamid-al-Shalchi, was appointed Mutassarif of Diwaniyah. His administration of the province was not, however, successful and it is now coming to light that he did not report fully to the Ministry of the Interior on the disturbed tribal situation which had been developing since the beginning of the current year. About the

middle of the present month he was replaced by Khalil Azmi, formerly Mutessarif of the Diyala Province, who is a regular official with a sound record.

3. Khalil Azmi soon found that his predecessor had left him a legacy of dangerous discontent, and the situation became worse when, some days ago, the Euphrates in spate broke its banks in several places and flooded a large area of tribal land. Much loss was caused thereby which, many believed, could have been avoided if the Government had agreed to allow the surplus water to flow into the Habbaniyah Lake.

4. On the 21st and 22nd April it was reported that a train had been fired on near Rumaitha, but the train showed no bullet marks and the firing was probably not intended to be more than a demonstration. The men responsible belonged to the Dhuwalim, one of the tribes which had supported Sheikh Khawam-al-Abbas of the Bani Zuraij in his revolt last year. Their leaders were summoned to report to the Government headquarters, but refused to come in; and they presented a number of demands which included the restoration of Khawam's confiscated lands, exemption from conscription, and an undertaking that the Government would not enforce the wearing of Pahlavi hats. This last demand shows the confused ideas behind some of the tribesmen's grievances.

5. On the 28th April a lorry was held up just south of Rumaitha. A police patrol arrived while the looting was in progress and a skirmish with the tribesmen followed. The police suffered no casualties, but the incident indicated that the tribesmen were in a dangerous temper and, as a precautionary measure, railway communication between Rumaitha and Samawa has been temporarily suspended.

6. On the 29th April two flights of Iraqi aeroplanes (six machines) were sent to Diwaniyah and staff arrangements were made for the concentration of the following force with ancillary troops in the Diwaniyah-Samawa area:—

- 1 squadron of cavalry.
- 1 mountain battery.
- 7 infantry battalions.

7. To-day the Minister of the Interior himself went by train to Rumaitha to investigate the situation.

8. Up to the present the insurgent movement is confined to the Dhuwalim tribe, whose efforts to bring in their neighbours have met with no success, nor is any encouragement being given to the insurgents from Bagdad or from the Holy Cities.

9. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Tehran.

I have, &c.

ARCHIBALD CLARK KERR.

[E 2605/1575/93]

No. 69.

Sir A. Clark Kerr to Mr. Eden.—(Received May 8.)

(No. 230.)
Sir,

Bagdad, May 5, 1936.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 225 of the 30th April, I have the honour to report the following further developments in the tribal situation in the Rumaitha area.

2. On the 1st May, as the headmen of the Dhuwalim tribe persisted in their refusal to report to the Government headquarters at Rumaitha, tribal villages and concentrations of men between Rumaitha and Samawa were twice bombed by Iraqi aeroplanes. Incendiary bombs were used and several villages were destroyed.

3. On the same day the unrest spread to the north of Rumaitha, and the Bani Aridh and the Aajib tribes attacked a small police post at Aridhat. They also tore up a section of the railway line a few miles north of Rumaitha.

4. On the 2nd May the police at Rumaitha, supported by a battalion of infantry, relieved the garrison of the Aridhat post. They claim to have inflicted heavy casualties on the tribesmen. At the same time aeroplanes bombed appropriate targets in the Aridh and Aajib tribal areas.

5. On the following day Amir Liwa Bakr Sidqi took over the duties of General Officer Commanding the troops in the area Diwaniyah-Basra, and established his headquarters at Diwaniyah. Two more battalions were ordered to the disturbed area.

6. Bakr Sidqi's plan is first to quell the disorders north of Rumaitha by moving one column from Diwaniyah southwards towards Rumaitha, and a second column from Rumaitha northwards towards Diwaniyah. This operation, it is expected, will be carried out to-day.

7. In the meanwhile, Iraqi aircraft have continued their bombing in the neighbourhood of Rumaitha.

8. The causes of the outbreak still remain obscure. Nothing further has yet come to light regarding the reasons for the revolt of the Dhuwalim, while the sudden rising of the Bani Aridh and the Aajib, after large reinforcements of troops had reached Rumaitha, remains without adequate explanation.

9. The Minister of the Interior is still at Rumaitha, and the Prime Minister has asked Mr. Edmonds to carry on the executive work of the Ministry until Rashid Ali returns.

10. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Tehran.

I have, &c.

ARCHIBALD CLARK KERR.

[E 2743/1575/93]

No. 70.

Sir A. Clark Kerr to Mr. Eden.—(Received May 15.)

(No. 236.)

Sir,

Bagdad, May 7, 1936.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 230 of the 5th May last, I have the honour to inform you that the military operation carried out on the 5th May appears to have been completely successful. Two army columns, together with two flights of the Iraqi Air Force, dispersed a large gathering of tribesmen astride the railway 5 miles north of Rumaitha. The enemy were estimated to number about 1,200 armed men, including contingents from the Dhuwalim, the Bani Aridh and the "Aajib," and the army claim to have inflicted about 200 casualties. This is probably an over-estimate. The losses sustained by the Government forces were two officers and eight other ranks killed and forty wounded.

2. On the same day an Iradah was issued proclaiming martial law in the Rumaitha area.

3. To-day's official communiqué states that the principal tribal leaders have offered their submission, but I learn from a reliable source that none of importance has yet actually surrendered to the authorities. Railway communication has now been restored between Rumaitha and Diwaniyah, and two columns are to-day moving southwards from Rumaitha to Samawa.

4. The Bagdad press is unanimous in demanding the severest punishment of the rebels and those who incited them to take up arms against the Government. I gather that the Cabinet incline to the view that the present trouble is due to the clemency shown to the insurgent Euphrates tribes last year. It is therefore probable that the tribes now involved will be heavily punished. I understand that, during the engagement of the 5th May, no quarter was given, and no prisoners were taken.

5. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Tehran.

I have, &c.

(For the Ambassador).

C. H. BATEMAN.

[E 2779/4/93]

No. 71.

Record of Seventy-Second Meeting of the Assyrian Committee of the Council of the League of Nations, held at Geneva on May 8, 1936. (Received in Foreign Office, May 18.)

(NOTE.—“Francs” in this record are French francs unless specifically stated to the contrary.)

Financial Situation.

AT the request of the president, *M. Bieler* spoke on the financial position, in continuation of his remarks at the sixty-ninth meeting of the committee on the 7th April. He said there had been little change since the last session of the committee. The position was as follows:—

(1) *Settlement*.—The continued delay in carrying out the programme of transfers had removed the necessity of making further remittances to Beirut. (NOTE.—Remittances made up to the end of March are tabulated in the record of the sixty-ninth meeting.) The board had, however, requested the payment of an instalment of 325,000 fr. in the near future as they were obliged to pay out considerable sums for motor vehicles and other material they were acquiring for the Ghab. The monthly financial returns provided for in article 16 (1) of the Financial Regulations had now been received for the first quarter of the year, and the position could be summarised by the following table:—

	<i>Credits provided in budget for first half-year.</i>	<i>Payments authorised by Trustee Board.</i>
(a) Ghab	2,307,168	134,873.45
(b) Khabur	1,586,360	713,025.35
	100,000 ⁽¹⁾	
(c) Trustee Board	360,000	74,764.58
Total of payments authorised		922,663.38

(2) *Ghab Reclamation*.—The last monthly statement received from the High Commissioner was for January; it revealed that no payment had been authorised, but that expenses amounting to 42,700 fr. had been incurred. The League had not transferred any funds to the High Commissioner since the 1 million francs remitted in October 1935.

M. Bieler supplied the following table to show (in Swiss francs) the amount of funds for the settlement at the disposal of the League at present:—

I.—Contribution of League of Nations for 1936	Swiss francs. 400,000
Deductions already made—	
Refund of League expenses	Swiss francs. 109,935.05
March transfer (800,000 French francs) to Trustee Board	161,600.00
Advances “in suspense”	4,454.85
Total deductions	275,989.90
Balance disposable	124,010.10
II.—First instalment of United Kingdom contribution— £60,000 (4,496,250 French francs) or approximately	912,963.56
Total disposable	1,036,973.66

M. Bieler added that the first instalment of 705,198.50 French francs payable to the High Commissioner for Syria in respect of expenses incurred by him on the Khabur (see record of sixty-ninth meeting) had not yet been remitted.

⁽¹⁾ Payment by French High Commission: see record of sixty-ninth meeting (No. 53).

The amounts drawn by the Trustee Board during January and February emanated (as mentioned at the sixty-ninth meeting) from the balance in the League account at Beirut, which in its turn represented the residue of the £60,000 paid over by the Iraqi Government in the summer of 1935.

M. Bieler proceeded to warn the committee against undue optimism at the financial position. The substantial balance in hand was solely due to the delays in the settlement programme, and it was quite possible that these delays would in the long run lead to an increase in the total cost of the settlement. *M. Bieler* was disposed to think that if everything was taken into account the outlook for the future was becoming even more alarming. On his return from Beirut in January he had expressed the view (see paragraph 3 of record of sixty-fourth and sixty-fifth meetings) that on the basis of settling 15,500 Assyrians from Iraq, plus the some of 6,200 already on the Khabur, the deficit on the total budget might well be some 17½ million French francs, or 4 million more than that shown in the estimates submitted to the last Assembly and reproduced in the report to the Council drafted in November 1935. According to the latest news from Iraq, it might be necessary to reckon with a total of 30,000 would-be emigrants, i.e., some 8,500 more than the total of 21,500 upon which the calculations had hitherto been based. If this extra number had to be provided for some 8,500,000 further French francs would have to be found. Again, more expenditure seemed inevitable for the acquisition of temporary lands in the vicinity of the Ghab; about 2 million French francs (over three times that provided for in the estimates) were apparently required to rent land for five years to feed only 5,000 Assyrians.

On the credit side there was only in prospect at present the funds which it was hoped to obtain from private charity; so far, the result of this appeal did not seem very encouraging.

The committee noted *M. Bieler's* remarks, but decided not to embark at this stage on a discussion of the general financial question.

Problem of Temporary Lands in the Ghab Area.

The President said that the Trustee Board's report of the 17th April, detailing the results of the conference on the land question with the mandatory authorities (committee document C/Min.Ass./205), was not very encouraging. It seemed that 3,360 hectares might be acquired in the State of Latakia, which would be sufficient for some 5,000 Assyrians; but a total rent bill of over 2 million francs would be incurred over the necessary period of five years, an amount which, as *M. Bieler* had pointed out, would necessitate a large new credit in the budget and still further increase the financial deficit. The outlook in the State of Syria was a little more hopeful, but the Trustee Board were clearly not very certain about the security aspect, and it would be necessary to obtain from the authorities explicit guarantees as to the safety of the Assyrians.

The French Representative said that he had tried unsuccessfully to induce the French Government to reply to the Secretary-General's letter of the 9th April (committee document C/Min.Ass./201) in time for the committee's opening meeting. The reply to the committee's appeal was being held up until certain further information was available, but he hoped that it would be ready very shortly.

The President recalled the attitude he had adopted at the committee's last session in April, namely, that the question of temporary lands was at present the vital element in the whole settlement project. He thought it would be impossible to make any progress in the matter until the French reply was available. If it came shortly and was encouraging, it would be possible to go forward with the existing programme. If the contrary proved to be the case, he thought it would be necessary to re-examine the whole settlement scheme and probably to refer the question of future policy back to the Council.

Speaking personally and not in his capacity of President, *Sr. Olivan* said that he could not contemplate agreeing to the transfer of *all* the Assyrians to the Khabur for temporary settlement while continuing to supply settlement funds for the reclamation works in the Ghab. Such a policy would inevitably encourage those who were hankering after a permanent settlement in the Khabur; there seemed to him a considerable risk that during the years which would elapse before the reclamation works were completed, obstacles, whether political or economic,

might arise to furnish reasons against breaking up the Khabur settlements and transferring the Assyrians to the Ghab. The position would then be that, whereas League funds had been instrumental in financing a handsome scheme of public works for the advantage of the mandated territories, the committee would in practice find it impossible to bring the Assyrians into the Ghab. Signor Olivan's conclusion, therefore, that if the question of temporary lands could not be solved in the near future, the committee would have to consider as a first step holding up the supply of funds for the reclamation works.

The United Kingdom Representative, while sharing the President's anxiety, suggested that it might be possible to devise a compromise solution, which, while making extended use of the Khabur for temporary settlement, would also provide for a limited transfer to the Ghab. He thought that the main difficulty with the Ghab transfers might prove to lie in the first step, and that once a "symbolic occupation" had been effected it might prove easier to expand the area for temporary settlement. The Ghab plan indicated the possibility of employing as many as 1,000 Assyrian labourers on the reclamation works, and although it had subsequently been stated that this number would have to be reduced owing to a decision to use more machinery for excavation work, the right policy did seem to be to aim at transferring as soon as possible the maximum number of labourers (with their families) whose services could be utilised. Presumably these labourers would not require the full allotment of arable land which the board had indicated as necessary, since they would be earning money wages and should be able to purchase food. The Trustee Board had stated that ample land was available for villages, whether temporary or permanent, and a few hundred hectares of arable land which were also available could perhaps be used for a limited amount of cultivation. He understood that M. Cuénod had alluded to the possibility of installing Assyrian labourers in the Ghab in a recent private letter to the Secretariat, but he had added that the move was dependent on the allocation of the contracts for the excavation work, which had still to be awarded.

As regards the Khabur settlement, it now seemed essential to sanction the immediate transfer of the 2,500 destined to move in the autumn. He had suggested at the committee's last session that, if it proved impossible to make immediate progress with the provision of temporary lands near the Ghab, it might be essential to expedite the transfer to the Khabur so as to reassure the Assyrians, and at the same time public opinion, that the task of removing the Assyrians from Iraq had not been abandoned. Since the last session, the Iraqi Government had insisted on the necessity for making this transfer without delay since uneasiness was spreading among the Assyrians, particularly among the quota of 2,500 who were the remnants of tribal groups already settled on the Khabur. Nuri Pasha had insisted personally on the urgency of this action in the course of a recent interview at the Foreign Office, and reports from the British Embassy at Bagdad had confirmed the desirability from the local point of view of removing these Assyrians as soon as possible.

It was not clear whether it would be necessary to interrupt transfers to the Ghab as well as to the Khabur during the hot weather, but if this was the case he thought that the committee would not need to despair if, in addition to advancing the transfer to the Khabur it could succeed in moving before the end of June the first instalment of labourers and their families to the Ghab. During the summer it would be possible to pursue the search for suitable temporary lands in the Ghab region, and it might be possible to catch up the programme before the end of the year. At the same time it seemed clear that the only way of acquiring these lands quickly and at a reasonable cost was by the intervention of the mandatory authorities between the Trustee Board and landowners.

The French Representative agreed that the difficulties could probably be overcome if the mandatory authorities intervened directly; their unwillingness to do this was due to the responsibility for the settlement operation proper having been taken away from the High Commissioner.

Mr. Hill said that Sr. Barcenat, who was now in Northern Iraq for the final consultation of the Assyrians, had telegraphed privately in support of an immediate transfer to the Khabur as it would relieve the indigence among the Assyrians in Mosul, which was now becoming serious. *Mr. Hill* added that according to the Trustee Board it would take seventeen days to effect the actual transfer of the 2,500 to the Khabur.

The Iraqi Representative said that he had just received a further telegram from his Government urging once more the necessity for not delaying this transfer.

The President said that he was now reluctantly convinced that it would be necessary to make this immediate transfer to the Khabur. He thought it should be made clear, however, that it was being authorised as a special measure and was not to be regarded as a precedent for moving Assyrians to the Khabur every time there were delays and difficulties in the Ghab.

The French Representative said that he too would agree reluctantly to the transfer, but because it seemed to be in the best interests of the Assyrians rather than simply in deference to the wishes of the Iraqi Government.

The committee agreed to authorise the transfer to take place immediately and instructed the secretary to inform the Government of Iraq and the Trustee Board accordingly. It was further agreed that the board should be invited to submit figure for the modifications which it would be necessary to make in the settlement budgets.

The committee recognised that this action raised once again the question of further hydraulic installations on the Khabur; it decided, however, that this point could be left over until the Trustee Board had replied to the observations on the subject in paragraph 7 of the Secretary-General's letter of the 9th April (committee document C/Min.Ass./203).

It was agreed that, as proposed by the president, it would be necessary to postpone further consideration of the question of temporary lands for the Ghab settlement until the French Government were in a position to reply officially to the committee's appeal on the 9th April. When this reply was available, the committee would have to consider whether or not it would be able to continue the attempt to carry out the settlement scheme as it stood at present.

J. G. WARD

*United Kingdom Delegation,
Geneva, May 12, 1936.*

[E 2825/4/93]

No. 72.

Record of Private Discussions at Geneva regarding the Policy of the Assyrian Committee of the Council of the League of Nations.

IT was agreed at the meeting of the Council Committee on the 8th May (see record of the seventy-second meeting⁽¹⁾) that it was essential to await the reply from the French Government to the committee's appeal for co-operation in settling the difficulties over the acquisition of temporary lands in the vicinity of the Ghab Plain before taking any decision as to future policy or the presenting of any report to the Council. The committee were influenced in taking this course by its understanding that the Quai d'Orsay were still making efforts to induce the mandatory authorities in Syria to give effective support to the Trustee Board. The French representative indicated that he hoped to be able to report the result of the latest representations to the mandatory authorities before the end of the Council's session.

2. On the following day, the 9th May, I had a discussion with the president of the Council Committee on the whole question of future policy. I found M. Olivan was seriously concerned at the position into which the committee was drifting. In the first place, the French representative had just told him that, although the Quai d'Orsay were continuing their efforts, he was pessimistic about the chance of persuading the mandatory authorities in Syria to give any effective support to the Trustee Board in its search for lands. Secondly, the general political question had now come to the fore again. In accordance with the decision which had been reached in the private discussions of the sub-committee last April (see paragraph 17 of record in E 2042/4/93), it was intended to record in the eventual report to the Council the assurance given by the High Commissioner to the Trustee Board and the president of the Council Committee

⁽¹⁾ See No. 71.

last March in regard to the future execution of the plan. The Secretariat had produced a draft and submitted it to the French representative; the latter, however, had stated that he would have to refer it to Paris for approval. It seemed that the French Government considered that the High Commissioner had gone much too far in his declarations, and that they were doubtful about their ability to ratify them by concurring in the draft report. Sr. Oliván observed that if this ratification was not forthcoming, M. de Martel's words would no longer have any value, and it did not seem possible to continue with the settlement scheme as if nothing had happened in Syria. He thought this new difficulty was connected with the Franco-Syrian negotiations now reported to be nearing conclusion in Paris, and that the French did not wish to commit themselves until they had settled the political future of Syria and knew the amount of influence they would retain after the termination of the mandatory régime.

3. In view of these developments, the president was personally in favour of bringing matters to a head and in effect presenting the French with a sort of ultimatum. If they then declared their inability to produce the co-operation necessary to overcome the land difficulties and to endorse the political assurances given personally by the High Commissioner, he thought it would be necessary to suspend the present settlement scheme and to report candidly on the whole position to the Council. Sr. Oliván said that, although he had agreed as a special measure to advancing the transfer of the 2,500 Assyrians to the Khabur, he could never agree to the expedient of settling any more Assyrians (*i.e.*, over and above the 8,700 foreseen under the present programme) on the Khabur unless some absolutely reliable guarantee such as he did not think could possibly be obtained—were forthcoming that no obstacles would be allowed to stand in the way of their moving to the Ghab when the reclamation was finished. He felt acutely the risk of a great scandal if, after the expenditure of some half a million pounds of League money on the Ghab reclamation, it should eventually prove impossible, for political or other reasons, to transfer the Assyrians on the Khabur to the Ghab. Further, he was convinced that the Assyrians would not in the long run be secure on the Khabur, and he thought it would be a lamentable conclusion to the committee's work if it only succeeded in putting the Assyrians in a situation where they were still liable to massacre.

4. I told Sr. Oliván that, while fully sharing his anxiety, I thought it would be advisable not to do anything at present which might precipitate a crisis with the French. In the first place, we knew that there were a lot of French officials who would welcome a chance to get out of the settlement plan, and if we presented any sort of ultimatum in Paris, this would cut the ground from under the feet of the other party in the French camp who were trying to carry out the scheme, and might well mean that the French Government would take the opportunity to escape from its obligations. Moreover, apart from the fact that if a breakdown was inevitable it seemed better tactics to manoeuvre the French into confessing that the scheme had broken down rather than ourselves suggesting to them that it had done so, I did not think that it was yet certain that there was nothing to be hoped for from the committee's representations to the French Government. There was evidently a lot of ill-will towards the scheme among the French officials in Syria, but there were also many genuine difficulties confronting the mandatory authorities, chiefly the fact that political developments had made it impossible for them to put real pressure on Syrian landowners. Time was obviously required in any case to overcome these difficulties. It seemed, moreover, that the Quai d'Orsay now realised the unfortunate situation which was developing and the scandal which might ensue if the whole scheme broke down, and that they were determined to do their best to save it from collapse.

5. Sr. Oliván eventually agreed to postpone any sort of ultimatum to the French for the time being and to await the outcome of the action which the Quai d'Orsay were taking with the mandatory authorities. He made the condition, however (to which I readily agreed), that the French should be given to understand that League contributions to the reclamation works would stop in the future until effective co-operation was forthcoming in Syria. (This lever was of some importance, since a sum of 2,455,000 fr. is due to be paid from League funds for the reclamation work during the present quarter.)

6. On the 11th May Sr. Oliván asked me to call on him. He said that he had just had a long conversation about the settlement plan with M. Massigli, and had informed him in no uncertain terms of the gravity of the situation, telling

him bluntly that no more money would be forthcoming from League funds for the reclamation works if the present difficulties in Syria could not be overcome and if effective co-operation was not forthcoming from the mandatory authorities in future. M. Massigli had fully appreciated the situation, and had undertaken to make further and even stronger representations to the French authorities at Beirut. At the same time M. Massigli had told Sr. Oliván that there was no chance of a reply from the French Government on the land question in the near future as the Quai d'Orsay were still in communication with Beirut. He gave the impression, moreover, that the French Government would require further time for consideration before there could be any question of their ratifying the declarations by M. de Martel on the political aspect.

7. In the circumstances Sr. Oliván thought that it would be useless, and might even be harmful, for the committee to make any report to the Council or even to hold a further meeting of its own until the situation had been cleared up. A report to the Council at this stage could either be quite anodyne and therefore of no value at all, or else it could explain the true situation, in which case it would paint a very unsatisfactory picture and risk provoking the crisis which we were now agreed to try to avoid until all hope was lost of carrying through the present scheme. Although it was personally very inconvenient to him, Sr. Oliván thought the best course would be to adjourn the whole matter until the prospective extraordinary session of the League Council in June. He had proposed this course to M. Massigli, who had entirely agreed, and had promised to do his utmost in the meanwhile to put matters right.

8. I told Sr. Oliván that personally I entirely agreed with his view that an adjournment until June was now the best policy, and after consulting Mr. Rendel I confirmed our agreement to the proposed procedure. Sr. Oliván subsequently obtained the individual consent of the other members of the committee to the adjournment, and the Assyrian question was formally removed from the Council's agenda at the private meeting of the Council on the afternoon of the 11th May.

9. With the consent of all the members of the committee, the president subsequently instructed the League Treasury to withhold until further notice all payments due from the settlement fund to the French High Commission at Beirut in respect of the Ghab reclamation. The French representative undertook to inform the High Commission of this decision, and it was agreed that the League Secretariat should simply reply to the request from the High Commission for the instalment due in the present quarter (see paragraph 5 above) by referring to the explanatory communication which the Quai d'Orsay would send to the High Commission on the subject.

10. In accordance with the committee's authority, the president has approved the changes in the settlement budgets necessitated by the earlier transfer to the Khabur (see letter dated the 13th May from the Secretary-General of the League to the board, committee document C/Min. Ass./208).

11. The Trustee Board were authorised in the same letter to spend 180,000 French francs in respect of additional irrigation machinery necessitated by the expansion of the Khabur settlement. This sum (to be expended on "norias," or water wheels) was the alternative proposal of the Trustee Board to their original request for a credit of 410,000 French francs in the draft budget for 1936 to cover a further motor pumping station. The committee had reserved the original proposal (which it considered too expensive in view of the temporary character of the Khabur settlement), and had invited the board to consider some less costly alternative arrangements for increasing the area of arable land on the Khabur (see record of seventieth meeting^(*)). The revised credit of 180,000 fr. appeared reasonable to the committee.

12. It was agreed between the president, the League Secretariat and myself that the other outstanding questions connected with the settlement (chiefly the financial deficit; the alleged technical shortcomings of the Ghab plan—particularly the doubt thrown upon the total area likely to be made available by reclamation—and the question of the definition of an Assyrian, with particular reference to the Persian Assyrians) should be left over until the future of the whole settlement project was clearer. It was also agreed that, in view of the uncertainty as to the future, and of the fact the League credits were now being held up for the reclamation work, there could be no immediate question of the

(*) See No. 54.

transfer to the Ghab of the Assyrian labourers who are intended under the official plan to participate in the reclamation of the marshlands. It was felt that until the scheme had been definitely shown to be practicable, the presence of an advance party in the Ghab would constitute a liability that might become embarrassing in the event of a subsequent breakdown in the settlement project.

J. G. WARD.

Foreign Office, May 15, 1936.

[E 2853/1575/93]

No. 73.

Sir A. Clark Kerr to Mr. Eden.—(Received May 14.)

(No. 245.)

Sir,

Bagdad, May 14, 1936.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 236 of the 7th May last, I have the honour to inform you that an official communiqué was published in the press of the 12th May in the following terms:—

"The leaders of the rebellion continue to make their submission to the Government. Nothing has transpired to necessitate renewed military operations, activity being confined to minor action by the police and air force. The train service between Bagdad and Basra has been resumed. Investigations are proceeding to discover the causes underlying the subversive movement so that preventive measures may be taken against future outbreaks."

Reports which have reached me from various quarters indicate that this communiqué is substantially correct and that the situation is well in hand.

2. During the operations in the Rumaitha district on the 7th-8th May, the army sustained a further thirty casualties and one "Audax" aircraft was shot down by the tribesmen. Owing to the explosion of the bombs on board, the machine was totally wrecked. The pilot and mechanic perished. I gather that the aircraft was flying at an unduly low altitude at the time when it was struck.

3. On the 12th May a "Hawker-Nisr" aircraft was hit by rifle fire and crashed in flames. The pilot and mechanic endeavoured to escape in their parachutes, but were killed by the tribesmen on landing. The body of the pilot was afterwards found to be riddled with bullets, while that of the mechanic had been horribly and deliberately mutilated. These disasters have caused a certain loss of moral in the Iraqi Air Force, whose incendiary bombs, used hitherto with great effect against villages and crops, have been a deciding factor in the course of the operations.

4. On the 8th May, an outburst of sniping by a roving band of some 150 men caused the temporary withdrawal to Bagdad of the Iraqi aircraft stationed at Diwaniyah. By the 11th May, however, all the machines used in co-operation with troop movements had again been concentrated on the advanced landing ground. The greater part of the army is now camped near Rumaitha awaiting events, while the tribal headmen make their submission to the Government.

5. Attempts by the tribesmen to flood the railway near Wawiyah were unsuccessful, but the first train that endeavoured to get through to Basra on the 10th May was fired on near Daraji, and was forced to return to Ur Junction.

6. During the course of a recent conversation the Prime Minister told Mr. Bateman that he had stopped a number of press telegrams to London reporting the loss of Iraqi aircraft because their alarmist tenor was not in accordance with the facts of the situation.

7. I am credibly informed that these events in the Middle Euphrates have resulted in a closing of the ranks of the opposition, and that the Prime Minister's position has been severely shaken. I shall have the honour to address you a separate despatch on this subject.

8. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Tehran.

I have, &c.

(For the Ambassador),

C. H. BATEMAN.

[E 3062/1575/93]

No. 74.

Sir A. Clark Kerr to Mr. Eden.—(Received May 28.)

(No. 254.)

Sir,

Bagdad, May 22, 1936.

I HAVE the honour to report that, since the date of my despatch No. 245 of the 14th May, there has been little military activity of importance in the disturbed area about Rumaitha. The forces concentrated there have been divided into three columns, based respectively on Rumaitha, Abu Tabikh (10 miles north of Rumaitha), and Aridhat (between Abu Tabikh and Rumaitha), and are at present engaged in minor punitive operations against the rebel tribesmen. Practically no opposition has been encountered for some days. Numerous villages have been destroyed and large areas of crops burned. Some stories of brutality on the part of the troops are now beginning to reach Bagdad. Few prisoners have, it seems, been taken, and there are the usual rumours of the shooting out of hand of parties of surrendering tribesmen with their womenfolk. I am not at present in a position to assess the truth of such reports, but they do not seem to be out of harmony with Bakr Sidqi's reputation for ruthlessness.

2. The Minister of the Interior (Rashid Ali) returned to Bagdad on the 14th May and appeared to be well satisfied with his work at Diwaniyah. What exactly he did there is not known to me, but it is said that he worked hard to keep other neighbouring tribes from joining the revolt and that he spent money lavishly to this end. His efforts seem, I am bound to say, to have been successful, for, although small detachments of sympathisers from other tribes have taken part in the fighting, the revolt in the main was confined to the septs of the Bani Huchaim Confederation.

3. The Prime Minister, whom I saw on the 17th May on my return from a visit to Mosul, told me that all the important chieftains of the insurgent tribes had submitted, and that the revolt might be considered to be at an end. Some thirty of the sheikhs would, he said, be tried by court-martial in a few days, but the rank and file had been punished enough by their losses in action. This time, he added, there would be no general amnesty such as he had granted last year a few weeks after the military court had finished its work. If that sort of thing were done habitually, martial law would lose its salutary effect. He had instructed the court carefully to sift all the evidence, with a view to establish the real cause of the trouble. In his opinion, malicious agitators were mainly responsible, and he hoped that the court would expose and punish them. He was referring to the local Shiah clergy, and he said that if guilt were eventually traced to them they would be shown no mercy.

4. He also told me that the Government were working out a plan for scattering the rebel tribesmen among less turbulent elements, and giving their lands to others whose loyalty could be better counted upon. It was intended, also, completely to disarm those tribal septs who were mainly responsible for the disorders.

5. I mentioned that I had heard that a deputation of a number of men prominent in public life had recently visited the King in order to protest against the severity of the Government's treatment of the rebels, and I asked whether this was true. His Excellency told me that Naji Suwaidi, Hikmat Sulaiman, Jafar Chalabi Abu Timman, Jamil Madfai, Maulud Mukhlis, Abdul Aziz Qassab, and one or two others had composed this deputation, and had complained bitterly to His Majesty about the constant bloodshed to which, they alleged, the policy of the Government was leading. According to the Prime Minister, King Ghazi gave them no encouragement, and affirmed his entire confidence in his Ministers. His Majesty was, the Prime Minister said, piqued by the deputation's slighting references to the army.

6. Yassin-al-Hashimi himself made light of these activities on the part of the Opposition and professed to be generally optimistic. He called my attention to the loyalty to the Government of the vast majority of the Euphrates tribes, and he claimed that, once the Government had cleared up the present situation, the country would be so quiet that even a fool like Jamil Madfai would have no difficulty in keeping office for as long as ten years. My information from other sources does not altogether justify the Prime Minister's optimism.

7. It is apparently true that most if not all of the rebel sheikhs have surrendered, but the tribes between Diwaniyah and Samawa remain in a

dangerous state of ferment, and it seems to me that time and more patience and understanding than are usually shown by the Government and their officials will be required to restore tranquillity.

8. In his appreciation of the causes of the disorders, the Prime Minister also seems to me to be in error. That there were people who worked on the temper of the tribes is more than likely, and that many of these were probably Shiah clergy of various grades is undeniable. But the root causes of the revolt must, in my opinion, be sought far deeper than in the frothy agitation of such men as these. It is still somewhat difficult to analyse, with any certainty, the discontent which found expression in the recent rebellion, but there is little doubt that the chief ingredients were a number of injudicious acts on the part of the Government themselves, among which partiality in dealing with tribal land disputes, conscription, and the prohibition of the usual mourning processions during the last Muharram celebrations take a prominent place. At the Prime Minister's own suggestion, Mr. Edmonds is preparing a comprehensive note on this question, a copy of which I hope to be able to send to you in due course. Mr. Edmonds tells me that he is expressing his views with a frankness which will, I fear, make his note unpalatable reading for the Cabinet.

9. I think his Excellency is equally at fault in disdaining the activities of the Opposition. There is little doubt that the Government are losing popularity. This is partly due to a natural process familiar in all countries where any form of parliamentary institutions exists. To a far greater extent, however, it must be attributed to the uneasiness, and in some instances the disgust, which has been caused by the Government's constant use of arms to impose their will upon the country. Many people have been shocked by the loss of life and the general devastation caused by the present Euphrates operations. Jamil Madfai would not be human if he did not make the most of the situation in order to discredit Yassin-al-Hashimi and his colleagues, and, as I reported in my despatch under reference, I think that the Prime Minister's position has been shaken. It is rumoured that he has sent for both Nuri-al-Said and Naji Shaukat (the Iraqi Minister at Angora) to return to support him in dealing with the Cabinet's present difficulties. The fact that Nuri is leaving England earlier than was expected may be confirmation of this story, but I have as yet no news that Naji Shaukat has actually left Angora. It should not, however, be assumed that the Government have now no friends. There are strong influences, both in Bagdad and the provinces, which support them, and sincerely applaud the severity with which they are dealing with the rebels. They have also succeeded in keeping the press unanimously on their side.

10. In regard to the general temper of the Euphrates tribes, I consider that the Prime Minister is again over-optimistic in believing that they are so solidly loyal to his Administration. He seems to have accepted at their face value the hurried protestations of obedience given to the Minister of the Interior by intimidated sheikhs summoned to administrative headquarters, and to have turned a blind eye to the signs of widespread restlessness and discontent which are patent to all those in touch with current events in the south of Iraq. Above all, he seems to ignore the notorious fickleness of these tribesmen, whose support of a leader or a cause is never anything but the most evanescent enthusiasm.

11. Nor can I readily believe that the scheme which he outlined to me for uprooting the rebels and giving their lands to other tribes will contribute to the tranquillity of these disturbed areas. Indeed, it appears to me to be an unsound plan. For the Government themselves to confiscate a tribe's lands is generally unwise; to hand over these lands to tribal rivals or enemies is to sow the seeds of endless strife and disorder. I propose to seek an early opportunity to discuss this project with Mr. Edmonds, and to see whether something can be done to modify the Government's intentions.

12. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Tehran.

I have, &c.

ARCHIBALD CLARK KERR.

[E 3523/4/93]

No. 75.

Sir A. Clark Kerr to Mr. Eden.—(Received June 15.)

(No. 268.)

HIS Majesty's Ambassador at Bagdad presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit to him copy of despatch No. 22 from His Majesty's consul at Mosul respecting the Assyrian Settlement in Syria.

Bagdad, June 2, 1936.

Enclosure in No. 75.

Consul Grafftey-Smith to Sir A. Clark Kerr.

(No. 22.)

Sir,

Mosul, May 23, 1936.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency, with reference to paragraph 45 of the enclosure in my despatch No. 21 of the 19th May, that Major Thomson, president of the Local Assyrian Settlement Committee, returned to Mosul from Syria on the 19th May, and that arrangements are now in active progress for the despatch to Syria of the 2,500 Assyrians destined for temporary settlement on the Khabur.

2. The first convoy, a small one of 150 persons, will leave for Syria, via Sinjar, on the 28th May, and will be followed by further convoys on the 2nd June and at four-day intervals until the 30th June. These convoys will absorb about 2,100 emigrants. The remainder will be sent across in September, when the worst of the hot weather is over, and a certain number of shepherds with their flocks on the hoof will follow in October, or as soon after October as weather conditions permit.

3. The 2,500 Assyrians are drawn from Mosul Town (about 550), from the levies (about 670) and from the villages (about 1,300). A batch of levy families will be sent with each convoy. The emigrants include elements of the Tkhuma (who will, however, leave in September), Upper Tiari, Diz, Halamun, Sarra, Kotchanis, Marbishu and Gawar. Selection from the villages has been made mainly on a poverty basis; those with adequate resources, sheep, &c., yield priority to the destitute.

4. Tribesmen of the Upper Tiari, Tkhuma and Diz will join their tribal villages already in existence on the Khabur. Four or five new tribal villages will be formed for the accommodation of the Sarra, Kotchanis, Marbishu and Halamun, &c.

5. Major Wilson's contract with the Iraqi Government has been extended until the end of June next. He will then proceed on leave to the United Kingdom. Major Thomson and Sr. de las Bárcenas will probably leave in early July, the latter to take up his new post with Sr. Oliván at the Spanish Embassy in London. Major Thomson expects to return to Iraq in August, to despatch the September convoys and the shepherds. Whether Major Wilson returns with him is uncertain. When the 2,500 Assyrians have been settled on the Khabur, the Local Committee presumably remains in a state of suspended animation, awaiting developments.

I have, &c.

L. B. GRAFFTEY-SMITH.

[E 3557/201/93]

No. 76.

Sir A. Clark Kerr to Mr. Eden.—(Received June 16.)

(No. 272.)

Sir,

Bagdad, June 3, 1936.

WITH reference to your despatch No. 308 of the 13th May, I have the honour to inform you that I have not yet been able to move the Iraqi Government to grant a general amnesty to all the Yazidis convicted by the Sinjar court-martial last autumn.

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2. Since the date of my despatch to which you referred, I have on several occasions spoken to the Prime Minister on this subject, but recent events have unfortunately tended to alter the sound views which he had at first held. In the first place, the Yazidis themselves have not settled down again as soon as he expected. An atmosphere of restlessness persists in the Sinjar, and the Qiran and the Sammoqa sections of these people recently moved into Syria for several weeks and appeared to be engaged there in petty intrigue with the local French officials. Secondly, the renewed disorders on the Euphrates, occurring as they did in spite of the general amnesty granted to those convicted in the same area last year, have served to convince the Government that clemency is a mistake and that what is wanted is the iron hand. I have done my best to make clear the fallacy of this reasoning, but without much success. Clemency, as a principle of government, is for the moment plainly out of favour.

3. Moreover, it seems to me that I have at present but slight ground for continuing to press for mercy to be shown to the Yazidis if at the same time I ignore the severity with which the Rumaitha tribes are being treated. So far I have not thought it judicious to make any special appeal on their behalf, although probably as much might be said in extenuation of their misdeeds as of those of the Yazidis. I have confined myself to general observations upon the wisdom of a policy that will not permanently embitter the relations of the Rumaitha tribes with the Government.

4. For the moment, therefore, I fear that there is nothing to be gained by further representations on behalf of a particular minority community. Nevertheless, I shall not fail to remain on the watch to profit from any opportunity which may occur to hasten the release of the unhappy Yazidis who still remain in prison.

I have, &c.

ARCHIBALD CLARK KERR.

[E 3525/1575/93]

No. 77.

Sir A. Clark Kerr to Mr. Eden.—(Received June 15.)

(No. 273.)

Sir,

Bagdad, June 2, 1936.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 254 of the 22nd May, I have the honour to inform you that there has been little change during the last week in the situation on the Euphrates.

2. The Government serai at Afaj (20 miles east of Diwaniyah) was sniped on the night of the 23rd or 24th May. This caused some anxiety lest the Afaj tribes should rise, and a mixed brigade of the Iraqi army was moved from the Rumaitha area to Diwaniyah to be ready to deal with them. Up to the present, however, nothing further has happened at Afaj.

3. A train was fired on at Wawiyah (midway between Rumaitha and Samawah) on the 29th May and Iraqi aeroplanes were sent to demonstrate over the area.

4. Two of the important leaders of the Dhuwalim are, I am told, still refusing to surrender, but it is said that they cannot remain at large much longer. There has been no further fighting, but it appears that the hostile state of the tribes makes a return to normal conditions impossible. The troops are in the towns and in their picquets, but the administrative machine is at a standstill.

5. The Prime Minister, whom I saw to-day, remains optimistic and apparently unperturbed either by the tribal situation on the Euphrates or by the many rumours in circulation about the plots of the Opposition. Whether the further course of events will be enlivened or come to stagnation through midsummer lethargy the next few weeks will probably show.

6. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Tehran.

I have, &c.

ARCHIBALD CLARK KERR.

[E 3562/1575/93]

No. 78.

Sir A. Clark Kerr to Mr. Eden.—(Received June 16.)

(No. 282.)

Sir,

Bagdad, June 10, 1936.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 273 of the 2nd June, I have the honour to report that during the last week the Iraqi army have been obliged to undertake further operations in the Diwaniyah liwa.

2. I enclose a copy of an official communiqué which was issued on the evening of the 6th June. From other sources I have obtained the following additional information. During the last days of May, Sheikh Sha'lan Al Atiyah, chief of the Shibana section of the Akra Confederation, together with other neighbouring sheikhs, showed a disposition to follow the lead of the Dhuwalim and the Bani Hucham. A tax collector was expelled by his tribesmen, police patrols were sniped in his tribal area, and the telephone line between Diwaniyah and Dagharah was repeatedly cut. Moreover, it was known that Sheikh Sha'lan was busily collecting signatures for a round-robin demanding an immediate pardon for all the Rumaitha insurgents, the suspension of conscription until work on a local canal had been finished, and an undertaking to respect religious customs.

3. On the 3rd June he was given an ultimatum to report to Diwaniyah within twenty-four hours. This he ignored, and three hours after the expiry of the ultimatum, an aerial demonstration was carried out over his tribal area. On the 5th June two columns comprising a total of six infantry battalions, one cavalry regiment and two batteries of artillery began operations against the new insurgents. A force of about 100 tribesmen was dispersed as soon as the advanced guard deployed, but on the following day the troops met with more resistance. They were everywhere successful. By noon Dagharah was occupied and Sheikh Sha'lan's fort destroyed. The official report states that fifty tribesmen were killed, but the Prime Minister estimates the total tribal casualties at about 300. Amongst the killed were Sha'lan's brother and his eldest son. Another son was wounded and made prisoner. Several other important tribal personalities were also left dead on the battlefield. The army's losses were two other ranks killed and two officers and nine other ranks wounded.

4. The reasons for Sheikh Sha'lan's revolt are at present difficult to appraise. It will be recalled that in March 1935 he was a prominent leader of the tribal movement against Ali Jaudat's Government, which was inspired by the very men who are now in office. I have not been able to discover exactly what grievance he has against the party which he so heartily supported only a year ago, but whatever the causes of his revolt, his stupidity in waiting until the Dhuwalim had been crushed before raising his own tribes is almost unbelievable. Happily for the Government, it seems to be almost impossible for the tribes to concert their movements. Sha'lan is now said to be a fugitive in hiding with the Bani Rabi'ah on the north of the Hai.

5. This military success has naturally elated the Government, and I found the Prime Minister calm and confident when I visited him at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs yesterday. The General Staff deserve credit for the promptness with which they collected their forces and the vigour with which they struck. There are still, however, causes for anxiety which the Government tend to overlook. The disturbed area now extends from the Dagharah regulator to Samawa—a distance of about 70 miles, through which run the railway and a complex irrigation system. So far the Government have been able to concentrate overwhelming forces to deal with the sporadic tribal revolts, but if the tribes, driven to desperation by a common adversity, were to achieve even a limited measure of unity, the situation might become serious. Already the forces at Rumaitha have been reduced to one battalion in order to provide units for the columns sent against the Akra, and the authorities there have been obliged hurriedly to enrol several hundred friendly local tribesmen as temporary police to protect the towns. Moreover, a military defeat of the tribesmen can only be regarded as the first step towards pacification, and much difficult and arduous work lies ahead of the civil authorities before real order and normal peaceful conditions are restored.

6. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Tehran.

I have, &c.

ARCHIBALD CLARK KERR.

Mr. Eden to Sir A. Clark Kerr (Bagdad).

(No. 435.)
Sir,

Foreign Office, June 25, 1936.

IN your Excellency's semi-official letter of the 19th February to Mr. Rendel you drew attention to the possibility that the revised instructions regarding the principles governing the employment of the Royal Air Force in Iraq (a copy of which was transmitted to you under cover of my despatch No. 86 of the 13th February) might require modification in the light of Sir F. Humphrys's letter of the 7th November, 1930, to Nuri Pasha, in which the following passage occurs:—

"Your Excellency further enquired whether the words 'essential communications' occurring in article 5 (of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of Alliance of 1930) referred only to air communications. I am authorised to reply that this term is held by my Government to refer to air communications over Iraq and to sea and air communications at the head of the Persian Gulf and in the Shatt-el-Arab."

2. You will have observed from my despatch No. 267 of the 29th April that the views of the interested Departments of His Majesty's Government were invited on the matter. It was explained to them that, at the time of the inter-departmental meeting held on the 3rd October last to discuss the revision of the existing instructions, this statement by Sir F. Humphrys had been unfortunately overlooked, and that, in consequence, the definition of "the essential communications of His Britannic Majesty" then adopted in paragraph 3 (e) of the revised instructions was more comprehensive than was compatible with Sir F. Humphrys's assurance to Nuri Pasha. It was suggested that the difficulty arising out of this contradiction was, however, one of form rather than of substance, and that it might legitimately be met by merely extending the meaning of the second phrase in the first sentence of paragraph 3 (e), i.e., "the safety of the British forces in Iraq," since the safety of those forces must clearly, in fact, involve and include the safety of their communications.

3. As a result of the consideration which the interested Departments have now given to this question, His Majesty's Government have decided that the land and water communications in Iraq, the safety of which it may be necessary for the Royal Air Force to assure, can reasonably be assumed to be covered to the necessary extent by the phrase "safety of the British forces in Iraq," since clearly the safety of the British forces in Iraq must include the safety of their essential communications. In order to meet the point and to reduce the risk of any further misunderstanding, the following sentence should therefore now be substituted for the final sentence in paragraph 3 (e) in the text of the revised instructions which formed the enclosure to my despatch No. 86 of the 13th February:—

"While the essential communications of His Britannic Majesty in Iraq, referred to in article 5 of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of Alliance of the 30th June, 1930, were defined, in a letter dated the 7th November, 1930, from Sir F. Humphrys to Nuri Pasha, as meaning 'air communications over Iraq, and sea and air communications at the head of the Persian Gulf and in the Shatt-el-Arab,' the safety of the British forces in Iraq must clearly be regarded as including the safety of such communications, whether by air, land or water, as may in the circumstances be essential for the security of those forces."

4. The present opportunity is further being taken to clarify the wording of the fifth sentence of paragraph 3 (b) (1) of the revised instructions. The phrase "falling within the procedure outlined below" as it stands appears somewhat ambiguous, and it is by no means clear whether the reference is to the concluding sentences of that sub-paragraph or to sub-paragraph 3 (b) (2). The relevant phrase should therefore be amended to read:—

"... unless they agree that immediate action is indispensable. In any case, the conditions outlined in sub-paragraph 3 (b) (2) below must be fulfilled."

5. A copy of the memorandum in its amended form is enclosed herein, and I request that you will regard this modified text as forming in future the authoritative instructions on the subject. A copy of the revised memorandum is also being sent by the Air Ministry to the Air Officer Commanding, Iraq.

I am, &c.

ANTHONY EDEN.

Enclosure in No. 79.

Principles governing the Employment of the Royal Air Force in Iraq.

APART from military co-operation with the Iraqi forces in time of war, which is not dealt with in this memorandum, the circumstances in which occasion might arise for the employment of the Royal Air Force in Iraq may be conveniently divided under the following heads:—

- (a) Repelling raiders from across the frontier.
- (b) Restoring internal order.
- (c) Protection of British subjects and British commercial interests.
- (d) Protection of other foreign subjects and commercial interests.
- (e) Protection of the essential communications of His Britannic Majesty and security of the British forces in Iraq.

Before considering these heads in detail it is desirable to consider the question of the channel through which His Majesty's Government will communicate their decisions as to the employment of the Royal Air Force.

2. His Majesty's Ambassador will have no direct authority over the Royal Air Force in Iraq, and the Air Officer Commanding will be responsible solely to the Air Ministry and not to the Ambassador. At the same time it is necessary that the closest possible touch should be maintained between His Majesty's Embassy and Air Headquarters, and the Air Officer Commanding, whatever authority may be delegated to him by the Air Ministry to sanction the employment of the Royal Air Force, should in no case exercise it without prior consultation with the Ambassador, or, in the event of the Ambassador not sharing his views as to its necessity, until the question has been referred to His Majesty's Government for a decision. The only cases in which this principle may be waived in circumstances of extreme urgency are those discussed in paragraph 3 (c) and (e) below.

3. To turn now to the five heads enumerated in paragraph 1:—

(a) *Repelling Raiders from across the Frontier.*—Article 5 of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930 provides that responsibility for the defence of Iraq from external aggression rests with His Majesty the King of Iraq, subject to the provisions of article 4. Article 4 deals only with war or the imminent menace of war, and it follows therefore that the Iraqi Government are solely responsible for the defence of Iraq from external raiders. This does not rule out the possibility of the Iraqi Government asking for the help of the Royal Air Force, but it does rule out independent action by the Royal Air Force. Except, therefore, in cases which may arise under heads (c), (d) and (e) below, the Royal Air Force should not be employed except upon a request in writing from the Iraqi Government to the Ambassador, and such a request should only be complied with if the Ambassador and the Air Officer Commanding are satisfied that the Iraqi Government have fully consulted the head of the British Military Mission, and that the latter agrees that every possible step has been taken by the Iraqi Government to repel the raiders with their own forces, and that Royal Air Force co-operation is essential.

(b) *Restoring internal order.*—(1) Article 5 of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930 provides that responsibility for the maintenance of internal order in Iraq rests with His Majesty the King of Iraq. Except in cases which may arise under heads (c), (d) and (e) below, independent action by the Royal Air Force is therefore normally ruled out. An occasion may, however, arise when although British or other foreign interests are not immediately and directly threatened, the Ambassador receives a request from the Iraqi Government for the employment of the Royal Air Force. No such request should be complied with in any

circumstances unless it is made in writing, and unless the Ambassador or the Air Officer Commanding considers that inaction will precipitate or aggravate a state of affairs which may ultimately call for action under heads (c), (d) or (e) below. If both these conditions are satisfied, the Ambassador and Air Officer Commanding should consult together and submit their views for the instructions of His Majesty's Government, unless they agree that immediate action is indispensable. In any case, the conditions outlined in subparagraph 3 (b) (2) below must be fulfilled. In every instance in which, when British interests are not immediately and directly threatened, the Iraqi Government make a written request to the Ambassador for the help of the British forces in Iraq to restore internal order, the Ambassador, when communicating this request to the Secretary of State, will inform him whether in his opinion compliance with the request of the Iraqi Government would be likely to lead to the use of the British forces to support oppression or misrule or the imposition of unpopular social or administrative innovations. His Majesty's Government will consider whether, in the event of their deciding to comply with such a request from the Iraqi Government, His Majesty's Ambassador should be requested to seek from the Iraqi Government, as a prior condition to the co-operation of British forces with the Iraqi forces, assurances that, on the conclusion of military action, they will be consulted regarding the treatment of the insurgents and the measures, including if necessary the redress of grievances, to be taken for the pacification of the disturbed areas.

(2) The British forces in Iraq will not intervene in the case of internal disorder unless the Iraqi Government undertake to fulfil such conditions as the Air Officer Commanding considers necessary or desirable in the light of the circumstances prevailing at the time. In the case of a major operation, these conditions might include the supreme direction of operations by the Air Officer Commanding, in order that the efforts of all forces, both air and ground, which are available, may be directed towards the attainment of a common aim. A general indication of the form which these conditions might take in certain eventualities is contained in the attached copy of a despatch⁽¹⁾ which the Air Ministry are addressing to the Air Officer Commanding, Iraq.

(c) *Protection of British Subjects and British Commercial Interests.*—If action by the Royal Air Force is essential in order to protect the lives of British subjects, it should be taken even if the Iraqi Government do not agree, and even without consulting them in cases of extreme urgency; but no action should be taken without the prior concurrence of the Ambassador, except in extreme cases where there is immediate danger to British life, and where it has proved impossible for the necessary communication between the Ambassador and the Air Officer Commanding to be established in time. The Royal Air Force should not be employed for the defence of British commercial interests, if there is no question of saving the lives of British subjects, except at the request of the Ambassador, who should if possible, obtain the prior concurrence of His Majesty's Government.

(d) *Protection of other Foreign Subjects and Commercial Interests.*—The Royal Air Force will not have the same direct moral responsibility for protecting the lives of other foreign subjects as they will have for those of British subjects, and as a general rule they should only be employed for the former purpose at the request of the Iraqi Government and with the prior concurrence of the Ambassador. In the event, however, of a foreign representative appealing direct to the Ambassador for action to be taken in cases of extreme urgency, the Ambassador, after satisfying himself that the foreign representative has been unable to obtain reasonable satisfaction from the Iraqi Government, should use his discretion whether to concur in the employment of the Royal Air Force, if the Air Officer Commanding sees no objection, or to refer to His Majesty's Government for instructions. The Royal Air Force should not be employed for the defence of other foreign commercial interests, if there is no question of saving life, except under instructions from His Majesty's Government on the representation either of the Ambassador or of the foreign Government concerned.

(e) *Protection of the essential communications of His Britannic Majesty and security of the British forces in Iraq.*—The Air Officer Commanding has unfettered responsibility for the security of the communications of His

⁽¹⁾ See Appendix.

Britannic Majesty, as referred to in Article 5 of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of Alliance of the 30th June, 1930, and for the safety of the British forces in Iraq. In the event of his considering that the safety of either is endangered, he should take such measures of defence as he considers necessary. He should, if possible, consult the Ambassador before taking such measures, but in an urgent emergency he must be free to do so without prior reference to the Ambassador. In such an event he should inform the Ambassador without delay of the action which he has taken. His Majesty's Government should also be consulted, unless the urgency of the situation renders this impossible, in which case they should be immediately informed of any action taken. While the essential communications of His Britannic Majesty in Iraq, referred to in article 5 of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of Alliance of the 30th June, 1930, were defined, in a letter dated the 7th November, 1930, from Sir F. Humphrys to Nuri Pasha, as meaning "air communications over Iraq, and sea and air communications at the head of the Persian Gulf and in the Shatt-el-Arab," the safety of the British forces in Iraq must clearly be regarded as including the safety of such communications, whether by air, land or water, as may in the circumstances be essential for the security of those forces.

4. Employment of the Royal Air Force in the circumstances discussed above should be limited as far as possible to measures which cause no loss of human life, and air action in the accepted sense of the term should only be taken in the last resort, and should then be subject to the same general principles as have governed its use by the Royal Air Force in Iraq during the mandatory régime.

5. There remains one contingency which has not yet been discussed, namely, that some change of the Iraqi Government or successful rebellion throughout Iraq may produce a state of affairs in which reliance cannot be placed upon the continued friendliness and co-operation of the Iraqi authorities. This is a situation for which it is necessary to be prepared, but the detailed discussion of which appears unnecessary at this stage. It could not arise without warning, and the measures which would have to be taken in order to meet it, would, in any case, require consideration by His Majesty's Government in the light of a number of factors which it is impossible at present to foresee.

6. In the absence of His Majesty's Ambassador from Iraq, his place will be taken, for the purposes set forth in the above memorandum, by His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires, or the diplomatic officer who may for the time being be in charge of His Majesty's Embassy.

February 13, 1936.

Appendix

Air Ministry to The Air Officer Commanding, British Forces in Iraq.

Sir,

Air Ministry, February 13, 1936.

I AM commanded by the Air Council to forward, for your information and guidance, the enclosed copy of revised instructions (C.I.D. 1088-B, Revised) to cover the employment of the Royal Air Force in Iraq, which have been approved by His Majesty's Government, to replace those contained in the previous Memorandum (C.I.D. 1088-B) which was forwarded to Sir Francis Humphrys in 1932.

2. You will observe that paragraph (b) of these instructions provides that, prior to intervening at the written request of the Iraqi Government to restore, or to assist in restoring, internal order, you may stipulate that the Iraqi Government shall undertake to fulfil such conditions as you consider necessary or desirable in the light of the circumstances prevailing at the time.

3. It is not possible to draw up in advance a set of conditions that would be applicable to all circumstances, since intervention may take widely different forms, e.g., a major campaign for the re-establishment of governmental authority in the country, a small air demonstration, or the air transport of Government officials or military stores.

4. The guiding principle to be followed is that the conditions referred to in paragraph 2 should be such as to ensure the efficient conduct of the contemplated operations. The utmost care should, however, always be taken so to

frame the conditions that, consistently with the foregoing principle, they cause the minimum degree of humiliation to the Iraqi Government. At the same time you should be on your guard against any attempt on the part of the Iraqi Government to give the impression of having transferred to His Majesty's Government their responsibility for maintaining internal security and for carrying out repressive measures.

5. In a major operation, for example, when restoration of Government authority in a part or the whole of Iraq is to be undertaken, it may be necessary, in order to direct the efforts of all available military forces towards the attainment of the common aim, to insist that the Iraqi Government shall agree to your general plan of operations, and that this plan shall be accepted by the Iraqi army and be loyally carried out by them. It is considered that it should rarely be necessary to insist on taking over actual command of the Iraqi land forces—which would be a very serious blow to the prestige of the nation—but it might, and probably would, be advisable to ensure that your instructions were being properly carried out by the Iraqi forces. This might best be achieved by attaching British liaison officers to the Headquarters of the Iraqi formations, but every care should be taken to ensure that the officers so selected (who might possibly be members of the British Military Mission) are *personæ gratae* to the Iraqi Army.

6. His Majesty's Government will have no objection to the Royal Iraqi Air Force being placed under your command if you consider this necessary. It may be hoped that this step will not give rise to serious difficulty provided that relations between the Royal Air Force in Iraq and the Royal Iraqi Air Force remain on their present satisfactory basis.

7. You should keep His Majesty's Ambassador fully informed of any conditions which you propose to stipulate as a condition of co-operation and, in the event of his disagreement, you should, if time permits, refer the matter to the Air Ministry.

I am,
Sir,
Your obedient Servant,
(Signed) J. M. SPAIGHT.

[E 3856/1575/93]

No. 80.

Mr. Bateman to Mr. Eden.—(Received June 26.)

(No. 299.)

Sir,

Bagdad, June 20, 1936.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 282 of the 10th June, I have the honour to report that no further military operations of importance have been undertaken either at Dagharah or Rumaitha. Two battalions and a cavalry regiment have been withdrawn from Diwaniyah to Bagdad.

2. The tribes appear to be sullenly quiet, and normal conditions have not yet been restored.

3. The court-martial is proceeding in Diwaniyah and Afaj, and Mr. Edmonds tells me that twenty executions have been carried out.

4. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Tehran.

I have, &c.
C. H. BATEMAN.

[E 4102/4/93]

No. 81.

(C./Min.Ass./217.)

Geneva, June 29, 1936.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS: SETTLEMENT OF THE ASSYRIANS OF IRAQ.

Report from the Local Committee in Syria, dated June 18 (Preliminary Distribution on the Basis of a Copy which has reached the Secretariat privately).—(Received in Foreign Office, July 3.)

To the Minister for Foreign Affairs at Bagdad. Mosul, June 18, 1936.

WITH reference to my letters No. 97 of the 27th February and No. 36 of the 13th June, I have the honour to submit the following general summary of the consultations of the Assyrians of Iraq as defined in C/1168 of the 19th April, 1936, carried out by this committee:—

(See annexed table: Total, 21,673.)

Although the committee has endeavoured to make its consultation as complete as possible, there are to its certain knowledge some nomads who have not yet been registered, while there are doubtless isolated persons in a similar situation in the villages of the northern liwas and in the towns of the south. An increase of the above figure of 21,663 to 22,500 should provide sufficient margin to cover these and any other errors and omissions.

By the autumn of this year 8,500 will have been settled on the Khabur, 6,000 of whom, having been there since the end of 1935, were not registered, and so are not included in the 22,500. If a total is sought covering all Assyrians entitled to the benefits of the League settlement scheme, the figure which must be kept in mind is, therefore, 28,500.

The completion of the recently authorised programme of convoys will leave 20,000 Assyrians in Iraq at the end of 1936, all of whom except about 1,500 are, in our opinion, capable of supporting themselves and their families in the present economic and political situation until such time as the Ghab will be ready for permanent settlement. The problem presented by these 1,500 indigent persons could be solved by their transfer to the Khabur this autumn, thus bringing the number of Assyrians settled there up to 10,000, a figure which can be considered as the maximum necessary under present conditions.

It is the opinion of the committee that, of the 18,500 which would then be left in the country, some 8,500 will finally elect to go to Syria, thereby bringing the total to be settled on the Ghab up to 18,500, which would appear to be the limit of capacity of that area. The remaining 10,000, mainly living in the Amadia qadha, may be expected to opt to remain Iraqi subjects.

I avail myself of this opportunity to explain the discrepancies in my letter of the 27th February, to which attention is drawn in C/Min.Ass.199.P.1, although the above presentation of the figures avoids any possible errors on this account. The figure of 11,650 given at the bottom of p. 3 of that document was obtained by deducting from the registered total of 13,357 (p. 5) those tribes which were either excluded from the scheme (Tergawar 612) or had reserved their final vote pending the decision of the tribal chiefs (Lower Tiari 974 and Berwari Bala 159), together, 1,736 individuals, the resultant balance of 11,621 being rounded off to 11,650. Any difference which may be noticed between the preceding tables and that given in the present letter are the result of the almost daily corrections which more complete information causes the committee to apply to their earlier lists. The number of those still to be registered (12,350) given in February was based on local information. Actually, 8,653, or with subsequent addition 8,942, were registered, as it is known that certain nomads of the regions recently visited have been omitted, the real total corresponding to the above estimate should not be very far short of 10,000.

Certain of the other points mentioned on p. 3 of the same document must also be modified owing to the more complete information now available. The proportion of urban to rural Assyrians has been reduced from 57 per cent. to 35 per

cent. The committee has been able to confirm its earlier impressions that the rural Assyrians is mainly pastoral, agriculture being reduced to the minimum necessary to supply personal requirements. The Ashuti are so predominantly pastoral and nomad that they have only one village.

The rural character of the region visited during the last consultation has raised the size of the average family from 4.01 to 4.13.

The committee does not know how many animals the Assyrians on the Khabur now own, but about 5,000 sheep and goats and 350 cows, mules, &c., were sent over in the autumn of 1935. It has, furthermore, the impression that the Assyrians in Iraq actually possess more sheep and goats than they registered. In consequence of this year's excellent lambing and pasture, the total given in the table (63,788) should be increased by at least 10 per cent.

Major,
President of the Assyrian Emigration
Committee, Mosul.

Assyrians Registered by Local Committee.

Tribes	Families	Persons	Sheep and Goats	Cows, Mules, &c.	Yes	No	Un-decided
Upper Tiari	247	926	1,461	107	626
Albaq	20	79	...	11	79
Halamun	108	476	890	12	476
Geramun	170	741	3,436	140	741
Tkhuma	121	452	2	7	440	12	...
Diz	10	49	49
Baz	363	1,634	2,722	542	1,616	...	18
Jelu	351	1,322	1,148	151	1,322
Shemadin	795	3,383	2,905	650	3,385
Narbishu	284	1,173	331	127	1,173
Zibari	16	87	430	32	87
Sara	192	723	140	58	723
Gawar	205	748	147	2	748
Qochanis	74	258	91	18	258
Barwar	25	103	103
Barwari Bala	352	1,628	7,994	601	115	42	1,513
Lower Tiari	869	3,472	17,280	883	206	...	3,266
Botan	73	250	166	104	250
Saat	65	242	466	109	242
Nodus	16	67	67
Supnai	95	439	780	47	219	5	215
Khananis	5	15	215	15	...
Liwon	9	42	42
Raikani	74	357	2,969	146	357
Herwai	58	249	1,865	127	249
Ashuti	644	2,768	18,635	788	991	...	1,777
Total	5,247	21,683	63,788	4,662	14,473	74	7,395

Tribes already on the Khabur.

Upper Tiari	1,579	Qochanis	198
Baz	262	Shemadin	266
Sara	156	Hyil	56
Ashuti	46	Gawar	197
Diz	318	Barwar	301
Liwon	207	Betimo	32
Timar	19	Marbisho	142
Jelu	200		
Tkhuma	1,901	Total	5,889

There are figures for November 1935: 5,889

It seems that a census in March 1936 gave a total of some 6,200.

Summary of Registrations and of Actual and Proposed Schemes of Settlements.

(a) Total registered	21,673
(b) Allowance for errors and omissions	827
(c) Total	22,500
(d) Previously on Khabur	6,000
(e) Total covered by League scheme, (c) plus (d)	28,500
(f) Going to Khabur under recent authorisation	2,500
(g) On Khabur by end of 1936, (d) plus (f)	8,500
(h) Left in Iraq by end of 1936, (e) minus (g)	20,000
(i) Indigents remaining in Iraq under present scheme, whom it is suggested could be sent to Khabur in 1936	1,500
(j) Total on Khabur if (i) is accepted	10,000
(k) Total in Iraq if (i) is accepted, (h) minus (i)	18,500
(l) Would go to Ghab when ready for final settlement	8,500
(m) Total to be settled in Syria, (j) plus (i)	18,500
(n) Would remain permanently in Iraq, (k) minus (l) or (e) minus (m)	10,000
(o) (m) plus (n)	28,500

CHAPTER III.—GENERAL.

[E 225/52/25]

No. 82.

Sir A. Clark Kerr to Mr. Eden.—(Received January 15.)

(No. 12. Secret.)

Sir,

Bagdad, January 7, 1936.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 4 of the 2nd January on the subject of the proposed Treaty of Friendship between Iraq and Saudi Arabia, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the text of a draft treaty handed to me yesterday by Nuri Pasha.

2. Nuri Pasha explained that this draft would form the basis of his negotiations with Sheikh Yusif Yasin, who, he expected, would arrive in Bagdad in about ten days' time. He accordingly asked me to give him, as soon as possible, any comments which I might think it desirable to make on the provisions of the treaty.

3. The draft bears signs of having been hurriedly and somewhat thoughtlessly prepared, but it clearly marks an important development of ideas. It is no colourless treaty of perpetual friendship, but a defensive alliance with important significance. Nuri Pasha told me, moreover, that he expected that its provisions would be readily approved by Ibn Saud.

4. I have not yet had time to study the draft carefully, but the following criticisms and comments have already occurred to me:—

The Preamble.

(a) Some phrase such as "have agreed to conclude a treaty of alliance" is evidently necessary after the words "the affairs of neighbouring countries" and before the sentence "For this purpose have appointed. . . ."

(b) The phrase "and whereas it is necessary in the interests of the two States that they should form a united front against foreign aggression" is unnecessarily bellicose, and suggests a threat of external aggression which does not at present exist.

Article 2.

Nuri Pasha explained that the annexure (1) mentioned in this article would be drawn up on the lines of the Treaty for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes initialled by the Persian and Iraqi representatives on the 2nd October, 1935, but no mention would be made of the Permanent Court of International Justice.

Article 4.

(a) This leaves unanswered the very difficult question of what constitutes an act of aggression.

(b) The proper fulfilment of the obligations of Iraq towards Great Britain in the event of circumstances arising which might give an opportunity to either King Abdul Aziz (or, if he signed later, the Imam of the Yemen) to claim that an act of aggression had been committed against him by His Majesty's Government (I am thinking of the undefined frontier between Transjordan and the difficulties which arise from time to time between Aden and the Yemen) is apparently safeguarded by article 9. But if such a claim were ever made and this article were invoked, the Iraqi Government might find themselves in an embarrassing position.

(c) The word "also" appears to be necessary after the words "shall be held" in the fifth line in order to make the intention of the article clearer.

Article 6.

This article seems to be open to strong objection, as it implies *inter alia* concerted efforts to support the Arab nationalist movements in Syria and Palestine. Indeed, Nuri Pasha made no secret of his idea that the treaty should be used to prepare the way for giving active help to the Arabs in Syria in their

efforts to obtain concessions from the French. I have no doubt that it would seriously embarrass Iraq's relations with the French in Syria if it were included in the treaty in this form.

Article 7.

This article suggests active and quite gratuitous interference in the affairs of the Arab sheikhdoms of the Persian Gulf, and I assume that His Majesty's Government would strongly object to the joint intervention of the Iraqi and Saudi Arabian Governments in, for example, a dispute between the sheikhs of the Trucial Coast.

Article 8.

The last sentence of this article, read in the light of article 6, would strengthen the distrust which the treaty, if concluded, would provoke in France. As you know, the French Government have long refused to allow the Iraqi Government to establish consulates at Damascus and Aleppo. Nuri's plan is clearly to get over the difficulty by arranging for the Nejd consul to act on behalf of Iraq and to be the instrument for giving effect to the provisions of article 6.

The remaining articles do not appear to call for special comment.

5. At my next meeting with Nuri Pasha I shall make orally to him the observations which I have set out above regarding the preamble and articles 2, 6, 7 and 8 of his draft. I intend, however, to reserve comment on the bearing of article 4 on the obligations of the Iraqi Government under the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of Alliance of 1930 until I receive instructions from you.

6. In the meanwhile, I shall, of course, warn him that I expect to be able to make fuller and more detailed criticisms when the draft has been examined by experts in London.

7. As very little time now remains before Sheikh Yusuf Yasin is expected to arrive in Bagdad, I should be glad if you would instruct me as early as possible, by telegraph, what further action you desire me to take concerning this draft.

8. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Jeddah and to His Majesty's consul-general at Beirut.

I have, &c.

ARCHIBALD CLARK KERR.

Enclosure in No. 82.

Treaty of Alliance between Iraq and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

HIS Majesty the King of Iraq:

His Majesty the King of Saudi Arabia:

In view of the brotherhood binding together their peoples; desirous of maintaining the safety of their territories; and whereas it is necessary in the interest of their two States that they should form a united front against foreign aggression and be in understanding one with the other towards the affairs of neighbouring Arab countries;

For this purpose have appointed as their plenipotentiaries:—

Who (having communicated their full powers, &c.) have agreed as follows:—

(1)

The high contracting parties reciprocally undertake not to enter with any third party into any understanding or agreement over any matter whatever of a nature prejudicial to the interests of the other high contracting party or to his State or its interests, or of a nature calculated to expose to danger or harm the safety or interests of his State.

(2)

The high contracting parties undertake to settle any disputes arising between them by means of friendly negotiations; and, in the event of the settlement of

any such dispute proving impossible through the said means, to resort to arbitration as provided for in annexure (1) to the present treaty.

(3)

In the event of any dispute between either high contracting party and a third State producing a situation involving a threat of war, the high contracting parties shall act together in an endeavour to settle such dispute by peaceful means in accordance with such international undertakings as may be applicable to the case.

(4)

In the event of an armed aggression being made against either high contracting party by a third State notwithstanding efforts exerted in accordance with the provisions of article 3 above, such aggression shall be held to be directed against the other high contracting party, and the latter party shall forthwith join efforts with the former for the repulsion of such aggression.

(5)

The high contracting parties recognise the necessity of safeguarding the integrity of the State of Yemen, and they will therefore endeavour to secure the accession of the Government of Yemen to the present treaty.

(6)

The high contracting parties undertake to co-ordinate their objects in regard to the peoples of neighbouring Arab countries, and to exert peaceful efforts to help these peoples towards the realisation of their aspirations for independence.

(7)

The high contracting parties shall make joint endeavours for the settlement of any dispute arising between Arab principalities in the Arabian Peninsula by means of friendly negotiations. In the event of the settlement of any such dispute proving impossible through the said means, they shall endeavour to secure its settlement by means of arbitration based on the provisions of annexure (1) to the present treaty.

(8)

The diplomatic and consular representatives of either high contracting party shall undertake the representation of the interests of the other high contracting party in foreign countries where such other party has no representatives; provided that this shall not in any way affect the freedom of such other party to appoint separate representatives of his own should he so desire. It is understood by the high contracting parties that their representatives abroad shall pursue a common general policy inspired by the spirit underlying the present treaty.

(9)

It is agreed by the high contracting parties that there is nothing in the present treaty to prejudice the undertakings of the Government of Iraq under the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Treaty of Alliance concluded between Iraq and Great Britain on the 30th June, 1930.

(10)

There is nothing in the present treaty to nullify or repeal the provisions of the following treaties and agreements concluded between the two States:—

1. Treaty of Mohammerah, dated the 5th May, 1922.
2. Uqair Protocol No. 1, dated the 2nd December, 1922.
3. Uqair Protocol No. 2, dated the 2nd December, 1922.
4. Bahra Agreement, dated the 1st November, 1925.
5. Treaty of Friendship and "Bon Voisinage," dated the 7th April, 1931.
6. Extradition Treaty, dated the 8th April, 1935.

(11)

The high contracting parties undertake, within one year from the date of coming into force of the present treaty, to start negotiations for the conclusion of treaties on the following subjects:—

1. Residence, passports and *laissez-passer*.
2. Economic, financial and customs affairs.
3. Organisation of means of communication.

(12)

The present treaty shall remain in force for a period of ten years. It shall be deemed to have been renewed for a further period of ten years, unless notice of desire to terminate it shall have been given by either high contracting party to the other six months prior to the date of expiry of its period.

[E 313/292/89]

No. 83.

Consul MacKereth to Mr. Eden.—(Received January 20.)

(No. 10.)

Damascus, January 10, 1936.

Sir,

WITH reference to Mr. Rendel's letter of the 6th November, 1935, I have the honour to transmit herewith a memorandum that I have drawn up giving an outline of the organisation and the working of the Courts of Justice in the Syrian Republic.

2. The French authorities have made a greater distinction in the organisation of "mixed" jurisdiction than did the British administrations in Iraq and Palestine when they undertook the recasting of Ottoman and capitulatory jurisdiction. In Syria more prominence has been given to the fact that by the mandate capitulatory privileges were merely suspended and not abolished. The plurality of courts resulting from this respect for form is not in practice as cumbersome as it may seem and gives little ground for serious complaint. Syrian nationalists have expressed dislike of the arrangement as threatening the eventual full sovereignty to which they aspire for their country. Foreigners, however, regard it as a valued safeguard especially in that it provides that even for petty offences they are tried by a French magistrate. There is no parallel in Syria of the laical administration of justice by district or assistant district officers in Palestine. On the other hand, persons subject only to courts of "local" jurisdiction do not enjoy in the higher courts the security and competence of a French magistrate.

3. In matters that can be heard by a "juge de paix" sitting alone, Syrian traders have shown a steadily increasing wish to take advantage of their right to covenant in their contracts for the settlement of disputes arising out of them by the "mixed" courts. This tendency is due to the greater security and expedition of the "mixed" courts of peace, which are in reality purely French courts. It is almost universal practice for bills of exchange, issued by and between Syrians, to bear a clause binding the parties to the bills to submit to the jurisdiction of the "mixed" courts in the event of litigation. In matters of greater importance or complexity the local population finds less incentive to bring suits in the higher courts of "mixed" jurisdiction. This reluctance to take advantage of the more skilful and diligent administration of justice is due in part to the language difficulty, for in practice all proceedings in "mixed" jurisdiction must be conducted in the French language. Whilst this ensures that the French magistrates fully understand the matters pleaded, it adds considerably to the cost and slowness of litigation. There is also a widely held view that the French judges are much too dependent upon the grace of the High Commissioner for advancement and renewal of their contracts. In consequence, it is held, when a suit or action brought before them has even the faintest political aspect the High Commissioner's opinion influences the judges in the framing of their pronouncements. It is felt, rightly or wrongly, that the present High Commissioner is more active than his predecessors in directing the course of justice.

4. The districts of the Jebel Druse and Alexandretta, although enjoying some administrative autonomy, form politically an integral part of the Syrian Republic and thus come without differentiation into the Syrian judicial system.

[14214]

P 2

5. Viewed generally there is, I think, no doubt that, with the possible exception of the most xenophobic of the nationalists, the French reorganisation of the administration of justice has met with the widespread approval of Syrians. Were it not, indeed, for the very serious language difficulty, it is probable that an insistent demand would already have arisen for the abolition of the courts of "local" jurisdiction and for their place to be taken by the existing courts of "mixed" jurisdiction, where the French magistrates have succeeded in winning the confidence of a naturally suspicious population.

6. I am sending copies of this despatch and enclosures to Aleppo, Beirut and Jerusalem.

I have, &c.

GILBERT MAC KERETH

Enclosure in No. 83.

Memorandum on the Judicial System in the Syrian Republic under French Mandate.

Common Law Jurisdiction (Nizamieh).

THE organisation of the Civil Courts remains, in principle, that which existed in Turkish times and which was an adaptation of the Napoleonic codes. It consists of:—

1. A Court of Cassation sitting in Damascus,
2. Two Courts of Appeal, one in Aleppo and the other in Damascus; dependent upon the latter is a Court of Appeal sitting in Deir-ez-Zor,
3. Ten Courts of First Instance, of which those of Damascus, Homs, Hauran and Deraa (for the Jebel Druse) are controlled by the Damascus Court of Appeal, those of Aleppo, Ydlib, Antioch and Alexandretta by the Aleppo Court of Appeal and those of Deir-ez-Zor and Hassetcheh by the Court of Appeal at Deir-ez-Zor,
4. Courts of Justices of the Peace, one in each caza, and two "mixed" courts, making thirty-six in all.

The Court of Cassation is presided over by a Syrian "Premier Président" of Cassation and is composed of two Chambres—a Chambre civile and a Chambre correctionnelle, each with three judges. The "parquet" is managed by a "procureur général."

The Appeal Courts in Damascus and Aleppo are each presided over by a "Premier Président" of Appeal, who is a Syrian. They sit either as Civil or Criminal Courts, with a bench of three judges. The Appeal Court at Deir-ez-Zor, which is a section of the Damascus Appeal Court, is also composed of three judges.

The Appeal and First Instance Courts sit as Penal or Civil Courts. They sit without a jury, which is an institution that does not exist in Syria. Each court has a "parquet" which is ordered by a "procureur général" and an "avocat général" in the case of the Courts of Appeal and by a "procureur" and a "juge d'instruction" in First Instance.

Attached to each of the above-mentioned courts is an office, under the direction of the President of the Court, for the execution of the orders and judgments of the court to which it is complementary.

The Courts of the Justice of the Peace hear civil and penal actions and are composed of one stipendiary magistrate—the "juge de paix." No "Ministère public" is provided, but the "parquet" of the controlling First Instance Court has a right of supervision and, if necessary, of intervention.

In Syria the "juge de paix" has far wider powers than in France. In civil suits he can hear, without the parties' having a right of appeal, actions involving £Sy. 294 (about £70 sterling), and with appeal to First Instance Courts up to £Sy. 588 (about £160 sterling). In penal actions he hears, without appeal, *contraventions*, and in crimes, with appeal to the Correctionnelle Section of the First Instance Court, he may inflict punishments up to three years' imprisonment or more in cases of recidivism. All judgments of the Courts of Justice of the Peace can be taken to Cassation.

As in Morocco, but in distinction from the system in France, matters of procedure are undertaken by "avocats," there being no solicitors ("avoués").

Attached to the Damascus Appeal Court is a bar of 177 "avocats-maitres" and 68 "avocats-stagiaires" and at Aleppo, 122 "avocats-maitres" and 16 "avocats-stagiaires." The bars are modelled on their French counterparts and are ruled over by a disciplinary council, which is elected annually by the members of each bar and which selects its "bâtonnier."

Jurisdiction.

Syrian jurisdiction is divided into local and "mixed" (*statuant en Matière étrangère*) the same law being applied in each division.

(A)—*Local Common Law (Nizamieh).*

Jurisdiction embraces civil and commercial suits and criminal actions in which only persons subject to Syrian jurisdiction are parties, with, however, the following important exceptions:—

- (1) Matters that fall to be dealt with by the Sharia and Ecclesiastical Courts.
- (2) Suits in which a foreign interest is involved. The interpretation of "foreign" covers not only non-Syrian but also persons and things which by capitulation, treaty, or usage, are excluded from the jurisdiction of Syrian courts of purely local jurisdiction.
- (3) Matters that have a political aspect (High Commissioner's "Arrêtés" No. 3349 of the 20th November, 1930, and 4/HC/Syrie of the 12th February, 1932), when the actions are only triable by the Mixed Courts or military tribunals.

The law applied derives from the Ottoman Codes (in their entirety and in contradistinction from the Lebanese practice), from the subsequent decrees and laws of the pre-Armistice Ottoman Empire, and from the post-war "Arrêtés" of the High Commissioner and the President of the Syrian Republic.

The Ottoman Codes of Criminal Procedure and of Commerce are reproductions of the relevant French codes. The Ottoman Code of Civil Procedure is a Turkish adaptation of various European codes, but the Civil Code (Medjellé) is a codification of Islamic precepts, local rules and customs. Nevertheless the mandatory Power has, by means of "Arrêtés," effected certain amendments to the archaic Ottoman Codes to bring them into step with the march of legislation in Western States.

(B)—*Jurisdiction in Actions where a "Foreign" Interest Arises.*

Organisation.

"Mixed" jurisdiction known as "Juridictions statuant en Matière étrangère" (abbreviated to "Juridictions S.E.M.E.") was inaugurated, in consequence of article 6 of the Act of Mandate, upon the suspension of consular or capitulatory jurisdiction. Its practice is governed for Syria by "Arrêté" No. 2028 of the 7th July, 1923, supplemented by "Arrêté" No. 2030 and modified by "Arrêtés" Nos. 2523/1 of the 25th March, 1924, and 313/S of the 20th August, 1925.

Its courts dispense justice in all its stages: Cassation, Appeal, First Instance and Justice of the Peace.

The judicial machine comprises a Court of Cassation S.E.M.E. sitting in Damascus, a Court of Appeal S.E.M.E. in Aleppo (a project to establish a second Court of Appeal in Damascus is now under consideration) having "mixed" appeal jurisdiction for all Syria, and two Courts of First Instance S.E.M.E., one at Damascus, the second at Aleppo, each with a dependent Court of a Justice of the Peace S.E.M.E. The First Instance Court S.E.M.E. in Aleppo goes on circuit to Alexandretta as occasion demands.

The Court of Cassation S.E.M.E. sits with a French president and two assessors, both of whom may be Syrians except where the "ministère public" or one of the parties requires (this is invariably the case in practice) that one assessor shall be a French magistrate.

The "procureur général" to the Court of Cassation S.E.M.E. is a French magistrate and holds the key position in the whole judicial organisation, local and "mixed," for he is at the same time Inspector-General of Justice and Judicial Adviser to the Syrian Republic.

The Court of Appeal S.E.M.E. sits with a French president and two assessors, selected as in the Court of Cassation. The place of the "ministère public" is occupied by a "procureur général," who is the Deputy Inspector-General of Justice, and by a "substitut," both being French magistrates.

The Court of First Instance at Damascus and Aleppo also sits with a bench of three judges, formed as for the Courts of Cassation and Appeal. The place of the "ministère public" is occupied by a French "procureur" in Damascus, and in Aleppo by a Syrian "substitut." In both Courts of First Instance S.E.M.E. a French magistrate acts as "juge d'instruction," and each court has its own auxiliary agents for its proper working and the execution of its orders and judgments.

Each of the First Instance Courts S.E.M.E. has a dependent Court of a Justice of the Peace, which sits with a single French stipendiary magistrate.

It should be noted that the "Mixed" Jurisdiction is not separate from the Nizamieh or Common Law Jurisdiction, for in law and practice it is an integral part of it. In fact, the Court of Cassation S.E.M.E. at Damascus is but a third section or *Chambre* of the Syrian Court of Cassation, and the Court of Appeal S.E.M.E. at Aleppo is a third section or *Chambre* of the Syrian Court of Appeal established in that city. The French judges, although they are seconded from the French Metropolitan Judicial Service, are, in Syria, considered as Syrian officials, are paid from the Syrian Treasury, and are subject to the same rules as their Syrian colleagues. They take the same oath as Syrian judges. The procedure in the S.E.M.E. Courts is the same as in the purely local courts, and the Advocates of the Damascus and Aleppo bars plead before them with the same formalities as before the other Syrian courts. Thus, it will be understood, the "mixed" courts apply the law which is applied in the courts of local jurisdiction.

Nevertheless, divergencies of interpretation unavoidably arise owing to the different educational and environmental background of French and Syrian magistrates, many of the latter, particularly in the higher grades, having had no academic legal education.

The competence of the S.E.M.E. Courts covers all civil, commercial, penal or administrative actions wherever there is a real foreign interest involved. The interpretation of "real" is of the widest, and covers any interest, however slight, that is not absolutely unsubstantial. Indeed, it is stated to be true that a number of foreigners make a sufficiency by acting as "prête-noms" to Syrians wishing to have their lawsuits heard in the mixed courts.

In addition to their normal functions, the mixed courts pronounce upon the following matters, even where no foreign interest is involved:—

- (1) Suits concerning limited companies ("sociétés anonymes"), Syrian or other ("Arrêté" No. 2881 of the 27th September, 1924).
- (2) Suits or actions to which the Customs Administration is party or, in special circumstances ("Arrêté" No. 3121 of the 22nd May, 1930), intervenes.
- (3) Civil or penal actions of a repressive nature or concerning claims made by or against servants or native agents of the "sûreté générale," where the actions relate to acts connected with the exercise of the duties of these agents ("Arrêté" No. 41/LR of the 27th May, 1931).
- (4) Penal actions instituted against police officials and night watchmen concerning acts done in the execution of their duties. Civil suits for damages arising out of the same acts ("Arrêtés" Nos. 1/HC/Syrie of the 20th January, 1932, and 6/HC/Syrie of the 18th March, 1932).
- (5) Offences against public security and order; following a special procedure laid down by "Arrêté" No. 4/HC/Syrie, the 12th February, 1932, for dealing with offences having a political nature.
- (6) Civil and commercial suits between Syrians or "non-capitulatory" foreigners, when the parties have, previously to the cause of action, agreed by formal declaration to submit their differences in respect of the matters in dispute to the S.E.M.E. Courts (Article 9 of "Arrêté" No. 1820 of the 17th February, 1928). This practice is rapidly growing in matters involving bills of exchange and general trade documents. Incidentally, foreigners can similarly covenant to have their differences heard in the purely local courts; there are very occasional cases of this nature.

- (7) In cassation, cases that have been heard by the military tribunals of the Syrian Gendarmerie and have been passed for appeal on points of law.
- (8) Requests for execution of judgments of foreign courts pronounced in matters of *statut personnel* ("Arrêté" No. 43/LR of the 30th May, 1931).
- (9) Offences concerning trade in arms and munitions of war ("Arrêté" No. 51/LR of the 3rd May, 1932).

The foreigners who come within the jurisdiction of the S.E.M.E. courts comprise:—

- (1) Subjects of European States who on the 1st August, 1914, enjoyed capitulatory or jurisdictional privileges.
- (2) Subjects who are under the jurisdiction or protection of the European States covered by (1) above. This, in Syria, is held to include Cypriots: the delicate question that was raised in Egypt in connexion with the jurisdictional rights of Cypriots has been avoided in the French mandated territories.
- (3) Subjects of North and South American States and of Japan.
- (4) Subjects of States who, by special agreement, have obtained for their nationals the right to come under "mixed" jurisdiction. At present Iranians (since the 19th September, 1935, only—"Arrêté" No. 218/LR) are the only "non-capitulatory" subjects to have this privilege, although Nejdians enjoyed it for four years following the 1926 treaty, which was abrogated in 1930.

Other foreigners who are justiciable only before a court of local jurisdiction include nationals of the following countries:—

In Europe: Yugoslavia, Albania and Bulgaria.

In Africa: Egypt, Ethiopia and Liberia.

In Asia: Afghanistan, China, Iraq, Palestine, Siam, Transjordan and Turkey. (Disputes, however, arising out of the Franco-Turkish Convention of the 27th October, 1932, come, exceptionally, before the S.E.M.E. courts.)

Non-Secular Jurisdiction.

(a) Sharia Courts.

Each *caza* is provided with a Sharia Court with a Qadi for judge. With him sit one or more Muftis, who advise the Qadi on matters of doctrine. These courts apply Islamic law of the Hanafite rite. Where no Sharia Court exists the "juge de paix" performs the Qadi's jurisdictional duties.

For Mahometans the Sharia is alone competent to pronounce on matters of births, marriages, dowers, divorces, alimony, lactation, disappearances, wills, inheritance and all questions of personal status. This power is exercised over foreign Mahometans, who in other matters come under civil jurisdiction (local or "mixed"), except those whose domicile is in countries where civil, as distinct from non-secular, courts deal with matters of personal status and probate ("Arrêté" No. 109/LR of the 14th May, 1935). Turkey, it is believed, is the only country that may be described as a Moslem country where secular courts have competence in questions involving the personal status of Mahometans, thus its nationals come for such matters under the civil courts of local jurisdiction.

The Sharia Courts have competence to decide matters of inheritance should *de cujus successionem*, although non-Moslem, die abroad, provided that the heirs are minors, absent or incapable. But in all other cases respecting inheritance between non-Moslems, Sharia jurisdiction can only be invoked if the parties cannot agree to submit their differences to their particular ecclesiastical court.

Appeal does not lie from the judgment of a Sharia Court; but resort to cassation may be had. In that event, the Cassation Court of local jurisdiction in Damascus pronounces upon the legal conflict.

The Druse community has its own jurisdiction with a Druse Qadi. The Shiah community, however, does not enjoy a similar privilege.

(b) Ecclesiastical Courts.

The different Christian and Judaic communities enjoy non-secular jurisdiction in the same measure as Moslems in matters of personalty, marriage, dowry, divorce, &c.

The following non-Moslem communities are recognised in Syria :—

- (i) Catholic communities of Armeno-Catholic, Chaldean, Greek-Catholic, Maronite, Roman, Syrian-Catholic rites.
- (ii) Orthodox communities of Armeno-Orthodox, Greek-Orthodox, and Syrian-Orthodox rites.
- (iii) Protestant community.
- (iv) Judaic community.

As in the case of Sharia jurisdiction no appeal exists, but points of law may be submitted to the civil side of the Court of Cassation in Damascus.

It should be noted that in Syria the Protestants do not enjoy, as do their co-religionists in the Lebanese Republic, their own ecclesiastical jurisdiction, which is exercised in the Syrian Republic by the civil courts of local jurisdiction for native Protestants and by the civil courts S.E.M.E. for foreign Protestants. This lack of autonomous jurisdiction does not arise from obstruction by the authorities, but rather from the difficulty the many sects of Protestants find in establishing a generally acceptable organic law covering ecclesiastical jurisprudence.

Annexed hereto are tables showing the distribution and dependency of the law courts⁽¹⁾ (Annex I), and in Annex II⁽¹⁾ a brief description of the internal organisation of the judicial machine.

Damascus, December 18, 1935.

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

[E 225/52/25]

No. 84.

Mr. Eden to Sir A. Clark Kerr (Bagdad).

(No. 60. Confidential.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, January 31, 1936.

I HAVE had under consideration your Excellency's despatch No. 12 of the 7th January in which you transmitted to me the text of a proposed treaty of friendship between Iraq and Saudi Arabia handed to you by the Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs. In view of the expected early arrival of Sheikh Yusuf Yasin in Bagdad, I have already telegraphed to you a provisional summary of my views on the general aspect of this draft treaty, and, in particular, my objections to articles 6 and 7.

2. Apart from these articles, my main preoccupation is with the manner in which the treaty will operate in so far as it concerns mutual assistance against aggression, and with the way in which its operation is likely to react upon the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of Alliance of 1930. By putting forward criticism from these points of view, I do not, of course, wish to give ground for the impression that His Majesty's Government are attempting to keep Iraq and Saudi Arabia apart. Such an impression would be entirely erroneous. Conversations which Mr. Rendel had with Foad Bey Hamza on the 19th September, 1934 ("Eastern (Arabia)" print, section 1, of that date), and with Nuri Pasha on the 1st July, 1935 (see Sir John Simon's despatch No. 449 of the 4th July, 1935), will show that His Majesty's Government would view with sympathy a rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iraq, provided always that any understanding is consonant with the existing obligations of the parties, notably those of Iraq as a member of the League of Nations and the ally of this country.

3. With these preliminary observations, I will review the proposed treaty article by article.

Preamble.—I agree with your Excellency's comments. In particular it seems desirable to omit the word "foreign" before "aggression" as being offensive and provocative.

Article 1.—While I do not propose that you should raise specific objections to the terms of this article, it appears to me that the purport of it is far from clear. The Iraqi Government, as one of the high contracting parties, undertake not to enter into any engagement with a third State (this would include the

United Kingdom) which is prejudicial to the interests of Saudi Arabia. What does this undertaking mean in practice? Does it mean that Saudi Arabia will for the future be in a position to veto any commitment into which Iraq proposes to enter? Or, on the other hand, does it mean that Iraq is the judge as to whether any commitment into which she proposes to enter is prejudicial to the interests of Saudi Arabia, and that this is, so to speak, a declaration of policy which, while not without meaning, is ultimately subject to the subjective appreciation of the party against whom it is invoked?

Article 2 does not appear to call for any objection, but the elimination of the Permanent Court of International Justice would appear to involve considerable departures, in drafting the annexure, from the draft treaty for the peaceful settlement of disputes initialled by the Persian and Iraqi representatives on the 2nd October, 1935.

Article 4 contains a definite obligation on the part of Iraq to come to the aid of Saudi Arabia by force of arms if Saudi Arabia is a victim of the armed aggression of another State. From the practical point of view this seems in any case a very serious commitment for Iraq to undertake, since it is in fact extremely doubtful whether she is in a position to render effective military aid. But from the theoretical point of view also the commitment appears to be one of doubtful wisdom. The commitment is dependent upon an armed aggression against Saudi Arabia. The question arises therefore whether it would be wise to insert in the treaty a definition of armed aggression. His Majesty's Government for their part have always doubted the possibility of arriving at a satisfactory definition, and the Iraqi Government may, indeed, prefer to retain by some form of words full liberty of appreciation as to what constitutes aggression. But as article 9 subordinates the obligations under this treaty to those of Iraq under the Covenant, a definition on the general lines of article 4 of the Treaty of Non-Aggression initialled in October last at Geneva by Iraqi, Persian and Turkish representatives might not be inappropriate. Such texts as that article might naturally be invoked in any case to interpret aggression should the need arise, and it is, therefore, perhaps not of great importance whether such a definition is inserted or not in the proposed Iraq-Saudi treaty, except that the insertion of the definition might have the advantage of making clear to the Saudi Government the way in which the whole of Iraq's action is inevitably bound up in, and limited by, the Covenant of the League of Nations.

Under article 4 of the draft Iraqi-Saudi Treaty, Iraq might be called upon by Saudi Arabia to take action: (a) against a member of the League; or (b) against a non-member of the League; in both cases to support a State which is a non-member. Even if it is assumed that armed aggression would only be interpreted as covering an attack which, if made upon a member of the League by another member of the League, would call article 16 into play, the treaty is being made with a non-member and might involve action against a member. In order to render it possible, therefore, for Iraq to fulfil her obligations under the Covenant and under the article in question, it would apparently be necessary for Saudi Arabia, if and when attacked, to accept an invitation, under article 17 of the Covenant, from the Council of the League to assume the obligations of membership in the League for the purposes of the dispute with all that that implies, namely, the appreciation of the position by the Council of the League and recommendations by the League. Unless Saudi Arabia adopted this course, it is doubtful whether Iraq could fulfil her obligations, at any rate in certain cases, consistently with the Covenant. It is true that Iraq's obligations under the Covenant are safeguarded by article 9 of the proposed treaty, but I doubt whether Iraq should agree to article 4 of that treaty as at present drafted, unless Saudi Arabia understands that Iraq can probably not take action under it until Saudi Arabia has submitted the dispute to the League under article 17 of the Covenant.

I would also draw attention to another point arising out of the wording of article 4. The effect of the article seems to be to make it conclusive that Saudi Arabia has been attacked, and that therefore the obligations under the article come into play, should war break out in spite of the efforts which Iraq and Saudi Arabia have made under the preceding article. If this view is right, and the article does thus, in fact, already contain by implication its own definition of aggression, it is still more open to objection, since the failure of the joint efforts of the two parties envisaged in article 3 is not necessarily a proper test of armed

aggression. In any case, it seems desirable that article 4 should contain a clause similar to article 6 of the Perso-Iraqi-Turkish Treaty of Non-Aggression as initialled on the 2nd October last, bringing the treaty to an end if one of the contracting parties undertakes an aggression against a third State.

I have so far considered article 4 from the point of view of Iraq's obligations; it remains to consider its possible effect upon the position of His Majesty's Government. Should Iraq become involved in war as the ally of Saudi Arabia under the proposed treaty, His Majesty's Government would presumably, for their part, be called upon to support Iraq under article 4 of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of Alliance of 1930, provided that the peaceful means of settlement prescribed by the Covenant of the League and any other relevant international obligations had been exhausted. Assuming, however, that Iraq went to the assistance of Saudi Arabia without exhausting these peaceful means of settlement, the position of His Majesty's Government as a member of the League, as the ally of Iraq, and with armed forces actually stationed in Iraq, would be one of obvious difficulty, especially if the State against which Saudi Arabia and Iraq were operating was a member of the League. This consideration makes it all the more important from the point of view of His Majesty's Government to ensure that the obligations of Iraq towards Saudi Arabia, under the proposed treaty, shall not come into force unless Saudi Arabia has first accepted the obligations of membership of the League for the purpose of the particular dispute in question under article 17 of the Covenant and all the requirements for peaceful settlement under the Covenant have been complied with.

Articles 6 and 7 require no comment additional to that which I have already expressed in my telegram No. 17 of the 22nd January.

Article 8 calls for no comment except to point out that, while there is no obligation in the matter, His Majesty's Government at present act for the Iraqi Government, in virtue of the special relations existing between the two countries, in foreign countries where there is no Iraqi representative.

4. You may make such use as you think fit of the material in the present despatch in discussing the proposed treaty with the Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs. You should urge upon him strongly the advisability of the most careful reflection before committing himself to an instrument which may so greatly complicate Iraqi policy *vis-à-vis* of the League of Nations and of the United Kingdom, and you should request, in virtue of article 1 of the Treaty of Alliance, that, in view of the possible reactions upon the obligations of the United Kingdom under that treaty, the Iraqi Government will give His Majesty's Government an opportunity of considering the matter further before entering into a definite commitment with Saudi Arabia involving armed assistance to that country.

I am, &c.

ANTHONY EDEN.

[E 568/195/89]

No. 85.

Consul-General Havard to Mr. Eden.—(Received February 1.)

(No. 10.)

Sir,

Beirut, January 23, 1936.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 2 of the 6th January, I have the honour to inform you that at an extraordinary session of the Lebanese Parliament held on the morning of the 20th January M. Emile Eddé was elected President of the Lebanese Republic.

2. The new President, whose biography will be found under No. 15 of Lebanese personalities which formed an enclosure to my letter to Mr. Rendel No. C. 1/35 of the 21st December, 1935, will formally take office on the 31st January next.

3. The first ballot gave 14 votes to M. Eddé and 11 to M. Bechara Khoury (No. 18 of Lebanese personalities), but, since M. Eddé did not obtain the necessary majority of two-thirds of the votes cast, a second ballot was held giving M. Eddé the absolute majority of 15 votes to 10 secured by M. Bechara Khoury.

4. There now remains the appointment of the Secretary of State, and this will be the object of one of the first decrees which the new President will issue on assuming office. It is freely stated among M. Eddé's partisans that his choice

is already made and that he will appoint Dr. Ayoub Tabet (Lebanese personalities, No. 34) to that office.

I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Bagdad, His Majesty's High Commissioner at Jerusalem and to His Majesty's consuls at Damascus and Aleppo.

I have, &c.

G. T. HAVARD.

[E 802/802/89]

No. 86.

Consul-General Havard to Mr. Eden.—(Received February 13.)

(No. 16 E.)

Sir,

Beirut, February 5, 1936.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that on the 9th January the annual meeting of the High Commissioner's delegates took place in Beirut, under the presidency of Count de Martel, in order to discuss and approve the budget of the component parts of the Levant territories under French mandate for 1936.

2. At this meeting the High Commissioner reviewed succinctly the plans which are being carried out to ameliorate Syrian economy and drew a picture of the present economic situation of these States. He said that the administration of the funds of common interest in 1936 would mark an important stage in the realisation of the economic programme which he had undertaken. He pointed to economies already effected by compression of general expenditure, which had permitted him to reduce customs tariffs in 1935, and he emphasised that the methodical execution of his programme of public works was beginning to show results. He had reduced the budget of the funds of common interest from 193,600,000 fr. in 1934 to 163,500,000 fr. in 1936, which was a proof of the effort made to bring down the level of expenditure to that of revenue. Reductions in expenditure had been made in every sphere, in personnel, material, and army, and even in the subvention given to the railway he foresaw a reduction of 1 million francs. It was these all-round reductions in expenditure which had made it possible for him to envisage with equanimity a prospective reduction in customs receipts of 8 million francs. M. de Martel added that, after the wholesale revision of the customs tariff carried out last year, the commercial community might consider the present tariff as definitive.

3. Having outlined the situation from the budgetary point of view, the High Commissioner dwelt on the works of public utility which were being carried out. He said the prolongation of the North Syrian Railway had passed from the stage of construction to that of normal exploitation, and by the mere fact of its existence opened up a particularly interesting prospect. In addition, the provision of railcars had enabled the railway company to speed up its services over the whole system. The work of enlarging Beirut harbour was proceeding normally and, when it was finished in 1938, Beirut would possess an additional 26 hectares of port, with 800 metres of new quay accessible to large steamers. The raising of the barrage at Homs Lake would be finished in two years and would provide 200 million cubic feet of water for irrigation. The Jebel Druze was not forgotten, and in the region of Salkhad canalisations for providing the population with drinking water had been built. In Aleppo and Damascus work on the local aerodromes had been carried out, and the desert track from Damascus in the direction of Bagdad had been so improved that even in the worst weather there would henceforward be no interruption to communications between the two cities. M. de Martel then referred to the work which would be started this year in the Ghab region with the financial assistance of the League, and added that irrigation works would be started this year at the south end of the Amouk marshes, in the Sanjak of Alexandretta. In 1934 and 1935 42 million francs had been spent on these works of public utility, and this year there would be a further expenditure of over 20 million francs. The High Commissioner ended by expressing his personal satisfaction that the whole of the programme extending from 1934 to 1939 was being entirely financed by revenue without any recourse whatever to borrowing.

I have, &c.

G. T. HAVARD.

[E 961/195/89]

No. 87.

Consul Parr to Mr. Eden.—(Received February 21.)

(No. 4.)

Sir,

Aleppo, February 15, 1936.

I REGRET that the agitation on which I had the honour to report in my despatch No. 1 of the 29th January broke out again at the end of last week on a somewhat more serious scale. Following events in other parts of Syria, and riots at Homs and Hama which involved eleven deaths, manifestations took place here on the afternoon of Saturday, the 8th February, when an orderly crowd of about three hundred young people paraded before the Turkish consulate and requested my colleague that his Government should lay their grievances before the League of Nations. Both he and my Italian colleague, who was visited later, are said to have returned courteous and non-committal replies to their petitioners. It is satisfactory that, despite the persistent talk of British sympathy with their movement, the manifestants did not think it worth while to visit this consulate.

2. On the Sunday and Monday, pressure was exercised to compel the closing of shops and business houses. By the Tuesday this had become almost entirely effective, and it continued so until yesterday, although the tramways were able to maintain their services. The incidence of glacial winds and very heavy rain contributed to restrict disorder so that, while the next few days saw spasmodic scuffles and brawls involving some five deaths, and a couple of bombs were exploded but to no great damage, the disturbances here have not been sufficient for grave anxiety. At Deir-ez-Zor, however, a riot occurred on the Monday morning in the course of which five persons lost their lives. These incidents, coupled with the recurrent uneasiness in other parts of Syria, decided the High Commissioner to entrust the military with the task of restoring order and, on the morning of the 12th February, the General Officer Commanding in the Levant issued a warning to the effect that all necessary measures to achieve this end would be taken, that the peaceful inhabitants of the town would be protected, that fomenters of trouble would be pursued and tried before military courts, and that gatherings of more than four persons would be dispersed.

3. So far as Aleppo, at least, is concerned, I fancy that this step was not prompted solely by the problem of maintaining order. The troubles of a fortnight ago had been handled by the civil administration with patience and good sense, and had passed without serious difficulty. But there seem to have been attempts to undermine the loyalty of the Algerian and Moroccan troops, and military circles have been indulging in outspoken criticism of the High Commissioner's disinclination for swift severity. Doubtless too, considerations not within my knowledge had their part in deciding his course of action.

4. Here the situation was that although, generally speaking, there was no interference with bakers, and the butchers carried on their trade behind shuttered fronts, food-prices advanced, with a consequent threat of distress which either side might hope to exploit against the other. Practically all shops and all the smaller counting-houses closed. Only the larger firms of bankers and commission-agents kept their offices open, and that as a matter of policy, since customers were few. It was currently stated that the town would be kept closed until the 3rd March, the Korban Haim, but yesterday and to-day a certain number of shops were opened in response to a specific promise of military protection. However, even if the normal life of the town is shortly resumed, the check to business activity has caused real trouble in a market which was already faced by difficulties. Ready money is short, bills and promissory notes cannot be met, merchants abroad are being asked to delay their consignments. Thus the action of the nationalists aggravates the situation instanced as one of their motives. The French problem in this part of Syria derives from the sullen fanaticism of the mob and from the unilluminated poverty of a trading community not yet adjusted to its shrunken markets, which feels, moreover, that under the present administration its resources are drained for the benefit of other districts, and that its activities are hampered to ensure dividends for the shareholders of the public utility companies. Another cause of complaint, more directly affecting the small trader, has been a recent order for the general adoption of the metric system, a pedantic and unnecessary stupidity in a country like Northern Syria. Allowance must be made too for the facts that a jealously scrutinised press and a suspended

Parliament provide no adequate opportunity for the discussion of grievances and that these organs of opinion, though open to galling and sometimes telling abuse, probably would yield, on balance, less embarrassing results than does the methodical suppression of criticism even if shrill and uninstructed.

5. The situation in Aleppo is unlikely to develop on graver lines than I have described, and its real weight lies rather in its reflection of the attitude of the other regions of the States under mandate towards French control. The nature, the extent and the persistence of the disorders afford evidence of a public sympathy with the agitation which, whether it is, as here, largely blind anti-foreign sentiment, or is, as appears to be the case in other centres, partly due to legitimate political ambition, cannot be ignored. In deference to this, and to the moral pressure deriving from the pretensions and achievements of neighbouring countries, the French may be tempted to yield to nationalist violence concessions which, even if thought to be overdue, cannot be made under pressure without prejudice to the future stability of these States. Political foresight would suggest present firmness, to be followed, after a decent interval, by concessions of place rather than of power to the Syrians who, at any rate in these northern territories, are still so backward as to require close supervision for many years to come unless the fundamental purpose of the mandate is to be sacrificed.

6. I am sending copies of this despatch direct to His Majesty's consul-general at Beirut, and to His Majesty's consul at Damascus.

I have, &c.

ROBERT PARR.

P.S.—Since writing the above, I have heard that the military have been successful in discovering hidden arms and a certain quantity of dynamite. It is reported also that three nationalist leaders, of whom at least two had been cautioned earlier in the week, and had maintained an evasive attitude, have been arrested. The town continues to resume work, and there appears to be little danger of a further outbreak unless in response to serious disturbances elsewhere.

R. P.

[E 1109/195/89]

No. 88.

Consul Parr to Mr. Eden.—(Received February 29.)

(No. 6.)

Sir,

Aleppo, February 22, 1936.

THE situation, on which I had the honour to report in my despatch No. 4 of the 15th February, has altered little during the past week. On the Sunday and Monday a certain number of establishments opened but were forced to close again by threats not only of immediate damage but of subsequent boycott. General Huntziger, commanding the troops in the Levant, visited Aleppo on Wednesday, the 19th February, and conferred with General Chevallier, commanding in the Northern Territories. It was decided that no active steps should be taken to persuade merchants and others to resume business, but to do nothing beyond protecting the property of those who did so. There seems to be an impression amongst the Christian population that, whatever the efficacy of the immediate protection afforded by the mandatory authority, it would be unwise to brave the antagonism of the Moslems in view of possible developments in the future. Meanwhile, the rising prices of food and the cessation of pay for daily workmen are beginning to cause distress, especially amongst the Armenian refugees, who supply most of the skilled labour of the neighbourhood. This distress would have been greater but for the fact that the weaving industry, which employs over 12,000 looms, has continued to operate.

2. There has been little disturbance. A few bombs have been exploded, but without grave damage. Certain arrests were made during the week, and a small stock of explosives was found in the house of a doctor, but the authorities have not been able to discover and establish the identity of the persons who are organising the strike movement.

3. A growing body of opinion is resentful of the enforced cessation of business activity, and a committee has been formed to negotiate with the French authorities in the event that the conversations at present being conducted at

Damascus by the High Commissioner fail to achieve an early conclusion of the dispute. I understand that this committee, which is composed of solid and moderate-minded men, will dissociate the town of Aleppo from the movement in other parts of Syria, but will ask for the release of the local nationalists who have been arrested and deported during the past ten days.

4. It appears that the riot at Deir-ez-Zor on Monday, the 10th February, was more serious than at first reported. A mob of some 400 attacked the residence of the general, who was absent at Kamechlieh. The sentries and the servants in the house were killed, but the crowd was then dispersed by four officers from headquarters, who opened fire with revolvers, killing seven persons and wounding others.

5. I am sending copies of this despatch direct to His Majesty's consul general at Beirut and to His Majesty's consul at Damascus.

I have, &c.

ROBERT PARR.

[E 708/708/65]

No. 89.

German Economic Penetration in the Middle East.

I.—TURKEY.

SINCE the end of the war Germany has not attempted to revive the political influence which she formerly exercised in Turkey, but many links remain to connect the two countries. Young Turks are still sent to Germany in considerable numbers for their technical studies; German material is familiar and well esteemed; and in the new Angora the hospitals, the gas and electrical undertakings, the railway material, the town planning are German, or German inspired, or German planned (*cf.* Angora despatch No. 606 E. of the 27th November, 1935). A new link is that of the exiled Jews, who have been appointed to professorial and other positions in Turkey and have brought German ideas and influence with them.

2. The purely economic connexion is also significant, since Germany has for many years taken the greatest share of Turkey's principal export—tobacco. When the Turkish Government started in about 1932 to industrialise their country on a "Five-Year Plan," it was not unnatural that they should turn to Germany for much of their equipment; and when they proceeded to balance their trade with foreign countries and to ration their imports, the door was left considerably more widely open to German trade than to the trade of any other country. Just at that time (*i.e.*, last year) Germany was feeling the necessity of buying her raw materials from "clearing" countries and countries to which she herself could sell; so she began to buy from Turkey (at good prices for the Turks) not only the classical tobacco, but considerable quantities of such commodities as cotton, raisins, figs, barley, valonia (for tanning), wool and mohair, nuts and eggs.

3. As a result, whereas Turkish exports to Germany during the years 1923-32 have averaged 12 per cent. (in value) of Turkey's total exports, the proportion has since risen as follows:—

	Per cent.
1933	19
1934	37.3
1935 (first four months)	42

with a tendency to rise to a still higher percentage.

4. The corresponding percentages of Turkish imports from Germany as compared with Turkey's total imports are—

	Per cent.
1923-29	(average) 12
1933	25
1934	34
1935 (first four months)	35½

with the upward tendency continuing.

5. It is doubtful whether this economic absorption has been deliberately planned in Berlin; it is certainly not desired in Turkey. But Turkey has gained by getting a good market when markets were rare. Exports to other markets, especially France, are falling off; other customers will not pay such high prices as the Germans. German trade produces no free currency, so Turkey is already in difficulties to meet the payments on her foreign debt, and is trying—so far in vain—to obtain credits in France.

6. There is no sign as yet that Germany is using her paramount economic position for political purposes.

II.—IRAQ.

There has been until recently little evidence of German commercial activity in Iraq, and none whatever of a conscious policy of penetration such as is being pursued in Turkey. The Germans have, indeed, appeared to accept hitherto the position that Iraq is a special preserve of Great Britain. Nevertheless, the increasing activities of Germany in Turkey, combined with memories of the pre-war "Drang nach Osten," have made His Majesty's Government particularly attentive to any manifestation of German activity in Iraq, in order to forestall any attempt at economic preponderance on the part of Germany.

2. There have been recently two such manifestations. In 1934 Dr. Suedhoff, a German expert in technical education, visited Iraq at the invitation of the Iraqi Government to advise on the establishment of a system of technical education. The Iraqi Government were impressed by Dr. Suedhoff's report, and contemplated placing the organisation of technical education in Iraq in his hands. His Majesty's Government feared that this might lead to the introduction of German methods on an increasing scale in Iraq, which, though limited in the first place to training, might eventually give Germany an important foothold in the economic life of Iraq. Steps were accordingly taken to secure the employment, in place of Dr. Suedhoff, of an English expert in technical education, who is now at work in Iraq.

3. The other manifestation lies in the increasing German participation in the British Oil Development Company, the owner of a large oil concession to the west of the River Tigris. This certainly contains oil, but apparently of a quality which necessitates a very considerable capital outlay before the stage of commercial exploitation can be reached. The company is registered in the United Kingdom, and must technically remain a British company in virtue of its concession, but, owing to the unwillingness of British financial interests to put up the fresh capital which it requires, British representation has declined to something in the region of 18 per cent., in favour of foreign—chiefly Italian and German—holdings. The German holding is now understood to be 41 per cent. and is the largest individual holding. The attraction of the company for the German interests is apparently the prospect of orders for machinery and railway material. The oil is too heavy to be transported economically by pipe-line the whole distance from the oil-field to the coast, and alternative methods of transport are now under discussion. The most favoured method appears to be to build an extension of the Syrian Railway from its present terminus at Tel Kotehek into Iraq to a point where it would meet a short pipe-line from the British Oil Development oil-field. Furthermore, until the stage of commercial exploitation is reached, the company has to pay a heavy annual dead rent to the Iraqi Government. It is finding serious difficulty in producing the money for these dead rent payments, and Herr Brown, who was British born but is now a naturalised German, is at present in negotiation with the Iraqi Government with a view to persuading them to allow the company to provide, in lieu of dead rent payments in cash, railway material for the line which the Iraqi Government are anxious to construct to link up the present northern terminus of the Iraqi railway system with Mosul. The original intention of the British Oil Development Company was that this material should be German. It happens, however, that the Iraqi railway system is an important British interest. His Majesty's Government are, in fact, still the owners of it, and negotiations are at present going on for the transfer of the ownership to the Iraqi Government. His Majesty's Government hope that one of the results of the transfer will be that the bulk of railway orders in future will come to this country. This hope is likely to be frustrated if the Germans get a foothold by supplying the material for the proposed new link

between Bagdad and Mosul, since the material used on that section may set the standard for the Iraqi railway system as a whole, on which there may have to be heavy capital expenditure in the next few years, both for new construction and perhaps also for the conversion of the existing metre gauge track to standard gauge. Every effort is, therefore, being made to ensure that the orders for the proposed new link between Bagdad and Mosul shall come to this country and the rather complicated discussions on the question are still in progress. Ordinary German commercial competition in Iraq has so far not been very noticeable. Great Britain accounts for about 27 per cent. of Iraq's exports and 25 per cent. of her imports, whereas the figures for Germany are, respectively, 5 per cent. and 3.7 per cent. During the last few years, Great Britain's share of the total trade has decreased considerably; but this has been principally due to increased Japanese competition.

III.—PERSIA.

Since the end of the World War Germans have been prominent in most fields of economic endeavour in Persia, but the growth of German trade, though satisfactory, has not been spectacular. This trade dwindled to nothing during the war, and a comparison with the early post-war years would have little value. But the table which is given below shows that by about 1926 German imports into Persia had reached their pre-war level and that since 1926 they have been doubled.

2. The table also shows that United Kingdom imports into Persia have declined since 1926, but the Board of Trade and the Department of Overseas Trade are satisfied that, in spite of one or two apparent exceptions, little, if any, of this decline is attributable to German competition:—

	German Imports into Persia.		United Kingdom Imports into Persia.	
	Value. Krans or Rials.	Percentage of total Imports.	Value. Krans or Rials.	Percentage of total Imports.
1913-14 (March 21) ...	30,373,000	4.7	97,956,000	15
1925-26 (March 21) ...	32,696,000	4.0	232,637,000	28
1933-34 (June 21) ...	69,976,000	10.0 ⁽¹⁾	136,722,000	20

(¹) N.B.—These percentages are the same for the first seven months of 1934-35.

3. A Perso-German clearing agreement was, however, concluded on the 30th October, 1935. The reason for this agreement was, broadly speaking, that, owing to the high prices offered by German importers for certain Persian raw materials, Persian "frozen debts" had tended to accumulate in Berlin. The only method whereby these debts can be cleared off is by some method enabling Persia to take increased quantities of German goods. The Clearing Agreement accordingly follows the same broad lines of those agreements recently concluded by Germany with Yugoslavia, Hungary, Roumania, Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey, and it is to be expected that it will have the same effect, namely, a considerable increase in German imports into Persia. In other words, Germany appears to be involved in a process which will tend to direct her exports towards Central Europe and the Middle East, and Persia seems at the moment to be the terminus of "expansion" in this direction. Whether the agreement will result in any very large increase in German imports into Persia is, perhaps, open to doubt.

4. For the rest, the progress of German enterprise in Persia has by no means been continuous during the last few years, and it suffered a decline in 1931-32, partly, at any rate, as a result of the publication in Germany of certain newspaper libels upon the Shah. For instance, the subsidiary of Junkers, Lufthansa, which ran a civil air service from 1927 to 1932, closed down in the latter year, its eventual disappearance being hastened by the financial difficulties of the parent company in Germany. In that year also the German experts employed in the arsenal were dismissed and the general manager, as were several other German officials in the National Bank. To-day the general manager is a Persian, and scarcely any Germans are left. Between 1928 and 1931, moreover, a German syndicate constructed the Caspian end of the Trans-Persian railway. They admittedly did their work well, but their charges were high and their contract was not extended.

5. In spite of these set-backs, the number of Germans now in Persia is, relatively, very large. This is partly explained by the fact that Germans are frequently found as commission agents in a small way, importing such things as fancy goods, &c., partly by the fact that German firms have secured one or two of the sub-contracts for the construction of sections of the railway.

6. Upon the whole, the German economic position in Persia is a potential, rather than an actual danger. Tehran is at present a happy hunting-ground for those who wish to construct railways, bridges, factories, ports and so on or to sell the material for their construction. In all these activities German agents are to the forefront, and they show great skill and energy in seizing their opportunities.

*Eastern Department, Foreign Office,
March 1, 1936.*

[E 1134/195/89]

No. 90.

Consul MacKereth to Mr. Eden.—(Received March 2.)

(No. 13.)
Sir,

Damascus, January 31, 1936.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith copies of four High Commissioner's "Arrêtés" (Nos. 5/LR, 6, 7 and 8),⁽¹⁾ dated the 10th January, 1936, which were published in the *Syrian Journal officiel* of the 25th January, 1936. They ordain a complete reorganisation of local administration within the Syrian Republic, excluding, however, the district of the Jebel Druse, whose Constitution, as enacted by "Arrêté" No. 1641 of the 24th October, 1924, is untouched.

2. Notwithstanding its appearance of novelty, the new legislation hardly represents more than a fusion of the local government system of mutessarifs and "conseils administratifs" ("Arrêtés" No. 4151 of the 12th April, 1932, and No. 225 of the 16th April, 1926), with certain modifications and extensions borrowed from Egyptian and Iraqi (Liwa Administration Law of the 27th April, 1927) practice. The main weakness of the past systems of local government in Syria arose, in the first place, out of the lack of any real authority given to mutessarifs, which led, perhaps unintentionally, to an increasing tendency of the Central Government in Damascus to interfere in matters that were unquestionably the sole concern of the local administration. The overriding of the mutessarifs in this way certainly added to their enervation. In the second place came the spirit of rivalry that grew out of the appearance of privileged position, which was the natural consequence of yielding (mistakenly, it is now thought) to local vanities by designating the district of Aleppo a vilayet instead of a sanjak like the other Syrian local administrative areas.

3. To obliterate, perhaps, memories of an office that had gained for itself a reputation for effiteness, and to dispel the pangs of jealousy, Syria is now to be divided into eight mohafazas (governorates)—Aleppo, Alexandretta, Damascus, Euphrates, Jezirah, Hama, Hauran and Homs—instead of seven sanjaks and one vilayet. The peculiar situation of Damascus itself, a city surrounded by an important agglomeration of villages in a wide and intensively cultivated belt with complicated irrigation rights, required a special form of administration. Its need is to be met by the creation of a separate administration, called a municipe ("Arrêté" No. 6), set up within the mohafaza of Damascus. The special requirements of the mohafaza of Alexandretta and of the municipal area of the City of Aleppo are covered respectively by "Arrêtés" Nos. 7 and 8.

4. All the mohafazas will enjoy equal status *vis-à-vis* the Central Government, and they will be independent so far as purely local administration is concerned. In matters, however, of public works of inter-mohafazate or general State interest, questions of national concern, and of finance, they will make recommendations for the approval of the Central Government. The mohafiz (or Governor), who must be a Syrian, will be appointed by the Council of Ministers of State on the recommendation of the Minister of the Interior. He will have considerable administrative authority and be required to seek, and

(¹) Not printed.

presumably not lightly ignore the advice of a locally constituted council ("conseil de mohafazat"). The attributions of these councils resemble closely those of the "conseils généraux" in France. As to one-third, this council will be nominated by the Council of Ministers of State, and as to two-thirds, it will be elected by limited suffrage from an electoral college more comprehensive than that of the old "conseils administratifs." In the mohafazas of Aleppo and Damascus twelve municipal councillors will, in addition, be incorporated into the mohafazate councils. Provision is made for equitable representation of sectarian minorities, but some of the less politically active Christian sects, notably the Protestants, complain that their rights to representation have been ignored.

5. The mohafazas are to be divided, as were the sanjaks, into cazas (cadha in Iraq), with their own local councils, and the cazas into nahias.

6. The new scheme is universally condemned by the Arabic press as concealing sinister intentions in regard to new general elections to the Syrian Parliament. Internal administrative reorganisation is not, they say, necessary. In Aleppo complaint is made that the special situation of that city is pointedly ignored by the reduction of its vilayet to a mere mohafaza. These terms are, however, identical in meaning, only the past distinction having gone. The Nationalist parties take the stand that a decentralisation *de facto*, if not *de jure*, has been introduced, which is in itself inimical to the attainment of the political unity of Syria. They argue from this that the mandatory Power is back again to the device of Louis XI, *Divide ut imperes*. Because it is enveloped in so much ill-tempered censure, it is difficult to follow the Nationalists' reasoning. They are, it may be suspected, influenced only by an innate belief that the French are invariably actuated by ulterior motives in the legislation they introduce into the country.

7. So far as I have been able to discover from conversations with French officials and advisers to the Syrian departments responsible for the drafting of the new decrees, the intention is to improve the existing very lax and inefficient local administration of the provinces, remove the causes of a great deal of the gerrymandering that goes on at present over the respective importance and needs of the provincial districts, and at the same time develop a civic spirit that is at present sadly lacking. On the other hand, appreciating the great influence the Minister of the Interior, through the préfets—his nominees—can, and invariably does, bring to bear during the voting at French general elections, one is at once struck by the similarity between the position, powers and dependence of a mohafiz in Syria and a préfet in France.

8. I am informed that in each mohafaza it is intended to place a délégué-adjoint, who will be subordinate to the High Commissioner's delegate in Damascus for the purpose of the co-ordination of general policy.

9. I am sending copies of this despatch to Aleppo, Beirut and Jerusalem.

I have, &c.

GILBERT MAC KERETH.

[E 1135/195/89]

No. 91.

Consul MacKereth to Mr. Eden.—(Received March 2.)

(No. 15.)

Sir,

Damascus, February 10, 1936.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 12 of the 27th January, reporting the continuation of public disorder in Syria, I have the honour of informing you that, notwithstanding the alternation of threats and blandishments from the mandatory authorities, the general strike in Damascus continues and has reached its twenty-third day.

2. Since the serious clashes with the police and soldiery during the week ended the 27th January, the crowds that daily assemble in the streets have adopted a sullen but unaggressive attitude, although occasional brushes with police patrols have resulted in some casualties on both sides. At Hama, 7 civilians lost their lives, and 2 officers, 14 soldiers, and over 40 civilians were wounded in a pitched battle that took place on the 6th February, between Nationalist supporters and a military force. Similar disorders, but of less serious nature, broke out in Homs

on the following day when 3 civilians were killed. In Damascus the boycott of the electric light and tramway company has been reinstituted.

3. As a reprisal to the strike of university students and school children, the Syrian Government has closed all its educational establishments in Damascus *sine die*. An attempt by Moslem mobs to attack the Christian quarter (actually some windows of the North Irish Mission school and chapel were broken by stones) was stopped by the intervention of some of the Nationalist leaders, who, with astonishing success, persuaded the crowd that their troubles were national and not religious. Later an important Moslem deputation went formally to express to the Christian elders their regret for the episode.

4. It is becoming increasingly difficult to obtain food-stuffs and essential commodities, yet the authorities are doing nothing to supply the need. The rise in prices, which is the consequence of scarcity, is having the effect of bringing the poor to the verge of starvation. It is not impossible that it is by this means that the Nationalist party hopes so to inflame the mob that it will be goaded by hunger to desperate measures.

5. The attitude of the mandatory is, at first glance, not easy to fathom, for, following declarations characteristic of M. de Martel's imperious disposition, the High Commissioner has himself fallen back on passivity. After a couple of Pyrrhic exhibitions in Damascus last week he has retired to his residence in Beirut.

6. I am inclined to think that the vacillation in Syria is, as usual, a natural sequence to the change of Government in France. As you are aware, a paradox of the French position in Syria, as distinct from the Lebanon, lies in the conflict between the Radicals in France, who wish to relieve the French taxpayer of an unprofitable burden, and the French senior-official and military castes. The official sees in the loss of Syria a loss of lucrative posts whilst the soldier has the imperialistic dreams that are natural to him. When the Government of M. Laval, with its "Right" complexion, was in power a heavy hand in Syria did not come amiss, so the High Commissioner felt no misgivings in ignoring, and even publicly insulting, the Nationalist leaders, and this undoubtedly led directly to the present troubles. One is forcibly reminded in this connexion of General Sarraill's contemptuous reception of the Druze notabilities in 1925, the consequences of which were, as you will recall, considerable. With the unexpected and sudden advent of M. Sarraut before the French Parliament on the 1st February the orchestral background in Paris for M. de Martel's solos became dissonant. Hence, as I am informed on good authority, the *mot d'ordre* has been given to avoid any incident and to discourage any newspaper report that might reawaken in the minds of the "Left" parties in France those altruistic urgings that led to the drafting in 1932 of a treaty of independence for Syria, which, had M. Ponsot remained as High Commissioner, would probably have been successfully negotiated in 1933.

7. I am sending copies of this despatch to Aleppo, Beirut and Jerusalem.

I have, &c.

GILBERT MAC KERETH.

[E 1173/381/65]

No. 92.

Sir A. Clark Kerr to Mr. Eden.—(Received March 3.)

(No. 101.)

Sir,

Bagdad, February 24, 1936.

I HAVE the honour to report that there has recently been a noticeable revival in this country of public enthusiasm for pan-Arab ideals. This has been due in part to events in other Arab countries and in part to official stimulus.

2. The political disturbances of the last few months in Syria, Palestine and Egypt have naturally been given prominence in the press, and have been used as the text for innumerable newspaper articles which have dwelt upon the common interests of the Arab peoples and the necessity for co-operation between them.

3. Public interest in the affairs of the Arab world has also been kindled by visits paid to this country by several men of mark from neighbouring Arab countries. Amil-al-Ghaury from Palestine in December last, Ibrahim Abdul Qadir-al-Mazini and Assad-al-Dagha from Cairo during the present month are examples. All of these have been generously entertained by Arab and Islamic

clubs and associations, and have addressed representative audiences on pan-Arab ideals. Dr. Sanhuri, the new Egyptian principal of the Bagdad Law School, and the other Egyptian professors and teachers who have lately been recruited by the Ministry of Education, have also been given a warm welcome as symbols of the growth of a closer understanding between the sister peoples of Egypt and Iraq.

4. The arrival of parties of young men from the Yemen for education in Iraq, the presence of Sheikh Yusuf Yasin from Saudi Arabia, the rumours of the conclusion of a pact open to all Arab States, to which his negotiations with the Iraqi Government have given rise, and the request of the Sultan of Muscat for an Iraqi expert to be sent to improve date cultivation in his State, are other factors which have been exploited by the enthusiasts to quicken popular interest and hope in Arab nationalism.

5. Another significant event is the conducted tour of Syria, Palestine and Egypt arranged this month for a party of over thirty students from the Bagdad Law School and Teachers' Training College.

6. At the same time it is noticeable that there is now little or no talk of organising a pan-Arab conference, the favourite scheme of the late King Feisal, and that nothing has been heard for a long time of the union of Syria and Iraq under one crown.

7. The present promoters of the movement seem to understand that before any sort of real political union can be established between the different nations of the Arab people, a common sympathy and a community of ideals and aspirations must first be developed. They are, consequently, at present chiefly concerned to profit from every opportunity to popularise the principles of Arab fellowship, to inculcate pride in the common heritage of the Arab race and to arouse a determination to strive together for national liberty and prosperity in the future.

8. The fact that Iraq herself has made such remarkable progress during the last decade and is free from irksome foreign political control undoubtedly gives the Iraqis a sense of pride in their achievement and places them in a position from which they feel able to help and encourage their neighbours in their struggles to move along the road over which Iraq has already travelled.

9. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioners at Cairo and Jerusalem, His Majesty's Minister at Jedda, His Majesty's consul-general at Beirut and to His Majesty's consuls at Damascus and Aleppo.

I have, &c.

ARCHIBALD CLARK KERR.

[E 6911/6911/31]

No. 93.

Mr. Eden to Sir A. Clark Kerr (Bagdad).

(No. 137.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, March 6, 1936.

I HAVE had under consideration your despatch No. 597 of the 13th November, 1935, in which you reported that the Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs had suggested to you the possibility of the union of Transjordan with Iraq. I approve the attitude of reserve which your Excellency adopted towards Nuri Pasha's suggestion, and I need hardly add that in the event of his reverting to this matter in the future you should give him no encouragement.

2. While the possibility of assimilating Transjordan to Iraq has presumably always been in the minds of Iraqi politicians with pan-Arab leanings (see for example the remarks by Rashid Ali-al-Gailani, then Prime Minister, to the Political Agent at Koweit in August 1933, recorded in part 3 of the record of conversation enclosed in despatch No. 1040 S of the 12th August, 1933, from the Acting Political Resident in the Persian Gulf to the India Office), the occasion described in your despatch seems to be the first on which an Iraqi Foreign Minister has actually gone so far as to mention the matter in the course of official conversation. The possibility of intrigues towards the absorption of Transjordan in Iraq was, of course, always present during the lifetime of King Feisal, but, with his disappearance and the preoccupation of the present régime in Iraq with internal affairs and the dispute with Persia, it is surprising to find that a responsible Iraqi politician can still seriously consider the prospect of

adding Transjordan to territory under Iraqi control. Doubtless, however, the initiative taken by Nuri Pasha was entirely personal in character and taken without previous consultation with his colleagues in the Iraqi Government.

3. Apart from the obvious geographical obstacles to any sort of political union between Transjordan and Iraq, and the disadvantages in bringing in any way under the control of the Iraqi Government a territory entirely dissimilar from anything within the present frontiers of Iraq and separated therefrom by several hundred miles of uninhabited desert, the political and legal obstacles to any such union would, as you rightly observed to Nuri Pasha, be quite insuperable.

4. No form of union would, of course, be possible unless and until Transjordan was released from its position under the Palestine mandate, and granted full political independence. The possibility of the eventual evolution of Transjordan from its present status towards full legal independence has, more than once in the past, received consideration. But such an evolution, while in many ways desirable, while certainly in accordance with the spirit of article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, and while possibly, in the long run, inevitable, is at present subject to formidable difficulties. In the first place, since Transjordan is subject to the provisions of the mandate for Palestine (with the exception of certain articles concerning Jewish colonisation), any important progressive steps towards independence would necessarily have to receive the consent of the Council of the League of Nations; in other words, it would be necessary at every stage to secure the consent of members of the Council, such as France, whose interests might be directly opposed to the emancipation of Transjordan. The position in this respect is much less favourable than was that of Iraq during the mandatory régime, since in the case of Iraq there was no actual mandate, but the position was governed by the provisions of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of Alliance of 1922.

5. Apart from this, and other general considerations, a very serious obstacle to the emancipation of Transjordan lies in the fact that this territory is not, and is most unlikely to become in the near future, financially independent. On the contrary, the administration of Transjordan on its present scale is only made possible by virtue of the annual grant-in-aid provided by His Majesty's Treasury.

6. The above brief summary of the position is of course intended only for your Excellency's own information and guidance. It will, however, enable you to appreciate a few of the fundamental difficulties which would have to be overcome before any sort of union between Transjordan and Iraq could become a matter of practical politics, even supposing (which appears to be extremely doubtful) that such a union were desirable in itself, or sincerely desired by the populations concerned.

I am, &c.

ANTHONY EDEN.

[E 1289/195/89]

No. 94.

Consul Parr to Mr. Eden.—(Received March 7.)

(No. 8.)

Sir,

Aleppo, February 29, 1936.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 6 of the 22nd February, I have the honour to report that the promise of relaxing tension which existed at the end of last week has not been fulfilled. The proposal to enter on separate conversations with the French authorities at Aleppo was dropped on news of the formation of the El Ayubi Ministry and knowledge of the terms of M. de Martel's letter to the new President of the Council, a copy of which has doubtless been sent to you by Colonel Mackereth. The reasons for this hardening of the opposition towards the mandatory Power are various.

2. In the first place, it is felt that the High Commissioner is weakening. On the 18th February there was published a declaration in the course of which he postulated a return to normal conditions as a preliminary to discussion of the difficulties and grievances of Syria. The letter to the Prime Minister was in a different key and showed a readiness to meet the nationalist sentiment that went

far beyond anything originally hoped for. So rapid a conversion, taken with a certain vagueness of phrasing, cast suspicions on the High Commissioner's good faith which are being industriously exploited, and reinforced by scurrilous attacks on his character.

3. The composition of the new Ministry also has been a surprise. It is felt that M. de Martel had an opportunity of setting up a strong Government containing pronounced Nationalists that would have commanded the respect and the confidence of the country. With such a body he might have taken a strong line himself, and have insisted on a compromise that would have been acceptable to all who are not extremists whilst safeguarding other interests. It is, indeed, said that such advice was tendered to him by his advisers here. Instead, he set up a colourless Ministry, and thereafter began to waver. Consequently, it is maintained, now is the time to display greater recalcitrance than ever. A manifesto is being circulated over the name of the "Committee of the Sword of Justice" condemning the change of Government and the declarations of the High Commissioner as political manoeuvres intended to deceive the country, calling for the continuation of the general strike and for the boycott of all foreign goods and of the services of the public utility companies, and appealing to the people not to spend their time in coffee-houses and cinematograph theatres, nor to celebrate the Korban Bairam, but to school themselves for the defence of their country and the avenging of their martyrs under a banner "red with the blood of traitors and of colonisers."

4. How far the opportunity outlined above did lie open to M. de Martel I am unable to say. One thing, however, is clear and must have influenced the Nationalist decision to maintain, and, indeed, to increase, their opposition to the mandatory Power. That is that the population here is beginning to suffer considerably from the general strike, and, if a truce were called at this stage, could not be persuaded to resume the struggle at a later date, even by a revival of the present methods of intimidation.

5. The cessation of business has become more marked in the last few days. Provision merchants in the Christian quarter who had remained open hitherto have now closed. Stocks of perishable food-stuffs are rotting. Some French families are endeavouring to build up hoards. The shortage of ready money is increasingly felt, and the Aleppo Municipality has informed its employees that salaries due at the end of this month cannot at present be paid. Amongst the poor there is growing distress, which would be worse but for doles distributed by the organisers of the strike through Moslem charities. The identity of these organisers remains a mystery.

6. There have been few incidents. One or two innocuous bombs have been exploded. Random shots were fired two nights ago at lighted windows in a building where my German colleague has an office. It does not appear that there was any thought of involving a foreign consulate in an incident, but that the shooting was a demonstration against a firm in the same building that had not closed its premises. An attempt to give effect to anti-Christian feeling has resulted in the issue of stringent directions from the Nationalists to the effect that anything of the sort would only serve to strengthen the French position in Syria and must be scrupulously avoided.

7. I am sending copies of this despatch direct to His Majesty's consul-general at Beirut and to His Majesty's consul at Damascus.

I have, &c.

ROBERT PARR.

[E 1313/195/89]

No. 95.

Consul MacKereth to Mr. Eden.—(Received March 9.)

(No. 16.)

Sir,

Damascus, February 13, 1936.

FOLLOWING my despatch No. 15 of the 10th February concerning the troubles in Syria, I have the honour to inform you that martial law was proclaimed yesterday in Damascus.

2. I enclose copies of a public warning issued by General Hutzinger, Commander-in-chief of the French forces in the Levant.

3. The last act of the civil authorities was to arrest the Nationalist Députés Nassib Bakry and Jamil Mardam. I transmit herewith a copy of the communiqué issued by the High Commissioner announcing this fact and giving reasons for this action taken by the mandatory authorities.

4. The poise that General Hutzinger may be counted upon to bring to the control of the situation, which has only become grave owing to a sequence of hysterical administrative acts of commission and omission, will probably rapidly restore public order, notwithstanding the fact that political passions are still running high.

5. I am sending copies of this despatch to Aleppo, Bagdad, Beirut and Jerusalem.

I have, &c.

GILBERT MAC KERETH.

Enclosure 1 in No. 95.

Avis à la Population de Damas.

D'ORDRE de son Excellence le Comte de Martel, Haut-Commissaire de la République française, l'autorité militaire prend, à partir du 12 février midi, la charge de rétablir l'ordre dans la ville de Damas.

Le Haut-Commissaire militaire informe la population de sa volonté formelle de mettre, si nécessaire, tous ses moyens en œuvre pour accomplir sa mission.

Son action durera autant que les circonstances le nécessiteront.

Le commandement militaire ne recherche pas le conflit, mais il ne le craint pas, et il est fermement résolu à protéger les habitants paisibles contre les menées des fauteurs de troubles et à chercher toutes les responsabilités.

Si la persuasion ne suffit pas, la force sera employée; les coupables seront déferés aux tribunaux militaires.

Aucune manifestation ne sera tolérée dans la rue; les attroupements de plus de quatre personnes seront dispersés.

Le commandement militaire fait un pressant et dernier appel à la population damasquine, dont il ne veut que le bien, pour qu'elle ne mette pas les troupes dans la cruelle nécessité de rendre coup pour coup.

LE GÉNÉRAL COMMANDANT SUPÉRIEUR
DES TROUPES DU LEVANT.

Enclosure 2 in No. 95.

Communiqué.

LES chefs nationalistes ayant, avec leur hypocrisie habituelle, tenté d'exploiter un crime de droit commun à des fins politiques et d'organiser de l'agitation à l'occasion des obsèques de la victime, le Haut-Commissaire s'est vu dans l'obligation de prendre à leur endroit des mesures de rigueur. Il ne saurait admettre, en effet, qu'au moment où l'autorité militaire est responsable de l'ordre de la ville, des agitateurs de mauvaise foi n'hésitent pas à risquer de faire couler le sang et à sacrifier à leurs ambitions personnelles des manifestants égarés par leurs intrigues.

En conséquence, les deux principaux instigateurs responsables de cette manœuvre mensongère, Nassib Bakry et Djamil Mardam, ont été appréhendés.

[E 1326/381/65]

No. 96.

Sir M. Lampson to Mr. Eden.—(Received March 10.)

(No. 223.)

Sir,

Cairo, February 24, 1936.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a report prepared in the Sudan Agency in Cairo on the "Pan-Islamic Arab Movement."

2. You will, of course, be familiar with the progress of this alienation of the Moslem populations of Syria and Palestine from France and England owing

[14214]

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to the operation of their respective policies in favour of the Christians in Syria and the Jews in Palestine. The influence of Egypt on Palestine and Syria is considerable owing to its cultural prestige in the Near East and the diffusion of its newspapers. The agitation in Egypt has recently been reflected in both Palestine and Syria, and no doubt any increased tension in Egypt will similarly react on those two countries.

3. Press reports of agitation in French North African possessions seem to show that the unrest described above is not without its counterpart in the western half of the Islamic territories on the Mediterranean.

4. His Majesty's Government will no doubt have in mind the importance of conciliating Egypt and detaching her as far as possible from the anti-European fermentation in neighbouring countries.

I have, &c.

MILES W. LAMPSON,
High Commissioner.

Enclosure in No. 96.

Report on the Pan-Islamic Arab Movement.

(Secret.)

THE recent events in Damascus, Aleppo, Hama and Homs, the leading Syrian towns, ostensibly against French misrule, but really part and parcel of general Arab-Islamic unrest, are worthy of the attention of those interested in the political future of the Near East.

To appreciate fully the importance of this unrest one has to go some years back in the study of events.

Under the Turkish caliphate the Arabs of Mesopotamia, Syria and Palestine always felt that they formed a part of the ruling Turkish authority. They shared to a certain extent in the civil and military administration, but, more important than that, they were given a free hand by the Turks in the ill-treatment and robbery of the non-Mahometan elements of the population.

With the advance of education and travel, however, the Mahometan Arabs began to feel that, in spite of their supremacy over the Christians and other elements, they had been deprived by the Turks of many of their national rights and privileges, and a spirit of dissatisfaction began to spread amongst the most enlightened element. Expression of these feelings were drastically suppressed by the severity of the Hamidian régime. During the short rule of the Committee of Union and Progress, this faction raised its voice even louder, and it was clear that it would be a force to be reckoned with in the future. But the advent of the Balkan, Tripolitan, and finally the Great War, crippled any growth of the movement.

At the outbreak of the Great War the Arabs were anxious and ready to shake off the Turkish yoke and assume some sort of self-government. Hence the universal response to the call of King Hussein against the Turks. Events, however, after the war went far to disillusion them.

It must be remembered that the feelings of the Arab Mahometans in general were exceedingly pro-British, and anti-British propaganda carried out in Egypt had little effect on them. They were witnessing with their own eyes the prosperity, the advancements and the liberty enjoyed in Egypt through British rule and longed to enjoy a similar position themselves.

The expulsion of King Feisal from Damascus, the end of their dreams of an Arab State, the Balfour promise, Zionist policy and French rule in Syria have gone far to alienate their feelings. The Arab Mahometans, who enjoyed immense material privileges and moral and social ascendancy under the Turks and who were looking forward to improving their social and political status and their future prospects, suddenly found themselves handed over, in Syria to French misrule, and in Palestine to the prospects of a Jewish State. In Syria they found all progress in their social and political life arrested and their country impoverished by the greedy economic policy of the French, and in Palestine they discovered the Jews, upon whom they have ever looked with scorn and contempt as inferior creatures, suddenly raised by the British to a degree of equality, with a threat of future suzerainty and supremacy in the country.

Their general disillusionment and their conviction that Great Britain and France have misled and cheated them has altered their attitude altogether, and has totally wrecked their past confidence in Great Britain's honesty and loyalty. They are now firmly convinced that the creation of the essentially Christian State of Great Lebanon in Syria and the Zionist State in Palestine are political strokes of France and Great Britain intended to create two non-Mahometan Arab buffer States in order to separate the Syrians and Mesopotamians from the Egyptian and Sudanese and other African Mahometans. The Syrians and Mesopotamians now believe that the political anti-British movement in Egypt, upon which they looked in the past with indifference, is genuine and worthy of their sympathy.

The feeling throughout the whole of the Mahometan world may be safely described as one of restlessness, and in Syria, Palestine and Egypt as one of serious political fermentation.

Hitherto the "Pasha and old Arab notable classes" have been scattered, disunited and self-interested; they have lacked experience and political individuality and have no common ties or interests. Circumstances have now greatly changed. Better communications and the advent of the motor have brought all the Arab States and peoples into close touch with each other. The morning papers of Cairo are read in Syria and Palestine in the course of the same day and in Mesopotamia a day or two later. The Arab youth, collected from all parts of Egypt, Syria, Mesopotamia, Hejaz and Yemen, now live and study together in large numbers in schools and universities. In the American University of Beirut, the pivot of Near Eastern education, nearly a thousand Mahometan Arab young men, from all the above countries, associate and enjoy perfect freedom of self-expression. They dwell on past grievances of their race and are inspired with future ambitions; when they return to their homes in the vacations they relate to the older generations the precarious political status of Islam and of the Arabs, denouncing the infamy and treacherous policy of Great Britain and France.

This undercurrent of political unrest and dissatisfaction, based on the conviction that instead of advancing the Mahometan Arab has been thrown some generations backward, is now the problem to be tackled by statesmen in the Near East. The movements are now led by educated men who understand the world, but they lack a leader to co-ordinate the activities in different localities. At one time King Feisal of Mesopotamia was looked upon as the likely future man. But his career was cut short, and the movement will continue to be irregular so long as France keeps her large army in Syria and deals with the movement in the high-handed manner she adopts at present, and so long as Great Britain can quell the movement in Palestine. But the students' factor which has now come on to the stage, and which will develop and increase, is naturally going to keep this restive spirit awake and active.

French corruption and misrule in Syria, unfortunately, is adding fuel and accelerating events. The present rising is due to a feeling of despair owing to the stifling of all national ambition for an autonomous Government in Damascus, and owing to the extremely bad economic and financial position to which the country has been allowed to fall. The movement is now widespread and more serious than the French authorities will admit. Recent arrivals from Syria state that, had the G.O.C. listened to the High Commissioner's orders, he would have caused a massacre in Damascus similar to that of General Sarrail's a few years ago. The G.O.C., however, refused to allow the French troops to fire indiscriminately on the unarmed crowds. In Hama, however, where, it is said, eleven French soldiers were killed, French troops opened fire on the crowds and there were over 200 casualties.

The movement in Damascus is still holding its own. On the 11th February the business town had been closed for twenty-five days and a complete and successful boycott of the French tramway and lighting companies has been carried out. The strike threatens to continue and merchants are moving all their goods from the markets to their dwelling-houses.

The expression of sympathy in Palestine with the above has been unanimous and all over Syria and Palestine the mosques have been used as the meeting-places and stormy speeches are heard from every pulpit.

The problem of the future is: "What will be the attitude of these people in the event of another world crisis in which Great Britain and France are involved?" Surely they will do their best to seize such a valuable opportunity

to rise, and with an independent and armed Mesopotamia and Hejaz the movement may be troublesome, especially to the French.

The attitude of the Druses is certainly in favour of such a rising, but their past experience with the French has taught them not to make another attempt alone. The Christians in Syria are now suffering in the same way as the Mahometans from the economic crisis and look forward to the financial future with horror, and they are compelled to throw in their lot with the Mahometans, although the real feelings of the latter—when their mob is out of hand—may be illustrated by the fact that during the troubles of the last week a Christian funeral was stoned by the Mahometan ruffians. The Mahometans have apologised for it, but the real spirit is evident.

In Palestine the Christian union with the Mahometans is now a genuine one, based on the fear of future Jewish financial supremacy and their own economic ruin.

*Sudan Agency, Cairo,
February 14, 1936.*

[E 1331/292/89]

No. 97.

Consul-General Havard to Mr. Eden.—(Received March 10.)

(No. 27.)

Sir,

Beirut, March 3, 1936.

WITH reference to Mr. Rendel's letter of the 6th November last, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a memorandum on the judicial organisation of the Lebanon and of the Alaouites Territory, which has been prepared by Mr. Vice-Consul Furlonge.

2. The practical working of the system calls for little comment. It is generally held locally that the system of mixed tribunals adequately protects those foreign interests which formerly benefited from Capitulations, and, in a society brought up to low standards of judicial rectitude, the French judicial authorities have made themselves so good a reputation that there is distinct tendency, as in Syria, to resort wherever possible to the mixed instead of to the native tribunals. Especially noticeable is the number of contracts, particularly rent-contracts, made between local subjects in which it is provided that any dispute arising out of them shall be decided by the Mixed Courts. In the Lebanon, where nationalistic feeling is far less strong than in Syria, there is little tendency to accuse the High Commissioner of undue interference in the processes of justice, such as has been noticed in Syria.

3. It will be seen from section IV of the memorandum that Turkish subjects rank among "non-privileged" foreigners and have not access to the Mixed Courts, except in the special case of lawsuits arising out of the Franco-Turkish Convention of 1927. Paragraph 4 of my despatch No. 30 of the 22nd February, 1935, specifically stated that the reference was to these cases only.

4. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's consuls at Aleppo and Damascus.

I have, &c.

G. T. HAVARD.

Enclosure in No. 97.

Memorandum respecting the Judicial Organisation of the Lebanon and Alaouites.

I.—NATURE AND COMPOSITION OF THE COURTS.

THE following are the existing courts:—

(1) Courts of Common Law.

(i) *Justices of the Peace*, established in districts fixed by presidential decree. They are of two kinds: (a) native, presided over by Lebanese or Alaouite magistrates, as the case may be; and (b) mixed, presided over by French magistrates.

(ii) *Courts of First Instance*, composed of two chambers, one civil and commercial, one "correctionnel." There are five of these in the Lebanon, those of—

Beirut, sitting in Beirut;
North Lebanon, sitting in Tripoli;
Mount Lebanon, sitting in Baabda;
South Lebanon, sitting in Sidon;
Bekaa, sitting in Zahlé;

and each having jurisdiction over the district bearing its name; and one in the Alaouite Territory, sitting at Lattakia. They sit with a president and two assessors, but without a jury, an institution unknown in this country. Of these, the North Lebanon, Mount Lebanon, South Lebanon, and Bekaa courts are presided over by Lebanese. The Beirut court has both Lebanese chambers, presided over by Lebanese, and mixed chambers, in which the president is French and in which, in addition, one of the assessors is French if a majority of the interests in the case are privileged foreign; the other assessor being in all cases Lebanese. The Lattakia court is presided over by an Alaouite magistrate except where one of the parties in cause is a privileged foreigner, in which case the court is presided over by a French judge and may, at the demand of one of the parties, in addition have one French assessor, the other being in all cases Alaouite. The "parquet" consists of a "procureur de la république" and a "substitut."

(iii) *Bureau exécutif*.—Attached to each Court of Peace and of First Instance is an executive bureau charged with the execution of the judgments rendered. These bureaux are all native with the exception of one mixed "bureau exécutif" attached to the Beirut Mixed Court of First Instance and presided over by the president of the latter. The Beirut native "bureau exécutif" has a special president; the remaining courts in the Lebanon and Alaouites are presided over by the senior magistrate of the court to which they are attached.

(iv) *Juge des Référés* (Judge of Pleas of Urgency).—The presidents of the courts of first instance also perform the functions of "juges des référés" (see II (iii) below).

(v) *Court of Appeal*.—There is one for the Alaouites at Lattakia, which hears cases on appeal from the Alaouite native courts only, and one at Beirut, which is both native and mixed, and hears cases on appeal from the native Lebanese courts and from the Mixed Courts of both the Lebanon and the Alaouites. The composition of the Beirut court (which has recently been changed by Decrees Nos. 271/LR of the 21st November, 1935, and 285/LR of the 4th December, 1935), will as from the 13th April, 1936, be: three Lebanese chambers, one civil and commercial, one criminal, and one for appeals on "correctionnel" cases, and one mixed chamber. The Lebanese personnel will consist of one president of the court, three presidents of chambers, and nine counsellors; the French personnel of one president of a chamber and two counsellors. The "parquet" consists of a "procureur général" and an "avocat-général."

(vi) *Supreme Court of Appeal (Cour de Cassation)*.—There is only one for both the Lebanon and the Alaouites, sitting at Beirut. Its composition, like that of the Court of Appeal, has been changed by Decrees Nos. 271/LR of the 21st November, 1935 (copy attached)⁽¹⁾ and 285/LR of the 4th December, 1935, and as from the 13th April, 1936, will be mixed and will consist of one French or Lebanese Chief President ("Premier Président"), and six counsellors, two of them French and four Lebanese. The "procureur général" in this court will be Lebanese or French according as the Chief President is French or Lebanese.

(2) Religious Courts.

In addition to the above courts of common law, there exist religious courts corresponding to each of the main religious denominations for hearing matters of personal status (see II (E) below). The following is a list of them:—

(i) Moslem Courts (Sheria):—

(a) *Sunni*.—There are seven Sunni Sheria Courts in the Lebanon and two in the Alaouites. There is one court of appeal (Tamyiz) at Beirut.

(b) *Shia*.—There are four Shia Sheria Courts, at Baalbeck, Shiab, Sidon and Beirut, with a court of appeal (Mahkima-al-Ja'afaria) at Beirut.

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

(ii) *Jewish Courts.*

There is one only for the Lebanon and Alaouites, sitting at Beirut and presided over by the Grand Rabbi, assisted by two Rabbis and a clerk. There is no court of appeal.

(iii) *Roman Catholic Oriental Communities.*

All these communities possess courts of first instance, presided over by Archbishops, and courts of appeal, presided over by the Patriarch, with a further appeal to the Pope.

(a) *Maronites* have eight courts all in the Lebanon, with a court of appeal at Bkorké.

(b) *Latins* (European Roman Catholics) have a court and court of appeal at Beirut, over which the Apostolic Delegate presides.

(c) *Greek Catholics* have seven courts in the Lebanon and a court of appeal at Damascus or Cairo (in the winter) or Ain Traz (Lebanon) (in the summer).

(d) *Armenian Catholics* have one court and one court of appeal, both at Beirut.

(e) *Catholic Syrians.* As for (d).

(iv) *Orthodox Oriental Communities.*

(a) *Greek Orthodox* have seven courts of first instance for the Lebanon and one for the Alaouites, with a court of appeal at Damascus.

(b) *Armenian Orthodox* have two courts for the Lebanon and one for the Alaouites, these courts also acting as courts of appeal.

(c) *Syriac Orthodox* have one court and one court of appeal, both at Beirut.

(v) *Protestants.*

The Syrian Protestants, who belong to the Presbyterian denomination, have three courts in the Lebanon, presided over by Pastors appointed by the President of the Lebanese Republic for that purpose. Up to the present time no court of appeal has existed and judgments given by these courts have been final, it is understood, however, that petitions have been presented to the President of the Lebanese Republic asking for the institution of a court of appeal as well as for another court at Tripoli.

II.—FUNCTIONS OF THESE COURTS.

(A) *Civil and Commercial Cases.*(i) *Justices of the Peace* hear—

Lebanon—

(a) Cases of personal property ("actions personnelles mobilières") where the sum involved does not exceed £T. 100 gold (calculated as £ Syrian 550), without appeal when the sum is less than £T. 10 gold (£ Syrian 55), but otherwise with the option of appeal; and

(b) Cases of landed property ("actions immobilières") where the sum involved does not exceed £T. 100 gold, but always with the option of appeal.

Exception.—In bankruptcy cases the court of first instance has exclusive jurisdiction.

Alaouites—

(a) Cases of personal property where the sum involved does not exceed £ Syrian 300, without appeal if the sum is less than £ Syrian 150, but otherwise with the option of appeal.

(b) All cases of landed property, with the option of appeal. Appeals from the decisions of Alaouite Justices of the Peace are made direct to the "Cour de Cassation" (see (C) below).

(ii) *Courts of First Instance* hear—

(a) In both the Lebanon and the Alaouites all cases not reserved in law for the Justices of the Peace and other special jurisdictions.

(b) In the Lebanon only, appeals from judgments of the Justices of the Peace, where made.

(iii) "*Juges des Référés*," deal with urgent measures to be taken in civil, commercial and criminal cases, without pronouncing on them and reserving to the Chief of the Executive Bureau the special competence vested in him.

(iv) *The Court of Appeal*, in both the Lebanon and the Alaouites, hears appeals from judgments of the respective courts of first instance.

(B) *Penal Cases.*

(i) *Justices of the Peace* try, in both the Lebanon and the Alaouites—

(a) All simple misdemeanours ("contraventions") without appeal, except that when they pronounce a sentence of imprisonment appeal can always be made;

(b) All minor crimes ("délits") punishable by fine and/or imprisonment for a period not exceeding six months, always with the option of appeal.

(ii) "*Tribunaux correctionnels*"—

(a) Try all misdemeanours and crimes ("infractions") not reserved in law for other courts, in both the Lebanon and the Alaouites;

(b) Hear appeals from judgments of the Justices of the Peace, in the Lebanon only. (See (C) (v) below.)

(iii) *The Court of Appeal* (Lebanese and Alaouite mixed "*chambres des affaires correctionnelles*") hears appeals from the Lebanese and Alaouite "*tribunaux correctionnels*" respectively.

(C) *The "Cour de Cassation."*

This comes above all the foregoing jurisdictions. Appeals can be made to it from both the native and the mixed tribunals, it being composed of a French majority in the latter case only. Amongst the types of cases which can be taken to it on appeal are the following:—

(i) *Arrêts contradictoires*.—(Decisions given after all parties have been heard) pronounced by the civil and commercial chambers of the court of appeal.

(ii) Judgments of the courts of first instance, functioning as appeal courts, in civil and commercial cases, at the expiry of the period fixed for lodging objections.

(iii) Decisions and judgments of the Court of Appeal or of the courts of first instance functioning as appeal courts in criminal cases.

(iv) Complaints against judges of lower courts.

(v) Appeals from the Alaouite justices of the peace and court of appeal.

If the "Cour de Cassation" does not reject the application as unjustified, and annuls the judgment, it refers the case back to another jurisdiction of the same order as that which gave the judgment now annulled. This new jurisdiction ("jurisdiction de renvoi") is bound by the decision of the "Cour de Cassation" as regards the points of law on which the latter has pronounced. The judgment which it gives cannot be referred a second time to the "Cour de Cassation," except that the Attorney-General has the right to make such application if in his opinion the law is being transgressed.

(D) *Land Cases.*

Generally speaking, there are no special land courts, and land cases are within the competence of the courts of common law.

An exception to this rule is, however, provided by the fact that, as a result of the modification of the Ottoman land law which has been introduced by legislation, operations of "recensement" and delimitation have been and are being carried out, and that, where these operations are in progress, a special judge may, by decision of the head of the State, be appointed in each "caza" or district to deal with disputes arising out of them. Failing the appointment of such special judge, his functions are performed by the justice of the peace of that area.

This special judge ("juge unique immobilier"), or the justice of the peace, as the case may be, supervise the working of the geometer who carries out the

provisional delimitation and boundary fixing operations, and also decides, without appeal the following:—

- (i) All disputes arising between the geometer and the landowners out of these operations.
- (ii) Questions regarding his competence, even when, according to the laws in force, the decision is subject to appeal.
- (iii) Questions and disputes relating to boundary or neighbours' rights, such as party rights, ancient lights, drainage, right of way, &c.

He also decides in the first instance questions and disputes relating to the existence or extent of rights of property or real property ("droits de propriété ou droits réels immobiliers") and to the position of the boundaries of real estate ("immeubles"), with the option of appeal to the auxiliary chamber of the court of appeal. This latter chamber will be suppressed in 1936 and land cases will thenceforward be brought, or validly continued, before the civil and commercial chamber.

As regards land cases in which foreigners are involved, Decree No. 86/LR of the 17th April, 1935, changed the existing procedure by laying down that the "juge de paix" or "juge unique immobilier" (who would in general be a Lebanese or Alaouite) should be competent to hear such cases, but that appeals from his judgments could be made to the mixed court of appeal. The Beirut consular corps decided on the 30th May, 1935, to protest in principle against this change of procedure, but it has not as yet been modified.

(E) Personal Status.

By Decree No. 109/LR of the 14th May, 1935, the High Commissioner enacted that cases of personal status involving one or more foreigners in whose country such cases were dealt with by common law should in the French Mandated Territories of the Levant be dealt with exclusively by the courts of common law. This decree was particularly aimed at Turkish subjects.

In the case of foreigners not covered by this decree, the religious tribunals enumerated in I (2) above are in general competent. They were, however, by Decree-Law No. 6 of the 3rd February, 1930, of the President of the Lebanese Republic, relieved of all the functions formerly vested in them with the exception of the following classes of case, which were specifically reserved to them (article 34):—

- (i) Betrothals.
- (ii) Marriage contracts.
- (iii) Nullity of marriages.
- (iv) Dissolution and weakening of marriage ties (divorce, judicial, separation, &c.).
- (v) Kinship (filiation).
- (vi) Legitimacy of infants.
- (vii) Guardianship of minors.
- (viii) Allocation of alimony between spouses, or of compensation in the event of nullity of marriages (subject to the right of the civil courts to fix the amount of the alimony or compensation, even during the course of the proceedings of divorce, nullity or legal separation by a judgment which is in all cases provisionally executory with or without guarantee).
- (ix) The right to decide, in cases where both parties signify agreement in writing, the amount of this alimony or compensation and questions relating to trousseaux and dowries.
- (x) The right to nominate the guardian of a minor and his successor in the event of his dying, resigning, or being dismissed, within a month from the receipt of an application *ad hoc*.
- (xi) The right to receive amounts from the administrator of a Wakf and to give him a discharge in the two following cases:—
 - (a) When the person to whom the Wakf is escheated ("dévolué") when the accounts are rendered is a religious body, and
 - (b) When by virtue of the act of constitution of the Wakf its administration is specifically reserved to a religious authority.

- (xii) The right to nominate the beneficiaries of a Wakf when, by virtue of its act of constitution, its revenues are specifically assigned to the poor of a family.

The same decree-law lays down (article 36) that matrimonial cases will come before the religious authority before whom the marriage was performed; and (article 38, modified by the decree-law of the 9th December, 1930), that both Sunni and Shia jurisdictions of personal status retained their former competence in regard to all persons coming within their respective jurisdictions and that the same powers as those conferred upon them are conferred on the Druze jurisdictions of personal status.

III.—TABLE OF THE COURTS THROUGH WHICH A CASE PASSES.

(See Appendix A. (1))

IV.—COMPETENCE OF MIXED AND NATIVE COURTS AND POSITION OF FOREIGNERS.

In general, cases involving only natives of the country and/or "non-privileged" foreigners are heard by the native courts, and cases in which any "privileged" foreign interest is involved are heard by the Mixed Courts.

The definition of "privileged" foreigners is given in article 8 of Decree No. 1820 of the 17th February, 1928, as follows:—

- (1) Subjects of those European States which on the 1st August, 1914, enjoyed the benefit of Capitulations or of special juridical privileges in these countries.
- (2) Subjects of States the present-day territories of which have been detached from those of any one of these former capitulatory or privileged States; also subjects of countries belonging to such States, with the exception of mandated countries.
- (3) Subjects of North and South American States and of Japan.
- (4) Subjects of countries admitted by special conventions to the benefits of the Mixed Courts.

The foreigners covered by (1) and (2) above are the following: British, French (including Algerians and Tunisians), Italians, Russians (including "White" Russians), Germans, Austrians, Hungarians, Czechoslovaks, Greeks, Roumanians, Poles, Finns, Latvians, Lithuanians, Swedes, Norwegians, Danes, Dutch, Spaniards, Portuguese, Swiss, Estonians, Belgians, Chinese, and subjects of Danzig.

Those covered by (4) are at present only Iranians.

It will be noted that Yugoslavs, Albanians, Iraqis, Bulgarians, Afghans, Egyptians, Palestinians and Turks are not covered by the above (except that disputes arising out of the Franco-Turkish Convention of the 27th October, 1932, are heard by the Mixed Courts).

In practice, the range of cases heard by the Mixed Courts is very wide. As in Syria, the most liberal interpretation is usually placed on the term "foreign interests" in a lawsuit, and cases only indirectly involving, or seeming likely to involve, privileged foreigners are usually heard by the Mixed Courts. In addition, some of the following types are taken to the Mixed Courts even when they involve only natives of the country:—

- (1) Cases concerning limited companies ("sociétés anonymes"), whether Lebanese, Alaouite, or other (Decree No. 2881 of the 27th September, 1924).
- (2) Suits or actions to which the Customs Administration is party, or, in special cases (Decree No. 3121 of the 22nd May, 1922) intervenes.
- (3) Civil or penal actions of a repressive nature or concerning claims made by or against servants on native agents of the Sûreté-Générale, where the actions relate to acts connected with the exercise of the duties of these agents (Decree No. 41/LR of the 27th May, 1931).
- (4) Offences against public order or security following a special procedure laid down by Decree No. 115/LR of the 10th August, 1932, for dealing with offences of a political nature.

(1) Not printed.

- (5) Civil and commercial suits between natives and/or "non-privileged" foreigners where the parties have, previously to the cause of action, agreed by formal declaration to submit their differences in respect of the matters in dispute to the Mixed Courts (article 9 of Lebanese Law of the 17th February, 1928, and article 5 of Alaouites Decree No. 1823 of same date). Incidentally, the same articles lay down that "privileged" foreigners can similarly covenant to have their differences heard by the native courts.
- (6) Requests for execution of judgments of foreign courts pronounced in matters of "statut personnel" (Decree No. 43/LR of the 30th May, 1931).
- (7) Offences concerning the trade in arms and munitions of war (Decree No. 51/LR of the 3rd May, 1932).
- (8) Suits concerning the Hejaz Railway (Decree No. 53/LR of the 8th June, 1931).

V.—SYSTEMS OF LAW EMPLOYED.

(1) Lebanon.

- (i) *The Sharia Courts* employ the Ottoman laws of personal status in so far as these have not been abrogated or modified by subsequent laws or decrees.
- (ii) *Other Religious Courts* employ their own canonical laws of personal status.
- (iii) *The Courts of Common Law* employ (a) the Medjellé (Ottoman Civil Code) in so far as its provisions have not been abrogated or modified by (b) the "Code des Obligations et Contrats" of the 11th October, 1934, and (c) the "Code de Procédure civile" of the 1st February, 1933; (d) the Ottoman Penal Code and Code of Penal Procedure; (e) Customs Code of the 15th June, 1935; and (f) the High Commissioner's decrees regarding real estate.

2. The Alaouites.

- (i) *Sharia Courts*.—As for the Lebanon.
- (ii) *Other Religious Courts*.—As for the Lebanon.
- (iii) *The Courts of Common Law* employ the Ottoman Civil Code, Penal Code, Code of Penal Procedure, and Commercial Code, except for certain modifications introduced by decree.

VI.—PROBATE JURISDICTION.

(1) Lebanese, Non-Moslems.

The regulations governing the testamentary dispositions of non-Moslem Lebanese subjects are laid down in the Lebanese Law of the 7th March, 1929, the principal provisions of which are as follows:—

- (a) Non-Moslem Lebanese may leave their real and personal property to anyone, whether a relative or not, except that where they leave father, mother, children or spouse, certain fixed percentages of the total estate are reserved for these and must be distributed amongst them before the remainder of the estate is distributed.
- (b) Their wills have executory force and need not be probated by a judgment, provided that they are drawn up in the forms provided for in this law. These forms include legalisation of the testator's signature by a notary, a president of a common law court, or a bishop of the testator's sect, in his presence and in the presence of four non-beneficiary witnesses, special provisions being laid down to cover the case of illiterate testators.
- (c) Disputes arising out of such wills are heard by the courts of common law.
- (d) When such wills are made outside Lebanese territory, they must be drawn up in the form customary for such wills in the place where they are made.

(2) Lebanese Moslems.

The law cited in the preceding paragraph also lays down that the estates of Moslem Lebanese shall be regulated by the provisions of the Medjellé (Ottoman Civil Code) regarding inheritance.

(3) Alaouites.

All estates are dealt with in accordance with the Ottoman Civil Code.

(4) Foreigners.

Decree No. 141/LR of the 3rd October, 1933, modified by Decree No. 298/LR of the 26th December, 1934, laid down the rights and powers of consuls as regards the estates left in the French Mandated Territories of the Levant by foreigners dying in or outside those territories. These powers included the right to seal, list, sell, take charge of, administer, and liquidate the property of the deceased. Any dispute or claim arising out of the estate must, however, be brought before the common law courts, the consul having the right to represent the heirs.

In the case of "privileged" foreigners (see Section IV above), the competent authority is the Justice of the Peace, or a judge appointed by the court of first instance to replace him "statuant en matière étrangère." For non-privileged foreigners, the native courts, Lebanese or Alaouite as the case may be, are competent. Cases concerning estates are, by article 95 of the "Code de Procédure civile," heard from beginning to end by the court before which they were opened.

In all cases the courts apply the foreigner's own national law.

Where, according to this law, the will is in good form, it may be given immediate executory force.

The actual procedure is as follows:—

A petition to the "Juge de paix, causes étrangères" should be filed by the surviving heirs, or their duly appointed legal representative stating:—

- (i) Name of the deceased person, day and date of death, last residence, &c.
- (ii) Names of next of kin (or reputed ones) degree of kinship, age, place of abode, profession, &c.

and asking for grant of probate (in case of will and testament) or for order of devolution of estate (if *de ejus* died intestate).

To the above petition should be attached:—

- (i) Will and testament (if any).
- (ii) Certificate of devolution from the Ecclesiastical Court of the community to whom the deceased belonged.
- (iii) Affidavit sworn before the consul giving a detailed and accurate statement of deceased estate, real and personal.
- (iv) Certificate of guardianship if minors are involved.
- (v) Any other relevant papers.

N.B.—(a) Original and copies of any document put in, including translation thereof (if drawn up in foreign language) should be attested by respective authorities, *e.g.*, original, by consulate, translation, by notary public.

(b) The court has discretionary powers to call any evidence in support of facts, statements, and documents produced by interested parties.

The case may be heard *ex parte* and decision given in chambers.

If contested case will be heard in open court, parties will be cited as usual, judgment given in presence of absence subject to apposition, appeal and revision. Execution judgment to be levied and notified to all persons concerned as usual.

It is to be noted that, by the law of the 18th June, 1929, Lebanese are permitted to inherit both real and personal property from foreigners; and that by Decree No. 3339 of the 12th November, 1930, foreigners can only inherit real property from Lebanese if their national law allows the same privilege to Lebanese in their country (which is the case where British subjects are concerned); and that foreigners of different nationalities can inherit both real and personal property from each other.

[E 1397/195/89]

No. 98.

Consul Parr to Mr. Eden.—(Received March 13.)

(No. 10.)

Sir,

Aleppo, March 7, 1936.

I HAVE the honour to report that, following on the situation described in my despatch No. 8 of the 29th February, news was received here on Monday, the 2nd March, of the heads of agreement reached at Beirut the previous evening, and the next day some of the deported politicians arrived in the town. Opinion was reluctant to accept the High Commissioner's undertakings at their face value, an attitude combated by the Nationalist leaders, who fear that their bargain will lapse if they are manifestly unable to carry the population with them. Accordingly, on Wednesday, the first day of the Korban Bairam, an appeal was made in the principal mosque for order, for loyalty to the leaders and for the resumption of business activity. Comment was merely that the speaker had been bought. Similar appeals were made on the Friday, but the issue is still doubtful. The mob is not entirely in hand, and an uncomfortable situation may result from the jealousies of the leaders and the influence of a section of the merchants that looks to benefit from further delay in reopening the market. Yesterday a pharmacy and a doctor's consulting room were attacked, as well as the premises of barbers and refreshment dealers who had been suffered to remain open hitherto. At the moment of writing this despatch the outcome of the next forty-eight hours is uncertain, and a perceptible tension exists. The local leaders, who have formed a shadow Administration, should succeed in imposing their authority if they can agree amongst themselves. Failing that, there may be occasion for nervousness. It must be borne in mind that the French acceptance of the agreement of the 1st March has been a complete surprise to the whole country. The Nationalist leaders were not prepared for it, and the mob is preening itself on the possession of unsuspected gifts of intelligence and strength.

2. I recently heard a general review of the situation from the lips of an educated Moslem whom I believe, in political and religious matters alike, to be a detached observer. It was of sufficient interest to merit a summary here.

3. He said that the occupation of the Arab countries had been a drain on the resources and had contributed to the fall of the Ottoman Empire. The charge had been assumed by France and Great Britain, but in still less favourable conditions. They had been hampered by the duality of control and by a failure to admit the true implications of the problem. Under the Turk, Arabia and the lands to the north had at least been an economic entity. They were now partitioned between five separate Administrations in defiance of the factors of trade, geography and race. The present agitation in Syria did not derive radically from the rather silly suppressions of the French, nor even from their exploitation of the country, although both these things had been immediate contributing causes. It was part of a general movement that had been in slow preparation for many years and had now been set in motion by the Italian war. To regard it as a form of the nationalism familiar to Europeans was an error that might prove costly. It was a renaissance of the fanaticism that had emerged from the deserts to win the victories of the 7th century, and M. de Martel's surrender had been a first instalment of revenge for the defeat of Tours. To imagine that the ideas of western civilisation could take firm root, even in Turkey, was to be deceived. In a couple of generations, if not before, Islam would stand arrayed against Europe along the whole Mediterranean littoral from the Bosphorus to the Atlantic. England might have forestalled such a development by the incorporation of Egypt in the Empire—a step which at one time would have secured the prosperity of the fellaheen and have gratified the vanity of the pashas—but it was now too late, and it would be England who was faced by the first problem of really grave difficulty presented by this movement when, in the natural course of its evolution, the frontiers dividing the Arab countries proper were abolished and she had to choose between war and the betrayal of her commitments to the Zionists.

4. Speaking more particularly of the state of affairs in Syria to-day, he said that the chief grievances for which the mandatory authority was held to be responsible were heavy taxation, burdens imposed in the interests of the public utility companies, corruption of individuals and abuse of the courts of law. The

Nationalists would not have been so successful in ranging the people of Aleppo beside them had not the great majority of their ignorant supporters here believed that the movement meant the end of all taxation, as well as the departure of the French. He said, too—and the warning came the more weightily from a Moslem—that no paper guarantees would safeguard the minorities, that in the streets Christians were already being threatened with the fate in store for them, and that the history of the Assyrians in Iraq would have its counterpart here. The protestations of gratitude now being lavished on the Maronites in the press meant nothing, at least in Northern Syria, and the attitude of the Patriarch could not avail to temper, except momentarily, the latest fanaticism of the Moslems.

5. There are, of course, readily apparent considerations to be set against the general lines of this forecast, which probably starts from the assumption that a European war will put an end to the various influences working for the spread of civilisation in the Middle East. But it is interesting in so far as it reflects ideas which are being canvassed amongst certain of the better educated Syrians at the present time.

6. In its particular assertions it is more important. In spite of warnings from their leaders, the Moslems have allowed themselves to be betrayed by news of the High Commissioner's concessions into disquieting symptoms of truculence against the Christians, whom they have sullenly learned to regard during the past years as the favourites of a foreign Administration. There have been various incidents, giving rise to serious uneasiness, especially amongst the Armenians, for the eventual security of the minorities of the town, and, while Nationalist influence is working to obtain Christian signatures to a manifesto proclaiming that there is nothing to fear from religious fanaticism and that Syrian solidarity overrides all differences of creed, the various heads of congregations have set before the High Commissioner's representative at Aleppo their profound anxiety for the fate of their flocks in the case of a withdrawal of direct French control.

7. Among those who have broached the subject to me has been the new Minister of Finance, M. Homsy, a banker of this town who had the advantage of receiving part of his education at Balliol. He was of opinion that the only possible solution of the difficulty would be for the League of Nations to provide a gendarmerie. Some armed force would be essential, whilst popular opinion would not tolerate the presence of French troops.

8. M. Homsy also spoke of the difficulties being created for the new régime by the provocation of protests from the Bedouin, from the Jebel Druze and from other sectional interests; of the conflicting claims to places on the delegation that will go to Paris; of the need for an exhaustive enquiry into the conduct of the railways and other public utility concerns; and of the economic problems involved in the realisation of Syrian unity. Those are tasks, awkward enough for the new Ministry and its successors, that can be viewed with detachment by an observer, but the possible fate of the minorities will engage a more active attention. No doubt means can be devised to spare them the grosser forms of persecution, but it will be less easy to ensure them immunity from a calculated campaign of petty administrative and social molestation that, in course of time, may dispose many of them to look for asylum elsewhere.

9. I am sending copies of this despatch direct to His Majesty's consul-general at Beirut and to His Majesty's consul at Damascus.

I have, &c.

ROBERT PARR.

[E 1438/195/89]

No. 99.

Consul-General Havard to Mr. Eden.—(Received March 16.)

(No. 28.)

Sir,

Beirut, March 10, 1936.

WITH reference to the series of reports on recent events in Syria ending with Damascus consulate despatch No. 24 of the 4th March, I have the honour to state that the negotiations for the settlement of the Syrian question, which took place in Beirut on the 29th February and the 1st March between the French High Commission and the representatives of the Syrian Government and of the Syrian Nationalist party, were closely followed by the Lebanese.

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2. As soon as it was evident that M. de Martel was prepared to negotiate, the Maronite Patriarch, Mgr. Arida, quickly realising that the readiness of the French High Commissioner to open discussions implied a willingness on his part to make concessions to Syria, summoned the Maronite Archbishop of Beirut and entrusted to him a letter for M. de Martel, in which he claimed for the Lebanon the same treatment as the Nationalist party were claiming for Syria. The High Commissioner did not reply in writing, but requested the messenger to inform the Patriarch that there was a national Government in the Lebanon whose prerogative alone it was to treat such questions with the mandatory Power. Nothing daunted by this rebuff, the Patriarch proceeded to get in touch with certain Deputies of the Lebanese Chamber, and on the 2nd March a memorandum signed by seven Deputies was addressed to the High Commissioner and sent to him through the President of the Chamber.

3. The signatories of this memorandum, after dwelling on the fact that the Lebanon had consistently shown its aptitude for parliamentary government and for independence in times of difficulty and crisis in which it had always remained most calm and orderly, put forward the three following claims:—

- (a) The restoration of the full Constitution;
- (b) A treaty with France; and
- (c) The subsequent admission of the Lebanese Republic to the League of Nations.

4. In support of these claims, the memorandum states that M. Clemenceau had promised such a solution to the former Maronite Patriarch, Mgr. Hoayek, and that in May 1926 the representative of the mandatory Power, when elaborating the Lebanese Constitution, had proclaimed that when the time came France would grant to the Lebanon the same favourable treatment as to Syria, and that the French Government had promised at that time to sponsor the Lebanese claim to enter the League. Further, on the 24th February last, they said the High Commissioner, in his letter to the newly-appointed President of the Syrian Council of Ministers, had stated that France was ready to grant concessions to Syria, including the return to parliamentary government, and was prepared to conclude a treaty on the basis of the Anglo-Iraq Treaty, and subsequently to help Syria to obtain admission to the League. All this had been confirmed by the agreement of the 1st March. The seven signatories to the memorandum therefore expressed the hope that, now that France was about to satisfy the desires of the Syrian people, she would also take into account the national claims of the Lebanese.

5. No reply was made to the signatories of this communication, and although a large majority of local opinion is in favour of the request for equal treatment with Syria, there is a feeling that the seven Deputies acted somewhat precipitately in putting forward these claims at a moment when the High Commissioner is so fully occupied with Syria. It appears to be felt that it would have been more dignified to put forward these claims after they had been discussed in the Chamber and had received the approval of the Deputies at a formal sitting.

6. Whilst there would appear to be little doubt that the Jebel Druse and the Sanjak of Alexandretta will join in a united Syria, the attitude of the Alaouites is somewhat obscure. The first delegation from Lattakia which waited on the High Commissioner asked for the continuation of the *status quo* and expressed a desire not to be joined to Syria. Subsequent delegations have come and expressed the desire for unity with Syria. M. de Martel is in consequence somewhat perplexed, and, whilst he has replied to the later delegations that it was a matter of indifference whether the Alaouites remained independent or united themselves with Syria, he would have to study the question.

7. On the 7th March the President of the Lebanese Republic visited M. de Martel and formally acquainted him with the desires of the Deputies of the Chamber, and asked him to bring them to the notice of the French Government during his impending visit to Paris. The High Commissioner, in reply, promised to do so, and on the 9th March an official communiqué appeared in the press confirming the promise.

8. The High Commissioner is leaving Beirut on the 17th March, and will attend the meeting of the Mediterranean Committee on the 25th March. The Syrian delegation is expected to leave for France about the same time in order to begin its negotiations with the French Government in Paris.

9. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Bagdad, His Majesty's High Commissioner in Palestine, and to His Majesty's consuls at Damascus and Aleppo.

I have, &c.
G. T. HAVARD.

[E 1434/195/89]

No. 100.

Consul MacKereth to Mr. Eden.—(Received March 16.)

(No. 20.)
Sir,

Damascus, February 24, 1936.

THE situation in Damascus remains unchanged, but the High Commissioner is beginning to assume a less opinionative attitude, and this may in turn lead to a temporary reconciliation between the Syrian people and the mandatory authorities.

2. As you are aware, the policy adopted in Syria by M. de Martel has recently been energetically attacked in the Foreign Affairs Committee of the French Chamber and in the French "Left" press. It is possible that this has prompted a more tolerant method of dealing with the present situation, for, after an interview a fortnight ago with a deputation of moderate Nationalists, which ended on an undignified note, the High Commissioner agreed last week to receive a deputation of merchants. It appears that he shared the belief, which was widespread among French officials, that the merchants and shopkeepers were unconcerned with the political future of their country and were only too anxious to resume normal activity provided they could be protected from the violence of the Nationalists. I am told that M. de Martel was surprised when the merchants—led by the mildest of Syrians, the president of the Damascus Chamber of Commerce—put forward, with more moderation of language, exactly the same proposals as the Nationalist leaders themselves, and, notwithstanding ample, indeed imposing, military protection, refused to resume trading until the mandatory Power had agreed to redress some at least of the grievances which the deputation stated the people of Syria had.

3. Yesterday the High Commissioner asked Sheikh Taj-ed-Dine to resign from the office of Prime Minister, to which, in spite of widespread public disapproval of the sheikh, M. de Martel, after suspending Parliament, appointed him in March 1934 (Damascus report, first quarter, 1934). This act will no doubt give general satisfaction and perhaps open the way to a resolution of a stalemate that has already lasted over five weeks, although, by a process of self-imposed privation, the population has reached a dangerous degree of fanatical asceticism, which is scarcely likely to facilitate a final appeasement.

4. I am sending copies of this despatch to Aleppo, Bagdad, Beirut and Jerusalem.

I have, &c.
GILBERT MACKERETH.

[E 1516/195/89]

No. 101.

Consul Parr to Mr. Eden.—(Received March 20.)

(No. 13.)
Sir,

Aleppo, March 14, 1936.

I HAVE the honour to report that, after a day or two of hesitation, it was finally decided to reopen the market of Aleppo on Monday, the 9th March. A certain amount of excitement, however, continued to be felt and was heightened by the news of a riot at Idlib, involving eight deaths, in the course of which some French travellers were very roughly handled, and by rumours of a disturbance at Antioch. During the week a few noisy demonstrations took place, culminating yesterday in a sharp brush with the police and the pillaging of some shops and stalls owned by Christians. The town was once more patrolled by mounted troops, who are again in evidence to-day. There are rumours of a recommencement of the general strike to continue until Syria obtains material proof of a desire to satisfy her pretensions.

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2. On the 8th March a Nationalist deputation visited the heads of the Christian congregations here and expressed regret for the threatening attitude towards them adopted by elements in the town, and for the various cases of assault and molestation that had occurred. At the same time efforts were made to elicit what might be claimed as a spontaneous declaration on the part of the Christians of their solidarity with the Moslems of the country, and their repudiation of any idea that the withdrawal of direct French control from Syria might expose them to persecution. Analogous invitations have been pressed on the Israelites of Aleppo. Meanwhile, as I am informed, the mandatory authorities have seized on the chance afforded by the action of the bishops, reported at the end of the sixth paragraph of my despatch No. 10 of the 7th March, to urge the importance of explicit declarations that a measure of European control is essential to the security of the Christians in Syria. The Christians have been naturally hesitant, since either course had its disadvantages, but eventually addressed a letter to the High Commissioner, copies of which were sent to the Quai d'Orsay and to Geneva. This document rehearses the various massacres of Christians which have taken place in Syria since 1850, eight in all being enumerated, and concludes by begging that France should assume responsibility for the protection of minorities until such time as the Moslems will have given sensible proof of their intention to treat the Christian minorities equitably. Meanwhile, at Antioch the Greek Orthodox community has demonstrated in favour of the Nationalists, and an attempt was made to release prisoners from the local jail. The majority of the population, however, viewed these efforts with little sympathy. Both in Antioch and in the villages of the district opinion is anti-Arab and, failing the autonomy of the sanjak, would prefer union with Turkey to embodiment in an independent Syria. Other elements throughout the sanjak, whether because they are Christian minorities or because, although Moslems, they have no sympathy with the inland Arabs, are averse to the prospect of being brought under the control of Damascus.

3. I am sending copies of this despatch direct to His Majesty's consul-general at Beirut and to His Majesty's consul at Damascus.

I have, &c.

ROBERT PARR.

[E 1712/195/89]

No. 102.

Consul MacKereth to Mr. Eden.—(Received March 30.)

(No. 23.)
Sir,

Damascus, February 27, 1936.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 21 of the 25th February reporting the nomination of Ata Bey Al Ayoubi as Prime Minister, I enclose a newspaper cutting from the *Echos* of yesterday's date reproducing a letter addressed by the High Commissioner to the new Prime Minister, and the Ayoubi Ministry's public declaration of policy.

2. The High Commissioner has made a gesture of peace in suggesting a return to the parliamentary system, and dangles the prospect of the much-desired treaty of alliance and entry to the League of Nations before the people. He also promises the immediate release of those persons who were arrested during public demonstrations and are awaiting trial. He is more cautious about the release of those already condemned (who, in fact, represent the vast majority) by the courts, civil and military, during the troubles.

3. For two reasons M. de Martel's communication has not had the effect of overcoming the public suspicion of French policy, and so the general strike continues unabated. In the first place, the Syrians say, if it is really the policy of the French Government to "réaliser les aspirations légitimes de la nation syrienne dans le cadre d'institutions parlementaires," why then did the High Commissioner suspend parliamentary sittings by what they consider to have been an abusive exercise of authority, which they hold heightened the *barrières de méfiance* between the Syrians and the mandatory Power? Public suspicion has not been allayed by the discretion with which the High Commissioner invests himself to select the condemned agitators or demonstrators who are to be released and the students who are to be allowed to return to their seminaries. In the second place, by pointedly ignoring the Nationalist party, which without doubt

represents and moulds the opinion of at least eight out of every ten Syrians, he has done nothing to diminish their dislike of him personally. As there can, I think, be no question in the minds of the High Commissioner and his staff that the Nationalist party, like the Wafd in Egypt, is the most powerful political influence in the country, it may prove to have been bad tactics to persist in publicly flouting it.

I have, &c.

GILBERT MACKERETH.

Enclosure in No. 102.

Extract from the Echos of February 26, 1936.

LA NOTE DU HAUT-COMMISSAIRE AU CHEF DU GOUVERNEMENT.

M. le Président,

LA politique de mon Gouvernement s'est toujours inspirée du désir de réaliser les aspirations légitimes de la nation syrienne, c'est-à-dire de poursuivre, dans le cadre d'institutions parlementaires, l'organisation conformément aux directives sanctionnées par la Société des Nations d'un système conciliant les aspirations unitaires avec le respect des droits reconnus par la Constitution aux minorités.

Ces directives conservent toute leur valeur.

Quand, grâce à votre sagesse et à l'autorité dont vous êtes investi, vous aurez réussi à dissiper les barrières de méfiance qui auraient pu se dresser entre l'opinion publique et la Puissance mandataire, il vous sera facile de préparer la reprise de la vie parlementaire et d'une politique d'évolution tendant à l'établissement entre la France et la Syrie d'un traité inspiré du précédent irakien et à l'entrée de la Syrie à la Société des Nations.

En vue de faciliter votre tâche, je tiens à vous donner l'assurance que les manifestants n'ayant point encore comparu devant les tribunaux civils vont être libérés et que les dossiers de ceux ayant déjà fait l'objet de condamnations seront, dans un esprit de large indulgence, individuellement examinés en vue de mesures gracieuses.

Les cas des étudiants et des écoliers frappés de sanctions seront étudiés dans le même esprit bienveillant.

Quant aux personnalités qui ont été éloignées, la nature même de la mesure prise à leur encontre indique que je suis prêt à y mettre fin aussitôt que possible dès que les motifs qui l'ont provoquée auront disparu.

La suspension prolongée de l'activité économique a posé des problèmes délicats pour les commerçants, problèmes que votre Gouvernement aura à résoudre, bénéficiant du concours bénévole des banques avec lesquelles il a déjà pris contact.

En vous confiant le pouvoir ainsi qu'à vos collègues, le Président de la République a rendu hommage à votre patriotisme, à votre compétence et à votre esprit de dévouement désintéressé au bien public; je suis heureux de m'associer à cette marque de confiance en vous déclarant que je ne vous marchanderai pas mon appui pour le plus grand bien de la Syrie.

Recevez, M. le Président, les assurances de ma haute considération.

DE MARTEL.

La Déclaration ministérielle.

Ayant accepté la charge de former le Ministère dans les circonstances actuelles en vue d'assurer le pouvoir auquel nous étions appelés, nous ne saurions que proclamer à nos chers concitoyens que nous n'avons accepté cette offre qu'après avoir étudié avec nos collègues les aspirations dont le pays ne cesse de réclamer la réalisation avec insistance.

Nous avons examiné particulièrement ce qui touche à la Puissance mandataire et à ses rapports avec le pays.

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Cet examen nous a conduit à entamer notre action sur les bases que son Excellence le Haut-Commissaire, représentant de la France, a consacrées dans les engagements contenus dans la lettre qu'il nous a adressée hier et dont le texte vient d'être rendu public.

Il nous est agréable de déclarer que le Ministère que nous venons de constituer est un Ministère de transition dont la mission principale se limite à préparer le retour à la vie parlementaire. Le Gouvernement constitutionnel prochain sera seul qualifié pour conclure le traité avec le Gouvernement de la République française et préparer l'entrée de la Syrie à la Société des Nations.

Le Gouvernement s'occupera d'abord de la réouverture des établissements scolaires fermés, de l'octroi aux étudiants et élèves touchés par les sanctions prises à l'occasion des derniers événements des mesures de clémence, de la mise en liberté des détenus et des personnalités éloignées, et l'application de toutes dispositions susceptibles de réparer les dommages causés et d'en atténuer les répercussions. Le Gouvernement s'occupera également d'assurer la reprise de l'activité normale ainsi que la stabilisation et la tranquillité et travaillera à préparer le retour à la vie parlementaire dans cette ère nouvelle souhaitée par le pays.

Nous sommes encouragés à entreprendre cette action par l'esprit de pondération de la nation syrienne et l'assurance que nous avons d'être favorisés par sa confiance; cette confiance et ce crédit nous engageront et nous aideront à assurer la réalisation des aspirations nationales dans le plus bref délai possible, confiant également dans l'aide que nous sollicitons au Très-Haut pour le plus grand bien du pays.

[E 1624/195/89]

No. 103.

Consul MacKereth to Mr. Eden.—(Received March 25.)

(No. 27.)

Sir,

Damascus, March 17, 1936.

I HAVE the honour of informing you that decrees by the President of the Syrian Republic have been published to-day appointing the members of the Syrian delegation that is shortly to proceed to Paris to negotiate the terms of a new Franco-Syrian treaty with the French Government.

2. The members of the delegation are Hasham-al-Atassi, leader of the Nationalist bloc, Farès-al-Khoury, Jamil Mardam, Saadallah Jabri, Amir Mustafa Shehabi and Edmond Homsî. Two of the members are Christians and four Sunni Moslems. Attached to the delegation will be a number of counsellors and experts who have not yet been definitely designated. It is hoped in some Nationalist quarters to bring into the delegation Dr. Abdul Rahman Shahbandar, at present a fugitive from French military justice, having been condemned by a military court for participation in the 1925 revolt. Dr. Shahbandar, who now resides in Egypt, would, it is thought, be a tower of strength to the Syrian cause.

I have, &c.

GILBERT MacKERETH.

[E 1886/381/65]

No. 104.

Sir M. Lampson to Mr. Eden.—(Received April 8.)

(No. 362.)

Sir,

Cairo, April 2, 1936.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 223 of the 24th February last, I have the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a further report prepared in the Sudan Agency in Cairo on the "Pan-Islamic Arab Movement."

2. Most of this report summarises facts already familiar to you, but the final paragraphs may be of interest.

3. The reasons of the sudden French yielding to the Syrian claim for treaty negotiations are given in paragraph 9, *i.e.*, the fear of troubles in Europe, the Syrian tenacity, and the sympathetic interest of the Mahometan world in the Syrian effort.

4. It may be argued that there is some similarity in the development of the Egyptian situation. England's preoccupation elsewhere encouraged the Egyptian demand for treaty negotiations and Egyptian tenacity made it difficult to refuse the demand.

5. The suggestion in paragraph 10 that the French yielded to the Syrians in order to make negotiations with Egypt difficult for us is too far-fetched.

6. With reference to paragraphs 11 and 12, I have, more particularly in my despatch No. 3 of the 30th March to His Majesty's Ambassador at Bagdad, a copy of which was forwarded in my despatch No. 348 of the same date, reported on recent manifestations of the movement for closer relations between Arabic-speaking peoples in the Near East. An effort is now being made to constitute a new moral front of these countries against European encroachment. It is therefore likely that the results of the treaty negotiations between Syria and France on the one hand and those between ourselves and Egypt on the other are likely to produce mutual reactions in the two countries.

I have, &c.

MILES W. LAMPSON.

High Commissioner.

Enclosure in No. 104.

(Secret.)

Memorandum respecting the Pan-Islamic Arab Movement.

II.

(The first note was issued on February 14, 1936.('))

AFTER a complete strike by the city of Damascus, which lasted more than fifty days, and a similar strike in most of the leading Syrian towns, the French Government suddenly gave way to the Syrian demands by declaring its willingness to receive in Paris a Syrian delegation representing the Syrian Nationalist party, and the new Syrian Government which had succeeded the unpopular Government of Tag-el-Din Hussein, in order to negotiate a Franco-Syrian treaty which would place the relations of the two countries on a permanent basis. The terms were to be not less magnanimous than the British-Iraq treaty. This declaration by the French Government was quickly followed by a general amnesty to those arrested during the troubles. The political leaders, who had been exiled only a few weeks before, were recalled; the Government officials as well as the teachers of the school of law, &c., discharged for political reasons, were reinstated, and both the French High Commissioner and his staff who had been only a few days before expressing disdain and contempt for the national demands, suddenly changed their attitude to one of sympathy and readiness to help in the achievement of their aims.

2. The Nationalist delegation, which consisted of Hashem-el-Atasi (leader), and comprising Saadalla-el-Gabri, Jamil Mardam, Faris-el-Khoury, all staunch Nationalist leaders, left Damascus on Saturday, the 21st March, and arrived in Paris on the 26th. Mardam is a graduate of French high schools in Paris and Faris-el-Khoury (Christian) is a graduate of the American University of Beirut.

3. The chief aim of the delegation is to get the French Government to recognise the union of the five different republics, into which Syria was divided by the French authorities, into one State with Damascus as capital. The new State is to include the Nasairiya country of the north and the Druses of Gebel Hauran, and the efforts of the French to get these two distinct races to ask for their districts to remain under the present system of administration have failed. The Syrians further aspire to a free Constitutional Government and their own army, with provisions for a military agreement and financial co-operation; also to membership of the League of Nations.

4. The position of Mount Lebanon will now be a source of anxiety to both the new Syrian Government and to the French.

5. Lebanon, as may be remembered, was granted an autonomous Government in 1860 guaranteed by the six Great European Powers. Care was taken to include in it as few Mahometan districts as possible, with the result that it became

(1) See No. 96.

an essentially Christian State (with about one-tenth of the population composed of Druses).

6. When France took over the mandate, they added to Lebanon the whole stretch of coast from Tripoli to Tyre, with a considerable part of the hinterland. This considerably increased the Mahometan population—so that nearly half the population of "Greater Lebanon" is now Mahometan and Druse.

7. When the French Government's recent decision as regards Syria became known, a movement was at once started in the towns of Greater Lebanon which had been detached from the pre-war Syria, and added to Greater Lebanon, clamouring for their return to their original States, or, alternatively, the union of all Lebanon with the new Syrian Federation. The majority of the Maronites of Lebanon, now the privileged ruling class, will oppose this movement—but all the Mahometans for racial, religious and political reasons will continue to agitate for reunion with Syria. With them are now ranged most of the non-Maronite Christians and the commercial classes of all creeds, who foresee a dark future, economically and financially, for this small State if not amalgamated in the future Syrian State.

8. The French Government in Lebanon is taking drastic action against those clamouring for union with Syria—proscribing the formation of such parties as illegal, and forbidding newspapers to discuss the subject. This will probably have the opposite effect. Further, the French Government has expressed its willingness to resuscitate the Lebanon Parliament abolished some years ago and substituted by a small sinecure Parliament.

9. News received by private letters from Syria tends to show that the French were forced to alter their front for the following reasons:—

- (1) The fear of troubles in Europe. The change of policy was declared only a few days before the incidents on the Rhine.
- (2) The unexpected and unusual tenacity of the Syrians in maintaining their strike and in arranging for its advertisement throughout the whole world.
- (3) The great interest taken in the matter by the whole of the Mahometan-Arab world, including the official protest by the Iraq Parliament and the campaign by the Arabic press in Egypt, Palestine and Iraq.

10. Some persons add to the above the desire of the French to render the negotiations in Cairo difficult for the British; whether this is true or not will appear from the result of the negotiations in Paris and the extent of the self-government granted by the French to Syria.

11. The interest taken in all Mahometan-Arab countries and the sympathy shown to the Syrian cause have been immense. Iraq, Palestine and Egypt and Hejaz have unanimously condemned the previous French line of policy, and finally expressed their great pleasure and relief at the solution. On the occasion of the anniversary of King Ghazi's birthday on the 24th March great celebrations were held in Damascus, Beirut and other Syrian towns. Contributions for the help of Syrian sufferers are being collected in Iraq, Palestine and Egypt. Even Prince Omar Toussoun has contributed £E. 50 to the fund, although he and other leaders in Egypt have, since the Great War, shown little interest in the Arab movement. (They probably look upon it with great dissatisfaction as being the cause of the downfall of the Caliphate.) The Prince and partisans of this policy now declare that the only policy against European colonisation is an Arab pact.

12. The reception in Egypt of the Iraq parliamentary and school delegations, of the Syrian and Palestinian students and pressmen, the speeches and poems delivered on these occasions go far to prove this new spirit of common feeling amongst the Arab countries.

13. The reaction in Palestine would certainly be the demand for an autonomous Government on the same lines as Iraq and Syria.

Cairo, March 28, 1936.

[E 1909/195/89]

No. 105.

Consul MacKereth to Mr. Eden.—(Received April 9.)

(No. 31.)

Sir,

Damascus, March 31, 1936.

FOLLOWING my telegram No. 4, sent to you to-day, concerning the agreement reached between the High Commissioner and the Syrian Nationalists, I have the honour to transmit herewith the texts of the twin official communiqués issued by the Syrian Government giving an account of the outcome of the negotiations with the mandatory authorities.

I have, &c.

GILBERT MacKERETH.

Enclosure in No. 105.

Extract from the Echos of March 3, 1936.

AU cours des réunions tenues à Beyrouth le 29 février et le 1^{er} mars, le Conseil des Ministres syriens s'est entretenu avec le Haut-Commissaire. Le Gouvernement avait tenu à ce que Hachem Bey Atassi assistât également aux délibérations. Celui-ci était accompagné de MM. le Dr. Kayali, Favez Khoury et Afif Solh.

Le Haut-Commissaire a fait connaître que les termes de sa lettre au Président du Conseil venaient de recevoir la sanction de son Gouvernement. Son prochain voyage en France a désormais pour objet de définir les moyens de passer à l'application.

Le Haut-Commissaire, qui rend hommage au patriotisme du noble peuple syrien, s'est rendu au désir qui lui était exprimé et s'est déclaré d'accord sur l'opportunité du voyage en France d'une délégation qui fera connaître ses vues au Gouvernement de la République française, afin de préparer la conclusion d'un traité.

Au cours des entretiens qui se sont déroulés, les délégués ont pu constater que les explications données par le Haut-Commissaire des termes de sa lettre dissipaient les appréhensions qui avaient trouvé leur expression dans la déclaration signée par Hachem Atassi.

En effet, en matière d'unité, les membres du Gouvernement ont reçu l'assurance que la France n'y était intéressée que dans la mesure où il s'agissait de préciser les modalités pratiques d'application de principe qui se trouvent être à la fois définies par la Société des Nations, à l'égard de laquelle la France est responsable, et par la Constitution syrienne que le Gouvernement syrien entend appliquer. Ces modalités seront étudiées à Paris par la délégation.

En matière de traité, il est entendu que les droits dont bénéficieront les Syriens ne seront pas inférieurs à ceux qui ont été reconnus aux Irakiens dans le dernier traité.

Dans ces conditions, le Gouvernement estime que le retour à la vie parlementaire suivant la loi électorale en vigueur et dont le principe ne fait plus de doute, est désormais un fait acquis.

Les termes du présent appel ayant reçu l'assentiment conjoint du Haut-Commissaire, de Hachem Bey Atassi et des autres membres présents aux entretiens, le Gouvernement fait appel au patriotisme du peuple syrien pour qu'il lui facilite la tâche de réaliser ses aspirations nationales.

Le Président du Conseil des Ministres,

S. ATA-EL-AYOUBI.

Les Mesures d'Amnistie sont d'Application immédiate.

Le Gouvernement syrien est heureux de proclamer qu'à l'issue des pourparlers le Haut-Commissaire a déclaré que les décisions relatives à la mise en liberté des personnalités éloignées et à la grâce des condamnés à l'occasion des derniers événements, vont être immédiatement prises et sont en cours de préparation.

En ce qui concerne les personnalités éloignées, des décisions seront prises ce jour même.

Quant à la réouverture des écoles fermées et aux mesures de grâce à l'égard des étudiants, elles sont déjà décidées et il appartient au Ministre de l'Instruction publique de les mettre en application.

Le Chef du Gouvernement,
S. ATA-EL-AYOUBI.

[E 1941/195/89]

No. 106.

Consul MacKereth to Mr. Eden.—(Received April 14.)

(No. 32. Confidential.)

Sir,

Damascus, April 4, 1936.

I HAVE the honour to submit the Damascus report for the quarter ended the 31st March, 1936.

2. I am sending copies of this report to His Majesty's representatives at Aleppo, Amman, Angora, Bagdad, Beirut, Jedda, Jerusalem, the British liaison officer at Beirut and the Air Force headquarters in Iraq.

I have, &c.

GILBERT MACKERETH.

Enclosure in No. 106.

Damascus Quarterly Report.—January 1 to March 31, 1936.

NOTE.—Nothing of political importance occurred during the quarter ended December 31 last and so no report was issued.

THE death, towards the end of 1935, of Ibrahim Hanano, the enfeebled but undisputed leader of the Nationalist *bloc*, brought the Syrian pot again to boiling point. The High Commissioner, fearful of the consequences of a recrudescence of discontent among the Syrians under more virile leadership, decided to take a strong line by arming himself with statutory powers to banish, without need to furnish justificatory evidence for the scrutiny of law courts, persons whose words or deeds might be considered by him likely to endanger public security. Then on the 18th January he ordered the exile of the Nationalist rhetorician, Fakhri Baroudy. This act had the immediate, and perhaps natural, consequence of precipitating the grave disturbances that it was no doubt designed to avert.

2. On the 19th January a general, and largely spontaneous, closing of the bazaars occurred as an act of protest against the humiliation of Fakhri Baroudy. On the following day university students played truant and assembled before the house of Nassib-al-Bakry. After being harangued there they were formed into a procession to march to the Délégation to protest against the High Commissioner's action. They were dispersed by the police. This nettled the people, who became aggressive; casualties were inflicted on the crowds and the number of wounded among the police and soldiery grew so that they, too, lost some of their patience and restraint. Matters were not improved by a meeting between Moderate Nationalists and the High Commissioner, who had come up to Damascus to deal personally with the situation. The interview ended in undignified and high-voiced altercation between M. de Martel and Faiz-al-Khoury in which the High Commissioner is alleged to have sought to intimidate the leader of the Damascus Bar by saying that he had but to give an order for the Senegalese sentry at the door to seize him and pack him off to join Baroudy in the Syrian desert. Faiz-al-Khoury, never at a loss for words, appears to have replied in disrespectful terms. The first attempt at conciliation thus broke down and both sides bared their knuckles for another round. The shopkeepers, who had, in the first place, only half-heartedly closed their shops, now declared their determination to carry on the strike to its bitter end; craftsmen and factories followed suit. Prices began to rise and the poor to want whilst a sort of politico-religious asceticism developed. The strain of constant menace and long hours of vigilance

began to tell on the police, who were not, moreover, without sympathy for their civilian compatriots. On the 4th February, M. de Martel issued a communiqué stating that the merchants of Damascus wished to end the strike but were prevented from carrying out this natural and laudable desire by "éléments de désordre." The past indulgence, said the High Commissioner, was no longer warranted, and henceforward more rigorous measures would be taken by the authorities. The Nationalists did not, however, flinch, and the shopkeepers, notwithstanding ample protection in the form of large numbers of troops and engines of war, made no attempt to return to their normal occupations. On the 6th February a crowd at Hama attacked a troop of cavalry, which in self-defence opened fire, killing seven of its assailants. On the following day similar but less serious brushes between mobs and the forces of the Government took place in Homs. In the meantime the situation in Damascus had become more threatening and on the 10th February the task of restoring order was passed on to the General Officer Commanding the French army in the Levant, and martial law was applied to the city. General Huntziger issued, in his turn, an admonishment to the people of Syria. He informed them that although the army sought no conflict with them it did not fear one. He forbade assemblies in the streets of more than three persons, and warned the population that his soldiers would return blow for blow. Following upon this, large numbers of persons were arrested and placed in preventive detention in the citadel, some to await trial before court-martial, others merely to wait. Nassib-al-Bakry and Jamil Mardam were exiled on a High Commissioner's order. The General Officer Commanding established his headquarters in the Orient Palace, in front of which Senegalese sentries kept pedestrians off the pavement; but no attempt was made to oblige passers-by to furl their umbrellas.

3. The news of what was happening got back to France despite a stringent control of journalists, French as well as foreign. A representative of an American news-reel company had the films he had taken of the disturbances confiscated at the frontier. On the 13th February the Committee for Foreign Affairs of the French Chambre nominated a sub-committee to enquire into the situation in Syria, and was not long in criticising in unmeasured terms the conduct of the mandatory authorities. The general strike went on, as it had begun, in a manner mainly passive, although occasional clashes continued to occur between police, soldiers and the civilian population.

4. On the 19th February the High Commissioner invited the president of the Damascus Chamber of Commerce, Aref-al-Halbouni, to meet him with a delegation of merchants to negotiate a settlement of the dispute. It is said in official circles that M. de Martel took this step in the belief that the merchants would appeal to him to crush the Nationalists and so allow the traders to resume trading. Such a request would, it was thought, admirably buttress the High Commissioner's own position, which was being undermined, *vis-à-vis* the authorities at home. The merchants under the gentle Harbouni repeated, however, the Nationalists' own demands *in toto* as a condition for their return to work. They asked for the immediate release of all prisoners arrested during the riots, the dismissal of Sheikh Taj-ed-Dine, the re-establishment of the Constitution, the reopening of Parliament and the negotiation of a treaty on the lines of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1931. The merchants did not share the High Commissioner's opinion that the Franco-Syrian Treaty, which the Syrian Parliament refused to ratify in 1933, was equivalent to its Anglo-Iraqi prototype. During this time the French "Left" press was becoming more and more insistent upon a change of policy in Syria.

5. On the 22nd February the French representative issued another communiqué declaring that France had never been hostile to the legitimate hopes of the Syrian people, but that until the population returned to obedient calm he could make no more public declarations.

6. On the 24th February M. de Martel asked Taj-ed-Dine to resign the premiership. After a show of reluctance and, according to popular rumour, a promise of compensation, the sheikh retired from office and went first to Beirut and then to Paris. Conjectures on the sheikh's journey to France have been many. Fear is supposed by some to have prompted his flight from Syria, where few men are more detested than he. Others believe that he was asked to go to France to be near the Quai d'Orsay, where his oriental craftiness could be at the service of the French negotiators.

7. On the urgent recommendation of the President of the Syrian Republic, the High Commissioner appointed Ata-al-Ayoubi Prime Minister. The change was favourably received by the Syrians, but it did not satisfy them. On the 26th February the prison doors were opened for all those who had been arrested but who had not then been brought before a court. In this way 157 persons were set free. According to the officially inspired newspaper the *Echos*, there remained incarcerated in Syria 3,080 persons who had been condemned by the military and civil courts to terms of imprisonment in connexion with the public disturbances since the 20th January.

8. On the 28th February, the fortieth day of the general strike, a monster demonstration was organised by the Nationalists, and the crowds came into violent contact with the police, who opened fire, killing four and wounding a large number; four rounds, in volleys, were fired.

9. On the 1st March the High Commissioner asked the Nationalists to nominate a deputation to discuss with him means to end the strike. Next day it was officially announced that agreement had been reached. The official communiqué stated that the High Commissioner, "after paying homage to the patriotism of the noble Syrian people," declared that the French Government had approved the terms of an agreement between the parties, adding that France was not concerned beyond the question of upholding the principles of the League of Nations in the matter of a "United Syria." It was agreed that a treaty, which should be no less favourable to Syria than was the latest Anglo-Iraqi Treaty to Iraq, would be negotiated forthwith in Paris by Syrian negotiators (chosen by the Syrian Government and the Nationalists) and the French Government. A return would be made to normal parliamentary practice in accordance with the Syrian constitutional electoral laws (that is to say, without application of the recently instituted system of *Mohafazas*). A general amnesty was declared of all persons arrested or exiled in connexion with the political disturbances. (A doubt remains concerning the fate of those condemned for participation in the 1925 revolt.)

10. The feast of *Ide-al-Adha* began on the 2nd March and was marked by four days' incessant parades in the streets of large processions, representing every quarter of the city and every guild. Scenes of the greatest jubilation were witnessed, the Nationalist leaders "who had led the nation to victory" were accorded especial ovations, and the city rang with the pæans of a happy people. Most of the processions stopped in front of the British consulate, where complimentary remarks were made and extempore poems recited in honour of His Majesty King Edward and his Government, whose ears must surely have burned whilst the crowds' orators commented on their magnanimity towards Iraq and, now, towards "sister" Egypt.

11. On the 2nd March the Nationalist party issued a manifesto to the people inviting them to return to work after the feast. This recommendation, like all the others, of the Nationalist leaders was followed.

12. A notable feature of the general strike and of the celebrations that succeeded it was the remarkable degree of obedience shown to the leaders and the powers of organisation and command that these leaders displayed in controlling the crowds both in anger and in joy.

13. The strike over, the Nationalists were faced with the problem of selecting their four representatives to go to Paris. Without undue difficulty their choice finally rested upon Hashem-al-Atassy, the Nationalist chief, Farès-al-Khoury, Jamil Mardam and Saadallah Jabry. The Government chose Amir Mustafa Shehaby and Edmond Homsy. Two of the members are Christians (one Protestant and one Greek Catholic) and four Sunni Moslems; they will be accompanied by a number of counsellors and experts. Because of Hashem-al-Atassy's very recent accession to the position of leader of the Nationalists in succession to the late Ibrahim Hanano he does not yet command the respect nor enjoy the authority essential to his position. There has, therefore, been a movement in the party to secure the return of Dr. Abdul Rahman Shahbandar to Syria to head the deputation to Paris, and possibly the Nationalist party too, but Hashem-al-Atassy and his friends do not appear to think it is a very good idea. There is no doubt about the doctor's ability nor of his influence among the Nationalists. It is rumoured that the French themselves do not favour his return to Syrian politics; in any case they have so far refused to extend their amnesty to him. He was condemned to death by court martial in 1926 for his share in the revolts of that and the previous year.

14. The most serious fence the Nationalist party had to take in selecting their representatives was to persuade Subhi Barakat to stand down. He is the High Commissioner's *bête noire*, perhaps on account of his incessant bombardment of the French and foreign press, French *Députés*, the League of Nations and foreign consuls with voluble denunciations of the High Commissioner's public acts and with scabrous stories of his Excellency's private life. Although Subhi Barakat has a powerful following and is a born leader, it was felt that his presence, even if the French would tolerate it—which was unlikely, might jeopardise the ultimate success of the negotiations about to begin. This stormy petrel of the Nationalist party at length and with not too good a grace gave way, but it remains an anxious question whether he will ratify what he has not been called upon to decide. On one point Subhi Barakat is very firm: it is the absolute necessity for doing away with any form of French military occupation of Syria after the signature of a treaty of friendship and alliance. He argues that whilst there was a tangible reason in the shape of imperial and strategic considerations for the maintenance of the British forces in Iraq and Egypt, no such vital aspects can be adduced by the French in respect of Syria.

15. The Syrian delegation left Damascus for Paris on the 21st March amidst scenes of great public enthusiasm. According to a newspaper report the treaty negotiations will open in Paris on the 2nd April.

16. While the Nationalists are labouring for their independence, the Christian and other "minorities" in Syria are trying to agree together on a line that should be taken to protect their interests in the event of the full realisation of Nationalist hopes. The Assyrians in particular, freshly arrived in Syria from their Iraqi experiences, are now beginning to wonder whether they have not jumped from the Iraqi frying-pan into the Syrian fire. It is thought that the number of volunteers to take advantage of the arrangements to settle them in the Ghab and Khabur Valleys may in future dwindle. This might serve to reduce the financial obligations of League members. The Nationalists are alive to the considerable material advantage that this well-endowed Assyrian settlement entails for their country and they are torn between cupidity and their dislike of the Assyrian race. Their present action is to promise the Assyrians every consideration and protection; it remains to be seen how reassured they may be by soft words.

17. The effect of the Syrian troubles in the neighbouring Arab lands has apparently been to give renewed impulsion to pan-Arabism. Sums of money and supplies of food-stuffs were collected in Palestine and Iraq and sent to Syria for distribution among the necessitous. Demonstrations of sympathy and solidarity in the Syrian cause took place in the Lebanon, Iraq, Palestine and Transjordan. So M. de Martel's idea of trying a fall with the Syrian Nationalists has had consequences beyond the Syrian mat.

18. At the end of March a party of Iraqi Members of Parliament, returning from a visit to Egypt, were fêted in Damascus by the Nationalist party. On the 28th March a luncheon was given at the Orient Palace Hotel in their honour. On the following day they were entertained by Fakhri Baroudy in his charming house and regaled with rhetoric, poetry and tea. The burden of the oratory was the future "United States of Arabia," when the speakers infected a distinguished audience with their own great enthusiasm. Ibrahim Hilmi Omar, who is said to be the Comptroller of Press and Propaganda in the Iraqi Government, and to whom the local press refer as the Iraqi "Goebbels," launched a virulent attack on European Powers in general and ended by making a jingo appeal to Arabs to unite and re-establish the glories of their distant ancestors. The proceedings ended somewhat pathetically, for the depth of feeling that the Arab poet, Al Rissafy, introduced into a bardic peroration caused the tears to stream down the faces of his affected hearers. The scene, a memorable one, was one of great emotion and appeared on the whole to be a rather forced attempt of Syrians and Iraqis to forget their past differences in the mystical contemplation of greater Arabia.

19. On the 23rd March Sheikh Yusuf Yassin, who was recently staying with his relatives in Lattakia, was the guest of honour at a banquet given by my Saudi Arabian colleague. A number of prominent Syrian Nationalists were among the banqueters, to whom, according to Arabic press reports, the sheikh imparted the news that he had received telegraphic instructions from his Royal master telling him to proceed forthwith to Bagdad there to sign on Ibn Saud's behalf the treaty

of friendship that he had been negotiating with Iraq, the draft terms having been found entirely satisfactory. Sheikh Yusuf added, so it is reported, amidst much applause that this treaty marked a considerable step in the progress of Arab unity, and that it would be open to other Arab States to adhere to it when they obtained their liberty of action.

Damascus, March 31, 1936.

[E 1940/195/89]

No. 107.

Consul Parr to Mr. Eden.—(Received April 14.)

(No. 18. Confidential.)

Sir,

Aleppo, March 24, 1936.

WITH reference to the closing sentences of my despatch No. 13 of the 14th March, I have the honour to report that tension is increasing in Antioch and its neighbourhood. The Greek Orthodox community and the Alawite elements in the town have indulged in open demonstrations of sympathy with the Syrian Nationalists that have provoked serious resentment from the Turkish party.

2. In spite of assurances that article 7 of the Accord d'Angora of 1921, as also the second paragraph of the protocol of the Convention turco-syrienne of 1926, would not be evaded, assurances which were repeated by M. de Martel to representatives of the Turkish press at Istanbul a few days ago, strong anxiety exists for the eventual fate of the sanjak. The population of Turkish descent have observed with misgivings the apparent triumph of the Nationalists and have received with resentment appeals for signatures to a manifesto proclaiming the identity of the interests of their district with those of Syria in general. The tension has given rise to a certain amount of brawling and may well produce still more serious results.

3. Last night the High Commissioner's assistant delegate at Alexandretta, talking with a group of people, said that the association of the Alawites and of the Greek Orthodox with the Nationalists had been "a last disillusion" for the French in Syria; that their behaviour was rousing strong hostility amongst the Turks and that he would not be astonished if there were serious bloodshed at Antioch. He went on to use language which left his hearers in little doubt that he would regard such a development with complacency.

4. I am sending copies of this despatch direct to His Majesty's Ambassador at Angora, to His Majesty's consul-general at Beirut and to His Majesty's consul at Damascus.

I have, &c.

ROBERT PARR

[E 2142/1403/89]

No. 108.

Consul-General Haxard to Mr. Eden.—(Received April 21.)

(No. 39 E.)

Sir,

Beirut, April 13, 1936.

ECONOMIC conditions in the Lebanon and Syria during the quarter ended the 31st December, 1935:—

1. Finance.

The budgetary situation of the various States of the French mandated territories of the Levant up to the 30th September was as follows:—

State.	Revenue.	Expenditure.	Balance.
	£ Syrian.	£ Syrian.	£ Syrian.
Syria	4,070,775	3,704,116	+ 366,659
Sanjak of Alexandretta	492,077	438,671	+ 53,406
Jebel Druse	170,080	122,910	+ 47,170
Government of Latakia	951,942	696,222	+ 255,720
Lebanon	2,444,423	2,386,750	+ 57,673
Total	8,129,297	7,348,669	+ 780,628

The state of the accounts of common interest which the French High Commission administers on behalf of the five States, and which are composed of customs receipts for the most part, was, at the 30th November, as follows:—

	£ Syrian.
Receipts	7,590,241
Expenditure	6,864,371
Showing a balance of	725,870

The customs receipts for the quarter ending the 31st December were approximately £ Syrian 2,274,873. The final figures for the other three quarters of 1935 were:—

	£ Syrian.
First quarter	1,975,283
Second quarter	1,913,421
Third quarter	1,831,350

This makes a total of £ Syrian 7,994,927 for 1935 as against £ Syrian 8,605,883 for 1934. This fall in revenue is to be accounted for by the important tariff reductions which took place in July 1935.

The note circulation at the end of December 1935 was £ Syrian 14,090,000, as compared with £ Syrian 15,175,000 on the 31st July, 1935.

2. Foreign Trade.

During the last quarter of 1935 the total value of foreign trade continued to rise. The figures, compared with those of September quarter 1935 and of December quarter 1934, were:—

	December Qr., 1935.	September Qr., 1935.	December Qr., 1934.
	£ Syrian.	£ Syrian.	£ Syrian.
Total imports	12,737,538	9,166,990	12,169,600
Total exports	6,532,051	5,713,516	6,044,091
	19,269,589	14,880,506	18,213,691

Comparative figures for 1934 and 1935 were as follows:—

	1934.	1935.
	£ Syrian.	£ Syrian.
Total imports	36,832,465	39,384,291
Total exports	15,564,417	21,784,820
	52,396,882	61,169,111

The deficit in the commercial balance has been brought down to £ Syrian 17,600,000 in 1935 from £ Syrian 37 million in 1931.

The progress made in 1935 can best be judged from the figures of the special exports and imports, that is to say, of exports of goods of Syrian origin and of imports for consumption in Syria. The following is a comparative table of the special exports and imports for 1934 and 1935 in weights and values:—

		1934.		1935.	
		Kilog.	£ Syrian.	Kilog.	£ Syrian.
Imports	...	558,638,312	29,817,900	561,243,726	29,788,517
Exports	...	133,433,762	8,194,839	175,747,885	11,734,977
Re-exports	...	1,090,949	355,013	3,059,349	454,069

It will be seen from this table that, whilst imports have varied little, exports and re-exports in 1935 have increased in weight by nearly 33 per cent., and in value by over 42 per cent. compared to 1934. The reduction in 1935 of the commercial balance by more than £ Syrian 3½ million is therefore due exclusively

to the increase of exports and re-exports. There have been many contributory causes to the amelioration of the commercial balance:—

- (1) The abundant harvest of the last two years.
- (2) The replacement by local products of goods formerly imported from abroad, such as flour, wheat, beer, biscuits, bricks and tiles, cement, soap, matches, fruit, fat products for food, &c.
- (3) Development of local production, not only with a view to supplying the local market, but also for export to neighbouring countries.
- (4) The successful working of the commercial agreements with neighbouring States, notably Palestine and Egypt.
- (5) Development of local communications and of attractions for visitors and tourists.
- (6) Protection for local agriculture and industry.
- (7) Limitation imposed on the development of certain industries in order to avoid an excess of production.

Referring to (4) above, the trade between Syria and Palestine is in constant progress. The following table illustrates this progress from 1933 to 1935:—

	1933. £ Syrian.	1934. £ Syrian.	1935. £ Syrian.
Imports from Palestine and Transjordan	937,644	867,747	1,191,770
Exports to Palestine and Transjordan	3,277,124	3,453,673	5,777,858

With Egypt a new commercial agreement was signed on the 11th October, 1934, and the results of a year's working are full of promise for the future.

	1934. £ Syrian.	1935. £ Syrian.
Imports from Egypt	712,080	961,646
Exports to Egypt	384,953	757,917

A commercial agreement was signed on the 7th August, 1935, with Iran, by which the latter granted most-favoured-nation treatment to goods of Lebanese origin, as well as consenting to apply certain measures in order to facilitate trade. It is, however, yet too soon to give any indication of the result of this agreement.

As an illustration of the protection afforded to agriculture, a decree issued in May 1934, raising the customs tariff on imported cereals and maintained in 1935, has succeeded in reducing the imports from 67,000 tons valued at 33,600,000 fr. in 1933 to 6,312 tons valued at 3,293,160 fr. in 1935, the difference having been made up by cereals grown in the country.

Imports.

The share of the three leading countries in the special import trade of Syria for the year ending 1935, as compared with 1934, was as follows:—

	1934. £ Syrian.	1935. £ Syrian.
Total special imports	29,817,900	29,788,517
France	4,823,803	4,277,977
United Kingdom	3,312,720	3,191,259
Japan	3,373,141	2,912,523

It is not possible to show in what particular goods the slight reduction of the United Kingdom trade has taken place as the detailed statistics are not yet published. It may, however, be safely said that the fall in Japanese imports is occasioned by the uncertainty surrounding the future customs treatment of Japanese cotton goods.

Transit.

The value of the transit trade in 1935 was £ Syrian 9,595,744, compared with £ Syrian 7,014,565 in 1934. The leading shares in this trade by country of origin were as follows:—

	1934. £ Syrian.	1935. £ Syrian.
United Kingdom	1,965,944	1,129,897
Iran	1,006,233	53,238
Iraq	316,582	5,219,664

The large increase in the figures for Iraq are to be accounted for by the inclusion in these statistics of the value of the oil exported from Tripoli by the Iraq Petroleum Company. Iran, on the other hand, is using the Syrian route less and less for its trade. Hopes are, however, entertained that the Aleppo-Tell Kotchek Railway will be prolonged to Mosul, and thus attract a larger proportion of Iranian trade, especially from North-West Iran.

3. Industry.

Lebanon.

During 1935 progress is shown in nearly every branch of local industry, and efforts have been made to replace imported foreign goods by goods produced locally. More attention, too, has been given to quality, and success has attended these efforts, particularly in farinaceous foods, biscuits, jams, brushes and perfumes. Whilst the rivalry which exists between the two local breweries has led to a severe reduction in the price of locally brewed beer, the public has appreciated the cheapness and has taken a liking to beer, with the result that the production of the two breweries has nearly doubled that of 1934. The following table shows the output of the principal Lebanese industries in 1935:—

Alcohol	800 tons
Matches	20,000,000 boxes
Beer	40,000,000 hectolitres
Biscuits	100 tons
Brushes	400,000 pieces
Chocolate	250,000 kilog.
Jams	75,000 kilog.
Halwa	500,000 kilog.
Farinaceous foods	750 tons
Bentwood chairs	2,000 dozen
Beds	15,000 pieces
Cement	100,000 tons
Socks and stockings	250,000 dozen
Shoes	150,000 pairs
Raw silk	40,000 kilog.
Spun silk	30,000 metres
Essence of flowers	4,000 kilog.
Razor blades	2,000,000 blades
Eau de Cologne	160,000 litres
Soap	2,000 tons

Syria (Damascus Area).

Syrian industrial production has also shown a notable increase over 1934. Customs protection is responsible for this, especially in certain classes of textiles; for instance, cotton piece-goods dyed in the thread, the imports of which in 1934 totalled 1,970,867 kilog., valued at £ Syrian 832,998, fell to 1,098,073 kilog., valued at £ Syrian 455,770 in 1935. The soap industry, however, suffered from Palestinian imports, and from 400 tons produced a few years ago it fell to 237 tons in 1934 and 110 tons in 1935. Amongst the industries in which production has increased are the following:—

	1934.	1935.
Cotton goods	43,350 pieces	265,000 pieces
Silk goods, pure and mixed	156,700 pieces	260,000 pieces
Sheets and sheeting	25,000 pieces	40,000 pieces
Silk and artificial silk crêpes	184,000 metres	635,450 metres
Poplin	250,000 metres	837,000 metres
Furnishing silks	30,000 metres	65,000 metres
Tanneries	88,000 skins	120,300 skins
Starch	220,000 kilog.	245,000 kilog.
Flour, milled	20,850,000 kilog.	31,500,000 kilog.
Cement	28,800,000 kilog.	33,450,000 kilog.
Jerseys, blouses and shirts in wool and in silk and cotton	46,000 dozen	147,750 dozen
Ladies' stockings	25,000 dozen	67,000 dozen
Men's socks	48,000 dozen	65,000 dozen

Syria (Aleppo Area).

Local production in North Syria does not show the same progress as in the southern area. Aleppo some twenty years ago was an important distributing centre, but customs barriers now bar the way to the districts of the former Ottoman Empire which used to depend on Aleppo for goods. The markets it can serve are now considerably restricted, and the Alepine merchant community has not yet succeeded in finding other outlets for trade.

4. Agriculture.

Grain.

The grain production during 1935 was good in the whole of the French mandated area. It would have been better still if in April there had not been a brief period of hot winds and if the sudden heat in May and June had not favoured certain parasites. Nevertheless, 1935 may be classed as one of the best years as regards the production of wheat, barley and maize since the institution of the mandate. The following is a comparative table for 1934 and 1935 of areas sown and of production of various cereals:—

	1934.		1935.	
	Area cultivated in Hectares.	Production in Metric Quintals.	Area cultivated in Hectares.	Production in Metric Quintals.
Wheat	555,157	4,430,424	523,260	5,040,350
Barley	295,400	2,920,895	289,290	3,471,090
Maize	16,065	160,280	18,791	214,940
Millet	105,649	793,909	99,005	679,050
Oats	13,113	145,310	12,291	110,512
Rice	870	28,700	1,352	39,740

Whilst the harvest was abundant, farmers made little profit owing to the fall in prices in the market, and there is no inducement to increase the area sown; in fact, it is feared that a reduction may take place. A very large adverse factor in the wheat situation is that Palestine, the most important customer of Syria, has been and is still reducing its imports of wheat from Syria and replacing them by imports of flour from elsewhere. In 1933 Palestine imported Syrian wheat to the extent of 16,910,318 kilog. valued at £ Syrian 514,039. In 1934 Palestine took only 11,809,784 kilog. valued at £ Syrian 361,232. The figures for 1935 have not yet been published, but it is stated that there has been a very serious reduction on the figures for 1934.

Industrial Cultivation, Cotton, Tobacco, &c.

The area under cultivation for 1935 was 46,000 hectares as against 26,000 hectares in 1934. Up to this year the annual area cultivated had remained more or less stationary, but in 1935 a considerable increase took place in the cultivation of cotton in the Aleppo district and in flax in Syria. The cotton mostly cultivated now is the American variety known as "Lone Star" and the Syrian climate appears to suit it. The following are comparative tables for 1934 and 1935 of industrial cultivation:—

	1934.		1935.	
	Area sown in Hectares.	Production in Metric Quintals.	Area sown in Hectares.	Production in Metric Quintals.
Cotton	13,243	35,766	32,840	239,592
Tobacco	5,473	33,563	3,240	20,141
Flax	1,210	8,200	4,673	33,910
Sesame	4,578	24,564	3,682	22,695
Castor seed ...	1,307	2,050	1,210	3,100
Sugar cane	8,000	220	3,500

In vegetable cultivation there was an increase in onions, the production for 1935 being 428,935 metric quintals as against 394,408 metric quintals in 1934.

As regards citrus fruits, the progress registered in exportation in 1934 was continued in 1935, as exemplified in the following comparative table:—

	Quintals.		
	Lemons.	Oranges.	Total.
1933	46,518	8,622	55,140
1934	71,239	14,419	85,658
1935	85,603	24,289	109,892

The reasons given for this progress in export are—

- An increase in purchasing power in importing countries.
- Greater care in growing, grading, and packing.

The restrictions on the export to certain countries of Italian lemons has benefited the Lebanese product, both in the quantity exported and the price offered. Where previously this fruit was exported to Roumania and Turkey, at the end of 1935 new markets were found in the United Kingdom, Belgium, Holland and France.

5. Live-stock.

The situation of the live-stock by the end of 1935 was completely re-established after the serious ravages made by drought in 1932-33. In every branch an increase in numbers is shown.

Copies of this despatch have been sent to His Majesty's High Commissioner in Palestine, and to His Majesty's consuls at Damascus and Aleppo.

I have, &c.

G. T. HAVARD.

[E 2243/708/65]

No. 109.

Sir E. Phipps to Mr. Eden.—(Received April 24.)

(No. 411 E.)

Sir,

Berlin, April 21, 1936.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of your despatch No. 362 of the 24th March last asking for my observations on a memorandum on German economic penetration in the Middle East.

2. It is, of course, the aim of every country nowadays to expand its foreign trade, and Germany, despite the current talk of "autarchy," is no exception. Nevertheless, I doubt whether the recent increase in German trade with the Middle East was, in the first place, the result of deliberate planning by the German Government. It may rather be ascribed to the clearing agreements which Germany pressed on the countries concerned in order to equalise her balance of payments with them. It may be observed that all the clearing agreements made by the German Government had at first a result which must have been almost as unexpected to the Germans as to the other parties, viz., no sooner was the agreement concluded than the Germans rushed to buy because buying was once more possible through the clearings. This happened even in the case of those clearings which were forced on Germany by France, Switzerland and Holland. The next step was that the countries concerned had to take measures, or to allow Germany to take measures, to limit Germany's imports from those countries. This happened with France, Switzerland, Holland, and also the United Kingdom. Other countries with less experience and forethought were badly caught out by the increase in German buying and the consequent piling up of reichsmark credits in their favour. In consequence, they sought to increase their imports from Germany, so far as they were able, and they may also be forced to limit their sales to Germany, although it must be added that the smaller countries producing mainly raw materials may not be able to afford to refuse German offers to purchase. The trade figures for the current year may throw light on this point.

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3. The initial effect of the system of clearing agreements is not reflected only in the figures of German trade with the Middle East. It must be held to account also for the enormous recent expansion of German trade in certain South American countries. A notable example is Brazil, where Germany was able to buy the raw cotton she could no longer buy in the United States. Between the years 1934 and 1935 German imports from Brazil rose from 77·2 million marks to 176·9 million, an increase of over 125 per cent. During the same period her exports to Brazil rose from 74·5 to 118·6 million marks, an increase of 60 per cent. Trade with Chile and Peru also showed a notable increase; exports rose by about 200 and 125 per cent. respectively in a year.

4. Many countries which have been particularly hard hit by the crisis—Germany, partly because of her foreign indebtedness (and, it must be added, her unscrupulous treatment of this subject), and many raw material producing countries—have been unable or unwilling to adjust their position by deflation or by devaluation of their currency alone, and have introduced exchange restrictions in the somewhat vain attempt to make further adjustment unnecessary. The result has been that their price level has remained too high, and they can only export with difficulty to countries which have made a more thorough adjustment, and usually only at the expense of export subsidies or some form of concealed devaluation. These measures result indirectly in their paying higher prices for the imports which they secure in exchange for such exports; but the need of obtaining imports is, in Germany's case at least, so great that the question of the price paid becomes to some extent secondary. This being so, the fact that the price level in other countries with controlled exchanges may tend to be high does not represent an obstacle to trade between Germany and those countries, while the existence of exchange restrictions on both sides tends to make such trade purely bilateral. In these circumstances it is not surprising that the volume of mutual trade between Germany and other countries with controlled exchanges should grow. There have even been some transactions lately, such as the payment by Greece to Roumania of half the price of petroleum products purchased by a transfer of a reichsmark clearing balance to Roumania, which represent a move in the direction of multilateral clearing between such countries. There seems thus to be a tendency for world trade to divide itself partly into two groups, that between countries with controlled exchanges and that between countries with free exchanges, and it may be that this tendency will continue and that Germany, being the most important industrial country with a controlled currency, will under present conditions absorb more and more the markets in South America, the Balkans and the Near and Middle East. If this forecast is correct it seems that the only measure which would reverse this tendency would be the restoration of free exchanges in the group concerned. The vicious circle could, no doubt, as well be broken by a restoration of free currencies in the small countries concerned as in Germany, and, so far as His Majesty's Government are in a position to exert any influence in the matter, they should continue to urge the abolition of exchange restrictions as they have consistently done hitherto.

5. To return to the Middle East. Whilst the increase in Germany's trade was probably not planned, the German Government are obviously aware of recent developments and must be expected to exploit them politically to the best of their ability. How far they can do so will depend largely on the attitude of the Middle Eastern countries, most of whom probably view the present situation with disfavour. Past experience suggests that these countries will sooner or later decline to tolerate a large accumulation of unpaid trade debts due by Germany with the alternative of making unduly large purchases from Germany, very often at unfavourable prices.

6. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Department of Overseas Trade.

I have, &c.
ERIC PHIPPS.

[E 2306/381/65]

No. 110.

Sir A. Clark Kerr to Mr. Eden.—(Received April 27.)

(No. 163.)

Bagdad, April 3, 1936.

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 101 of the 24th February, I have the honour to inform you that a party of fifteen Iraqi Senators, Deputies and notables left Iraq on the 9th March for a visit to Syria, Palestine and Egypt, and returned to Bagdad on the 1st April.

2. You will no doubt receive from His Majesty's representatives in these countries full accounts of the events which marked this tour. Judging, however, from the reports which have appeared in the Iraqi press, it was a great success. Everywhere the Iraqis were made much of, fêted and most hospitably entertained.

3. For their part, the visitors worked hard to make the most of their opportunities to strengthen the religious and social ties which link Iraq to these sister Arab countries. They made innumerable speeches in which they stressed the fundamental unity of the Arab peoples and pledged the help and sympathy of Iraq to all their brother Arabs in the struggle for independence which Iraq had herself won.

4. In some instances, the zeal of the speakers outran their discretion, and an oration delivered at Nablus by Said Thabit, a Deputy for Mosul, appears to have been particularly violent and provocative. I have remonstrated with both the Prime Minister and Nuri Pasha about this speech and have warned them that Said Thabit's conduct may make it difficult in future for Iraqi visitors to obtain from the authorities the courtesies and facilities which this party enjoyed.

5. There is now talk in Bagdad of return visits to Iraq by groups of influential men from Syria, Palestine and Egypt, and of a tour of the Arab principalities of the Persian Gulf by another unofficial delegation of notables from Iraq.

6. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioners at Cairo and Jerusalem, His Majesty's Minister at Jedda, His Majesty's consul-general at Beirut and to His Majesty's consuls at Damascus and Aleppo.

I have, &c.
(For the Ambassador),
C. H. BATEMAN.

[E 2656/195/89]

No. 111.

Consul-General Havard to Mr. Eden.—(Received May 12.)

(No. 46.)

Beirut, May 5, 1936.

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 28 of 10th March regarding the Lebanese attitude towards the Franco-Syrian negotiations, I have the honour to inform you that the sittings of the Lebanese Parliament were resumed on the 17th April.

2. When the High Commissioner left for Paris on the 17th March it was expected that the basis of a Franco-Syrian accord would be agreed upon in a short space of time and that M. de Martel would return to Syria in little over a month to work out the details of the agreement locally.

3. The Lebanese Government, not wishing that the Franco-Lebanese question should be discussed in the Chamber during the absence of the High Commissioner, decided to use its authority under the Constitution and suspend the sittings of the Deputies for thirty days. This period having elapsed, it would have been unconstitutional to prolong the suspension further, and the Chamber accordingly resumed its sittings.

4. At the first meeting, when the few items of ordinary business had been transacted, the leader of the Government party, Kheir-ed-Din Abdab, rose and

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expressed the satisfaction of his party at the favourable development in the political life of the country which all expected would take place shortly. He made a reference to the memorandum which a group of Deputies had presented to the High Commissioner last March and to the subsequent conversation which took place between President Eddé and M. de Martel before the latter's departure for Paris, and ended with the assurance that his party would support a policy of Franco-Lebanese understanding which they felt confident the President of the Lebanese Republic would be able to bring about with the High Commissioner on his return.

5. This speech was followed by one from the Leader of the Opposition, M. Michel Zaccour, who explained that in presenting their memorandum to the High Commissioner at the time they did they fully realised the delicacy of the situation of the Lebanese Republic in regard to the Franco-Syrian negotiations, but they had felt that a unique occasion had arisen for them to make known their aspiration and that if they did not seize that occasion it would be a dereliction of their duty. The previous speech of the Government party leader had convinced him that all the Deputies were in agreement with the general terms of the memorandum, and he felt that the majority of the inhabitants of the Lebanon were also of the same opinion. He ended by expressing the hope that President Eddé, when the time came for negotiations, would consult all prominent Lebanese citizens about the future of their country.

6. The President of the Chamber then spoke and said that it was evident that both parties in the House were imbued with the same patriotic spirit and suggested that the debate might now close. One of the Opposition Deputies, however, arose, and speaking in colloquial Arabic said that for the last sixteen years they had heard speeches and nothing but speeches, and the time had come when they wanted something more than that. The Lebanon must have the same privileges as Syria and nothing less. It was the High Commissioner, in his reply to the Maronite Patriarch, who had said that it was for the Lebanese Government to say what it wanted, and it was for that reason therefore that he and his colleagues had drawn up and presented the memorandum of Lebanese aspirations. They had every right to do so, but the only result of their patriotism had been violent attacks made on them by certain sections of the press. This speech aroused great enthusiasm in the Chamber both by the expressive manner in which it was delivered and because it was quite unexpected.

7. When the enthusiasm had subsided the Secretary of State interposed and assured the Deputies that the Government was animated by the same patriotic motives as the Deputies, and that when the time came privileges for the Lebanon would be claimed equal to those accorded to Syria. It was only necessary to await the High Commissioner's return and the question would be taken up with him. This intervention had a sedative effect on the House and appeared to satisfy the Deputies. On the few occasions on which the Chamber has since met, nothing further on the subject has been said.

8. Meanwhile, the press reports that the Franco-Syrian negotiations are drawing to a close in Paris, and it is stated that the High Commissioner will return in the middle of the month to resume negotiations locally.

9. Copies of this despatch have been sent to His Majesty's Ambassador at Bagdad, to his Excellency the High Commissioner in Palestine, and to His Majesty's consuls at Damascus and Aleppo.

I have, &c.
G. T. HAVARD.

[E 2653/94/31]

No. 112.

Sir A. Clark Kerr to Mr. Eden.—(Received May 12.)

(No. 229.)
Sir,

Bagdad, May 4, 1936.

I HAVE the honour to report that the progress of the disorders which are now occurring in Palestine has been followed with close interest in Iraq.

2. The newspapers have given prominence to the official communiqués and to many reports from different news agencies and from the press of Egypt, Syria

and Palestine. These have been eagerly read by the public and discussed in the coffee shops throughout the country.

3. In order to counteract the influence of the false rumours which have been in circulation, I have been at pains personally and through my staff to keep the Iraqi Government informed privately of the essential facts related from day to day in the reports telegraphed to the Colonial Office by the High Commissioner, and during my short absence in Koweit last week Mr. Bateman made a special appeal to Nuri-al-Said to take steps to prevent any outburst of public excitement or victimisation of the Jews in this country.

4. Press comment on the situation has, up to the present, been generally reasonable and restrained, but a leading article in the *Bilad* on the 23rd April and another published in the *Istiqlal* on the 24th April deliberately distorted the facts and contained quite unwarranted attacks on His Majesty's Government. Mr. Bateman accordingly wrote a letter to the Prime Minister, a copy of which is enclosed herein,⁽¹⁾ inviting his attention to these articles and requesting him to restrain the press from publishing further tendentious matter of this kind.

5. No further objectionable articles have since appeared, but on the 30th April all newspapers published the text of a protest addressed to the League of Nations by the Moslem Defence League of Bagdad. A translation of this communication forms the second enclosure to this despatch.⁽²⁾ The copy stated to have been sent to me has not yet reached me.

6. On the same day I received a visit from a deputation of Senators and Deputies, who handed to me a memorandum, a translation of which is enclosed herein, in which they expressed the grave anxiety of the Arabs of Iraq concerning the future of the Arabs of Palestine.

7. The leader of the deputation, Naji-al-Suwaidi, emphasised the special fear of the Iraqis that failure to find an early solution of the problems of Palestine, and, in particular, that of fixing a final limit to Jewish immigration, would react most unfavourably on the good relations which now happily existed between the Arabs and the British in Iraq, and which they were all most anxious to strengthen and preserve.

8. He also laid stress on the point that it was natural and inevitable that the Arabs of Iraq should take the greatest interest in the political, social and economic welfare of the Arabs in adjacent countries and that, in consequence, any events which brought distress to their neighbours and brothers must also deeply stir public feeling in Iraq.

9. In replying I outlined briefly the known policy of His Majesty's Government in Palestine and recalled the scheme for the creation of a legislative assembly and the invitations given to the Arab leaders to visit London to explain their views, as evidence of the goodwill of His Majesty's Government towards the Arabs. I also expressed my confident hope that, with good sense and, above all, patience, on both sides, the difficulties which now appeared so formidable would be overcome in the not far distant future.

10. At the same time I promised to transmit their memorandum to my Government, from whom I assured the deputation it would receive the most sympathetic consideration.

11. The tone of the whole conversation was most cordial and friendly and Naji-al-Suwaidi took especial care to avoid any sort of tendentious or provocative advocacy of the grievances of the Palestinian Arabs. The wording of the memorandum is not so happy, but I think allowance must be made for habitual oriental hyperbole in such clichés as "bloody calamities" and "extermination of a nation." The deputation left no doubts in my mind concerning their essential friendliness and their wish that, in the best interests of Anglo-Arab relations, the Arab question in Palestine might be speedily and happily settled.

12. I am sending a copy of this despatch and its enclosures to His Majesty's High Commissioner at Jerusalem.

I have, &c.
ARCHIBALD CLARK KERR.

⁽¹⁾ Not printed

Enclosure in No. 112.

Memorandum handed to Sir A. Clark Kerr by Deputation of Senators and Deputies.

Your Excellency,

WE are among the most anxious for the strengthening and consolidation of ties of friendship and bonds of amity between the two peoples, the Iraqi and the British.

At the same time we earnestly desire that the sons of our dear country of the various religions and communities should live together in good accord and harmony united by common feeling and community of interests, and far removed from all that is calculated to affect their solidarity and their unity of opinion, since we believe in the principle that religion belongs to God and country to all alike. This is no new thing, for history both ancient and modern testifies that this is a hereditary distinction of the people of this country.

The bloody calamities and successive disasters which have been afflicted on our kinsmen in the sister country of Palestine are, however, such as make us fear evil consequences.

We have no doubt that your Excellency shares with us the view that the existing state of affairs in Palestine is neither natural nor stable, and that the extermination of a nation or its molestation in its own home for the sake of an intruding group is inconsistent with the principles governing the natural rights of man. You will also agree with us that this confused state of affairs has produced a situation which threatens grave evil.

We are fearful of the successive disasters in Palestine producing evil repercussions in this country which is bound up with that sister country with a variety of ties which cannot be ignored or disregarded. It is not easy to check public sentiment and restrain public emotion aroused by the persecution and destruction suffered by kinsmen simply because they want to live in peace and tranquillity in their home. You will, no doubt, agree with us that the continuance of these mischiefs and visitations and failure to remedy the situation definitely are calculated to lead to results of which the disastrous and evil consequences can neither be defined nor confined within any definite limits.

We therefore beg that you will convey this expression of our feelings on the subject to the quarters concerned with a view to a reconsideration of the present policy in Palestine, which experience has proved to have failed, and the restoration to the people of that holy territory of their rights in full and their tranquillity complete.

These are representations which we wished to make to your Excellency, moved by firm friendship and old-established confidence.

Please accept, &c.

Yours sincerely,

NAJI-AL-SUWAIDI, *Senator.*

MUHAMMAD RIDHA-AL-SHABIBI, *Senator.*

YASIN-AL-KHEDHAIRI, *Senator.*

AUNI-AL-NAQASHLI, *Deputy.*

ABDULAZIZ-AL-QASSAB, *Deputy.*

RAFAIL BUTTI, *Deputy.*

DAUD-AL-SAAFI, *Deputy.*

RASHID-AL-KHOJA, *Deputy.*

ABDUL MAHDI, SAIYID, *Deputy.*

ALI MAHMUD, *Deputy.*

HAZIM SHAMIDIN AGHA, *Deputy.*

[E 2654/94/31]

No. 113.

Sir A. Clark Kerr to Mr. Eden.—(Received May 12.)

(No. 231.)

Sir,

Bagdad, May 5, 1936.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 229 of the 4th May last, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith two further memorials on the subject of the policy of His Majesty's Government in Palestine which have been communicated to me by the Moslem Youth Society and the students of the Bagdad Law College.

2. The first⁽¹⁾ was delivered by a deputation consisting of the president and two members of the society who visited the oriental secretary for this purpose. They were polite and friendly and spoke with what appeared to be genuine concern for the future of the Arabs of Palestine.

3. The second memorial was brought to the Embassy by two of the signatories, who did not ask to see any of the staff. It has clearly been drafted with the idea of making what these young men hope will be a fine impression of their patriotic zeal when copies are published in the press, and I do not believe that in fact they think so badly of the oppressive yoke of British tyranny in Palestine as their words imply. Nevertheless, stripped of its heroic phrases, this memorial does in its essence reflect very truly the hatred of educated Iraqis for Zionism and their conviction that ultimately the Arabs of Palestine can only be saved by a positive limitation of Jewish immigration.

4. For the present there is still confidence enough in the goodwill of Great Britain towards the Arabs to keep patience alive and to kindle the hope that somehow British statesmanship will find a solution for the problems of the Arabs and the Jews in Palestine, but if this solution is long delayed their patience is, I fear, likely to become exhausted and they may then resort to more active methods of supporting their Palestinian brethren.

5. I am sending a copy of this despatch and its enclosures to His Majesty's High Commissioner at Jerusalem.

I have, &c.

ARCHIBALD CLARK KERR.

Enclosure in No. 113.

Protest addressed to His Majesty's Ambassador by some 100 Students of the Law College, Bagdad.

Your Excellency,

WE, the undersigned, students of the Law College, Bagdad, hereby strongly protest against the cruel British policy pursued since the Balfour Declaration in Palestine, who is groaning under the yoke of two oppressive colonisations: Jewish colonisation with its ample financial resources and its cunning, and British colonisation with its might and power employed in support of the former.

We are not now in the primitive ages of the life of nations during which one race was exterminated to give place for another race. Accordingly the planting of the Jewish race in the home of the Arab race is an act repugnant to humanity as well as to all Arabs and Moslems. Let Britain know that the tragedy which is being enacted in Palestine constitutes an arrow directed at the bosom of Arabs in particular and that of Moslems in general, and that the friendly policy which Britain is now pursuing towards Arabs will have a reverse effect unless British policy in Palestine is modified. If Britain wishes to win the friendship of the Arab race of not less than 80 million souls and of the many millions of Moslems, all these are prepared to stretch out their hands to her provided she is willing to alter her policy, otherwise these millions will in the course of time be turned by Britain into an element complaining of and embittered against her on account of her conduct.

Finally, we repeat our crying protest against the cruel policy at present pursued in Palestine, and beg that our protest will be conveyed to the British Government and the British High Commissioner in Palestine, for which we thank you in anticipation.

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

Consul MacKereth to Mr. Eden.—(Received May 27.)

(No. 46.)

Sir,

Damascus, May 15, 1936.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith a short memorandum on pan-Arabism. I have made these notes largely with a view to clarifying my own mind on this very confused question. There is no doubt of the existence of an Arab movement, but there is considerable doubt regarding its potentialities.

I have, &c.

GILBERT MACKERETH.

Enclosure in No. 114.

Memorandum respecting Pan-Arabism.

BEFORE attempting a brief examination of the Arab movement, a quotation from Meredith Townsend's essays *Asia and Europe*, written at the end of the last century, may not be out of place, for that writer possessed undoubted qualifications as a student of the East. He wrote:—

"None but those who have lived among Asiatics can understand how an oriental mind can brood over an idea. It is perhaps the most marked distinction between him and the Western man: the European thinks, the oriental only reflects, and if left to himself the idea turned over and over endlessly in his mind hardens into the consistency of steel."

It is difficult to think of a description that would better depict the attitude of the Arab towards the idea of pan-Arabism, which has been put before him by a small body of his own intellectuals. The idea bears no close investigation, yet it cannot be questioned but that it is deep-seated in the Arab mind and only questioned when individual interests become involved.

The Arab leaders themselves seem to find much of their inspiration in a perverted history of the past and ignore, or pretend to do, the reasons that led to the rapid decay of the Arab-Berber civilisation that seemed so glorious 1,000 years ago. These leaders preach that all the obstacles to the re-establishment of Caliphate Arabia can be surmounted by intellectual processes and passive resistance, and they encourage their followers in this fascinating exercise of self-deception.

It may here be added, parenthetically, although it does not alter the general question so far as Great Britain and France are concerned, that pan-Arabism or Arab nationalism has never flourished otherwise than as a subversive movement finding its chief stimulus in a revolt against law and order, which the Arab has ever found irksome, especially when established by foreign rule. It has thrived only under what is thought to be oppression, and has always died in liberty. So to-day the pan-Arab movement is most lively in the mandated territories, where the mandates are the "oppressors," and yet are inhibited from employing "the old Tartar method of stamping out" the revolt against their rule. Since the war, the viper kept alive abroad to bite the Turk now finds in the bosom of its protectors a softer flesh for its fangs.

Strictly speaking, the Arab movement concerns the group of States that were carved out of the Ottoman dominions conquered by the Allies. They fall naturally into four divisions, as follows:—

- (1) Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Moslem and Christian Palestine, and Transjordan.
- (2) Saudi Arabia and its dependencies of Hasa and Azir.
- (3) The Yemen.
- (4) The Arab States in Southern Arabia under British influence or protection.

Religio-politically, the North African countries come within the scope of what has been described as a pan-Islamic movement, but which is in reality only an extension of the pan-Arab movement.

This grouping of Islamic countries is open to objection; it is, however, convenient and applicable to the present purpose. In order to avoid undue prolixity, only the Arab movement in the first group of countries will be considered, although it is a well-known fact that political activity in any of the countries in this group produces immediate reactions in the Berber-Arab North African countries.

The leaders of the movement are themselves extremely vague as to the meanings they attach to the terms nation, nationalism, confederation or pan-Arabism, but, in any case, their interpretations differ widely from our own. They will, on occasion, look upon Syria, Palestine and Transjordan as the Arab "nation" having a population of 5 million Arabs, or englobe the countries of Arabic-speaking peoples in Asia and think of a "nation" of 15 million Arabs. In more expansive moments they claim all Moslems as their brothers, and talk of an Arab people of 300 million. In the *Nation arabe*, Shakib Arslan and Ihsan-al-Jabri (before the first-named became a remittance man of the Italian Treasury) used to take up the cudgels, not only on behalf of Arab countries, but of the whole of Asia and Africa, against Europe in general.

Amidst this confusion one finds the paradox of intense chauvinism in Arab clans and Moslem sects of all matters concerning their personal rights, hatreds and beliefs. At first glance, the elements of disruption appear so potent that the ideology of pan-Arabism seems an absurdity; yet it cannot be dismissed so easily.

The movement in its modern guise began in 1905 with the creation by Syrian students in Paris of an "Arab League" to resuscitate the Arab empire; an empire to be formed within what was then held to be its natural limits: "from the valleys of the Euphrates and Tigris to the Gulf of Suez, and from the Sea of Oman to the Mediterranean."

Subsequently the pan-Arab idea was nursed almost exclusively in the colonies of Syrian *émigrés* in North and South America, as well as in small groups of Syrian and Lebanese students in France, Germany, Austria and Egypt. At that time the object of the conspirators was revolutionary and directed solely against the Turks; it was racial and in no way religious. It was equally so during the war, when the services of Bedouin bands, under the leadership of the late King Hussain and his sons Feisal and Abdullah, were available in exchange for British gold and certain ill-defined promises.

The war over, the movement, which had flourished and been fostered (not altogether disinterestedly) in European capitals, became anti-European. The celerity with which the Syrians and Iraqis, after having for nearly four years been at one with the Turks in opposing the Allies, claimed as brothers the Bedouin whom they had hitherto despised and welcomed the British forces as liberators, almost immediately after to execrate them and the French as oppressors, exposes the inconstancy of the Arab, which is the outstanding characteristic of his nature; a fact that, in England, romanticism has sometimes tended to obscure.

With this change of front the movement developed a unifying religious aspect, which had hitherto been absent, and spread beyond the limits of the pre-war Ottoman Empire.

Notwithstanding, however, this newly acquired religious force, the congress held in Cairo in 1924 for the purpose of appointing a Caliph of Islam did little but bring into relief the jealous cultivation of separate and independent nationalism, which had developed in each of the Arab States that had come into existence as a result of the Allied victory over the Turks. Yet the Arab leaders in these States, with an inconsequence so natural in them yet so disconcerting to the European observer, have never ceased to accuse England and France of Machiavellian cunning in the post-war parcelling of Arabia into the very States that now insist upon their autonomous rights.

The majority of Arab intellectuals aim perhaps not so much at the attainment of a "United States of Arabia" or federation as at a conglomeration of Arab States under the moral control of a central congress (a sort of Arabian League of Nations) seeking inspiration, guidance and discipline from the head of the most powerful State-member. Much hope of this died with the late King Feisal of Iraq in 1933, for King Ghazi has not in this respect taken the place his father held. Since then, eyes are turned rather in desperation and with little optimism, to King Abdel Aziz of Saudi Arabia, who has at last, after years of jealous hesitation, in signing a treaty with Iraq, taken the first tangible step in the "Halaf Arabi" (Arabian Alliance) that was dear to the former King of Iraq. The "Halaf" was to comprise Iraq, Transjordan and Saudi Arabia and later be

extended to other Arabian States. The fundamental underlying idea of these projected alliances was mutual protection against European Powers and Turkey.

Syrian and Palestinian Nationalists consider that the most important immediate hindrance to further progress lies (a) in the divisions effected by the French in Syria and Lebanon and, as they see it, in the exaggerated regard the French are showing for the protection of "minorities," even to the extent of importing fresh "minority" elements, in the Assyrians, from Iraq, and (b) in the rise of a Jewish population in Palestine strong enough to resist Arab domination. So the Nationalist executives in Syria and Palestine, like any Arab muleteer with his beasts of burden, seek to keep every political sore open on the back of a docile and ignorant population the better to goad it to self-improving strikes and to desperate and painful civil disobedience, with the object of developing a sense of grievance and of wearying the mandatory Powers to the point of making them anxious to be rid of their mandatory burden.

The programme sketched in 1932 at the Jerusalem meeting of Arab Nationalists of different countries under the chairmanship of Yassin-al-Hashimi (the leader of the Opposition party in Iraq and now Prime Minister there) avoided discussions on religious problems and followed the advice of the late Saad Zaghlul in Egypt to abstain from disputes over Islamic or quasi-Islamic rites and non-Islamic faiths. The avowed object of such unaccustomed silence was to "deprive imperialistic policy of the arm of minorities that it finds so handy a means for keeping the peoples of the East in subjection." The rest of the programme consisted in an Arabian Zollverein, the unification of currency systems, the creation of an Arab bank and the abolition of passport formalities. Finally, as a symbolic gesture, it recommended the adoption of a uniform flag and postage stamp for Iraq, Syria and Transjordan.

The congress which was to have been held in Bagdad under the presidency of the late King Feisal following this preparatory meeting to discuss and approve the programme there fixed did not assemble because (so wrote "Fata-al-Arab" on the 8th October, 1932) of personal ambitions nurtured under British inspiration.

This was a blow to the hopes of the pan-Arabists that proved all but fatal. Out of the flames, however, of the Syrian disturbances in January 1936 (set blazing by almost as small a spark as that which enflamed Palestine three months later), the pan-Arab phoenix rose again with an astonishing display of vigour. The Nationalist parties that had for three years remained divided by trivial personal rivalries reunited in opposition to the French, just as the Arab parties coalesced later, if somewhat awkwardly at first, against Zionism and the British upholding of it. How long this united front will endure is a matter for doubt, if the past is any guide, it will not long outlast the disturbances that gave it birth. Dissension is the very lifeblood of the sons of Ismail.

Militating against the ideology of pan-Arabism is, as has already been mentioned, the creation and growth of separate Arab States (imbued with all the chauvinism and individuality that the word "nation" implies) in the old Ottoman provinces of Mesopotamia, Syria and the Arabian peninsula. Herein, perhaps, exists a force that will grow increasingly inimical to Arab cohesion and confederation. Slowly, yet surely, the national idea is developing. In each State has been formed a Government with a permanent or semi-permanent officialdom, recruited on European lines and jealous of its power and prospects. Autarky has more than made an appearance and national defence forces have been individually organised and infused with local *esprit de corps*. Legal and political systems, grafted upon different roots, have grown quite dissimilar. Each country has apart from the influence of the mandatory Powers tended to become increasingly conscious and jealous of the boundaries fixed by the "victorious allied Powers." It is sufficient in this connexion to recall the frontier difficulties that have arisen between Iraq and its Arab and Islamic neighbours. Xenophobia has also reared its head in the labour market in Iraq where, as in Egypt some years ago when considerable hostility was shown by Egyptians to officials of Syrian or Lebanese origin, Syrians are still regarded bitterly and begrudged the savings they make and export to their own country. In Syria, Saudi Arabians or Iraqis are generally despised, secretly if not always openly, and scoffed at as "ajānib" ("ajānib" is one of the Arabic words for foreigner and has an opprobrious tang to it). Transjordan, too, has shown the same distaste for foreigners. Great fear of the Zionist movement has made the Palestine Arab

slightly more tolerant of his brethren from adjoining countries. Possibly a cantonment system, the idea of which Mr. Archer Cust recently revived, could it be made workable, might render leaders of Arab political thought there more exclusively Palestinian in their outlook. They appear, even to-day, to be loath to consider amalgamating their lot, except as the dominant partner, with that of the more primitive Arab population of Transjordan.

Saudi Arabia, being on a much lower plane of social evolution, has witnessed a slower growth of "national" spirit and so less objection is at present raised to the enlistment of the services of "ajānib." A noteworthy instance of this is the employment of a Druse (the last of heretics to a Wahabi, one might suppose) as an important official.

The position of Egypt in the pan-Arab movement is by no means clear. It has shown little sign of wishing to take any collective responsibility in an Arab or Islamic confederation. Indeed, it has been said that Egypt has yet to make up its mind whether it is an Arab, a Pharaonic or a would-be-western State.

If the facts and tendencies of the Arab movement have been fairly indicated so far in this memorandum, it is evident that the whole matter is in a state of considerable confusion and charged with incompatibilities.

The partition of the Arab or quasi-Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire into separate States, and the internal organisation of some of these newly-formed States on differing European lines, have created a peculiar political situation, and have at the same time confronted Arabian politicians with three conflicting alternatives: pan-Arabism, pan-Islamism and nationalism. The effort to render these alternatives mutually sympathetic has led to obvious contradictions, which seem to have weakened each and have led to a dissipation of vital political force, for any one of them argued to its natural conclusion rules out the other two. The pan-Arabists urge the suppression of the individual State and seek to abolish as between Arabs all political and religious barriers. But these same pan-Arab rhetoricians are no less ardent in demanding the exclusion from State-paid employment Arabs from neighbouring countries, or in protesting against having an undue number of Christians, as in Syria and Palestine, or of Sunnis or Shi'ahs (according to the religious complexion of the speaker) in Iraq. Iraq, rich in its oil royalties, feels no urge to share its wealth with Syria or Transjordan, through which countries its oil passes to the markets of the world, while Syria cultivates the hope that its independence will enable it to extort from Iraq transit dues on the oil passing through its territory. Perhaps it is in these local jealousies (and they are only taken as samples and are by no means exhaustive) that to-day, as 900 years ago, lies the weakness of the Arab movement and of Islam as a permanent political force.

The power of religious as distinct from political (and the distinction exists) Islam to weld the heterogeneous elements into a whole may also be doubted, notwithstanding the fact that a considerable weight of Arab opinion favours the possibility. The ability of the faith to infuse strength into resistance against English, French and Jewish "colonisation" is marked, but it represents only half of the present story of pan-Islamism. The other half concerns the possibility of reconciliation of the many Islamic schisms: Sunni, Shi'ah (the main ones), Wahabi, Metawileh, Ansariyeh, Druse, and many smaller sects; and, finally, the numerous Islamic confraternities. In addition, the element of Christian Arabs, particularly in the ranks of the *intelligentsia*, is by no means as negligible as their numbers would seem to imply.

So great and intangible are the difficulties of establishing pan-Arabism on a religious basis that it may seriously be questioned whether the religious aspect is of any importance at all beyond its immediate value as a focal point against the European Powers immediately affected.

The more advanced, and possibly the most energetic, protagonists of pan-Arabism have been ready to appeal for support to the "free thinkers" in England, France, Germany and Russia, and to go so far as to propose a union of agnostic and communistic forces against Christianity; anything, in fact, to get freedom from the Western yoke. In this way pan-Arabism has begun to be divorced from pan-Islamism after but a brief marriage.

Nowadays the vital force of the Arab movement lies chiefly in the spread of modern Arabic literature and of journalism. Thanks to the persistent and skilfully directed efforts of the Egyptian educational authorities to standardise a modern and simplified language to replace "classical" Arabic, which has become

as dead as Latin, a growing literary output has been made intelligible in countries using different dialects. The standard of thought found in Arabic journalism is, to say no more, mediocre, and full, as Johnson would have said, of deliberate anfractuosités of temper, but it is widely esteemed by the masses. It is a diverting sight to visit an Arab café and find a literate Arab reading to a large circle of semi-literate bits from Arabic newspapers, published in Damascus, Jerusalem or Cairo, reviling the Western Powers for their iniquitous treatment of orientals or proclaiming the power of the Italian air force to blow the British fleet out of the sea, and a thousand and one more abstruse mysteries that must have about the same influence on the hearers as the tales of Scheherazade. Discussions follow that usually take the most ludicrous turn; all with an air of gravity that might lead the onlooker to think it represented profound understanding. In this manner a fairy web is woven all over the Arabic-speaking world. It will be instructive to follow closely the effect of Arab journalism and literature in moulding and unifying Arab opinion and in weaning it from its present parochial interests. But, if a guess is permissible, it will be many generations before anything palpable appears. Until then it would seem certain that local Arab nationalism will be the rule. And the longer it is the rule the more important will local factors become. With this, the dream of a "United States of Arabia" or an Islamic confederation brought about by culture, religion and peaceful persuasion in a greater common weal, will tend to become an abstraction suitable only for the entertainment of philosophers.

GILBERT MacKERETH.

Damascus, May 15, 1936.

[E 3128/2746/89]

No. 115.

Consul-General Havard to Mr. Eden.—(Received June 2.)

(No. 51.)

Sir,

Beirut, May 21, 1936.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that the troubles in Palestine have, so far, aroused little interest and comment in Beirut and little more in the more Moslem towns of Tripoli, Sidon and Tyre. The latter three towns closed their shops for the day on Sunday the 10th May as a sign of sympathy with their Arab brethren in Palestine, but the Moslem shopkeepers of Beirut for some reason did not follow their example but promised to do so later. They have chosen to do so to-day, and pamphlets in Arabic have been distributed in the town proclaiming the fact and stating their sympathy with the Arabs of Palestine. The demonstration, however, is only half-hearted since the majority of the more important shops being Christian remain open—and those that have closed have done so because it is Ascension Day.

2. If there is any sympathy with either side amongst the Christians of the Lebanon it is rather on the side of the Jews. The Christian community here realises the great advantages which have accrued to Palestine by the influx of Jewish immigrants, especially those from Germany. The prosperity they have brought to Palestine has benefited Lebanese trade, and it was noticeably to the advantage of Lebanon that last summer more than 5,000 Palestinians—mostly Jews—visited the Lebanese summer resorts and stayed for at least a part of the summer there. Already the press is expressing its apprehension that the troubles in Palestine may continue and thus prevent Palestinians from passing their summer holidays in the Lebanon.

3. It appears therefore somewhat anomalous that the Greek Orthodox Patriarch who is at present in Beirut should have made an appeal to the Archbishop of Canterbury for the curtailing of Jewish immigration into Palestine. I beg to enclose what purports to be a translation of that appeal taken from the Beirut paper the *Orient*. I am reliably assured that the majority of the Greek Orthodox community in Beirut consider that their Patriarch is meddling in a question which he had better have left alone and that they do not agree with his statements. I have heard it stated—and I am inclined to think there is truth in the statement—that the Patriarch took the action he did in the hope that he would gain the same praise from the Moslems of Syria and Palestine as did the Maronite Patriarch when, during the recent troubles in Syria, he

openly espoused the cause of the Syrian Nationalists against the French High Commissioner.

4. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioner in Palestine and to His Majesty's consuls at Damascus and Aleppo.

I have, &c.

G. T. HAVARD.

Enclosure in No. 115.

Extract from the *Orient*.

UN PATHÉTIQUE APPEL DU PATRIARCHE ALEXANDROS À L'ARCHEVÊQUE DE CANTORBÉRY EN FAVEUR DES ARABES DE PALESTINE.

(Traduction.)

A Son Eminence l'Archevêque de Cantorbéry,

Mon cher Frère,

PAR suite des troubles qui ont éclaté dernièrement en Palestine et des effusions de sang qui ont suivi, je me sens dans l'obligation d'attirer votre attention sur la situation critique de ce pays, matérielle et morale.

Je ne retracerai pas les événements. Je me bornerai à dire que deux peuples rivaux—Arabes et juifs—s'entretuent.

La cause principale de ces troubles est la déclaration Balfour, qui créa un foyer national juif en Palestine.

Ne perdons pas de vue qu'avant la guerre, juifs et Arabes vivaient ensemble en paix, que jamais une inimitié n'a existé entre eux. Aujourd'hui la face des choses a changé. Les Arabes croient que le foyer juif n'a été fondé que pour détruire le leur, pour les chasser de leur pays.

Deux propositions contradictoires se trouvent dans la déclaration Balfour :—

(1) Création d'un foyer national juif.

(2) Sauvegarde des droits des habitants du pays.

Mais cela est-il possible? Aux dépens de qui sera édifié ce foyer juif? Il n'y a pas de doute que c'est aux dépens des autochtones.

Personnellement, j'éprouve une profonde sympathie pour les juifs, qui sont persécutés en Allemagne et ailleurs; mais le salut des réfugiés juifs peut-il justifier le sacrifice du peuple palestinien?

Les juifs sont actuellement propriétaires du tiers du territoire palestinien, malgré que leur importance numérique ne justifie pas une telle proportion. Si la vente des terres n'est pas arrêtée, il arrivera un jour (que je crois très prochain) où les Arabes seront réduits à la misère et au dénuement, où ils n'auront même plus de refuge pour les abriter.

Le résultat sera alors une lutte à mort, dont personne ne peut prévoir les conséquences.

Par ailleurs, en ma qualité de chef de l'Eglise orthodoxe d'Antioche et de tout l'Orient, je ne puis voir sans appréhension la continuation de l'émigration massive des juifs dans les Lieux-Saints. En effet, non seulement notre communauté mais toutes les communautés chrétiennes et musulmanes sont inquiètes du sort qui sera réservé aux Lieux-Saints lorsque les juifs constitueront la majorité dans le pays. Je redoute que dans ces conditions l'avenir ne nous réserve des guerres sanglantes semblables à celles des croisades.

Voilà pourquoi je vous prie d'attirer l'attention des Ministères des Affaires étrangères et des Colonies pour qu'ils trouvent un moyen de résoudre le problème palestinien de façon satisfaisante: le peuple anglais ne doit pas oublier que les Arabes ont combattu à ses côtés durant la grande guerre et que justice leur est due.

Dans l'espoir de recevoir des nouvelles, je demeure votre frère.

ALEXANDROS,
Patriarche orthodoxe d'Antioche
et de tout l'Orient.

[E 3022/2585/93]

No. 116.

Sir A. Clark Kerr to Mr. Eden.—(Received June 3.)

(No. 249.)

Sir,

Bagdad, May 19, 1936.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 231 of the 5th May, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a translation of a telegram which I received on the 9th May from a number of Mosul notables protesting against the policy of His Majesty's Government in Palestine.⁽¹⁾ The other copies were, I understand, sent to the nationalist leaders in Palestine and to the heads of other foreign missions in Bagdad.

2. Events in Palestine are still closely followed in the newspapers and efforts are being made in certain quarters in Bagdad to organise further public support for the Arab cause.

3. A general meeting was held at the principal Arab nationalist society (the Nadi-al-Muththanah) a few days ago, at which it was decided to seek permission to arrange a special day of prayer and mourning for the Arabs of Palestine. Other plans which have been discussed are a boycott of Jewish goods and a sympathetic strike of one day.

4. Recent events on the Euphrates are, however, to a large extent occupying public interest and are distracting attention from the disorders in Palestine.

5. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioner at Jerusalem.

I have, &c.

ARCHIBALD CLARK KERR.

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

[E 3314/2585/93]

No. 117.

Sir A. Clark Kerr to Mr. Eden.—(Received June 8.)

(No. 257.)

Sir,

Bagdad, May 27, 1936.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 249 of the 19th May, I have the honour to report that Friday, the 22nd May, was observed in Bagdad as a day of mourning for Palestine.

2. Most of the daily newspapers were printed with heavy black borders and contained special leading and other articles about the situation in Palestine. I enclose a note on these articles which has been prepared in the oriental chancery.

3. The organisers had intended to hold a mass meeting at one of the Bagdad mosques, but at the last moment permission was refused by the Government. I am told that it was feared in official quarters that the meeting might lead to demonstrations and disorder.

4. On the same day schoolboys were sent throughout the town collecting for the "Palestine victims." The press declares that large sums were obtained, but no figures are given, and I doubt whether much money will ever find its way to Palestine.

5. I have spoken to the Prime Minister about the exaggerated language used in many of the newspaper articles published on this occasion. His Excellency said that it was necessary for the Government to provide some outlet for public feeling, but that they were carefully checking anything likely to lead to violence or disorder.

6. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioner at Jerusalem.

I have, &c.

ARCHIBALD CLARK KERR.

Enclosure in No. 117.

*Extracts from Local Press dated May 22, 1936.**Palestine Day in Iraq.*

IN accordance with the resolution adopted by a meeting of journalists the day before yesterday, all papers (except the *Istiqal* and the *Iraq*) appear with black borders as a sign of mourning for the sufferings of the Arabs of Palestine, and each paper publishes one or more articles about that country.

All these articles condemn as wrong, unjustifiable and disastrous the Balfour declaration and the British mandatory policy in Palestine, and hold the mandatory Power responsible for the misfortunes of the Palestinian Arabs. They also criticise British policy in Palestine as being inconsistent with the friendship which the British Government desire to have with the Arab nation, and declare that the cause of the Arabs of Palestine is the deep concern of the entire Arab nation. Finally, they unanimously announce the determination of all Arabs to stand by the Arabs of Palestine, and to extend to them all possible moral and material support until their rights are fully restored.

The Istiqal writes:—

"Responsibility for the calamities besetting the Arabs in Palestine falls upon the mandatory Power, who has imposed upon them the castaways of all nations and turned their country into a field of struggle and strife. . . .

"Palestine acts rightly in rising in rebellion to safeguard with blood and fire her honour and her self-respect, and the entire Arab nation supports Palestine and defends her cause by all the means and with all the power that it commands."

Sawt-al-Shab, in its leading editorial, writes:—

"It is now clear that the Arabs will not compromise about their rights, and will not hesitate to use all the power they command, both moral and material, for the attainment of their object. There remains the question of the policy on whose power and might the Zionists depend. Will this policy extend support to the foreigner to enable him usurp the rights of the native people? When we speak of policy, we must be frank and ask: 'Will the English continue to support the Zionists against the Arabs?' . . . We believe that the English made a mistake in giving the Balfour pledge to the Jews. Proof of their mistake is to be found in the disastrous consequences of this pledge for both Arabs and Jews. . . . What benefit can accrue to Great Britain from supporting one party against the other? Undoubtedly none! Having made a mistake, Great Britain has only to hurry to its correction. It is stark ignorance for statesmen to think that the Moslem world will tolerate this injustice, and it is pitifully foolish of British statesmen to think that no harm can be feared from the indignation which it has aroused."

In another front-page article entitled: "Will Palestine become a Second Andalusia," an anonymous correspondent, who signs "Historian," denounces the Jews as being agents of destruction throughout the world and enemies of all order, all nations and all religions except their own. He declares every Jew everywhere to be a Zionist at heart, yearning for the re-establishment of the Jews in Palestine as a sovereign nation.

Of the Balfour declaration the writer says:—

"The Jews were given this pledge not out of love for their dark eyes, but in a desire to weaken the Arab unity which imperialism feared at the time. This pledge grew in strength, supported by ample Zionist financial resources and sharp English weapons, and the result is the present miserable condition of a free people who are humiliated and degraded in their own home."

"What measure should the Arabs adopt against this rushing tide and this closing menace? The answer is easy, and so is action. . . . The English now realise that their interests in the East and along the route to

India cannot be assured except through a policy of friendly co-operation with the Arabs, and that it is not in their interest to ignore the hatred of 80 million Arabs and several hundred million Moslems for the sake of a small group of castaways who have found their way into Palestine from a variety of countries.

"As to the Jews, these will shortly be pressed hard by a fresh boycott throughout the Moslem and Arab world, and an economic siege imposed on them such as will force them to give in to evident right. It is not unlikely that committees will be formed in the various Moslem and Arab capitals to call a boycott of the Jews and declare an economic siege against them."

The *Bilad* publishes a leading article from the pen of Abdulaziz-al-Sani, in which he spiritedly appeals for effective practical support for the Arabs of Palestine, and declares that empty expressions of sympathy and noisy protests are contemptuous and of no avail. After reviewing the great and brave achievements of the Arabs of old and their high national qualifications, he makes the following exhortation:—

"O Arabs! old and young, great and humble, high and lowly, rise up as one man and shout with one voice to echo throughout the world 'Palestine or death!' Act in a praiseworthy manner, and prove to the world that you are a nation of deeds, not of words, and one of sword and lance-bearers, true to the traditions of your worthy ancestors!"

The *Alam-al-Arabi*, in a leading editorial, writes:—

"What adds to the indignation and pain of the Arabs is that policy, instead of meeting, at least in part, the demands of the Arabs in regard to the stoppage of Zionist immigration into Palestine, has encouraged immigration by agreeing to an increase in the number of immigration certificates to be issued to Jews in various countries of the world."

Under the heading "Origin of Palestine's Calamity" is published a translation of a chapter from *Waters Flowing Eastward*, by L. Fry, dealing with the circumstances under which the Balfour Declaration was issued.

The *Iraq*, in a leading editorial, asserts that the dissatisfaction of the Arabs with the state of affairs in Palestine is perfectly natural and justifiable, and that, contrary to "statements in the foreign press," the resort from time to time to violence on the part of the Arabs of Palestine is entirely spontaneous, and "not the result of outside instigation on the part of foreign hands who are supporting the Arabs there in order to exploit the movement in their own interest."

[E 3284/381/65]

No. 118.

Sir A. Clark Kerr to Mr. Eden.—(Received June 6.)

(No. 260.)

Sir,

Bagdad, May 28, 1936.

I HAVE read with interest the report on the pan-Islamic Arab movement enclosed in Sir Miles Lampson's despatch No. 223 of the 24th February last, which came to me under cover of your despatch No. 229 of the 15th April, and I venture to submit some observations on this subject derived from my own contact with it in this country.

2. In the first place, I think it is perhaps a little misleading to use the term pan-Islamic when discussing the modern movement which springs from Arab nationalism. The efforts which have been made in recent times to quicken the spirit of Islam have been fundamentally religious and universal in their aims, while the manifestations of Arab nationalism have been political and regional. There are, of course, points at which the two movements meet, but these are, I feel, too few to justify their being dealt with as connected phenomena.

3. The Islamic world has not yet recovered, and may, indeed, never recover, from the shock of the Turkish abolition of the Caliphate in 1924. If, in their hour of victory, the Turks had not thrown aside Islam and the Caliphate and declared for a purely secular and nationalist State, a new unity might have developed among Islamic peoples. As it was, Islam was rejected by the one State

that might have assumed the rôle of leader, and the Mahometan world was deprived of the one central institution (apart from the Haj) which stood above the regional interests of its diverse peoples. Appreciation of the gravity of the situation led to a movement in some quarters to revive the Caliphate, but the proclamation of King Hussein as Caliph in 1924 and the Caliphate Congress in Cairo in 1926 were both failures. The Congress of the Islamic World summoned by King Abdul Aziz Al Saud at Mecca in the summer of 1926 was equally barren of results. The General Islamic Congress founded in Jerusalem in December 1931 has also failed to establish its authority as a central directive body for Islam, and it now appears to be moribund. It should also be noted that, although its conception owed much to the idea of the Mufti of Jerusalem that the congress could be used to bring to the Palestinian Arabs the help of the Moslem world in the Wailing Wall dispute with the Jews, the congress itself was careful to resist all efforts to convert it from a pan-Moslem into a pan-Arab gathering.

4. The failure of this last effort to organise Islam was very largely due to the aloofness of all the Islamic Governments. The Turkish and Persian Governments regarded it as reactionary and obscurantist. The Arab Kingdom of Iraq and Saudi Arabia were suspicious of any organisation in which they could not enjoy a predominant influence. Egypt stood aside and Afghanistan was too distraught by internal disorders to have time to spare for the outside world. Only the Yemen accepted officially the invitation of the organisers. The line of cleavage was clear. National interests had usurped the allegiance once given to the faith. Henceforward, the peoples of Islam were to rally under their national flags rather than under the banner of the prophet.

5. The modern history of the movement to attain some form of political unity among the Arab peoples follows a different course. The spectacular manifestation of Arab national sentiment which was brought about by the Amir Feisal and T. E. Lawrence in the Hejaz (which, it must be remembered, was a revolt against the Caliph) did not evoke universal response in other Arab countries. In the heart of Arabia, in Nejd and in Hail, the princes and the people were quite unmoved. In Mesopotamia the revolt in the desert was scarcely known, and Egypt had not then made up her mind whether she was really Arab at all. In Syria and Palestine the Hashimite rebellion won more adherents, but these two countries were too strongly held by the Turks for the Arabs there to give effective support. The vicissitudes of King Feisal's career need not be recapitulated here. So long as he lived, some of the ambitions, which his father claimed to have been recognised in the MacMahon correspondence, survived, but the Hashimite conception of Arab unity had in reality ceased to be practical politics when King Abdul Aziz conquered the Hejaz in 1925. With the death of King Feisal the last dream of a Hashimite hegemony over Arabia finally passed away. For a while there was nothing to take its place, but although King Feisal was dead, the men who had led his troops and who had been his Ministers still remained, and before long they began to evolve a new plan for Arab unity. It is this revised conception of the older ideal which is now being developed and which is the characteristic feature of the pan-Arab movement of to-day.

6. The heart of the movement is now in Iraq, where the political leaders have become masters of their country's destiny and are free to turn to wider issues. Palestine and Syria are still shackled by mandates, and until these shackles are broken the attention of the Arab leaders in these countries will inevitably be focussed on their local struggle for independence. Saudi Arabia is free from foreign domination, but is too backward and too self-centred to be able to take the lead. Egypt, like Palestine, is at present preoccupied with the settlement of her relations with Great Britain. It has therefore fallen to Iraq to inspire and direct the revival of the pan-Arab movement.

7. I have reported some of the chief indications of this revival in my despatch No. 101 of the 24th February last. Since then other events have continued to reanimate national sentiment. Another semi-official Iraqi delegation has been vociferously welcomed in Syria, Palestine and Egypt, a treaty of Arab Brotherhood and Alliance has been concluded between Iraq and Saudi Arabia to which it is open to all other independent Arab States to accede, and a significant rapprochement has taken place between Egypt and Saudi Arabia. The disorders in Palestine and the struggle of the Arabs for a positive limitation of Jewish immigration have at the same time evoked strong feelings in Iraq.

8. The immediate objective of the leaders appears to be the steady strengthening of a common national feeling among all Arab peoples. Their methods are incessant propaganda and the fullest possible personal intercourse between the leaders and publicists of the principal Arab countries, Iraq, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Palestine. Their ultimate aims are less easily defined. They are no longer dreaming of an Arab Empire under one ruler or ruling family. They think more in terms of some form of close federation which would leave a wide autonomy to each individual State and which might perhaps stretch some day from the Persian border to the Atlantic.

9. The essence of their ideals was, I think, revealed in the negotiation of the Iraq-Saudi Arabia Treaty, in which a defensive alliance between all Arab States, a common Arab foreign policy, a common Arab culture and economy and the facilitating of intercourse between all Arab countries were at first the main issues discussed. For a variety of reasons provisions concerning all these points could not in the end be embodied in the treaty, but I suggest that they may be accepted as the objectives which the leaders of the pan-Arab movement are striving ultimately to reach.

10. The attitude of these leaders towards Great Britain is not, I believe, unfriendly. Bitterness about the alleged failure of His Majesty's Government to fulfil the so-called MacMahon pledges to King Hussein is now a thing of the past, and the straightforward honesty of British policy in Iraq, our friendship with Ibn Saud, our stand for Abyssinia and the present hopefulness of the situation in Egypt are all facts which encourage confidence in the goodwill of His Majesty's Government. In Syria, I am told, the Arab nationalists constantly eulogise the success of Great Britain's work in Iraq. It is only the Jewish question in Palestine which tends at present to embarrass our relations with the pan-Arabs; and the best of the leaders in this country and, I believe, elsewhere (although I cannot speak for Palestine) have not yet lost confidence in the desire and in the ability of His Majesty's Government to devise an equitable solution of this problem. If this can be done, I see no immediate reason why the pan-Arab movement should be in any way hostile to Great Britain, or why its aims should be inimical to British interests. On the other hand, if the situation in Palestine continues to deteriorate, there may be, I fear, uncomfortable consequences for British interests in the principal Arab countries.

11. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioners at Cairo and Jerusalem, to His Majesty's Minister at Jedda and to His Majesty's consular officers at Beirut, Damascus and Aleppo.

I have, &c.

ARCHIBALD CLARK KERR.

[E 3399/2585/93]

No. 119.

Sir A. Clark Kerr to Mr. Eden.—(Received June 11.)

(No. 276.)

Sir,

Bagdad, June 3, 1936.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 257 of the 27th May, I have the honour to inform you that when I saw the Prime Minister yesterday he spoke to me about the present situation in Palestine.

2. His Excellency said that the Iraqi Government were receiving what he described as hundreds of requests for help and support from all kinds of organisations concerned in the efforts now being made in the interests of the Arab cause in Palestine. He was puzzled to know how to meet these demands. He did not wish to see His Majesty's Government involved in any further embarrassments while they were preoccupied with the situation caused by Italian aggression in Abyssinia; but it was only natural that both the Government and the people of Iraq should feel a deep interest in the position of their brother Arabs. In his recent contacts with his Palestinian friends he had counselled patience and confidence in His Majesty's Government, and had advised strongly against the tactics of violence and disorder which had recently been adopted by some elements of the Arabs in Palestine. He had told them frankly that such methods could do their cause no good, and he was pleased to see, in a manifesto published a few days ago, that some of the leaders had declared their abhorrence

of the killing, arson and other outrages which were being committed in their name. He said that, in his opinion, the vital issue was that of Jewish immigration. The Arabs foresaw that, if it continued without a maximum limitation, they would be reduced to the position of an impotent minority under the sway of an alien people whose intellectual and financial resources were far superior to their own. It was the realisation of this fact that was now driving them to desperation. He well understood the difficulties of His Majesty's Government, and knew that strong influences were being brought to bear upon them from many quarters to find room for the Jews now fleeing from Germany to escape Nazi persecution. Nevertheless, he thought it his duty to give me a friendly and serious warning to the effect that he feared that, in spite of the goodwill which the Arabs as a whole felt towards the British, His Majesty's Government would see the present happy state of harmony between the two peoples much damaged if a solution of the problem were not soon found. Was there anything that he could do to help? For the moment the Iraqi Government, both for reasons of internal policy and for the sake of their good relations with His Majesty's Government, upon which they set great store, did not desire to be drawn into taking any action in the matter, but they might not be able indefinitely to resist the pressure that was being brought upon them to champion the Arab cause.

3. I thanked his Excellency for the frankness with which he had spoken and for the confidence which he had expressed in the ability of His Majesty's Government, inspired as they were by goodwill towards the Arab peoples, to find a satisfactory solution of the Palestinian problem. I promised to report his remarks to you, and I assured him that they would receive careful consideration. I also thanked him for the good advice which he had given to his friends in Palestine. The first essential was clearly the restoration of order. Nothing could be done until a stop had been put to the outrages which were being daily committed in the name of the Arab cause. Once this had been effected, the way would be clear for the Arab leaders to accept the invitation of His Majesty's Government to go to London in order to represent their case, and I shared his Excellency's confidence that His Majesty's Government would then be able to find a way out of the present difficulties. I said that for myself I had always felt that any real solution must be based on an effort by the Arabs and Jews to work together for the common good of Palestine. Such talks as I had had from time to time with responsible leaders of Zionism had led me to the belief that they were asking no more than this, and much would be gained if the Arabs could be brought to understand it. Yassin-al-Hashimi said that this was probably true, and that he thought that the Arabs in Palestine would accept any solution which would safeguard them from the risk of falling in the future into a position of subordination and inferiority in what they regarded as their own country.

4. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioner at Jerusalem.

I have, &c.

ARCHIBALD CLARK KERR.

[E 3794/195/89]

No. 120.

Sir G. Clerk to Mr. Eden.—(Received June 24.)

(No. 802. Confidential.)

Sir,

Paris, June 22, 1936.

WITH further reference to your despatch No. 521 of the 20th March last, I have the honour to inform you that a member of my staff took the opportunity to ask at the Quai d'Orsay to-day whether any further progress had been made with the negotiations for the drafting of a Franco-Syrian treaty.

2. In reply M. Chauvel explained that the Syrian Nationalist leaders who are still in Paris have no official status of any kind, and that no negotiations have so far taken place between them and the French Government. Up to the present they have had conversations with M. de Martel, which were interrupted some time before the elections and have not since been resumed, though it was expected that they would recommence in about a fortnight's time. The change

of Government in France, said M. Chauvel, had naturally made the Syrians hopeful that more concessions could be extracted from the present French Government than their predecessors would have been willing to make. In fact, however, M. Blum's Administration were showing an admirable firmness, which had greatly relieved the Quai d'Orsay, and would, it was hoped, have a salutary effect, since the Syrians must soon realise that there was unlikely to be any French Government in power in the near future which would be more accommodating in its attitude than the present one.

3. The present position was that the Syrian leaders would now resume their conversations with M. de Martel, and if the latter were able to report that there were prospects of concluding the kind of treaty which the French Government could accept, then official conversations would at once begin between the representatives of France and Syria with a view to its speedy conclusion.

4. Passing to the question of the Alawite and the Jebel Druse territories, M. Chauvel said that their inclusion in the Syrian Republic was a matter of considerable difficulty, but that the French Government felt, in view of the terms of their mandate for Syria, that there was no other alternative open to them. These territories already enjoyed autonomy under the High Commissioner; if a satisfactory Franco-Syrian treaty were signed, they would enjoy a similar autonomy under the Syrian Government and full safeguards would be demanded to ensure that this part of the treaty was carried out. In addition, it was the intention of the French Government to maintain a garrison in the Jebel Druse territory, and he hoped that this information would be welcome to His Majesty's Government.

5. As regards the Lebanon, M. Chauvel said that the Lebanon Nationalist leaders were being informed immediately that the French Government, once the Franco-Syrian treaty had been negotiated, were prepared to offer a similar treaty to the Lebanon. A telegram in this sense had been despatched to Beirut and would be published there very shortly. The question of the future treatment of the Lebanon had very seriously occupied the French authorities, but they had come to the conclusion that there was no alternative but to grant the Lebanon the same terms as were being given to Syria. They had at one moment considered the incorporation of the Jebel Druse into the Lebanon territory, but this would raise serious administrative difficulties and the Syrians would clearly never agree. A further difficulty to be encountered was the question of the present joint régime, which covered customs, postal regulations and money for the two territories. This régime would clearly have to be continued and a special reservation to that effect made both with Syria and the Lebanon.

6. The treaties which it was hoped to conclude would follow generally the lines laid down in the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty. The High Commissioner would probably become Ambassador, and, so M. Chauvel thought—though this, he explained, was quite tentative—would be accredited to both Syria and the Lebanon, a Chargé d'Affaires being maintained in the latter territory.

7. Questioned as to the prospects of the present negotiations being successful, M. Chauvel declared himself an optimist, and stated that once the Syrian elections were over he hoped that the conclusion of the treaty would follow quite shortly. He added, however, that he was unable to say how long it would be before the Syrians would be judged capable of assuming full responsibility for their country or what limits of time would be laid down in the treaty. Some authorities, among whom he said was Nuri Pasha, had suggested that the period should last at least four years.

8. I have sent a copy of this despatch to the British delegation at Montreux
I have, &c.

GEORGE R. CLERK.

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(15316)

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PART XXXIX—JULY TO DECEMBER 1936.

CHAPTER I.—ARABIA.

[E 5458/1041/25]

No. 1.

Mr. Calvert to Mr. Eden.—(Received August 29.)(No. O.T. 20.)
Sir,

Jedda, June 26, 1936.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith the general survey of economic, commercial and financial conditions in Saudi Arabia, to which Sir Andrew Ryan has from time to time referred in correspondence with your Department, and to which a reference is made in Sir John Simon's despatch No. 294 of the 30th July, 1934, paragraph 3.

2. This general survey has been prepared by Mr. Vice-Consul Oppenheim, and is the first report of its kind made by this Legation in respect of the political entity now known as Saudi Arabia. It is, indeed, only the second comprehensive economic survey attempted in this post over a period of many years, the previous instance being the report, on economic conditions in the Hejaz, drawn up by Mr. Graftey-Smith in 1923, forwarded to the Foreign Office under Mr. Bullard's despatch No. 12 O.T. of the 31st October of that year.

3. The compilation of this survey has been in contemplation, as you are aware, for a number of years, but its magnitude, if it were to receive careful treatment, and the pressure of more urgent affairs have led to postponement of the undertaking. It will be readily understood that to assemble the material for the report from information gleaned with difficulty and in meagre quantities over a long period of time, especially from local sources often reluctant and generally unable to impart particulars in an exact and scientific form, has proved a laborious task. To that task, Mr. Oppenheim has devoted himself with industry and enthusiasm, and I venture to commend both the zeal and the ability displayed by him in compiling what I believe is a valuable record of the general economic and commercial life of Saudi Arabia.

I have, &c.

A. S. CALVERT.

Enclosure in No. 1.

Economic Survey of Saudi Arabia.

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Preface.

Saudi Arabia is a poor country. Its trade is almost negligible, depending for the great part on the attraction of a religious pilgrimage. It is, however, a country from whose sands the last two years have revealed oil and gold, either of which may lead it to a more important place in the economic world. Moreover, Saudi Arabia is a country, immense in size, of which large areas are only superficially known, and who can to-day say whether the apparent barrenness of the land is a true or false gauge of its poverty!

Having these extraordinary conditions in mind, this report has had to aim more at a general survey of the economic life and progress of the country and of the nature of its administration and people than at an attempt to set forth mathematical information concerning national resources or statistics of imports and exports, little of which could be more than guess work. Where, however, such information of reasonable reliability is available, it has been given.

Commercial Summary.

Area.—Peninsular Arabia is estimated to be about 1 million square miles, of which Saudi Arabia may cover two-thirds.

Population.—Estimated at about 3 million Bedouin and 2 million town and village dwellers.

Religion.—Sunni Moslems. There are Shia communities in Hasa and Hail. There are no native Christians or Jews.

Language.—Arabic. English is widely used in commercial circles in the Hejaz.

Newspapers.—The *Umm-al-Qura* and the *Saut-al-Hejaz*, both Arabic, printed in Mecca.

Advertising.—Little possible, owing to the illiteracy of the population. Occasional advertisements appear in the newspapers. Advertisements depicting living creatures are forbidden.

Currency.—The English gold sovereign, the Saudi riyal (Hejaz), the Indian rupee, the Maria Theresa dollar or riyal (Nejd). Egyptian notes and silver are current in the chief towns of the Hejaz.

£1 gold = 110 piastres miri (gold).

1 Saudi riyal = 11 piastres miri (silver) = 22 piastres Saudi. N.B.—Piastres miri gold or silver are used in certain Government transactions, but do not exist as coins.

[NOTE.—Since this report was prepared new legal parity has been established as follows:—

£1 gold = 20 Saudi riyals.

1 Saudi riyal = 11 Saudi piastres.

1 Saudi piastre = 2 nickel piastres.

Also, new Saudi riyals have been minted and put into circulation. These coins are of the same size, weight and fineness as the Indian rupee (for further details, see note at end of Part IV (c)).]

Exchange.—Average rates for sterling for the last five years have been:—

1930: 10 riyals to £1.

1931: 10 riyals to £1. (From October) £1 gold 120 per cent. sterling.

1932: 13 riyals to £1. £1 gold 140½ per cent. sterling.

1933: 14·14 P. to £1. £1 gold 149½ per cent. sterling.

1934: 14·10 P. to £1. £1 gold 161 per cent. sterling.

1935: 11·6 P. to £1. £1 gold 170 per cent. sterling.

Steamship Services.—The Khedivial Mail Line runs a weekly service from Suez to Port Sudan via Jedda and return. Alternate ships call at Wejib and Yanbu. Ships leave Suez Wednesdays, arrive Jedda Sundays, Port Sudan Mondays; return from Port Sudan Tuesdays, Jedda Wednesdays, arrive Suez Sundays. This schedule is subject to temporary dislocation for a few weeks before and after the pilgrimage. The Tirrenia Line (Italian) runs a fortnightly service from Suez to Massawa via Jedda. The Strick Line, Blue Funnel Line (Javanese, Malay and Moroccan pilgrims), Bombay and Persia S.N. Company (Limited), Mogul Line (Indian pilgrimage), Besse Line, Rotterdam Lloyd, Hansa Line and the Svenska Ostasiatiska Line also call at Jedda from time to time.

Air Services.—Imperial Airways India route passes along the Persian Gulf coast of Saudi Arabia and has landing grounds in the independent principalities of Koweit and Bahrein.

Passports and Visas.—British passports are not generally issued valid for the interior of Saudi Arabia. Saudi visas must be obtained either at the Saudi Legation, 42 Eaton Place, S.W.1, or from the Saudi agent in Cairo. Non-Moslems are not allowed to visit Mecca or Medina.

Hotels.—There are two hotels in Jedda, one belonging to the Government and the other to the Banque Misr of Cairo. The latter is only open during the pilgrimage season.

Calendar.—The lunar Moslem year consists of twelve months, twenty-nine or thirty days in length: Muharram (30), Safar (29), Rabi-al-Awwal (30), Rabi-al-Thani (29), Jumad-al-Awwal (30), Jumad-ath-Thani (29), Rajab (30), Sha-ban (29), Ramadhan (30), Shawwal (29), Dhu'l Qa'da (30), Dhu'l Hijja (29). The Pilgrimage day at Mecca falls on the 9th Dhu'l Hijja each year. The corresponding Christian dates for the first day of the Hijra year and probable date of the pilgrimage for the years 1936-40 are—

		Pilgrimage Day.	
		New Year's Day A.H. (Approximately by 1 day.)	
A.H.	1354	April 5, 1935	March 3, 1936.
	1355	March 24, 1936	February 22, 1937.
	1356	March 14, 1937	February 11, 1938.
	1357	March 3, 1938	February 1, 1939.
	1358	February 21, 1939	January 21, 1940.
	1359	February 10, 1940	January 9, 1941.

Holidays.—The weekly holiday for the Government is Friday. Other official holidays are—

Id-al-Fitr (Shawwal 1-3).

Id-al-Adh'ha (Dhu'l Hijja 10-14).

Accession Day (January 8).

Unification of the Kingdom (September 22).

Weights and Measures.—English and metric weights and measures are used in external trade, the former being customary on the Persian Gulf coast. Arab weights and measures are used in retail trade. The principal are—

The Hejaz.

(a) *Weights*—

1 qirat (pl. qararit) : gold, silver, drugs	=	00043 lb.
1 Dirham (pl. darahim) = 16 qararit	=	00688 "
1 Mikyal (pl. Makayil) = 1½ darahim	=	08254 "
1 Uqiyya (pl. Awaq) = 12 darahim	=	08254 "
1 Ratl (pl. artal) = 12 Awak	=	990504 "
1 Uqqa (pl. uqqat) = 400 darahim	=	275137 "
1 Farasala (pl. farasla) = 8 uqqat	=	22011 "
1 Qantar (pl. qanatir) = 5 Farasla	=	1100548 "

(b) *Length and Area*—

1 Hindaza (pl. hanadiz) : cloth, &c.	=	22.5 in.
1 Dhiraa (pl. adhruu) baladi for carpets and cloth	=	22.83 "
1 Dhiraa Mii'mari : land	=	29.52 "
1 Makhzan (pl. Makhazin) : Small = 75 sq. adhruu	=	50.43 sq. yds.
Large = 85 sq. adhruu	=	57.54 "
1 Qirat : houses, land	=	¼th of the total area.

(c) *Capacities.*

Liquids are generally bought and sold by weight. The only common measure of capacity is the Kaila (pl. kailat), which varies with the distance from the port of Jedda—

<i>E.g.</i> , 1 kaila of rice at Jedda	=	3 uqqat.
1 " " Mecca	=	2 "
1 " " Medina	=	1½ "
In Jedda 1 kaila of wheat, beans or lentils	=	3 uqqat.
1 " of barley	=	2½ "
1 " of flour	=	2 "
1 Jedda kaila = approximately 9 pints.		
Medina only, 4 kailat = 1 Mudd.		

Nedj.—(Other than any mentioned above.)

(a) *Weight*—

4 waznat (sing. wazna) = 1 qunu : dates, sugar, tea, &c.
= approximately 3 lb.

(b) *Area and length*—

Dhiraa and Qirat as in the Hejaz.

1 qama : wells = approximately 170 centimetres.

(c) *Capacity*—

Measured by weight as in the Hejaz.

1 Saa = approximately 1½ Jedda kailat = approximately 8 lb.
(rice, flour, wheat, &c.).

(d) *Miscellaneous*—

Meat is sold by the "Mashrak" or bundle and firewood, charcoal, &c., by the camel load.

Hasa.—(Other than mentioned above.)

(a) *Weights*—

1 ruba = weight of 12 Maria Theresa dollars.

32 ruba = 1 qiyasa (pl. qiyis).

24 qiyis = 1 mann.

1 musumiya, rice in husk = 10 qiyis.

1 musumiya, wheat = 12 qiyis.

(b) *Length and Area*—

1 dhiraa = 18 inches.

2 adhruu = 1 war = 1 yard.

1 ba' (also used in Hejaz for ropes) hand to hand, both arms extended = 2 yards.

1 shibir = full hand span = approximately 9 inches.

1 farasakh = 3 miles.

I.—INTRODUCTION.

The legend of Araby, the land of gold, frankincense and myrrh, of gums, precious stones and spices, of all the things which spelled luxury to a previous civilisation, is hard to reconcile with the arid desert peninsula of fact. The legend carries us back to ancient times when the Semite Arab was acting middleman to the wealth of the Hadhramaut and India. In modified form it has been passed down through the ages until only in the last few years the actual facts of the wealth and poverty of the interior of Arabia have begun to be unveiled to the world.

It needed the disillusion of a military expenditure to prove to the Romans that Arabia, situated between the two main trade routes to the East, was not herself the source, but only the carrier of the luxuries that found their way along her caravan routes into the Roman markets. Even when this truth had been guessed, the difficulties encountered by Greek navigators with the monsoon perpetuated this transit trade to the favour of the Arab.

With the rise of Islam in the 7th century, trade in the peninsula underwent a revolution. Until then Arabia had, by the infiltration of Christianity and Judaism from the north and from the south, been becoming increasingly "Western" in outlook. Now, it found itself no longer a mere country of passage, but the spiritual centre of a new and separate civilisation; it became "Eastern"; trade with Europe was cut and the commerce of the peninsula became, what it still largely is, the commerce of the pilgrimage. With the spread of Islam, a new transit trade sprang up in the Red Sea, which was to endure until the days of the steamer and the Suez Canal, for Jedda, the port of Mecca, became by virtue of its pilgrim trade an entrepôt for the trade between Egypt and India and the East. In the middle of the 19th century as many as forty native Indian ships, under the British flag, were engaged in trading to Jedda with pilgrims and goods, the latter destined largely for transshipment by Arab dhows to Egypt.

Direct trade with Europe was reopened with the discovery of the Cape route, but was long confined to the richer and less fanatical south-west and south-east of the peninsula, areas which to-day lie outside the frontiers of Saudi Arabia. It was the establishment of the "Overland Service" to India which first attracted the attention of modern Powers, especially France and Britain, to the Red Sea Coasts; Jedda was necessary in those early days to ships as a coaling and revictualling station, a fact which gave rise to agencies and a small European commercial community. This revival of direct contact with Europe and Europeans and the establishment of a through trade route to the East in the Red Sea ushered in a new era for the commerce of this part of Arabia, the Hejaz. The first economic effect was the destruction of the Jedda native entrepôt trade, which, in parenthesis, doubtless contributed an economic factor to the ill-feeling that culminated in the massacre of Europeans in 1858. Native shipping was replaced entirely by European steamers; trade was increasingly concentrated in European hands; trade began once more to incline to the west, a tendency which is still far from complete and which Japan may successfully check.

These later developments were less noticeable in the central and eastern portions of the peninsula. The centre, Nejd, even to-day carries on trade along her mediæval caravan routes, and it is only in the latest years that she has come into touch with foreign trade through the political unification of the country and the contacts of her Government. The trade of the east, Hasa, is still entirely in native hands and still oriented towards the east rather than the west.

It is these historical factors that make the economic unity even of the part of the peninsula that is Saudi Arabia non-existent, and which combined with the lack of information about the interior make difficult a rational economic survey of the country.

II.—THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA.

"Saudi Arabia" is a new term not yet five years old, and may mean little to the business man. As a name it symbolises the increased political unity given to the territories concerned by the present ruler, King Abdul Aziz Al-as-Saud, and superseded the name "Hejaz, Nejd and its Dependencies," by which the country was known from 1926 to 1932.

(a) *Frontiers.*

In common with other desert countries the frontiers of Saudi Arabia are more clearly defined on maps than in fact. This uncertainty, however, is, with exceptions, of less economic than political importance.

The northern frontier, fixed by treaty, except in the west, very generally stated may be said to run from the head of the Gulf of Aqaba to the Hejaz Railway at Mudawwara and 100 miles beyond, where it runs north to include the greater part of the fertile Wadi Sirhan in Saudi Arabia, and terminates at Cape Mish'ab on the Persian Gulf. On this northern frontier there are two neutral zones in which all rights are shared equally by Saudi Arabia and Iraq in the one case, and Saudi Arabia and Koweit in the other. The latter, which is economically the more important area, forms an irregular quadrangle on the base of the Persian Gulf coast from Ras Mish'ab to Ras-al-Qalia.

The south-eastern frontier is still unsettled, but the *de facto* line may be said to run south from the head of Dohat-as-Salwa out into the Great Desert, the Rub-al-Khali.

The southern frontier, now fixed by treaty with the Yemen, runs inland from a point north of Midi on the Red Sea coast. Excerpts from the relevant treaties giving exact definition of the frontiers will be found in an appendix to this report.

(b) *Physical Features and Climate* (see Map I^(*)).

The country enclosed within these frontiers is divided into three geographical zones, each of which lends itself to generalisation. The most important characteristic of the peninsula is the range of mountains which runs the length of the west coast, the Hejaz mountains, dividing, as its name signifies, the eastern plateau (Nejd) from the Red Sea. Coastward from the Hejaz range lie the foothills and narrow coastal plain called Tihama. The climate of this zone is hot and near the sea extremely damp. The soil is sandy and unfertile, and the zone would be of little importance did not the foothills harbour the cities of Mecca and Medina, the holiness of which has transformed this naked waste into a centre of pilgrimage and brought trade and money to its ports.

The Hejaz range itself, averaging 5,000 feet, rises to a height of 8,000 feet in the Harrat areas (lava desert) on the north, and still higher to 10,000 and 12,000 feet in Asir. The climate of this mountain is less torrid. Rain is plentiful in the winter, especially in the south, and good vegetation is found in the larger oases of Taima, Khaibar, Taif, Turaba and Abha.

Eastward from the Hejaz range the surface of the land slopes gradually down to the Persian Gulf, the central plateau having a mean elevation of somewhat over 2,000 feet. Here and there harder masses stand above the level of the plateau, as the Jebel Shammar, 5,000 feet, and the long low ridge of Jebel Tuwaiq. The whole of this third zone is divided into two parts by a ring of deserts, which is almost continuous from the Great Nafud in the north, through the Dahana to the east of Jebel Tuwaiq, down to the Rub-al-Khali in the south. The area between the Hejaz range and the desert ring is Nejd (the plateau), and consists largely of gravel plains and steppe land, cut into by strips of Dahana (hard desert plain covered by sand belts), or Nafud (deep sand formed into dunes). Jebel Shammar and Jebel Tuwaiq form a bulwark against these deserts, and harbour in their valleys sufficient sub-surface water to support a semi-circle of oases, which politically and geographically fall into three groups: Firstly, Jebel Shammar, with its chief town of Hail; secondly, the Qasim between Jebel Shammar and Jebel Tuwaiq, along the Ruma Valley, with Anaiza and Bumaida, the two chief commercial cities of central Arabia; and, thirdly, Nejd proper with the Jebel Tuwaiq oases of the Sadair, Washm, Aridh and Wadi Dawasir districts, including, notably the capital, Riyadh.

Beyond the ring of deserts lie, to the north, the fertile depression of the Wadi Sirhan, with its chief oasis at Jauf, and to the east the coastal plain of Al Hasa, mostly barren, but containing the largest oasis in the country, the Al Hasa oasis with the town of Hufuf. Between Hasa and Wadi Sirhan curves a vast area of steppe land, falling away to the Euphrates valley.

The climate of these areas differs considerably. Central Arabia is hot and dry in the summer and cold in the winter, frost being known in the north. Hasa has a hot climate, and on the Persian Gulf coast is as damp as the Hejaz Tihama.

(*) Not reproduced.

Rainfall throughout is scarce, and nowhere so plentiful as in the western mountains. The rainfall of Hasa is thought to average about 4 inches per annum.

Owing to the lack of precipitation, there are no perennial rivers in the whole of Saudi Arabia, but many river beds (Wadis) which serve as drainage channels to carry off the storm floods and whose easily accessible sub-surface water fertilises oases on their course. The most important of these drainage channels are in the Wadi Rumma, which falls from the Hejaz range not far from Medina, through the Qasim, to the head of the Persian Gulf, and the Wadi Hamdh, which, starting from the same area as the Wadi Rumma, runs westward, past Medina, to the Red Sea.

(c) *Population.*

Saudi Arabia with Australia is the least populated country in the world. An area equal to that of peninsular India contains an estimated population of about 5 million.

Throughout the kingdom the population is divided into tent dwellers and house dwellers. In the Hejaz and Asir the division is less sharp than in Nejd on account of the existence of a village life supplementary to town life. In Nejd small settled communities are rare and confined to the religious settlements recently founded by Ibn Saud, of which mention will be made below (Part VI (a)). In the whole country there may be 3 million Bedouin to 2 million village and town dwellers, the Hejaz and Asir accounting for over half of the settled inhabitants. The approximate population of Mecca is 60,000, Jedda and Hufuf 30,000, Riyadh and Medina 10,000.

The majority of the population is Arab, but slavery and the pilgrimage have mixed the blood, especially in the Hejaz, where Abyssinians, Negroes, Javanese and Indians have all left their mark. The immigration of African negroes has led to the foundation of black communities, notably the town of Khaibar. In the Hejaz the Hadhramis form an important and useful element amongst the commercial community known for their industry as the Jews elsewhere.

In Mecca, Medina and Jedda there is an important Indian merchant community, of which the Patnis, inhabitants of the town of Pattan in Baroda, form a picturesque part. This small Indian town has maintained a secular connexion with Hejaz trade. Some firms have been established for several hundred years in Jedda, yet it is doubtful whether any member during that period has been born in the Hejaz, so assiduously is the link with India maintained.

Jedda is the only town in which European commercial firms are established.

III.—ADMINISTRATION (see Map II^(*)).(a) *Government.*

Saudi Arabia is since 1932 a united kingdom. It has, however, no systematised Government, and the theoretical constitutional differences between the Hejaz and Nejd are great. The King granted the Hejaz a Constitution in 1926, placing the administration under his second son Feisal, who holds the title of Viceroy. Nejd, on the other hand, remained under the traditional patriarchal system of Government, being governed as a congerie of sheikhdoms. In practice, however, constitutional differences have little effect. The Government of the country is throughout an autocracy, and the smallest questions are referred to the King's decision which is unfettered save by the rulings of the Sharia or Khoranic Law.

Since the unification of the kingdom in 1932, the tendency is to make certain administrative departments common to the whole country, notably that of finance, and with it of customs. The Constitution of the whole of Saudi Arabia, promised in 1932, has not materialised.

(b) *Law.*

The law is the religious Sharia law, and no legislation may be decreed which is in contradiction to the fundamental teachings of Islam, the writings of the Koran and the works and sayings of the Prophet. In consequence judges are of necessity appointed from amongst the ulema, learned men in theology.

In Jedda the Majlis-at-Tujjar, or Assembly of Merchants, composed of six merchants and a member of the Sharia Court, appointed for periods of two years,

(*) Not reproduced.

has magisterial powers to deal in the first instance with certain commercial disputes. Its functions are defined by the Saudi Commercial Code of 1931-32, and includes judgment of disputes between merchants; dhow owners, ship owners and merchants; banks and merchants; and so forth.

Disputes with Government departments, *e.g.*, disputes over assessment of duty, cannot be taken to the courts, but are referred in the first place to the local Governor (in Jedda the kaimakam) and, through him, to the respective Ministries.

(c) *Public Security.*

Ibn Saud has ruled with a strong hand, and there is security of travel and peace between the tribes such as has not been known in Arabia for many centuries. Europeans, however, are not permitted to travel in the country without the consent and the protection of the Government, but such travel is now relatively common except in the south-west. Non-Moslems are not permitted to enter the holy territories that surround Mecca and Medina.

Security of life is equalled by the security of property, the thief and robber being greatly discouraged by the rigour of the religious law.

(d) *Commercial Legislation.*

Commercial Code.—A Commercial Code based mainly on the old Ottoman codes was published in successive numbers of the official newspaper, the *Umm-al-Qura*, from the 7th August, 1931, to the 26th February, 1932, coming into force on the latter date. The code originally applied to the Hejaz only and, so far as it applies to the Majlis-at-Tujjar, still relates to the Hejaz only.

Ownership of real property.—Regulations issued on the 26th October, 1934, reaffirmed the old principle that foreigners may not hold property in the Hejaz as distinct from the rest of Saudi Arabia.

Company registration and licences to trade.—By regulation No. 144 of the 16th Muharram, 1347 (1928), commercial companies ("association of more than one person for the purposes of trade"), including agents, must register with the Government.

By official communiqué No. 14 of the 1st Rabi-al-Thani, 1353 (the 13th July, 1934), all people practising trade in Saudi Arabia must obtain a licence from the finance department of the town in which they live. For this purpose, firms, shops and vendors' booths are divided into four categories which pay for licences annually at the rates of £2 gold, £1 gold, £½ gold and £¼ gold respectively. Doctors, dentists, chemists and chauffeurs are subject to special regulations.

Patents and Trade-marks.—No provision seems to be made either in the Sharia law or the Commercial Code mentioned above for the registration or protection of patents and trade-marks.

Debtors.—Commercial debts are heard according to the Commercial Code of 1931-32 before the Majlis-at-Tujjar in the first instance and, if complicated, before the religious Sharia court. By a decree of the 25th November, 1932, provision was made for preventing defendants from leaving the jurisdiction of courts in which they are sued for debt. There are no firms of lawyers in the country, and absent creditors must appoint local agents to plead their cases before the court.

Tariffs.—A customs tariff applicable to the whole of Saudi Arabia was published in official communiqué No. 1 of the 10th Muharram, 1352 (the 5th May, 1933). A supplementary list of dutiable articles was published on the 23rd June, 1933, and modifications of the tariff on the 15th June, 1934, and the 14th May, 1935. The tariff classes goods in two categories. The first, and by far the larger category, is taxed by a system of specific duties. The second is treated as *ad valorem*. The customs tariff is regarded by the Government solely as a source of revenue, there being no local industry to protect. Duties are invariably high even on the necessities of life, such as, for instance, sugar and rice. The only class of goods of importance that are admitted duty free are phenol (tariff modification published on the 14th May, 1935) and pumps for drawing water.

There is no system of bonded warehouses at any port, and all goods once landed are liable to demurrage and if reshipped to export taxes. These latter are imposed at various rates, some *ad valorem* and others specific by weight or by head.

By decree published in the summer of 1926, the King abolished all internal tariffs in the Hejaz which had been in force under the Hashimite régime.

Merchants, however, who wish to send their goods from Mecca into the interior, must obtain a customs certificate from the Ministry of Finance at Mecca, else the goods will be regarded as smuggled and treated accordingly.

Religious Restrictions on Trade.—(1) In obedience to the Sharia law, the import and sale of all alcoholic beverages are forbidden. Methylated spirit and pure alcohol can be imported under the conditions laid down in the regulations published on the 21st September, 1934. (2) Tobacco and cigarettes are allowed to be imported, but smoking is actively discouraged by the Government (see VII (b) (8), below). (3) The import of musical instruments, especially of gramophones and gramophone records is forbidden. Since the 29th January, 1935, wireless receiving sets are allowed to be imported and used by residents in the coastal towns of the Hejaz for the object of hearing the news and recitations of the Koran only. (4) According to the Sharia Law, and confirmed by Royal decree early in 1926, no interest may be charged on loans or bank deposits; it is legal, however, with the former, to charge an agent's commission.

Legislative Restrictions on Trade.—(1) By regulations published on the 31st October, 1935, the import of all arms and ammunition, other than sporting guns and cartridges, was forbidden. These latter are covered by a decree of the 15th May, 1931, whereby their import and export is forbidden, except by Government licence. (2) Import and export of narcotics is only permitted under Government control; regulations published on the 7th, 14th and 21st September, 1934. (3) Henbane, which is grown in parts of Saudi Arabia, is forbidden for export.

(e) *Commercial Treaty Relations with Neighbouring Arab States.*

Transjordan.—There is no commercial agreement with Transjordan. By article 9 of the Treaty of Friendship and "Bon-Voisinage" signed in 1933, the tribes of either State are free to move across the frontier for their own trading purposes. By an exchange of correspondence in October 1928 and August 1929, the two Governments notified each other that trade between their territories must pass through certain posts: on the Saudi side Qarryat, Jauf, Taima, Tabuk or Dhaba; on the Transjordan side, Aqaba or the routes Jauf-Jafr-Ma'an, Tabuk-Ma'an, Qarryat-al-Malh-Umari-al-Muwaqqar-Sahb-Amman.

Syria.—Commercial relations between Saudi Arabia and Syria and the Lebanon are at present governed by Chapter III of the Treaty of Friendship and "Bon-Voisinage" signed between them on the 10th November, 1931. The treaty, pending the conclusion of a special commercial agreement, regulates the entry of merchant caravans of one State into either of the other two and abolishes all taxes levied by tribes on such caravans. By the Hadda Agreement of 1925 between Nejd and Great Britain, the latter guarantees freedom of transit to *bona fide* Nejd merchants across mandated territory for the prosecution of their trade with Syria, and undertakes to exempt their goods from customs dues when their trade is not confined to camels and other animals.

Iraq.—There is no special commercial agreement. Article 3 of the Treaty of Muhammara (1922) stipulates treatment of the goods of either country on an equal basis with those of other States. Article 6 of the Treaty of Friendship and "Bon-Voisinage" of the 7th April, 1931, allows for the movement of tribes across the frontiers in the prosecution of their own trading. In 1935 a special agreement concerning the opening up of the motor pilgrim route from Najaf to Hail and Medina was reached between the two countries.

Koweit.—There is no commercial agreement between Koweit and Saudi Arabia. The Government of Nejd and later of Saudi Arabia have maintained for many years an embargo on all trade between the two countries. This embargo has long been the subject of negotiations between His Majesty's Government and the Saudi Arab Government and it is hoped that an arrangement will be reached in the near future which will put an end to a state of affairs, deleterious to the interests of both countries.

Bahrein.—Notes exchanged between His Majesty's Government and the Saudi Arab Government on the 16th-17th November, 1935, regulate the transit trade to and from Saudi Arabia through Bahrein. Duties of 2 per cent. and 1½ per cent. *ad valorem* is levied on goods landed and transhipped respectively at Bahrein.

Duty of 5 per cent. *ad valorem* is levied on dates imported into Bahrein from Saudi Arabia.

Qatar, Trucial Oman, Oman, Hadhramaut and Aden.—Overland trade between these States and Saudi Arabia is almost non-existent, the last three being separated from Nejd by the Great Desert. There are no trade agreements.

Yemen.—Article 19 of the Treaty of Taif concluded at the end of the Saudi Yemen war in 1934, states that both parties "announce their desire to do everything possible to facilitate postal and telegraphic services, to increase the communications between the two countries, and to facilitate the exchange of commodities and agricultural and commercial products between them; to undertake detailed negotiations in order to conclude a customs agreement to safeguard the economic interest of their two countries by unifying duties throughout the two countries or by special regulations designed to secure the advantage of the two sides." The customs agreement mentioned has not yet been concluded.

(f) *Commercial Treaty Relations with other States.*

Since the lifting of the ban on Soviet products early in 1933, equal treatment has been accorded to all States trading with Saudi Arabia.

A commercial treaty has been signed with Italy (Jedda, the 10th February, 1932) stipulating most-favoured-nation treatment for vessels, merchandise and fishing boats of either nation, the last with reference to Eritrea.

A "Provisional Agreement," concerning reciprocal most-favoured-nation rights, was signed with the United States in London on the 7th November, 1933.

Treaties of friendship, including most-favoured-nation clauses, have been concluded with Germany (Cairo, the 26th April, 1929) and France (Jedda, the 10th November, 1931, ratified the 24th June, 1932).

Treaties embodying a clause signifying the desire of the contracting parties to conclude at some future date a commercial treaty have been signed with Turkey (Mecca, the 3rd August, 1929) and Persia (Tehran, the 23rd August, 1929).

Additional to the above, Saudi Arabia is in general treaty relations with Great Britain (Jedda, the 20th May, 1927) and Afghanistan (Mecca, the 5th May, 1932, ratifications exchanged the 1st April, 1934).

Soviet Russia and the Netherlands are in relations with Saudi Arabia and maintain representatives at Jedda without having concluded formal treaties. Egypt and Belgium maintain consular representatives at Jedda, the former without having formally recognised the present régime. Czechoslovakia is represented at Jedda by an honorary consul of Saudi nationality.

[NOTE.—Since this report was drawn up, a treaty between Egypt and Saudi Arabia has been signed (the 7th May, 1936) at Cairo. Article 5 provides for the co-operation of the Egyptian Government in carrying out certain works of repairs, &c., in respect of the Holy Places of Mecca and Medina, in regard to roads used by pilgrims, &c. Article 6 provides for early negotiation of customs, postal and navigation agreements.]

IV.—FINANCE.

(a) *Review of the Years 1926–35.*

Economic development is entirely dependent on the length of the Saudi purse, as the Government is seldom in a position to meet more than one or two seemingly necessary payments at once. No statistics are published, or it is believed, compiled. No budget has been published, except in January 1932, when an estimate of expenditure by various departments in the Hejaz was printed, but without indication of estimated revenue. It is therefore only possible to judge the state of the country's finance by rough estimation and the attitude of the Government to their larger debts.

When in 1923 the subsidy which His Majesty's Government had paid to Ibn Saud since 1917 ceased, Nejd was left a poor country able to exist as it had done through the ages by petty trading and, when things were bad, by raiding and warfare, but without means to pay for western machines, arms and cars to which the influx of money during the Great War had accustomed the northern parts of the peninsula. The Hejaz, on the other hand, was comparatively wealthy through the proceeds of the annual pilgrimage to Mecca, and might have prospered under more enlightened rule than that of King Hussein. It was therefore to the Hejaz that King Abdul Aziz looked for revenue once the two

States were united under his rule. On his election as King of the Hejaz in 1926, he assumed control of the military forces of the country and assured the safety of the roads. For these services the Hejaz was to pay him £140,000 gold per annum. Additional to this sum, Ibn Saud was granted an annual revenue of £60,000 gold in his capacity of King and Commander-in-chief, which was approximately the amount of the subsidy paid him from 1917 to 1922 by His Majesty's Government.

But even with the conquest of the Hejaz, finance was not all plain sailing. In Nejd the war had to be paid for by distributions to the tribes. In the Hejaz the new broom was sweeping clean and requiring money. There were new coinage, motor cars, condensers and other improvements to be paid for on the one hand, and the reduction of pilgrim and customs dues on the other. The economy of administering a dual kingdom was not so great as might have been thought; friction between the fanatical Nejdīs and the easy going Hejazīs led to the withdrawal of Wahhabi soldiers, and necessitated the organisation of a Hejaz force at a cost probably in excess of the £140,000 per annum mentioned above. Moreover, the King now found himself in touch with the outside world; indemnities had to be paid to individuals for the loss of property during the Hejaz-Nejd war, and the Moslem Conference convoked at Mecca brought its burden to the Treasury. To meet these expenses the Government had to resort early to loans from merchants, the reduction of pay of civil servants and the indirect increase of dues to pilgrims.

The boom pilgrimage years of 1927 and 1928 would have gone far to restore the situation if political events in Nejd in 1928–29 had not faced the King with serious rebellions in the centre and north-eastern part of the country. The financial situation, instead of ameliorating, grew steadily worse. Forced levies were raised from the pacified Hejaz tribes, new taxes on rent and on shopkeepers imposed. Government bills were paid by transferable drafts on customs so numerous that they became realisable only at a heavy discount. By these means the Government managed to tide over matters until the 1929 pilgrimage.

The restoration of internal peace in 1930 was off-set by the fall in the pilgrimage caused chiefly by the world economic crisis. In 1927 132,109 overseas pilgrims came to the country. By 1930 the figure had fallen to 84,821. When in 1931 the pilgrimage fell by over 50 per cent. on the 1930 figures, matters came to a head. In June a national conference of urban dwellers was convened in the Hejaz, and criticisms of the financial administration, including the absence of a budget, were expressed. The situation was aggravated by the inability of the Government to maintain the value of the Saudi silver riyal to the gold pound, to which it was legally tied (see sub-section (c) below), making matters impossible by trying to pay out at the official rate and to charge at the devalued rate. When on top of this internal crisis Great Britain went off the gold standard in September 1931, the Government were unable to tackle the situation further save by prohibiting the export of gold.

The financial straits of the Government became manifest to all in September by the commandeering without notice or payment of the stocks of petrol held by local firms in the Government storage at Jedda to meet Government requirements. The resultant wave of indignation induced the King to issue a proclamation (the 13th November, 1931) promising budgetary reform for the Hejaz. The proclamation gave the future percentage allocation of revenue to expenditure: 35 per cent. administration, 25 per cent. debt liquidation, 25 per cent. economic development, 15 per cent. reserve. No attempt at estimating the amount of revenue was made, which is perhaps somewhat inevitable so long as the economic structure of the country depends entirely on the vagaries of a religious pilgrimage.

The budget was eventually published in January 1932 to cover the lunar year beginning with the 12th December, 1931. It related to the Hejaz only, and was not only the first but also the last to be published. As stated above, the budget presumed the revenue without indicating its sources. As expenditure was calculated in piastres miri, some at the fixed gold rate and some at the silver rate, it was difficult to calculate the sterling equivalent of the total estimated expenditure. It probably amounted to about £835,000 gold. The percentages mentioned in the Royal proclamation were not maintained. In spite of this, a goodly sum was reallocated for debt remission, but brought little relief in practice to creditors. Officials' salaries continued to fall into arrear and were added to the general Government indebtedness. On the 17th June, 1932, a regulation was

issued to the effect that debts not already provided for otherwise would be met by drafts on customs. Creditors such as Government servants had to designate import merchants to receive and handle drafts on their behalf. Matters remained in this unsatisfactory state all the year, and in the autumn a moratorium was declared.

However black the outlook was in 1932, the Government were making efforts to put matters straight. The misappropriation of the stocks of petrol was rectified in November by agreement. New sources of revenue were eagerly searched for: schemes were discussed for a national bank; through the philanthropy of an American a survey of the natural resources of the country was made. Early in the year the Government engaged for one year a Dutchman as financial adviser, but unfortunately, few of his recommendations were put into practice. The Ministry of Finance was reorganised to cover the whole country.

Not all the schemes projected during 1932 and 1933 to bring grist to the Saudi mill materialised. The State bank came to nothing. A concession to build the Jeddah to Mecca Railway languished and was finally cancelled. But one prospered. An oil concession was granted in 1933 to the Standard Oil Company of California, bringing in immediate revenue in return for prospecting rights. This windfall compensated somewhat for the further decrease in the overseas pilgrimage which fell to 20,705 pilgrims.

The deterioration of political relations with the Yemen, however, which led to the outbreak of war in May 1934, caused the King to husband carefully all the revenue he was able in order to cover the cost of war preparations. The unsatisfactory state of Government indebtedness and the arrears of salaries remained therefore as before.

Economies, new taxes, a slightly increased pilgrimage in 1934 and further payments on account of the oil concession enabled the Government successfully to tide over the war period and to make on the return of peace handsome distribution to the combatant tribes.

The tendency to improvement continued through 1935. The number of overseas pilgrims again increased to 33,898 and the customs receipts seemed to have shown a corresponding rise. Exports received an unexpected fillip by the sale of 1,000 camels at a good price to the Italian Government for service in Eritrea. A further economy was made at the expense of the Saudi official, salaries being cut in the early summer by 25 per cent., and arrangements made whereby one-third of the reduced salary should be paid in kind. Efforts have been made to get away from giving drafts on customs, and such drafts when given are, since 1932, non-transferable. Especially noticeable as a healthy sign of improved conditions has been the repayment of part of the foreign debts owed and an increased readiness on the part of the Government to meet current liabilities.

(b) Revenue and Expenditure.

As stated above no statistics are compiled nor budget prepared. It is therefore impossible to do more than indicate the chief sources of revenue and heads of expenditure. The former are first and foremost the pilgrimage, followed by customs receipts, posts and telegraphs and certain minor taxation as koshan (road tax on travellers), zikat (religious tithes levied on tribes), trading and other licences and so forth. To these may soon be added royalties on oil in Hasa and gold in the Hejaz. An Egyptian source (Al Mekkattam) estimates the revenue for the year A.H. 1354 (1935-36) at £600,000 gold obtained as follows:—

	£ gold.
Pilgrimage	300,000
Customs	200,000
Other sources	100,000

These percentages are probably accurate, although it is never possible to foresee the size of the pilgrimage with any accuracy. The number of pilgrims and the wealth they bring also effects the purchasing power of merchants and customs receipts.

Probably about half the revenue, as budgeted in 1932, goes to Royal military purposes including subsidies paid to the tribes. The other half goes to meet administrative expenditure and the repayment when possible of debt.

(c) Currency (see also Commercial Summary).

Saudi Arabia has not yet achieved a currency system for the whole country. The Hejaz and Nejd are separate in this respect united only by a common allegiance to the English sovereign.

When Ibn Saud took over the Hejaz, old Turkish coins were still in circulation and in such numbers that King Ali of the Hejaz had had to reduce them to half their face value. King Abdul Aziz had his own cupro-nickel coins struck at the London mint in 1926, 1 million each of 1, $\frac{1}{2}$ and $\frac{1}{4}$ piastre-pieces known as Saudi piastres. Turkish nickel paras were then withdrawn. Turkish silver piastres remained current until 1928. The Saudi piastre was fixed at 220 to the gold pound. Government exchange booths being established in each town to maintain the rate. In spite of this the rate appreciated owing to the demands of the pilgrimage, rising in 1927 to 198 to the gold pound.

During 1926 and 1927 Turkish silver coins gradually disappeared from the market owing to their high silver content, being largely exported to Egypt and India. To meet the situation the Government ordered from the United Kingdom an Arab silver coinage, the Saudi riyal or dollar. 400,000 riyals, 100,000 $\frac{1}{2}$ -riyals and 200,000 $\frac{1}{4}$ -riyals were imported. Owing to the shortage of silver and the oncoming pilgrimage, the Government had no difficulty in getting money changers to accept the new coinage. The Turkish coins were not withdrawn, but ceased to be legal tender. To regulate the new currency a Hejaz Nejd currency regulation was published to come into force on the 23rd January, 1928. The regulation established two standards, the English gold sovereign and the silver riyal, similar in composition and weight to the old Turkish Mejidieh with provision for legal parity of 220 Saudi piastres equal to 10 Saudi riyals equal to £1 gold.

The Government's currency policy was successful during 1928. Parity between nickel, silver and gold was roughly maintained, the pound not falling below 218 piastres. Success did not continue. More cupro-nickel coins were imported in 1928 and silver and cupro-nickel coins in 1929-30. Added to this increase in silver coinage there was a tendency on the part of the Government, noticeable already in 1928, to hoard the gold, probably necessary for remittances to Nejd, and to flood the market with silver coinage when making any payment, however large, riyals being legal tender up to any amount.

These factors combined with the world rise in gold in 1931. The riyal depreciated in March of that year to below 13 to the pound. The Government took steps to bring it back to parity by forbidding the export of gold and making arrangements with the Netherlands Trading Society of Jeddah so that they accepted unlimited riyals and sold foreign drafts in gold at the official rate less commission. This, although temporarily successful, failed through the lack of sufficient gold backing by the Government.

In April 1931 the nickel coinage broke away from the silver riyal and slumped badly, causing serious loss to the poorer pilgrims then in the country. Parity was restored by the Government, with the help of money raised by a committee of merchants, withdrawing about £24,000 worth of nickel coins.

When on top of these internal crisis Great Britain went off the gold standard in September 1931, the riyal seemed to follow sterling and depreciated to 18 to the gold pound and lower. The Government then gave up attempting to keep the riyal at par of exchange, any attempt towards which they had already stultified by trying to pay out silver at the legal rate and to receive at the depreciated rate. Since 1931, therefore, the riyal has fluctuated according to supply and demand, falling to 24 to the gold pound and rising to 18 to the gold pound.

During the summer of 1931 the Government had tried one more solution, not mentioned above, to restore the value of the riyal, that of making it current in Nejd as well as in the Hejaz. This failed. The Nejd tribesman accepted the Saudi piastre, but rejected the Saudi riyal. The Maria Theresa dollar was the standard coin of Nejd and could not be superseded by the riyal, which was unacceptable in Iraq, Koweit and Bahrein, whence all the purchases of Nejd came. So unwelcome is the riyal still in Nejd that in 1935 it was changeable in Riyadh for not more than 18 piastres Saudi. In other towns of Nejd the discount was probably greater.

Owing to the unpopularity of the riyal in Nejd, the Government has had to introduce the Indian rupee in ever increasing quantities to replace the disappearing Maria Theresa dollar. The rupee has long been used in Hasa and, being the currency of Bahrein and Koweit and known in Iraq, is well acceptable to

the Bedouin and the townspeople alike. It is now, combined with the use of Saudi piastres, the chief coinage in use. The Maria Theresa dollar is thus being relegated to the south-west corner of the kingdom, Asir.

In Hasa the tawila, a brass piece shaped somewhat like a nail and worth half an anna, is a survival of more primitive days and is disappearing from use.

The quantity of gold in Saudi Arabia may be said to be almost stationary. Gold rates follow the London market, but owing to a constant local demand, the rate is generally slightly dearer in Arabia. In spite of this there is little inflow of gold, except when special payments are made to the Government, owing to the export regulations in other countries. The export of gold from Saudi Arabia was forbidden outright in the spring of 1931, but the regulation was later modified and gold may now be exported with Government permission. Gold remains the currency for all large transactions such as the payment of rents.

In the Hejaz, English notes, Egyptian notes and currency and to a less extent the rupee are in general circulation in the towns.

[NOTE.—Since this report was prepared the Saudi Ministry of Finance, on the 23rd March, 1936, issued a notice readjusting the relation between Saudi piastres and the other elements in the currency by calculating the pound gold at 20 Saudi riyals, the Saudi riyal at 11 Saudi piastres and making 1 Saudi piastre = 2 nickel piastres. The main effects appear to be the establishment of a new legal parity of the existing riyal for the purpose of transactions with the Government, or the abolition of the "miri" piastre. Later, new Saudi riyals (to the value of 1 million Saudi riyals), minted in the United Kingdom, arrived at Jedda. These coins are of the same size, weight and fineness as the Indian rupee, and are, therefore, considerably smaller in size than the old Saudi riyal. No steps have yet been taken, as far as is known, to have the latter withdrawn from circulation.]

(d) Banking.

Banking business is done by Messrs. Gellatly, Hankey and Co. (Sudan) (Limited) and the Nederlandsche Handel Maatschappij (Netherlands Trading Society), both of which have branches established in Jedda. Other firms, Messrs. International Agencies (Limited), Haji Abdullah Alireza and Company, undertake banking transactions from time to time. According to the Sharia law and confirmed by the King in a decree of 1926, it is illegal to charge interest on loans or bank deposits. When the former are made, an agent's commission is therefore payable instead. Few native merchants open accounts with banking firms, and business is chiefly confined to buying and selling of drafts, collecting debts and exchange work.

The "Hundi" system, whereby pilgrims buy in Egypt or Indian drafts on merchants in the Hejaz, is still used to a certain extent.

The Saudi Arab Government have long flirted with the idea of a State bank, which would be able to finance their needs. When Ibn Saud conquered the Hejaz in 1926 he confirmed a Hashimite decree of 1925 giving the Amir Habib Lotfallah the right to establish the Arabian National Bank of the Hejaz, with powers to carry on all usual banking business and also to issue currency notes. The latter, it was hoped, could be guaranteed on customs receipts and other Government revenue. With the increasing financial depression of the following years there was little reason why such a scheme should succeed. Notes were printed, but never issued. The bank continued to exist in Jedda on a very modest scale for several years, but no longer opens for business.

The Netherlands Trading Society opened a branch in Jedda in November 1926, the first purely banking establishment of a serious nature to come to the Hejaz since the disappearance of the Ottoman Bank in the first few years of the Hashimite régime.

The idea of a State bank was revived early in 1932 through the Government's desire for a financial loan, apparently unobtainable elsewhere. An agreement between a representative of the ex-Khedive Abbas Hilmi Pasha and the Saudi Government was announced in the official Mecca paper, the *Umm-al-Qura*, on the 17th March, 1933. The ex-Khedive was, however, unable to confirm the agreement, and the scheme fell through in 1934 after a further attempt on the part of his representative to obtain backing on his own account in the city of London.

V.—COMMUNICATIONS AND TRANSPORT (see Map III(')).

(a) Railways.

The only railway in Saudi Arabia is that portion of the Hejaz railway (105 cm. gauge) which runs from Medina to the northern frontier, and this has not functioned since Lawrence and the Hejaz army blew up large parts of it in the Great War. The recommissioning of the Saudi portion of the line has been delayed by disagreement between the Saudi Government and the French and British Governments, who administer the northern sections, concerning the ownership of the whole railway from Damascus southwards. In 1935, however, a conference met at Haifa to discuss the technical side only. It dispersed again without achieving agreement.

The Hejaz Railway, when first built by the Turks, was planned to continue beyond Medina to Mecca. This project, at first held up by the hostility of the tribes, has now become secondary to the recommissioning of the existing line.

A project for a railway between Jedda and Mecca has for many years attracted the interests of capitalists. A 60-mile line through foothills with an assured traffic would seem to be an attractive proposal, but in spite of repeated announcements of projects and even concessions the scheme has never even resulted in a survey. The sensitiveness of the religious Moslem and the Nationalist Arab to any non-Moslem or foreign penetration has been the greatest obstacle to the realisation of this idea.

(b) Roads and Road Transport.

Railways in Arabia are likely to be less heard of in the future owing to the rapid development of motor transport. The desert serves for the most part as a natural road for light cars and trucks, if not for heavily laden lorries, and by its use quick communications are established with the minimum of capital outlay.

The conquest of the Hejaz by Ibn Saud and the consequent pacification of its unruly tribes enabled the King to substitute car traffic for camel traffic as the chief transport of pilgrims. Private car companies rapidly increased, and the number of cars imported each year has become considerable. In 1935 the Government amalgamated all existing car companies into the "Arab Car Service," a company which has a monopoly for carrying fare-paying passengers throughout the country, but probably effectively only in the Hejaz. The amalgamated company is sub-divided into two divisions, the first, the former independent companies, and the second, the former Government companies. The Government have a contract with the local representative of the Ford motor company (see VII (iv) below), whereby only Fords are purchased for the "Arab Car Service." The Government finance the purchase of cars for the "public" division of the company, and in return have first call on them and pay nothing. The "private" division of the company seems to have little working capital, and is thus left with old cars. The scheme has many defects in operation, but may outgrow them in due course.

Merchandise is still almost completely carried by camel or on shorter distances by donkey.

Both cars and camels follow age-old tracks from well to well. Camel roads lead everywhere and need not be enumerated. The most used car roads are those following the traditional pilgrim routes in the Hejaz—Jedda to Mecca and Jedda to Medina. In 1927 an attempt was made at metalling the former by taking stones from the neighbouring hills and rolling them in with a steam-roller imported from the United Kingdom. The road was never a success, and once constructed no attempt was made at upkeep. With time the metalling has disappeared below the sand, and now, eight years later, there is little to show of the road save an occasional projecting boulder. Besides the Hejaz roads, the road from Mecca to Riyadh and across to Hufuf is also well used, and the worst gradients have been engineered by the Government. Petrol and oil dumps are maintained by the Government along this road at Muwaih and Dawadimi.

One other road worthy of special note is the pilgrimage road from Najaf in Iraq through Hail to Medina, which was opened to motor traffic for the 1935 pilgrimage by agreement with the Iraqi Government. A service is maintained during the pilgrimage season only by Iraqi-owned cars as far as Medina. Onward transport to Mecca is by the Arab Car Service.

The only traditional pilgrim route which is still impracticable to motor traffic is the Darb-ash-Sham, from Medina to Damascus, along the disused Hejaz

(¹) Not reproduced.

railway line. The portion between Tabuk and Al Ula passed through high mountains and lava deserts, and is only passable at great cost to vehicles. The King has, however, promised to examine the possibilities of opening a road along this route if negotiations for the recommissioning of the railway fail.

The Government have always shown interest in the possibility of improving their roads. They are interested from a strategical point of view, and still more where the comfort of pilgrims is concerned from a financial point of view. In 1935 the Shell Company of Egypt surfaced a sample 100 metres of asphalt road outside the walls of Jedda on behalf of the Banque Misr, who have been in negotiation during the last years with the Saudi Government over various economic and charitable projects. It is not known at the time of writing whether they will reach agreement for the construction or improvement of the Jedda-Mecca road.

Independent of the Government, the Saudi Arabian Mining Syndicate, who are commencing the exploitation of gold at Mahd-adh-Dhahab, are building a road from Jedda direct to the mine, the first road of any length to be constructed as such in the country. The road is engineered but unsurfaced, and is approximately 220 miles in length.

(c) Ports.

There are no constructed harbours in Saudi Arabia. Ports are anchorages, of which some are navigable by steamship, but most only by dhows. Jedda is the principal port both for the pilgrimage and general commerce and the only port of importance in the kingdom. It is visited regularly by vessels of the Khedivial Mail Steamship Company (British) and of the Compania Tirrenia (Italian). For other lines, see the commercial summary.

1930	With cargo.		In ballast.	
	No.	Tonnage.	No.	Tonnage.
Entered:				
British	162	260,312	62	168,209
Other flags	106	240,321	37	161,950
Cleared:				
British	86	96,155	138	332,366
Other flags	26	30,255	117	372,016
1931				
Entered:				
British	140	183,330	8	20,378
Other flags	111	243,462	17	72,607
Cleared:				
British	91	97,174	57	111,534
Other flags	60	74,288	68	241,781
1932				
Entered:				
British	106	147,356	19	50,245
Other flags	90	208,119	36	106,661
Cleared:				
British	67	75,363	58	122,238
Other flags	10	20,218	116	294,562
1933				
Entered:				
British	145	209,093	8	18,539
Other flags	93	197,080	11	35,787
Cleared:				
British	103	105,105	50	122,527
Other flags	12	13,360	92	219,507
1934				
Entered:				
British	188	261,271	11	31,018
Saudi	6	814	10	114
Other flags	93	206,279	12	55,696
Cleared:				
British	114	114,623	85	177,666
Saudi	7	707	8	1,146
Other flags	4	7,863	101	254,112

1935	Entered:	With cargo.		In ballast.	
		No.	Tonnage.	No.	Tonnage.
	British	197	299,104	4	2,602
	Saudi	5	375
	Other flags	80	182,208	24	61,673
	Cleared:				
	British	107	120,413	94	181,293
	Saudi	1	75	4	300
	Other flags	9	16,317	95	227,564

The harbour of Jedda consists of two anchorages sheltered by coral reefs. The inner anchorage is about 1½ miles as the crow flies from the shore. All cargo has to be transhipped, the lighterage being done lateen-sailed dhows.

Harbour improvement at Jedda has been talked of but without result. The reefs are marked by beacons, which are kept in repair by the Coastguard Department, but the absence of lights makes the harbour practicable only between sunrise and sunset. The channel through the reefs, by which lighters come to the quay, badly needs dredging. In the monsoon season when the water is low, even the smallest craft cannot make the channel without scraping the bottom. Cargo in dhows has often to be partly transhipped midway between ship and quay. Within the next ten years, as the busy season of the port—the pilgrimage season—recedes into the summer and as the coral grows, the position will become critical. The alternatives which appear to offer themselves are the dredging of the channel for lighters or the construction of a pier on the coral reefs out into the inner anchorage.

The Saudi Arabian Mining Syndicate propose to build a short quay into deep water in the inner anchorage a few miles to the north of Jedda, in order to facilitate the landing of their equipment. Work on this project has not yet begun, but if it is carried out it might be developed and revolutionise the conditions of the whole port.

Of other ports Wejha and Yanbu are visited regularly by Khedivial mail steamers. Yanbu, the port of Medina, is marked with beacons similar to those at Jedda. Rabigh, Lith, Qunfidha and Jizan, on the Red Sea, have also been visited by steamships from time to time. Rabigh is the best natural port of the Hejaz, but unlike Jedda and Yanbu, having no considerable town in its hinterland, it is rarely visited.

On the Persian Gulf, Saudi Arabia has a low lying sandy coast with only one natural harbour suitable for large craft at Ras Tanura, to the north-west of Bahrein. All imports come through Koweit, on the one hand, or Bahrein, with transshipment to Qatif and Uqair, on the other. The possibility of developing Ras Tanura has therefore not been overlooked by the Government.

Ras Tanura is a ridge of sandhills which projects into the sea for about 9 miles. It is about 35 miles by road and 10 by water from the nearest town Qatif. There is anchorage in depths of 30-39 feet at a distance of 1 cable from the shore, which can be approached with safety by ships drawing up to 18 feet. In 1933 a pier 100 feet long was built and a large shed erected on shore. There are, however, difficulties to be faced, among them the supply of fresh water, and it is doubtful whether, in view of the small trade involved, it would repay the Government to spend a large amount of money in the creation of a proper port.

Apart from steamship ports there are many creeks and breaks in the coral reefs the length of the Red Sea where sea-going dhows can come to the shore. Slaving vessels and vessels carrying African pilgrims have since time immemorial known these ports. The present régime has, however, realised the desirability of controlling this traffic, and have made a start at coastguarding. By official communiqué No. 1 of the 20th June, 1935, sailing vessels are only allowed to load and unload at fourteen Red Sea ports: Dhaha, Wejha, Umm Lajj, Yanbu, Rabigh, Al Qadhima, Tuwal, Jedda, Lith, Qunfidha, Al Birk, Al Qahma, Jizand and Farsan.

On the Persian Gulf coast sailing vessels call, as well as at Ras Tanura mentioned above, at Uqair, Qatif, Darin and Jubail. Of these, Uqair, the port linking Hasa to Bahrein, is the chief, with stone-built warehouses and a pier at which boats can come alongside even at low tide. Qatif and Jubail are also equipped with storage warehouses and piers, but can only be approached at high water.

In no port in Saudi Arabia are mechanical means for handling goods available.

(d) *Coastal Shipping.*

The Khedivial Mail line calls at Wejh and Yanbu, as well as at Jedda, carrying Saudi Government mails and passengers. This is the only regular coastal service in Saudi Arabia.

On the 5th May, 1934, the Mecca newspaper *Umm-al-Qura* announced the establishment of a national company, the "Arab Steam Navigation Company," registered at Jedda. It was stated that the company's steamers would ply between national ports on the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf. The company is a semi-private Government-controlled concern, the manager and several of the shareholders being prominent people in Government service. It is understood that the Government undertakes to guarantee any loss on working. Two ships were originally bought, but the second seems to have been returned or resold. The remaining ship *Al Fath*, approximately 150 tons, has not as yet ventured outside the Red Sea.

Dhow traffic is still considerable in the Red Sea, and a good number trade beyond Saudi ports, especially to Mukalla and the Hadhramaut. The regulations on fishing published in July and August 1932 apply in some aspects to such traffic.

(e) *Aviation (see Map III(')).*

There are no air services in Saudi Arabia, although the Imperial Airways India route passes off the coast of Hasa. There are, however, landing grounds of varying efficiency on the Jinnah and Darin Islands off the Hasa Coast, at Riyadh (marked out but never yet used), Taif, the headquarters of the small Saudi air force, Jedda, Yanbu, Wejh and Medina. The last four are not permanently marked.

The Saudi air force consists of some old De Havilland machines taken over from King Hussein, which are no longer serviceable, four Wapitis supplied by His Majesty's Government in 1929, of which three are still in use, and one Caudron Renault Pelican monoplane given to the King by the French Government in March 1936.

In 1930-31 an Arab Aeronautical Society was formed to create public interest both in military and civil flying. In 1932 it was announced that the society had received funds amounting to £2,094 gold, of which £1,751 gold were contributed as gifts chiefly by the King and the Amir Feisal, and £343 gold raised by annual subscriptions by members. In 1935 the society sent a number of students to Italy to train as pilots, but no further purchase of equipment had been made. Whether the Arab Aeronautical Society will confine its activities to supporting the national air force and will leave the future of civil aviation in Saudi Arabia to external interests remains to be seen. Meanwhile, it is engaged in promoting, at the time of writing, the collection of subscriptions in Mecca, Jedda, Riyadh and Medina for the purchase of aircraft to be named after these cities. Enquiries in this respect have already been made from Moslems in connexion with the pilgrimage, and experimental flights have been made from time to time from Cairo to Jedda. In January 1936 the first aeroplane of the Misr Airwork (Limited) landed at Medina, and arrangements may be completed in the near future for a seasonal service from Cairo to the Holy Cities.

[NOTE.—Since this report was prepared three small aeroplanes for training purposes and civil uses arrived in Jedda, having been offered by the Italian Government. Further machines are expected, and an Italian instructor has arrived.]

(f) *Posts.*

The Hejaz-Nejd Government joined the International Postal Union in 1926 to take effect on the 1st January, 1927. On the 7th July, 1930, the Government ratified the Universal Postal Convention of London (the 28th June, 1929) and its six subsidiary agreements. On the 28th September, 1934, the Government ratified the Universal Postal Convention of Cairo (the 20th March, 1934) and six subsidiary agreements, including the money order agreement. In 1931 the Hejaz-Nejd Postal Administration had concluded special money order agreements with the Palestinian and Indian Administrations.

(¹) Not reproduced.

Since joining the Postal Union the Saudi Arab Government has shown energy in developing its postal communications, both internal and external, and the administration worked as a whole with a considerable degree of efficiency. In 1927 four employees were sent for training in various branches of work to Palestine. A Government commission of inspection was appointed to survey the working of the administration in 1935; the results are not yet known.

External postal communications have been arranged from Jedda with the Sudan, Eritrea and Egypt by the Khedivial Mail and the Tirrhenia Lines, assuring a weekly service both ways to Egypt and the Sudan; a direct mail bag is now sent from the London General Post Office to Jedda. A daily service runs from Hufuf to Bahrein by agreement with the Indian Post Office, and efforts are at present being made to make a similar agreement for a ten-day mail from Jizan to Kamaran.

Internal posts are either by car or by camel, the latter in the interior being probably only irregularly run. Post offices have been established at Mecca, Jedda, Medina, Rabigh, Yanbu, Wejh, Dhahba, Al Ula, Tabuk, Lith, Qunfidha, Abha, Jizan, Ghamid, Taif, Riyadh, Hufuf and Jubail, practically all of which, it will be noticed, are in the Hejaz. A daily motor service runs between Jedda and Mecca, and during the summer between Mecca and Taif. There is a bi-weekly service between Jedda, Rabigh and Medina and a fortnightly service between Mecca and Riyadh.

The Khedivial Mail Line carry weekly mails between Jedda, Yanbu and Wejh without charge to the Government.

Regular camel post connects the post offices at Riyadh (Hufuf and Jubail; Al Ula and Wejd; Yanbu and Medina; Taif and Ghamid; Mecca and Lith, whence mail is distributed also by camel to Qunfidha, Jizan, Abha and Najran.

As with other Saudi Government departments no statistics are published regularly. The only statement concerning the Hejaz postal figures was published in the *Umm-al-Qura* in the spring of 1929. According to this statement the value of mails carried during the preceding year was—

		Gold Francs.
(1) Registered and insured parcels—		
Home	...	36,829
From abroad	...	51,838
To abroad	...	25,853
(2) Letters and printed matter, &c., returned to sender and money orders—		
		Gold Francs.
Home	...	89,165
From abroad	...	24,783
To abroad	...	133,322
(3) Letters, printed matter, ordinary parcels, &c.—		
		Gold Francs.
Home	...	12,417
From abroad	...	63,611
To abroad	...	3,716,212

(g) *Wireless, Telegraphs and Telephones (see Map III(')).*

Wireless.—King Abdul Aziz has been led chiefly by administrative and strategical reasons to cover the country with a network of wireless stations. These stations can be used for private communication and are for such purposes under the Posts, Telegraphs and Telephones Administration.

In 1926 there were eleven old Turkish sets working in the Hejaz, ten Telefunken and one Marconi. By a contract signed with the Marconi Wireless Company (Limited) on the 7th October, 1930, the latter undertook to construct an organised system of stations throughout the country. Fifteen new sets for telegraphy and telephony were imported and erected during the years 1931 and 1932, including two large 6-kilowatt sets erected at the two capitals, Riyadh and Mecca. Other stations now operating are Qarayyat (Kaf), Sakaka (Jauf) and Hail in the north; Tabuk, Dhahba, Wejh, Al Ula, Yanbu, Medina, Rabigh, Jedda, Lith, Taif and Qunfidha in the Hejaz; Jizan in Asir; Makhlaif in Najran; Buraida, Majma'a and Duwadimi in Qasim and Nejd; Jubail, Qatif, Uqair and Hufuf in Hasa.

(¹) Not reproduced.

The external wireless communications of Saudi Arabia are governed by the agreement signed on the 17th April, 1935, between the Government and the Eastern Telegraph Company (Limited) and Cable and Wireless (Limited) (see also below). By that agreement the Saudi Arab Government bound themselves not to use their wireless stations for external communications, save with stations belonging to Cable and Wireless (Limited) and for communications originating from or terminating in the neighbouring Arabian States, including Syria.

Telegraphs.—Besides wireless, Saudi Arabia is connected with the outside world by the Jeddah cable to Port Sudan, which is the joint property of the Sudan and Saudi Arab Governments (agreement signed the 18th December, 1926, with His Majesty's Government as a third party) and is operated by the Eastern Telegraph Company (Limited) under an agreement between them and Cable and Wireless (Limited) on the one hand and the two owners on the other, signed on the 17th April, 1935.

Telephones.—Services are operated in Jeddah, Mecca and Taif, which three towns are inter-connected by land-line, and in Medina and Riyadh. The majority of the wireless stations mentioned above are fit for wireless telephony; notably, the palaces at Mecca and Riyadh are directly connected by such means.

The telephone service in Mecca, Medina and Jeddah dates from the Turkish times. That in Riyadh was installed in 1932. In 1934 the Soviet Government presented to the Administration of Posts, Telegraphs and Telephones twenty-five automatic telephones, with a central, which were installed in the Government offices at Taif.

VI.—NATURAL RESOURCES AND INDUSTRY.

(a) Agriculture.

Saudi Arabia, in spite of its large area and small population, is unable to support itself with cultivated produce. This does not mean, however, that the country is completely desert or that cultivation is unknown. In vast areas water is not forthcoming, but in others, especially in parts of the Hejaz, the Wadi Sirhan and Hasa, water is plentiful above and below the surface of the soil, while in still other areas the potentialities of creating a water supply are great. In these last areas, the development has, however, been arrested until recent years by the lack of security, and is still crippled by the ignorance, apathy and poverty of the inhabitants. Even were these overcome by enlightened Government and education, the lack of considerable markets and the difficulties of transport would probably vitiate any economic return to the capital outlay. The development of agriculture and the settlement of Bedouin must in Arabia remain a political rather than an economic problem.

This was the case with the so-called Hijra movement, started by the present King in Nejd; that is, the settlement of Wahhabi tribesmen in villages (hijra = flight), of which Artiwiya was the first and remains the principal. One is tempted to give a greater economic significance than is perhaps warranted to this evidence of enlightened policy in Central Arabia. To the contrary, although information concerning the sixty-odd settlements so founded is scant, it would probably be more correct to account the movement, as an agricultural movement, a failure rather than a success.

Agriculture is only developed in the cultivation of dates. Instruments are the crudest, even the plough being unknown, save in the Hejaz. In recent years, pumping machinery has been imported (chiefly Petter engines) to draw water in the palm groves of Riyadh and Medina. The interest of the Government in agriculture is evidenced by the facts that such machinery is imported duty free, and that the Government distributes seeds to cultivators from time to time.

Little is known of cultivation in Asir and Najran, but they are probably more extensively cultivated than other parts of the kingdom, the rainfall being greater. The Hejaz contains numerous villages in its valleys cultivating dates, wheat and barley and fruits. Noteworthy are the region round Taif, with its grapes, apricots and pomegranates, its honey, its wheat and barley, the Wadi Fatima, Yanbu and Nakhil and Medina, with their extensive palm groves. The Wadi Fatima, where there is an ancient system of irrigation, also supplies Mecca and Jeddah with limited vegetables—spinach (silliq), rice and beans. Medina as an agricultural centre has lost much of its pre-war importance; wheat and

barley which used to be exported abroad are hardly cultivated owing to the fall in the pilgrim market. Medina's hopes lie with the reconditioning of the Hejaz Railway.

The most extensive and probably the most fertile agricultural area in Saudi Arabia is the Wadi Sirhan in the north. From Kaf to Jauif, the Wadi depression runs 220 miles with plentiful water either above or just below the surface. Unfortunately owing to the continual warfare of the surrounding Bedouin in the past, the area has never been properly developed even on native lines. The sole produce of the oases round Kaf and Jauif is dates.

Throughout Nejd and the neighbouring provinces there are oases of cultivation where dates, lucerne, wheat, barley and millet, also vines, citron and figs are grown. The oases of Qasim (the Khubub between Buraida and Anaiza), the district of Kharj, south-east of Riyadh, and the oasis of Hasa are the most important. The well known "Khlass" dates of Hasa are packed in goatskins and now also in cartons and exported through Bahrain chiefly to India. Vegetables such as onions, spinach (silliq), egg plant and bamia (ladies' fingers), radishes and beans are grown in the Hasa oasis, also cotton in small quantities. Certain minor products of the Saudi soil are of commercial value on account of their medicinal or other properties, small quantities being exported abroad:—

Aniseed.—Grown in Hufuf and used for flavouring. Hasa dates are often so flavoured before export.

Ashnan.—The ground brushwood of a shrub found in the Hejaz and used as a soap in bathing. A strong alkaline.

Balm of Gilead (Duhn Bailasan).—Cultivated around Taif and used as an antiseptic for wounds. Hejaz natives drink the balm as a prophylactic against gonorrhoea.

Gum Arabic.—Found near Medina and Taif. Small quantities are still exported irregularly to Egypt.

Henbane.—A poison; is found in the Hejaz, but its export is forbidden.

Henna.—Grown at Hufuf and in the Hejaz at Yanbu-an-Nakhil, Medina, Wadi Wasta and Wadi Safra. The powder, obtained by soaking the leaves in oil and crushing, sells in the Hejaz at one-half riyal per kaila. The stain is used as an ornament both for humans and animals. For the latter it is believed to harden the skin and prevent saddle sores. Before the war there was a steady export to Damascus and Beirut and to Germany. Certain amounts are still sent to Egypt.

Senna.—Grows wild in the Hejaz and is a popular cathartic. It is also exported to Egypt.

Zahrat-ad-Durum.—A plant used medicinally as a sudorific and febrifuge and exported to Aden and India.

Charcoal is plentifully obtained from acacia wood in most parts of the country.

(b) Live-stock Breeding.

Horses, camels, sheep and goats are bred by the nomad tribes. Horses are the best known product of Arabia, but the least important economically to Saudi Arabia. Nejd now imports more horses from the Iraq Jazira than it exports. The best horse-breeding area lies to the north and east of the Dahana, in the Summan, whose valleys are rich in "Nassi," a sort of wild hay. Horses bred there are found mostly with the Ajman and Mutair tribes.

Good grazing for camels is found over large areas of steppe land in Nejd, especially beyond the Dahana to the north-east near the borders of Koweit, where the "arfaj" bush grows in profusion. The Nafud districts in the north and centre also provide highly prized grazing after rainfall.

A large export trade was carried on formerly in camels from all parts of the country, but this trade has very largely diminished, especially to Egypt, where camels are being superseded both as a means of transport and as a diet. A fillip to the export trade was provided in 1936 by the sale of camels to the Italians in Eritrea at high prices.

Sheep are also bred more especially in the northern parts of the Hasa Province, large herds being found with the Awazim tribe. Goats are plentiful everywhere, but cattle are rare.

(c) *Fishing and Sea Products.*

Regulations concerning fishing and diving for pearls, mother-of-pearl, coral, cowries and sea slugs in Red Sea waters were published in July/August 1932. Jizan, Birk, Qunfidha, Lith, Jedda, Rabigh, Yanbu, Umm Lajj, Wejh and Dhaba are named as ports from which fishing may be undertaken. Licences are necessary, and the products are taxed on being landed.

Little fishing is done by the natives except for their own purposes and up and down the coast. The coastal market is limited, and fish will not carry to the larger towns of the interior. Crayfish are occasionally exported from Wejh to Egypt.

The Persian Gulf is famous for pearl fishing, but that industry is centred round the islands of Bahrein and only affects Saudi Arabia indirectly. Native divers fish for pearls on the Red Sea coast, but they have no idea of conserving the beds which, as a result, contain small-sized shells of little value. The offer of the Saudi Arab Government in 1934 to grant Sheikh Abdurrahman Qusaibi, a member of the foremost pearl merchant family of Bahrein, a monopoly for pearl fishing on the Red Sea coast, led to the survey of the coast from Wejh to Jizan and the Farsan Islands by a party of Venezuelan divers. The concession was not taken up.

Other sea products are mother-of-pearl and coral (black coral is especially prized and used for making into rosaries), which are collected by individual native fishermen, also sea slugs ("Bêche de mer"), which are not at present fished in quantity, although, it is believed, natives on the Sudan coast do a certain amount of trade in this "delicacy" with China.

The commercial treaty of 1932 with Italy has a clause ensuring to Italian and Eritrean fishing vessels most-favoured-nation treatment.

(d) *Industries.*

Saudi industry as an economic factor is negligible. In the tribal areas it is little more than the production of the simpler necessities of Bedouin life. In the more advanced Hejaz towns the pilgrimage provides for all, and industry not connected with it is at a discount.

Bedouin tents are made of goat or camel hair, and ropes of palm fibre. Shamlas, rough pileless rugs, are woven by the Bedouin women, and are vegetable dyed. The best Arab cloaks, made of camel hair (Mishlah), come from Nejd, but are adorned with gold or silver thread imported from Germany and India. Foreign gold thread and silver silk thread are also required for the grander type of "iqal" (head ropes), which are made in Mecca and Taif. Copper long-spouted coffee pots are made in Hasa, Medina and Mecca; in the Hejaz, however, those of better quality are imported from the Yemen. The copper used in the local manufacture of these articles is imported from India. Sandals of camel leather, saddle-bags of sheep and goat hair, and palm-leaf and palm-fibre mats, fans and basket work are other products of small native labour, none of which is exported.

One or two industries of more modern kind are found in Mecca, Jedda and Medina, but the only one which can be said to be run as a normal commercial enterprise is the mineral water factory at Jedda.

At Mecca the Government established in 1927 a factory for the weaving of Kiswa (holy carpet to cover the Kaaba), following on a dispute with Egypt over the annual despatch of the traditional Mahmal, which previously included the Kiswa. The factory was founded with men and material from India, but owing to trouble in successive years it has now been put in charge of Hejazi weavers. The silk for the Kiswa, imported in the first years from Germany, is now supplied from Moslem Syria. The cost of weaving the carpet in Mecca is believed to be inordinately high. An attempt in 1929 to utilise the factory for the supplementary manufacture of carpets, of the type of the Indian "durri," was not successful owing to the high costs. A subsidiary industry to the local weaving of the Kiswa, and likewise established by the Government, is that of embroidery needed for the carpets' decoration. (Regulations governing this industry were published on the 13th September, 1935.) Besides the above, the printing of books is a limited industry of Mecca and Jedda; regulations concerning the profession were issued in May 1929.

At Medina the piousness of Indians of Hyderabad has founded a weaving institute (Dar-as-Sana), which was opened on the 6th September, 1933. By 1935 there were over fourteen looms and 150 spinning wheels, chiefly brought from India, but some made locally in imitation. The spinning is done by natives as a house industry, and the weaving by pupils under the supervision of Indians. The cloth made is of poor quality. "Ithram" (pilgrim dress) and shirts are made, but in addition to the bad weaving the price is so high that only pilgrims who look for a "tabarrak" (blessing-bringing souvenir of the Holy Places) will purchase them.

(e) *Oil.*

Complete political independence with the resultant stoppage of all foreign subsidies, Turkish or British, has forced Saudi Arabia to look for new sources of revenue to supplement the precarious pilgrimage. For some years the Saudi Arab Government allowed themselves to be hampered by the theory that concessions should be given to Moslems only, a theory endorsed by the Hejaz "National Conference" of 1931, but abandoned since 1933 by virtue of the grant in that year of an oil concession in Hasa to the Standard Oil Company of California and in 1934 of a mining concession in the Hejaz to a British syndicate.

Three areas of the present Kingdom of Saudi Arabia have attracted at one time or another the attention of oil interests: Midian, in the Northern Hejaz; Asir, the Farsan Islands in particular; and the Persian Gulf Coast.

An inchoate concession for oil drilling in an area covering parts of the Northern Hejaz and parts of territory now in Transjordan and Palestine, was said to have been granted by the Ottoman Government to a British company before the war, but the concession never took definite form. Since the attainment of Arab independence no concession has been taken up for this area, although individuals have shown interest from time to time. In 1920 a short prospecting journey for oil and other minerals was undertaken between Wejh and Dhaba by a small British party, while more thorough investigations, perhaps, were made in roughly the same region by the American, Mr. K. S. Twitchell, on behalf of the Saudi Arab Government in 1931, and by American geologists on behalf of the Standard Oil Company of California in 1934. Mr. Twitchell in his report (published in the *Umm-al-Qura* of the 14th August, 1931) mentioned the area between Umm Lajj and Muwalla in particular as productive of oil, but it is said that the actual area is too small to be operated in with profit.

In Asir matters progressed further by the actual grant in 1926 of a concession for oil in the Farsan Islands by the then ruler of Asir, the Idrissi, to the Red Sea Petroleum Company, but following on a dispute between the two parties, in which Ibn Saud acted as arbitrator, the company withdrew in 1928, having been unable to start experimental borings.

The discovery of oil in Bahrein in 1932 attracted the attention of the oil world to the possibility on the Arab mainland to the west of the Persian Gulf. In this Saudi Arabia is concerned in two separate political areas—the Province of Hasa, an integral part of the kingdom, and the Koweit Neutral Zone, a condominium of King Abdul Aziz and the Sheikh of Koweit.

In 1933 (the 29th May) the Saudi Arab Government granted a concession to the Standard Oil Company of California, who also hold the concession in Bahrein, for the exploitation of oil in Hasa. The exact extent of the concession area has not been published. A new company, the California Arabian Standard Oil Company, was formed, with a head office in London, and started drilling at the end of 1934 at Jebel Dhahran, near Qatif. Oil has not yet been obtained in commercial quantities, although prospects are said to be satisfactory.

No concession has been as yet granted by the co-rulers in respect of the Koweit Neutral Zone.

(f) *Gold and other Minerals.*

Very little of the total area of Saudi Arabia has been surveyed for mineral wealth, although parties of prospectors, including the explorer, R. F. Burton (1877), whose adventures are recorded in his book *The Gold Mines of Midian*, are known to have visited the Hejaz from time to time. On the lighter side, these included in 1920 a party of four Syrians, whose knowledge as geologists does not seem to have impressed even King Hussein. The King, it is said, after listening to one expert discourse on the valuable properties of a boulder of rock in the

desert, made him carry its 40 lb. weight the 2 miles back to his camp; the epithet then used for the stone was no longer "valuable." A large stride forward was taken, however, when the Saudi Arab Government accepted the offer of the American philanthropist, Mr. Crane, for the loan of an engineer, Mr. K. S. Twitchell, to make a rapid survey in 1931 and 1932 over large areas, especially in the Hejaz. The object of the survey was to look into water possibilities and to examine the potential mineral resources of the country. Mr. Twitchell's report was published in various numbers of the *Umm-al-Qura*, and mentions the discovery in different parts of the Hejaz of traces of mica, iron, talc, gypsum, lead and gold.

On the 23rd December, 1934, Mr. Twitchell, on behalf of the newly-formed British-Saudi Arabian Mining Syndicate, obtained a concession from the Saudi Arab Government to prospect for two years for metallic minerals of all kinds in an area of varying depth, extending from Birk in Asir to the Hejaz-Transjordan frontier, and to form subsidiary companies within that period to work any particular areas the syndicate thought profitable to take up. The syndicate is especially interested in gold at the ancient disused mines at Mahd-adh-Dhahab ("Cot of Gold"), between Mecca and Medina. Considerable work has been done in order to connect the mine at Madh-adh-Dhahab with Jedda by road, and to start drilling there under the necessary subsidiary company. Both the mining syndicate and the Saudi Arab Government are optimistic about prospects.

Besides Mahd-adh-Dhahab there are old gold mines in the neighbourhood of Wejh, and traces of the metal have also been found near Taif.

VII—FOREIGN TRADE.

(a) Exports and Tribal Commerce.

Besides Egyptian, Indian and Javanese currency notes and coinage, brought by the pilgrims, the exports of Saudi Arabia consist of hides and skins, intestines (in very small quantities to Germany), live-stock and the meagre products of Bedouin industry and agriculture (most of which has been detailed in Section VI above). The whole is of little and decreasing value, the imports of the country being paid for by the revenue of the pilgrimage and payments by foreign concessionaires. Exports through Jedda have been recently valued, unofficially, at about £13,500 per lunar year.

In 1934 a company called the "Arabian Export Company" was formed in Mecca with many of the highest Government officials on the list of shareholders. The company appears to have done little business so far, although it is still in existence and calling for more subscribers.

Contrary to the movement of imports, a greater value of exports pass over the land frontiers than through ports, in the form of small tribal trading, called "musabila." Every year at the end of the summer and after the date crop has been picked, there is a regular move of tribes from Nejd towards the Euphrates, to Karbala, Najaf, Samawa, Nasiriya, Khamisiya and Zubair, where they purchase their needs for the winter season, after selling what goods they themselves have to sell. Rice, piece-goods, dates, coffee, sugar, ropes and woollen and leather articles are bought, and live-stock, samn (clarified butter), hides and skins, hair tents and other Bedouin products are sold.

In the case of Koweit, which geographically is the natural port and market of the northern Nejd tribes, the "musabila" system of export and import is in abeyance owing to the prohibition maintained by Ibn Saud against trade with that principality. For the same reasons, the great organised caravan traffic between Koweit and the merchant towns of the Qasim has been destroyed to the detriment of their mutual prosperity.

"Musabila" is also carried on with Syria and Transjordan. In the latter State, Maan has become the meeting place of Saudi tribesmen and Palestinian and other merchants. As elsewhere, there are no reliable statistics, but the following figures are given as a gauge of this tribal trading with Transjordan, an exiguous trickle, but of first importance to the economic life of the tribes of northern Saudi Arabia. In the case of exports from Saudi Arabia the figures represent only that part of the trade of which note has been taken on the Transjordan frontier, and in the case of imports into Saudi Arabia they are based on an estimate obtained recently in Amman.

Exports.

		Kilog.
(1) From April 1, 1932, to March 31, 1933—		
Butter (samn)	17,000
Dates	1,160
Hair tents	300
From April 1, 1933, to March 31, 1934—		
Butter (samn)	84,050
Dates	10,960
Hair tents	150
From April 1, 1934, to March 31, 1935—		
Butter (samn)	33,850
Dates	2,762
(2) Live-stock—		Camels. Goats. Sheep.
1932	3,127	538 491
1933	7,931	771 3,053
1934	10,790	2,957 10,175
1935 (January-June)	3,318	1,452 7,893

Imports.

		L.P.
From April 1, 1934, to March 31, 1935—		
Silk goods	4,000
Cotton goods	6,000
Cereals	2,000

Salt is also exported in small quantities from the salt villages (Qarayyat) in the Wadi Sirhan to Transjordan and Syria.

(b) Imports.

(1) General.

The trade of Saudi Arabia consists almost entirely of imports, the necessities of life as well as luxuries having to be brought from abroad. In this, as in other aspects of local economic conditions, the absence of any official statistics makes difficult a precise appreciation of the situation, and confines a review more or less to generalities.

The bulk of overseas trade, including most Government purchases, enters Saudi Arabia through the port of Jedda, although considerable quantities pass through Yanbu, the port for Medina, and Bahrein, in transit for the mainland. The value of imports through Jedda has been estimated for the two lunar years A.H. 1351 (1932-33) and A.H. 1352 (1933-34) at £1,261,000 gold and £981,000 gold respectively. Other figures are not available. By the same estimate the average per annum of the principal imports over the two lunar years 1351 and 1352 were—

	Value over £ gold.
Cotton piece-goods	250,000
Rice	100,000
General provisions, refined sugar	50,000
Cigarette tobacco, flour, wheat, barley, millet, lentils, cigarettes, petrol, petroleum, carpets, habdashery, motor cars, silk goods, spare parts for cars	10,000
Tobacco for water pipes, maize, loaf sugar, oils (machine and paint), spices, matches, ready-made clothing copper articles, outer tyres	5,000
Other imports—Tea, coffee beans, soap, prayer beads, cement and timber.	

Imports through Bahrein for Saudi Arabia consist principally of rice, cotton piece-goods, sugar, coffee, tea, silk piece-goods, flour, woollen goods, barley, wheat and building materials. An ancient but small commerce is carried on by sailing

boats with the Yemen (Hodeidah) and the Hadhramaut (Mukalla), bringing coffee from the former and millet, dried fish, olibanum and palm fibre, ropes, from the latter.

(2) *Textiles and Clothing.*

Most piece-goods are imported from Japan, either through the Persian Gulf ports or Jedda. Japanese greys have long been popular to the exclusion of those of the United Kingdom and Indian manufacture. In the last four years Japan has captured a large proportion of the trade in bleached and printed goods. Japanese drill competes with Belgian and French supplies. The United Kingdom and Japan supply artificial silk piece-goods, mixtures and poplin. An increase in the import of artificial silk piece-goods from Japan into Hasa, through Bahrein, has been noticeable in the last three years. Ready-made clothes, shirts, woollen waistcoats and so forth are imported from Egypt and Syria, cotton vests come from Japan.

There is a small trade in the Hejaz in socks and sock-suspenders (chiefly Japan) and canvas shoes (Japan). These articles, not forming part of the normal Arab dress, have, however, only a market limited to the would-be smart townfolk.

A larger trade is done in towels (Ithram) used by pilgrims to Mecca as the prescribed seamless garment, cotton sarongs and "korta" (outer clothing of cotton used by the women). United Kingdom and Japan are the chief suppliers. Small amounts of woollen goods are imported through Bahrein and Jedda of United Kingdom and Central European origin.

(3) *Food-stuffs.*

The overwhelming proportion of Saudi imports is made up of food-stuffs such as rice, sugar, flour, wheat, barley, lentils, millet and maize, beans, bran, vinegar, nuts, tea and coffee, spices, sesame, preserves and confectionery.

Rice.—As seen above, rice is one of the most important imports, entering the country both through the Persian Gulf ports and Jedda. Large quantities are imported each year by the Government for distribution to the tribes in Nejd. The bulk of requirements comes from Rangoon, with India also shipping certain quantities. In 1934, 12,920 metric tons were landed at Jedda from Rangoon and 2,160 from Calcutta.

Sugar.—Refined sugar and, in smaller quantities, loaf sugar and lump sugar are imported from Belgium, United Kingdom, Czechoslovakia (through Trieste), Java and Egypt. The sugar imported into Hasa from the Persian Gulf ports seems to be of Java and United Kingdom origin. In 1934, 3,250 metric tons of sugar were landed at Jedda.

Flour.—Supplied by Australia, India, Iraq (for Hasa) and France. In 1934 6,720 metric tons of flour were landed at Jedda.

Wheat, Barley, Lentils, Maize and Millet.—Wheat and barley are imported from Bombay, Karachi, Egypt and Iraq; lentils from India and Egypt; maize from India, Iraq and the Sudan; millet from India and the Sudan.

Beans and Wheat Bran come from India and Egypt; vinegar from the United Kingdom, Italy and Egypt; nuts from Malaya, Turkey and Syria.

Tea and Coffee.—Tea, the staple drink of the Hejaz, is imported from India, Ceylon and Java, while coffee, the drink of Nejd and now spreading in the Hejaz, comes from the Yemen and East Africa. Yemen coffee, which is highly prized amongst all Arabs, is carried overland to Nejd. In 1934, 3,400 packages of tea and 2,200 packages of coffee (East Africa) were landed at Jedda.

Spices.—Cardamon, ginger, pepper, cloves and cinnamon, are brought from India, Java and Ceylon (through India).

Sesame (gingelly seed) is imported from India.

Preserves and Confectionery come very largely from the United Kingdom and in smaller quantities from Holland, Denmark and Italy. The market is naturally limited to the more sophisticated town dwellers. Jedda and Mecca are the two centres of this trade.

(4) *Motor Vehicles and Accessories.*

The market for cars in Saudi Arabia is not negligible. Cars and trucks are needed by (a) the Government for all transport of men and goods and also for the Royal family's private use; (b) the "Arab Car Service," the company providing all pilgrimage transport (see V (b) above); (c) private purchasers. By a contract of

the 1st August, 1934, between Messrs. Sharqieh (Limited) of Jedda and the Saudi Arab Government, the latter have undertaken, subject to conditions, only to permit the purchase of Ford cars for official Government use (not including cars bought for the use of the Royal family, &c.) and for use by the registered motor companies. Messrs. Sharqieh (Limited) by the same contract hold a monopoly for the import of tyres and Ford spare parts. The market for cars other than Fords is therefore confined to private purchase including, notably, cars purchased for the private use of the Royal family.

No statistics are available, and figures given below are by estimation and only approximately correct. In March 1928 a statement was published in the *Umm-al-Qura* to the effect that the number of cars then registered, other than those belonging to the palace, were about 500, of which 467 American. By January 1932 it was estimated that the total number of cars in use had risen to just over 1,000, which approximate figure probably also remains correct for 1936, owing to the short life of motor vehicles run under Arabian conditions. The great majority of cars remain of United States manufacture.

The number of cars imported into the country during the last four years is approximately:—

		Cars.	Commercial Vehicles.
1932—			
United States	...	76	6
Italy	...	5	...
		81	6
1933—			
British	...	1	16
United States	...	8	2
		9	18
1934—			
British	...	2	2
United States	...	106	130
		108	132
1935—			
British	...	3	...
United States	...	117	287
Italian	...	2	...
		122	287

(5) *Machinery.*

Imports of machinery are practically nil.

Since 1930 a number of pumps (Petter) have been imported for irrigation and installed principally at Riyadh and Medina (see VI (a) above). The market, however, is most limited owing to the small number of prosperous cultivators.

Electric lighting sets are imported from time to time by the few Europeans and richer natives who appreciate and can afford electricity. The few sets now in the country are almost all of British manufacture. There is no municipal lighting (see VIII (f) below).

A few small grinding machines for flour are also imported with 2-h.p. i/c engines. They are of Belgian origin.

(6) *Cement.*

The cement imported in Saudi Arabia varies considerably in quantity, averaging from 300 to 500 barrels a month. It is almost all grey cement and is supplied by Italy, Belgium, Egypt and Czechoslovakia. In recent years Japanese cement has been imported into the Persian Gulf ports in certain quantities, part of which, doubtless, has been resold in Saudi Arabia. In 1934 600 metric tons of cement landed at Jedda.

(7) *Petroleum Products.*

In 1934 imports through Jedda in metric tons amounted to:—

Benzine	2,253
Kerosene	1,994
Lubricating oil	100
Fuel oil	52

Practically all petroleum products are imported from Egypt or the Sudan. The Saudi Arab Government has a contract, renewable yearly, for the supply of Shell petrol. Small quantities of the Vacuum product are also sold. Russian petrol, which was imported in considerable quantities during 1931-33, has now disappeared from the market. Small quantities of lubricating oil are imported from the United Kingdom.

(8) *Cigarettes, Cigarette Paper, Cigarette Tobacco and Tombac.*

Although the smoking of tobacco is regarded as sinful in Wahhabi eyes, its import into the Hejaz is now permitted and licences are issued to tobacco sellers. Smoking in Nejd is still discountenanced, and cigarettes therefore sell for high prices.

Cigarettes are imported from the United Kingdom, Egypt and Turkey and in small quantities from Aden. Cigarette paper is imported from Syria and Belgium and also Japan.

Cigarette tobacco comes from Egypt (Turkish and Greek origin) and Aden, the latter being in especial favour in the Hejaz.

The water pipe (hubble bubble or Narghile) is widely smoked by men and women in the towns of the Hejaz. The tobacco smoked in these pipes, "tombac," is of two kinds, "hummi" and "kayzaruni," which are imported from the Yemen through Aden. "Jurak," a mixture of tombac, agra wood, flowers and honey, is imported from India. Jurak is the smoke of men only.

(9) *Haberdashery.*

The market is supplied chiefly from Switzerland and the United States of America and in smaller quantities from the United Kingdom, Japan and Egypt. Gold and silver thread (see VI (d) above) for use in decorating Arab garments is imported from Germany and India.

(10) *Hardware.*

Enamel ware, low quality aluminium ware, pewter and metal tea-pots, nails, &c., come from Germany, Holland, Czechoslovakia and also in small quantities from the United Kingdom and Italy. Copper and brass ware (cooking utensils, coffee-pots, kohl-holders and trays) are imported cheaply from India.

(11) *Soap.*

Washing and toilet soaps come from France and Syria. Some Japanese toilet soap is also found on the market.

(12) *Matches.*

No special make of matches seems to hold the market. While Russian ships used to call at Jedda a few years ago, Soviet matches were more common than other makes. Since Russian ships ceased calling no Soviet matches are on sale. Czechoslovak, Swedish and Japanese matches are all sold.

(13) *Radio.*

Receiving sets are allowed, by a regulation dated the 29th January, 1935, to be imported and installed in authorised areas which include Jedda but not Mecca. The market for sets is therefore very limited, but during 1935 a number of American and Dutch sets have been imported. Short and medium-wave sets are the only ones in demand, Cairo being the station to which the Arab population wish to listen.

(14) *Beads and Religious Souvenirs.*

There is a large call for small souvenirs of the Holy Land during the pilgrimage season. Imitation jewellery, amberoid beads, rosaries, souvenir rings and rosaries with spy glass views of the Holy Kaaba and the tomb of the prophet, cheap prayer mats, aniline dyed with designs of the Holy Places, all have worth in the eyes of the pilgrim when bought in Mecca or Jedda. Such trash is imported from Czechoslovakia, Germany and Japan (rings and rosaries), France, Germany, Belgium and Japan (prayer mats).

(15) *Building Materials.*

There is a considerable difference between the architecture of Nejd and the Hejaz. Buildings in the former are crude, made of local materials; baked mud walls and palm beams. Buildings in the Hejaz towns are more elaborate with much woodwork. In a country with no timber, all the wood used has to be imported from abroad. Teak is brought from Singapore, deal from Central Europe. Round beams are also imported from Germany and the Sudan. Of late, many builders, who care little for quality, have taken to using the wood from motor car packing cases and petrol cases for the making of window frames and doors. Little glass is used in windows and metal frames are unknown. Most houses are built of local stone, although one or two have now been built in Jedda of reinforced concrete.

(16) *Paints and Varnish.*

The United Kingdom, Holland and Germany supply the market. In spite of the large amount of woodwork used in the Hejaz in the interior and exterior of houses it is only in recent years that the more thoughtful house-owner has begun to preserve his wood with paint.

(17) *Military Requirements.*

The Government makes occasional purchases of arms and ammunition from Europe. Orders have, in the past, been placed in the United Kingdom and Poland. Only a small proportion of the armed forces wear uniforms.

(c) *Methods of Business.*

Saudi Arabia, having as yet achieved little economic unity, lacks any one centre for trade and distribution, although all imports of bulk and importance tend to come increasingly through the Hejaz port of Jedda.

The commission agent is almost unknown; most firms import direct and either sell retail or sell wholesale to small retailers. A common system with India is to have a fixed buying agent for any one article (*e.g.*, flour) in, say, Bombay, from whom consignments are received as required and to whom the importer periodically remits specie in reimbursement.

(d) *Orders by the Government.*

Supplies for the Government, which, besides the annual import of motor cars and petrol for the pilgrimage and occasional orders for war material, consists almost entirely of rice, flour, and other food-stuffs, are ordered through the European firms in Jedda or one or two of the larger native firms in Jedda and Bahrein.

(e) *Orders by Concessionnaires.*

The two present concessionnaires, the California Arabian Standard Oil Company and the Saudi Arabian Mining Syndicate, normally purchase their requirements through their head offices in London.

VIII.—SOCIAL.

(a) *Cost and Standard of Living.*

The cost of living is dear throughout Saudi Arabia, due to high tariffs in a country where all necessities must be imported from abroad. In the Hejaz, moreover, it varies markedly with the time of the year, money and merchandise

becoming dearer during the pilgrimage season. Attempts have occasionally been made by the local Government to keep retail prices low. In 1935 the local authorities in Jedda contracted with a merchant to sell at certain fixed rates, but owing to the losses incurred the scheme failed.

The standard of living is, of necessity in a country lacking any general natural wealth, low. The Bedouin live in poverty, needing little and asking for no better, while the townspeople, with exceptions in the Hejaz, are scarcely better off. The fact that the national income is confined to the pilgrimage and one or two commercial concessions tends to canalise what wealth there is through few hands, chiefly Government hands, and this may lead in a short time to an increased contrast between the wealthy few and the impoverished mass, a contrast which hitherto has been almost non-existent as with other primitive communities.

Of employment, there is sufficient in the Hejaz to keep the indigenous population occupied. From time to time the British Government find it advisable to repatriate to Africa numbers of West Africans, who, having stayed in the country after the pilgrimage as porters and navvy workmen, become too numerous for the work available and too poor to pay their passages across the Red Sea.

(b) *Slavery.*

Connected with the standard of living and employment is slavery, which is an old established institution in Arabia. The slave trade and the enslavement of pilgrims have been stopped to a great extent by the patrolling of the Red Sea and the supervision of the present Saudi Arab Government. Slave dealing in the country, however, remains legal within the Sharia law. Slavery provides domestic servants, soldiers and agricultural labourers. As an institution it can only have a detrimental effect on the psychology of the population and debase the value of the labour of free men.

(c) *Education.*

Besides Islam, which assures a certain standard of culture generally throughout the population, there is little learning as understood in the West. Schools exist in Mecca, Jedda and Medina, with an elementary curriculum. The King, in addition, has recently founded a school for princes at Riyadh.

(d) *Newspapers and Advertising.*

Owing to the lack of education the number of literates is not high even in the towns. The scope for newspapers is therefore limited. Two are published in Mecca, the *Umm-al-Qura* and the *Sant-al-Hejaz*. Egyptian Arabic newspapers also circulate in the towns of the Hejaz. Advertisements appear occasionally in the local newspapers, but pictorial advertisements, depicting created beings, are not permitted for publication.

(e) *Trade Guilds.*

All workers following the same calling in any one town in the Hejaz are banded together in guilds under the authority of a sheikh, who is responsible to the Government through the municipalities. There are guilds of jewellers, brokers, tax collectors, criers to prayer, tent makers, butter sellers, butchers, tinsmiths, barbers and tailors, and of many other professions, including that of the eunuchs.

Craftsmen who carry on their profession in shops pay a tax to the municipality of which a portion goes to the sheikh of the guild in question. Apprentices joining the profession also have to pay a sum to the sheikh. In return the sheikh arbitrates disputes between members of the guild and between them and their customers. If he fails the case is taken to the Sharia Court.

(f) *Municipal Works.*

Municipal authorities exist in the Hejaz as an heritage of Turkish rule. In Nejd, the administration of the towns is cared for by the Governors. The works described below, water and electric supply are, however, under the supervision of the Central Government rather than under the authority of the municipalities. The activities of the latter are confined to the cleaning of streets and other minor matters.

Arab towns built in oases do not generally have a water supply other than the wells of the oasis. The towns spread or dwindle in relation to the quantity of water the wells provide. In some Hejaz towns, however, e.g., Mecca, Jedda and Yanbu, whose present size depends not on the natural resources of the neighbourhood, but on the pilgrimage, the question of water is urgently important.

Zubaida, the Queen of Harun-ar-Rashid, besides sinking wells along what is now the overland car route from Najaf to Medina, gave Mecca a water supply in the 8th century A.D., on which the town still depends, an aqueduct bringing water from the mountains by Jebel Arafat. This water supply, known as "Ain Zubaida," also serves the places visited by pilgrims at the great pilgrimage, and is therefore a religious endowment under the care of a committee, working without wage. Under the present Government the Ain Zubaida Committee have made (1930-31) extensive repairs to the aqueduct and springs, and have constructed wells and reservoirs along the pilgrimage route. A steam pump raises the water from the aqueduct into reservoirs at Mina (a village visited during the pilgrimage).

The Ain Zubaida Committee have also (1933-34) reopened the Turkish aqueduct, which, before the Saudi-Hejaz war, brought water from Waziriya, 11 miles away in the foothills, to Jedda. This supply is plentiful except at certain times of the year and cheap, as no charge is made save for distribution. It is, however, neither clean nor sufficient for all the needs of the population and pilgrims. There are also numerous underground rain-water catch pits around Jedda, which are capable of storing a considerable quantity of water.

The real water supply of Jedda, as of Yanbu, depends on the condensers erected by the Government to condense sea water.

Under the Hashimite régime there was one old condenser working in Jedda. From 1926 to 1929 two larger condensers were bought from the United Kingdom (Mirrlees Watson, Glasgow), and a third (100 tons per twenty-four hours), of the same manufacture, was installed at Yanbu. The two condensers at Jedda are capable of producing 300 tons of water a day, which is sufficient to meet the needs of the town under all circumstances. The retail cost is relatively high.

The Government has recently had in mind the erection of a condenser at Jizan.

There is no municipal electricity in Saudi Arabia. The Associated British Manufacturers (Limited) sent an engineer in 1926 to survey Jedda for this purpose, but nothing has since been done by the local authorities. The Banque Misr of Cairo are stated to be at present interested in the provision of Mecca with a municipal supply. The mosques at Mecca and Medina are lighted by their own plants donated by pious Moslems.

In Mecca some attempt has been made to create a small public garden, to which, it was announced in 1935, the public would be admitted on charge. The King imported plants and flowers for his Mecca garden in 1928 from the Sudan, Cyprus and India. Few other attempts are made to embellish the towns even in the Hejaz.

(g) *Pilgrimage and Religious Endowments.*

The pilgrimage to Mecca is prescribed as one of the five obligations of Islam; the pilgrimage to Medina is optional. While the lesser pilgrimage to Mecca, which has a certain virtue, can be made at any season of the year, the "Haj," or greater pilgrimage can only be completed by standing on the plain of Arafat, outside Mecca, on the 9th day of Dhu'l Hijja. Although the whole ceremony therefore occupies but four or five days in each year, many pilgrims arrive as much as five months before this date and many do not leave until two months after it. The pilgrimage season thus occupies a considerable portion of the year, and so enables almost the whole native population of the Hejaz to live in entirety by the industry so created.

For convenience of reference, the approximate A.D. equivalents of the Pilgrimage Day (the 9th Dhu'l Hijja) during the years 1936 to 1941 are shown in the commercial summary of this report. The importers of merchandise destined for the pilgrim market (prayer rugs, amulets and rosaries, beads, textiles, &c.) require to receive their stocks before the beginning of Ramadan, the third lunar month preceding Dhu'l Hijja—about ninety days. During Ramadan, a month of rigorous fasting by day, much entertainment is habitual by night, and the

largest sales of confectionery and sweetmeats, ornamental crockery and glassware take place just before or during Ramadan. The end of the month is celebrated by the Id-al-Fitr, a festival for which universal purchases of new clothes and trinkets are made. The festival immediately following the Arafat ceremonies, the Id-al-Adhdha, is another important date in the local bazaars. It may, therefore, serve some purpose if British exporters are made aware of these dates of the Moslem year: the 1st Ramadan, which is the latest date by which stocks should reach Jedda; the period, from a few weeks before Ramadan until a few weeks after Arafat day, when business is most brisk and local trade reaches its high water mark.

Large sums of money are spent by the pilgrims during their sojourn in the Hejaz, and the end of the pilgrim season finds local merchants more ready than at other times of the year to pay off their debts to suppliers.

The number of overseas pilgrims in recent years amount to:—

	1926.	1927.	1928.	1929.	1930.	1931.	1932.	1933.	1934.	1935.	1936.
Indian ...	18,237	26,406	13,954	15,146	11,061	7,276	9,634	7,003	7,369	11,113	8,231
Malay ...	5,500	29,004	4,418	1,455	2,590	506	80	101	173	617	
Netherlands											5,169
East Indies	5,110	30,704	42,730	31,119	32,000	16,803	4,375	2,316	2,827	3,992	
West African...	1,377	589	2,051	2,338	3,525	1,558	780	509	891	1,164	2,318
Sudanese ...		957	2,014	1,371	1,065	588	527	420	534	886	1,175
Palestinian	168	333	471	558	383	447	1,352	240	385	1,432	769
Egyptian ...	16,094	15,547	14,069	18,522	17,127	4,967	2,312	1,098	4,302	5,301	5,517
Others...	8,539	18,879	21,030	18,049	17,070	7,201	10,005	8,328	8,780	9,353	7,751
Total ...	55,725	132,109	100,767	88,558	84,821	39,346	29,065	20,705	25,291	33,898	30,966

The fact that the Hejaz is the Holy Land of Islam also brings to her religious endowments (Waqf, pl. Awqaf), either in the form of hostels built and maintained for the benefit of pilgrims or the poor of the country, or the annual receipt of money from foundations in other Islamic countries, endowed by the pious for the benefit of the Haramayn (the two sanctuaries of Mecca and Medina), or, again, for the poor of these towns.

(h) Prisons, lunatic asylums and hospitals.

There are prisons in Jedda, Mecca, Medina and other towns. There are no arrangements for feeding persons in prison, save that a small ration of water is supplied by the Government. No special provision is made for lunatics in Saudi Arabia. They are put in prison, but not cared for.

The Saudi Arab Government evinces great interest in public health arrangements, on which much depends during the pilgrimage, but they lack efficient personnel and equipment. There are Government hospitals in Mecca, Jedda and Medina, and with the help of foreign Moslems considerable extensions and rebuilding have been done to the latter two in the last two years.

The British (Government of India) and other foreign Governments maintain dispensaries in Jedda and/or Mecca which are busily attended not only by pilgrims but by all classes of the local population.

APPENDIX.

Frontiers of Saudi Arabia where Defined by Treaty.

(a) Transjordan-Hejaz Frontier.

This frontier has not yet been agreed upon by the mandatory Power and Saudi Arabia. The *de facto* frontier is defined in a letter annexed to the Treaty of Jedda dated the 19th May, 1927 (the 18th Dhul Qada 1345). "The frontier between the Hejaz and Transjordan starts from the intersection of Meridian 38 degrees East and Parallel 29 degrees 35' north which marks the termination of the frontier between Nejd and Transjordan, and proceeds in a straight line to a point on the Hejaz Railway 2 miles south of Mudawwara. From this point it proceeds in a straight line to a point on the Gulf of Aqaba 2 miles south of the town of Aqaba."

(b) Transjordan-Nejd Frontier.

"The frontier between Nejd and Transjordan starts in the north-east from the point of intersection of meridian 39 degrees east and parallel 32 degrees north, which marks the termination of the frontier between Nejd and Iraq, and proceeds in a straight line to the point of intersection of meridian 37 degrees east and parallel 31 degrees 30' north, and thence along meridian 37 degrees east to the point of intersection with parallel 31 degrees 25' north. From this point it proceeds in a straight line to the point of intersection of meridian 38 degrees east and parallel 30 degrees north, leaving all projecting edges of the Wadi Sirhan in Nejd territory; and thence proceeds along meridian 38 degrees east to the point of its intersection with parallel 29 degrees 35' north."

(c) Iraq-Saudi Frontier.

(1) The frontier from the east begins at the junction of the Wadi-el-Audja with El Batin, and from this point the Nejd frontier passes in a straight line to the well called "El Ukabba," leaving Al-Dulaimiya and El Ukabba north of the line. From El Ukabba it continues north-west to Bir Unsab.

(2) Starting from the point mentioned above, *i.e.*, from the point of the junction of the Wadi-el-Audja with El Batin, the Iraq boundary continues in a straight line north-west to El Amghar, leaving this place to the south of the line, and from thence proceeds south-west in a straight line until it joins the Nejd frontier at Bir Unsab.

(3) The area delimited by the points enumerated above, which includes all these points, will remain neutral and common to the two Governments of Iraq and Nejd, who will enjoy equal rights in it for all purposes.

(4) From Bir Unsab the boundary between the two States proceeds north-west to Birkat-el-Djumeima, and from thence northwards to Bir-el-Akaba and Kasr Athmin, from there westwards in a straight line passing through the centre of Djal-el-Batan to Bir Lifa, and then to Bir-al-Maniya and thence to Djadaidat-el-Arar, from there to Mukur and from Mukur to the Jebel Anaza, situated in the neighbourhood of the intersection of latitude 32 degrees north with longitude 39 degrees east, where the Iraq-Nejd boundary terminates.

(d) Yemen-Saudi Frontier.

The frontier line between the two kingdoms begins at a point half-way between Medi and Al Musim on the coast of the Red Sea, and (runs) up to the mountains of the Tihama in an easterly direction. It then turns northwards until it ends on the north-west boundary between the Beni Jamaa and (the tribes) adjacent to them on the north and west. It then bends east until it ends at a point between the limits of Nuqaa and Waar, which belong to the Waila tribe, and the limits of the Yam. It then bends until it reaches the pass of Marwan and Aqaba Rifada. It then bends eastward until it ends, on the east, on the edge of the boundary between those of the Hamdan-bin-Zaid, Waila, &c., who are outside Yam, and Yam. Everything on the right-hand side of the above-mentioned line, which runs from the point mentioned on the sea-shore up to the end of the borders on all sides of the mountains mentioned, shall belong to the Yemen, and everything on the left of the above-mentioned line shall belong to the Saudi Arab Kingdom.

[E 4594/486/25]

No. 2.

Mr. Calvert to Mr. Eden.—(Received July 20.)

(No. 196. Confidential.)

Sir,

Jedda, July 2, 1936.

I HAVE the honour to submit herewith the Jedda report for June 1936.

2. Copies have been distributed as in the list in paragraph 41 of the report for January.

I have, &c.

A. S. CALVERT.

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D

Enclosure in No. 2.

JEDDA REPORT FOR JUNE 1936.

I.—Internal Affairs.

201. THE King and the heir apparent remained at Riyadh during the month. Early in the month a curious report was received by the Legation from the Persian Gulf, according to which an attempt on the life of Ibn Saud was made on or about the 22nd May by his nephew Khalid-bin-Muhammad, with one of Khalid's brothers and five accomplices, whilst the King was encamped at Ashaira. No rumour of this reached Jedda, and as the King was reported to have left Ashaira on the 18th May it may fairly safely be dismissed. Khalid appeared to be in favour when Ibn Saud was last in Jedda.

202. Amir Feisal came to Jedda from Taif on the 3rd June, when he received Signor Persico, who presented his credentials as Italian Minister (see paragraph 223), and, later the same morning, Sir Andrew Ryan. The Amir remained in Jedda until the 5th June in order to entertain His Majesty's Minister to an informal farewell dinner-party and to receive him in farewell audience (see paragraph 219).

203. Sheikh Yusuf Yasin, in spite of his personal desire to leave for Riyadh after the 14th June, remained on in Jedda by the King's orders. He had a number of business and other meetings with Sir Andrew Ryan and, later, with His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires. Sheikh Abdullah Suleyman, as usual, divided his time between Jedda, Mecca and Taif and, together with Sheikh Yusuf Yasin, left for Taif on the 28th June in connexion with negotiations for the Red Sea oil concession (see paragraph 210).

204. The Deputy Kaimakam of Jedda, Muhammad Id-Rawwaf, left by sea on the 17th for Damascus, where he is to spend three months' leave. Sheikh Ali Taha, as usual, is acting during his absence.

205. One of the more highly-coloured items of gossip retailed in Mecca has centred round Sheikh Muhammad Seroor, the Minister of Finance's influential assistant. Young Hejazis of Mecca are said to be so dazzled by the wealth and liberality of Seroor, whose hospitality (equalled only by his rapacity) is a byword in the Holy Cities, that hopes are now being nourished in youthful breasts of a Hejaz Republic, under his leadership, severed from a Nejd, which has drained the Holy Land of its wealth.

206. Sheikh Abdul Aziz-bin-Zeyd (paragraph 165 of last report) left for his new post on the Transjordan frontier about the 8th. The new Governor of Kaf is Abdul Kerim-bin-Zeyd. A new Governor of Tebuk would appear to have been appointed in the room of Sheikh Abdullah-as-Sdayri, now Governor of Medina, but no announcement has been made and his name is not yet known.

207. (Reference paragraph 167 of last report.) There has been considerable aerial activity during the month. One of the three Italian instructional planes took the air on the 17th, since when one or two of these machines have flown daily. The new Italian instructor (paragraph 187 of last report), who arrived early in June, is stated to be superintending the further training of the Saudi "Eagles" in these small, but handy, machines. On the 24th, the two planes capsized in a strong wind whilst on the ground—little damage could have been done as they were up again the following day. The White Russian air mechanic, Nicola Nadenhoff, and his wife, left Jedda by sea on the 24th on leave. Further subscriptions for the purchase of aeroplanes to be named after the four cities of the country are still coming in, and it has been gathered from a reliable source that an up-to-date aerodrome is to be made at Kandara near Jedda, and that a chain of landing-grounds is to be established between Jedda and Riyadh, the intermediate stations to be one between Taif and Ashaira, others at Muwaih and Dawadmi.

208. (Reference paragraph 168 of last report.) Messrs. Twitchell and Laycock arrived from Taif on the 11th, and left two or three days later by air for Wejh in the syndicate's plane. From another member of the staff, who had done considerable prospecting in that area, it was understood later in the month that Taif had proved disappointing and would be abandoned. On the other hand, a very promising find had been made near Wejh, where there are traces of ancient workings. Wejh now has a white population, it is stated, of nine. Mr. Twitchell left on the 24th for the United Kingdom, not on leave, but, he said, "to work,"

and it is thought in some quarters that he may not return (but that has been thought so often of Mr. Twitchell). Mr. Park, American, is now the reigning general manager in this country. The road from Jedda to Mahd-adh-Dhabab is now through, and a useful road-report was recently drawn up by a member of the Legation.

209. A further consignment of new rials, mentioned in paragraph 170 of last report, is believed to have arrived during June. On the 23rd the *Saut-ul-Hejaz* announced that as from that date the old half- and quarter-rial pieces would be withdrawn, payment being made at the rate of 20 rials to the pound gold, during a period of two months only.

210. The Red Sea oil concession came in for a good deal of attention during the month. The Frenchmen, M. Biraud and another, were here all the month, but did not appear to be very active. The Société française des Pétroles is a member of the Iraq Petroleum Company consortium, and when Mr. S. H. Longrigg (accompanied, as in 1933, by Mr. Mudarris—see report for March 1933, paragraph 34 (c)) arrived on the 24th June to clinch, if possible, on behalf of Petroleum Concessions (Limited), the negotiations already initiated by Mr. Ydlibi and Colonel Etherton, British and French oil representatives were to work together. They left together for Taif on the 28th, where the negotiations were to take place, with Sheikh Yusuf Yasin and Sheikh Abdullah Suleyman. Sheikh Yusuf Yasin professed to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires to be eager to come to terms with Petroleum Concessions (Limited). The Italian Minister, about the 22nd, had requested the Saudi Government to defer the grant of the concession until Italian interests had had time to enter the field, particularly in regard to a concession for the Farsan Islands, the chief Italian objective. Sheikh Yusuf Yasin asserted that he had tried to head the Italian Minister off, and was, therefore, all the more anxious to come to a successful understanding with Mr. Longrigg as soon as possible.

211. Sheikh Yusuf Yasin informed Mr. Calvert with great satisfaction on the 27th that a message had been received by telephone that No. 2 Well in Hasa had come into commercial production and was yielding 500 tons a day.

212. It came to the notice of the Legation that the Saudi Government were to impose a tax of six centimes on all telegrams sent from Saudi Arabia from the 1st July. As no official announcement of this new tax has been seen, enquiries as to its nature are being made of the Saudi authorities.

213. The names of the shareholders of the "Arab Press and Publications Company," referred to at paragraph 174 of the last report, have now been published and include that of Sheikh Yusuf Yasin. A further minor economic project has been given a certain publicity in the National Company for the Construction of Artesian Wells at Medina. It rejoices in regulations of twenty-six articles, but has very doubtful prospects of success.

II.—Frontier Questions and Foreign Relations in Arabia.

214. The *Umm-al-Qura* of the 19th June contained an article on the Iraqi-Saudi Arab Treaty, the theme of which was that the treaty was entered into spontaneously by the Governments concerned and was neither inspired by nor aimed at any foreign country. It had not been brought about by British influence, as some French and Italian journalists were inclined to suggest, nor was it an Arab alliance with an anti-British bias, as some British commentators appeared to think. A few days before this article appeared, the *Saut-ul-Hejaz* announced that Seyyid Muhammad-bin-Muhammad Zabara, a Yemeni palace official, had left Sana for Iraq via Aden as the King of the Yemen's representative to negotiate with the Government of Iraq the adhesion of the Yemen to the Saud-Iraq Treaty.

215. The Iraqi Legation here has been in charge of a subordinate for over a year. No appointment of a Chargé d'Affaires has yet been announced, but it is thought that it will not be long deferred. Seyyid Nuri-as-Said may pay a visit to this country later in the summer, possibly on his way back from Europe to Iraq.

216. (Reference paragraph 178.) There has been evidence of greater interest in events in Palestine during the month under review. Whilst the press has refrained from comment on the course of the crisis, a fund has been opened for the relief of Arab victims in Palestine. Amongst the subscribers are Amir Abdullah Feisal, Sheikh Abdullah Suleyman and Sheikh Yusuf Yasin.

217. The Koweit proposals (paragraph 145 of the report for April) arrived at the end of the month. It is hoped to discuss them with the Saudi authorities in the very near future.

218. It is understood that the Iranian Government have formally protested against the agreement with the Saudi Arab Government regarding transit dues, concluded in November 1935 by His Majesty's Government and the Government of Bahrein (see paragraph 17 of report for January). The Saudi press has paid a certain amount of attention to the Sheikh of Bahrein's visit to the United Kingdom.

III.—Relations with Powers outside Arabia.

219. Sir Andrew and Lady Ryan left Jedda on the 14th June by the sloop H.M.S. *Londonderry* for Port Sudan. They were given an official send-off at the quarantine quay, where a guard of honour was mounted, and where a numerous gathering included Sheikh Yusuf Yasin, the Deputy Kaimakam, and many other Saudi notables, foreign colleagues and other foreign residents. As has already been mentioned, the Amir Feisal came from Taif on the 3rd and received Sir Andrew, who presented Mr. Judd, the same day. On the 4th His Royal Highness gave an informal dinner-party to Sir Andrew, which was attended only by certain members of the Legation staff and a limited number of Saudi officials and other personages. The Amir quite readily agreed to the informality of the affair in view of Court mourning for King George. On the 5th Amir Feisal again received His Majesty's Minister, who was accompanied by Mr. Calvert, when Sir Andrew formally took his leave of His Royal Highness. Other and less official entertainments occupied the ten days prior to Sir Andrew and Lady Ryan's departure, all of an informal character, when expression was given to the great and affectionate regard in which they were held by all their friends and colleagues in Jedda. There was the customary exchange of telegrams between His Majesty's Minister and the King and Amir Feisal on the actual day of departure.

220. Mr. A. S. Calvert returned from leave on the 3rd and assumed charge of the Legation on the 14th.

221. In the course of business conversations with Sheikh Yusuf Yasin before his departure, Sir Andrew Ryan on the 6th referred once more to the question of Saudi indebtedness to His Majesty's Government and the Government of India, and on the 9th to that of facilities for British aircraft on the Hasa Coast, concerning which he made a general statement of the conclusions reached by His Majesty's Government following on the exchange of views with Fuad Bey Hamza last summer.

222. Mr. Calvert had meetings with Sheikh Yusuf Yasin on the 20th, 23rd and 27th, when, *inter alia*, the Red Sea oil concession question was discussed (see paragraph 210), and various pilgrimage matters of a somewhat contentious nature were mentioned by Sheikh Yusuf.

223. (Reference paragraph 188 of last report.) It has already been mentioned that on the 3rd June the Italian Chargé presented his credentials as Minister to Amir Feisal in the King's absence. Dr. Fea left for Rome on the 17th on leave. It is rumoured in the town that he will be accompanied on his return by an Italian lady doctor and nurses, and that it is intended to establish a resplendent Italian dispensary at Jedda. Other items relating to the Red Sea oil concession and Italian aeroplanes have been already dealt with at paragraphs 210 and 207 respectively.

224. On the 16th June the *Saut-ul-Hejaz* published a notice by the Italian Legation, in which persons holding Italian bank-notes were requested to deposit them at the Italian Legation before the 10th July. Owners would be credited with the value of the notes, without interest, but would not be able to realise on the amount so deposited, except by the purchase of goods or property in Italy.

225. The Afghan Minister, Muhammad Sadiq-al-Mujaddidi, whose relations with the Saudi Arab Government have not been too happy recently (see paragraphs 192-4 of last report), left for Alexandria on the 24th. He expected to return in October.

IV.—Miscellaneous.

226. The sloop H.M.S. *Londonderry* (Captain H. B. Jacomb, R.N.) arrived on the 11th and left with Sir Andrew and Lady Ryan on board on the 14th for Port Sudan.

227. The French sloop *d'Iberville* arrived on the 18th and left on the 22nd.

228. The *Saut-ul-Hejaz* of the 9th gave a gratuitous puff to a book by one Amin Said, published in Cairo, entitled *The History of the British Domination of Arabia*. From the brief review the book would appear to include Egypt and the Sudan in its scope, as well as Iraq, Palestine, Transjordan, the Yemen and the Persian Gulf. This is, we are told, the first volume.

229. The representative in Egypt of the Socony-Vacuum Oil Company, Mr. Axler (see paragraph 70 of report for February 1935), arrived on the 17th. He left again on the 24th June.

230. The *Umm-al-Qura* came out on the 26th June with a lengthy leading article, headed: "The Hejaz and Quarantine Stations in Egypt," addressed to the Egyptian Minister of Health, and attacking the International Quarantine Board and the arrangements made annually in connexion with the Haj. The article was very probably inspired by Sheikh Yusuf Yasin, whose antipathy to the board is well known. A similar attack was launched last year after the pilgrimage.

231. The position as regards the manumission of slaves by the Legation during June was as follows:—

On hand at the beginning of the month: One male.
Took refuge in June: Two males.
Manumitted and repatriated: Nil.
Locally manumitted: One male.
On hand at the end of the month: Two males.

[E 5003/1283/25]

No. 3.

Mr. Calvert to Mr. Eden.—(Received August 7.)

(No. 207. Confidential.)

Sir,

Jedda, July 13, 1936.

WITH reference to my telegrams Nos. 91 and 94 of the 10th and 12th July respectively, in which I reported the successful conclusion of the negotiations between the Saudi Arab Government and the representatives of the Petroleum Concessions (Limited) for an oil concession for the Red Sea coasts of this country, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a translation of the brief announcement which appeared in the Mecca newspaper *Umm-al-Qura* of the 10th July.

2. As you are aware, the negotiations took place at Taif, whither Mr. S. H. Longrigg went on the 28th June. He was accompanied by Mr. Mudarris (who was his colleague in the spring of 1933, when the Iraq Petroleum Company were unsuccessful in bidding for the Hasa Oil Concession) and M. Biraud, of the Société française des Pétroles. The Saudi representatives were Sheikh Abdullah Suleyman, Sheikh Yusuf Yasin and Sheikh Khalid Abul Walid. Sheikh Yusuf apparently delayed his arrival at Taif by several days, so that by the time he put in an appearance the financial clauses had been settled. Mr. Longrigg, whom I saw upon his return to Jedda, related amusingly that both the other negotiators appeared anxious to settle as much as possible before their colleague appeared on the scene, as they knew well his talent for obstructiveness. Discussions continued for nearly two weeks, Sheikh Yusuf Yasin returning to Jedda on the evening of the 10th July, followed next day by Mr. Longrigg and his companions with the Minister of Finance, whose guests (with the exception of M. Biraud) they were until they left Jedda on the 12th July.

3. I had a meeting with the Acting Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs on the morning of the 11th July, when he referred to the satisfactory conclusion of the negotiations. He paid a tribute to the helpfulness shown by Mr. Longrigg, and claimed that the Saudis, too, had not been backward in promoting the final agreement. The most important matter, he said, concerned the question of the "transfer of ownership" in the company. This was a somewhat vague statement, but as I was to see Mr. Longrigg the same afternoon I forbore to cross-examine Sheikh Yusuf on the point. He went on to express his thanks for the assistance afforded by His Majesty's Government, and, generally, he appeared to be eminently satisfied with the agreement. I acknowledged his thanks and expressed my pleasure at the news.

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4. Mr. Longrigg, who had telegraphed from Taif on the 10th July to make an appointment for the following day, called later in the day and gave me fuller particulars of the new agreement. He confirmed that the area of the concession was the whole Red Sea coasts of Saudi Arabia, to a depth of 100 kilom., including the Farsan and other islands and territorial waters, with the exception of the stretch between Rabigh and Lith. The exception is probably due to the Saudi Arab Government's fear of criticism, in their own country and other parts of the Islamic world, that Ibn Saud is throwing the holy territory of the Hejaz open to the penetration and exploitation of foreigners and infidels. Mr. Longrigg felt no difficulty in accepting this exception, as it is fairly certain, he said, that no oil exists in the excluded area.

5. No difficulty arose, apparently, over the question of nationality of the company, except that the Saudis seemed very concerned to safeguard themselves against the possibility of the transfer of the company, or of any of its constituent members, or of any subsidiary eventually formed to exploit this concession, to a company of any other nationality than those of the Petroleum Concessions (Limited) and its present constituents. The object of this would appear to be to prevent control of the company passing into Italian hands. Mr. Longrigg saw no difficulty in entering into an understanding on this subject, which was embodied in letters duly exchanged, which are not to be published. The letters provide that any such change taking place without the prior consent of the Saudi Arab Government would render the concession null and void.

6. Mr. Longrigg informed me that a copy of the terms of the concession would be supplied to the Foreign Office on his return to London, so I will content myself with a brief reference to other features of the agreement of interest:—

- (a) £30,000 gold is to be paid in a lump sum after ratification.
- (b) £7,500 gold per annum is to be paid as rent.
- (c) £150,000 gold per annum is to be paid in royalties two years after the discovery of oil in commercial quantities.
- (d) Prospecting rights have been secured for four years, with the option of a fifth.
- (e) The company has the right to drill for ten years, and if oil is not then found new arrangements to be made.
- (f) Complete exemption from taxation (except municipal), and exemption from customs dues on all materials, cars, &c., imported.
- (g) The right to communicate between northern and southern concessionary areas (excluding the holy areas of Mecca and Medina) is to be provided for in a separate exchange of letters, not to be published. These letters, I understand, remain to be exchanged.
- (h) A separate agreement will have to be reached on the question of the right to employ aircraft, a matter over which the Saudis at first proved unaccommodating, but later modified their attitude.

7. Mr. Longrigg spent several of the few hours of his stay in Jedda, before leaving for Port Sudan, in inspecting a number of houses in the town with a view to selecting suitable premises for the Jedda office of Petroleum Concessions (Limited). He stated that he expected that a manager would be sent out here in the autumn.

8. With regard to ratification, I understand that this is to be effected, as far as the company is concerned, within twenty days of Mr. Longrigg's arrival in London. Telegraphic notice is then to be given of the fact to the Saudi Arab Government, who would thereupon take appropriate measures here, informing the company to that effect by telegram. The £30,000 gold would then be paid over to the Saudi Government.

9. For the sake of completeness, the share taken by the French representative might be briefly described. M. Biraud, who in any case knew no Arabic, was unwell when he accompanied Mr. Longrigg to Taif. There he became seriously, even dangerously, ill, and so took no part in the negotiations. He returned to Jedda on the 11th July, but was not well enough to leave with Mr. Longrigg and Mr. Mudarris, and I much regret to say that I learn that he died here suddenly this morning.

I have, &c.

A. S. CALVERT.

Enclosure in No. 3.

Extract from Umm-al-Qura, July 10, 1936.

PROCLAMATION CONCERNING OIL MINING ON THE RED SEA COAST.

(Translation.)

HIS Excellency the Minister of Finance, on behalf of the Saudi Arab Government, has signed with Mr. Longrigg, the representative of Petroleum Concessions (Limited), on behalf of the said company, an agreement for oil mining in the area of the western coasts of the Saudi Arab Kingdom, with the exception of the area situated between Rabigh and Lith. The agreement will be published after ratification in due course.

[E 5039/271/25]

No. 4.

Mr. Calvert to Mr. Eden.—(Received August 10.)

(No. 225.)

Sir,

Jedda, July 28, 1936.

I HAVE the honour to refer to Sir Andrew Ryan's despatch No. 21 of the 13th January last, in which he described the developments up to that date in the operations of the Saudi Arabian Mining Syndicate (Limited), and to submit a further brief report on the subsequent progress of this concern, in order to supplement the brief references to the subject that have been made from time to time in Jedda reports.

2. The four prospecting parties referred to in the enclosure to the despatch under reference left Jedda early in January in various directions. Little was heard of their subsequent progress, except that at the end of that month reports reached the Jedda office of the syndicate that trouble had befallen certain members of the parties. This was probably not more serious than mechanical breakdowns of their motor vehicles, but for a time alarmist rumours were rife locally, according to which difficulties had been encountered both at the hands of local tribesmen and of local officials. These were either entirely false or grossly exaggerated. Indeed, Mr. T. P. Larken returned towards the end of June from Taif after a period of several months of prospecting, during which time he travelled extensively, mainly in an area south of Taif, and reported that he had met with no interference. He had equally met with no success in his quest, and it was understood from him that the syndicate's operations in the Taif area would now be definitely abandoned.

3. Much more promising results were reported from the Wejh area, where the remains of old gold mines had been discovered at a number of places in and around Umm-al-Qariyat, some 10 or 12 miles north of Wejh. It appears as though the syndicate propose to go rapidly ahead in this new area, for they have now about a dozen of their European and American staff stationed there. These include the personnel of their own aeroplane, a Bellanca monoplane, which arrived at the end of April and is based on Wejh, whence it has several times made its appearance in Jedda. The pilot, an American, is accompanied by his wife, who acts as wireless operator, and by a mechanic.

4. Work continues at the Mahd-adh-Dhahab, or Cot of Gold. The road, of which mention is made in the despatch under reference, was completed in June and is reported to be a very serviceable affair for most seasons of the year over most of its length. A useful report on the major part of the road was drawn up by a member of the Legation shortly before the work was completed. Otherwise, the main interest in regard to the Mahd-adh-Dhahab centres round the problem of water. For some time drilling for water has been in progress and has been in the hands of American drillers, using American drilling machines. Progress has been slow and little or no water has been found. More recently, the Jedda manager of the syndicate relates, the London office, becoming impatient at the apparent lack of success, despatched two British drillers to this country, with British drilling machinery. The latter had just arrived when Mr. Duncley spoke on the subject, but the two drillers had been here a week or two longer and had already considerably improved on the efforts of the Americans. Water, however, is still to seek, and the matter is apparently a serious one, for, in the words of Mr. Duncley: "No water, no mine." The syndicate, he added,

[14940]

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were prepared to drill to a depth of 2,000 feet, whereas at the moment they have not gone deeper than 100 feet.

5. I observe from Mr. Rendel's letter of the 7th May last to Sir Andrew Ryan that a concern named the Mining Trust (Limited) now holds a controlling interest in the Saudi Arabian Mining Syndicate (Limited), and assume that, since the flotation of the syndicate, the component interests concerned (as given in the enclosure to Foreign Office printed despatch No. 313 of the 14th August, 1934) have changed somewhat. In this connexion, I was recently struck by a statement made by the Jedda manager of the syndicate that the Saudi Arabian Mining Syndicate was owned by the American Smelting Company, "lock, stock and barrel."

6. In Jedda work on the terminal compound has progressed very considerably, but the various premises are not yet at a stage when they can be occupied by the staff. No signs of work on a jetty are apparent, but a landing ground for the syndicate's aeroplane has been established in the immediate vicinity of the compound. Mr. K. S. Twitchell, the general manager in Saudi Arabia of the syndicate's operations, left on the 24th June for the United Kingdom, and his place has been taken by another American, Mr. Park.

7. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Department of Overseas Trade and to Transjordan.

I have, &c.

A. S. CALVERT.

[E 5365/486/25]

No. 5.

Mr. Calvert to Mr. Eden.—(Received August 25.)

(No. 229. Confidential.)

Sir,

Jedda, August 1, 1936.

I HAVE the honour to submit herewith the Jedda Report for July 1936.

2. Copies have been distributed as in the list in paragraph 41 of the report for January, with the exception that the Commander-in-chief, East Indies Station, has now been omitted from the distribution list at his request.

I have, &c.

A. S. CALVERT.

Enclosure in No. 5.

JEDDA REPORT FOR JULY 1936.

I.—Internal Affairs.

232. July was a comparatively uneventful month. The King and Amir Saud remained at Riyadh; Amir Feisal as usual at Taif.

233. The Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Finance were actively engaged during the first part of the month in negotiating at Taif the Red Sea oil concession with representatives of Petroleum Concessions (Limited) (*vide* paragraph 239), shortly after the conclusion of which Sheikh Yusuf Yasin was at last able to leave Jedda for Riyadh. Sheikh Abdullah Suleyman remains here, however, and will be available for the transaction of business on more important questions with His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires.

234. The internal situation was one of unbroken tranquillity, as far as was known in Jedda. The Saudi Minister in London early in July informed the Foreign Office, in the course of conversations regarding present events in Palestine (paragraph 247 below), that Ibn Saud had received reports that certain tribal elements in Saudi Arabia (it was not stated which) were threatening to take action and demonstrate on behalf of the Arabs in Palestine. Nothing was heard in Jedda of any such tendency, in respect of which, it was added by Sheikh Hafiz Wahba, Ibn Saud had issued orders to local Governors that any further developments were to be suppressed.

235. (Reference paragraph 206.) No announcement has yet been made here concerning the new Amir of Tebuk, but Major Glubb, in a recent intelligence report, stated that the name of the new official had been given as Saud-bin-Sad-al-Hedhlul.

236. There is little to report concerning the embryo Saudi air force. Early morning training proceeded daily until about the 18th, when it was stated the centre of activity had been transferred to Taif. This is, of course, in accordance with the practice of the past year or two. Further subscriptions for the purchase of machines to bear the names of the four principal towns of the kingdom were announced in the press from time to time during the month.

237. The work of the Saudi-Arabian Mining Syndicate continues to progress. It is understood that one of the main preoccupations of the moment concerns the effort to find an adequate water supply at the Mahd-adh-Dhahab to enable operations to go forward. Water has not yet been tapped in any quantity, and boring has not gone beyond 100 feet, whilst the syndicate are prepared to drill to 2,000 feet for, to quote an official of the syndicate, "no water, no mine." It is of interest to mention that the same official related that as the American drillers and machinery had not proved altogether satisfactory, two British drillers had been sent out and had already been able to improve considerably on the efforts of the Americans. British machinery is now also being installed. There have been a number of new arrivals, but as some of these pass through Jedda for the mine without stopping, it is difficult to keep check on all the syndicate's personnel.

238. It was reported towards the end of the month that 250,000 rials, entirely half and quarter pieces to a value of £13,000, of the old currency now being superseded, had been shipped to London via Suez on or about the 26th. A similar amount is expected to be shipped by the next Khedivial ship.

239. As related at paragraph 210 of last month's report, negotiations over the Red Sea oil concession took place at Taif. They lasted until the 10th July, when the *Umm-al-Qura* announced the successful conclusion of the discussions and the negotiators returned to Jedda. The concession is for the whole of the Red Sea coast of Saudi Arabia to a depth of 100 kilom., and includes the Farsan and other islands and territorial waters, but excludes the area between Rabigh and Lith (very possibly in deference to Islamic sensitiveness over foreign penetration into the Holy Land). Mr. Longrigg, who, with M. Mudarris, left Jedda on the 12th July, anticipated that Petroleum Concessions (Limited) would open an office in Jedda later in the year. M. Biraud, who is now thought to have been the only French oil representative here since no other Frenchman has come to light, was seriously ill at Taif and, in consequence, took no part in the negotiations. He died suddenly two or three days after his return to Jedda (paragraph 254 below). The Saudi Government made a further announcement respecting the concession by publishing in the *Umm-al-Qura* of the 31st July the Royal decree confirming the result of the negotiations at Taif, and ratifying the agreement, which was to come into force from the date of the publication of the decree.

240. (Reference paragraph 212.) The Saudi Government replied to the Legation's enquiry concerning the surtax of 6 centimes on all telegrams that it had been imposed under the terms of article 30 of the Madrid Convention of 1932, and that it had been in force since the 13th February, 1936. It is typical of Saudi administrative methods that no public announcement should have been made on the introduction of this surtax.

241. (Reference paragraph 230 of last report.) It now appears that on the 27th January last the Saudi Government addressed the French Government, through the French Legation here, a note in which they declare their readiness to ratify the International Sanitary Convention of 1926, of which Saudi Arabia is already a signatory, if other Governments concerned would agree to this being done on the basis of numerous reserves (*vide* paragraph 245 of the report for October 1934). The matter is now being studied by the Governments concerned. Meanwhile, the *Umm-al-Qura* of the 31st July announces that Dr. Mahmoud Hamdi Hamouda, the Saudi Director-General of Public Health, has left for Europe to attend, as usual, the October meeting of the International Health Office at Paris.

242. Among other movements of officials reported were the departure of Sheikh Hamad as Suleyman of the Ministry of Finance and brother of the Minister of that department, for Egypt, and of Sheikh Khalid Abdul Walid and Sherif Muhammad Sharaf Ridha for Riyadh, of whom the former was one of the Saudi negotiators at Taif over the Red Sea oil concession.

243. There have been sundry announcements during the month concerning the "piastre" scheme, initiated last year, but which appears now to have been put on a new basis, also of an even more ambiguous project entitled "The Arab

Saving and Economy Company," whose objects are successfully concealed in imposing statutes consisting of forty-four articles.

244. Education has received some attention this month. The press announced, *inter alia*, that the Department of Education had decided to establish a school for the preparation of students who were to proceed to Egypt on special courses of study. The appointment of Sheikh Abdul Hamid Hadidi as inspector of schools was published, and the establishment of a semi-educational institution in the form of a "club for gymnastics" was also an item briefly recorded.

II.—Frontier Questions and Foreign Relations in Arabia.

245. On the 1st July the Saudi Arab Government informed the Legation that the Amir of Tebuk had reported that on the 24th June, at 7 A.M., two aeroplanes from Transjordan flew over Saudi territory in the neighbourhood of Alqan. The note made an official protest and asked for an investigation and punishment of those guilty of the trespass. The Government of Transjordan in due course replied that although on the date mentioned two R.A.F. machines flew near the frontier in the Rum area, they were careful not to cross the frontier. The assurance that every precaution is taken to avoid violation of the frontier was renewed, and at the same time attention was called to the ease with which the actual position of aircraft flying at a height can be misjudged.

246. Sheikh Yusuf Yasin informed Mr. Calvert on the 11th July of his desire to return to Riyadh as early as possible, and in the same breath mentioned the forthcoming visit of Seyyid Nuri-as-Said to Riyadh for the purpose of exchanging ratifications of the Saudi-Iraqi Treaty and his (Sheikh Yusuf's) desire to be present. It was assumed from this that Nuri would be visiting Riyadh very shortly, but it was later gathered from Bagdad that the visit will not take place until October or November next.

247. Events in Palestine have been given considerably more attention by the Saudi authorities since reference was made to this subject at paragraph 216 of the last report. Ibn Saud instructed his Minister in London to approach His Majesty's Government with the suggestion that, if agreeable to them, he would take the initiative in concerting action with the rulers of Iraq and the Yemen to urge on the Arabs of Palestine the advisability of the cessation of disturbances. Later this was extended to include the ruler of Transjordan. Sheikh Hafiz Wahba represented Ibn Saud as being inundated with requests from all sides to intervene on behalf of the Arabs of Palestine, and even asserted that the bedouin of Saudi Arabia had threatened to make sympathetic demonstrations (what form these might take is a little difficult to imagine), but these were being sternly held in check. In the event, the Kings of Iraq and the Yemen agreed to co-operate with His Majesty's Government, subject to certain conditions concerning the cessation of immigration, which His Majesty's Government found it difficult to accept. Ibn Saud, less insistent than the others, expressed the hope that immigration would be suspended, but, on receiving the views of His Majesty's Government, agreed to continue to exercise moderating influence on Arab opinion.

248. Locally, the Mecca press has very largely confined itself to publishing lists of donations and totals subscribed in the several towns of the Hejaz for the relief of Arab sufferers in Palestine. The *Saut-al-Hejaz* of the 21st July announced that a sum of £E. 500 had been remitted to Palestine for distribution amongst the afflicted. Arabic broadcasts from Jerusalem are now received here in satisfactory condition.

III.—Relations with Powers outside Arabia.

249. On the 17th July Sheikh Yusuf Yasin telephoned to the Legation to enquire concerning the attempt of the day before on the life of King Edward, and expressed his horror at the outrage. His enquiry was suitably acknowledged by the same means.

250. Mr. Calvert had meetings with Sheikh Yusuf Yasin on the 11th and 16th July, when a number of subjects were discussed, including the Red Sea oil concession, Transjordan-Nejd frontier, the forthcoming exchange of notes respecting the prolongation of the Treaty of Jedda, and two other subjects which will be given separate mention in the following two paragraphs.

251. (Reference paragraph 217.) The Koweit draft regulations were sent to Sheikh Yusuf on the 9th July by personal letter. Upon his return from Taif

he took up the question generally with His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires, expressing the personal opinion that the regulations were satisfactory, but would have to be studied further by the King and his advisers. He appeared to find the absence of any provision for checking smuggling from Koweit via Iraq a matter of difficulty. Mr. Calvert, on the 16th July, informed him that such smuggling was not the concern of the Government of Koweit, but added that he understood that the Government of Iraq had instituted for the past year special anti-smuggling measures on the Koweit-Iraq frontier. Sheikh Yusuf continued to cast about for other difficulties to raise, but finally agreed to the suggestion that he should first consult Ibn Saud.

252. The second question related to the protest by the Iranian Government against the Bahrein Transit Dues Agreement (paragraph 218). Sheikh Yusuf stated that his Government had received the protest through the Iranian Minister in Egypt (who is also accredited to Ibn Saud), and read over the text to Mr. Calvert. He similarly read out the terms of the Saudi Government's draft reply and asked for observations. Mr. Calvert made certain comments, but further views are being sought from His Majesty's Government, to whom the matter has been referred. It was interesting to hear so cautious a person as Sheikh Yusuf Yasin express the view, at the close of the conversation, that the Iranian claim to Bahrein was rather a "joke," and confess to being highly amused whenever he heard it advanced.

253. The *Saut-al-Hejaz* announced on the 14th July that the Egyptian Government had decided to raise their representation here from a consulate to a Legation, and that Abdurrahman Azzam, who is already accredited to Iraq and Iran, was to be Chargé d'Affaires in addition to his other capacities.

254. The French Legation are understood to be having some difficulty with the Saudi authorities over the effects of M. Biraud (paragraph 239), which the Saudis wish to examine. It is believed that the Saudis are in possession of the baggage, but that the French have the keys.

255. The Dutch Legation is still in charge of the Javanese vice-consul, who left on an official visit to the Yemen on or about the 9th July.

256. The Italian Chargé stated towards the end of the month that he had recently had three or four cases of the repatriation of ex-slaves to Ethiopia. Enquiry elicited the fact that the individuals concerned are Ethiopians enslaved in this country, but freed here by their owners before being repatriated by the Italian Legation. Signor Persico quoted the case of a benevolent old Javanese master, who not only freed his slave, but handed £40 to the Italian Legation to defray the cost of repatriation. Signor Persico declared that whilst the Eritrean authorities made no difficulties over cases of the sort, it was far otherwise with Italians who wished to go to Eritrea. A member of his colony here, who had recently proposed to go to Asmara, was refused permission on the grounds that he had not definite employment to go to in Eritrea with a company who had formally asked for permission for him to enter the country. This stringency is apparently designed to obviate unemployment in Eritrea.

IV.—Miscellaneous.

257. After an unusually cool May and June temperatures began to climb, particularly towards the end of July, when, with a southerly wind blowing, minimum night temperatures, for example, reached 87½ degrees. It can now definitely be said that "Summer is i-cumen in."

258. The first two ships for the next Haj will leave Singapore, according to the *Umm-al-Qura*, on the 8th October and the 2nd November, with Javanese pilgrims.

259. A Turk, said to have come from Ethiopia and there to have been chauffeur to the Negus, arrived on the 26th July in search, it is said, of employment.

260. The position as regards the manumission of slaves by the Legation during July was as follows:—

On hand at the beginning of the month: 2 males.
Took refuge in July: 2 males, 4 females.
Manumitted and repatriated: Nil.
Locally manumitted: Nil.
Left voluntarily: 1 male.
On hand at the end of the month: 3 males, 4 females.

261. A slave of Abyssinian origin, claiming to have been born at Addis Ababa, took refuge with the Legation. As repatriation in the present circumstances of Ethiopia appeared likely to present difficulties, telegraphic correspondence with Addis Ababa and the Foreign Office took place, but it was eventually unnecessary to come to a decision in this particular case as the man left the Legation premises voluntarily towards the end of the month, whilst the matter was still under consideration.

[E 5367/27/25]

No. 6.

Mr. Calvert to Mr. Eden.—(Received August 25.)

(No. 233. Confidential.)

Sir,

Jedda, August 3, 1936.

I HAVE the honour to submit herewith the annual report on the pilgrimage to the Holy Places of the Hejaz for the year 1936. It has been prepared on the same lines as the report for 1935, enclosed with my despatch No. 223 of the 4th August, 1935.

2. I should like once again to record my appreciation of the excellent work of the pilgrimage officers of the Legation, from whose exhaustive reports this general survey has been compiled. The intimate knowledge and an experience extending over many years of pilgrimage affairs of Khan Bahadur Ihsanullah, the Indian vice-consul, have been invaluable, and my thanks are also due to Haji Abdul Majid, the Malay pilgrimage officer, Dr. Abdul Hamid, the Indian medical officer, and Mr. C. Ousman, pro-consul, for their most useful contributions to the report. I am indebted to their respective staffs, in particular to Shah Jehan-al-Kabir, principal assistant to the Indian vice-consul, for much laborious work undertaken in typing this report.

3. As in the past, copies of this despatch and enclosure are again being sent only to the Government of India (Foreign and Political Department), the Government of India (Department of Education, Health and Lands) and the Government of the Straits Settlements. It will doubtless be circulated in print to other authorities interested in the pilgrimage.

I have, &c.

A. S. CALVERT.

Enclosure in No. 6.

Report on the Pilgrimage of 1936 (A.H. 1354).

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(1) Introductory and General.

NOTHING has occurred, in the twelve months since the last report was written, to disturb the general serenity of the internal situation in Saudi Arabia. Neighbourly relations have been maintained with adjacent States: with the Yemen, delimitation of the frontier provided for in the Treaty of Taif was carried out by a joint commission; with Iraq, relations became ever more cordial and were cemented by the conclusion of a Treaty of Arab Brotherhood and

Alliance, signed at Bagdad on the 2nd April, 1936; with Transjordan, a visit by Amir Saud, on his return from his European tour, to Amir Abdullah served to emphasise the improvement in general relations in the north-west. Ibn Saud also successfully placed his relations with Egypt on a more regular basis by the conclusion of a treaty with that country, signed at Cairo on the 7th May, 1936, by which, although difficult questions, such as that of the Sacred Caravan, were postponed, important matters of concern to pilgrims and the Moslem world generally were dealt with (*vide* paragraph 14). The Italo-Ethiopian dispute, in which the Saudi Government assumed an attitude of neutrality, cast its shadow over the latter part of the year—its influence on the pilgrimage generally is discussed later in this report.

2. The visit of the heir apparent to Europe, referred to at paragraph 2 of last year's report, was one of the more interesting events of the summer of 1935. During His Royal Highness's stay of some five weeks in London, conversations with Fuad Bey Hamza were held at the Foreign Office on a number of questions of common interest. Sir Andrew Ryan continued these discussions later in the year, both at Riyadh, where he paid a memorable visit as the guest of Ibn Saud, and at Jedda.

3. The Saudi Arab Government, in the enjoyment of tranquillity, internal and external, were thus able to devote their attention even more closely to questions concerning the pilgrimage. Unable this year to predict a "Haj-al-Akbar," or a Friday Haj, and desirous of reinforcing the efforts of mutawwifs, and other agents, in their efforts to recruit larger numbers of pilgrims from abroad, the Government announced, as was anticipated in last year's report (*vide* paragraphs 17 and 129), a reduction of 25 per cent. in the pilgrim tariff for 1936. This reduction will be examined more closely in a later section (paragraphs 113 ff.), but broadly the reduction was effected in respect of transport charges only, other items, *e.g.*, mutawwifs dues being slightly increased.

4. The energetic Minister of Finance, under whose aegis all pilgrimage matters come, visited Egypt, now an important theatre of propaganda for the Haj, and was reported to have utilised the wireless for broadcasting purposes on occasion. As a result of all this propaganda, and in spite of the influence of the Italo-Ethiopian war, which aroused certain misgivings as to the safety of travel in the Red Sea, the number of overseas pilgrims, including those who travelled in motor vehicles by the overland route via Iraq, was 33,830, as against 33,898. This may be considered to be very satisfactory in view of the adverse factors already described, but the Saudi authorities were disappointed, having expected a larger pilgrimage than last year as a result of the 25 per cent. reduction in the tariff.

5. Pilgrimage Day, the 9th Dhu'l Hijja, fell this year on Tuesday, the 3rd March. The congregation on Arafat numbered some 60,000, inclusive of all elements, according to Legation estimates, 10,000 less than last year. The decrease can be chiefly attributed to a drop in the number of Yemenis and pilgrims of other and poorer nationalities, as well as to economic distress in this country. For the first time the Saudi Government omitted to publish their estimate of the number of the congregation "standing" on Arafat.

6. Climatic conditions were excellent, and the general health was good. There was a welcome shower of rain, which served to reduce the temperature and lay the dust. Health conditions deteriorated after the Haj (*vide* paragraph 56 below).

7. Due perhaps to the incident during the 1935 pilgrimage, when an attack was made on the life of Ibn Saud (*vide* paragraph 8 of last year's report), Ibn Saud was reported to be circumspect in his movements. The Holy Haram was cleared of all foreign nationals when Ibn Saud, well attended by guards and soldiers, performed the circumambulation of the Kaaba. Even the "Sai," which it is customary to perform on foot, running, between the two hills of Safa and Marwa, was performed by the King in a well-guarded motor car.

8. There was little change evident in the general economic situation. The slight signs of improvement noticed last year were hardly maintained, and the chronic causes of complaint in the Hejaz, in regard, for example, to dilatoriness in payment of official salaries, and the exaction of payment to Government in gold at advantageous rates, endured. Trade received little fresh stimulus, and well-to-do pilgrims were scarcer than the year before. No further attempt was made by the Saudi Arab Government to reduce their foreign indebtedness, although

current liabilities continued to be met. There were satisfactory falls of rain, and in consequence good grazing, particularly in northern districts. Prices, however, showed a tendency to fluctuate upwards owing to panic created by the Italo-Ethiopian crisis, and increased customs dues on tea and sugar (see under "Customs," below) also bore hardly on poorer consumers. The sale of a number of camels, stated to be about 1,000, to the Italians in Eritrea, at a fancy price brought a small but welcome addition to the Saudi revenues, and to camel dealers. Distress remained severe in Medina, but was alleviated by the final distribution of the Egyptian wheat, and some cash, to which a reference was made at paragraph 12 (a) of last year's report.

9. The California Arabian Standard Oil Company made further progress in Hasa, but their activities proved less immediately beneficial to the Hejaz than those of the Saudi Arabian Mining Syndicate, whose operations have given employment to townsfolk and bedouin alike. Amongst other projects initiated or proposed during the year, the following deserve mention:—

- (a) The Nizam of Hyderabad has expressed the desire to supply electricity for the Holy Mosque of Medina, and representations have been made to the Saudi Government to this end.
- (b) A concession has been granted to a local Arab firm for the supply of electricity to Jedda.
- (c) Proposals have been made by the Banque Misr to carry out certain works of a beneficial nature in the Hejaz.
- (d) The piastre project, described in paragraph 11 (b) of last year's report, appears to have made little further progress. Under the auspices of the Ministry of Finance, however, several companies have been floated, e.g., The Printing and Publishing Company, whose shares are held in a limited and influential circle.
- (e) Nothing further was heard about the establishment of a charitable dispensary at Medina, mentioned in paragraph 12 (c) of 1935 report.

10. (*Vide* paragraph 13 of last year's report.) A shortage of silver currency became apparent in the summer of 1935, and during the period May to December, about 2 million rupees were imported by the Saudi Government from India. This was followed by a further development, for early in 1936 the Saudi Ministry of Finance placed an order with Banque Misr for 1 million new riyals to be minted in Birmingham. The new coins arrived in May and June 1936, and proved to be similar in size and silver content to the Indian rupee. They were to be stabilised at 20 to the English gold pound, and their appearance caused a temporary flurry in the market. New and old riyals circulate side by side at the time of writing, but old half and quarter riyal pieces are being withdrawn as from the 23rd June, 1936.

11. The aeronautical society, mentioned in paragraph 14 of last year's report, collected subscriptions from leading pilgrims. The ten Hejazi student pilots returned from Italy in 1936 and were acclaimed as "Eagles." They are still under instruction and fly daily in the machines presented by the Italian Government. Latterly, funds were being raised for the purchase of four aeroplanes, to bear the names of Mecca, Medina, Jedda and Riyadh, whilst the French and the Italian Governments have presented the Saudi Government with one and three aeroplanes respectively. The Banque Misr were reported to have obtained permission for an air service between Egypt and Jedda, and Jedda-Medina. Both the California Arabian Standard Oil Company and the Saudi Arabia Mining Syndicate employ an aeroplane for their own purposes.

12. (*Vide* paragraph 15 of last year's report.) Further Saudi exiles returned to the Hejaz during the period under review, some of whom have been given important Government posts.

13. The activities of Indian and other propagandists (see paragraph 16 of last year's report) appeared to be more vigorous during the year. Muhammad Khan Ghazi Khan, and his lieutenant Choudhury Muhammad Amin of Amritsar, were prominent, as of course was Ismail Ghuznavi, though the relations between these two parties were thought to have become embittered. One particularly pernicious report was published in India to the effect that Ibn Saud had invited 1,000 Indians to make the pilgrimage as his guests, and had promised to pay all expenses from landing to re-embarkation. This was taken up by the organisers

of the Khaksar movement, encouraged by Ismail Ghuznavi and probably other seditionists, and the propagators of the lie persisted in it for a time, though an official Saudi *démenti* was eventually published. Dr. Shafi Ahmed of Delhi again came on Haj, but is believed to have returned home without the solatium he had come to receive. Indeed, Ismail Ghuznavi appeared to be the sole Indian recipient of Saudi monetary favours, and the Indian vice-consul expresses the belief that Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman showed a tendency to cultivate influential Egyptians, Syrian and other pilgrims to the neglect of those from India.

14. During the year a notable improvement in Saudi-Egyptian relations has taken place, culminating in the conclusion of the treaty already noticed at paragraph 1. Amir Saud visited Egypt for a day or two on his return from his visit to Europe, and Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman also visited Egypt, where he was handsomely entertained by the Banque Misr. Talaat Pasha Harb again came to the Hejaz before the Haj, and was reported to have secured for Banque Misr the right to collect from intending Egyptian pilgrims all Saudi pilgrim dues, transport charges, &c., and to settle these charges direct with the Saudi Ministry of Finance. He was also stated to be interested in other projects, e.g., the Jedda-Medina air service already mentioned, water and electricity supply and perhaps roads, though he considered these to be too expensive to make at present. By the Saudi-Egyptian Treaty, the following matters of pilgrimage interest were dealt with, viz., the Saudi Arab Government agreed to the reconditioning by the Egyptian Government of the mosques at Mecca and Medina, and to their undertaking other works in the interest of pilgrims, including road construction, the lighting of the mosques and the provision of water.

15. In this friendly atmosphere and as a result of the vigorous propaganda carried out by the Banque Misr, fears engendered by the Italo-Ethiopian war proved no deterrent to Egyptian pilgrims, whose number increased from 5,361 last year to 5,723 this. Amongst a number of distinguished personages from Egypt was Princess Khadija Abbas Halim, who arrived by the steamship *El Kawasir*, but flew to Medina from Jedda the day after the Haj, and returned to Egypt by air, but had to put in the regulation period of quarantine at Tor. This was the first occasion of its kind in the annals of the pilgrimage, and it is noteworthy that a pilgrim could thus return home after completing the Haj, when other pilgrims were still awaiting at Mecca the permission of the Saudi Government to proceed to Jedda to sail for their respective countries. The Banque Misr Navigation Company again provided two large barges for the conveyance of their pilgrims between ship and shore. Unlike last year, this arrangement proved satisfactory, specially on one occasion when the sea was very rough and ordinary dhows were unable to remain alongside the ship in the outer harbour. This year, a steam launch was used to tow the barges from the outer harbour to nearer the quarantine quay, whence local launches were employed. The Banque Misr were stated to have decided to open their hotels in Medina also, but this development may be expected to await the next pilgrimage.

16. Although objections were not raised to the visit of non-Moslems to Taif (*vide* paragraph 19 of last year's report), the attitude of the Saudi authorities grew more restrictive as regards the Moslem members of foreign missions. The curtailment of this privilege, to which no objection was taken in the past, may be partly due to an incident which occurred recently when the Afghan Minister rented a house at Taif for the season. A somewhat aggravated misunderstanding arose and the house was taken away from him for the accommodation of a relative of the Viceroy, Amir Feisal (*vide* paragraph 163).

17. There was no halt in the rush of Saudi "legislation." The more important items, from the pilgrimage point of view, were the regulations regarding foreign dispensaries, doctors, compounders, &c., by which a measure of Saudi control was introduced in respect of these institutions and their personnel (see paragraph 67 below); revised regulations regarding the practice of medicine, dentistry, midwifery, &c., were introduced; pharmaceutical chemists and sanitary affairs generally received legislative attention; and a "National Humane First-Aid Society" was established. Little or no consequences appear to have followed the communiqué respecting the International Sanitary Conventions of 1926, noted at paragraph 20 of last year's report.

18. No improvement was noticed in the local quarantine station. A certain obstructiveness in the attitude of local officials was evident in respect of visits by officials of foreign Legations to incoming pilgrim ships. The Indian vice-

consul and the Indian medical officer report that they were hampered in their access to these ships in consequence. Some interest attaches to an article which appeared in the Saudi press in June 1936, in the guise of an appeal to the Egyptian Minister of Health, attacking the International Quarantine Board and its arrangements for the Haj.

19. There was not this year the same tendency to exploit the pilgrimage as a platform from which to ventilate political grievances (*vide* paragraph 21 of last year's report). Nevertheless, the presence of numerous Arab and other Nationalist leaders, newspaper editors and the like, no doubt resulted in a fairly extensive exchange of views. The unofficial Saudi mission to Palestine and India, referred to in that paragraph, did not in the end leave this country. A meeting was reported of a body styled "The Young Men of Saudi Arabia" at Muna during the Haj, which is stated to have been attended by representatives of all nationalities except Indians.

20. A technical conference, attended by British, French and Saudi representatives, was held at Haifa in October 1935, to consider matters connected with the reconditioning of the Hejaz Railway, as a through line to Medina. The conference adopted five resolutions, but the concrete result was small owing to difficulties over the question of expense of reconditioning.

21. No Japanese came on Haj this year, though three of the four who came last year were reported to have got as far as, but no further than, Egypt.

22. Strict rules were adopted early in 1936 to prevent occidentals professing Islam from going to Mecca without satisfying the authorities that they had been practising Moslems for a stated period. These rules were modified later by Ibn Saud himself, and it was proposed for the future to require pilgrims of this kind to spend three months in Jedda under tutelage of a religious committee. An American woman named Mrs. Sterling, who arrived in February, was refused permission and left some weeks later. Mr. Abdur Rahman MacBryan, an Islamised Briton, of whom more at paragraph 182, was given permission at the last moment before the Haj. Two other European Moslems, a Hungarian and a Pole, came to notice this year and performed the pilgrimage.

23. Besides the hotels of the Banque Misr, those of the Government were fully booked during the season. The rest houses on the road were not patronised, and, as usual, the Government opened their hotel in Medina. No other developments, either in respect of the scheme of Sir Nizam Jung or others, came into being this year. The Hejaz motor service underwent a radical change after the last pilgrimage season, as was foreseen in the 1935 report (paragraph 94). Individual private companies were required to surrender their vehicles at a valuation for amalgamation into one single corporation, in return for shares in the combine. The assessment was carried out by the directors of the corporation, amongst whom were some of the motor owners themselves. Many owners were reported to have suffered owing to irregular assessment, and there was no provision for appeal against it. Actual transport arrangements under the corporation proved unsatisfactory, and pilgrims were often faced with hardship on the Mecca-Jedda road, where vehicles were unduly delayed owing to, *inter alia*, shortage of petrol. Greater difficulties were experienced by pilgrims travelling to Medina, where a considerable number were held up for days on the road. Touring cars occasioned unusual difficulties, as they were too few, were inadequately equipped and badly repaired. Spare vehicles were maintained as usual, but the assistance rendered to the pilgrims, Khan Bahadur Ihsanullah reported, lacked sympathy and goodwill, and he compared general arrangements unfavourably with those of pre-corporation days. The mismanagement of the corporation culminated on the evening before Arafat Day in an apparent breakdown of the service, for although they had paid motor hire in advance several days before the Haj, many distinguished Indian pilgrims were unable to obtain vehicles for their conveyance to Muna. Interested persons, however, were not wanting in eulogising to the King the success of the corporation in affording comfort and convenience to the pilgrims. A report on the mismanagement of the corporation, in which embezzlement of the funds was alleged, was submitted later on to the King. A half-hearted attempt was made to repair certain of the worst portions of the Mecca road, branches of trees and plants being used, with a covering of earth. The Medina road was the scene of many mishaps, which were aggravated by heavy floods. On this road, shortly before the Haj, serious floods took place and a number of fatalities, involving five Punjabi Indians, two Bahreinis and one

Sudani, were reported to the Legation by the Saudi Arab Government, in response to an official enquiry. Other pilgrims were also held up, and were detained two to four days without food near Rabigh. A number of regrettable motor accidents occurred in the year under review. No deaths of British subjects, other than those due to the floods, were reported, though many cases of injury came to notice. The number of accidents was higher than last year, and it was reported that chauffeurs were more than normally reckless in their driving.

24. The overland route between Nejed and Medina was again opened to motor traffic this year. One thousand eight hundred and twenty-nine pilgrims, including about 200 Indians, travelled to the Hejaz by this route. Pilgrims emphasised the excellence of the arrangements made within Iraq. According to the terms of the treaty between the two Governments, Iraqi vehicles were allowed to transport pilgrims as far as Medina only, whence the pilgrims were required to travel in more dilapidated Saudi vehicles. Many leading Indians approached the Saudi authorities concerned to permit them to proceed to their destination in Iraqi vehicles, but they were refused. A relation of the Mir of Khairpur (Sind), who travelled all the way in his own car, was, however, allowed to proceed to Mecca and also to Arafat, &c., in his personal car, on payment of the usual "Koshan" to the Saudi authorities. Further details, as also of other overland routes, will be found below under the section on Internal Transport.

25. The orphanage at Medina (paragraph 24 of last year's report) continued to maintain its reputation and worked satisfactorily. Attempts are being made to amalgamate this institution with the Hyderabad Industrial Institute in Medina in order to reduce expenses of management of the latter, but opposition was, however, encountered from friends of the manager of the Hyderabad Institute. The "Poor House" opened by the Director-General of the Saudi Police Force at Mecca (paragraph 24 of the 1935 report) proved a mixed blessing and a tendency to turn it into a prison of sorts for the poorer classes of Indian pilgrims, especially those who came on foot overland, was reported by the Indian vice-consul. A feature this year was the severity of the Saudi authorities towards poorer pilgrims of all classes, both those coming by sea and overland. Those who could not pay Government dues payable on arrival at Jedda in respect of mutawwifs, &c. (a sum amounting to about 59 rupees), were detained at Jedda for long periods till a few days before Congregation Day at Arafat. A party of Bengali pilgrims, who came by sea, was kept under lock and key at Jedda by the Wakil for non-payment of dues, and was only released when this Legation brought the matter to the notice of the authorities. It was reported that numbers of Somalis and Yemenis, who travelled by overland routes, were arrested at Mecca and deported from the Hejaz by dhow. A party of eleven Indian pilgrims, including a woman, was also returned to Jedda from Mecca, after they had visited the Holy Kaaba, an act which outraged the feelings of Indian Moslems on Haj. This party was kept in the Jedda jail until the Indian vice-consul made unofficial arrangements for their return to Mecca, just before the Haj. A number of pedestrian pilgrims also were turned back on the Medina Road, after they had travelled more than half way. Only those were allowed to continue their march who could pay a sum of about 69 rupees—a new tax but equivalent to the amount of "Koshan" charged for the journey to Medina by camel. Afghans, who also received similar treatment, put up resistance, and a hand to hand fight with the police was reported to have ensued, though without injury to either side.

26. Of the two small steamers of the Arabian Steam Navigation Company mentioned in paragraph 25 of last year's report, one was sold during the year under review. The other plies desultorily up and down the coast.

27. Pilgrimage shipping showed little change except that, rather singularly, a Turkish steamer carrying a few hundred pilgrims from Chinese Turkestan (via Russia) came direct from Istanbul. It is of interest to record that some thirty-eight of these pilgrims, upon appeal to the Legation, who in turn referred to the Government of India, were allowed to return to their country via India. The Egyptian ship *Kawsar* ran aground on a reef at Jedda on the 28th February, but was successfully refloated on the 10th March by a salvage vessel.

28. The value of the riyal remained high during this year's pilgrimage season, at 17 riyals to the gold pound. The Saudi Government have since issued a new riyal, whose value has been fixed by the Government at 20 to the gold pound (*vide* paragraph 10 above). As already noticed the prices of food-stuffs showed an upward tendency.

29. Security was as excellent as in past years. Cases of pilferage occurred at Mecca, Arafat, Muna and Muzdalifa. This was especially the case at Muzdalifa, where pilgrims stay for a portion of the night on their return from Arafat. Hundreds of cases of loss and theft were reported at this place.

30. The King, as usual, gave his annual pilgrimage dinner on the 29th February. Although he was present at Mecca, the Indian vice-consul was not invited to the function this year. The more cordial relations established with the Egyptian Government were emphasised by the latter's representative at Jedda occupying an important place at the dinner. Otherwise, the only other foreign representative present was the Afghan Minister in Jedda. Egyptian nationals, who were shown special consideration, delivered speeches eulogising Ibn Saud. There was nothing new in the King's speech which followed the lines of that of last year. Ismail Ghuznavi interpreted the royal speech in Urdu.

31. With regard to the reforms respecting the pilgrimage to Medina (*vide* paragraph 31 of last year's report), Khan Bahadur Ihsanullah was unable to pursue them this year. But with His Majesty's Minister's permission he had private conversations with Fuad Bey Hamza on matters of pilgrimage concern. It may partly be as a result that Fuad Bey it was understood submitted a scheme to the King, which aimed at the abolition of the various offices of the Sheikhs ul Mutawwifin (who are three in number, i.e., for Indians, Javanese and other Moslems), and the establishment instead of a Director of Pilgrimage, who would be a paid official of the Government (see paragraph 104 below).

32. Though less numerous than last year a number of highly-placed Indian personages attended this year's Haj. Among them were:—

The Hon. Khawaja Sir Nazimuddin, K.C.I.E., of Bengal; his Excellency Amir Abdul Majid Didi, ex-Prime Minister of the Maldive Islands; Captain Nawab Bahadur Abdus Sami Khan of Talib Nagar (Aligarh); Sirdar Bahadur Captain M. Habibur Rahman, C.I.E., of Delhi; Mr. Hafiz Abdul Majid, I.C.S., of the Punjab; Mir Jafar Ali, brother of his Highness the Nawab Ruler of Rampur State (U.P.); and Mir Ghulam Husseyn, a near relation of his Highness the Mir of Khairpur (Sind).

There were also a number of Khan Bahadurs from the North-West Frontier Province, Government officials, non-officials and intellectuals.

33. In addition, other distinguished pilgrims this year were Princess Khadija Abbas Halim, sister of the late Khedive and widow of the late Abbas Halim Pasha; Sheikh Abdus Salam-el-Qureishy, Sheikh-ul-Islam and Minister of Justice in Morocco; Fawwaz-bin-Shaalan; Sheikh Abdullah and Sheikh Hassan, sons of Sheikh Muhammad-al-Khalifa and members of the ruling family of Bahrein; Moulad Pasha of Iraq; Mr. Abdul Wahid, O.B.E., member of council, Kenya, and many leading Egyptian, Syrian and Iraqi nationalists and journalists.

34. Apart from Hasrat Mohani (paragraph 34 of last year's report), who is an annual visitor and travelled this year by the overland route via Iraq, and Ismail Ghuznavi, other Indian agitators who performed pilgrimage this year were Moulana Husseyn Ahmed-el-Madani, Ali Muhammad Mori Baluch, president of the Sind Khilafat Committee, and the "Ahrar" deputation consisting of Moulana Mazhar Ali, M.L.C., of the Punjab and Daud Ghuznavi. Mohammad Khan Ghazi Khan, who is now employed on a propaganda mission in India, also performed the Haj and left again for India.

35. Arrangements for the dispersal of the Indian pilgrimage worked, on the whole, satisfactorily this year, except in regard to the sailings of the steamship *Atari* and steamship *Islami* on the 28th March and the 12th April respectively. Three hundred and fifty pilgrims were left behind on the sailing of the former, and 778 pilgrims arrived at Jedda two days after the sailing of the latter. These pilgrims had to wait here for a period of nearly fifteen days on each occasion. They became a source of trouble to the Legation, demanding maintenance, which was not permissible under the laws in force, as ships arrived just in time to embark them. No compensation allowance was therefore paid by the shipping company to pilgrims for detention at Jedda this year.

36. H.M.S. *Londonderry* (Captain H. B. Jacomb, R.N.) visited Jedda for the Haj week. Twelve Moslem ratings performed the pilgrimage.

37. The Indian vice-consul discovered one forged 10-rupee note at Jedda this year, but could not trace any other specimens either at Mecca or Jedda. The

individual guilty of forging rupee notes in Beirut (*vide* paragraph 25 of the 1933 report) was released from prison this year.

38. At the end of 1935 the Saudi press announced the appointment of an official commission for the "delimitation" of Arafat and Muna. It is believed that the idea is to allot different areas to different nationalities. The work of the commission received the approval of the King, but no effect could be given this year to its decisions. This is promised for the next Haj.

39. The Afghan Minister in Cairo, mentioned in paragraph 39 of last year's report, closed his office in Egypt and took up permanent quarters in Jedda. The Afghan Government deputed an Indian doctor, in their employment, named Dr. Noor Mohammad, for medical work in Mecca (*vide* paragraph 164 below).

40. Foreign residents in this country were not troubled this year so far as the question of landed property in the Hejaz was concerned. But they had to pay a somewhat higher motor fare for the journey to Medina during the non-pilgrimage season, and, in addition, the "Koshan" during that period for the same journey was double that payable by Saudi subjects. Indian chauffeurs were again allowed to work in this country and no objection was raised to their employment as mechanical engineers.

41. As last year, the "Kiswa" or the Holy Cover for the Kaaba was woven locally. It was also reported that a "Kiswa" for the inner portion of the Holy Kaaba was sent by the head of the Bohra community in India.

42. No case of enslavement of pilgrims came to the notice of this Legation during this season, as last year.

(2) Statistics.

43. The following tables give the usual statistical information. The figures given are those prepared by the quarantine authorities, but it should again be pointed out that discrepancies occur between these figures and those supplied from other sources. The official figures given below represent, therefore, the total number of pilgrims who landed at Jedda, Yanbu and Lith (no pilgrims landed at Qunfida this year), during the period the 30th October, 1935, to the 1st March, 1936, viz., 32,423, as against 33,898 for 1935. It may be noted that there was a regular motor service by the overland route from Nejed to Medina (*vide* paragraph 85 below), by which route 1,829 pilgrims were transported to the Hejaz, as against 398 last year. The total number of pilgrims who arrived from foreign countries to the Hejaz in the year under review, either by sea or land routes in motor vehicles, therefore, amounted to 34,252, as against 34,296 in 1935 (made up of 33,898 sea-borne plus 398 overland pilgrims). It will appear from these figures that, in spite of the Saudi Government's announcement of a 25 per cent. reduction in all dues and charges, there was no improvement in the number of pilgrims arriving in the Hejaz during the pilgrimage under report. Table (A) shows the increase or decrease in the number of separate nationalities. From this Indians, Persians, North Africans and Palestinians were less by 2,674; 667; 751; and 663 respectively over the previous year, whilst British Malays, Javanese and Egyptians showed an increase of 289; 548; and 363 respectively over last year.

44. It is worthy of remark that while there was a decrease of 4,188 pilgrims in Indians, North Africans and Palestinians, who are among the wealthier sort, an increase was noted in the number of the following nationals:—

Nationality.	Increase over last year.
West African	1,386
Somali	366
Sudanese	330
Hadhrami	168
Total	2,250

who represent a poorer class of pilgrims, from whom the Saudi Government derive little pecuniary benefit. As an offset to this, the increase in the numbers of Egyptians and Javanese must have brought some compensation to Saudi revenues.

TABLE (A).

Number of Pilgrims arriving by Sea and landing at different Ports of the Hejaz, arranged by Nationality.

Nationality.	1935.	1936.	Landed at—		
			Jedda.	Yanbu.	Lith.
India and Far East—					
Indian ...	11,113	8,439	8,436	3	
Malayan ...	617	906	906		
Dutch East Indies ...	3,992	4,540	4,540		
Chinese and other ...	223	185	172	13	
Japanese ...	4				
Africa—					
North African ...	2,880	2,129	2,105	24	
Egyptian ...	5,361	5,724	5,679	45	
Sudanese ...	866	1,196	1,195	1	
West African ...	1,164	2,550	2,550		
Senegali ...	30	47	47		
Somali ...	37	403	403		
Zanzibari and East African ...	139	25	25		
South African ...	59	42	42		
Abyssinian ...	29	7	7		
Arab countries—					
Syrian ...	718	713	525	187	
Iraqi ...	170	33 ⁽¹⁾	24	9	
Palestinian ...	1,432	769	650	119	
Yemeni ...	491	514	351		163 ⁽²⁾
Hadrami and Adenese ...	284	452	404		48 ⁽²⁾
Hejazi ...	679	500	482	18	
Persian Gulf (including Muscat and Bahrain) ...	105	157	107		50 ⁽²⁾
Miscellaneous—					
Afghan ...	1,707	1,498	1,403	95	
Bokharan ...	523	1,055	1,055		
Persian ...	1,063	396	359	37	
Turkish ...	156	72	54	18	
Seamen of different nationalities ...		22	22		
European countries—					
Yugoslavian ...	43	27	10	17	
Albanian ...	11	22	22		
English ...	2	1	1		
Total ...	33,898	32,423 ⁽²⁾	31,576	586	261

N.B.—⁽¹⁾ Indicates the number of Iraqi who came by sea, as the Iraqi generally travelled by overland route this year.

⁽²⁾ Indicates those who arrived by dhow.

⁽³⁾ In addition to the above number of overseas pilgrims, there were 1,829 pilgrims who travelled by overland route via Iraq, and also returned by the same route. There were also 635 destitute Indian pilgrims, who travelled overland or by dhow, but were returned by ship. There was no report of any large number of pilgrims from Koweit.

TABLE (B).

Number of Pilgrims arriving in the Hejaz by Sea, arranged by Countries of Embarkation.

Country of Embarkation.	1935.	1936.
India and Far East—		
India ...	13,441	10,581
Malaya ...	1,013	1,984
Dutch East Indies ...	3,802	3,745
Africa—		
North Africa ...	2,322	1,940
Egypt ...	8,405	7,598
Sudan ...	1,831	3,820
Eritrea ...	85	201
East Africa ...		
South Africa ...	70	29
Arab countries—		
Syria ...	1,685	1,256
Iraq ...	1	
Yemen ...		3
Aden ...	651	683
Hadramaut ...	199	
Asir (Hejaz) ...	29	
Miscellaneous—		
Turkey ...		322
Europe ...	33	
By dhow from different places but landed at Lith ...	301	261
Total ...	33,898	32,423

TABLE (C).

Number of Pilgrims arriving in the Hejaz by Sea, arranged by Countries of Embarkation.

Flag.	1935.		1936.	
	Number of voyages.	Number of pilgrims.	Number of voyages.	Number of pilgrims.
British ...	66	20,913	61	19,357
Dutch ...	6	3,833	6	3,774
French ...	2	2,685	4	2,364
Italian ...	15	256	14	310
Soviet ...				
German ...	1	29		
Egyptian ...	6	5,852	6	6,035
Turkish ...			1	322
Arabian ...	1	29		
By dhow ...		301		261
Total ...	97	33,898	92	32,423

Notes—

(a) This year no pilgrims landed at Qunfida

(b) The figures given relate to the actual pilgrimage season and not to the whole Arabic year.

(3) Quarantine.

45. Quarantine measures in respect of the overland motor route for pilgrims between Nejef and Medina (paragraph 44 of the 1935 report) showed little change for the better in Saudi Arabia this year. The increased number of pilgrims travelling by this route this year has already been mentioned, but except for the maintenance of a similar quarantine post outside Medina to last year (where quarantine dues and mutawwifs' fees were collected) and the appointment of a Syrian doctor to Hail, no other measures came to notice.

46. The usual quarantine measures were again instituted at Kamaran, Tor and Suakin during the year under review.

Kamaran.

47. The pilgrimage season opened with the arrival of a pilgrim ship from Singapore on the 30th October, 1935, and ended with the departure of the steamship *Akbar* on the 25th February, 1936. During this period, 16,586 pilgrims were dealt with. The introduction of compulsory vaccination and inoculation at the port of Aden proved satisfactory. The director of Kamaran Quarantine Station reported that the health of pilgrims was very good, and with the exception of an Indian member of the crew of steamship *Khosrou*, who was landed with smallpox at Kamaran, where he died, no other case was reported. For the first time in the history of Kamaran, not a single pilgrim was required to be landed at Kamaran for disinfection purposes. Sixteen deaths and one birth were reported on Indian pilgrim ships.

48. It was noticed that the steamship *Rizwani* embarked 256 uninoculated and unvaccinated pilgrims at Hodeida in February after leaving Kamaran for Jedda, where they were treated on arrival.

49. In view of the declaration of the Saudi medical authorities, verified by the Indian medical officer and the representative of the International Quarantine Board, that the pilgrimage was clean, His Majesty's Minister was able to dispense ships returning to India and Malaya from calling at Kamaran. Similar precautions to last year (paragraph 49 of 1935 report) were observed regarding vaccination and inoculation of returning pilgrims. An Indian destitute pilgrim was refused embarkation on the steamship *Alavi* on the 29th May, as he was suspected of being in an infectious condition, and was again refused on the steamship *Jehangir* on the 16th June.

50. In returning Indian pilgrim ships the following cases occurred during the voyage:—

Steamship *Islami*, the 20th March: 1 smallpox; 1 chicken-pox.

Steamship *Akbar*, the 3rd April: 3 chicken-pox.

Steamship *Alavi*, the 10th April: 1 chicken-pox.

Fifty-three deaths occurred on eight homeward-bound Indian pilgrim ships between the 12th March and the 9th May, 1936.

Tor.

51. Returning pilgrim ships, as well as the aeroplane carrying Princess Khadija (paragraph 15), were subjected to the usual detention of three (and in case of the aeroplane five) days. The Alexandria Quarantine Board declared the pilgrimage clean on the 16th March.

Suakin.

52. Pilgrims returning to Africa via the Sudan underwent the usual five days' detention at Suakin. A number of cases of suspected smallpox were rejected by the Khedivial mail ships, but all turned out to be chicken-pox. About fifteen Sudanese contracted smallpox coming from Medina, and, of ten who were admitted to the Jedda hospital, nine died. Those who did not enter the hospital recovered. Telegraphic notification of this outbreak (which did not amount to an epidemic) was given to all British ports of destination of pilgrims, and the period of quarantine at Suakin was for a time increased to fourteen days.

Jedda.

53. No quarantine measures were necessary, or were applied, in respect of pilgrim ships or pilgrims this year. After the pilgrimage was over, the ships arriving from Suez from the 14th June onwards remained in quarantine and their passengers were sent to the local islands, owing to a reported case of plague at Suez.

54. The Port Medical Service was maintained by two doctors, Dr. Yahya Bey and his assistant, Dr. Ibrahim Adham. There was again cause for complaint regarding the latter's attitude in respect of the launches of the Legation, which he prevented from going alongside pilgrim ships, whilst the quarantine flag was up (*vide* paragraph 18 above).

55. Dr. Muhammad Saleh again came to Jedda as the representative of the International Quarantine Board at Alexandria.

(4) *Health.**General.*

56. The health of pilgrims and general climatic conditions were as satisfactory as last year. The Indian medical officer of the Legation reported that the health of the local inhabitants was bad during the months of April and May. Malignant malaria was very prevalent and is, at the time of writing, still common. Many deaths have occurred. The algid form of malaria was suspected to be cholera. There were a few cases of mumps among children. Generally, it may be said that health conditions deteriorated considerably after the Haj. The fifteen cases of smallpox amongst Sudanese pilgrims from Medina have already been noticed (at paragraph 52).

Saudi Medical Service.

57. The following is the distribution of medical personnel during the season, based on a list supplied by the Indian medical officer, except for transfers to Mecca for temporary service at the height of the pilgrimage:—

Mecca.—No change (*vide* paragraph 58 of last year's report), except for the addition of one new Syrian doctor. One doctor returned from leave after the pilgrimage.

Jedda.—Four doctors, two at the hospital and two quarantine. One midwife.

Bahra.—A dispensary in charge of a temporary dispenser of doubtful qualifications.

Medina.—One doctor—no change.

Yanbu.—One doctor—no change.

Taif.—One doctor—no change.

Riyadh.—One doctor in place of the royal physician who returned from abroad after the pilgrimage.

Abha.—The Indian Unani doctor who was in Najran last year.

Excluding 2 midwives and the Unani doctor, the total this year was 18, consisting of 13 Syrian, 2 Turkish and 1 Saudi doctors and 1 Syrian dentist. There has been little change in private practitioners and pharmacists (concerning whom legislation was introduced). The Italian doctor was replaced by another, Dr. Fea, whose relations with his Legation appeared to be closer.

58. There has been little development in Saudi hospitals (*vide* paragraph 61 of last year's report):—

Mecca.—The central hospital is undergoing repairs, where a ward is to be named after Amir Saud. The X-ray plant arrived, but is not yet in use. Four students were sent to Egypt to be instructed in the use of X-ray appliances. No surgeon or X-ray specialist was appointed during the year.

Jedda.—Repairs to the hospital still go on. £200 gold was donated for the purchase of beds, but these have still to be acquired. Isolation arrangements are still defective. A quantity of vaccine was imported this year.

Medina.—The project for a new hospital fell through.

Taif.—The hospital under construction is not yet finished.

59. Saudi medical services showed little improvement over last year and were very far from justifying the glowing account of them given by the Director-General of Public Health to the Paris Health Office at the October meeting. A piquant instance of defective supplies and personnel occurred when Sheikh Yusuf Yasin, a determined adversary of foreign Government dispensaries, was obliged to send his little daughter to the Mecca dispensary for treatment for gangrene. Dr. Abdul Hamid prescribed and sent the prescription to the Saudi hospital, but a reply was received to the effect that the required medicines (even glycerine) were not in stock.

60. The formation of the National Humane First-Aid Society has already been referred to (at paragraph 17). In order to secure funds for this society, the reimposition of the 1-piastre stamp tax was suggested. A motor ambulance, the gift of Talaat Pasha Harb, was in service during the Haj week.

61. The following statement of cases treated and deaths in Government hospitals for the twelve months the 1st June, 1935, to the 31st May, 1936, has been prepared by the Indian medical officer from weekly returns published in the local press:—

Disease.	Number of Cases.	Deaths.
Dysentery	3,077	75
Smallpox	113	77
Consumption	264	103
Syphilis	3,059	20
Typhoid	50	35
Chicken-pox	3	1
Puerperal fever	58	44
Leprosy	38	2
Mumps	4	...
Whooping cough	53	11
Dengue	90	...
Influenza	156	5
Diphtheria	2	...
Meningitis	4	3

These figures are given for what they are worth and at best can only give a partial idea of the prevalence of disease in a country so poorly provided with hospitals.

62. Compared with the last year, dysentery and syphilis show a heavy increase, whereas smallpox appears to have diminished, perhaps due to compulsory vaccination. Leprosy, for which there is no special accommodation, shows an increase.

Diseases during the Pilgrimage Season.

63. Smallpox appeared to be less than last year, although a number of cases occurred among the Sudanese (*vide* paragraph 52) and Javanese, but none amongst Indians. Influenzal catarrh was a serious complaint during the actual pilgrimage, and malaria was prevalent as usual. Diarrhoea and dysentery were less common during the pilgrimage days, but cases were numerous amongst pilgrims returning from Medina.

Mortality.

64. The death-rate amongst pilgrims as a whole is estimated by the Indian medical officer to have increased to 0.8 per cent. At Arafat there were three deaths due to senility, and for the three days of the Haj there were about twenty-six deaths, or several less than last year.

General Sanitary Conditions.

65. Dr. Abdul Hamid saw no improvement this year at Mecca, Arafat or Muna. At Jeddah some improvement was evident in the method of keeping vegetables clean, bread and meat well protected. Temperatures were much the same as last year.

Water Supply.

66. There was no change in conditions this year. At Jeddah the Waziria Committee appear to have remained inactive, it is said on account of a controversy between them and the Ain Zubeyda Committee of Mecca. They have issued pamphlets in Urdu with the object of collecting money from Indian pilgrims.

Government of India Dispensaries.

67. Reference has already been made at paragraph 17 above to the introduction of Saudi regulations regarding foreign Government dispensaries and their personnel (also *vide* paragraph 74 of last year's report). The strong insistence of the Saudi Government on their right to regulate by domestic legislation the position of these dispensaries proved difficult to resist, and His Majesty's Government confined their efforts to an attempt to secure improvements in the regulation, a draft of which had been privately communicated to the Legation.

Something, though unfortunately less than was desired, was secured. The regulations were promulgated on the 4th October, and His Majesty's Government agreed to their enforcement in the case of the Government of India dispensaries early in January 1936. The Saudi authorities were still inclined to create difficulties, especially over the opening of the branch dispensary at Mecca, which was delayed, and the issue of permits to certain of the personnel to perform their duties. The Mecca dispensary was eventually opened on the 9th February, and Dr. Abdul Hamid found his reception, on going to see the Director-General of Public Health at Muna, more cordial than for some years past.

68. The Jeddah dispensary remained open as usual throughout the year. Dr. Abdul Hamid went on study leave to the United Kingdom in September, returning the 5th January, 1936, and Dr. Muhammad Khan was left in charge. The annual supply of medicines and stores was received as usual, and after some delay in customs was cleared, no dues being charged.

69. The opening of the Mecca dispensary was delayed until the 9th February, 1936, as explained above. Dr. Hamid Husseyn was in charge as sub-assistant surgeon, and remained until the dispensary closed on the 1st May, 1936. Arrangements in respect of Muna and Arafat followed the usual lines of previous years. At Muna, Dr. Abdul Hamid had to hire accommodation for three days at his own expense.

Cases Treated in the Indian Dispensaries.

70. The total number of cases treated at the Jeddah dispensary from the 1st June, 1935, to the 31st May, 1936, was 41,886, as compared with 43,535 last year. Of these the number of Indian pilgrims treated at Jeddah was 6,380, as compared with 6,841 last year for a similar period of six months. The number of cases treated at Mecca from the 9th February, 1936, to the 30th April, 1936, was 18,331, as compared to 20,306 last year. Patients of any and all nationalities were given free medicines and treatment. During three days at Muna 260 cases were treated.

71. Indoor cases this year totalled twenty-four, as compared with thirty-six of last year. Dr. Abdul Hamid performed 160 major operations, and Dr. Muhammad Khan sixty during the Indian medical officer's four months' absence. Minor operations amounted to 2,640.

72. The following table shows the percentage of the various diseases treated in the Indian dispensaries during the year ended the 31st May, 1936:—

Medical—	Percentage.
(1) Malaria and its complications	40.00
(2) Other fevers and infectious diseases	0.20
(3) Urinary diseases, including syphilis and gonorrhoea	10.80
(4) Digestive troubles	6.34
(5) Circulatory diseases	0.62
(6) Respiratory diseases	3.11
(7) Nervous diseases	0.29
(8) Diseases of the locomotory system	1.55
(9) Women's diseases	2.46
(10) Children's diseases	3.96
(11) Eye, ear, nose and throat diseases	5.57
(12) Deficiency diseases	0.43
Surgical—	
(13) Sinuses, &c.	20.25
(14) Wounds and other contusions	4.03
(15) Hydrocele and hernia	0.09
(16) Cystitis, stone, &c.	0.30
	100.00

73. The practice noted in paragraph 65 of the report for 1933 in respect of a charge of 5 rupees for cost of transport made to patients visited in their own quarters was followed again this year. About forty visits were made free to indigent persons.

Other Foreign Medical Assistance.

74. There was no change this year in the Dutch and Egyptian medical missions, though Dr. Abdul Hamid was much impressed by the up-to-date equipment of the former. A new Afghan doctor arrived, with a stock of medical stores, but was reported to have worked in Mecca for one month only. There was no Russian doctor here this year. An Algerian doctor accompanied the pilgrims from that country.

75. The Italian Legation opened a dispensary in Jedda with one doctor, Dr. Fea already mentioned above, and with accommodation for four indoor patients. The doctor recently left for Rome, and it is rumoured that on his return he will be bringing with him an X-ray plant and nurses for a hospital which it is stated the Italian Government propose to establish in Jedda.

Medical Arrangements on Pilgrim Ships.

76. Medical arrangements were generally satisfactory. The recommendation referred to at paragraph 88 in last year's report has been incorporated in the Indian Pilgrim Shipping Rules.

Publicity.

77. An article by the Indian medical officer on *Medical Hints for Pilgrims* was again published in India, in which it was stressed that doctors and other medical men coming on pilgrimage should not attempt to practise in the Hejaz unless they first obtain a permit from the local Government to do so. Also, the local Government did some publicity work by holding a first aid demonstration before the pilgrimage at Mecca. In addition, when malaria was seriously prevalent at Mecca, three articles on the subject were published by the *Umm-al-Qura*.

Legation Medical Staff.

78. Dr. Abdul Hamid proceeded to the United Kingdom in September on study leave. It is recorded with pleasure that he obtained a well-merited diploma of tropical medicine in the School of Tropical Medicine of the University of Liverpool. There were certain changes in the subordinate staff, all of whom worked with their accustomed zeal.

(5) Internal Transport.

79. As was anticipated in paragraph 94 of last year's report, the King issued a Royal decree sanctioning the amalgamation of the various motor companies into a single corporation. The new corporation consisted of two sections: (a) comprising vehicles surrendered by the companies; and (b) consisting of Government vehicles. Two-thirds of the total number of pilgrims were to be allotted to section (a), and one-third to (b), and they were to work independently of each other and be responsible for their own profit or loss.

80. The first year of the corporation's operations proved so unsatisfactory that after the pilgrimage a considerable agitation was raised against it by the shareholders. A Royal Commission was appointed as a result, and it is reported that its investigations led to stricter enquiry into the accounts. One welcome feature of the new corporation is that an attempt was made to place before the public a statement of its operations, for general information. In brief, the report published by the corporation shows that in the year under review the corporation (including both sections) carried a total of 24,444 pilgrims and others, as follows:—

From Mecca to Medina and back ...	6,062
From Jedda to Medina and back ...	2,226
From Mecca to Jedda (single) ...	4,051
From Jedda to Mecca (single) ...	10,320
From Yanbu to Medina (single) ...	42
From Yanbu to Mecca (single) ...	221
From Medina to Mecca (single) ...	172
(*) From Medina to Mecca and back to Medina	1,350
	<hr/> 24,444

(*) The number of overlanders by the Nejd-Medina route.

The report, however, gave no account of income, expenditure, profit and loss in respect of the Government section of the corporation. Rather surprisingly, a dividend of 12½ per cent. for the year was declared. The following table sets forth the sources of income of section (a) of the corporation:—

	Piastres Miri at 110 to a gold pound.
From pilgrims ...	9,385,204½
From natives ...	534,818½
From Government ...	309,446½
Miscellaneous sources ...	247,089½
	<hr/> 10,476,558

No particulars are afforded in the report of the last item in the statement of income, but it is believed to have been derived from the hiring of vehicles to pilgrims for performance of the "Umra," which would mean that this amount also is derived from pilgrims. It would, therefore, appear that 92 per cent. of the income of section (a) of the corporation was derived from pilgrims.

81. The Indian vice-consul deplures that pilgrims, who were the source of so large a proportion of income, should have their interests and comfort so little studied. The difficulties, and often the hardships, undergone have been mentioned at paragraph 23 above. He is severe in condemnation of the corporation, and insists that minimum requirements should be: (1) that rolling-stock should be properly repaired and adequately equipped; (2) proper arrangements for the comfort of pilgrims should be made in case of accidental detention, &c., on the road; and (3) arrangements should be made for an adequate supply of water, petrol, spare parts, &c., at road stations.

82. On the dispersal of the pilgrimage from Mecca, the Minister of Finance was credibly reported to have granted permission to leave first to those pilgrims who were proceeding to Medina, at the expense of those who, in some cases, had performed the pilgrimage to that sacred city earlier, and who in any case were anxious to leave for Jedda as early as possible. As a result, the pick of the motor transport was taken for Medina, and the sorry remnants left to those from whom, their pilgrimage over, the custodian of the Saudi revenues had less to expect. Additional expense and further delays were a natural consequence for these unfortunates, and Khan Bahadur Ihsanullah draws a moving picture of stranded pilgrims on the Mecca-Jedda road, and, even where all were bound for Jedda, of stalwart Egyptians, Arabs and others ousting weaker brethren from their seats in such motor transport as was available.

83. The proportion of poorer pilgrims was again greater this year, as would appear from the fact that only 10,072 pilgrims, or about 33 per cent., travelled to Medina by motor this year, while the number of Indians alone who visited Medina, either by motor or by camel, can again safely be estimated to be about 60 per cent.

84. The same difficulty was again experienced by well-to-do pilgrims in securing motor transport to Arafat. The charges were the same as last year, viz., £1½ gold a head by bus and £2½ gold a head by car.

Overland Routes.

85. It is pleasing to record that no motor vehicle came with pilgrims from India this year by land all the way. This may be attributed to the fact that the agreement over the Nejd-Medina route prohibits the passage of motor cars conveying pilgrims, other than those of the concessionnaires, who this year were Abbud Shallash and Co. of Bagdad. This route was the only one recognised by the Government of Iraq, who declared in January 1936 that they had adopted the necessary measures to prohibit the transport of pilgrims from or to Iraq via any other overland route; 1,829 pilgrims travelled by car by this route in the year under review, including about 200 Indians. Those who desired to visit Kerbela before the Haj were enabled to do so. Many Indians travelling by this route would have preferred to return home after the Haj by sea from Jedda, but as by Government of Iraq regulation they had been obliged to take return tickets, and as the Iraqi company were not prepared to refund the cost of the return journey, nor the Saudi Government to permit single journeys from

Medina to Mecca by motor vehicles (although the contrary would appear to be indicated in their guide), the pilgrims for the most part were unwilling to incur the loss involved, and so returned to India via Iraq. The fares were as follows:—

					<i>Nejef to Medina and back.</i>
					<i>I.D.</i>
1st class	18/500
2nd class	14/500
3rd class	10/250

Pilgrims were loud in their praises of the comfort of the Iraqi vehicles, and the arrangements made for safety, water supply, &c., within Iraq. In Saudi Arabia security on the road was as good as ever, whilst at Hail a strict examination was made by the Saudi authorities of pilgrims' effects.

86. It was reported that 250 Syrian pilgrims came overland from Damascus by camel, taking one month to reach Medina. Two motor vehicles, carrying Indian pilgrims, also arrived in Mecca direct from Basra via Hasa and Riyadh, in spite, it would seem, of the Iraqi Government's measures referred to above.

87. King Abdul Aziz is believed to be still most desirous of opening overland routes from the Persian Gulf for pilgrim traffic. With regard to the route from Uqair via Riyadh to Mecca, it was reported that the King was anxious to promote the establishment of a motor service on this route, under conditions and terms of a favourable nature. A reference will be made below to destitute pilgrims travelling by this motor route on foot, and also at paragraph 218 to some 200 pilgrims who came overland from Koweit, mainly by camel.

Camels.

88. Saudi officials brought pressure to bear on mutawwifs to induce the pilgrims in their charge to travel to Medina in motor vehicles. As a result, the number of pilgrims who travelled to Medina remained almost the same as that of last year, in spite of the greater number of poorer pilgrims on Haj. The camelmen were recipients of a small share of the hire of their beasts for pilgrim transport to Arafat and Medina, and, accordingly, were reluctant to employ their animals. On the evening before Arafat Day, camels were not available, and mutawwifs had to pay a few riyals from their own pockets to arrange conveyances for their pilgrims. A similar situation arose in respect of camel conveyance to Medina. Further, the Government prohibited the sale by cameleers of "shuqdufs" (litters) to pilgrims, preferable to the latter as being cheaper, and instead fixed a sum of £1 gold for "shuqduf" hire and other expenses, *e.g.*, mats for the litter, wages of servant, &c.

Cabs.

89. The same practice as last year was followed in respect of the use of cabs in the town of Mecca.

Dhows.

90. The arrangement of last year (paragraph 105 of the 1935 report) was again renewed between the Government of India and Messrs. Turner, Morrison and Co. for the conveyance of pilgrims and their luggage between ship and shore and *vice versa*. Though extortion by dhowmen was still practised, fewer complaints were received this year and an improvement in this respect took place. The presence of a representative of the local shipping company to supervise embarkation was useful.

General.

91. No attempt was again made this year to prevent pilgrims from travelling on foot between Mecca and Jedda, but stringent measures were adopted on the Medina road, and hundreds of pedestrian pilgrims were brought back to Jedda from Rabigh. A number of pedestrians were returned to Mecca from very close to Medina. A special police officer was deputed from Jedda, with a posse of constables, to reinforce the police at Rabigh for the control of pedestrian traffic on the Medina road. Those who could pay the sum of 69 rupees were allowed to

continue their journey on foot to Medina (*vide* paragraph 25 above). Pedestrians who attempted to cross Arabia from Uqair on the Hasa coast will be dealt with under "Destitutes" at paragraph 156 below.

(6) Customs.

92. (Paragraph 110 of the 1935 report.) There was no improvement evident this year in regard to smuggling and venality. The Director of Customs at Jedda has caused high walls to be constructed all round the quay, but the evil is difficult to check with a customs staff virtually unpaid for long periods.

93. Indian pilgrims were subjected to a new duty this year. If a party of pilgrims was in possession of more than one bag of rice, duty on the remaining bags was charged at the full rate instead of being exempted as in past years. Javanese pilgrims are exempted from the duty under this head, as they come under an arrangement whereby a maximum sum of 5 piastres miri is recovered from each of them for any amount of rice they carry.

94. Pilgrims experienced some difficulty this year on passing through the Jedda customs on their homeward journey. Unlike previous years, only one door of the customs gate was opened, and at a late hour of the morning, when serious overcrowding took place. Many pilgrims received injuries in the struggle which ensued, and some Afghan pilgrims used force and left the quay without showing their passes.

95. After the pilgrimage season was over the Government announced a further reduction of customs duties on a number of articles, the publication of which would indicate less sensitiveness on the part of the Saudi Government to charges by strict Wahhabis of tolerating the import of articles of luxury. The reduction affected artificial silk, thread, perfume, wood, cement, jewellery and Egyptian rice. On the same day (the 27th March) the Government announced the imposition of a licence system for the importation of tea and sugar. This turned out not to be, as at first thought, a monopolistic development, but in the nature of a disguised surtax (of 1 piastre miri) on these commodities. The tax may be expected to be felt by the poorer classes.

(7) Religious Policy.

96. Committees of virtue existed in name only and their functions were again carried out by the constables. The permission to use radio sets in the coastal towns, mentioned in paragraph 113 of last year's report, was extended to Mecca, but their use was limited to receiving the news bulletins, lectures, religious discourses, &c. Music was to be taboo, but this was observed in the breach. The Crown Prince used a radio set, it is stated, in his residence at Mecca, which was just opposite to the Holy Haram, and pilgrims were not a little surprised to hear the melodious notes of Egyptian singers invade that sacred atmosphere. The Government adventured even further into modernism by allowing music in the army, thereby shocking Indian pilgrims, particularly when music was played in front of the Holy Haram itself, against which they protested to the King.

97. The Nizam of Hyderabad approached Ibn Saud for permission to repair the walls of the cemeteries at Mecca and Medina. The chief engineer of the Hyderabad State, who came here with the special mission of obtaining permission for the installation of electricity in the Holy Haram of Medina, was also said to have tried to obtain permission for the building of a library on the spot where the Holy Prophet was born. The result of his effort was not known. A wealthy Indian merchant also applied to Ibn Saud for permission to build a mosque over the Holy Spot, but was unsuccessful, as the Government stated that they were considering the question of constructing a library there themselves.

98. With all this show of tolerance the Saudi authorities, nevertheless, were as restrictive as ever regarding visits to tombs and shrines. An Indian pilgrim who went to visit "Jebel Tor" (in Mecca) was seriously injured by the Saudi guards on duty. Yet, on the whole, pilgrims had again less reason to complain of excessive religious zeal shown by the Wahhabi authorities. The action of the Saudi authorities in returning a party of Indian pilgrims from Mecca to Jedda for non-payment of dues (already mentioned at paragraph 25 above) was a source of great regret to Indian pilgrims generally.

99. The greater religious tolerance evident did not prevent the occurrence of isolated incidents, as when after the pilgrimage the tomb of a venerated

Yemeni saint, which was within a private house at Jedda, was opened and the body exhumed for reburial in the public graveyard.

100. The attitude of the Saudi authorities to recent converts to Islam is dealt with at paragraph 22 above.

(8) Mutawwifs.

101. The activities of agitators and seditionists like Ismail Ghuznavi and Mohammad Khan Ghazi Khan (*vide* paragraph 122 of last year's report) have unfortunately met with a measure of success, and the good and harmonious relations between the Indian vice-consul and the various Saudi authorities concerned in the pilgrimage have been for the time being prejudiced. The agitators were able to influence Ibn Saud, it is thought, by forwarding to him copies of inflammatory articles published in the Indian vernacular press (these articles often being of their own composition), in which pilgrims, returning from the Hejaz, are described as carrying away the impression that the British authorities here exercised a predominant control in pilgrimage affairs. The Saudi Ministry for Foreign Affairs first took the initiative in raising the question of the black-list system maintained by the Government of India in respect of mutawwifs. The Sheikh-ul-Mutawwifin, joined in the campaign by encouraging mutawwifs and their wakils not to lend themselves to the old practice by which the Indian vice-consul was able to redress many of the grievances of pilgrims by his private efforts.

102. The number of complaints against mutawwifs made by pilgrims was perhaps in consequence larger and of a more serious nature than last year. Articles appearing in such organs of the Indian vernacular press as the *Aman* of Delhi and the *Mukhtoo-i-Alam* of Moradabad, depicted the misconduct of mutawwifs in no uncertain terms.

103. There was undoubtedly a tendency to place obstacles in the way of the Legation in matters connected with the welfare of the Indian pilgrimage, and this tendency may be expected to increase. The Saudi authorities may develop an attack on the following lines: (1) Pilgrims should not be allowed to deposit their return tickets with the Legation; (2) the Legation should not have any connexion with the arrangement of accommodation of pilgrims in homeward-bound vessels; (3) the black-listing system of the Legation should be abolished; and (4) the pilgrims should not be allowed to ventilate their grievances to the Legation, and should any complaint reach them, the Legation should direct the pilgrim to approach the local authorities. This corresponds with the thesis of Ismail Ghuznavi that from the moment of the pilgrims' arrival in Saudi waters till their departure for home, they should have no concern whatsoever with the Legation, and must look to the Saudi Government for help and assistance during their stay in the Hejaz.

104. In contrast to the above, it may be noted that, on the expiry of the Haj, Fuad Bey Hamza, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, sought the advice of the Indian vice-consul on certain matters of pilgrimage reorganisation. His Majesty's Minister assented to this exchange of views, but the ill-health of Fuad Bey and his subsequent departure from the Hejaz limited the scope of the discussions. Khan Bahadur Ihsanullah, however, suggested that the present system of having three Sheikhs-ul-Mutawwifin for Indians, Javanese and other nationals, should be abolished, and in their place a Central Pilgrimage Office should be established, attached to the Saudi Ministry for Foreign Affairs. It is reported that the question of establishing a Central Pilgrimage Office is receiving the consideration of the King, though it may be expected to meet with the united opposition of the three Sheikhs-ul-Mutawwifin.

105. No improvement other than that referred to in paragraph 118 of last year's report took place. Further instances of intrigue to secure agencies were reported. It is more satisfactory to note that wakils generally displayed no opposition to the Indian vice-consul this year.

106. The other recommendation of the Indian vice-consul (paragraph 119 of last year's report) requiring the personal presence of wakils at Jedda to meet incoming pilgrims, was not carried out this year.

107. In spite of the efforts of the Saudi Government, the conduct of the pilgrim guides whilst in India and during the Haj remained as unsatisfactory as last year (*vide* paragraph 120 of 1935 report). Even cases involving the

modesty of Indian women came to the notice of the Indian vice-consul, although they proved difficult to follow up. Some mutawwifs complained direct from India to the Legation against fellow-mutawwifs for improper competition in securing their pilgrims and also to the Saudi Minister of Finance, but action by the Saudi authorities appeared to be confined to the despatch of a cable by the Sheikh-ul-Mutawwifin to mutawwifs in India warning them to behave properly. The procedure regarding the visits of "Sabees" to India remained the same as last year, and though mutawwifs were free to visit India, "Sabees" could only do so as representatives of those mutawwifs who were unable to go in person.

108. The hopes anticipated in paragraph 121 of last year's report were not borne out. Many mutawwifs, it is alleged, paid up to £1 gold or 22-8 rupees to acquire each pilgrim when in India, a significant matter when their income amounts to 26 rupees per pilgrim as prescribed by the tariff, including their share in the Medina transport. Not only do mutawwifs batten on pilgrims, but the Government are themselves severe not only to pilgrims but to mutawwifs, when their revenues are affected, and collect the full amount of dues from mutawwifs, even on account of their destitute pilgrims who are unable to pay. Mutawwifs sometimes are required to pay for the destitute pilgrims of the Sheikh-ul-Mutawwifin, a case in point having arisen this year, when a number of destitute pilgrims arrived in the name of the sheikh, but were allotted by him to different mutawwifs for the payment of Government dues.

109. Despite all, the mutawwifs are still very much alive and active, though they may be in debt and not so contented as formerly. They exploit the pilgrims by various means, including those of appealing to their charitable instincts, and to their religious feelings by the practice of Haj-i-Badhal, whereby quite ordinary articles are invested with great religious value as souvenirs, &c.

110. (Paragraph 124 of the 1935 report.) The payment of dues in advance again was the source of considerable trouble, and it would not be surprising if the Saudi Government were to adopt more stringent measures in future in dealing with this question. The hardship of being detained at Jedda for a considerable time has been referred to at paragraph 25 above.

111. There was no change in the "Taqrir" system. The question of its restoration has, however, been raised by interested parties, who point out to the Saudi authorities that if Moslem countries are divided under the "Taqrir" system and allotted to prescribed mutawwifs, increased revenue would accrue to the Treasury. The matter is now under the consideration of the Government, but in the meantime they have directed mutawwifs to present their old documents granting them the "Taqrir" under the Turkish régime.

112. No attempt could be made to pursue the question referred to in paragraph 126 of last year's report, in connexion with the proposal to have Indians of the Shia faith under the care of the Indian Sheikh-ul-Mutawwifin.

(9) Pilgrimage Tariff and Cost of Pilgrimage.

113. In paragraph 129 of the 1935 report it was anticipated that the Saudi Government would make a reduction of 25 per cent. in their pilgrim tariff for the following year. When it appeared it was seen that the reductions related to charges for transport of pilgrims by motor and camel, as well as on the "Shuqduf" hire. An unfortunate feature, however, was the consolidation of a number of items into one lump sum which was to be paid in advance at Jedda on landing. This year, therefore, no details of the component charges and dues under this one item were shown in the pilgrimage tariff, but in their stead the consolidated amount of £2-6-95 gold was given as representing certain particularised items as for last year, with the addition of tent hire for Arafat. This sum, at the prevailing exchange rate during the season, amounted to about 59 rupees, against about 54 rupees of last year, an increase of about 5 rupees. As a result of the reduction of 25 per cent., the aggregate amount which a pilgrim had to pay was less this year, though the actual reduction was not so great as had been anticipated, and was criticised as it was accompanied by more stringent provisions for collection.

114. Another unfortunate feature of the enforcement of the revised tariff was that the poorer classes of pilgrims, *e.g.*, Sindhis, Afghans and Malabaris, who formerly used to enjoy concessional rates, had the privilege withdrawn this year and were made to pay full tariff alike with other pilgrims. It created considerable

difficulty not only for the pilgrims, but for the Legation. The Government instructed wakils not to allow pilgrims to proceed to Mecca, unless their dues had been paid. It proved difficult for wakils to exercise control, as some pilgrims managed to evade their notice and walked to Mecca. This led wakils to attempt closer supervision, and one of them went so far as to place a party of Bengali pilgrims under lock and key for fifteen days, until released on the intervention of the Legation, as already recorded at paragraph 25 above. Sudanese pilgrims had to pay this year a sum of 141½ piastres miri against a variable but smaller sum last year (*vide* paragraph 194 below).

115. The Legation again prepared this year a tentative estimate of the expenditure likely to be incurred by a pilgrim during his pilgrimage, on the lines of last year, based on the revised Saudi tariff. Ismail Ghuznavi also published a guide in India, in which he stated that a sum of 440 rupees would be required for a third-grade pilgrim travelling in the Hejaz by camel, against the sum of 540 rupees estimated by this Legation for the same grade. The most mischievous feature of his propaganda was in giving a misleading estimate of expenditure for a third-grade pilgrim using buses for transport in the Hejaz.

116. Indian pilgrims, who arrived by the overland route of Iraq-Medina, were not allowed to take single tickets for their journey from Medina to Mecca, though apparently permissible under the regulations contained in the manual published by the Saudi Government. In addition full taxes were collected from them, as in the case of pilgrims arriving at Jedda by sea, including boat hire, coolies' charges, house rent at Jedda, &c.—items which do not arise where pilgrims travelling overland are concerned.

117. Pilgrims who travelled overland on foot via Hasa were detained at Buraida, and were charged a sum of 45 rupees. Pedestrian pilgrims travelling to Medina from Mecca were detained at Rabigh and made to pay a sum of 69 rupees a head before being granted permission to proceed further, though no item on this score was shown in the Saudi schedule of dues and charges.

118. In the past the Saudi Government used to permit pilgrims to travel to Medina direct from Jedda (without visiting Mecca) on payment of the motor hire equivalent to the fare between Mecca and Medina plus the amount of "Koshan" for the journey from Jedda to Mecca. But this year a different and rather curious procedure was adopted, as from the 21st January, in that for the above journey a pilgrim was charged the usual motor hire plus the full motor hire for the journey to Mecca from Jedda. For instance, a pilgrim who visited Medina from Mecca had to pay £7½ gold only, while those who visited Medina from Jedda were to pay £7½ gold for the journey from Jedda to Medina and back plus a further sum of three-quarters of a sovereign for the journey to Mecca from Jedda, *i.e.*, a total of £8½ gold. The Legation was bombarded with enquiries by puzzled pilgrims over this novel procedure.

119. The facilities referred to in paragraph 130 of last year's report again proved of great help to pilgrims.

120. In view of the difficulties created by Indian agitators like Ismail Ghuznavi and others, the Indian vice-consul was unable to pursue the recommendations referred to in paragraph 131 of the 1935 report.

121. The same inability of pilgrims to realise that Saudi dues are fixed in terms of gold was observed this year. The difference between the estimate and the actual amount was very small.

122. Again the published tariff of the Saudi Government did not include the charge for motor transport to and from Arafat. The rates were the same as last year and are given at paragraph 84 above.

123. Transport charges for the journey to Medina in motor vehicles during the non-pilgrimage season were as follows:—

	£ Gold.
For Saudi subjects—	
Koshan from Mecca to Medina and back ...	1
Motor hire for the above journey ...	1½
For foreigners—	
Koshan from Mecca to Medina and back ...	2
Motor hire for the above journey ...	2

The total charges payable by a Saudi subject for the above journey were £2½ gold; by a foreigner £4 gold.

(10) Indian Pilgrimage.

124. The Indian pilgrimage began this year with the arrival of the steamship *Islami* on the 13th November, 1935, and arrivals ended with the steamship *Akbar* on the 27th February, 1936.

125. The following table shows the number of pilgrims from each province of India and from Ceylon, classified according to ports of embarkation:—

British Subjects.

Province.	Total Number of Pilgrims in 1935.	In 1936.			
		Bombay.	Karachi.	Calcutta.	Total.
Bengal and Assam ...	1,121	633	28	362	1,023
Punjab ...	2,537	64	2,273	...	2,337
Bombay Presidency ...	1,739	1,004	53	...	1,057
United Provinces ...	1,579	856	368	7	1,231
Madras Presidency ...	316	181	1	...	182
Sind Province ...	870	1	866	...	867
Behar and Orissa ...	266	250	8	4	262
Central Provinces ...	820	292	68	...	360
Beluchistan ...	226	17	352	...	369
N.W. Frontier Province ...	313	54	237	...	291
Hyderabad (Deccan) ...	736	281	281
Delhi ...	135	34	152	...	186
Burma ...	41	16	16
Nepal ...	16
Ceylon ...	14	5	5
French India ...	1	7	7
Mauritius	13	13
Miscellaneous ...	41	7	20	...	27
	10,771	3,715	4,426	373	8,514

126. The discrepancy between the foregoing total and that given in paragraph 44 above is due to the fact that the figures in that paragraph include Indian pilgrims from embarkation ports other than those in India, and the present statement has been compiled from the lists of pilgrims sent to this post by the various Port Haj Committees in India, whereas those in paragraph 44 have been compiled from information supplied by the quarantine authorities. This table puts the total number of pilgrims from British India, the Native States, Ceylon and other foreign possessions in India at 8,487 (excluding 27 miscellaneous), as compared with 10,730 of last year. In order to facilitate comparison between the number of pilgrims this year and last, the figures for 1935 have also been shown in the above table. It would appear that the arrivals from each province of India, with the exception of Beluchistan, showed a slight decrease this year, whilst the Presidency of Bombay, Central Provinces and Hyderabad State (Deccan) showed considerable decreases in the year under review.

127. The following list shows the number of non-Indian pilgrims who travelled to the Hejaz via Indian ports:—

	1935.	1936.			
		Bombay.	Karachi.	Calcutta.	Total.
Chinese (Turkestan) ...	383	...	500	...	500
Chinese	33	33
Afghans ...	1,668	77	1,029	1	1,107
South Africans ...	3	16	16
Russians (Turkestan) ...	3	...	2	...	2
Persians ...	4	1	1	...	2
Hejaz-Nejd subjects ...	272	106	48	17	171
Malayans ...	2	3	3
Arabs from Persian Gulf ...	44	22	84	...	106
Tibetans ...	6	7	7
Miscellaneous ...	7	14	14
	2,392	279	1,673	18	1,970

128. Any difficulty in reconciling the foregoing figures with those in paragraph 44 above is due to causes similar to those indicated in paragraph 126 above. In order to facilitate comparison between the number of pilgrims this year and last, the figures for 1935 have also been added. Arrivals from Afghanistan showed a decrease, whilst a considerable increase is noticed in the number from Chinese Turkestan. It may also be noted that, besides the above number, a further 322 pilgrims from Chinese Turkestan arrived in the Hejaz by a Turkish steamer direct from Istanbul (reference paragraph 27 above).

129. According to information from the Deputy Naqib of Wakils at Jedda, the numbers of Indian pilgrims who arrived from other than Indian ports, as well as of those who left by other routes, were as follows:—

	Arrivals.	Departures.
Suez	89	34
Port Sudan	29	3
Aden	17	6
South Africa	40
Dutch East Indies and Malaya	13	...
Zanzibar and East Africa	11	...
Beirut	18
Hodeida	13	...
	172	101

In addition to the above, about 200 Indian pilgrims arrived by motor vehicle overland from India via Iraq, and, with one or two exceptions, returned by the same route, and 635 on foot via Nejd, Yemen, Iraq and Palestine, who were repatriated eventually at the expense of the Government of India.

130. The Mogul Line fleet of Messrs. Turner, Morrison and Co. was again the only line engaged in the pilgrimage traffic from India this year.

131. The following table shows the movement of return traffic, with details of the number of ships available on given dates for repatriation of pilgrims, the number of pilgrims awaiting repatriation and the number actually repatriated:—

Dates.	Number of ships in port.	Pilgrims awaiting embarkation.	Pilgrims despatched.	Pilgrims remaining.	Remarks.
1936—					
March 12	4	3,963	1,637	2,326	Rizwani.
March 14	3	2,576	1,394	1,182	Khosrou.
March 17	2	2,130	1,561	569	Islami.
March 23	1	1,627	1,393	234	Akbar.
March 28	1	1,378	1,028	350	Alavi.
April 12	1	1,552	1,552	...	Islami.
April 27	1	1,028	1,028	...	Alavi.
May 9	1	1,026	1,026	...	Jehangir.
May 29	1	257	257	...	Alavi.

132. The following table shows the number of ships run, voyages effected and pilgrims carried by the Mogul Line:—

Outward from India.			Homeward to India.		
Number of ships.	Number of voyages.	Number of pilgrims.	Number of ships.	Number of Voyages.	Number of pilgrims.
6	11	10,466(*)	6	9	10,508(*)

(*) The discrepancy between this figure of pilgrims arriving in the Hejaz and that given in Table (B) of paragraph 44 above is due to the difference between the Quarantine Department and the shipping company in the manner of their enumeration. The former includes all souls including infants, while the latter shows only the number for whom quarantine dues have to be paid.

(*) This figure includes 662 destitutes, who came overland, &c., but returned by steamer at the expense of the Government of India. There was also a number of pilgrims who came from India, during the non-pilgrimage season, and returned after the Haj: 547 return tickets are still held in deposit with this Legation.

133. The following table shows the distribution of the totals given in the preceding paragraph by ports of embarkation and destination. In the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 124 of the 1934 report, it has again been possible this year to give the exact number of pilgrims who returned to Bombay or Karachi:—

Port.	Pilgrims embarked.	Pilgrims returning.
Bombay	3,995	3,973
Karachi	6,081	6,535
Calcutta	390	...
	10,466	10,508

134. The following is a statement of the number of pilgrims who purchased single and return tickets in India, or deposited the amount of return passage:—

Port.	Deposit.	Single.	Return.	Total.
Bombay	165	3,830	3,995
Karachi	92	60	5,929	6,081
Calcutta	2	16	372	390
	94	241	10,131	10,466

135. The remarks at paragraph 148 of last year's report regarding the desirability of encouraging pilgrims to avail themselves of the deposit system still apply. Karachi showed a welcome increase, being ninety-two as against twenty-two of last year. It is satisfactory to note that the number of single-ticket holders was again small, considering that the total of 241 includes mostly pilgrims travelling first or second-class.

Return of Pilgrims to India: General.

136. Although the number of arrivals this year from Indian ports was less by 2,633 than last year, arrangements made by the shipping company for the return journey occasioned some difficulty this year. On the sailing of steamship *Akbar* on the 23rd March, 1936, 234 pilgrims were unable to obtain accommodation. They created a lot of trouble during the period of detention at Jedda. Steamship *Alavi*, which arrived a few days later, sailed from here on the 28th March, 1936, but unfortunately could not accommodate the total number of pilgrims waiting at Jedda, and accordingly on her sailing some 350 pilgrims were again left behind. They had to wait here for almost fifteen days for the steamship *Islami*. The latter was detained for twenty-four hours in the harbour, in the expectation of picking up further arrivals from the interior, but had to leave with about sixty-two pilgrims less than her capacity. Within a couple of days of her departure, however, 778 pilgrims arrived from Medina, and had to wait here for about fourteen or fifteen days for the steamship *Alavi*. Although there was detention of pilgrims at Jedda for about fifteen days on these two occasions, the company were not called upon to pay the detention allowance as the pilgrims embarked within the prescribed period.

137. As mentioned in paragraph 150 of the 1935 report, the Indian vice-consul was again confronted with persistent requests from all manner of pilgrims for the reservation of their passages by telegrams, &c., in advance. As a contravention of the established rotation system would have been involved, these requests could not be acceded to, in justice to the rights of other pilgrims and in the interests of the shipping company.

138. The two homeward-bound voyages of steamship *Islami* proved a great convenience to first-class pilgrims, who were not greatly incommoded this year. Four first-class pilgrims travelled voluntarily as second-class passengers by the steamship *Jehangir* on the 9th May, 1936, and four second-class pilgrims as deck passengers by the steamship *Islami* on the 17th March, the *Islami* having no second-class accommodation.

139. Some difficulties were experienced this year on the arrival of pilgrim ships from India. On the outward journey pilgrims who had handed their heavy luggage to the shipping company for storage in the hold were granted metal discs as receipts. On arrival at Jedda difficulty was experienced, as no one was found to deliver luggage on presentation of the discs. All luggage was deposited on the quay, where the pilgrims helped themselves to their own property, with the result that many packages were lost.

Food, Accommodation, &c.

140. There is little change for the better to record this year over last (*vide* paragraph 154 of the 1935 report) in this respect, and Amirs-al-Haj, both on the outward and homeward voyages, had much fault to find with the food supply system. The introduction of the cabin food system for first and second-class pilgrims helped to reduce the grievances of these classes of pilgrims, although some of the first-class pilgrims on board the steamship *Islami* were not willing to take the "cabin food" supplied under the rules, and the master of the ship was good enough to arrange for their catering, without any extra charge, from the European food prepared for the crew. This privilege was also accorded to a few other pilgrims by the masters of one or two other pilgrim vessels. Apart from the food question, almost all Amirs-al-Haj and other leading pilgrims directed their criticisms, as last year, against baths and latrines, accommodation and storage of heavy luggage, attendants and doctors to be Moslems.

Committee of Pilgrims, &c.

141. (Paragraph 155 (a) of the 1935 report.) During this season Amirs-al-Haj replaced Committees of Pilgrims, in accordance with arrangements sanctioned by the Government of India. The shipping company's experience was that "Committees of Pilgrims" were less conducive to discipline on board ship and affected the authority of the master. Accordingly, pilgrim ships from Bombay or Karachi direct to Jedda had one Amir-al-Haj on board, while those coming from both the ports had two Amirs-al-Haj, one appointed by each of the Port Haj Committees. In spite of the difficulty one man must have in dealing with so many pilgrims and their problems, the majority of the Amirs-al-Haj carried out their duties efficiently, furnishing valuable reports on the working of the system and suggesting improvements. One criticism, however, was made by certain pilgrims against one or two Amirs-al-Haj, appointed from amongst deck-class pilgrims, for their having been granted first or second-class cabins, special food and attention, without extra charge. In fact, one Amir-al-Haj compiled a report of a few lines only, and that devoted to appreciation of the ship's staff and the catering company.

142. On return voyages the Legation also appointed one or two Amirs-al-Haj, as the case arose, on board the homeward-bound pilgrim vessels. Care was taken as far as possible to make the appointments from first or second-class pilgrims, though on some occasions it was difficult to adhere strictly to this principle in view of the dearth of English-speaking pilgrims.

143. Amirs-al-Haj did not again confine themselves in their reports to the duties required of them by the terms of their letter of appointment (paragraph 155 (c) of the 1935 report). The reports were, as usual, larded with suggestions for improvement which comes within the scope of the new Pilgrim Ships Rules and the Merchant Shipping Act.

Pilgrim Passes.

144. Difficulties were again experienced in handling the existing form of pilgrim passes, especially during the height of the season. The Indian section of the Legation issued 123 duplicate passes to pilgrims, who had lost their original pilgrim passes, and a further 604 emergency passes to those who travelled overland on foot or who had remained in the Hejaz for more than two years and had lost their pilgrim passes.

Refunds on Deposit-Paid Passes and Return Tickets.

145. The system, mentioned in paragraph 142 of the 1934 report, was again followed and proved of great help to pilgrims concerned, who were not required to wait for months as in the past. Some question, however, arose in respect of

the procedure of obtaining refunds on return tickets. At the close of the season the Saudi Ministry for Foreign Affairs raised unofficial objections to the requirement that return tickets of non-British subjects should be presented to this Legation for endorsement under section 208 (c) of Indian Merchant Shipping Act, on refund being claimed, the Ministry being inclined to contend that the local shipping agents should have the full authority to refund the amount of return tickets, belonging to non-Indians, without reference to this Legation. The matter had not recently been pursued further at the time of writing, but may be so later.

Registration.

146. The Legation arrangements continued to work satisfactorily, and 8,243 Indian pilgrims of the 8,439 shown in Table (A) of paragraph 44 above as having arrived by sea, registered at this Legation, the deficit being accounted for by the reasons mentioned in paragraph 143 of the 1934 report.

147. Thirty-eight unclaimed or unused return tickets or deposit-paid passes of 1935 are still lying in the custody of this Legation. They will be forwarded to the Port Haj Committee, Bombay, in one batch after the expiry of a period of eighteen months from the date of issue of the last of each season's batch. This amended procedure has proved of great utility and convenience to pilgrims in claiming refunds under article 209 (2) of the amended Indian Merchant Shipping Act, 1933, and, administratively, to the Legation itself.

148. Six Indian pilgrims who had not deposited their return tickets at this Legation and fourteen foreign pilgrims reported the loss of their return tickets. Arrangements similar to those described in paragraph 179 of the 1932 report were made for all cases to enable them to obtain passages.

Local Haj Committee.

149. It will be recalled that in 1927 the Indian pilgrimage officer was able to inaugurate a Haj Committee, with the assistance of the then Kaimakam of Jedda, with a view to controlling the booking of pilgrims for their homeward journey. An account of this committee was given at pp. 8 and 9 of the annual pilgrimage report for 1927. This committee again worked in 1928, details of which will be found at pp. 12 and 13 of the report of that year. The committee functioned thereafter each year as usual, and carried out its work satisfactorily till 1935, as may be seen from annual pilgrimage reports, although on two occasions there were reasons for doubting its permanency.

150. The situation underwent a sudden change at the close of the pilgrimage of 1936. Intrigues in which Ismail Ghuznavi and others were concerned eventually succeeded in bringing about the abolition of a most useful pilgrimage organisation. Although after the pilgrimage, the Saudi Government at first allowed the formation of the committee, as usual, they suddenly recalled their representatives and instructed them not to sit on the committee. The Indian vice-consul was left alone with the representative of the shipping agents to arrange the departure of the remaining pilgrims, two homeward-bound vessels having been already dealt with by the committee before it broke up. The apprehension of such a development had been felt since 1932, and consequently section 137 of Indian Pilgrim Ships Rules, 1933, proved of great help, as was expected, in dealing with the situation. Khan Bahadur Ihsanullah therefore found no difficulty in coping with the situation, and was even able to see advantages before the work was completed, in that the greater opportunity for devoting personal attention enabled the work to be carried out more efficiently.

151. Special care was taken this year to warn pilgrims not to pay any gratuity to mutawwifs' wakils, &c., for accommodation on board ships obtained in preference to the rightful claimants. Efforts were made to bring home to them that pilgrims are booked in accordance with the strict order of their arrival in Jedda after the Haj, and no departure from this rotation system is permissible.

Hyderabad State Caravan.

152. The newly appointed Director of the Ecclesiastical Department of the Nizam's Government effected a very useful reform in the State pilgrimage by doing away with the monopoly of a single mutawwif. The system of appointing only one mutawwif for the whole caravan (consisting of 736 pilgrims in 1935) was one under which the interests of the poorer classes of pilgrims in the party

were apt to suffer. The mutawwif used to extend hospitality and personal service to well-to-do pilgrims, whereas poorer pilgrims were often neglected. This year, therefore, the Hyderabad caravan was not confined to one mutawwif. On the conclusion of the pilgrimage, Nawab Sir Nizam Jung, the late Political Secretary of the Nizam's Government, who is unofficially interested in State pilgrimage and other affairs in the Hejaz connected with the State, made private enquiries from the Indian vice-consul of his views regarding the change referred to above. In reply, Khan Bahadur Ihsanullah welcomed the reform, but pointed out that if the pilgrims in the caravan were divided amongst a large number of mutawwifs, the leader of the caravan would find it impossible to cater for the caravan and arrange for their accommodation at Arafat and Muna, besides being hampered in leading a well-organised party to Medina and Jedda. The Nizam's Government would be advised, he suggested, to select three mutawwifs at the most for the caravan, thereby leaving no opportunity for other mutawwifs to bargain with the State pilgrims. The selected mutawwifs should be required to follow the rules and regulations which the Ecclesiastical Department of the State may frame to organise the journeys, &c., in the Hejaz under the leadership of the "Kafila Salar," and strictly to comply with the latter's instructions both in Bombay and on board the ships. It was also advisable, he said, that the "Kafila Salar" of the State Caravan should not be changed every year if possible. Khan Bahadur Ihsanullah reported in terms of warm appreciation of the work done by the "Kafila Salar" this year, both in the organisation of his caravan, and in his collaboration with the Indian vice-consul in his work.

Destitutes.

153. There was, unfortunately, an increase in the number of destitutes this year over 1935, the figures being 662 as against 562. The number of those who came overland was again greater in proportion to the total, being 617 out of 662. The following table gives an analysis of the figures for this year by (a) provinces of origin, and (b) routes of access to the Hejaz:—

(a) Provinces of origin—

Bengal	100
Sind	289
Punjab	159
Assam	4
United Provinces	5
North-West Frontier Province	20
Central Province	3
Baluchistan	31
Madras	15
Bombay	2
Behar	2
Orissa	1
Central India	2
Kalat State	12
Bahawalpur State	11
Bharatpur State	1
Rampur State	1
Mysore State	1
Kashmir State	1
Rajputana	1
Burma	1
Total	662

(b) Route—

(1) Overland—

Via Gwadar-Muscat-Mokalla-Yemen	169
Via Gwadar-Muscat-Nejd	282
Via Bombay-Mokalla-Yemen	43
Via Karachi-Muscat-Yemen	49
Via Iraq-Nejd	65
Via Karachi-Gwadar-Nejd	9
Total	617

(2) By sea—

Bombay (steamer)	10
Karachi (steamer)	14
Miscellaneous (dhow)	2
Total	26
Bombay-Mokalla-Jedda	1
Total	27

(3) Partly by sea and partly on foot—

Bombay to Mokalla by dhow; rest on foot via Yemen, &c.	7
Karachi to Batna-Dibai by dhow; rest on foot via Riyadh	11
Total	18
Total for (2) and (3)	662

154. The authorities in India were again able to get a quotation of 40 rupees a head, excluding food and conveyance charges, direct from Messrs. Turner, Morrison and Co., for the repatriation of destitutes. A sum of 730 rupees was collected from twenty-three of the individuals repatriated, who seemed able to contribute, in part, to the cost of their return. The actual amount expended on behalf of the Government of India was 30,820-8 rupees.

155. The usual precautions were taken to guard against fraud, to provide the authorities in India with the lists of the persons repatriated, and to take from each an undertaking to repay the money expended.

156. It was apparent in the light of the figures of destitutes travelling overland across Arabia cited above, that measures have still to be devised to stem this most undesirable movement. The Saudi Arab Government in November last refused to allow some 500 Indian destitute pilgrims to proceed further than Hasa, where they had arrived *en route* for Mecca and the Government of India, with the co-operation of the authorities in Bahrein, were eventually able to repatriate them to India. The attention of the Government of India was again invited to this question in order that a repetition of this incident may be avoided, and, indeed, the number of destitutes generally be reduced.

Publicity.

157. (*Vide* paragraph 168 of the 1935 report.) The Bombay Port Haj Committee again published the Manual of Instructions for Pilgrims to the Hejaz for the year under review, but its issue was, however, delayed. Comment was made by pilgrims on the innovation of including advertisements, interleaved with the text of the instructions. It was stated that it would be better if the advertisements were placed together at the end of the manual.

Banking Facilities.

158. No change occurred in the position described in paragraph 156 of the 1934 report. The principal banking concerns in Jedda are still the Netherlands Trading Society, which has branches in India, and Messrs. Gellatly, Hankey and Co., whose correspondents in India are the National Bank of India. The Legation again deprecates the use of "Hundis."

159. Requests were again made this year, also by several leading pilgrims, to make arrangements to cash drafts and make payments at Mecca and Medina. The amount of surplus cash deposited by pilgrims, in the safe custody of this Legation, amounted to 9,100 rupees and £417 this year.

Indian Staff.

160. (Paragraph 171 of last year's report.) Staff arrangements remained the same as last year. Shah Jehan-al-Kabir went to India on privilege leave last year and returned on the 23rd February, 1936, and Iqbal Din, with the assistance of the temporary staff, ably and efficiently carried out the registration and other routine work connected with the Indian section. During the period of high

pressure after the Haj, the whole staff worked with commendable zeal. Khan Bahadur Ihsanullah again draws attention to the excellent work of Shah Jehan-al-Kabir, and to the meritorious work of Munshi F. A. Quazi and other temporary clerical assistants.

(11) Afghan Pilgrimage.

161. There was a decrease in the number of Afghan pilgrims, in the year under review, being 1,498, as against 1,707 last year.

162. Out of 1,498 Afghans, who travelled to the Hejaz by the sea route, 1,107 came via Indian ports and the remaining 391 via Suez. It shows that they are now developing an increasing tendency to visit the other Holy Places of Islam in Iraq and Palestine. Although the number of Afghan pilgrims was less by 209 than the previous year, the number of those who travelled to the Hejaz by sea, other than from the Indian ports, increased from nineteen to 391 this year. All those who came from Indian ports were either return-ticket holders or deposit-paid pilgrims. Of those who travelled by sea via Suez or by overland routes via Nejd, &c., no less than twelve cases of destitutes came to the notice of this Legation, through their endeavours to pass themselves off as British subjects and so be repatriated at Government of India expense. The Afghan Minister at Jedda as usual paid little attention to them, and eventually the cost of the passages of thirty-three Afghan destitutes in all was borne by local charity.

163. During the year the Afghan Minister here ceased to represent his Government in Egypt, closed the Legation in Cairo, and took up his permanent residence at Jedda. He was stated not to have concerned himself unduly with questions affecting the welfare of Afghan pilgrims. He considered it unnecessary to depute a representative to sit on the local Haj Committee, declaring his faith in the Indian vice-consul's impartiality in operating the rotation system, no preference being given to Indians over the non-Indians. Muhammad Sadiq-al-Mujaddidi, on the other hand, did a disservice not only to his own nationals, but to Indian pilgrims also, by protesting to the Saudi Government against the prevailing arrangements for recovering transport charges from pilgrims visiting Medina from Jedda direct, a protest which ultimately led to the imposition of the extra amount, referred to in paragraph 118 above. After the Haj, the Afghan Minister intended to spend the summer at Taif, and rented a house there without assuring himself that the Saudi Government would allow him to reside there. It was eventually occupied by a relative of Amir Feisal, and in reply to his protests the Minister for Foreign Affairs informed him that, though members of foreign missions could visit Taif for short periods, they were not allowed to take permanent residence there. He subsequently retired to Egypt to spend the summer, leaving behind a clerk in charge of the Legation.

164. A new doctor, named Noor Muhammad (an Indian), was deputed this year as medical mission from Afghanistan. He arrived at Jedda on the 21st January and left for India on the 23rd March, 1936, having carried out his duties until after the Haj. He earned an excellent reputation for his diligence in visiting free of charge patients of all nationalities.

165. No notable Afghans came on Haj this year. It was rumoured that ex-King Amanullah was to visit the Hejaz again this year, and the visit of Mir Rahmatullah Humayun, a Punjabi by origin, who was formerly private secretary to the ex-King, to this country during the pilgrimage season was made on the chance of meeting the ex-King.

(12) Malayan Pilgrimage.

Shipping (Outward from Malayan Ports).

166. The season under review commenced with the sailing of the steamship *Teiresias* of the Blue Funnel Line from Singapore on the 13th October, carrying 557 pilgrims, and with its arrival at Jedda on the 1st November, 1935. Three other ships followed, all of the same company, and altogether they carried a total number of 1,881 pilgrims, who consisted of not only British (Malayan), but also, as usual, Dutch (Javanese), American (Philippines), Chinese and Saudi Arab nationalities. It might be mentioned that pilgrims from Colombo (Ceylon) were also included in the above total, and this for the first time.

Number of Pilgrims.

167. The number of registered pilgrims from British Malaya was 906, composed as follows:—

Straits Settlements—

Singapore	37
Penang and Province Wellesley	53
Malacca	12
Labuan	0

Federated Malay States—

Perak	131
Selangor	40
Pahang	48
Negri Sembilan	72

Unfederated Malay States—

Johore	168
Kedah	92
Kelantan	190
Trengganu	62
Brunei	1
Perlis	0

Total 906

168. This total is an increase of 47 per cent. on last year, when the number was 617. The Malay pilgrimage officer considers that had it not been for the Italo-Abyssinian conflict, with its attendant uncertainties, the number of pilgrims might have been larger than it actually was. In any case, it is satisfactory to note that the improvement which has been evident over the past three years has been maintained this year.

Issue of Pilgrim Passes and Tickets.

169. Haji Abdul Majid reports that the issue of "collective" pilgrim passes, i.e., passes containing the names of more than one pilgrim, became more general this season. He again deprecates this practice as causing complications, not only in registering these pilgrims in the Legation at Jedda, but also in carrying out the necessary formalities with the Saudi Arab Government when cases of death occur or when, for example, one of the pilgrims on a "collective" pass wished to return home while another wished to stay on in the Hejaz.

170. As regards the issue of single tickets, two found this season, an improvement over last year (*vide* paragraph 180 of last year's report).

Charges and Cost of Pilgrimage.

171. The general nature and effects of the Saudi pilgrimage tariff are again discussed in a separate section of this report. The approximate rate of exchange this year was 17 riyals = £1 gold = between 14.50 Straits dollars and 15 Straits dollars during the season.

172. The cost of a return ticket Singapore-Jedda, inclusive of quarantine dues, was the same as last year, viz., 181 dollars. Haji Abdul Majid estimates that the minimum cost of the pilgrimage for the Malay pilgrim was:—

- (a) To Mecca only—about 340 Straits dollars.
- (b) To Mecca and Medina—about 400 Straits dollars, exclusive, in both cases, of cost of maintenance whilst in the Hejaz.

Mutawwifs.

173. Several cases of overcharging by mutawwifs were successfully settled, with the co-operation of the head mutawwif in Mecca, Sheikh Hamid Abdul Mannan. The case of Sheikh Abdullah Rawa (*vide* paragraph 188 of last year's report) has not been pursued by the Saudi authorities for some time. As a result of this case, however, Haji Abdul Majid reports that the Saudi authorities have taken steps to prevent mutawwifs of little or no substance from handling money paid as advances by Malay pilgrims. When such advances are made they are received by the head of the Jedda wakils, by whom they are remitted to the head

mutawwif for Javanese and Malays in Mecca, who doles money out to the mutawwifs concerned as and when required. Haji Abdul Majid also reports that in Malaya notices have been issued by the Government warning intending pilgrims not to make advance payments to mutawwifs before reaching the Hejaz.

General Conditions during the Pilgrimage Season.

174. These again have been treated fairly fully in other parts of this report. Haji Abdul Majid refers more particularly to the fact that the prices of food-stuffs and water remained about the same as in last year, so that pilgrims did not pay exorbitantly high prices during the season. He again alludes to the general security of the country for purposes of travelling, but mentions that the number of thieves seemed to have increased, particularly during Haj days at Arafat. One or two cases were reported where the victims were assaulted and even killed. Happily, writes Haji Abdul Majid, these victims were not Malays.

175. Torrential rains of extraordinary violence occurred during the season (already noted at paragraph 23 above), and in one case the route to Medina in certain parts was flooded, causing cars and caravans to be swept away. There were some fatalities among pilgrims, but here again fortunately the victims were not Malays.

Hostels for Students in Mecca.

176. The managing committee of the new school, "Darul-'Ulum' uddiniyah," referred to in paragraph 187 of this report for last season, decided to send a deputation to Malaya and the Dutch East Indies for the purpose of collecting donations from well-wishers towards the building of a school house and a hostel for the students, who, by the way, have increased from 100 in number, when the school started last year, to more than 400 this year.

Mortality.

177. The total number of deceased pilgrims among Malays who arrived this season, as reported to the Malay pilgrimage officer up to the 5th April, 1936, was twenty-seven. This approximated to 3 per cent. of the total number of arrivals, and compared with last year, when the percentage of deaths was 2½ per cent., was slightly higher.

Effects of Deceased Pilgrims.

178. (*Vide* paragraph 193 of the 1935 report.) A reply was at last received by the Legation from the Saudi Arab Government to the effect that the effects of (1) Abdul Rahman-bin-Tambi, and (2) Abu Seman-bin-Mat Noh, two deceased pilgrims from Province Wellesley, were lost trace of after they had been handed over to the official of the Beyt-al-Mal at Jedda, who committed suicide some time in 1932.

Assistance to Pilgrims.

179. Pecuniary assistance was withheld during this season as the few applicants were those who had been warned that they would not be repatriated by the Legation if they sold their tickets. It was observed that these individuals succeeded in getting assistance from their friends.

180. One case of loss of luggage, whilst being handled by the servant of a certain sheikh, was also successfully dealt with, and refund therefor obtained, thanks to the system of the black list maintained by the Legation.

Notabilities from Malaya.

181. Fewer notables from Malaya came on pilgrimage this season than usual. They included:—

Inche Busu (Yusuf)-bin-Noh, a Trengganu civil servant; Tuan Haji Mohammad-bin-Haji Hasan, a philanthropist from Malacca.

182. A British convert to Islam, Mr. G. T. M. MacBryan (Moslem name, Abdur Rahman), formerly in the service of the Government of Sarawak, arrived at Jedda via Egypt in January 1936. He managed to have an audience of Ibn Saud, and, after considerable delay in Jedda, permission was granted to him to enter the Holy Cities of Mecca and Medina on the 1st March, two days prior to the Assemblage at Arafat.

Miscellaneous.

183. Haji Abdul Majid reports that several cases of houses being bought recently by Malays for Wakf purposes came to notice. It was stated that as the donors had not had them registered with the Committee for Wakfs, as required by Saudi law, the houses were being used by interested persons for purposes other than those for which they were originally intended.

184. A sum of £152 7s. 4d. was received by the Legation towards the end of 1935 from Sungei Ujong, Seremban, for distribution amongst the poor and needy of Medina. After consultation with the Government of the Straits Settlements, this money was officially remitted to the Saudi Ministry for Foreign Affairs for disposal by the authorities. No information as to the manner of its disposal had been received at the time of writing.

Staff.

185. The Malay pilgrimage officer, Haji Abdul Majid, arrived at Jedda on the 1st November, 1935, and left, not by the last pilgrim ship of the season on the 5th April, through unavoidable circumstances, but on the 26th April, 1936. He was satisfactorily assisted by Haji Muhammad Jamil throughout that period.

(13) West African Pilgrimage.

186. Statistics published by the Saudi authorities show that 2,550 West Africans arrived in Jedda on pilgrimage this year. They are, as usual, described in the return under the somewhat vague heading of "Takrunis," a loose term applied locally to all natives of West Africa, irrespective of nationality. No figures are given for West Africans who disembarked at the ports of Qunfida and Lith this year, although it is known by the Legation that at least two dhows, carrying between them 250 odd West Africans, arrived at Qunfida from Massawa. Although it is impossible to estimate with accuracy the percentage of British or British-protected persons included in the above figure, it may be assumed that they do not exceed more than 65 per cent. of the total.

187. The position with regard to dhow traffic from Massawa was still difficult to estimate, but military activity in Eritrea due to the Italo-Abyssinian war would appear to have caused a diminution in a traffic which, however, still goes on. According to one informant no restrictions were placed in the way of Mecca-bound pilgrims.

188. Up to the time of writing this report no applications for repatriation have been received. With the development of the operations of the Saudi Arabian Mining Syndicate, Limited, the labour market has become much healthier with a steady demand for cheap labour.

189. In the light of the past two seasons the Nigerian Pilgrimage Scheme is not enjoying the measure of success it deserves. This year only twenty-six pilgrims travelled under its auspices as compared with fifty-eight last year and sixty-nine in 1934. By the 14th April all pilgrims, who had travelled under this scheme, had collected their return tickets and the sums due to them, and all but one had left the country by the 15th June, 1936.

(14) Somali Pilgrimage.

190. This year Saudi returns differentiate between Somalis and Eritreans, and under this heading 403 pilgrims are shown as having arrived in Jedda on pilgrimage, as compared with thirty-seven last year. It is estimated that not more than a third of them were British-protected persons. A small number of others doubtless came overland, but, as usual, no figures regarding them are available.

191. This year thirteen Somalis travelled on official pilgrim passes, issued by the District Office, Berbera, one of whom applied for and received the refund of his deposit.

192. Repatriation of British Somalis: position on the 15th June, 1936:—

(a) Applications deserving of consideration	6
(b) Applicants repatriated	Nil
(c) Applicants assisted	6

(15) *Sudanese Pilgrimage.*

193. According to Saudi quarantine returns 1,195 Sudanese pilgrims entered the country through the port of Jedda this year, an increase of 329 on last year's figure. They were, as usual, carried to and from the Sudan in ships of the Khedivial Mail Line. Emergency certificates were issued to a number of pilgrims who had lost their travel documents, and Messrs. Gellatly, Hankey and Co. (Sudan) (Limited) were again good enough to provide them with free steamer tickets.

194. This year the Saudi authorities appear to have agreed to standardise mutawwifs' dues at £1 gold 31½ piales, fixed for collection purposes at £E. 2.150 mms., for all Sudanese pilgrims who arrived at Jedda via Suakin, irrespective of whether they came from town or countryside (see paragraph 203 of the report for 1933). This sum is half the full mutawwifs' dues which are scheduled at £2 gold 63 piales. The reason given for fixing the rate at £E. 2.150 mms. was that in previous years mutawwifs had experienced great difficulty in collecting full dues from those who were scheduled to pay them, and in the large majority of cases had to be satisfied with what they could get, which was usually a sum in the neighbourhood of £E. 2.

195. In spite of the reduction described in the previous paragraph, the Legation was again inundated during the return season by pilgrims requiring monetary assistance. After careful elimination, 58 pilgrims were each advanced the sum of £E. 1.500 mms. In most cases the loans were required to tide pilgrims over the waiting period between homeward-bound ships. Following correspondence with this Legation the Sudan Government this year agreed to fix the sum of £E. 1.500 mms. as a standard loan, and furnished a supply of printed receipt forms, which, coupled with the adoption of the suggestion that the Suakin authorities should insert the *markaz* and province of the Sudanese bearer of the Suakin Pilgrim Pass, has simplified considerably the clerical work hitherto involved in this connexion.

196. Shipping arrangements during the return season were again far from satisfactory. Numerous complaints were lodged by pilgrims who, financially embarrassed, had to wait from fourteen to twenty days for a homeward-bound ship. The first Khedivial sailing from Jedda to Suakin after the Haj (4th March) was on the 14th March; the next ship left fourteen days later on the 28th March.

197. A notable who performed the pilgrimage this year was Barakat Ghuwinim, Omda of Rashayda, accompanied by 134 followers. He returned to the Sudan with 130 followers on the Khedivial mail steamer which left Jedda on the 14th March, 1936.

198. During the return season fifteen Sudanese pilgrims arrived from Medina suffering from small-pox, ten of whom were admitted to the Government hospital at Jedda, where nine of them died. The other five cases were treated locally, and eventually recovered. All those who recovered have since returned to the Sudan (*vide* paragraph 52 above under "Quarantine"). This question was the subject of subsequent correspondence between the Legation and the Sudan Government.

199. One Sudanese pilgrim, Haj Merghani Ali Bilal, of Tangar, near Shellal, is reported to have lost his life in the floods which occurred on the Medina road between Rabigh and Medina during the month of Ramadhan (see paragraph 23 above). He was buried by the local authorities at Rabigh.

200. Repatriation of Sudanese; position on the 15th June, 1936:—

(a) Applications deserving of consideration	2
(b) Applicants repatriated	1
(c) Applications still under reference	Nil

(16) *Zanzibari and East African Pilgrimages.*

201. Saudi returns show that twenty-five pilgrims entered the country via the port of Jedda this year, a decrease of 114 on last year's figure of 139.

202. A notable who performed the pilgrimage this year was Mr. Abdul Wahid, O.B.E., a member of the council, Kenya Colony.

203. No Zanzibari or East African pilgrim applied for repatriation this year.

(17) *South African Pilgrimage.*

204. According to Saudi returns, forty-two South African pilgrims entered the country via the port of Jedda on pilgrimage this year, as compared with fifty-nine last year. Most of them were of Indian extraction, and people of means who required no other assistance than the endorsement of their passports.

205. No South African pilgrim applied for repatriation this year.

(18) *Palestinian and Transjordan Pilgrimage.*

206. According to official returns published by the Saudi quarantine authorities, 770 Palestinian and Transjordan pilgrims entered the country through the ports of Yanbu and Jedda, a decrease of 662 on last year's figures.

207. As the number of registered pilgrims exceeded 500 (see paragraph 205 of the report for 1934), the Government of Palestine seconded Wasfi Aret Abdul Hadi, a clerical officer of the Palestine Health Department, for service with this Legation for a period of six weeks. He arrived in Jedda on the 1st March and proceeded direct to Mecca on pilgrimage, returning to take up his duties at the Legation on the morning of the 12th March. Although the clerical work in connexion with this section of the pilgrimage was considerably lighter this year than in 1935, Wasfi Aret Effendi performed his duties with great efficiency, and to the entire satisfaction of the officer under whom he worked. He left for Palestine on the 15th April.

208. During the return season fifty-one pilgrims were each advanced the sum of £4, and two pilgrims, owing to exceptional circumstances, were each advanced the sum of £4 10s. This year applications were received from four pilgrims alleged to be destitute at Yanbu, requesting that refunds of their deposits be made to their mutawwif at Jedda, who would transmit the money to them. To obviate possible hardship the refunds were made. The pro-consul calls attention to the apparent increase in the popularity of Yanbu as a port of embarkation for pilgrims homeward bound from Medina, and the possibility of similar applications in future.

209. This year an attempt was made to regularise the overland route via Ma'an and Tebuk, and also via Jauf. Twenty-three pilgrims, all of whom were in possession of regular passports, who had travelled on the Ma'an-Tebuk route, called at the Legation and asked for assistance, but when informed that their cases would have to be referred to the Government of Palestine, decided to return whence they came. According to their statements, the authorities at Tebuk had levied dues ranging from £1 gold to £5 gold, the actual amount payable depending it would seem, on the apparent means of the pilgrim. Only one pilgrim, a Transjordanian, who had used the Jauf route came to the notice of the Legation.

210. Shipping arrangements again worked smoothly, and no complaints were received from Palestinian pilgrims.

211. Repatriation of Palestinians and Transjordanians:—

(a) Applications deserving of consideration	2
(b) Applicants repatriated	Nil
(c) Applications still under reference	Nil

(19) *Pilgrimages of Adenese and Natives of the Aden Protectorate.*

212. According to Saudi returns, 404 Hadhramis and natives of the Aden Protectorate arrived in Jedda this year on pilgrimage, and forty-eight Hadhramis are shown as having landed at the port of Lith. No figures are available regarding those who came overland.

213. The number of emergency travel documents issued during the return season to Hadhramis of the semi-settled class was relatively small (see paragraph 224 of last year's report). During the period under review only 155 such documents have been issued, as compared with 212 over a similar period last year and 270 in 1934.

214. Shipping arrangements on the whole worked smoothly this year. A few complaints were received from pilgrims who had booked return passages on Besse steamers. These were satisfactorily dealt with when the local agents made refunds which enabled the recipients to take passages on steamers of the Turner, Morrison Line.

215. Repatriation of Adenese and natives of the Aden Protectorate: Position on the 15th June, 1936:—

(a) Applications deserving of consideration	30
(b) Applicants repatriated	Nil
(c) Applicants assisted	22

(20) *Muscati, Bahreini and Koweiti Pilgrimages.*

216. Under the heading "Muscat and Persian Gulf," Saudi returns show that 107 pilgrims arrived in Jedda on pilgrimage this year, and fifty are shown as having landed at the port of Lith, an increase of sixty-eight on last year's recorded total of eighty-seven.

217. Two Bahreinis were officially reported by Saudi Government to the Legation to have been drowned in floods near Rabigh a little while before the pilgrimage (*vide* paragraph 23 above).

218. No figures are given in the returns regarding those who came overland. But according to the "Koweit Intelligence Summary," No. 4 of 1936, 202 Koweitis proceeded on pilgrimage this year by the overland route: 198 by camel and 4 by car.

219. Bahreini notables who performed the pilgrimage this year were Abdulla and Hassan, sons of Muhammad Al Khalifa, relatives of the Sheikh of Bahrein.

220. No Muscati, Bahreini or Koweiti pilgrim applied for repatriation this year.

(21) *Sarawak Pilgrimage.*

221. The manager of the Jedda branch of Messrs. Gellatly, Hankey and Co. (Limited), who acts as Sarawak pilgrimage officer, reports a heavy increase of fourteen from Sarawak performed the pilgrimage this year. This figure probably includes an Islamised Briton, Mr. Gerard Truman Magill MacBryan, an ex-official of the Sarawak Government, and a recent convert to Islam under the name of Abdur Rahman (*vide* paragraph 182 above).

[E 5515/2617/91]

No. 7.

Mr. Ingram to Mr. Eden.—(Received September 1.)

(No. 950.)

Sir,

Rome, August 29, 1936.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that, according to a recent Stefani communiqué, the Treaty of Friendship and Commerce between Italy and the Yemen dated the 2nd September, 1926, the text of which was enclosed in Mr. (now Sir Charles) Wingfield's despatch from this Embassy, No. 846 of the 4th October, 1926, has been extended until November 1937 by an exchange of notes between the two Governments. I shall not fail to supply you with the text of these notes as soon as they are published in the *Official Gazette*.

2. The extension of this treaty has been the occasion of considerable comment in the press here. An article in the *Popolo di Roma* recalls that the important points established by the treaty were the declaration by the Government of the Yemen of their willingness to import technical material from Italy and to admit Italian experts into the country to assist in its economic development, and the declaration by the Italian Government of their willingness to grant facilities in this sense. When the treaty was concluded (continues the writer of the article) a number of Arab journals expressed the fear that Italy was planning to turn the Yemen into a zone of exclusive Italian influence and that the provisions of the treaty were not compatible with the full independence of that country. The ten years which have lapsed since the treaty was signed have been sufficient to explode this myth. Not only does the agreement not impinge in any way on the liberty of action of the Yemen Government, who are not obliged by it to accept Italian materials or experts against their wishes and whose liberty to purchase in whatever market they wish is expressly reserved, but Italy's policy since the signature has given rise to no suspicions that she has any other designs in the country than those compatible with true friendship.

3. In an article in the *Messaggero* it is stated that the prolongation of the treaty corresponds with the plans of the Italian Government for the development and maintenance of peaceful relations with the countries on the eastern coast of the Red Sea, where there exists a long tradition of commercial exchange and affinity of custom and religion with Ethiopia. Italy is determined, says the writer of this article, through relations of "bon-voisinage" maintained with these States, to contribute by all the means in her power to their progress and civilisation. She has no designs on their independence or their autonomy. This policy "is an aspect of the Italian Empire which will assume more and more importance as time goes on and which fits in perfectly with the programme of relations between Italy and the Orient on which the Duce insisted in two memorable speeches." The speeches to which reference is here made appear to be those which he pronounced at the opening of the Congress of Asiatic Students in December 1933, a summary of which was enclosed in Sir Eric Drummond's despatch No. 990 of the 22nd December of that year, and his discourse before the second Quinquennial Fascist Assembly (a translation of this speech was enclosed by his Excellency in his despatch No. 245 of the 19th March, 1934). I venture to draw your particular attention to the portions of this speech in which Signor Mussolini touches on the rôle that Italy was designed by history and geography to play in Asia and Africa. Recent events give his words a peculiar significance.

4. Thus it will be seen that the renewal of the treaty between Italy and the Yemen has been made the occasion for a number of inspired articles illustrating the rôle of patron and friend which Italy aspires to play and which she believes she has already begun to play in the Near East. Collaboration with the Arab races, as the *Giornale d'Italia* observes, is to be developed to the mutual advantage of both parties. The conquest of Ethiopia, it is said, has been a great step in this direction, for opposite the Arab littoral now lies, not the amorphous dynasty of Abyssinia, but the Italian Empire with its harbours and roadsteads open to the exchange both of goods and of ideas. Nevertheless Italy does not, it is maintained, cherish designs on the liberty of the Arab States. On the contrary, their independence and their friendship are cardinal points in her policy.

5. These comments are doubtless designed to impress foreign (and in particular Arabian) as much as Italian opinion with the value of friendship with the newly-founded Italian Empire and with the innocuousness of Italian policy so far as the eastern shores of the Red Sea are concerned. Time alone can show the extent to which these professions will be translated into practice.

6. I have sent a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's representative at Jedda.

I have, &c.

E. M. B. INGRAM.

[E 5792/1041/25]

No. 8.

Mr. Calvert to Mr. Eden.—(Received September 14.)

(No. 246.)

Sir,

Jedda, August 14, 1936.

WITH reference to Sir Andrew Ryan's despatch No. 95 E. of the 29th March last, I have the honour to report certain further developments in the currency situation in Saudi Arabia.

2. Five hundred thousand new riyals arrived early in May and some appeared in circulation almost immediately. The Government have, however, shown great caution in introducing the new currency, and to this caution, according to an official of the Jedda branch of the Dutch banking concern, the *Nederlandsche Handels Maatschappij*, may be attributed the present comparative stability of the riyal, both in relation to the gold pound and to the Egyptian paper pound. It is also stated that the Government are resolved to maintain the present rate of 20 riyals to the gold pound, but whether this will be possible when the pilgrim season creates an added demand for local currency may well be conjectured.

3. Up to date only two new half and no new quarter riyal pieces have passed through the hands of the Legation accounting officer, although, according to a notice which appeared in the newspaper *Saut-al-Hejaz* on the 23rd June, the old half and quarter pieces ceased to be legal tender on that date, but could be exchanged against gold, at standard rate, if presented at the Ministry of Finance within two months. The reason given for this order was the risk of confusion between the old half riyals and the new riyals, as the latter are only a little larger than the former.

4. The authorities seem to have been fairly successful in their attempt to withdraw the old currency, as two large shipments to London have been made recently through Messrs. Gellatly, Hankey and Co. (Sudan), Ltd. On the 29th July, 250,000, and on the 5th August, 123,000 riyals were despatched by Khedivial Mail steamer. A certain number of 1-riyal pieces were, I understand, included in the second shipment.

5. I am sending a copy of the despatch to the Department of Overseas Trade, Government of India (Foreign and Political Department) and Cairo.

I have, &c.

A. S. CALVERT.

[E 5932/486/25]

No. 9.

Mr. Calvert to Mr. Eden.—(Received September 21.)

(No. 257.)

Sir,

Jedda, September 1, 1936.

I HAVE the honour to submit herewith the Jedda report for August 1936.

2. Copies have been distributed as for the report for last month.

I have, &c.

A. S. CALVERT.

Enclosure in No. 9.

JEDDA REPORT FOR AUGUST 1936.

I.—Internal Affairs.

262. Ibn Saud, according to a reliable informant, has been slightly indisposed recently and appears to have been feeling the effects of the heat, which has been unusually trying this year at Riyadh. He has not indulged in his customary hunting expeditions quite so often lately.

263. Amir Feisal visited Jedda on the 14th August from Taif, arriving to find the town stickily enveloped in a heat mist. He remained until shortly after midnight of the following day, when he retreated again to the hills. He received the French Minister in circumstances described at paragraph 282 below. His visit aroused a perfect storm of rumour, connected chiefly with the Italians from whom, it was said, he had come to receive a further consignment of aeroplanes which were to be brought here in an Italian warship. It is probably true, and is scarcely a matter for great astonishment, that he had certain exchanges with the Italian Minister during his brief stay here.

264. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs at Taif continued to be run on a caretaker basis. Fuad Hamza, who is abroad, was understood to be taking a cure at Carlsbad and was not expected to return before November. His brother, Tewfik Hamza, has, however, now returned to this country. Yusuf Yasin has remained with the King at Riyadh all the month.

265. There have been no disturbances of the general security and peace of the country. Such small military forces as are stationed in Jedda have been displaying somewhat more professional activity, and are now certainly more soldierly in dress and show improvement in march discipline. The barracks at Taif are being repaired.

266. The Saudi Air Force reappeared from Taif during the month, at the time of the Amir Feisal's visit to Jedda. Two machines have been in evidence here most mornings since, except for several days after a slight mishap which

happened to one of them on landing, when the plane stood firmly but gracefully upon its nose. The Saudi pilots are now being trained to make somewhat longer flights, and the *Saut-ul-Hejaz* announced triumphantly on the 25th that "Arab Eagles fly over Mecca"—the first time that that sacred air had been so visited. It added that the purchase of machines from abroad was to be expedited. Work on the preparation of a new landing-ground near the Kandara villa is in progress, so it would appear that there is some truth in the particulars given at paragraph 207 of the report for June.

267. (Reference paragraph 238.) The second shipment to London of the Saudi currency now being superseded was of 125,000 riyals, consisting of some 1 riyal pieces, but mainly of half and quarter riyals. The Government have shown great caution in introducing the new currency, and local banking circles attribute the comparative stability of the riyal to that caution. One informant expressed the opinion recently that the Saudi Government had now accumulated a satisfactory gold reserve, sufficient to support the riyal at the par rate of 20 to the gold pound, having received loans, &c., from the various concessionary concerns working in this country.

268. The Minister of Finance, Sheikh Abdullah Suleyman, was as active as ever. His brother, Hamad Suleyman, returned from leave abroad at the end of the month. A new Director of Finance for Hasa was appointed in the person of Sheikh Abdullah Qadi, whilst the appointment, one of considerable interest, was also announced of Najib Ibrahim Salha, the English-speaking secretary of Sheikh Abdullah Suleyman, to be Director of the newly-formed "Office of Public Works," established as part of the Ministry to deal with the growing number of foreign concerns in this country.

269. The preoccupations of the Saudi Arabian Mining Syndicate (Limited) over the discovery of an adequate water supply at the Mahd-ad-Dahab have not been relieved (paragraph 237). Amongst a number of newcomers in the personnel of the syndicate is a Swedish geo-physicist (receiving, it is stated, the gentlemanly salary of £300 a month), and, a more recent arrival, an English water-diviner. The syndicate, therefore, are taking their problem very seriously. They appear to be equally concerned for the health of their personnel, for there has been a considerable amount of sickness amongst members of the staff for some months past. It is understood that a Colonel Mackie, of the Ross Institute for Tropical Diseases, is due to arrive here shortly in order to investigate health conditions for European members of the staff at the Mahd and at Wejh. The death of Mr. Ballard in May (paragraph 168) has been followed, at the end of August, by that of an Englishman, Mr. W. D. Thomas, lieutenant, R.N. (retired), who only arrived in Jedda on the 26th as shipwright and head carpenter, and who, it was learned to the general regret, died on the 28th *en route* for the Mahd, where he was buried. Details are lacking, but it is stated that he died from the effects of the heat.

270. (Reference paragraph 239.) The text of the Red Sea oil concession was published in the *Umm-al-Qura* of the 7th August. Premises have already been taken in Jedda for Petroleum Concessions (Limited) and a manager is expected to arrive in October.

271. The Jedda office of the California Arabian Standard Oil Company has been reinforced by the arrival on the 9th of Mr. W. Burleigh (American) as assistant to Mr. W. J. Lenahan, whom he is ultimately to replace on Mr. Lenahan's departure.

272. The *Umm-al-Qura* of the 14th announced that the Legislative Assembly had now drawn up the Constitution, consisting of 140 articles, of the Saudi Arab Kingdom. This production was to be submitted to high authority (presumably the King) for sanction.

273. The Government announced by an official communiqué, published on the 7th August, their ratification of the International Convention for Limiting the Manufacture, &c., of Narcotic Drugs, signed at Geneva on the 13th July, 1931. The communiqué emphasised that the provisions of the convention not only accord with, but indeed fall short of, what is already enjoined on Islamic authorities by the Sharia Law.

274. Other appointments announced are: Sheikh Abdurrahman-bin-Ibrahim-al-Mubarak to be Amir of Qunfida in the room of Muhammad-bin-Abdul Aziz-bin-Madhi, who has been transferred to Jizan. Talat Wafa to be officer commanding police forces of Asir and Najran.

[14940]

275. More evidence of attention to education has been noted during the month in the announcement that nine new schools, in different centres in the Hejaz and Nejd, are being established, and that a night school for the teaching of English is to be opened in the spring of 1937, the teacher to come from Bagdad. The Education Department has decided, it is stated, to recruit three teachers in Egypt, one for English and two for mathematics and physics. There is said to be a demand for the teaching of English, probably set up by the requirements of British and American oil and gold companies for English-speaking local personnel, and though the above may be steps taken to cater for it, there have been signs, nevertheless, of a tendency on the part of the Saudi authorities to suppress private teachers of English.

276. A variety of improvements reported during the month deserve to be chronicled. A new meat and vegetable market, constructed under the supervision of the Public Health Department, has now been opened in Jedda. Mecca, too, is reorganising the arrangements in force there in regard to the killing of animals and transport of meat. Electricity has ousted kerosene from the streets of Taif.

277. Health, generally, has not been satisfactory, and disturbing reports have been received from Asir of the prevalence of malaria. Doctors were sent from Taif, but it is not known how far they have been successful. Rumour alleges a lack of medicines and that some at least of the doctors have given the task up as a bad job—or through fright.

II.—Frontier Questions and Foreign Relations in Arabia.

278. The Minister for Foreign Affairs addressed a note to the Legation on the 16th August alleging transgression of the Saudi-Transjordan frontier by a Transjordan patrol car on the 5th July last in the Mudawwara area, and lodged an official protest. The matter has been referred to the British authorities concerned.

279. Events in Palestine have not so far occupied much of the attention of the local press (reference paragraph 247). In August there have been fewer references to this subject than ever, and even publication of particulars of subscriptions to the fund for Arab sufferers in Palestine have more or less ceased. Indeed, it is stated that considerable difficulty has been experienced in inducing people here to subscribe, pressure having been brought to bear in some cases. This is scarcely surprising in the Hejaz, where the large elements in the urban population of Indian, Javanese or African origin take little interest in the cause of Arab nationalism. It is, of course, far different in Northern Hejaz and Nejd, and one is impressed with the description, given in a recent Transjordan Intelligence Report, of the "passionate interest" taken in the present situation in Palestine by Arabs in the northern areas of Saudi Arabia.

280. The *Saut-ul-Hejaz* of the 25th August published a brief paragraph to the effect that the Yemen had adhered to the Saudi-Iraqi Treaty of Alliance (reference paragraph 214). The King of the Yemen, however, is stated to have asked for further explanations both of the Government of Iraq and of Saudi Arabia, so it may be that his adhesion is not yet complete.

III.—Relations with Powers outside Arabia.

281. Sir Reader W. Bullard, K.C.M.G., C.I.E., His Majesty's Minister, was expected to leave England about the end of August. He is due to arrive at Port Sudan on the 13th September, and is to cross to Jedda by H.M.S. *Londonderry*, arriving the following day.

282. (Reference paragraph 251.) Sheikh Yusuf Yasin replied from Riyadh by personal letter, suggesting a modification to article 1 of the Koweit draft regulations and accepting the remaining nine as a basis for discussion. He made certain other proposals on the subject of relations with Koweit, which are now under the consideration of His Majesty's Government and other British authorities concerned.

283. On the 29th August the eastward-bound Imperial Airways air liner *Horsa* forced-landed some 40 miles south of Salwa wells, south of the Dohat-as-Salwa. The machine, with its occupants fortunately unhurt, was located on the 30th, and at the end of the month arrangements were being made

for the removal of the passengers and for dealing with the plane, which was slightly damaged.

284. M. Maigret on the 14th August presented fresh letters of credence to the Amir Feisal, in his capacity as Viceroy of the Hejaz, this time as Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary. It was only as recently as the 25th February last that he presented his letters of credence to King Abdul-Aziz as Minister Resident. He is now alone in his Legation, as his Algerian vice-consul proceeded on leave during the month.

285. The Italian Minister remains to share the summer heat with the rest of us. He was joined by Comm. L. F. Bellini, his vice-consul, who returned from leave on the 9th. Reference has already been made to the spate of rumour aroused by the visit of Amir Feisal to Jedda, according to which a high Italian personage was to come here on an Italian warship to present Italian three-engined aeroplanes to an allegedly Italophil Amir. Jedda, however, waited in vain, and local pot-house politicians are believed to be nonplussed by the grant of the Red Sea oil concession to a British company, when Italian interests were only too eager to compete, at least for the Farsan Islands, and at a time when the Italo-Saudi relations are apparently so cordial.

IV.—Miscellaneous.

287. (Reference paragraph 254.) The French warship *D'Iberville* arrived on the 5th August and embarked the body of M. Biraud, leaving for Suez the same day.

288. Mr. H. M. Eyres went on leave on the 5th August to the United Kingdom.

289. (Reference paragraph 259.) The name of the Turk who arrived here last month from Ethiopia has been given as Ahmad Sayam-bin-Muhammad Kemal-ud-Din.

290. (Reference paragraph 196.) Mr. Philby has been reported from Aden as having entered the Hadhramaut via Najran with a party of about thirty men and at the end of the month to be at Mukalla.

291. The position as regards the manumission of slaves by the Legation during August was as follows:—

On hand at the beginning of the month: Three males, four females.
Took refuge in August: One male.
Manumitted and repatriated: Nil.
Locally manumitted: Nil.
Left voluntarily: One male.
On hand at the end of the month: Three males, four females.

292. Two cases on hand are those of slaves against whom the Saudi authorities have preferred accusations of robbery of money and property belonging to the ex-owners. The Saudis have demanded delivery of the two slaves for trial, but the Legation, dissatisfied with the *bona fides* of the charges preferred, has refused. No solution of the difficulty has yet been reached.

[E 6078/56/25]

No. 10.

Mr. Calvert to Mr. Eden.—(Received September 28.)

(No. 259. Confidential.)

Jedda, September 5, 1936.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to report that, during the past few days, the Italian Legation, through its cavasses, has been engaged in distributing broadcast through the town of Jedda copies of two Arabic newspapers, the *Barid Barqah*, published at Benghazi, and *Al Adl* of Tripoli. That the distribution has been lavish would appear from the fact that my Indian vice-consul obtained six copies of each without any apparent difficulty. Apart from a totally incorrect report of 7,000 British casualties on the North-West Frontier of India (a report also broadcast recently from the Italian wireless station at Bari, causing some

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concern for a time amongst Indians resident here), the contents of these newspapers do not appear to be open to serious objection, their principal features being items of news of the progress of the Italian subjugation of Ethiopia; the reproduction of an article from the Egyptian *Kowab-ash-Sharq* on Italian Islamic policy, and referring in particular to the announcement by the Italian authorities that the Arabic language would be used in the courts of law at Harrar; and a number of photographs of Islamic institutions in Italian North Africa.

2. The dissemination in this way of Italian news, of a propagandist nature, is further proof of the interest now manifested by that country in Arabian affairs, an interest which my Italian colleague was said to have stressed, in referring to the friendly dispositions of his Government towards Arab nations, during his audience with Ibn Saud on the 10th May last, reported by Sir Andrew Ryan in his confidential despatch No. 146 of the 17th May.

3. Brief reference was made in Jedda report for August (paragraphs 263 and 286) to the unusual crop of rumours to which the visit of Amir Feisal to Jedda on the 14th August gave rise. In all of these the Italians figured prominently, and in a favourable light. Three more aeroplanes were to arrive here, it was said, during the Amir's visit; they were to be brought by an Italian man-of-war; and a high Italian personage was to accompany them presumably to hand over to the Saudi Arab Government, though some reports went so far as to state that he was to supersede Signor Persico (who has remained here this summer) as Italian Minister. These rumours, of course, died a natural death, but the impression in Jedda is, I think, general that the Italians are, for the present at least, on the most cordial terms with the Saudi authorities. Incidentally, the original Italian offer of aeroplanes was of six machines, of which three only, so far as is known, have been delivered. Three more, therefore, may be said to be overdue, and rumour is again busy, at the time of writing, prophesying their imminent arrival.

4. I am sending copies of this despatch to Cairo, Addis Ababa and Aden.
I have, &c.

A. S. CALVERT.

[E 6114/260/91]

No. 11.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received September 29.)

Sir,

India Office, September 28, 1936.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to transmit to you, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of letters from and to the Petroleum Concessions (Limited) of the 11th, 14th and 15th September, on the subject of the activities of the Petroleum Concessions (Limited) in the Persian Gulf.

I am, &c.

S. F. STEWART.

Enclosure 1 in No. 11.

Mr. Longrigg to Mr. Clauson (India Office).

Petroleum Concessions (Limited),

London, September 11, 1936.

My dear Clauson,

AT our meeting in your office a few days ago, when Colonel Fowle was present, you suggested that I should send you a summary of our proceedings, actual and intended, in the region which concerns the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

You are, I think, already fully informed on the subject, but perhaps, as you suggested, your information is contained in scattered reports which it would be convenient to summarise. I will therefore do this.

In the Neutral Zone, immediately south of the Koweit Principality, we hoped, early in the present year, to obtain a concession for the Sheikh of Koweit's

half-rights over the territory: for which purpose we drafted a concession and sent you a copy. Later, however, when our negotiator, Major Holmes, was actually in the field, we were led by the advice of the Foreign Office to renounce the idea of a concession, in view of the delicate inter-State position of the Neutral Zone, and to ask merely for an option on the sheikh's rights. This, in May, it seemed certain that we could obtain. At the last moment, however, the sheikh refused to sign (tempering his refusal with many friendly expressions), and said he would prefer to leave the question temporarily in abeyance. The reason, we believe, was that, owing to his increasingly friendly relations with Ibn Saud, the sheikh hoped for the reincorporation of the Neutral Zone in his own territories (as was the case previous to the delimitation of the zone), and thus for the power to bestow, not half, but the whole. Both he and Ibn Saud are convinced that the Neutral Zone is rich in oil. We shall probably return to the charge later in this year, in the hope that the sheikh will have modified his position.

In the Bahrein group of islands we intend to obtain a concession for all the territory (including territorial waters) not already leased to the Bahrein Oil Company. Contact was made with the sheikh by Major Holmes and certain amendments to our draft concession—of which you were given a copy—were made by the sheikh. With these we can probably agree. On the financial side we have made what we consider a generous offer, but have not yet the sheikh's reply. I am hoping to discuss the revised draft and offer with Mr. Belgrave within the next few days. The question of ownership of Hawar Island was referred by us to you, and you have replied that it should be considered as Bahrein territory.

The company proposes to make Bahrein the administrative headquarters of its activities, not only in that island, but in the whole Persian Gulf area. It is, therefore, shipping to Manama the necessary equipment for the drilling and geological parties proposed, of which details are given below. Mr. E. V. Packer, whose appointment as company's manager in that area you have already approved, has paid a flying visit to the Gulf, and will take up his residence at Manama on the 19th October. He will be joined there a fortnight later by geologists and drillers, whose work (as will appear below) will be upon the mainland. Mr. Packer will arrange for his house and office accommodation on his arrival, meanwhile occupying Major Holmes's house. We are at the moment taking in hand, through the Bombay Agency of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, the recruitment of certain Indian personnel, which we think will be necessary for our office, our Qatar drilling programme and our Trucial Coast geological programme. We have sent you under separate letter particulars of the Indian personnel we propose to import, and are anxious to observe the proper formalities in this connexion. In the event of our importing a limited number of rig-coolies from Iraq for work on Qatar, we shall obtain the necessary permits in the same way, but shall, of course, do our own recruiting in Iraq. The company's interim agent, pending Mr. Packer's establishment, is Haji Yusif Kanu.

The Qatar Concession remains, at the moment of writing, the property of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, who obtained it early in 1935, and followed this by signing a political agreement with His Majesty's Government. Petroleum Concessions (Limited) has now formed a subsidiary, Petroleum Development (Qatar) (Limited), with the object of taking over the concession from the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. This proposal has, within the last day or two, received India Office consent, and letters to the Sheikh of Qatar, proposing that he agree to the transfer, are being sent by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, Abadan, and, we understand, by the Political Resident. The text of Abadan's letter will first have been approved by the Resident. Petroleum Development (Qatar) (Limited) expects, on transfer of the concession, to assume all the obligations *vis-à-vis* His Majesty's Government and the sheikh, which were previously incumbent on the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. One of these was the drilling of two water-wells on Qatar, and this we propose to carry out during the coming autumn and winter. Qatar will be visited by two of our geologists, Messrs. T. F. Williamson and D. Glynn Jones, early in November, for the purpose of siting the wells in consultation with the sheikh. These will be accompanied, or immediately followed, by Mr. O. S. Dickson, who will be in local charge of the drilling, and by Mr. W. St. G. Hombersley, who will supervise the drilling initially and by subsequent visits. The company will take over the house already hired by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company at Doha, and will ship from Bahrein the necessary motor vehicles and drilling and other materials.

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On the Trucial Coast two-year options were, as you know, obtained by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company during 1935 from the rulers of five out of the six independent sheikhdoms, Umm-al-Qaiwain being the exception. You have, of course, copies of these options, which envisage the granting of a long-term concession to the same or an associated company during the period. Copies of draft concessions for the purpose were supplied to you early in the present year and your permission obtained for the arrangement of concessions by our negotiator, Major Holmes. The latter accordingly visited the Trucial Coast in June, found touch with most of the sheikhs and took up his abode at Sharjah for three months. He found the sheikhs largely preoccupied with the pearl-diving season, but was able to make considerable progress with the Sheikh of Dubai, whom he regards as one of the most influential. A concession was arranged with Sheikh Maktum, the text of which has been communicated to you for your agreement. In the end each of the twenty-seven articles were initialled by the sheikh and Major Holmes, but the concession as a whole has not been signed. We understand that the sheikh, having heard that he would be asked to enter into a further agreement with His Majesty's Government on the subject, was unwilling to sign the concession until he knew more of the Government obligations it would involve. We hope that all this may be satisfactorily arranged to permit of signature in the present autumn, when Major Holmes will probably return to the Gulf. Meanwhile, the company hopes to arrange with you the terms of the "Political Agreement" which, we understand, will be necessary in the case of each of the Trucial Coast concessions. The only point, we believe, upon which difference of opinion between the company and His Majesty's Government may occur is in the matter of the latter's requirement for a refinery to be erected on the Arab side of the Gulf, in connexion with oil which may some day be discovered. On this matter the company has recently addressed you in a separate letter.

It is to be noted that only two of the five option-giving sheikhs on the Trucial Coast have yet signed the security clause propounded to them by the Political Resident, thus securing His Majesty's Government's ratification of the options. The Sheikhs of Sharjah, Ajman and Ras-al-Khaimah have not yet signed. We have invited your attention to possible consequences of this failure to sign, and expressed the hope that the Political Resident will be able to represent the matter to them in such a light that they will sign and thus permit ratification of the options. Without this, we imagine, long-term concessions could scarcely follow, and our field work might, in the meanwhile, be hampered. It is our intention to send our geological mission named above to Dubai about the middle of November, after they have sited the Qatar water-wells. Based on Dubai, where we have leased a house from the sheikh, and on subsequent camps, they will explore the geology of the Dubai-abu-Dhabi Sheikhsdoms, and later, we hope, those of Sharjah and Ras-al-Khaimah.

Major Holmes left the Trucial Coast on the 2nd September and Koweit two or three days later. He will be in England to-morrow, the 12th September, for a short visit of consultation and holiday.

We have intended to approach the Sultan of Muscat and Oman for a concession similar to those proposed for the Trucial Coast, but, owing to his long absence at Dhofar, we have not yet been in touch with him. We have addressed you separately upon this point.

Yours sincerely,
STEPHEN H. LONGRIGG.

Enclosure 2 in No. 11.

Mr. Clauson to Mr. Longrigg.

My dear Longrigg,

India Office, September 14, 1936.

WE are very much obliged to you for your letter of the 11th September, summarising your company's proceedings, actual and intended, on the Arab side of the Persian Gulf. This summary will be very useful to us.

There is only one point to which I feel it is desirable to refer at the moment. You mentioned that the question of the ownership of the Hawar group of islands has been referred to the India Office, who have replied that it should be considered

as Bahrein territory. In order that there may be no misunderstanding, may I refer to Walton's letter to Skiros, dated the 14th July. It is important that the company should clearly understand that His Majesty's Government's position is as stated in the last sentence of that letter, namely, that, on the basis of the evidence at present before them, it appears to them that Hawar belongs to the Sheikh of Bahrein and the burden of disproving his claim would lie on any other potential claimant. Perhaps you will be kind enough to drop me a line to confirm that the company appreciate the limited nature of the decision given by His Majesty's Government in regard to this group of islands.

Yours sincerely,
M. J. CLAUSON.

Enclosure 3 in No. 11.

Mr. Longrigg to Mr. Clauson.

Petroleum Concessions (Limited).

London, September 15, 1936.

My dear Clauson,

YOUR letter of the 14th September. The limited nature of the decision given by His Majesty's Government in regard to the Hawar group of islands is clearly understood by the company. When I said in my note that you had replied that Hawar "should be considered as" Bahrein territory, I should perhaps have said "that it might temporarily and provisionally be considered as." My note was aiming at a brevity which I fear it failed to achieve.

Yours sincerely,
STEPHEN H. LONGRIGG.

[E 6720/131/25]

No. 12.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received October 26.)

(No. 278.)

Jedda, October 6, 1936.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to report that your despatch No. 221, dated the 26th August, regarding the Treaty of Jedda, &c., arrived only the day before I reached Jedda, and that consequently Mr. Calvert had no time to act on the instructions in paragraph 2 of your despatch before I took over from him. I informed the Amir Feisal, at the dinner which he gave the day after I presented my credentials, that we were ready to effect the proposed exchange of notes, but the Amir had no responsible official of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs with him in Taif, and Sheikh Yusuf Yasin had to be fetched from Riyadh. He arrived at Jedda on the 30th September, very anxious that the formalities should be concluded at once, and in particular that the Slavery Regulation should appear in the Mecca newspaper, the *Umm-al-Qura*, on the 2nd October, Friday, which is the only day in the week on which this paper is published.

2 With some difficulty Sheikh Yusuf Yasin, who is, I gather, both suspicious and fussy, was persuaded to agree to the amendment suggested in paragraphs 3 and 5 of your despatch, so that the object of the notes should read as the modification of the conditions under which the treaty might be terminated. He was, however, very anxious to insert a passage referring to the modification of certain provisions of the Treaty of Jedda and of the Clayton letters, and a harmless draft was made to which your approval was given in your telegram No. 111, dated the 2nd October. Meanwhile, I felt that the instructions in your despatch No. 221 referred to above justified the immediate exchange of the confidential notes after amendment of the passage criticised by the Foreign Office to the unimpeachable phrase "notes relative to the Treaty of Jedda," and the publication of the Slavery Regulation. The confidential notes were therefore exchanged on the 1st October, and the Slavery Regulation appeared on the 2nd October. For the third step, however, I awaited the receipt of your reply to my telegram No. 111, dated the 30th September, in which, besides quoting the

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additional words proposed by Sheikh Yusuf Yasin, I recommended that, to obviate the delay which would result if we waited for a reply from Ibn Saud as to slaves on hand at the moment of the exchange of the final notes, we should be content with a letter which I was sending with the confidential note, explaining that my signature would be affixed to the final note on the assumption that slaves on hand at that moment would be dealt with under the old arrangement, a point on which I anticipated no difficulty. On receipt of your telegraphic reply, No. 111, dated the 2nd October, the exchange of the final notes was duly effected. I should explain that the Amir Feisal remained at Taif throughout, the two notes being sent up to him for signature and handed to me, signed, by Sheikh Yusuf Yasin.

3. Enclosed herewith are the undermentioned documents:—

- (a) Confidential note about slavery signed by the Amir Feisal on the 1st October, 1936, enclosing Slavery Regulation (in Arabic).
- (b) Certified English translation of (a).
- (c) Certified English translation of enclosure to (a) (Slavery Regulation published in *Umm-al-Qura* of the 2nd October).
- (d) Certified copy of confidential reply to (a) from His Majesty's Minister, dated the 1st October, 1936.
- (e) Certified Arabic translation of (d).
- (f) Copy of personal letter from His Majesty's Minister, dated the 1st October, 1936, informing the Amir Feisal that the note about the Treaty of Jedda will be signed on the assumption that slaves on hand at that moment will be dealt with under the arrangement in force hitherto.
- (g) Saudi note regarding the Treaty of Jedda, signed by the Amir Feisal on the 3rd October (in Arabic).
- (h) Certified English translation of (g).
- (i) Certified copy of reply to (g) from His Majesty's Minister, dated the 3rd October, 1936.
- (j) Certified Arabic translation of (i).

4. The amendment of the Slavery Regulation that was suggested in paragraph 4 of your despatch under reference was found to be unnecessary, as the draft produced by Sheikh Yusuf Yasin for publication left articles 8 and 9 in the original order. The translation enclosed is the version as amended by the memorandum enclosed in Sir Andrew Ryan's despatch No. 156, dated the 26th May, with a few changes which I have ventured to make. The only change of any importance is the replacement of "law" by "Islamic law" in several places. It occurred to me that unless this change were made the reader might think that the reference was to Saudi regulations and not to the Sharia.

5. Sheikh Yusuf Yasin said that they would like to publish the final notes on Friday, the 9th October, and to issue even before that date a notice announcing the exchange of the notes. I reminded him that in such cases simultaneous publication was often adopted, and he is awaiting your reply to a telegram which I have sent to you on the subject, No. 112, dated the 4th October.

6. It was clearly a great day for Saudi Arabia when the final notes were exchanged, and Sheikh Yusuf Yasin did not fail to express the thanks of his Government to His Majesty's Government and to Sir Andrew Ryan. He reminded me that this was the third treaty concluded by the Saudi Arab Government this year, the others being those with Iraq and Egypt. It seemed to me that there was some special reason why Sheikh Yusuf Yasin had wanted the exchange of notes to be effected so rapidly, and had then wanted to publish the notes at the earliest moment possible, and I concluded that Ibn Saud felt that he had been crowded out of the limelight by the Egyptian and Syrian treaties and by the leading part played by Nuri Pasha in the Palestine negotiations, and hoped to regain his position by producing an agreement so advantageous to his country as the one now concluded.

I have, &c.
R. W. BULLARD.

Enclosure 1 in No. 12.

(b)

Amir Feisal to Sir R. Bullard.

Your Excellency,
(After compliments.)

*Mecca, Rajab 15, 1355
(October 1, 1936).*

YOU will recollect the letters exchanged between His Majesty my Lord the King and Sir Gilbert Clayton at the time of the conclusion of the Treaty of Jedda of the 18th Zul Qa'da, 1345, corresponding with the 20th May, 1927, and Sir Gilbert Clayton's statement in his said letter that His Majesty's Government would be prepared to consider the abolition of the right of manumission, previously exercised by their consular officers in this country, as soon as it should become clear that the co-operation stipulated in article 7 of the said treaty should have resulted in the enforcement of such practical measures as to render the exercise of the right of manumission no longer necessary.

Since the entry into force of the said treaty, the Government of His Majesty the King have exerted themselves to the utmost possible extent to bring the slave trade gradually to an end. With this object they have absolutely prohibited the importation of slaves by sea. They have also imposed stringent restrictions on slave traders. They think that it is now time to make new arrangements for dealing with the difficult question of slaves, better applicable to the present circumstances, and at the same time to secure the common humane object, and to put an end to an abnormal state of affairs relating to the purely internal administration of the Government of His Majesty. They have to this end drawn up a new draft regulation concerning the manumission of slaves, making slavery subject to certain specified conditions and improving the status and life of existing slaves.

I enclose a true copy of the proposed regulation which it is intended to promulgate and apply shortly. On perusing it you will no doubt see that the Government of His Majesty the King have done all that is in their power to improve the status of slaves and carefully to control the trade in them. The Government of His Majesty the King consider that when the regulation is promulgated the time will have come to abolish the system whereby the representatives of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have continued to manumit slaves presenting themselves of their own free will to His Britannic Majesty's consular officers at Jedda with a request for liberation and repatriation.

I have pleasure in informing you that the Government of His Majesty will be ready to publish and put into force this regulation immediately after the receipt of the official communication from your Excellency giving the approval of His Britannic Majesty's Government to the abolition of the aforesaid right of manumission of slaves.

As it is agreed that this note and your Excellency's reply thereto will be (kept) in the confidential archives, the publication of the record of the abolition of the aforesaid right of manumission of slaves in an official manner by your Government will be contained in the two notes relative to the Treaty of Jedda which will be exchanged and published within a very short period.

I shall be glad if your Excellency will be good enough to reply to this note of mine.

With highest respects,
FEISAL,
Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Enclosure 2 in No. 12.

(c)

Instructions concerning Traffic in Slaves.

PART I.

(Translation.)

ARTICLE 1. Whereas the provisions of the Islamic law require that the subjects of treaty States shall not be enslaved or sold it is absolutely prohibited—

- (1) To import slaves into the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia from any country by sea;

- (2) To import slaves into the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia by land routes unless the importer produces a Government document confirming that the person imported was recognised as a slave in the country from which he is imported at the time of the publication of this regulation;
- (3) To enslave free persons in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia;
- (4) To buy or obtain possession of any slave who has been imported or enslaved in any manner contravening the foregoing paragraphs after the promulgation of this regulation.

In the event of any contravention of the provisions of the foregoing paragraphs the person committing such contravention shall be liable to the following penalty:—

- (1) The slave concerned shall be considered free and set at liberty;
- (2) The customs regulations against smugglers shall be enforced;
- (3) Rigorous imprisonment shall be imposed for a period not exceeding one year.

PART II.

Art. 2. The slave shall have the following rights as against his owner or possessor:—

- (1) The right to be fed, clothed and housed;
- (2) The right to be well treated and to be employed with kindness and consideration and without harshness;
- (3) The right to free medical attention;
- (4) In general all the rights enjoyed by the members of a man's household or dependents as laid down in the provisions of the Islamic law.

Art. 3. In the event of a slave complaining of bad treatment on the part of his owner or possessor the competent authority shall summon both the complainant and the person against whom the complaint is lodged and if it is satisfied that the complaint is well-founded it shall caution the owner or possessor in the first instance and shall grant him respite for a period not exceeding two months in order to examine again the condition of the complainant and, if it is satisfied in the second instance that the grounds for complaint still exist, it shall compel the owner or possessor to divest himself of the ownership or possession of the complainant either by sale or otherwise. If the owner or possessor fails to bring the complainant before the competent authority within the period fixed by it he shall be punished in the first instance by a fine not exceeding £1 and if the contravention is repeated a fine double that amount shall be imposed and he may be sentenced to imprisonment for a period not exceeding one week.

Art. 4. Any slave who can prove that he was born free and that he was enslaved in a manner contrary to Islamic law during the period which has elapsed since the establishment of the Government of His Majesty the King in the year 1344 shall have the right to petition for his release from slavery and it is the duty of the competent authority to consent to examine the case and to give an equitable decision concerning it.

Art. 5. Subject to any rights which the owner or possessor may have reserved in a form recognised by Islamic law and recorded in writing at the time of the marriage, it shall not be lawful for the owner or possessor to separate two slaves who have contracted matrimony in accordance with Islamic law except under an order issued in accordance with that law.

Art. 6. The owner or possessor shall not separate children from their mother so long as they are minors.

Art. 7. The slave shall have the right to apply to his owner or possessor for "Mukataba" (i.e., an agreement enabling the slave to purchase his freedom), and it shall be the duty of the owner or possessor to accede to this demand and in the event of any dispute arising between owner or possessor and slave as to the amount of the sum to be paid that sum shall be assessed by the competent authorities and they shall appoint dates for its discharge. The existence of the "Mukataba" shall not be held to set aside the application of the provisions of article 3 above.

Art. 8. Any slave who was born outside the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia shall have the right to choose the place where he shall reside when he has been freed in accordance with the provisions of this regulation or in accordance with any other form recognised by Islamic law.

Art. 9. All slaves must be enrolled in a special register to be kept by the competent authorities, and every slave shall be given a certificate of identity containing his description and, in the case of males, his photograph. Certificates of identity shall be in triplicate, one to be kept by the competent authorities, one by the owner or possessor and one by the slave. There shall be entered on the certificate of identity all the formalities relating to the slave, and the owners or possessors of the slave shall be required to complete the formalities of the registration within one year from the date of the promulgation of this regulation.

Art. 10. Any slave who has not been registered by his owner in the manner set forth in the preceding article shall have the right to present himself before the competent authority and to demand to be given a certificate of freedom.

Art. 11. When slaves are transferred from the possession of one person to that of another they must be produced before one of the doctors of the Department of Public Health, in order to obtain a certificate that they are in good health.

PART III.

Art. 12. It is not permitted to engage in the traffic in slaves as an agent or broker except in accordance with an official licence issued by the competent authority.

Art. 13. A special official, entitled Inspector of Slave Affairs, shall be appointed to deal with matters relating to slaves and he shall have, in case of necessity, a travelling assistant.

Art. 14. The competent local authorities shall present a six-monthly report on the working of this regulation, containing a summary of the formalities which have been concluded, and the six-monthly reports shall be forwarded, together with the observations of the Inspector of Slave Affairs, to the Minister of the Interior within two months from the expiry of the six-monthly period covered by the report.

Art. 15. The competent authorities referred to in this regulation are the Ministry of the Interior in the capital and the Amirates in the provinces, and when cases are under consideration in accordance with the provisions of this regulation the competent authority shall form a committee to examine and give judgment concerning the matter, this committee to be composed of a representative of the said authority, a representative of the Police Department and a representative of the Administrative Council.

Art. 16. This regulation shall have effect from the date of its promulgation.

Enclosure 3 in No. 12.

(d)

Sir R. Bullard to Amir Feisal.

(Confidential.)
Your Royal Highness,
(After compliments.)

Jedda, October 1, 1936.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge with thanks the receipt of your Royal Highness's confidential note of to-day regarding the regulations, which the Saudi Arab Government propose to promulgate regarding slavery. I am authorised by my Government to give a binding assurance on their behalf that as soon as these regulations have been promulgated they will definitely renounce the right of manumission hitherto exercised by their representatives in this country. It is understood that this renunciation will be recorded in the proposed exchange of notes relative to the Treaty of Jedda on the text of which we have already agreed, and that these notes will be exchanged at the earliest possible moment after the promulgation of the said regulations.

It is further understood that your Royal Highness's note under reference and this reply will be regarded as strictly confidential.

With highest respects,
R. W. BULLARD.

Enclosure 4 in No. 12.

(f)

Sir R. Bullard to Amir Feisal.

(Personal.)

Your Royal Highness,
(After compliments.)*Jedda, October 1, 1936.*

WITH reference to the notes exchanged to-day, I have the honour to draw the attention of your Royal Highness to one point on which it is desirable that there should be no misunderstanding, viz., the position of any slaves who may happen to be in His Britannic Majesty's Legation in Jedda at the time when the notes relating to the Treaty of Jedda are exchanged. The instructions which I have received from my Government are to the effect that all such slaves should be dealt with in accordance with the procedure in force hitherto, and I therefore write this letter to explain to your Royal Highness that it is on that basis that my signature will be affixed to the note about the Treaty of Jedda which I hope to sign in the course of the next few days.

With highest respects,
R. W. BULLARD.

Enclosure 5 in No. 12.

(h)

Amir Feisal to Sir R. Bullard.⁽¹⁾

Your Excellency,

(After compliments.)

Mecca, Rajab 17, 1355 (October 3, 1936).

WHEREAS the period of seven years specified in article 8 of the Treaty of Jedda of the 18th Zul Qa'da, 1345, corresponding with the 20th May, 1927, expired on the 8th Jumad ath-Thani, 1353, corresponding with the 17th September, 1934, and under this article the operation of the said treaty may be terminated on six months' notice being given by either party to the other party:

Our two Governments have for some time past been in negotiation with the object of placing their reciprocal relations on a more stable basis, and being animated by a common desire to consolidate still further the friendly relations happily existing between them have, as a result of these negotiations, agreed, subject to certain stipulations which have been agreed upon, to modify the conditions in which the said treaty may be terminated and also to modify certain of the provisions of that treaty and of the letters annexed thereto, exchanged between His Majesty King Abdul Aziz and Sir Gilbert Clayton at the time of the conclusion of the treaty. I confirm hereinafter the stipulations agreed upon:—

1. Subject to what is set forth hereinafter in the following paragraphs the two Governments have reciprocally agreed to abolish for a period of seven solar years from to-day's date their right to give six months' notice of their wish to terminate the said treaty, as provided for in article 8 thereof.

2. There shall be added at the end of article 4 of the said treaty relative to the disposal of the effects of deceased pilgrims:—

"It is further agreed that the competent authorities of the Government of the Saudi Arab Kingdom may, at the request of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom conveyed through the diplomatic channel, sell such property or any part thereof and hand its value to the British Legation in Jedda, subject to the formalities and collection of the dues referred to in this article."

3. As regards the provision in article 10 of the Treaty of Jedda which reads "but in case of divergence in the interpretation of any part of the treaty the English text shall prevail," the two Governments agree to its deletion from the treaty, article 10 of which shall consequently read as follows:—

"The present treaty has been drawn up in Arabic and English. Both texts shall be of equal validity."

⁽¹⁾ Also printed in Treaty Series

4. The Government of His Majesty the King of Saudi Arabia reserve their rights in the Aqaba-Ma'an area as set forth in the letter of His Majesty King Abdul Aziz, King of Saudi Arabia, to Sir Gilbert Clayton, dated the 19th Zul Qa'da, 1345, corresponding with the 21st May, 1927, in reply to the letter of Sir Gilbert Clayton of the 18th Zul Qa'da, 1345, corresponding with the 19th May, 1927.

5. It is agreed that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom renounce the right of manumission of slaves referred to in the letter of Sir Gilbert Clayton to His Majesty King Abdul Aziz, King of Saudi Arabia, dated the 19th May, 1927, corresponding with the 18th Zul Qa'da, 1345, and His Majesty's reply thereto of the 19th Zul Qa'da, 1345, and cease to exercise the said right as from to-day's date.

6. Notwithstanding what is contained in Sir Gilbert Clayton's letter to His Majesty King Abdul Aziz, King of Saudi Arabia, dated the 19th May, 1927, corresponding with the 18th Zul Qa'da, 1345, and His Majesty's reply thereto, the Saudi Arab Government agree that if they should wish to purchase arms, ammunition or war materials from manufacturers in the United Kingdom, the exportation thereof shall be subject to the regulations in force in the United Kingdom at the time of exportation.

7. It is agreed that the present note and your Excellency's reply thereto confirm the acceptance by our two Governments of the stipulations set forth therein and together constitute a binding and reciprocal agreement between our two Governments which shall come into force from to-day's date.

FEISAL,
Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Enclosure 6 in No. 12.

(i)

*Sir R. Bullard to Amir Feisal.⁽¹⁾*Your Royal Highness,
(After compliments.)*Jedda, October 3, 1936.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Royal Highness's note of the 17th Rajab, 1355, corresponding with the 3rd October, 1936, in which you recall the fact that the period of seven years specified in article 8 of the Treaty of Jedda of the 20th May, 1927, corresponding with the 18th Zul Qa'da, 1345, expired on the 17th September, 1934, corresponding with the 8th Jumad ath-Thani, 1353, and that under the said article the operation of the said treaty may be terminated on six months' notice of such termination being given by either party to the other party. Your Royal Highness refers to the negotiations in which our two Governments have been engaged for some time past with the object of placing their relations on a more stable basis and to the fact that, animated by a common desire to consolidate still further the friendly relations happily existing between them, they have, as a result of those negotiations, agreed to modify the conditions under which the said treaty may be terminated, and also certain of the provisions of the said treaty and of the letters exchanged between His Majesty King Abdul Aziz and Sir Gilbert Clayton at the time of the conclusion of the treaty, subject to certain stipulations which have been agreed upon and which are recited in your Royal Highness's note under reference.

I have the honour to confirm, on behalf of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, the agreement which has been reached and the stipulations to which it is subject, as follows:—

1. Subject to what is set forth in the following paragraphs, the two Governments have agreed reciprocally to renounce for a period of seven solar years from to-day's date their right to give six months' notice of their wish to terminate the said treaty, as provided in article 8 thereof.

⁽¹⁾ Also printed in Treaty Series.

2. The following addition shall be made at the end of article 4 of the said treaty relative to the disposal of the property of deceased pilgrims:—

"It is further agreed that the competent authorities of the Saudi Arabian Government may, at the request of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, conveyed through the diplomatic channel, sell such property, or any part thereof, and hand the value thereof to the British Legation in Jedda, subject to the formalities and collection of the dues mentioned in this article."

3. As regards the provision in article 10 of the Treaty of Jedda which reads "but in case of divergence in the interpretation of any part of the treaty the English text shall prevail," the two Governments agree to the deletion of this provision from the treaty, article 10 of which shall consequently read as follows:—

"The present treaty has been drawn up in English and Arabic. Both texts shall be of equal validity."

4. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom take note of the reservation made in paragraph 4 of your Royal Highness's note under reference with regard to the Aqaba-Ma'an area, as set forth in the letter of His Majesty King Abdul Aziz, King of Saudi Arabia, to Sir Gilbert Clayton dated the 19th Zul Qa'da, 1345, corresponding with the 21st May, 1927, in reply to Sir Gilbert Clayton's letter of the 19th May, 1927, corresponding with the 18th Zul Qa'da, 1345. My Government, for their part, adhere to the position defined in the said letter of Sir Gilbert Clayton.

5. It is agreed that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom renounce the right of manumission of slaves referred to in the letters addressed by Sir Gilbert Clayton to His Majesty King Abdul Aziz, King of Saudi Arabia, on the 19th May, 1927, corresponding with the 18th Zul Qa'da, 1345, and His Majesty's reply thereto of the 19th Zul Qa'da, 1345, corresponding with the 21st May, 1927, and will cease to exercise the said right as from the date of this exchange of notes.

6. Notwithstanding what is contained in Sir Gilbert Clayton's letter to His Majesty King Abdul Aziz, King of Saudi Arabia, of the 19th May, 1927, corresponding with the 18th Zul Qa'da, 1345, and His Majesty's reply thereto, the Saudi Arab Government agree that if they should wish to purchase arms, ammunition or war materials from manufacturers in the United Kingdom, the exportation thereof shall be subject to the regulations in force in the United Kingdom at the time of exportation.

7. It is agreed that your Royal Highness's note under reference and this reply confirm the acceptance by our two Governments of the stipulations set forth therein and together constitute a binding and reciprocal agreement between our two Governments, which shall come into force from to-day's date.

With highest respects,

R. W. BULLARD.

[E 6851/131/25]

No. 13.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received November 2.)

(No. 283.)

Sir,

Jedda, October 11, 1936.

I HAVE the honour to report that, after the exchange of notes on the 3rd October, Sheikh Yusuf Yasin asked whether he could see me about certain other questions, and it was arranged that he should call at the Legation on the 5th October. He had already asked whether I wished to continue the discussion of the Koweit and frontier questions or would prefer to await the return of Fuad Bey Hamza, which was expected to occur very soon, and I told him that the Saudi counter-draft of article 1 of the proposed Koweit regulations against smuggling was being considered by His Majesty's Government, and that, as to the other matters, it would perhaps be well for me to wait until Fuad Bey's return, since I was new to the post, and needed as much time as possible to make myself

fully acquainted with the relevant files. Sheikh Yusuf had made no objection to this, and had concluded that all questions of major interest were therefore in abeyance, and that on the 5th October he would discuss minor questions at issue, such as the blacklisting of certain pilgrim guides. He, however, embarked upon a long statement on foreign affairs, which, he said, he had been charged to make by His Majesty King Abdul Aziz. He spoke very carefully, hesitating from time to time, as though to recall Ibn Saud's exact words. The statement, however, was so clearly, in its more important parts, only a repetition of many statements made to the Legation during the Ethiopian dispute, that it has been possible to cut down to a page or so the summary which I attach to the present despatch.

2. In reply, I said that Sheikh Yusuf must not expect a detailed answer. I was new to the post, and I had not been warned what he proposed to talk about. (I might have reminded him that when he asked for a meeting I had enquired whether he wished to speak of anything of great importance, so that I might be prepared, and that he had waved this aside.) As to Palestine, I was happy to say that, when I was received by Mr. Eden after my appointment, he authorised me to convey to His Majesty King Abdul Aziz his personal thanks for the help offered in connexion with the Palestine dispute. On all other points except one my remarks were purely conventional. The exception was Italy, though even on this point I confined myself to generalities. I said that it was clearly impossible for me to go beyond statements made to the Saudi Government by Sir Andrew Ryan, acting on instructions from His Majesty's Government. For myself, I would suggest that the Saudi Government should take a long view and not think only of the Ethiopian question, which had been complicated by the fact that the whole world was trying to find a solution by hitherto untried methods. The Saudi attitude towards the Italian offer of money and arms was presumably prompted by a desire to maintain their independence, an aim which must have the fullest sympathy of His Majesty's Government. His Majesty would do well to look again at the Rome understanding of 1927. It was not usual to give such assurances as the Saudi Arab Government had wished to receive. What would happen would depend on world affairs, on a host of circumstances. The King had at least one solid fact to go upon—the long experience of His Majesty's Government to which Sheikh Yusuf had referred with appreciation. I stated that what Sheikh Yusuf had said would be reported to the Foreign Office, and I concluded with suitable thanks for the assurances of friendship, and with similar assurances on our own part.

3. Since the meeting which I have described, I have read with great attention all the papers relating to the attempt made by Ibn Saud a few months ago to obtain from His Majesty's Government assurances that they would assist him if he should be threatened by the Italians. It is difficult to see what Ibn Saud expects to gain by raising this point again, when it has been dealt with so fully and so many times by my predecessor, acting on instructions from His Majesty's Government. But I did not gather that Ibn Saud was really expecting a more favourable reply, but only that he was stating his position. Perhaps he felt that it was the proper thing to do, on the appointment of a new British Minister, to give a summary of his foreign policy as it affects His Majesty's Government. And then the oriental always attaches importance to individuals, and hopes that B will get him better terms than were offered by B's predecessor, A.

4. I imagine that you will wish me to express my thanks for the assurances of friendship, and perhaps your particular pleasure, at Ibn Saud's remembering occasions before the war when the support of His Majesty's Government was of assistance to him, and to say, with regard to the references made by Sheikh Yusuf Yasin to Italy, that Sir Andrew Ryan went into this question so fully and explained so clearly the attitude of His Majesty's Government that I am unable to add anything to what he said. I await your instructions.

I have, &c.

R. W. BULLARD.

Enclosure in No. 13.

Brief Summary of a Statement made by Sheikh Yusuf Yasin to His Majesty's Minister on October 5, 1936.

FRIENDSHIP with His Majesty's Government had long been the basis of Ibn Saud's foreign policy. He had been in relations with them since the early days of his career and was grateful for their support. In particular, he was grateful for the help they gave him at a moment when the Turks were about to attack him. They asked the Turks to give them a few months' notice before the beginning of hostilities, so that British subjects and their property might be removed from Nejd, and, in the interval, he was able to come to terms with the Turks. Ibn Saud now saw danger in three quarters: near, farther off, and remote, viz., Italy, Turkey and Germany. (N.B.—Germany was not mentioned again.) The Italians had been the last to recognise Saudi Arabia, and their conduct in regard to Asir and the Yemen had been very suspicious, but at the time of the Ethiopian dispute there had been a complete revolution in their policy towards Saudi Arabia. Italy had recently wished to give Ibn Saud arms and munitions to the value of perhaps £1 million. He had not wanted to accept, but, to avoid giving offence, he had accepted a few aeroplanes. He had informed Sir Andrew Ryan, and had asked whether His Majesty's Government could give him assurances. He regretted that they had not been able to do more than refer him to the Rome understanding of 1927.

The Turks were ancient enemies of the Arabs, and resented the rise to independence and importance of people whom they regarded as savages. It was fear of the Turks that had impelled him to initiate the negotiations that had ended with the treaty with Iraq. (Here Sheikh Yusuf Yasin made a brief but very cordial reference to Iraq.)

Difficulties with Transjordan arose from time to time (Sheikh Yusuf hinted that these were due to the incurable levity of character of the Amir Abdullah), but Ibn Saud did not want trouble there. He had always been conciliatory, and he trusted that with the help of His Majesty's Government such difficulties as arose would always be settled satisfactorily. As to Syria, Ibn Saud had made a point of keeping on good terms with the French. In regard to Palestine, Ibn Saud had no other aim than to see peace re-established between two parties, both of whom were his friends.

The statement ended with conventional but strong assurances of friendship.

[E 6850/486/25]

No. 14.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received November 2.)

(No. 282. Confidential.)

Sir,

Jedda, October 10, 1936.

I HAVE the honour to submit herewith the Jedda report for September 1936.

2. Copies have been distributed as for the report for July last.

I have, &c.

R. W. BULLARD.

Enclosure in No. 14.

JEDDA REPORT FOR SEPTEMBER 1936.

I.—Internal Affairs.

293. Ibn Saud, who was reported last month to be slightly indisposed, is now restored to health, and at the end of the month Sheikh Yusuf Yasin stated that the King was away from Riyadh and engaged in the hunting expeditions which normally occupy most of his time at this season of the year. Almost at the same moment the *Umm-al-Qura* announced that His Majesty had left Riyadh on the 30th September "to inspect the affairs of his subjects" in the north. The Amir Saud is staying in Riyadh, where he is being joined by the Amir Feisal.

294. The Amir Feisal came down from Taif to Jedda on the 21st September and left again the following night. The main purpose was to receive on behalf of Ibn Saud the letters of credence of Sir Reader Bullard, the new British Minister, and of Hamdi Bey Sadr-al-Din, the new Iraqi Chargé d'Affaires, who had arrived on the 6th September. On the 22nd he gave a dinner to celebrate the arrival of His Majesty's Minister. In deference to the court mourning it was confined, like the farewell dinner to Sir Andrew Ryan, to members of the British Legation and a few Saudi officials and notables. The moment it was over the Amir made for the hills, whither his British guests who, after a heavy meal on a sticky evening, had become "dem'd damp, unpleasant bodies," would have been glad to follow him.

295. In the absence of Fuad Bey Hamza abroad and of Sheikh Yusuf Yasin at Riyadh, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs at Taif showed no activity. On the last day of the month, however, Sheikh Yusuf came down from Taif, where he had just arrived from Riyadh, to suggest a programme for the publication of the proposed Saudi Slavery Regulation and for the exchange of notes with His Majesty's Legation regarding the Treaty of Jedda. At the end of the month it was understood that Fuad Hamza had reached Egypt via Syria, and was kicking his heels there awaiting the return of Nahas Pasha from Europe on the 12th October, presumably to confer over the Palestinian situation.

296. (Reference paragraph 204 of report for June.) Muhammad Id-Rawwaf, the Deputy Kaimakam of Jedda, returned from leave in Syria on the 20th September.

297. Aerial activity has been more restricted during September, one machine only being used for morning exercises, and that irregularly, but the Amir Feisal, during his brief visit to Jedda of the 21st-22nd September, was present at the inauguration of the aerodrome and "Arabian School of Aviation," as it is called, at Kandara (see paragraph 266 of the report for last month). The new landing ground has not yet come into use, however.

298. The appointment is reported of Aziz Bey as Commandant of the Mecca garrison, in place of Tahsin Bey. He is an Iraqi, who played a rôle here in Shereefian days, but early turned his coat on the Wahabi invasion of the Hejaz. His predecessor in this post, Tahsin Bey, by origin a Turk, has, it is stated, been given the position of principal secretary to the Deputy Minister for Defence, Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman.

299. It appears that the Saudi Arabian Mining Syndicate have not yet found the water without which the gold discovered at Mahd-ad-Dhahab might as well be so much sand. The Swedish geophysicist hold out no hope of their finding water within an economic radius of the ore. The water-diviner, however, declared that water was to be found at a spot within that radius, and the company are apparently prepared to drill there. But the diviner left, refusing to go to Wejh to repeat his experiments there, but whether he was unwilling to stay until his assertion has been put to the test, or whether he was merely scared at the death of Lieutenant Thomas from heat stroke in the car in which they were travelling together to the mine, is not known. The syndicate have now established their own landing grounds (their only aeroplane is at present, it will be recollected, based on Wejh), at Jedda, Mahd-ad-Dhahab, Wejh, Yanbu, Dhaha and Taif.

300. The Jedda manager of the California Arabian Standard Oil Company in Hasa states that the company have recently made a loan to the Saudi Arabian Government. He did not mention the amount. It is supposed that the sum is part of the advance of £50,000 that is due to the Government upon discovery of oil in commercial quantities, and that, although the output attained does not yet fall within the definition of "commercial quantities" laid down in the concession, the company's confidence in the future of the Hasa wells justifies their being more generous than the letter of the concession requires. The manager also states that an advance has been made to the Saudi Government by the Saudi Arabian Mining Syndicate, and gives it as his opinion that with these two advances and the sum paid by Petroleum Concessions (Limited) for the oil rights in Western Arabia, the Government should have a gold reserve sufficient to maintain the Saudi riyal at its par rate of 20 to the gold pound. This may be true, but it is difficult to believe that orthodox economics have made such headway in this country that a large sum in gold would be kept for the sole purpose of maintaining the value of the local currency. It is useless to talk Bagehot to, for instance, royal wives who spurn Fords and insist on Buicks.

[14940]

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301. Sheikh Yusuf Yasin spoke to His Majesty's Minister with satisfaction about the quality of the oil now being extracted in Hasa, which he said was very much higher than that of the Bahrein oil. He added that the Saudi Government had not yet granted a concession for what was probably the richest oil area, the Wadi Sirhan. This is a surprising statement, as hitherto the Wadi Sirhan has not been mentioned as a possible oil-field.

302. The manager of the California Arabian Standard Oil Company had a visitor for several days, viz., an American named Pinckard, who represents the Texas oil interests, and is said to be their marketing manager for China. The object of the visit is believed to be to fill in the details of an arrangement already concluded, by which Mr. Pinckard's firm will market the oil extracted by the California Arabian Standard Oil Company in Hasa and possibly in Bahrein too. It is suspected that Mr. Pinckard has his eye on the Sudan and Egyptian markets.

303. According to a report, which seems to have some foundation, a considerable number of policemen took advantage of the presence of the Amir Feisal in Jedda to demand an interview, so that they might request payment of the heavy arrears of wages owing to them. It is reported that the authorities, fearing that some violent demonstration might be made against the Amir, brought other police down from Mecca, who, when the malcontents had been disarmed by a trick, escorted them, in their underclothes and bareheaded, up to Mecca, where they have been put in prison.

304. Some two or three years ago a tax on merchants and shopkeepers was imposed, the maximum being £2 gold per annum and the minimum £½ gold. It seems that there was much opposition to this tax on the score of unfair grading, and that many persons withheld payment pending an appeal to the King. Orders have now been issued that the tax is to be collected, with all arrears due.

II.—Frontier Questions and Foreign Relations in Arabia.

305. The situation in Palestine continued to absorb the attention of the politically-minded, but real interest is limited to a relatively small circle in the Hejaz. Both Meccan newspapers have maintained complete discretion on the subject during the month, and this may be taken as an index to the Royal policy. Mr. Calvert, on the 8th September, under instructions, communicated unofficially to Amir Feisal, His Majesty's Government's communiqué issued to the press in England on that date.

306. The new Iraqi Chargé d'Affaires, Hamdi Bey Sadr-al-Din, to whom a reference is made at paragraph 294, arrived on the 8th September.

III.—Relations with Powers outside Arabia.

307. Sir Reader Bullard arrived in H.M.S. *Londonderry* on the 14th September to take up his duties as His Majesty's Minister in succession to Sir Andrew Ryan. He presented his credentials to the Amir Feisal on the 21st September.

308. No matters of importance came up for discussion between His Majesty's Legation and the Minister for Foreign Affairs until the last day of the month, when Sheikh Yusuf Yasin came to Jedda from Riyadh and proposed that the Saudi Slavery Regulation should be published in the *Umm-al-Qura* on Friday, the 2nd October, and that the exchange of notes regarding the Treaty of Jedda should be effected as soon after as possible. It may be mentioned here, in anticipation of the October report, that the programme proposed was adopted and that the notes were exchanged on the 3rd October.

309. The Saudi Government intend to be represented at the coronation of His Majesty King Edward VIII by a high personage, but before deciding whom to designate, they propose to find out what sort of delegations are to be sent by "other Arab States," e.g., Egypt and Iraq.

310. The Imperial Airways air-liner *Horsa*, referred to at paragraph 283 of the last report, was successfully repaired and returned to Bahrein on the 12th September. Notice of the forced landing had been sent to the Saudi authorities, but it could be argued that this was not necessary, since the region where the *Horsa* landed, viz., 40 miles due south of Salwa Wells, lies outside the territory admitted by His Majesty's Government as belonging indisputably to Saudi Arabia and in an area which has for some time been a subject of discussion between the two Governments.

311. Another case of forced landing occurred in the Persian Gulf when two R.A.F. machines were obliged to make an emergency landing on the 29th September on the Hasa coast, near Ras-al-Khanliya (or Khaliya), about 60 miles north-west of Bahrein. The aircraft were able to take off again a little more than one hour later, after the necessary repairs had been effected. The customary official note expressing regret was addressed to the Saudi Arab Government.

312. An article appeared in the local press expressing satisfaction at the conclusion of the Franco-Syrian Treaty as another step on the road to the independence of Arab territories and eventual Arab union. The article appeared in the *Saut-ul-Hejaz*, which official pretence alleges to be unofficial, and it was signed by a name of no importance, but like everything else that is published in the local press it can be taken as the official view. No reference is made in the article to the Palestine problem, which the Saudi newspapers have consistently ignored except to the extent of publishing lists of sums collected for sufferers in Palestine. Indeed, His Majesty's Government even came in for a compliment, for having granted the Egyptians more favourable terms than the French have granted to the Syrians. But the article is of general application and the Arab reader will naturally ask why what is good for Egypt and Syria and Iraq should not be good for Palestine.

313. M. Persico, the Italian Minister, left suddenly for Eritrea on the 30th August, without informing his colleagues. He returned on the 18th September. He told His Majesty's Minister that he had had an interesting motor-car trip of some 400 miles with the Governor of Eritrea, from Asmara into Ethiopia. He stated that the Moslems looked contented, but the Coptic priests sulky. The sulks he attributed to loss of income due to recent events, but his vice-consul, M. Bellini, hastened to explain that the Italian authorities would subsidise the Coptic priesthood in the same way as the Roman Catholic Church. M. Persico said, with a leer, that the local women were mad on the "white" troops, who, he implied, put up the feeblest resistance. This was sad hearing for a foreigner who had read of the Duce's assurance that miscegenation in Ethiopia would not be allowed.

314. Early in September the Italian Legation distributed broadcast in Jedda copies of two Arabic newspapers, the *Barid Barqa* of Benghazi and the *Al Adl* of Tripoli. These contained, for the most part, news of Italian progress in Ethiopia, where the Arabic language was to be employed at Harrar in the law courts, and illustrations of Islamic institutions in Italian North Africa.

315. Italian shipping in the Red Sea, as far as it can be observed from Jedda, remains much the same as usual. A shipping agent here recently expressed the view that during the past six months, there had been, if anything, a falling off in numbers of Italian ships calling at Jedda.

316. The treaty of commerce between Italy and the Yemen, which was signed on the 2nd September, 1928, has been extended, but only for eleven months.

317. On the 4th September the *Umm-al-Qura* published an official communiqué announcing the appointment of Sheikh Fauzan-as-Sabiq as Saudi Arab Chargé d'Affaires "to the court of His Majesty the King of Egypt," and consul-general in Cairo, to date from the 25th August, 1936.

IV.—Miscellaneous.

318. H.M.S. *Londonderry*, which arrived with His Majesty's Minister on the 14th September, left for Malta on the 18th September.

319. The object of the journey from the Hejaz to the Hadhramaut, which Mr. Philby has just performed, is still obscure. All that the Jedda manager of his firm seems to know is that Mr. Philby proposed to return via Najran, when he has received the motor spares for which he is waiting at Mukalla.

320. Saudi hostility to the International Quarantine Board and to its sanitary control of pilgrims, to which reference was made in paragraph 230 of the June report, was again voiced in an article in the *Umm-al-Qura*, which claimed as an ally the Egyptian newspaper *Al Balagh*. The *Umm-al-Qura* alleged that a reply made to a question in the Chamber of Deputies by the Egyptian Minister of the Interior was based on false information supplied by the administration of the Quarantine Board.

321. Motor transport for pilgrims is to receive its annual reinforcement. Messrs. Sharqieh (Limited) have imported this month 150 Ford vehicles, mainly

trucks, but including a number of *de luxe* touring cars. It is to be hoped that pilgrim transport this year will be more adequate and less disreputable.

322. The prohibition of the carrying of passengers in private cars has been published again, in the *Saut-ul-Hejaz* of the 1st September.

323. The devaluation of the French and Netherlands currencies came as an unpleasant shock to the Saudi authorities as likely to diminish the number of pilgrims from North Africa and the Dutch East Indies. The pilgrims from Tunis, Morocco and Algiers are never very numerous, but some 7,000 Javanese were expected to make the pilgrimage this time, and if the purchasing power of their money is to be reduced, as against charges and prices in the Hejaz, which are based on gold, by perhaps a quarter or a third, some may be unable to come and those who do come will have less to spend.

324. The Saudi press announce the creation of a Pilgrimage Propaganda Bureau at Mecca. Its activities are to be superintended by a council, under the presidency of the Minister of Finance.

325. The Saudi authorities were greatly disturbed during the last pilgrimage by the large number of destitute Indians who landed on the Arabian side of the Persian Gulf with the intention of making the Hajj. They are a little relieved to learn that the Resident in the Persian Gulf and the Muscat authorities have devised means for preventing the departure of such persons from Gwadar this year, and for watching the Batinah Coast, which is the objective of most of the destitute pilgrims, to prevent the landing of such persons in Muscat territory.

326. The discovery is announced of a spring of water at Umm Salem on the Jedda-Mecca road. Much appears to be expected of this, and there is talk of leading the water via the Waziriah conduits to Jedda, but on the face of it this project does not seem promising.

327. The position as regards the manumission of slaves by the Legation during September was as follows:—

On hand at the beginning of the month: 3 males and 4 females.
Took refuge in September: Nil.
Manumitted and repatriated: 1 female.
Locally manumitted: Nil.
Left voluntarily: 2 males.
On hand at the end of the month: 1 male and 2 females.

328. The two slaves to whom reference was made last month in paragraph 292, solved what might have been a difficult question by disappearing from the Legation. As they had first persuaded the doorkeeper to absent himself to buy them something in the bazaar, it is clear that their disappearance was not only voluntary, but premeditated.

[E 7007/2617/91]

No. 15.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received November 9.)

(No. 286. Confidential.)

Sir,

Jedda, October 17, 1936.

WITH reference to Mr. Calvert's Confidential despatch No. 239 of the 5th September last, I have the honour to report that the Italian Legation has recently distributed locally further copies of the *Barid-al-Barqa*, the newspaper in Arabic published at Benghazi. Copies dated the 16th and 24th August and the 8th September have come to my notice.

2. Much of the news contained in these three issues is not worth reporting in detail. In that of the 6th September, however, is a leading article entitled: "Pacific Policy of Italy: Renewal of Friendship between Italy and the Yemen," in which a reference is made to the extension of the treaty of 1926, between the two countries, for a further period of one year (until November 1937). This is claimed as proof of the friendly disposition of the Fascist State towards Arab countries generally, with whom Italy desires to promote economic relations based on respect for their institutions and for their inviolability. The article alludes to the circulation in the press in some Arab countries of reports that Italy intended to attack the Yemen, and declares it superfluous to publish further

denials of such reports (which it attributes to unspecified foreign sources), in view of the Duce's pronouncement that Italy will now confine her activities to the peaceful development of Ethiopia.

3. I am sending copies of this despatch to Cairo, Addis Ababa and Aden.

I have, &c.

R. W. BULLARD.

[E 7326/486/25]

No. 16.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received November 24.)

(No. 298. Confidential.)

Sir,

Jedda, November 1, 1936.

I HAVE the honour to submit herewith the Jedda report for October 1936.

2. Copies have been distributed as for the report for July last.

I have, &c.

R. W. BULLARD.

Enclosure 1 in No. 16.

JEDDA REPORT FOR OCTOBER 1936.

I.—Internal Affairs.

329. According to the Mecca press, Ibn Saud returned to Riyadh from Qasim and Hail on the 24th October. The Amir Feisal, who was visited at Taif by the Amir of Jauif, Abdul Aziz-al-Sdayri, at the beginning of October, left for Riyadh soon afterwards.

330. Sheikh Fuad Hamza is still abroad. He is believed to be in Egypt, where he is perhaps watching the Palestine situation. Sheikh Yusuf Yasin left for Mecca and thence for Riyadh as soon as the exchange of notes regarding the Treaty of Jedda had been effected and the date for a simultaneous communiqué by the British and Saudi Governments had been fixed. Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman was authorised to sign documents on behalf of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, but in a few days he also left for Riyadh, and, it is believed, for a tour of inspection to Hasa, and the authority to sign was conferred on his brother Sheikh Hamad Suleiman.

331. Various scraps of news tend to show that the Saudi treasury is not too full. The consolidated pilgrim tax is slightly higher this year than last. The police, who demanded the arrears of wages (paragraph 303), are said to have been imprisoned in Mecca and severely beaten. One of the quarantine doctors at Jedda complained to a European that his pay had been reduced from £37½ gold a month to £20 gold, and his chief's from £50 gold to £25 gold. A "medical aid" stamp of ½ piastre now has to be affixed to all letters and documents in addition to the postage and revenue stamps. The 150 cars and lorries imported by Sharqieh (Limited) this year are all that the Ford Company would give credit for. The Saudi Government wanted 200, but the number was cut down to 150. They had to pay something like cash for eighteen additional cars which they needed. The first two batches of pilgrims from the Far East have been subjected to a customs examination of unprecedented rigour, conducted by the Director of Customs in person, and duty has been charged on articles and small quantities of food such as had hitherto escaped assessment.

332. A rumour that a Registration Department is to be set up in Mecca and is to make a census of the male population has inevitably led to the general belief that conscription will follow. At present the small regular forces are employed in the towns upon what are little more than police duties, and it is unlikely, even if Ibn Saud could afford to maintain a considerable regular army, that it could ever take the place of the tribal levies which won victories for him against Hamid-bin-Rifada and Feisal-ad-Dawish and the Imam of the Yemen.

333. The "Arab Saving and Economy Company," to whose mysterious activities reference was made in paragraph 243, is declared by the *Saut-ul-Hejaz* to be making suits of clothes at the rate of 90-100 a day and to be employing about sixty workmen. This clothing appears to be part of a contract for army

[14940]

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uniforms which has been secured by Sheikh Muhammad Surur for the company, and this is represented as a victory for local enterprise over a company which was formed by Husain-al-Uwaini (who, by the way, returned to Jedda on the 3rd October), with Fuad Hamza and Yusuf Yasin as shareholders, and obtained a contract for the importation of uniforms and civilian clothing. There is nothing improper by Saudi standards in the participation of officials in a company which sells its goods to the State. On the contrary, it appears that Ibn Saud has ordered all the leading officials to take shares in the company, which has obtained the concession for the supply of electricity in Jedda.

334. Petroleum Concessions (Limited) has formed a separate company for the exploitation of the Red Sea Oil Concession, under a complicated title, which is said to be Petroleum Developments (Western Arabia) (Limited). The Jedda office is being opened by Mr. H. J. Wratislaw (British) and Mr. S. Mudaris (Syrian), who arrived on the 25th October. They are wondering how they are to staff the office with Saudi employees, for the terms of the concession forbid the company to bring in a foreigner for any post which can be filled by a Saudi. However, they interpret the clause as meaning that they are free to look outside the country for employees if they try local candidates and find them unsuitable. It may be mentioned that the Saudi Arabian Mining Syndicate have a similar clause in their concession, and find it exceedingly onerous in operation.

335. A committee for the improvement of roads in the Hejaz has been formed and has opened an office in Mecca. A road tax is being levied on pilgrims this year. It is incorporated in the consolidated pilgrim tax.

336. It is said that two of the three aeroplanes which were presented to the Saudi Government by the Italian Government have been slightly damaged. Certainly not more than one has been seen in the air at one time for some weeks. The three Italians who accompanied them are still here.

337. A fire in Jedda harbour, which consumed a dhow and 300 cases of kerosene and which the authorities tried vainly to extinguish with the aid of two or three extinguishers borrowed from European houses, has led to the issue of a municipal order prohibiting the storage even of small quantities of kerosene or petrol on private premises; all stocks must be kept at the municipal store. So far the regulation has not appeared in the press, but has only been made known through the town crier.

338. The *Saut-ul-Hejaz* of the 27th October publishes a leading article, which perhaps foreshadows legislation on the subject, protesting against the hindrance to marriage and the consequent "anarchy in morals" resulting from following the ancient custom whereby excessive sums are demanded as dowries, and unnecessarily large expenditure is incurred on marriage ceremonies and entertainments. The article says that such expenditure is beyond the reach of the youth of to-day, and asks that a law be passed to obviate these evils.

II.—Frontier Questions and Foreign Relations in Arabia.

339. The calling-off of the disorders and the strike in Palestine unmuzzled the Saudi press on the subject. The articles were mild enough, compared with the attacks in Arab papers elsewhere, but, in that they appeared in newspapers which are closely controlled by Ibn Saud, they were not without significance. The *Saut-ul-Hejaz* printed a violent telegram from the Palestine Arabs calling for a day of intercession on their behalf, and promising to shed the last drop of their blood in the defence of the Al Aqsa Mosque. Its comments were quiet, but with a definite pan-Arab tinge, and ended with the statement that all Arab countries were united as to their grievances and their desiderata. The *Umm-al-Qura* neutralised the pan-Arab tinge of its leading article to some extent by inserting a vaguely-worded but quite definite dig at Nuri Pasha for having rushed in and apparently accomplished nothing.

340. It is understood that the Iranian protest to the Saudi Arab Government about the Bahrein Agreement (paragraph 218) has drawn forth a reply to which His Majesty's Government, who were consulted beforehand, saw no reason to object, stating that the Saudi Arab Government have no knowledge of any Iranian rights in Bahrein, and saying that, on the contrary, Bahrein used to belong to the ancestors of Ibn Saud, but that the Saudi Arab Government have nevertheless recognised Sheikh Hamad-bin-Isa as Amir of the Bahrein Principality.

III.—Relations with Powers outside Arabia.

341. As was reported last month, in paragraph 308, the Saudi Slavery Regulation was published on the 2nd October. A translation of the regulation is attached to this report. It will be a long time before one can safely draw conclusions about the effect of this regulation. The most diverse comments have been heard, from prophecies that slavery will now gradually disappear, to statements that for the first time for years the former wealthy inhabitants of Mecca are praising Ibn Saud as having at last done something for them by sending up the value of their slaves.

342. Sheikh Yusuf Yasin was intensely anxious to publish the news about the signature of the agreement with His Majesty's Government, and even to publish the full text, at the earliest possible moment. The inference drawn was that Ibn Saud felt that the limelight had been diverted from him by the Syrian and Egyptian Treaties and by Nuri Pasha's activities in Palestine, and wanted to bring it back by showing what a favourable agreement he could wrest from His Majesty's Government. Out of deference to the practice of His Majesty's Government, whereby treaties are not published in full until laid before Parliament, the *Umm-al-Qura* published only a summary of the agreement, though it might almost have published the full text, since the summary mentioned all the provisions, viz., the "extension" of the Treaty of Jedda, the manner in which pilgrims' effects are to be dealt with, the recognition of the Arabic text of the treaty as of equal value with the English, the reservation of rights on both sides in regard to Aqaba and Ma'an, the renunciation of the right of manumission by His Majesty's Government, and the conditions governing the purchase of arms in Great Britain by the Saudi Arab Government. A leading article in the same number of the *Umm-al-Qura* took pains to point out that there was no more in the relations of Saudi Arabia with His Majesty's Government than with any other State, and congratulated the Government on the policy which it had adopted "in the interest of Islam in general and of the Arabs in particular."

343. His Majesty's Minister has received a private letter from Sheikh Yusuf Yasin saying that Ibn Saud is thinking of sending missions of young Saudis abroad to study aviation, and asking him to ascertain whether His Majesty's Government would be prepared to receive and assist such missions, and, if so, what help could be given and what would be the terms and the expense. Some ten to fifteen students would be sent every year, for training in civil and/or military aviation. His Majesty's Minister, who does not believe that any good could come of such a project, has sent an interim reply which, while as sympathetic as possible, reminds Sheikh Yusuf Yasin that His Majesty's Government are, at present, so fully occupied with the reorganisation and expansion of the Royal Air Force that they may be unable to grant the facilities without which the result could not be satisfactory to either party. Of all the reasons which may have prompted this request the most probable seems to be that the Italians are offering to train more Saudi "eagles" (doubtless without charge), and to deliver the other three aeroplanes, that the Saudi Government, from fear of Italy and pleasure at getting something for nothing, are disposed to accept, and that to forestall any criticism on our part they have made a proposal which, if accepted by His Majesty's Government at all, could only be accepted on financial terms which Ibn Saud could reasonably say were too heavy for his purse.

344. The Italian Legation continues to distribute regularly copies of Arabic newspapers from Italian North Africa which are full of their propaganda. To the *Barid Barca* and the *Adl*, which have been familiar here for some time, has now been added the *Raqib-al-'Atid* of Benghazi, which in its issue of the 10th September prints an anti-British article in the usual vein. The hypocritical British, while pretending to defend the poor Abyssinians against Italy, are dropping fire on the heads of Indians, killing poor people in Palestine, and undermining Arab freedom in the "nine districts of the Yemen" (an allusion to the rulers within the Aden Protectorate). It goes on to represent the British Empire as terrified by the Italian threat to its communications, and as using Palestine as a pawn in its scheme of imperial defence.

345. On the 20th October the influence of Italian propaganda on the local press was noticed for the first time, when the *Saut-ul-Hejaz* reproduced two items of news from Arabic newspapers distributed by the Italian Legation. One reported the release of all who had opposed the Italians in North Africa and

the restoration of their confiscated property, the other reproduced a speech made at the opening of a new mosque, in which a Qadhi told of the deep affection in which Moslems are held by the Italians. The *Saut-ul-Hejaz* is a dull rag, and the editor may merely have welcomed fresh material for his scissors and paste; but since the paper is closely controlled, and since the comments on Palestine (see paragraph 339) have been a little stronger than they might have been, one is tempted to believe that the Italians are now requiring some return for free aeroplanes and munitions and the training of Saudi "eagles."

346. M. Adriaanse, the Netherlands Chargé d'Affaires, who is now accredited to the Iraq Government also and called at Bagdad, presumably to present his credentials, on his way back from leave, is travelling from Bagdad to Jedda by way of Bahrein, Hasa and Riyadh. By the end of the month he had reached Hasa. It is assumed that he will be received by Ibn Saud in Riyadh.

347. The return from leave of the Turkish Chargé d'Affaires, Celal Arat, was expected, but on the 25th October an official from Angora, Muhammad Muhiuddin R. Palsay, appeared without notice in his place. M. Palsay describes himself on his card as "Représentant diplomatique de la République turque," but from the circular announcing his arrival he appears to bear the same title as his predecessor, viz., Chargé d'Affaires. He is extremely flowery and effusive in conversation, but appears to be well-meaning. He adduces, as proof of pro-British leanings, the fact that his only son has gone to study electrical engineering in London.

348. Muhammad Ali Ridha, honorary consul for Czechoslovakia, returned from a longish visit to Europe on the 12th October in good time to give a generous if fly-blown tea-party on the national day of the country which he represents.

349. The French Minister, M. Maigret, departed for Syria on leave on the 7th October.

350. M. Ilario Marinangeli (paragraph 278, August 1935) is said to have left during the month and to have been replaced by another Italian (civil) engineer whose name, however, has not been reported.

IV.—Miscellaneous.

351. The first pilgrim ship of the season was the Blue Funnel steamer *Teucer*, which arrived on the 19th October from Singapore with pilgrims from Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies. By the end of the month the number of pilgrims landed from British Malaya was 792. Pilgrims who have arrived from or via India number about 254 up to the present.

352. The Jedda quarantine authorities, on the arrival of the first two pilgrim ships of the season from Singapore, asserted that the International Sanitary Convention of 1926 had been infringed in that infants under the age of one had not been included in the computation of pilgrims and that every two children from one to twelve years of age had been counted as one person. The masters and the Jedda agents of the vessels pointed to Singapore legislation as authorising this practice, but the quarantine authorities maintained that the practice was ruled out by article 100 of the convention, which prescribes that the accommodation on pilgrim ships is to be so much per person regardless of age, though in fact it would seem that the penalties laid down in the convention in article 157 are only applicable if masters of pilgrim ships contravene article 113 (1) and bring more pilgrims than are specified in the certificates granted at the ports of embarkation. The Saudi Arab Government are, of course, sensitive about quarantine matters and might enjoy placing a European Government in the pillory for infringing the convention, and the matter is being taken up with the authorities at Singapore and with the Foreign Office. There is reason, however, to connect the objections raised by the quarantine doctors with recent reductions in pay and their failure to receive even the reduced pay on the appointed dates.

353. The Pilgrimage Propaganda Bureau whose creation was announced last month (paragraph 324) has set up in separate premises opposite the Grand Mosque at Mecca. The president is Sheikh Ibrahim Shura, an Egyptian who was formerly Director of Education, and he is said to have several paid assistants or agents. The bureau has just issued a long notice to pilgrim guides, officials, merchants and the general public, telling them how to treat pilgrims. One of its duties is believed to be to invite prominent foreign pilgrims to the bureau and there to instil pro-Saudi propaganda into them as well as propaganda for the

Haj, and also to invite them to subscribe to various objects represented as benevolent. On the other hand, it appears that the Central Haj Committee in Mecca is to be improved. Formerly it was composed exclusively of the leading pilgrim guides, but now it is to have representatives of the Advisory Council, the Ministry of Finance and the police among its members, and a member of the Advisory Council is to preside at its meetings.

354. The extraordinarily thorough customs examination referred to in paragraph 331 led to many complaints, particularly by the pilgrims from the Netherlands East Indies, that they had been subjected to unreasonable delay. In the end an arrangement had to be made for one member of each family or party to remain in Jedda to deal with the customs formalities while the rest went on to Mecca. The Minister for Foreign Affairs is said to have promised to remedy the grievances, but in any case it would be impossible to conduct such a rigorous examination at the height of the season, for even with ordinary despatch the congestion in the custom-house is very great.

355. The pilgrim tariff for the coming pilgrimage, which has now been published, differs very little from that of last year (paragraph 275, August 1935). Such changes as there are, are nearly all increases. One of the changes is the imposition of the road tax referred to in paragraph 335 above.

356. Disturbed at their heavy sick-list and the loss of two employees by death, the Saudi Arabian Mining Syndicate have brought out an expert in tropical diseases from the Ross Institute, Brevet Colonel F. Percival Mackie, C.S.I., I.M.S., to advise them. He arrived on the 11th October with Mr. Twitchell, who, it had been reported, would not return. He spent about a fortnight in Jedda, partly in a vain search for the anopheles mosquito. He should have greater success a month hence, for the anopheles hatches out after the first rains. He was well received by the health authorities, and shown the hospitals and the schools. He examined a considerable number of school children for signs of past malaria and found only about 10 per cent. with enlarged spleens. The doctor of the Italian Legation found about 86 per cent. among the people he examined, and it is assumed that he either restricted his examination to the sick or multiplied his figures by a Fascist coefficient for the production of bigger and better statistics. Colonel Mackie has now left for the Cot-of-Gold mine, and from there he will go to Taif. He has promised to give the Hejaz authorities the benefit of his researches, but even so the warmth of their welcome is remarkable. It is attributed to the fact that Colonel Mackie is here on behalf of a private firm, and one out of which the Saudi Arab Government hopes to make a large revenue. M. van de Poll, the Islamised Hollander, is said to have resigned from the Saudi Arabian Mining Syndicate. The syndicate's aeroplane was seen at Jedda twice during the month. It is believed to be based on Yanbu' now, instead of Wejh.

357. The Jedda "winter" (it has sometimes been cool enough to sleep under a sheet during this month) was inaugurated by the closing down of the local ice machine until next summer, and confirmed by two or three rains—one of them heavy and all preceded by fierce dust-storms. The cooler months are less welcome than might be expected, as there is much more sickness then than in the summer.

358. Mr. C. G. Hope Gill, His Majesty's consul at Addis Ababa, called at Jedda on the 19th October on his way home. He stated that in the course of a visit which he paid to the Yemen on his way to Jedda two persons of importance, one of them a Minister of State to the Imam, asked him why there were no broadcasts in Arabic from England as there were from Italy.

359. Mr. J. A. Smith, general manager in the Sudan of Messrs. Gellatly, Hankey and Co. (Sudan) (Limited), visited Jedda for a few days about the middle of the month and then left for Egypt.

360. Mr. Axler, of the Socony-Vacuum Oil Company, in Egypt, (paragraph 229), paid another and rather longer visit to Jedda this month. He left on the 25th October, having done little or no business with the Saudi Government.

361. Mr. Daimpré, of General Motors, paid a short visit to Jedda in October. General Motors have such small interests here, owing to the concession held by Ford's through Sharqieh (Limited), that they rarely send a representative to Jedda, but leave their interests for long periods in the hands of their agents, Messrs. Gellatly, Hankey and Co. (Sudan) (Limited).

362. Reports forwarded from Aden suggest that Mr. Philby did some log-rolling for Ibn Saud when he was in the Hadhramaut, but the absence from the

Hejaz of all the Foreign Affairs officials of any consequence has so far prevented the Legation from taking up the matter in a manner which would suit the circumstances. There is evidence, provided by Mr. Philby's engineer in Jedda, that archæology was one object of the journey. It seems that the Amir Saud, during the campaign against the Yemen, came across vestiges of antiquity in Najran, which he brought to Mr. Philby's notice, and that Mr. Philby sent to the British Museum from Najran part of a bronze lion which was discovered there. Mr. Philby is now at Najran, on the return journey, and is expected in Jedda at about the middle of November.

363. There is no change in the slave return since last month. The slaves now at the Legation, which consist of a woman and her three children, are owned by two brothers who are somewhere in the Sudan, and whom the Sudan Government are endeavouring to trace, so that they may be called upon to manumit the slaves. The agreement between His Majesty's Government and Saudi Arabia, which was signed on the 3rd October, was concluded subject to the reservation on the part of His Majesty's Government that any slaves on hand at the time of signature would be dealt with under the old manumission procedure.

Enclosure 2 in No. 16.

Provisional Translation of Regulations concerning Traffic in Slaves, issued by the Saudi Arab Government in the Umm-al-Qura of October 2, 1936.

PART I.

ARTICLE 1. Whereas the provisions of the Islamic law require that the subjects of treaty States shall not be enslaved or sold, it is absolutely prohibited:—

- (1) To import slaves into the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia from any country by sea.
- (2) To import slaves into the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia by land routes, unless the importer produces a Government document confirming that the person imported was recognised as a slave in the country from which he is imported at the time of the publication of this regulation.
- (3) To enslave free persons in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
- (4) To buy or obtain possession of any slave who has been imported or enslaved in any manner contravening the foregoing paragraphs after the promulgation of this regulation.

In the event of any contravention of the provisions of the foregoing paragraphs, the person committing such contravention shall be liable to the following penalty:—

- (1) The slave concerned shall be considered free and set at liberty.
- (2) The customs regulations against smugglers shall be enforced.
- (3) Rigorous imprisonment shall be imposed for a period not exceeding one year.

PART II.

Art. 2. The slave shall have the following rights as against his owner or possessor:—

- (1) The right to be fed, clothed and housed.
- (2) The right to be well treated and to be employed with kindness and consideration and without harshness.
- (3) The right to free medical attention.
- (4) In general all the rights enjoyed by the members of a man's household or dependents as laid down in the provisions of the Islamic law.

Art. 3. In the event of a slave complaining of bad treatment on the part of his owner or possessor, the competent authority shall summon both the complainant and the person against whom the complaint is lodged, and if it is satisfied that the complaint is well-founded it shall caution the owner or possessor

in the first instance and shall grant him respite for a period not exceeding two months in order to examine again the condition of the complainant, and if it is satisfied in the second instance that the grounds for complaint still exist it shall compel the owner or possessor to divest himself of the ownership or possession of the complainant, either by sale or otherwise. If the owner or possessor fails to bring the complainant before the competent authority within the period fixed by it, he shall be punished in the first instance by a fine not exceeding £1, and if the contravention is repeated a fine double that amount shall be imposed, and he may be sentenced to imprisonment for a period not exceeding one week.

Art. 4. Any slave who can prove that he was born free and that he was enslaved in a manner contrary to Islamic law, during the period which has elapsed since the establishment of the Government of His Majesty the King in the year 1344, shall have the right to petition for his release from slavery, and it is the duty of the competent authority to consent to examine the case and to give an equitable decision concerning it.

Art. 5. Subject to any rights which the owner or possessor may have reserved in a form recognised by Islamic law and recorded in writing at the time of the marriage, it shall not be lawful for the owner or possessor to separate two slaves who have contracted matrimony in accordance with Islamic law, except under an order issued in accordance with that law.

Art. 6. The owner or possessor shall not separate children from their mother so long as they are minors.

Art. 7. The slave shall have the right to apply to his owner or possessor for "Mukataba," (i.e., an agreement enabling the slave to purchase his freedom), and it shall be the duty of the owner or possessor to accede to this demand, and in the event of any dispute arising between owner or possessor and slave as to the amount of the sum to be paid that sum shall be assessed by the competent authorities, and they shall appoint dates for its discharge. The existence of the "Mukataba" shall not be held to set aside the application of the provisions of article 3 above.

Art. 8. Any slave who was born outside the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia shall have the right to choose the place where he shall reside when he has been freed in accordance with the provisions of this regulation or in accordance with any other form recognised by Islamic law.

Art. 9. All slaves must be enrolled in a special register to be kept by the competent authorities, and every slave shall be given a certificate of identity containing his description, and in the case of males his photograph. Certificates of identity shall be in triplicate, one to be kept by the competent authorities, one by the owner or possessor and one by the slave. There shall be entered on the certificate of identity all the formalities relating to the slave and the owners or possessors of the slave shall be required to complete the formalities of the registration within one year from the date of the promulgation of this regulation.

Art. 10. Any slave who has not been registered by his owner in the manner set forth in the preceding article shall have the right to present himself before the competent authority and to demand to be given a certificate of freedom.

Art. 11. When slaves are transferred from the possession of one person to that of another they must be produced before one of the doctors of the Department of Public Health in order to obtain a certificate that they are in good health.

PART III.

Art. 12. It is not permitted to engage in the traffic in slaves as an agent or broker, except in accordance with an official licence issued by the competent authority.

Art. 13. A special official, entitled Inspector of Slave Affairs, shall be appointed to deal with matters relating to slaves and he shall have, in case of necessity, a travelling assistant.

Art. 14. The competent local authorities shall present a six-monthly report on the working of this regulation, containing a summary of the formalities which have been concluded, and the six-monthly reports shall be forwarded, together with the observations of the Inspector of Slave Affairs, to the Minister of the

interior within two months from the expiry of the six-monthly period covered by the report.

Art. 15. The competent authorities referred to in this regulation are the Ministry of the Interior in the capital and the Amirates in the provinces, and when cases are under consideration, in accordance with the provisions of this regulation the competent authority shall form a committee to examine and give judgment concerning the matter, this committee to be composed of a representative of the said authority, a representative of the Police Department and a representative of the Administrative Council.

Art. 16. This regulation shall have effect from the date of its promulgation.

[E 7451/90/25]

No. 17.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received November 30.)

(No. 302.)

Sir,

Jedda, November 10, 1936.

AS I had the honour to inform you in my telegram No. 120, dated the 8th November, a three-engined Italian aeroplane arrived at Jedda on the 4th November. It had flown from Rome, stopping the first night, it is understood, at Cairo, and arriving here the next morning. The personnel on board are said to have numbered five. According to my information it is a Caproni of by no means the most recent make, and two more of the same type are to follow. These machines, like the three smaller aeroplanes already received from Italy, are a present from the Italian Government. They are presumably the three machines for civil aviation to which reference was first made in telegram No. 57 which Sir Andrew Ryan sent to you on the 30th April.

2. Popular opinion described the Caproni which arrived on the 4th November as a bomber. On the staff of the Saudi Arabian Mining Syndicate (Limited) there are two experienced aviators, and they state that it is not a bomber but could be easily converted for bombing purposes. It is making flights every day now, flying frequently very low over the town as though to make the greatest possible impression. It is the first machine to make use of the new Kandara aerodrome, whose inauguration was reported in paragraph 297 of the Jedda Report for September. I assume that instruction in flying this larger type of machine is being given to some of the Saudi "eagles," but there is no definite information on this point. It is alleged that only one of them, a certain Abdullah Mandili, has shown any real skill as a pilot, and that it was he who always piloted the Italian instructional aeroplane which, as I reported in paragraph 2 of my despatch No. 295 dated the 27th October, continued to fly regularly after the other two had been damaged. I may add that this third machine had not been seen in the air for over a week until to-day.

3. The press report quoted in despatch No. 1072 dated the 30th September from Rome to the Foreign Office, to the effect that fifty more Saudis were to be trained in aviation in Italy, must at least mean that Italy is prepared to train more Saudis even if Ibn Saud has not quite made up his mind to send them, and as the training would almost certainly cost Ibn Saud nothing it is difficult to suppose that he would seriously contemplate having pilots trained in the United Kingdom unless that training also was to be free—an arrangement which his knowledge of the methods of His Majesty's Government would rule out as unattainable. Moreover, to have pilots trained in the United Kingdom to fly aeroplanes given by Italy as a present would be so clumsy a method of maintaining a balance of foreign interests as to be unlikely to be adopted. I am even more inclined than when I wrote my despatch No. 295 dated the 27th October to believe that whatever the reply of His Majesty's Government to Sheikh Yusuf Yasin's enquiry about the training of Saudis in aviation in the United Kingdom, the training will in the end be effected in Italy.

4. If the Saudi Government acquire a few tolerably good pilots and a few machines, the maintenance of the machines will present a serious problem. That Saudi mechanics can be used for this purpose is excluded for many years to come, and the use of Russian refugees on a scale large enough for the purpose would be open to many objections, even if they could be recruited in sufficient numbers.

This difficulty might open the way to a *quid pro quo* which would be of great value to the Italian Government, in that the Italians could propose that in return for landing facilities at Jedda for the Italian service to Eritrea and Ethiopia, whereby flight over the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan could be avoided, Italian mechanics should be kept at Jedda to provide "service" for the Saudi aeroplanes as well as for the Italian aeroplanes using the Jedda aerodrome.

5. It seems reasonable to suppose that the Italian offers of assistance to the Saudi Government are working up to a request for facilities for Italian aviation on the Red Sea coast of Saudi Arabia, and this suggests that it might be well not to press too strongly for the present our request for facilities on the other side of Ibn Saud's territory. It is true that what we want is not facilities for regular services but only such arrangements as would minimise any danger and delay that might result from forced landings, but any concession in this direction to which Ibn Saud might agree might make it more difficult for him to resist Italian demands for permission for their aeroplanes to land at Jedda and perhaps other places on this coast, and it is for consideration whether our needs on the Persian Gulf side are sufficiently important to warrant our pressing them at the risk of assisting the Italians to secure much more valuable advantages on this side. I suggest that as the present arrangement works tolerably well it might be advisable not to take up again with the Saudi Government for the present the question of formal provision for forced landings of British aircraft in Saudi territory. If the Italians were nevertheless granted landing facilities here we should then have good ground for pressing our request for an arrangement to provide for forced landings on the Persian Gulf coast of Saudi Arabia.

6. Copies of this despatch have been sent to Cairo and Jerusalem.

I have, &c.

R. W. BULLARD.

[E 7755/52/25]

No. 18.

Sir A. Clark Kerr to Mr. Eden.—(Received December 14.)

(No. 581.)

Sir,

Bagdad, December 1, 1936.

WITH reference to my Saving telegram No. 34 of the 23rd November, I have the honour to inform you that in the course of a further talk about his visit to Riyadh the Minister for Foreign Affairs told me that he had discussed with King Abdul Aziz the accession of the Yemen to the Treaty of Arab Brotherhood and Alliance signed at Bagdad in April last. You will remember that article 6 provides that both signatories shall endeavour to secure the accession of the Yemen to this treaty.

2. King Abdul Aziz had said that he feared that, in view of the present suspicious attitude of the King of the Yemen towards himself, it would be of little use for him to ask His Majesty to join the alliance. He had, therefore, proposed that the Iraqi Government should send a delegation to Sanaa for this purpose. He had also suggested that the delegation should travel via Saudi Arabia and had promised that, in addition to making all arrangements for the journey, he would provide them with letters to King Yahya in which he would give his full support to their mission.

3. Dr. Naji-al-Asil told me that the Iraqi Government had been much taken by this proposal and had chosen Jamil Beg al Madfai to head the delegation. He hoped that they would set out on their journey quite soon, but recent news from the Yemen indicated the possibility of an outbreak of disorder, and if enquiry showed that the situation seemed likely to become serious their mission might have to be postponed.

4. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Jedda and to the Political Resident at Aden.

I have, &c.

ARCHIBALD CLARK KERR.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received December 14.)⁽¹⁾

(No. 308.)
Sir,

Jedda, November 25, 1936.

IN his despatch No. 145, dated the 14th May, my predecessor transmitted in accordance with standing instructions, the text of the treaty concluded between Saudi Arabia and Egypt. I now have the honour to forward the text, as given in the *Umm-al-Qura* of the 20th November, of notes exchanged in Cairo on the 18th November between Nahas Pasha, the Egyptian Prime Minister, and Fuad Bey Hamza, Deputy Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia, as a result of the friendly negotiations provided for in article 6 of the treaty for the settlement of outstanding questions. The letters are as follows:—

- (1) Notes exchanged regarding the resumption, with effect from the forthcoming pilgrimage, of the despatch of the "Mahmel" and of the "Kiswa" (Holy Carpet or covering of the Mecca shrine).
- (2) Notes exchanged regarding the resumption, with effect from the forthcoming pilgrimage, of the distribution of alms to the poor of the Hejaz and of the distribution in the Holy Land (of the Hejaz) of the surplus of the Wakfs of the two Holy Places.
- (3) Note from Nahas Pasha regarding a reciprocal arrangement whereby Egyptians in Saudi Arabia and Saudi subjects in Egypt will have the right to opt for Saudi or Egyptian nationality within six months from the date of the signature of the letter. (An editorial note states that Fuad Bey's telegram about the exchange of notes did not include the text of his reply on this point, but that the text of the reply corresponded to that of the note of Nahas Pasha.)
- (4) Note from Fuad Bey Hamza to Nahas Pasha assuring him that the tariff of pilgrim dues and charges will be published and communicated by the Saudi Arab Government to the Government of Egypt, every year before the pilgrim season.

2. Fuad Bey returned to Jedda from Egypt on the 22nd November, and I had an opportunity to congratulate him on the successful conclusion of his negotiations in Egypt. He expressed great satisfaction at the removal of the grounds of the friction which had hitherto been so harmful to Saudi-Egyptian relations.

3. Hejazis in general are no less happy about the result, though their interest is concentrated almost exclusively on one point, viz., the return of the stream of Egyptian trust funds to its old bed in the Hejaz.

4. A copy of this despatch is being sent to Cairo.

I have, &c.

R. W. BULLARD.

Enclosure in No. 19.

Notes exchanged between the Egyptian Government and the Saudi Arabian Government on November 18, 1936, regarding Matters in Suspense between them.

Exchange of Notes respecting the "Mahmel" and the "Kiswa."

(1)

Mustafa El Nahas Pasha to Fuad Hamza Bey.

I HAVE much pleasure in informing your Excellency that the Government of His Majesty the King of Egypt intend to resume the despatch of the Kiswa pertaining to the holy Kaabah as from the next pilgrimage season. The Mahmel, which will accompany the Kiswa, will leave Cairo at the customary time. On their arrival at Jedda, the Mahmel will remain there while the Kiswa will be despatched to Mecca where it will be placed on the Kaabah with ceremony

⁽¹⁾ The printing of this despatch has been delayed pending the receipt of translations of the notes enclosed which have been made from the texts in the Egyptian Official Journal.

appropriate to the dignity of the place and to the majesty of the Occupant of the Throne of the Hejaz.

On the Kiswa the following inscription will be embroidered: "Presented to the holy Kaabah in the reign of His Majesty King Abdel Aziz Aal Saud, King of the Saudi Arabian Kingdom."

I beg, &c.

MUSTAFA EL NAHAS,

President of the Council of Ministers.

Cairo, Ramadan 4, 1355 (November 18, 1936).

(2)

Fuad Hamza Bey to Mustafa El Nahas Pasha.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that the Government of His Majesty the King of the Saudi Arabian Kingdom have duly been informed of the intention of the Government of His Majesty the King of Egypt to resume the despatch of the Kiswa pertaining to the holy Kaabah as from the next pilgrimage season, and that on the Kiswa the following inscription will be embroidered: "Presented to the holy Kaabah in the reign of His Majesty King Abdel Aziz Aal Saud, King of the Saudi Arabian Kingdom."

I have pleasure in conveying to your Excellency the thanks of the Government of His Majesty the King of the Saudi Arabian Kingdom to the Government of His Majesty the King of Egypt for their goodwill towards the Holy Land, and for their agreement that the Mahmel should land and remain at Jedda. The mission entrusted with the transport of the Kiswa will be met at Jedda with full ceremony and the Kiswa will similarly be received with full honours in Mecca and will be placed in position with ceremony worthy of the donor.

I beg, &c.

FUAD HAMZA,

*Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
of the Saudi Arabian Kingdom.*

Cairo, Ramadan 4, 1355 (November 18, 1936).

Notes exchanged regarding the Distribution of the Surplus of the Wakfs of the two Holy Places.

(1)

Mustafa El Nahas Pasha to Fuad Hamza Bey.

I HAVE pleasure in informing your Excellency that the Government of His Majesty the King of Egypt intend to take the necessary steps to resume the disbursement of alms to the poor of the Hejaz, and to resume payment of the balance of the revenue of the Wakfs of the Haramain in the Holy Land as from the next pilgrimage season.

The Egyptian Government will appoint a committee who will undertake to supervise the disbursement of the charitable funds which will be sent by the Egyptian Government. They also intend to spend, within the limits prescribed by Mahometan law, part of the funds set apart as alms and part of the surplus revenue of the said Wakfs on repairs to the Haramain and on improvements to the surroundings thereof.

The Egyptian Government will, in due course, transmit to the Saudi Government their plans for such repairs and improvements to facilitate agreement between the two Governments regarding the specifications relative to those works.

I beg, &c.

MUSTAFA EL NAHAS,

President of the Council of Ministers.

Cairo, Ramadan 4, 1355 (November 18, 1936).

(2)

Fuad Hamza Bey to Mustafa El Nahas Pasha.

THE Saudi Government have received with pleasure your Excellency's communication in which you state that the Government of His Majesty the King of Egypt intend to take the necessary steps to resume the disbursement of alms to the poor of the Hejaz and to resume payment of the surplus revenue of the Wakfs of the Haramain in the Holy Land as from the next pilgrimage season, and that they intend to spend, within the limits prescribed by Mahometan law, part of the funds set apart as alms and part of the surplus revenue of the said Wakfs on repairs to the Haramain and on improvements to the surroundings thereof.

The Government of His Majesty the King of the Saudi Arabian Kingdom earnestly welcome the execution of the projects for the repairs and improvements which the Egyptian Government intend to undertake, and they have pleasure in informing your Excellency that the disbursement of the charitable funds will be effected under the supervision of the committee, who will be appointed by the Egyptian Government for this purpose.

I beg, &c.

FUAD HAMZA,

*Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
of the Saudi Arabian Kingdom.*

Cairo, Ramadan 4, 1355 (November 18, 1936).

Exchange of Notes regarding a Reciprocal Arrangement whereby Egyptians in Saudi Arabia and Saudi Subjects in Egypt will have the Right to Opt for Saudi or Egyptian Nationality.

(1)

Mustafa El Nahas Pasha to Fuad Hamza Bey.

I HAVE the honour to confirm hereunder the principles which have been agreed upon in respect of the nationality of those Egyptians who were resident in the territory of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia at the time when the regulations regarding Hejazi nationality were issued, and of the nationality of those Saudi Arabians who were resident in the territory of the Kingdom of Egypt at the time when the Egyptian Nationality Law was promulgated.

Each of the above-mentioned categories shall be allowed a period of six months in which to opt for either Egyptian or Saudi Arabian nationality. There shall be agreement upon the final lists containing the names of Egyptians in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and those of the Saudi Arabians in the Kingdom of Egypt within three months following the above-mentioned period.

Where any resident in one country opts for the nationality of the other country, this shall not affect his right to remain or settle in the territory of the country in which he resides.

It is understood that Egyptians or Saudi Arabians who arrived in the territory of the other country after the issue of its nationality law preserve their original nationality.

I beg, &c.

MUSTAFA EL NAHAS,

President of the Council of Ministers.

Cairo, Ramadan 4, 1355 (November 18, 1936).

(2)

Fuad Hamza Bey to Mustafa El Nahas Pasha.

I HAVE received your Excellency's letter regarding the principles which have been agreed upon in respect of the nationality of those Egyptians who were resident in the territory of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia at the time when the regulations regarding Hejazi nationality were issued, and of the nationality of those Saudi Arabians who were resident in the territory of the Kingdom of Egypt at the time when the Egyptian Nationality Law was promulgated.

I have the honour to express my approval thereof. They are as follows:—

Each of the above-mentioned categories shall be allowed a period of six months in which to opt for either Egyptian or Saudi Arabian nationality. There shall be agreement upon the final lists containing the names of Egyptians in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and those of the Saudi Arabians in the Kingdom of Egypt within three months following the above-mentioned period.

Where any resident in one country opts for the nationality of the other country, this shall not affect his right to remain or settle in the territory of the country in which he resides.

It is understood that Egyptians or Saudi Arabians who arrived in the territory of the other country after the issue of its nationality law preserve their original nationality.

I beg, &c.

FUAD HAMZA,

*Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
of the Saudi Arabian Kingdom.*

Cairo, Ramadan 4, 1355 (November 18, 1936).

*Tariff of Pilgrim Dues and Charges.**Fuad Hamza Bey to Mustafa El Nahas Pasha.*

WITH reference to your Excellency's desire that the Egyptian Government wish to be acquainted, before the beginning of the pilgrimage season, with the amount of taxes, dues and charges levied on pilgrims each year, I have the honour to inform your Excellency that the competent authorities of the Saudi Arabian Kingdom draw up a detailed tariff of the approved taxes, dues and charges and announce it before the pilgrimage season each year. His Majesty's Government will be pleased to communicate the tariff to the Egyptian Government, subsequent to its promulgation, in order that the latter may, in due time, bring it to the notice of Egyptian nationals desirous of making the pilgrimage.

I beg, &c.

FUAD HAMZA,

*Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
of the Saudi Arabian Kingdom.*

Cairo, Ramadan 4, 1355 (November 18, 1936).

[E 8005/486/25]

No. 20.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received December 28.)

(No. 313.)

Sir,

Jedda, December 5, 1936.

I HAVE the honour to submit herewith the Jedda report for November 1936.

2. Copies have been distributed as for the report for July last.

I have, &c.

R. W. BULLARD.

Enclosure in No. 20.

JEDDA REPORT FOR NOVEMBER 1936.

I.—Internal Affairs.

364. After an absence of over seven months Fuad Bey Hamza returned to Jedda on the 22nd November. He left for Mecca on the 25th, for a short visit.

365. A coming man appears to be a certain Abdullah Khuwaitir, a Nejd, who began as a friend and protégé of Abdullah Suleiman and is said to be setting up as a rival. He is a sort of director of Government purchases, and one of his

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more successful deals is said to be the buying up at very low prices of the clothing and headaddresses which Ibn Saud distributes and which the recipients promptly sell, and their resale to the Government at a profit. A comment made by the Legation's informant probably fits the case of Khuwaitir and that of many another Saudi official too. "Khuwaitir is doing a good service to his Government, but at the same time he is not missing his own interests, please."

366. The Ministry of Finance seems to be collecting its share of the charges levied on pilgrims from the mutawwifs even earlier than usual. Another sign of shortage of cash in the Government till was an attempt made by the authorities whether it succeeded or not is not yet known), to compel the Mecca mutawwifs to despatch a large camel caravan of pilgrims to Medina early in Ramadan. The object was to ensure that pilgrims should not spend all their money in Mecca and be unable to go to Medina and contribute to the exchequer by means of the heavy *koshan*. This policy was very unwelcome to all the inhabitants of Mecca who live by the pilgrimage, especially those who sell the kind of things that pilgrims may be expected to buy during Ramadan and the subsequent feast. From the point of view of the pilgrim it does not matter much which course is followed, since he will hardly get away with any money in his pocket in any case, but the direction of the pilgrim traffic by the State into those channels which secure the largest possible share of the profits for the treasury cannot fail to cause discontent among many persons whose sole source of income is the pilgrimage.

367. It is announced that the training of the first batch of twenty young Saudis in the police school established last year has been completed. The Director-General of Police returned from a visit to Iraq with a copy of the Police Regulations which he laid before the Saudi authorities. He brought with him also articles which might have been, from the context, traffic signals, or, from the root of the Arabic word, ointment to rub on the foreheads of little children. The strange word turns out, however, to be the Mejdī Arabic for drums. The damnable iteration of some of these instruments was heard daily at practice under the Legation windows, until the nuisance, which had lasted for two or three weeks, was brought to Fuad Bey's notice, whereupon it was transferred to a more suitable place. Fuad Bey points out, as a proof of the evolution which Saudi Arabia is undergoing, that a year or two ago not even drums were allowed, whereas now the Government have even ordered some wind instruments. *Ods tympana!*

368. The *Umm-al-Qura* seizes the occasion offered by the completion of the training of the first batch of police officers to urge upon the youth of the country to take advantage of the local opportunities for vocational training for the police, the army and aviation, not to mention the school to fit students to follow courses in institutions in foreign countries. The appeal would have been more attractive if it had been accompanied by an official guarantee that in future the custom of keeping official salaries several months in arrears would be discontinued. A later newspaper paragraph reports the nomination of two teachers from Egyptian colleges by the Egyptian Ministry of Education, at the request of the Saudi Government, to train Saudi students who are to go abroad to study science.

369. A leading article in the *Umm-al-Qura* calls upon Hejazis to free themselves from dependence on the pilgrimage by embarking upon industrial enterprises, and holds up the history of Japan during the last century as an example. To say that Japan had natural resources is no excuse; all countries have resources if the people are energetic. Centuries ago the Hejaz could export its surplus agricultural produce, but now through the laziness of its inhabitants it is dependent on other countries even for its food supplies.

370. Petroleum Development (Western Arabia) (Limited) are about to begin prospecting in the area covered by their concession. Four geologists have arrived for the purpose: Messrs. Owen (British), Pomeyrol (French) and Wofford and Pike (American). The work is likely to be delayed by the unsuitability of the transport provided by headquarters in London, who seem to have chosen it without reference to local conditions. The tyres are too small for desert work, and the trucks themselves are too few in number, and so small that, according to the manager, they can hardly carry their own petrol. It seems to have been overlooked that even one geologist must take with him not only spares and large quantities of petrol, but also heavy tents, and finally the escort, which is fixed by the authorities at ten men.

371. The Saudi Arabian Mining Syndicate (Limited) continue to put up permanent buildings at their terminal near Jedda, and have marked out a line for a pier over a mile long, for which it is understood the material has already been ordered. Mr. Dunckley, an Englishman, who is manager in Jedda for the syndicate, avers that the expenditure on the buildings and the pier is still unjustified, the water discovered being insufficient for the working of the Cot-of-Gold mine. Mr. Dunckley has always been dissatisfied with his position, and has now resigned and is to leave shortly, so he is a hostile witness; but Mr. Twitchell, whose optimism is responsible for the speculative expenditure, though he recently spoke of the discovery of more wells to His Majesty's Minister, did not claim that enough water had been found to make the mine workable. The syndicate's aeroplane, which is now based on Jedda, has made frequent flights for the surveying and photographing of the reefs over which the pier must pass to reach deep water. The aeroplane has lost its wireless operator, Mrs. Mountain, wife of the pilot, who has had to leave through illness. With the approval of the Saudi authorities, H.M.S. *Weston* took soundings, to supplement and confirm or correct those on the Admiralty chart, off the point where the seaward end of the pier would lie, and she is to receive from the Mining Syndicate, in exchange for these figures, copies of the aeroplane photographs of that part of the coast with its reefs.

372. Lieutenant-Colonel Ralph Micklem, C.M.G., one of the directors of the Select Trust (Limited), arrived with Colonel Etherton (paragraph 171) on the 25th November. They are interested in a mining concession which Colonel Etherton seems to have tried to secure during his previous visit. They had proposed to travel to Jedda from Cairo by air, but owing, according to Colonel Etherton, to his failure to make the circumstances clear to the Saudi authorities, the proposal was rejected. They flew to Port Sudan and reached Jedda later than if they had travelled from Egypt by steamer. They find the Saudi authorities lukewarm and elusive. This is probably because Mr. Twitchell is after the same concession for his syndicate. One of their difficulties is that they cannot get into direct touch with any official of consequence. All their negotiations so far have been through (one cannot say "with") Najib Bey Salha (see paragraph 268), a clever young Beirut-trained Egyptian who was a clerk with Messrs. Gellatly, Hankey and Company a few years ago and is now Director of Public Works.

373. It might have been thought that the appointment of a committee for the improvement of the roads in the Hejaz (paragraph 335) was mainly a pretext for the levy of a new tax on pilgrims, and the appointment of a sub-committee to look at the roads, and the issue of orders that the steam-rollers lying in the work-shops should be made ready did not necessarily mean that anything serious was being done. But the Egyptian Government have been asked to nominate a road engineer for employment in the Hejaz, and the sub-committee claim to have found a better road from Rabigh to Medina (the Rafsa Road, which runs by Rafsa to Bir Arma, near Medina) and a small diversion by which the sandy patch on the Jedda-Mecca road from Alam to Shamisa can be avoided. Mr. Twitchell, of the Saudi Arabian Mining Syndicate, states that the Saudi authorities have shown great interest in the work on the road to the Cot-of-Gold, and have been attempting more or less efficient imitations in some places.

374. The concession for the supply of electricity to the town of Jedda, which had been granted (paragraph 89) to two local merchants, is stated to have been cancelled. It is difficult to believe that the concession was of value, except as a speculation to people who wanted something to sell at a profit, for it is unlikely that an electricity enterprise for the town would pay for itself, still less earn profits. The foreign Legations and firms have private installations which they would be reluctant to exchange for the vagaries of a Saudi plant; the State and the municipality would expect electricity for nothing; and most of the local population are too poor to pay the price which would have to be charged by a commercial enterprise.

375. According to the *Saut-al-Hejaz*, two new short-wave wireless stations, which are unaffected by atmospherics, have been established at Abha and Riyadh. The authorities, the report continues, are trying to obtain a number of such sets for installation in various places. Sharqieh (Limited), who represented Messrs. Marconi when the contract for Marconi sets was obtained, state that the new sets are not Marconi's. It is believed that a German was here some time ago trying to sell wireless sets to the Saudi Government.

376. The only aeroplane which has been seen in the air during the last two or three weeks of November is the American machine belonging to the Saudi Arabian Mining Syndicate. It might be thought that Ramadan, which coincided with the second half of the month, had something to do with this inactivity, but other causes are believed to be responsible. The only one of the three Italian instructional machines which was in order at the beginning of the month ceased to appear very soon afterwards, and it is understood to be disabled in some way. On the 4th November a three-engined Caproni arrived as a present from the Italian Government. The local press describes it as a Caproni DC 101 eight-seater, and says that it flew from Rome via Tunis, Cairo, Asmara and Massawa, travelling 7,000 kilom. in thirty-five hours—apparently including stops. A reception to celebrate the arrival of the aeroplane was given at Kandara Palace, near the Kandara aerodrome, which was used for the first time when the Caproni arrived. The new machine flew every day for several days, often flying low over the town as though to make the greatest possible impression, but a breakdown of some kind condemned it to immobility while spares were obtained from Asmara. The Italian Minister related, with a mixture of chagrin and amusement, that when the spares arrived the customs refused to admit them free of duty, while the Italian mechanics are said to be complaining that it is only with great difficulty that they can induce the authorities to give them even a little petrol for cleaning purposes. Two foreigners in Jedda, who are expert pilots, state that the Caproni is by no means of the latest type. They also say that while the popular opinion that the machine is a bomber is incorrect, it could easily be converted into a bomber. The machine is fitted with a wireless apparatus which, according to the local press, enabled it to communicate direct with Riyadh on arrival. The Italians are supplementing their present of aeroplanes by presenting and erecting a steel hangar which is to be bought out in sections. This must be the hangar which the Commandant of Jedda has spoken of as about to be erected to contain fifteen or twenty aeroplanes. The Russian pilot employed by the Saudi Government, M. Naidyonoff, told His Majesty's Minister that the Wapitis were in excellent order and "good for another five years," but that they could not be used because it was a condition of Italian assistance in aviation that none but Italian aeroplanes should be used. This information, which is considered reliable, would also account for the fact that the machine which the French Government gave to Ibn Saud is never seen or heard of.

377. The belief that the Saudi "eagles" trained in Italy would be less likely to cleave the empyrean with bright wing than to make a mess in the evrie is confirmed from no less important a source than Said Bey-al-Kurdi, Commandant of Jedda. During a courtesy visit which was paid to him by Commander Bowen of H.M.S. *Weston*, the conversation turned to aviation, which Said Bey said would be of the greatest use to Saudi Arabia, both for ordinary administrative purposes and as a means of controlling the tribes. He then broke out into a violent tirade, which, although nominally against all young Arabs educated abroad, was obviously aimed at the newly-returned "eagles." Such people, he said, were good for nothing but to live a life of luxury and try to teach their grandmothers to suck eggs. They expected pay, food, clothes and servants on European scales, but to work as men work in Europe was the last thing they would do. He declared that he disapproved entirely of the despatch of young Saudis to foreign countries to be educated or trained; he thought it much better that foreign instructors should be brought to Saudi Arabia.

378. The *Saut-al-Hejaz* continued in a recent article its attack (paragraph 338) on heavy dowries as a hindrance to matrimony, and referred to measures taken in other countries to encourage marriage by penalising the unmarried and rewarding the others for their "humanitarian and patriotic zeal."

II.—Frontier Questions and Foreign Relations in Arabia.

379. Saudi Arabia was wondering whether the change of Government in Iraq would mean a change of policy towards this country, but, as if to calm such apprehensions, the new Iraqi foreign Minister, Dr. Naji-al-Asil (referred to in the Saudi press as "Saiyid" Naji), went to Riyadh almost immediately, and on the 13th November exchanged ratifications with the Amir Feisal of the Treaty of Arab Brotherhood and Alliance. On the 16th November an agreement on the

subject of passports and laissez-passers was signed by the two foreign Ministers. Commenting on the ratification of the treaty, the *Saut-al-Hejaz* proposes that there should also be "economic unity, with the organisation of the industrial, agricultural and commercial relations which that would involve."

380. During 1936 the Saudi Government have sent in several written complaints of alleged violation of Saudi territory by the armed forces of Transjordan. In replying recently to one of these complaints, the Legation suggested that better results would be attained if the frontier officials would use the method of direct communication provided for in the Bon Voisinage Agreement of 1933. The suggestion was repeated to Fuad Bey by His Majesty's Minister, who said that, on our side, we had frequently had grounds for serious complaint, but had preferred to leave it to time and experience to convince the Saudi authorities of the good faith of the Transjordan frontier officials and their readiness to co-operate with the officials of Saudi Arabia. On the apparently simple point of local co-operation Fuad Bey showed an inability or unwillingness to understand that suggests the presence of some deep suspicion of our motives, or of the motives of the Government of Transjordan. A similar impression was conveyed by Fuad Bey's manner when the discussion turned to the question of the line of the frontier between Transjordan and Nejd. Not long before he left, Sir Andrew Ryan summed up the negotiations on this point in a letter to Sheikh Yusuf Yasin, which showed how close together the opposing views had been brought. Sheikh Yusuf Yasin had promised to reply in writing, but eventually said that the matter required further study. According to Fuad Bey, he himself was in favour of the despatch of the written reply prepared by Sheikh Yusuf Yasin, but Ibn Saud suppressed it, and, after communication with Riyadh, Fuad reports that the Saudi Government still require "certain information" before they can continue the discussion.

381. There seems to be much bazaar talk about the Yemen, but it is difficult to decide how much of it is based upon information, correct or incorrect, received direct from the Yemen, and how much upon reports in Egyptian papers founded upon a recent article in the *Times*. There is a general belief, however, that Ibn Saud is keeping a close watch upon events in the Yemen, and it is even reported that he will leave Riyadh early this year and stay at Ashaira until the beginning of the pilgrimage month of Dhu'l Hijja, nominally because the drought in Nejd had dried up or spoiled the water in his favourite wells, but, in reality, because he wishes to be near at hand if there should be trouble in the Yemen.

382. The journal of the Royal Geographical Society records with satisfaction the news of Mr. Philby's expedition to Najran and Shabwa. The writer of the note was not to know that Mr. Philby visited Shabwa without warning with a strong Saudi escort, though Shabwa is well within the Aden Protectorate. His Majesty's Minister spoke of this matter to Fuad Bey Hamza as soon as he returned and asked for an explanation. Fuad Bey said that the only information he had was that published in the Egyptian papers, though he knew that Mr. Philby had talked about visiting Najran and also Shabwa, which Miss Stark and a German had failed to reach. In any case he could never have replied on a matter of such importance without reference to Ibn Saud. By the time the reply was received His Majesty's Minister was able to inform Fuad Bey that His Majesty's Government were now being reproached by the Imam for the entry of Mr. Philby into the Yemen with the Saudi armed party. The reply was not received by the end of the month, but to complete the record it may be stated that Ibn Saud declares that he did not know Mr. Philby was going south of Najran, and throws on him all the responsibility for his excursion outside Saudi Arabia.

III.—Relations with Powers outside Arabia.

383. The new Turkish Chargé d'Affaires, M. Palsay, presented his credentials on the 7th November. Either M. Palsay or his Government is easily satisfied, for the credentials were presented not to the Amir Feisal, who as Viceroy receives the foreign representatives on first arrival if Ibn Saud is away at Riyadh, but to Sheikh Hamad Suleiman, who was described in the *Umm-al-Qura* on this occasion as "acting Minister for Foreign Affairs," but so far as is known to the Legation had merely been authorised (paragraph 330) to sign letters from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in the absence of every other

official of consequence from Mecca. The Turkish consul, Talaat Acar (*i.e.*, Ajar) left on the 4th November, nominally on leave, but it is believed that he will not return. Since M. Palsay's arrival the Turkish Legation, which began a year ago (paragraph 347, October 1935), to fly the Turkish flag on Sundays, instead of Fridays, now flies its flag both on Sunday and on Friday.

384. The journey from Bagdad of the Netherlands Chargé d'Affaires to Iraq and Saudi Arabia, M. Adriaanse, ended at Jedda on the 15th November. He saw Ibn Saud at Riyadh on the 8th November, and, according to the *Umm-al-Qura*, sent him the next day "a present from Her Majesty the Queen of the Netherlands, viz., the highest class of the Order of the Netherlands Lion." He received from Ibn Saud the present of an Arab mare. He returns from the active social life of Bagdad with feelings divided between gratitude for the handsome hospitality that he enjoyed and relief at sinking back into the peaceful, if primitive, life which the foreign community lives in Jedda.

385. On the 18th November Nahas Pasha and Fuad Bey Hamza exchanged in Cairo notes embodying the results of the friendly negotiations provided for in article VI of the Treaty of Cairo of May 1936 for the settlement of outstanding questions. The points dealt with in the notes are three in number:—

- (1) The sending of the Mahmal and the Kiswa from Egypt is to be resumed with effect from the forthcoming pilgrimage. The Mahmal is to remain in Jedda, where the Kiswa will be taken over by the Saudi authorities in ceremonial fashion. The Kiswa is to bear an inscription saying that it was presented to the Holy Kaaba in the reign of His Majesty King Abdul Aziz-al-Saud, King of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
- (2) The distribution of alms to the poor of the Hejaz and the distribution in the Hejaz of the surplus of the Waqfs of the two Holy Places are to be resumed with effect from the forthcoming pilgrimage.
- (3) Egyptians who were resident in Saudi Arabia when the Hejaz Nationality Law was promulgated and Saudis who were resident in Egypt at the time of the promulgation of the Egyptian Nationality Law are to have the right to opt, within six months from the date of the exchange of notes, for Egyptian or Saudi nationality.

386. The Hejazis, who regard themselves as most worthy objects of the charity of the Moslem world, have hailed with great satisfaction the prospect of the return of the stream of Egyptian trust funds to its old bed, which has been dry for some years. The Saudi Government have failed in their desire to collect all the arrears also, but, on the other hand, they have won a victory in persuading the Egyptian Government to be content with sending the Mahmal as far as Jedda.

387. The Italian Legation celebrated the birthday of King Emmanuel on the 11th November by a party, which was perhaps larger than usual, in order to mark the arrival of the Caproni aeroplane and the presence of its crew. The official reception of the aeroplane and the puff about it in the press may have been flattering to Italian feelings, but the difficulties mentioned in paragraph 376 might well give one cause to fear the Saudis even when they accept gifts. The manner of M. Persico suggests that he has few illusions about the efficacy of the policy of present-giving.

388. When speaking to His Majesty's Minister about M. Tuimetoff, Soviet trade agent at Sanaa (paragraph 392), the Soviet Minister said: "We don't do any business in the Yemen now, and we shan't do any more business there. We sold our goods on credit, then the crisis came, and Tuimetoff is now trying to collect the money due to us. Fortunately, these small markets like the Yemen and the Hejaz mean little to an export business the size of ours."

IV.—Miscellaneous.

389. H.M.S. *Weston* (Commander J. H. Bowen) arrived on the 27th November for a stay of five days.

390. Mr. H. M. Eyres returned from leave on the 25th November.

391. Colonel Mackie, late I.M.S. (paragraph 356), returned to Jedda on the 3rd November from his investigations at the Mahd gold-mine and at Taif, and left for the United Kingdom on the 11th November.

392. Yusuf Tuimetoff, formerly a clerk in the Soviet consulate in Jedda and now Soviet trade representative in the Yemen, arrived from Hudaida by dhow about the 31st October (see Aden Intelligence Report No. 507, paragraph 6064), having taken five days on the way. He stayed a few days with his former chief, the present Soviet Minister in Jedda, and then left for Russia on leave.

393. Dottore Salvatore Aponte, an Italian journalist representing the *Corriere della Sera*, arrived on the 29th November—from Aden, it is believed. At the end of the month he was expecting to visit the Sudan for "touristic" and professional purposes.

394. The interest with which Ibn Saud follows foreign news on the wireless is well known. According to his wireless operator, the travelling wireless set presented to him by Sir Andrew Ryan at Riyadh is his great hobby. The same informant states that Ibn Saud now listens in to songs by Egyptian women, but can't abide the male singers.

395. The customs authorities have been more reasonable in the examination of pilgrims' luggage than they were last month (paragraph 354). As a result, apparently, of the complaints that were lodged, the Saudi authorities issued what seems to be a very reasonable interpretation of the customs provisions relating to the importation of food and clothing by pilgrims.

396. Mr. Maxwell Darling (paragraph 108) hopes to continue his researches regarding the desert locust by visiting Hofuf and the Dawasir next spring, and the assistance of the Saudi Government, which was afforded generously this year, has again been requested.

397. The Saudi Government can have found little satisfaction in the reception accorded by the Egyptian Quarantine Board to the communication which the Saudi Government sent to the International Sanitary Office in Paris in January last, setting forth its objections to the articles of the Paris convention in respect of which it had formulated reserves as being unnecessary, a hindrance to pilgrims, harmful to the economic interests of Saudi Arabia, and unwarrantable interference in Islamic religious affairs, and so on. On only one point does the board's decision make a concession to the Saudi thesis, viz., in stating that the presence of a delegate from the Saudi Government on the board would be useful. The board agree politely that the Saudi Government have made great efforts to improve the hygienic conditions of the country, but refuse to admit that the results justify the claims advanced in the Saudi note. Two comments made by the board may be quoted here:—

"Malgré son adhésion à l'Arrangement de Rome, le vaste Royaume arabe séoudien, qui s'étend du golfe Persique à la mer Rouge, reste, au point de vue sanitaire, un pays fermé."

398. The slaves mentioned in paragraph 363 as having been on hand at the time of the issue of the Saudi Slavery Regulation under the exchange of notes have formed the subject of correspondence with the Saudi authorities which should permit them to leave the Legation and continue to live in Jedda without fear that their masters, if these men should return from the Sudan, will be able to reduce them to slavery again.

399. According to information received, there is at Taif, living in slavery, an 11-year-old boy named Khumais, who is alleged to be the son of one of the leading merchants of Dhubai and to have been stolen and sold for 400 rupees to the Director of Wireless Operators at Riyadh. Enquiries are being made to ascertain whether such a boy did, in fact disappear from Dhubai.

[E 8075/2617/91]

No. 21.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received December 29.)

(No. 127.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, December 29, 1936.

YOUR despatch No. 350 of 9th December.

In conversation on 26th December Fuad Bey, who had just returned from Riyadh, represented Ibn Saud as having said to him that never before had his relations with His Majesty's Government been on so satisfactory a basis.

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Language was, in any case, vague, but clearly meant to be very friendly. According to Fuad, Ibn Saud seems to think that his attitude over Palestine has convinced His Majesty's Government of his sincerity and desire to help. On the other hand, Fuad appeared to imply that Ibn Saud had deserved well of His Majesty's Government and had more than repaid concessions made to him in regard to Treaty of Jedda. All this was background to frontier discussion (see my immediately following telegram), which made no advance.

[E 8077/152/91]

No. 22.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received December 29.)

(No. 128.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, December 29, 1936.

MY letter of 8th December to Mr. Rendel.

On return from seeing Ibn Saud, Fuad spoke of eastern and south-eastern frontiers. According to him, the impression gained by Sir A. Ryan that Saudi Government were prepared to compromise was due to a misunderstanding of Fuad's idea, which was that he and His Majesty's Minister should try to find some middle course to recommend to their Governments. He had no counter-proposals to make to the latest offer of His Majesty's Government, claimed that southern boundary proposed by Saudi Government was based on essential needs of tribes, and professed indifference to suggestion that line along longitude 55° east might be moved eastwards, on the ground that the country thereabouts is desert. Taking advantage of the change of Ministers he tried the transparent manoeuvre of pretending that His Majesty's Government had always been most keen about the Khor-al-Odaid and much less so about the Jabal Naksh, which Saudi Government regarded as most important. I held out no hope of any concession beyond the one mentioned above, and said that I could only report to you.

2. If the problem had not been complicated by oil, I should have been in favour of leaving it in abeyance for a while. As things are I can only suggest this:—

1. To counter Fuad's manoeuvre and leave Saudi Government under no illusion I should tell him that His Majesty's Government regard both the Jabal Naksh and the Khor-al-Odaid as essential. At the same time I should ask him on what other parts of the frontier he thinks he and I could produce joint proposals that would appeal to our Governments.
2. Meanwhile, it should be considered whether His Majesty's Government could afford to offer further slight concessions at Sufuk and on borders of Oman and Aden Protectorate.
3. I know the difficulties in the second suggestion and I am extremely doubtful whether such concessions would induce Ibn Saud to make a formal renunciation of the Jabal Naksh, but the alternative seems to be to do nothing. I have the impression that Ibn Saud would regard Sufuk as a substantial gain, but I know nothing about the merits of his claim to that place.

(Repeated to Aden, No. 11, and Bushire, No. 31.)

CHAPTER II.—IRAQ.

[E 5416/4/93]

No. 23.

Record of the Development of the Assyrian Settlement Question immediately before and during the Session of the Assyrian Committee of the Council of the League of Nations from June 23 to July 4, 1936.

THE position in which matters had been left at the previous session of the Council Committee in May is described in the memorandum of the 15th May in E 2825/4/93.⁽¹⁾ No definite reply had been available to the urgent representations addressed to the French Government in April regarding the difficulties experienced by the Trustee Board in renting the necessary lands for the temporary settlement of the Assyrians pending the reclamation of the Ghab marsh, and the prospects for the future appeared very uncertain. The committee came to the conclusion, however, that it would be a mistake to precipitate a crisis until it was quite clear that the difficulties could not be overcome; it decided to adjourn any decision until the following month, and the Assyrian question was accordingly removed from the agenda of the May session of the Council. Meanwhile, the committee instructed the League Treasury to withhold until further notice all payments due to be made from the settlement fund to the French High Commissariat, Beirut, in respect of the Ghab reclamation works.

2. It seemed in the first weeks after the committee had adjourned as though the difficulties in acquiring temporary lands were being gradually overcome. This improvement soon proved, however, to be illusory. Early in June the League Secretariat were informed by the French High Commission that unless the necessary funds were forwarded to Beirut before the 15th June it would be necessary to denounce the contract which had been made with the French concessionary company ("Régie générale des Chemins de Fer et des Travaux publics") for the execution of the reclamation works, with the result that—even if the contract were resumed later—the first season's work would be lost and an inevitable delay of one year would ensue in the execution of the scheme. The French representative on the Council Committee confirmed this information to the Secretariat, and went on to say that, as a result of further enquiries into the position, the French Government now had grave doubts whether the Ghab plan was practicable in the altered political circumstances prevailing in the mandated territories as a result of the policy inaugurated earlier in the year for their more rapid political emancipation. For example, it had now come to light that to carry out the scheme it would be necessary to expropriate a considerable number of the local indigenous population from their lands in and around the Ghab marsh; the Ghab plan made no provision for compensating these people, and the French authorities could no longer contemplate their forcible expropriation.

3. At the same time the League Secretariat received disquieting information from the president of the Trustee Board at Beirut. Not only did M. Cuénod share the misgivings of the French authorities as to the political outlook for the scheme, but he also reported further difficulties of a technical nature; in particular, further investigation had revealed that large additional credits would be necessary for anti-malarial treatment and to bring the reclaimed marshland into a fit state for agriculture.

4. These developments showed that the decision of the Council Committee to withhold League funds for the reclamation works had forced the French authorities to admit the difficulties which had been accumulating for some time, and it was evident that a final decision as to the future could no longer be postponed. It was essential, however, that the committee should have the necessary time to consider fully every aspect of the question, and this was secured by the Quai d'Orsay inducing the concessionary company to prolong until the end of the month the time limit for denunciation of the contract. Meanwhile, the Council Committee was convoked for the 23rd June at Geneva, and it was understood that it would then receive a communication setting out the views of the French Government on the situation.

⁽¹⁾ See Part XXXVIII, No. 72.

5. A preliminary inter-departmental meeting with representatives of the Treasury and the Air Ministry was held at the Foreign Office on the 18th June to consider the line which should be taken by the United Kingdom representative when the committee met. A record of this meeting is in E 3693/4/93; the conclusions reached were that, while the attitude of the United Kingdom representative would inevitably have to depend on the terms of any communication which the French Government made to the committee when it met, there would be no advantage in trying to force the Ghab scheme through in the face of: (a) the opposition of the French Government; (b) lack of real co-operation by the local authorities in Syria; and (c) the increasing deficit in the settlement budget entailed by the heavy additional expenditure required to overcome the various technical difficulties which were now coming to light. It was felt that if the Ghab scheme had to be abandoned, the only alternative appeared to be to aim at the permanency and expansion of the existing settlement on the Khabur River, with every possible guarantee as to security. The objections (chiefly on the ground of security) to an indefinite continuation of the Khabur settlement were fully appreciated, and it was realised that it would not in any case provide a radical solution of the Assyrian problem, since many of the Assyrians still in Iraq would probably refuse to emigrate to the Khabur, where conditions appeared less attractive than in the Ghab scheme. But there seemed to be no choice, in the absence of any practicable alternative, to maintaining the existing settlement on the Khabur and to endeavouring to secure the admission to it of other Assyrians still anxious to leave Iraq.

6. It was appreciated at the same time that any plan for a permanent settlement on the Khabur would inevitably have to depend on (a) the agreement in principle of the French Government and of the Syrian Nationalists (whom it was thought the Iraqi Government might be able to influence privately), and (b) the abandonment by the Turkish Government of their objection to a permanent settlement of Assyrians within 50 kilom. of the Turco-Syrian frontier. It seemed clear, therefore, that the Council Committee would be unable to take any rapid decision about the Khabur, and in any case, after its experience of the Ghab scheme, it would probably insist on a thorough preliminary investigation of the technical aspects of any alternative permanent scheme.

7. The conclusions reached at this meeting were telegraphed to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Bagdad (Foreign Office telegram No. 106 of the 19th June). Mr. Bateman was instructed to inform Nuri Pasha of the position, and (in view of the fact that Nuri Pasha had always expressed himself confident of being able to secure the co-operation of the Syrian leaders) to invite his Excellency to consider the possibility of bringing private influence urgently to bear on the Syrian Nationalist leaders not to reject in principle the permanent settlement of Assyrians in Syria.

8. When the Council Committee assembled at Geneva on the 23rd June, the promised official communication giving the views of the French Government was still not available. The first day was accordingly spent in private discussions, in the course of which the French representative made it clear that the basis on which the Ghab plan had been prepared was the retention of the mandate for Syria for at least five more years, and that this basis had been destroyed by the recent political developments in Syria (culminating in the promise of early independence and entry into the League of Nations, which had been given to the Syrian Nationalists). The successful execution of the Ghab plan depended in many essential respects on the retention by the French authorities of the powers and influence which they possessed under the present mandatory régime. Already the promises to the Syrian Nationalists made it extremely difficult for the French authorities to use any sort of coercion, and within a year or two it seemed probable that the French Government would no longer be able to take any direct responsibility for events in the mandated territories. M. de Panafieu said that the Syrian Nationalist delegation in Paris had not themselves raised the Assyrian question, but it had been mentioned to them in the course of private conversations, and they had displayed strong opposition to the whole idea of settling Assyrians in what they regarded as part of their own country.

9. The French Government's general attitude was that they had done their best to respond to the pressing appeal made to them by the League of Nations in March 1935, but that political developments, which they could not have been expected to foresee, and which were themselves largely the result of the political

ferment in Egypt and Palestine, had compelled them to modify their policy towards Syrian nationalism. The French representative recalled that his Government had in any case clearly pointed out in their letter to the League of the 4th April, 1935, accepting in principle to take the Assyrians as permanent settlers in the mandated territories, that—

- (a) The Syrian Moslem majority in Syria were hostile to the introduction of foreign minorities into their country.
- (b) While the mandate defined the guarantees to be given to indigenous minorities, it was silent about new ones brought in from outside.
- (c) That the settlement of Assyrians in Syria was likely to complicate the task of the mandatory Power and might have awkward local consequences.

10. The French representative stated that, in the opinion of his Government, the political aspect was much more important than the technical difficulties which had come to light. Nevertheless, his Government had been much disturbed at an article published by the *Times* on the 6th June, which questioned the technical competence of the plan and seemed to them to suggest that the Ghab scheme was little better than a fraud. An urgent reinvestigation had now been made into the technical aspects of the scheme, and this had proved that the allegations about the poor quality of the soil in the Ghab were at any rate entirely unfounded. At the same time, it remained true that the plan had seriously underestimated the amount of money which would have to be spent to combat malaria and eventually to bring the reclaimed lands into a fit state for agriculture. The difficulty in finding temporary lands at a reasonable rent he ascribed to the decision in September 1935 to take the actual settlement operation out of the hands of the High Commissioner at Beirut; this had resulted in a long delay until the Trustee Board could be set up and the right moment for acquiring the lands had been missed.

11. As a result of questions put to M. de Panafieu, it further became clear that the French Government would be unwilling to impose any obligation on the future Nationalist régime in Syria to carry on with the execution of the scheme. Their attitude was that as the execution of the plan had barely been begun, no *fait accompli* had in practice so far been created, and they did not feel able to impose any condition on the emancipation of Syria in favour of an alien minority which had not yet been introduced into the Ghab area. As regards the existing settlement on the Upper Khabur River, their attitude appeared almost equally unforthcoming, since M. de Panafieu maintained that the future security and general welfare of that settlement would have to be left in the hands of the new Syrian régime, subject to any general guarantees which the League might impose on that régime in respect of all religious minorities. The French Government regarded any special guarantees for the Assyrians as an impossible discrimination in favour of an alien minority, and they took the line that, even if possible, such guarantees would not be in the best interests of the Assyrians.

12. The explanation of the French representative caused the president of the committee to take an extremely gloomy view of the situation. He was in favour of putting an end to the committee's work as soon as possible, and his chief concern was to extract from the French Government some special practical guarantees for the security of the settlement on the Khabur, for whose existence and ultimate fate the committee had made itself responsible. The same preoccupation with the responsibility aspect made Sr. Oliván opposed to the committee taking any further steps to increase the Khabur settlement, and he took the line that henceforth the Iraqi Government would have to resume full and entire international responsibility for all Assyrians remaining in Iraq.

13. His attempt to obtain French recognition for the fact that the Assyrians ought to be considered as a special case among minorities in Syria merely led M. de Panafieu, however, to restate the French thesis as summarised above. While considering it advisable as far as possible to keep out of the dispute between Sr. Oliván and M. de Panafieu, I felt obliged myself to argue against Sr. Oliván's desire to wind up the committee's work and not to allow any increase in the Khabur settlement. I said that, while most reluctant to see its abandonment, His Majesty's Government realised that if the mandatory Power was convinced that the Ghab scheme was no longer practicable it was no use trying to persevere with it; it seemed clear, however, that only the French Government was in a

position to decide this point. But I could not admit that the breakdown of the Ghab scheme would justify the committee giving up its task altogether. The Khabur was always present as an alternative, and there were obviously many Assyrians still in Iraq whom it would be better to move to the Khabur (for all its political disadvantages) than to leave in their present precarious economic or political situation. It seemed to me that the committee might well incur a worse responsibility if it left these Assyrians in Iraq than if it added them to the existing settlement of the Khabur.

14. On the following day, the long-awaited communication from the French Government arrived. The letter^(*) began by drawing attention to the heavy unforeseen expenditure now proved necessary to overcome technical obstacles which had come to light, and it expressed the view that, owing to the increase which this would involve in the existing budgetary deficit, the Council Committee would do well to make certain of the money necessary to cover the whole settlement operation before embarking upon large transfers of funds to finance the reclamation works. The letter went on to describe the more serious difficulties arising from the "present state of mind in the Arab world," and the more rapid political emancipation of the Levant States to which the French Government had been obliged to agree. It recalled the original reservations made by the French Government in April 1935 (paragraph 9 above), and expressed the fear that, as the proposed settlement of the Assyrians in the Ghab would take several years and was dependent upon financial contributions from the mandated territories, it would encounter various obstacles which the mandatory authorities would no longer have the necessary means to overcome. The letter concluded by referring to a press campaign in Syria against the introduction of the Assyrians and to the possibility of repercussions on the position of indigenous minorities.

15. The situation created by this letter was discussed privately between the president, the League Secretariat and myself. It was recognised that the letter was unsatisfactory as it failed to make any definite recommendation and left the entire responsibility to the Council Committee for any decision as to future policy. Moreover, while admitting the importance of the political obstacles, it tried to focus attention away from them by reviving the bogey of the budgetary deficit and suggesting that the Ghab plan had become unworkable for financial reasons, although it was quite clear from the explanation furnished privately by the French representative that the French Government were now definitely convinced that the political aspect was paramount. The president of the committee was, however, strongly against sending a written reply to the French Government, since he feared that such a procedure would only lead to prevarication and more delay; he urged that the best course would be to hold an official meeting of the committee and for the obscurities and omissions in the letter to be remedied by means of answers returned by the French representative to the leading questions which Sr. Oliván would put to him. This procedure was finally agreed to by the individual members of the committee, including the French representative, who arranged to obtain the necessary instructions from his Government by telephone.

16. An official meeting of the Council Committee was accordingly held on the 25th June. In reply to the president's questions, the French representative stated officially, on behalf of his Government, that the Ghab plan had been based on the assumption that the mandate for Syria would continue for at least five years, and that as the mandatory régime now appeared to be on the eve of termination, the French Government could no longer take any responsibility for the future of the scheme or ensure the payment of the contribution to the reclamation works promised on behalf of the mandated territories. M. de Panafieu further declared that his Government definitely considered that the political difficulties were of much greater importance than those of a technical or financial nature, to which their letter had also made allusion. He failed, however, to give the committee any direct recommendation upon which to found its final decision about the Ghab plan and to draw up its future policy. Moreover, although he guaranteed the entire security of the Khabur settlement as long as France retained the mandate over Syria, he said that his Government saw no justification for trying to secure any special safeguards for the future beyond the scope of the practical safeguards which they were trying to secure for all religious minorities. A suggestion by the Danish representative that the League itself might elect to

(*) See Annex IV (a) to Committee's report of the 2nd July to the Council in No. 20.

impose obligations about Assyrian settlement as a condition of the entry into it of an independent Syria drew from the Iraqi representative a reminder that the Iraqi Government had already made it clear that they did not agree to the Assyrian question being in any way brought into connexion with the political emancipation of Syria.

17. It had been previously agreed between Sr. Oliván and myself that the best policy would be to avoid any sort of open breach or dispute with the French representative on the committee and, after extracting from him, orally, the fullest possible information as to the attitude of his Government, to leave over to the more favourable atmosphere of private negotiation the question whether it was practicable to try to carry out the scheme by agreement with the Syrian nationalists, and the question of the extent to which the French Government could be induced to facilitate such an arrangement by bringing influence or diplomatic pressure to bear on the Syrian Nationalists. While we agreed as to the necessity for placing as much responsibility for the breakdown as possible on the French Government, we felt that it would also be desirable to leave this and other delicate points—such as guarantees for the security of the Khabur settlement—to be broached one by one as they emerged during the drafting of the report to the Council.

18. In accordance with this policy, the explanations of the French representative were allowed to pass in silence, and the meeting was brought to a conclusion by the committee adopting the following conclusions:—

- (a) That a new situation had been created by the letter from the French Government and the supplementary oral explanations of the French representative in regard to the political obstacles in the way of the Ghab plan.
- (b) That there appeared to be no other course but to postpone the execution of the Ghab scheme, and, consequently, any final decision as to the future of the Khabur settlement, pending the emergence of a new authority in Syria which could assume responsibility for the future.
- (c) That as soon as the new régime was established in Syria the committee would have to approach it with a view to securing its co-operation in the settlement of the Assyrians.
- (d) That in the meanwhile the existing settlement on the Khabur would have to continue on its present basis. The French representative specifically undertook that no obstacle would be put in the way of the completion of the transfer of 2,500 Assyrians authorised in May, although he stated that the French Government could not assume responsibility for agreeing to any further transfer beyond this number.

The committee concluded by appointing the Danish, French and United Kingdom representatives to act as a drafting committee to prepare a first draft of the report to the Council.

19. At this juncture Mr. Rendel arrived at Geneva from Montreux, and further private discussions took place with Sr. Oliván. It was agreed that the attitude of the French Government was still unsatisfactory, since, even with the supplementary oral explanations furnished by M. de Panafieu, the French Government (a) appeared still to be trying to leave to the committee the entire responsibility for the recommendation about the future of the Ghab plan which would have to be made to the Council, and (b) had failed so far to give the committee any indication as to when and how it would be able to enter into negotiations with the proposed new régime in Syria, or whether it could count upon French influence or pressure being brought to bear on the Syrians. It seemed clear that nothing further could be extracted from M. de Panafieu, who was bound by his instructions, and it was felt that the moment had come to take matters up with French officials of higher rank.

20. Mr. Rendel, accompanied by myself, accordingly called on the 27th June on the head of the French League of Nations Section, M. Lagarde, who had served until recently as Deputy High Commissioner at Beirut and had been personally concerned in the negotiations leading up to the preparation of the Ghab scheme. Mr. Rendel began the conversation by drawing M. Lagarde's attention to the extremely awkward consequences likely to result for all concerned if the scheme for settling the Assyrians in Syria were allowed to break down. On the basis of the Ghab plan as put forward by the French Government commitments had been

entered into, money had been voted by the Governments of the United Kingdom and Iraq and by the League of Nations and also collected from private sources in the United Kingdom, and definite promises had been made to the Assyrians themselves. In the face of all these moral obligations it could not be said that there was not already a *fait accompli*. Mr. Rendel felt that in the circumstances the French Government might reasonably be expected to arrange to transfer to their successors in Syria, even if in a modified form, the obligations which they had contracted, and not merely to throw up the whole scheme and pass back the responsibility to the Council Committee.

21. M. Lagarde replied by restating the French point of view about both the Ghab plan and the Khabur settlement as already explained to the committee by M. de Panafieu (see paragraphs 8-11 above) and he added the personal opinion, based on his long experience of Syria, that even if it were possible (which he denied) to impose responsibility for the execution of the Ghab plan on a Nationalist régime in Syria it would not be wise, or in the best interests of the Assyrians themselves, to do so. The Ghab plan as put forward by the French Government was extremely complicated—politically and financially as well as technically—and its success would always have been uncertain even under a continuance of the mandatory régime. The French Government have been fully aware of the difficulties from the beginning. But they were anxious to help the League to find a home for the Assyrians and—he could say frankly—they were also very anxious to carry out the scheme for the reclamation of the middle course of the River Orontes which they could never afford without the assistance of the League settlement funds. Now that there was no prospect of their retaining effective political control in Syria for the minimum period necessary to see the scheme through the situation was entirely changed. Even if the Syrian Nationalists could be induced to incur the odium of assuming responsibility for introducing this unpopular Christian minority into their country he was convinced that they would never be able to cope with the manifold technical difficulties inherent in the Ghab plan (which would call for constant supervision by European experts, armed with executive authority) and he thought that the scheme would inevitably break down in the long run after the expenditure of the bulk of the League settlement fund. M. Lagarde insisted that the French Government were taking the most honest, though not the most easy, course in warning the Council Committee of the dangers ahead. They could have allowed the plan to go ahead, as he admitted many interested parties in Syria (including a section of the mandatory officials) would have liked, and let matters drift towards eventual collapse and a subsequent scandal.

22. M. Lagarde's frank statement introduced an entirely new element into the situation since it was now absolutely clear that the French officials in the best position to judge regarded the Ghab plan as being quite incapable of execution and that the policy already tentatively decided upon by the committee of waiting for an opportunity to reopen negotiations direct with the new Syrian régime was no longer justified. Mr. Rendel, therefore, suggested to M. Lagarde that if the outlook was indeed so hopeless it was most desirable in the general interest that the French Government, who alone were in a position to assess the political and technical risks, should themselves so inform the committee. It seemed hardly fair to the committee simply to indicate certain difficulties and to leave it to take a decision as to the future of the plan and he felt that the French Government should give a definite lead. M. Lagarde, however, protested that in the absence of definite arrangements for the emancipation of Syria the French could hardly go beyond the strong hint of future difficulties which they had already given to the committee. He agreed, however, that the whole question should be the subject of further private discussions in the presence of the president of the Council Committee.

23. This further discussion duly took place at the League Secretariat throughout the 29th June, with the presence as well of the president of the Council Committee, the Danish and French representatives on the committee, Mr. Walters and other members of the League Secretariat. Mr. Rendel recalled what he had said to M. Lagarde two days before, and concluded by expressing the opinion that if it was really necessary to abandon the Ghab plan the situation should be faced immediately and matters not allowed to drag on. The president summed up the situation with the observation that it was useless to set about finding the extra money to overcome unforeseen technical difficulties and fill the deficit (as

suggested in the letter from the French Government) unless and until it was absolutely certain that the execution of the whole scheme was politically feasible. M. Lagarde then spoke in the sense of his remarks to Mr. Rendel (paragraphs 21-22 above) repeating categorically his personal opinion that the committee would be unwise to take the risk of trying to negotiate with the Syrians, since even if they decided for reasons of their own to offer collaboration they would not have it in their power to bring about a successful outcome. Nor would any paper undertaking to execute the plan which the French Government might extract from the Syrians have any real value. M. Lagarde still maintained, however, that it would be difficult and invidious for the French Government to explain the position publicly on these lines at the moment when they were about to emancipate Syria and to propose to the League of Nations the termination of the mandate.

24. The meeting was not long in reaching the conclusion that in the light of M. Lagarde's explanations it would be worse than useless for the committee to wait indefinitely for the chance of negotiating with the new Syrian régime. If the French authorities, who held all the cards in their hands, felt unable to pass the Ghab plan on to the Syrians with any chance of success, it seemed useless for the committee to attempt to do so itself. There was, therefore, general agreement that the committee would have to recommend the total abandonment of the Ghab plan. At the same time it was found that there was now general agreement that the committee ought to continue its efforts to find the best possible permanent solution for the Assyrians, and the president contented himself with a reservation that the responsibility for the Assyrians remaining in Iraq should be put squarely on to the Iraqi Government. It was appreciated that while the existing provisional settlement on the River Khabur would have to be maintained, its expansion was extremely delicate in view of the objections of the Turkish Government and also of the probable opposition of the Syrian Nationalists. Moreover, both Sr. Oliván and the French representative were disposed to argue that the committee should not take the responsibility for increasing this settlement—without securing a radical solution of the whole Assyrian problem—just so as to help the Iraqi Government to get rid of the more objectionable elements among the Assyrians. In view of the different opinions held about this settlement, it was felt that the best course would be to avoid as far as possible any mention of it in the committee's report or in the actual proceedings in the Council itself.

25. In default of any other alternative, the possibility was discussed of resettling within Iraq all Assyrians in a precarious political or economic situation who had not yet been moved to Syria. It was felt, however, that while this possibility would have to be borne in mind it would at the best offer only a partial and possibly unsatisfactory solution of the problem, and it would not therefore be wise to allude to it in the impending report to the Council. Mr. Rendel also mentioned to M. Lagarde the suggestion for placing Assyrians in the Lebanon which had recently been made to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires in Bagdad by Sr. Barcenas, the Spanish diplomat representing the Council Committee on the individual consultation of the Assyrians. M. Lagarde, however, rejected the idea categorically, apparently on the grounds that there were no available lands.

26. The meeting devoted long discussion to the question of the form in which the committee's decision should be presented to the Council and the degree of responsibility to be attributed to the French Government in respect of that decision. It was finally agreed that a formula should be employed in the report to the Council which, while causing as little hurt as possible to Syrian *amour-propre*, would make it clear that the committee's decision to abandon the plan was being taken on the direct advice of the French authorities. Shortly after the meeting, however, the French representative on the Council Committee announced that the French Government had decided after all to make a categorical written declaration to the committee, explaining the whole position and giving a direct recommendation in favour of abandoning the Ghab plan.

27. The Council Committee met officially on the following day to approve formally the policy which had been provisionally agreed upon at the private discussions. The president began by explaining how, in the interval since the last meeting, further discussion of the whole question by the members of the Drafting Committee in conjunction with himself had revealed that the policy already provisionally decided upon required reconsideration. The French representative then officially communicated to the committee the declaration which he had now been empowered to make. This declaration (which was

published as Annex IV (b) to the committee's report to the Council of the 2nd July^(*) rehearsed the point of view of the French Government as already explained by M. de Panafieu and M. Lagarde (see paragraphs 8-11 and 23 above), and then went on to state that the French Government felt bound to call the committee's attention to the advisability of abandoning forthwith a plan which would not in future have any real chance of success. In the light of this frank and categorical statement the committee lost no time in ratifying the conclusion reached at the private discussions that the Ghab plan would have to be abandoned. It also ratified the decision to announce to the Council its readiness to continue its work, subject to the condition (upon which the president insisted) that it must be made clear that the responsibility for the future of the Assyrians remaining in Iraq must be the sole concern of the Iraqi Government.

28. The Drafting Sub-Committee set to work at once on this new basis, and on the 2nd June the draft report was ready and was adopted by the whole committee the same day. In deciding the exact recommendation to be made to the Council in regard to future policy, account had to be taken of the strong feeling of the president and the French representative that if no alternative scheme emerged in the interval before the next session of the Council, the committee ought to envisage presenting to the Council at that session proposals for the liquidation of its work and for stabilising the Assyrian position as best might be on the basis of maintaining the "provisional" settlement in Syria and making all possible arrangements with the Iraqi Government for the welfare and security of the Assyrians remaining in Iraq. It was finally agreed, however, not to allude to the possibility of a termination of the committee's mandate, and merely to indicate the committee's intention to lay definite proposals for the future before the Council in September.

29. The committee decided to request the Council to accord it a mandate to take the necessary measures of liquidation necessitated by the abandonment of the Ghab plan; it was agreed, however, in advance that it would be desirable to keep on the Trustee Board for the present, and that as a first step the Trustee Board should be asked to furnish detailed recommendations for a programme of liquidation. The Secretariat were instructed to inform the High Commission at Beirut of the decision to abandon the plan as soon as it had been formally taken by the Council.

30. The only remaining difficulty encountered in the course of the drafting of the report was over the procedure for notifying the Assyrians of the breakdown of the Ghab scheme. I took the line, with the support of the Iraqi representative, that as the committee had in the past drawn up messages about the Ghab scheme for communication to the Assyrians through the local committee in Iraq, it ought now logically to send a further message reporting the breakdown of the scheme, but emphasising the intention of the committee to continue to work for a solution and the need for calm on the part of the Assyrians themselves. The president and the French representative, however, were strongly opposed to any further message from the committee on the ground that such communications had already led to the assumption by the committee of responsibility for the welfare and security of the Assyrians in Iraq, which properly belonged to the Iraqi Government. They maintained that the committee's function was solely to try to find and execute a scheme for resettlement of the Assyrians outside Iraq, and that since entire responsibility for the Assyrians within Iraq fell on the Iraqi Government, it should be left to that Government to draw any conclusions it liked from the committee's report and to inform the Assyrians of the position and give them the necessary advice. The most that the committee could be induced to accept was that the Iraqi Government should be requested by the Council in its final resolution to make the necessary communication to the Assyrians.

31. The report was issued on the 2nd July as Council document C.282 M. 171,^(*) with the declaration by the French Government advising abandonment (paragraph 27 above) as Annex IV (b), and came before the Council on the 4th July. The *rapporteur*, Sr. Barcia, the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs, submitted a report supporting the conclusions arrived at by the committee and a resolution under seven heads. The permanent delegate of Iraq spoke first, and, after expressing the regret of his Government at the breakdown of the Ghab plan and their hope of an early alternative solution, stated that they would

(*) See No. 26.

continue to take steps for the security and well-being of the Assyrians. He said that the attitude of the Iraqi Government towards the general question of Assyrian settlement would remain as defined by Nuri Pasha at the League Assembly in 1935; by which remark he referred obliquely to the Iraqi reservation that the settlement of Assyrians should not be allowed in any way to interfere with the political emancipation of Syria (see paragraph 16 above). The French representative expressed regret at the breakdown, and added (thereby breaking the conspiracy of silence which had been generally agreed upon (see paragraph 24 above)) that, while the French Government could not decide the future of the Assyrians in the provisional settlement on the Upper Khabur, they could say that the Assyrians would enjoy the benefits of all general minority guarantees both under the present mandatory régime and under any new régime in the future.

32. The Secretary of State, speaking as United Kingdom representative as well as president of the Council, concluded the speeches. He expressed the regret of His Majesty's Government at the breakdown of the Ghab plan, but considered that the committee had taken the wisest course in view of the very difficult circumstances indicated in the declaration of the French Government. He welcomed the readiness of the committee to continue its efforts, as he felt that another attempt should be made through collective action on a League basis to find the lasting and satisfactory solution of the problem, which was as urgent as ever, in the interest both of the political tranquillity of the Middle East and of the Assyrians themselves. Mr. Eden recommended therefore that the Council should extend the mandate which it had given to the committee in October 1933. The Turkish delegate did not speak; he had originally intended to repeat the objection which his Government took to any settlement of Assyrians close to the Turkish frontier, but was persuaded by a personal appeal of the Secretary of State to refrain from thus adding to the immediate difficulties of the situation.

33. The Council then formally adopted the resolution submitted to it, which was in the following terms:—

"The Council:

"(1) Takes note of the report of the Council Committee on the Settlement of the Assyrians of Iraq and approves the proposals which it contains—in particular, that which concerns the definite abandonment of the plan for the settlement of the Assyrians of Iraq in the Ghab plain.

"(2) Approves the present report of its *rapporteur*, the representative of Spain.

"(3) Instructs its committee to continue its efforts, and, in particular, to undertake a general study of the situation so as to be in a position to inform the Council definitely whether, and, if so, to what extent, the settlement elsewhere than in Iraq of the Assyrians of Iraq who still wish to leave that country is at present practicable.

"(4) Authorises the committee to take any steps of an administrative and technical nature which the abandonment of the Ghab plan may render immediately necessary, and requests it to report to the Council such steps as it may take in virtue of this authorisation.

"(5) Reminds the Iraqi Government of the first chapter of its declaration made at Bagdad on the 30th May, 1932, when the mandatory régime was about to come to an end in Iraq, and expresses its confidence that the Iraqi Government will continue to take the necessary measures for the security and welfare of the Assyrian population.

"(6) Expresses its confident belief that the Assyrians of Iraq will continue, in their own interest, to obey loyally the law of the country, and that they will refrain from any action which might give cause for complaint regarding their conduct.

"(7) Invites the Government of Iraq to bring to the knowledge of the Assyrians living in Iraq as much as may concern them of the contents of the report of the committee and of the report of the *rapporteur*."

J. G. WARD.

Eastern Department, Foreign Office.

Sir A. Clark Kerr to Mr. Eden.—(Received July 2.)

(No. 297. Confidential.)

Sir,

Bagdad, June 19, 1936.

I HAVE the honour to refer to the series of telegrams which I have sent to you during the last few days concerning the political effects in Iraq of the marriage of Princess Azzah. The first and acute phase of the affair now seems to be past, and the present is probably a good moment at which to tell the early chapters of what may possibly be a long story.

2. It was some ten days or so before news of the princess's elopement reached Bagdad, for the Government were at pains to exclude any reference to it from the local press. But they were unsuccessful in their efforts to prevent foreign newspapers containing full reports from finding their way into Iraq, and in due course the princess's adventure became the main topic of conversation throughout the country.

3. While for a foreigner it was hard at first to measure it, there can now be no doubt about the damage done to the reputation of the Hashimite family and, in particular, to the personal prestige of King Ghazi. In the face of the flight of his sister, a daughter of the house of the Prophet, with an hotel servant and of her apostasy from Islam, the first popular reaction was one of dismay and of indignation with the princess herself. The second and the more violent was one of hot anger with her brother, King Ghazi. To the everyday and uninformed European this might well seem unreasonable, but to the Iraqi it was natural and inevitable, and for it His Majesty was himself to blame. Had he enjoyed even a modest share of the respect and affection commanded by his father, the offence of his sister would have drawn to him the sympathy of the whole country. But he had been foolish. His absorption in his private hobbies had led him into a heedlessness of the welfare and the susceptibilities of his subjects and indifference to affairs of State which had become notorious. And, still more, even amongst a people by no means and by no right queasy about human frailties, a penny plain or twopence coloured, his mode of life had long been a cause for whispered scandal and had served to make the Iraqis hold him in aversion. What had been whispered about him before now became the subject of the common talk of the coffee shops, and of talk of such a kind as to bring His Majesty into contempt. Thus the main odium provoked by his sister's escapade fell upon King Ghazi himself.

4. Among tribal Arabs such a stain as that left by Princess Azzah upon the family honour can only be wiped out by the blood of both the man and the woman. Often in this country women and their lovers are killed by outraged male relations for misdemeanours less serious than the present one. The murderers come in for popular praise and are dealt with lightly in the courts. But in this instance the culprits are far away from Iraq and vengeance in the classic tradition offers many difficulties.

5. From the beginning it was clear that the Government and the Court were greatly upset. But it has been only within the last few days that the Prime Minister has admitted to me the extent of his concern, which has been deepened by the unhelpful and even reckless attitude of Nuri Said.

6. Early on the morning of the 15th June Yasin telephoned to me to ask me to see him about an urgent matter. He came to the Embassy at 9 o'clock. He was plainly much perturbed. He began by speaking of Nuri, who had just returned from Europe. He said that experience had shown that, from time to time, Nuri adopted, and put forward as his own, ideas suggested to him by others, and he gave me one or two instances of what he meant. Yasin added that he mentioned this because it was widely believed that Nuri often gave voice to the views of this Embassy. Since his return from Europe on the 12th June, Nuri, in discussing with some of his colleagues the situation created by the affair of Princess Azzah, had argued that the Royal Family had been so disgraced that there was nothing for it but to depose King Ghazi and to set up a Council of Regency to govern the country until the infant Crown Prince came of age. Yasin explained that, when this came to his knowledge, he had discussed the matter in private with Rashid Ali, who had agreed with him that the course advocated by Nuri would be disastrous. They had, however, both thought that Nuri's views

might have had their origin in suggestions made to him either in your Department, during his recent visit to London, or by myself in Bagdad. Yasin recalled that, within the last ten days or so, I had questioned him about King Ghazi's position, and said that he had decided to ask me frankly whether Nuri's ideas had been inspired by His Majesty's Government.

7. He went on to explain that, in his opinion, any plot to set King Ghazi aside would expose the country to the danger of general anarchy. In Iraq no one trusted anyone else, each one was jealous of his neighbour, and it would be impossible to find a group of men who commanded respect or authority enough to be able to rule as Regents without exciting the envy and hostility of a number of dangerous rivals. If King Ghazi were deposed, a struggle for power would be sure to follow and the country would be brought to ruin. One had only to think how such a state of things would be exploited by the Shiah and Kurdish tribes in order to realise to what disasters the step which Nuri proposed would lead. I replied that I felt bound to agree that he had rightly described the situation which would be likely to arise, and I said that I shared his views about Nuri's plan.

8. Yasin then said that he understood that Nuri had even gone so far as to suggest that he (Yasin) himself should be Regent. Such an idea was as ill-judged in itself as it was repugnant to him personally. He had no wish whatever to become Regent. Indeed, if he were to, he would certainly be accused of having engineered the disgrace of the princess in order to usurp supreme power.

9. I said that I had received no record of any conversation which Nuri Pasha might have had at the Foreign Office concerning the marriage of the princess, and that I could confidently assure his Excellency that it was out of the question that even a hint of such an idea as deposing King Ghazi could have been given to Nuri without my having been informed.

10. I then asked the Prime Minister to tell me to what extent, in his view, King Ghazi's position had been damaged by the marriage. Yasin replied that public feeling was running so high that it might be difficult for King Ghazi to hold his own unless his honour were speedily retrieved. It was His Majesty's first and obvious duty to kill his sister with his own hand. His lost honour could not properly be regained by means of a hired assassin. If King Ghazi killed the princess promptly, he could hold up his head again and look people in the face. Otherwise, as time went on, his position might become so shaken as to be beyond saving. The Prime Minister spoke without excitement, choosing his words with deliberation.

11. I replied that much of what he said, both about the gravity of the shock to King Ghazi's prestige and the pitiless method of restoring it, was confirmed by what I had recently heard elsewhere. I thought it my urgent duty to warn him that public opinion outside Iraq, which, I was sure he would agree, could not be ignored, would look at the affair in a different light. Morganatic marriages had become commonplace among some Royal families of Europe, and nowadays little or no stigma attached to them. For a few days the "romance" of the story was given prominence in the press, and then it was quickly forgotten. On the other hand, if His Majesty murdered his sister, no matter what justification there might be for such an act under Arab custom, he would so horrify the civilised world that he would be disgraced for ever.

12. The Prime Minister listened attentively and then said that he had been turning over in his mind the possible and, in his view, the inadequate alternative of securing the annulment of the marriage and the return of the princess to her own country. The Iraqi Minister at Rome had, in fact, already made a special appeal in King Ghazi's name to King Victor Emmanuel and Signor Mussolini to have the marriage annulled, and had received a not discouraging reply. I enquired what would be done with the princess if she were brought back to Iraq. The Prime Minister replied that she would be declared to be insane and shut up. When I asked if her life would be safe, he admitted that he could by no means guarantee that. He could, in fact, make no promise that she would not be murdered.

13. Yasin went on to grumble that he had been persistently kept in the dark by King Ghazi's advisers, both about His Majesty's habits and the private life of the Royal Family in general. For example, he had just heard things about King Ghazi which had profoundly shocked him, and had discovered that the Amir Abdulillah, who had recently taken his sisters to Alexandria for a

holiday, had included in his party a well-known Bagdad jockey. This fact, innocent though it might be in itself, inasmuch as the prince had taken his racehorses also, had naturally given a chance to scandalmongers, and the Prime Minister had felt obliged to telegraph asking that the jockey should be sent back to Iraq at once. He was anxious at all costs to safeguard the good name of Abdulillah, so far unsullied, for in the last resort it might be to Abdulillah that Iraq would have to turn for a sovereign.

14. The Prime Minister then reverted to Nuri's proposal to get rid of King Ghazi, and said that it was all the more unfortunate because, at the present moment, the country was faced with many internal difficulties. After all, as things were to-day, King Ghazi, as I knew quite well, played no part in State affairs, and any Government in Iraq had in effect all the powers that could be given to a regency. Indeed, if the worst came to the worst, a Prime Minister could discharge most of the duties of the Crown until it became possible for His Majesty to reappear in public. There was, therefore, nothing to be gained by Nuri's scheme. At the same time, he realised that, if he cared to pursue his plans, Nuri could carry a large body of opinion with him, for it would be a simple matter to inflame popular passions against King Ghazi. But since the accident to his son, Nuri, he felt, had been nervous and distraught, and seemed to have lost his sense of proportion. Yasin therefore begged me to use my influence with Nuri to bring him to his senses. No mention, he said, should be made of our present talk, for Nuri would be sure to put his plan to me. I readily agreed to do this, for I was persuaded that the Prime Minister was right.

15. My visit to Nuri the day after was the first I had paid to him since his return from Europe. I was disturbed by his appearance and his manner. He seemed to be but the shale and husk of himself and looser than ever, both in his thought and in the expression of it. As foreseen by Yasin, he at once raised the subject of the princess's marriage. He said that he feared that the affair would utterly destroy King Ghazi's reputation. His Majesty's way of life was already well known and had damaged his prestige as King. What had now happened might well be the final blow. As he saw it, public contempt for King Ghazi was likely soon to reach such a pitch that it might become impossible for His Majesty any longer to carry out the duties of the Crown. With what face, for instance, could such a King meet a situation which demanded the dismissal of a Government which had lost the confidence of the country? And how, in these circumstances, could an Administration which was abusing its position be removed from office except by *coup d'Etat*. Such perplexities as these had been occupying his mind night and day. He felt that it was imperative to do something. Some clear-cut and unquestionable authority must be set up in the place of the King, for this was essential to the Government of Iraq. For instance, the unruly elements in the country and all those with grievances had hitherto been able, as a last resort, to appeal to the throne for redress. Since King Feisal's death this had not meant much, but it had acted in a way as a vent. The vent had now become choked, and if it were not replaced an explosion might be expected.

16. He then put to me somewhat incoherently his plans for a regency and asked for my views. I protested that this was a far-reaching proposal, and that, if he wanted my views, he must develop it a little. He confessed that he had had time neither to study its practical implications nor to take Yasin into his confidence, and he spoke confusedly first of deposing King Ghazi and then of putting his prerogatives into commission. The rest was a tirade against His Majesty and his manner of life. When he drew breath I thought that the time had come to express disapproval of his plan, and I used all the arguments which Yasin and I had found against it the day before. I then said that I thought he should lose no time in discussing it with the Prime Minister, and I suggested that he and Yasin should dine with me at the Embassy on the following day and talk the whole matter over. Nuri agreed to do this, and added that he had been distressed, since his return from Europe, to find the Prime Minister in a highly nervous condition, and really not to be trusted to give a reasoned opinion on any important matter.

17. If it be for me to judge between the two men, I feel bound to say that it seems to me to be Yasin who has kept his wisdom.

18. I then told Nuri that I had heard from people in authority, such as his own brother-in-law, Ja'far-al-Askeri, that in order to make his honour safe

again King Ghazi must kill his sister. Nuri agreed that this was so. If it were known in Iraq that the girl had been killed by King Ghazi or on His Majesty's direct orders, his honour would be restored in all Arab countries. I lost no time in repeating to Nuri the solemn warning that I had given to Yasin. He hedged a little, and said that it would not much matter who killed the princess so long as she died. Perhaps it would not shock the world so much if it could be made to appear outside Iraq that the murder had not been committed at King Ghazi's direct instance. He was himself opposed to savagery of this kind, but the death of the princess was undoubtedly the ideal solution of the present problem. As regards the rest of the world, he appreciated that the effect would be unfortunate, but it must be remembered that King Ghazi had to reign in Iraq and not in Europe. As our conversation went on, he agreed that if the princess were allowed to live and her marriage were dissolved, and if then, perhaps, she were shut up for a time somewhere in Europe, it was not improbable that public indignation would be to some extent quietened. In conclusion, Nuri said that he was telling me frankly of everything that had been passing in his mind, because it was obvious that His Majesty's Government, having special interest in Iraq's welfare, could not remain unconcerned in the face of such a situation. He was sure that the Iraqi Government would welcome, and be grateful for, any guidance which His Majesty's Government might feel able to offer.

19. The Prime Minister and Nuri dined with me the day after. Yasin arrived first, and thanked me warmly for having spoken to Nuri, for what I had said had obviously shaken Nuri's belief in his own plan. After I had left the Ministry for Foreign Affairs yesterday, Nuri had gone at once to Yasin, and had said that, in the course of his conversation with me, the idea of a regency had suddenly occurred to him, and he had thought that I would be the best person upon whom to test it. Nuri had, I gathered, somewhat dramatised what had passed between himself and me, for it seems that my reactions to his proposal had been remarkable. I had gone pale and averted my face, and had beaten my forehead with the palms of my hands. On recovering from what obviously must have been a great shock to me, I had used strong arguments against a regency, and all this had led him to the belief that it would probably be wiser to drop his plan.

20. When the time came to discuss the matter Nuri approached it with something of his old calm. I asked him if he had told the Prime Minister of his plan, and, on hearing that he had, I reiterated the arguments I had used to him the day before, and I said that, to my mind, the best course open to the Government was to purge the Royal household of the equivocal people with whom King Ghazi had chosen to surround himself, to establish strict control over His Majesty's actions and movements, to keep him for a time in the background, and to hope that, with care and hard work, his reputation and authority would be restored in time and the unhappy story of his sister forgotten.

21. The Prime Minister said that he thought that I was possibly under-estimating the extent to which King Ghazi had lost face during the last few days. It would be a very difficult task to restore his authority and redeem his reputation. Nevertheless, he agreed with me that this task should be attempted before other courses, such as the creation of a regency, were considered. He held strongly that it was impossible for Iraq to be governed without an effective Sovereign. Some man, standing above the parties and personalities, who could hold the balance in politics and be a court of appeal for those who felt wronged or oppressed was essential to Iraq, and, for this reason, his main purpose was to re-establish King Ghazi's authority.

22. After rearguing, without much conviction, his proposal for a regency, Nuri was brought to acquiescence in the rough outline of policy which I had suggested.

23. The Prime Minister then pointed out that it was possible that the Government might find themselves in conflict with His Majesty over the ordering of his household and private life. Such a situation, unless handled with great tact, might easily bring the Government into disfavour with King Ghazi, who would then be likely to lend himself to the intrigues of the Opposition designed to overthrow the Government. The chance of escaping from the close restraint to which it was proposed he should now be subjected might be a strong temptation to him to give way to the blandishments of the group of politicians under Jamil Madfai, who were always hoping to slip back into office. Yasin added that at

present he believed that he still enjoyed King Ghazi's goodwill and confidence, but, if this were withdrawn, it would be impossible for him to carry on the government of the country.

24. I said that I felt sure that his Excellency possessed tact and authority enough to equip him to deal with these difficulties. Here Nuri interrupted and, pointing at me, said: "It all really depends upon you and your Government. If you support us we shall succeed." Yasin, who, as I have said, had kept his wisdom, at once retorted that he had no wish to be in the position of having to depend upon British support. Friendly co-operation was one thing, dependence was something quite different. If it were known, or even widely believed, that he was dependent upon the Embassy, his influence and power would vanish at once. On the other hand, he said, if Nuri remained his friend and worked with him, he could hope that his Cabinet would be strong enough to ward off the danger which seemed to be threatening, but if Nuri left him he knew well enough that he could not remain in office. Upon this the two Ministers pledged their loyalty to each other with every evidence of sincerity.

25. It was no small pleasure to me to see this spontaneous declaration of allegiance made in my presence, for I had not forgotten that, when last the paths of these two men (upon whose co-operation the stability of Iraq seems to depend) threatened to diverge, the task of reconciliation had fallen upon me and I had been unable to persuade them to meet and discuss their differences, but had been obliged to fetch and carry between them.

26. Nuri then asked me if I would help by speaking to King Ghazi myself and Yasin took up this suggestion with enthusiasm. He begged that I should tell His Majesty what his people were saying about him, for King Ghazi plainly did not appreciate the extent to which his name had become a by-word in the country. Some friendly advice from myself, as Ambassador and as a spectator of events in Iraq, would be a valuable contribution to the solution of the present problem. This I agreed to do on the condition that I should be allowed to see His Majesty alone.

27. I then asked them about the princess. Did they think that public feeling against her conduct was dying down? To my astonishment Yasin clenched his fist, and, hammering out his words with blows on the arm of his chair, said: "So long as Nuri and I and every other Iraqi who has felt this disgrace have breath in our bodies, we shall continue to wish for the death of that miserable girl." With vigour and feeling in harmony with his own, I spoke again of the deep horror with which the murder of the princess would be regarded throughout the civilised world. For a long while we threshed out every point in the case, and in the end I led them reluctantly away from thoughts of murder and back again to the less horrible alternative of the dissolution of the marriage and the temporary detention of the princess somewhere in Europe. Yasin maintained that she must be brought to Iraq so that the people might know that she was mad, but Nuri, with my support, urged that it would be enough that she should be shut up somewhere abroad for a while and later on perhaps released and allowed to disappear.

28. Yasin then asked whether His Majesty's Government would help to bring about the dissolution of the marriage. I was purposely vague in my answer, first because I thought that such a request would be an embarrassment to you and then because I remembered that, when discussing the day before the return of the princess to Iraq, Yasin had still had murder at the back of his mind.

29. My conversation with King Ghazi was not as painful as I had expected. I like to think that I was gentle with him. In any case he took what I had to say in good part. He said that he had only just learned that his way of life had become a public scandal. Until now nobody had had the friendliness to come to him to give him any warning. I must not believe everything that was told me. All he had perhaps been guilty of was some harmless little indiscretions with servants to whom he was attached and he would certainly not repeat them. I said that it had occurred to me that perhaps public judgment would not have been so harsh if His Majesty had given himself a little more trouble to endear himself to his people, and I made a few suggestions as to how this should be done. Whether or not he recovered his prestige seemed to me to depend entirely upon himself. If I might venture to give him some advice, it was that he should put himself for some time into the hands of his Ministers and closely follow their guidance, for they had his welfare at heart. His Majesty assured me that

henceforth he would be scrupulously careful that nothing in his private life should expose him to criticism and that he would be guided by his Ministers. He added that at the instance of the Prime Minister he had that day dismissed all his aides-de-camp, his two chauffeurs and nearly all his personal servants.

30. King Ghazi then began to complain about the trouble into which the ill-considered action of his sister had brought him. This gave me an opportunity to tell him that I had heard it suggested that she should be killed, and I explained to him the impression which such a murder would make on the outside world. He said that he himself appreciated this, although many of those about him did not. In any case, the idea of murder was odious to him. When I was leaving him His Majesty thanked me warmly for the advice I had given him, and said that he would always look upon me as a brother.

31. When later in the day I again saw the Prime Minister I found his Excellency's temper almost buoyant. He told me that he had had talks with the leaders of the Opposition and had found that they were all in agreement with and ready to support the policy which he had decided to follow. He confessed to feeling much relieved. He said that he now had good hopes that the political trouble which he had feared would be averted. In any case if it came at all it would not come for some considerable time. King Ghazi had accepted the wholesale dismissal of those about him with good enough grace, but, as I well knew, His Majesty was not to be counted upon not to gather them together again. Yasin was, therefore, busying himself about replacing them by people who would not be too uncongenial to their master.

32. The Prime Minister added that news had just reached him from Rome to the effect that the Italian Government were unwilling to co-operate in an effort to secure the annulment of the princess's marriage and that he did not therefore wish to pursue the request he had made for the help of His Majesty's Government in this matter.

33. Meanwhile, the Government have been busy with the drafting of amendments to the Organic Law, the text of which will reach you in a separate despatch. These amendments contain a provision by which Princess Azzah may be deprived of her property in Iraq. Ministers admit that they are here on questionable ground, but they seem to be ready to face the consequences of any diplomatic difficulties in which this provision may involve the Iraqi Government.

I have, &c.

ARCHIBALD CLARK KERR.

[E 4162/3089/93]

No. 25.

Mr. Bateman to Mr. Eden.—(Received July 6.)

(No. 312.)

Sir,

Bagdad, June 25, 1936.

WITH reference to Sir A. Clark Kerr's despatch No. 297, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a translation of an ordinance concerning the Royal family which was issued on the 13th June last.

2. The ordinance, in addition to defining the conditions of membership of the Royal family, provides for the establishment of a council which is empowered, in certain circumstances, to deprive members of the Royal family of their rights and titles.

3. It is expected that steps will now be taken to deprive Princess Azzah of such rights as she inherited as the daughter of King Feisal. There is considerable head-shaking amongst the wisacres of Bagdad as to the legality of any such procedure. There is even a fear expressed that, as the Princess is now an Italian subject, the Italian Government may have something to say if any attempt is made to deprive the Princess of her inherited properties.

4. Meanwhile, the King's household is being purged of what are considered to be its undesirable elements. Tahsin Kadri, the Master of Ceremonies, has been posted as counsellor to the Iraqi Legation in Tehran, and replaced in the palace by Dr. Naji-al-Asil. The military aides-de-camp have all been sent back to their units, and successors carefully chosen for their integrity and high moral

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standards. Below stairs there has been a clean sweep of the servants and new ones have been engaged, who, it is hoped, will not encourage or facilitate the repetition of the delinquencies which have given rise to so much criticism of the palace over the past three years.

I have, &c.
C. H. BATEMAN.

Enclosure in No. 25.

Royal Family Ordinance No. 75 of 1936.

(Published in the local papers of June 16, 1936.)

WE, King of Iraq,

After reference to article 26 (c) of the Organic Law:

In pursuance of the proposal of the Minister of the Interior and Acting Minister of Justice and with the concurrence of the Council of Ministers, do hereby order the enactment of the following ordinance:—

Article 1.—The Royal family shall consist of the descendants of King Feisal and the wife of the King. The King shall be head of the family.

Art. 2.—Members of the Royal family shall be children of a legitimate marriage, Moslem, and of Iraqi nationality.

Art. 3.—(1) The title of "Prince" or "Princess" ("Amir" or "Amirah") shall be applicable to members of the Royal family, but not to the children of a princess married to other than a prince.

(2) The title "Princess" shall be applicable to wives of princes, and also to widows of the latter unless they remarry.

(3) The Crown Prince and other children of the King shall be addressed by the title "Royal Highness," and other members by the title "Highness" only.

Art. 4.—If a prince or a princess is desirous of marrying, or if the guardian of a prince or a princess is desirous of arranging the marriage of a prince or a princess in his ward, such prince or princess or guardian shall obtain permission in writing from the King for this purpose after consulting the Special Council.

Art. 5.—A special council shall be set up, consisting of the Prime Minister, the Presidents of the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies, the Ministers of the Interior and Justice, and the Rais of the Royal diwan. It shall assemble under the presidency of the King, or the Prime Minister when deputed for this purpose by the King, and at least three of its members must be present.

Art. 6.—(1) The council shall consider disciplinary measures in questions affecting members of the Royal family which have already arisen or which may arise in the future, and shall deal with cases of personal status in which one or more members of the Royal family are concerned.

(2) The courts may not hear any case falling within the jurisdiction of the council.

(3) In matters referred to it under this ordinance, the council shall have the same powers as those belonging to the courts.

(4) Subject to the exceptions provided for in this ordinance, the council shall apply the laws of Iraq in matters coming within its jurisdiction.

(5) The decisions of the council shall be executed in the same way as judgments given by the courts.

(6) The council will determine the procedure to be followed in dealing with matters brought before it.

Art. 7.—The decisions of the council shall be adopted by the unanimous vote of the members present or by a majority vote of such members, and in the case of the council being equally divided in opinion the side for which the President has voted shall carry the decision.

The King may order any decision to be reconsidered within fifteen days from the date of issue of such decision, and in such case the last decision to be adopted by the council shall be final.

Art. 8.—The council shall have the right to distribute the amounts fixed in the general budget for members of the Royal family, and may revise the provisions made for them or stop such provisions as a provisional or final measure.

Art. 9.—If a prince or a princess marries without the permission of the King, the council may decide that such prince or princess shall be deprived of his or her title. Such decision may be restricted to depriving the wife of the princely title derived from her husband. If a prince is deprived of his title, his wife and his children through her shall also be deprived of the title which they would otherwise have derived from him.

Art. 10.—(1) If a prince or princess commits any act derogatory to the honour of the Royal family, the council may decide for his or her expulsion from the family, in which case such prince or princess and his or her descendants shall be deprived of the princely title, and such prince shall also be deprived of his right of succession to the throne.

(2) The council may in addition decide—

(a) To deprive such prince or princess of any right which may pass to him or her as a member of the Royal family, including the right of inheritance from the King or from any member of the Royal family.

(b) To prohibit his or her entry into Iraq or residence therein.

(c) To deprive him or her of the right to exercise possession of immovable property in Iraq.

(3) The council shall dispose in such manner as they deem proper of property of which a prince or princess has been deprived under the preceding clauses.

Art. 11.—All members of the Royal family and persons related to the King within the second, third and fourth degrees of relationship shall be held to be deprived of the right of election or appointment to the membership of Parliament, in accordance with article 30 (10) of the Organic Law.

Art. 12.—The most senior official at the Office of the Rais of the Royal diwan shall act as private secretary to the council, and the records and papers of the council shall be kept at the said diwan, copies of decisions adopted by the council being kept at the Office of the Council of Ministers.

Art. 13.—This ordinance shall come into force from the date of its publication in the *Official Gazette*.

Art. 14.—The Ministers of State are charged with the execution of this ordinance, which shall be submitted to Parliament at its next session.

Done at Bagdad this 24th day of Rabi'-al-Awwal, 1355, and the 13th day of June, 1936.

GHAZI.

NURI-AL-SAID,
Minister for Foreign Affairs.

YASIN-AL-HASHIMI,
Prime Minister.

JAFAR-AL-ASKARI,
Minister of Defence.

RASHID ALI,
*Minister of Interior and
Acting Minister of Justice.*

MUHAMMAD AMIN ZAKI,
*Minister of Economics and
Communications.*

RAUF-AL-BAHRANI,
Minister of Finance.

SADIQ-AL-BASSAM,
Minister of Education.

[E 4185/4/93]

No. 26.

C.282.M.171.1936.VII.

SETTLEMENT OF THE ASSYRIANS OF IRAQ.

Report of the Committee of the Council of the League of Nations.—(Received in Foreign Office, July 7.)

Geneva, July 2, 1936.

SINCE the drafting of its last report to the Council (Doc. C.454.M.236.1935.VII) the committee has held six sessions, in December (two sessions), January, April, May and in the last ten days. The committee first considered measures for putting into operation on the spot the organisation approved by the

Council on the 18th December, 1935, when it adopted the statute of the Trustee Board and the financial regulations for the control of the funds. It then—at its January session and during part of its April session—examined and approved the budgets for 1936, both for the Ghab reclamation scheme and for the actual settlement operations. Other questions, such as the individual consultation of the Assyrians and the problems connected therewith, were also considered. Above all, however, the committee had to give much thought over a long period to certain unforeseen difficulties preventing the realisation of the settlement plan in accordance with the scheduled programme, such as the question of leasing cultivable land for the provisional settlement of the Assyrians in the neighbourhood of the Ghab. These difficulties became more and more acute and the French Government wrote to the committee officially on the subject in a letter dated the 23rd June, 1934. After receipt of this letter the committee took the decision which it now submits to the Council for approval.

The committee has the honour to present herewith, under the relevant headings, an account of these various events and activities:—

I.—Trustee Board.

1. By the resolution adopted at its meeting on the 18th December, 1935, the Council appointed M. Henri Cuénod chairman of the Trustee Board and M. Juan de las Barcenás a temporary member of the Board until the 29th February, 1936. At the same time it requested the High Commissioner of the French Republic in Syria and the Lebanon to appoint his representative on the Trustee Board as soon as possible.

The High Commissioner appointed Major Duprez, representative of the High Commissioner of the French Republic for the Settlement of the Assyrians, to be a member of the Trustee Board from the 1st January, 1936. The three members of the Board having thus been appointed, the Board entered upon its duties on the 3rd January, 1936.

2. By the same resolution the Council authorised the Committee for the Settlement of the Assyrians of Iraq to appoint a titular member of the Trustee Board on the expiry of M. Juan de las Barcenás's temporary contract. The committee accordingly appointed Dr. Bayard Dodge, a citizen of the United States of America and president of the American University at Beirut, to be a titular member from the 1st March, 1936. Dr. Dodge, who was a director of the Near East Relief for Syria and Palestine after the war, was good enough to agree to accept this appointment in an honorary capacity. As, however, he is obliged by his university duties to absent himself from Beirut from time to time, he requested the committee to appoint a permanent substitute. The committee felt that this request was justified and appointed Mr. W. H. Ritscher, professor of political science in the American University at Beirut, as permanent substitute for Dr. Dodge.

As the Council's resolution of the 18th December, 1935, provided for the appointment by the committee of a substitute for the chairman of the Trustee Board only, the committee asks the Council to be good enough to sanction Mr. Ritscher's appointment.

3. The committee thought it advisable to take advantage of the Council's authorisation to appoint a substitute for M. Cuénod in his capacity as representative of the committee on the Local Committee in Iraq. It was found essential for the work of organising and setting in motion the settlement scheme that M. Cuénod should remain in Beirut and he was consequently unable to go to Iraq for the consultation of the mountain-dwelling Assyrians, which had still to be carried out. Since M. Juan de las Barcenás's temporary appointment as a member of the Trustee Board expired on the 29th February, 1935, the committee was glad to be able to continue to avail itself of his services by appointing him as M. Cuénod's substitute on the Local Committee in Iraq until the consultation of the mountain-dwelling Assyrians was completed.

4. In its report to the Council (Doc. C.454.M.236.1935.VII) the committee announced its intention of recommending the Trustee Board to appoint an expert on settlement questions to collaborate with the officials of the High Commissioner in the conduct of the settlement operations. The Trustee Board accordingly appointed for that purpose M. Georges Burnier, who had until then been the representative of the Nansen Office in Syria responsible for the settlement of

Armenian refugees in that country and had already been engaged in the work of settling the Assyrians on the Upper Khabur in 1934-35.

5. It had been agreed that the French Government would, on behalf of the Levant States under French mandate, make a declaration promising to take the necessary steps to invest the Trustee Board with a juridical personality and the powers and privileges defined in its statutes. This declaration signed on the 25th January, 1936, by M. P. E. Flandin, Minister for Foreign Affairs, was duly communicated to the Secretary-General and is now in the archives of the Secretariat.

Furthermore, the High Commissioner of the French Republic in Syria and the Lebanon published on the 7th May an ordinance in which it was recognised that the Trustee Board possessed legal personality.

6. Article 8 of the statutes of the Trustee Board provides that the Board shall make its own internal regulations, which it shall communicate to the Council of the League of Nations. These regulations are reproduced in Annex I^(*) to the present report.

7. The report of the Trustee Board on its work, during the period the 1st January to the 12th June, 1936, forms Annex II^(*) to this report.

II.—Financial Questions.

(a) Budget.

The budgets for the year 1936 relating to the Ghab reclamation scheme and the settlement operations proper, as approved by the committee at its session in January, are given for the information of the Council in Annex III.^(*)

Arrangements have been made between the Secretary-General and the United Kingdom and Iraqi Governments with a view to ensuring the regular provision of funds to cover the expenditure contemplated during the current financial year.

(b) Appeal to Charitable Organisations.

On the 19th January, 1934, the Council issued a general appeal to Governments and private organisations, asking them to consider the possibility of participating generously in financing the scheme for the settlement of the Assyrians. In July 1935, when a site for the settlement of the Assyrians had been found in Syria, the committee renewed this appeal. In November of the same year, after the Governments of the United Kingdom, of France (on behalf of the Levant States under French mandate) and of Iraq, and also the League of Nations, had promised substantial contributions towards the financing of the settlement scheme, the committee informed the Council that in view of the considerable balance which still remained to be found—13½ million French francs, according to the initial budgetary estimates—it would be obliged "to rely to a very large extent on private charitable organisations, from whom it trusts that substantial contributions will eventually be forthcoming."

In response to these urgent representations, a national organisation has been set up in the United Kingdom to collect funds for the settlement of the Assyrians, and this organisation launched an appeal at the end of March. The committee wishes to express its appreciation of this action, and hopes that in other countries also private individuals and organisations interested in the welfare of the Assyrian community will contribute to this work.

III.—Individual Consultation of the Assyrians.

In its last report (Doc. C.454.M.236.1935.VII) the committee expressed the hope that the individual consultation of the Assyrians of Iraq with the object of ascertaining the number of those who desire to take advantage of the proposed scheme of settlement in the French mandated territories of the Levant might be begun early in November.

When submitting the committee's report to the Council on the 18th December last, the *rapporteur* explained why it had not been possible for the consultation actually to begin until the 14th December, 1935. The Local Committee in Iraq completed its enquiries just before the end of February, so far as it was able to do so in view of local climatic conditions. The committee had then still to carry

^(*) Not printed.

^(*) For Annex III, see Annex 2 in Part XXXVIII, No. 37.

out the individual consultation of those Assyrians who live in the mountains on the northern frontier of Iraq and are, in part, native to the district, occupying their original homes. Owing to local conditions, the mountain area could not be toured until about the middle of May.

The consultation of the Assyrians was based on the plan of settlement in the Ghab, the broad outlines of which were made known to them in a message circulated prior to the consultation. The Assyrians who were consulted were ex-Ottoman subjects and their descendants.

The consultation yielded the results given in the following table drawn up by the Local Committee:—

Tribes.	Families.	Persons.	Age.	No. Doubtful. ^(*)
Upper Tiari	247	926	926	
Albak	20	79	79	
Halaman	108	476	476	
Geramun	170	741	741	
Tkhuma	121	452	440	12
Diz	16	49	49	
Baz	363	1,634	1,616	18
Jelu	351	1,322	1,322	
Shemsdin	795	3,383	3,383	
Marbishu	284	1,173	1,173	
Zibari	16	87	87	
Sara	192	723	723	
Gawar	205	748	748	
Quochanis	74	256	256	
Barwar	25	103	103	
Barwari Bala	352	1,628	115	42 1,471
Lower Tiari	869	3,472	206	3,266
Botan	73	250	250	
Saat	65	242	242	
Nodus	16	57	57	
Supnai	95	439	219	5 215
Khananis	5	15	15	
Liwon	9	42	42	
Raikani	74	357	...	357
Nerwai	58	249	...	249
Ashuti	644	2,768	991	1,777
Total	5,247	21,671	14,259	59 7,353

Those Assyrians who were already on the Upper Khabur at the end of 1935 belong to the following tribes:—

Upper Tiari	1,579	Jelu	209
Baz	262	Quochanis	198
Sara	156	Shemsdin	266
Marbishu	142	Eyil	56
Ashuti	46	Gawar	197
Diz	318	Barwar	301
Tkhuma	1,901	Betimo	32
Liwon	207		
Timar	19	Total	5,889

IV.—Execution of the Plan of Transfer and Settlement arranged for 1936.

The committee approved in January the programme of settlement for 1936 which had been submitted to it by the Trustee Board. This programme provided for the provisional settlement in the neighbourhood of the Ghab of 6,000 Assyrians, among whom would be the labourers to be employed on the reclamation works and their families, and the provisional settlement on the Upper Khabur

(*) These are the Assyrians living in the mountains who stated that they left the decision to their tribal chiefs. The latter have not yet announced their decision, but, according to the Local Committee's report, they have never concealed their reluctance to leave Iraq.

of a further group of 2,500 Assyrians belonging to tribes already settled in that district. The transfer of the contingents due to proceed to the Ghab area was envisaged for the spring, while the move to the Khabur was to take place in the autumn. The realisation of the provisional settlement plan in the Ghab region, however, encountered serious and unexpected difficulties.

Before receiving the Assyrians, a sufficient area of arable land had to be secured, since it was essential for financial reasons that the Assyrian settlers, at the end of their first year's stay in Syria, should speedily become self-supporting. The plan for the settlement of the Assyrians in the Ghab plain, submitted at the end of last August by the French Government, provided for the leasing of 8,500 hectares in Syrian territory towards the southern extremity of the Ghab plain, sufficient "for the provisional settlement of about 20,000 Assyrians, who will be able to grow crops and graze their sheep on it." The rent of this land during the whole period of temporary settlement (five years) was to amount to 450,000 French francs.

The committee decided to make some important modifications in the administrative part of the plan submitted to it, particularly as regards the powers of the Trustee Board, the constitution of which became an essential condition of the putting into force of the settlement plan, and as regards the financial regulations for the control of the use of funds. The Trustee Board could not therefore be constituted before January.

As soon as it entered upon its duties, the Trustee Board informed the committee that this estate of 8,500 hectares was no longer available, but that it hoped to be able to rent about 4,000 hectares of other land, mostly belonging to the Syrian State lands. From this moment it became apparent that the estimates in the budget for the leasing of land would be insufficient, particularly as in open negotiations the demands of landowners would not fail to become larger owing to the shortage of available land. The board therefore considered it necessary to allow for an increase of 200,000 French francs in the original total credit provided for the rent of lands for temporary settlement.

Since then new difficulties have arisen, and at the beginning of April the committee learned that the Trustee Board could no longer count even on the lands mentioned above, and that only about 360 hectares of State lands situated in the State of Latakia remained available, of which a parcel of about 300 hectares was an estate hitherto leased to the Nansen Office. The Governor of Latakia, in reply to the Trustee Board's request, notified the latter of a certain number of parcels of land representing a total area of 1,950 hectares, belonging to private persons, within the territory of Latakia, which it might be possible to rent by private agreement with the owners. It was clear, however, that even if these lands could be acquired, protracted bargaining would be necessary, in which the Trustee Board would not be in a position to conclude a favourable deal. Moreover, the Trustee Board considered that the total area of the available land was quite insufficient to meet immediate requirements. It reported that in these circumstances it was not in a position to carry out the programme drawn up in January for the transfer of the Assyrians to the Ghab district in the spring of the present year. Having received a request from the Iraqi Government that transfer operations should begin as soon as possible, the Trustee Board expressed the opinion that the only practicable solution would be to modify the programme and settle on the Khabur as soon as possible the 2,500 Assyrians whom it had only been proposed to transfer to this area in September.

During a session held from the 6th-9th April the committee examined this question very carefully. It expressed its preference for keeping as far as possible to the existing programme, and thought that the settlement plan as a whole might be seriously compromised if a solution could not be found for the present difficulties. It accordingly drew the French Government's special attention to the difficulties encountered by the Trustee Board, and was glad to learn from the French representative that his Government proposed to take steps to remedy this situation in the near future.

By a letter dated the 9th June the French Government informed the committee of the special efforts that had been made by the mandatory authorities, at its instance, to assist the Trustee Board. It appeared from this letter, and also from the report of the Trustee Board, that it would be possible, as a result of the efforts made, to lease at once, in the Government of Latakia, 4,000 hectares at an average annual rent of 75 fr. per hectare. Even apart from the fact that

this area was considered definitely insufficient to provide food for all the Assyrians who were to be settled provisionally in the neighbourhood of the Ghab, the rent of these lands alone would have amounted to 300,000 fr. a year, or 1,500,000 fr. for five years; whereas it had originally been hoped to obtain for only 450,000 fr. an area more than double the size, which was considered sufficient to accommodate and feed some 20,000 Assyrians. The committee had already realised that there would probably be a considerable increase on the original estimates, and had reached the conclusion that it should defer any decision to enlarge the budget until it had learned the result of the efforts of the Trustee Board and the mandatory authorities to bring the rents down to the lowest level. It was at its present session that the committee had proposed to take all the necessary measures to deal with this problem.

In the meantime the Iraqi Government urged once more at the beginning of May that, in view of the impossibility of effecting the transfers to the Ghab in accordance with the existing programme, the removal of the quota of 2,500 Assyrians to the Khabur should be advanced so as to reassure the Assyrian population. The committee felt that it could no longer oppose this change in the programme, and on the 8th May gave the necessary instructions to the Trustee Board. It was understood, however, that this decision, which simply reversed the order of the transfers provided for in the programme for the current year, was not in itself to entail any change in the general plan of settlement, and could not be cited in any respect as a precedent.

The transfer to the Khabur began on the 28th May and continued at intervals until the 30th June. The flocks and herds belonging to the Assyrians who have been moved are to follow after the first autumn rains; a certain number of Assyrians required to convoy them have remained in Iraq for that purpose.

V.—Recent Developments.

At its meeting of the 25th June the committee of the Council had before it the French Government's letter of the 23rd June, which is appended under Annex IV (a). The importance of this letter did not escape the committee's notice.

From the outset the committee has followed closely the evolution of the political situation in Syria, which found its expression in a declaration made on the 1st March of this year by the High Commissioner of the French Republic in the mandated States of the Levant to the representatives of the Syrian Nationalist party. That declaration foreshadowed the conclusion of a Franco-Syrian treaty on the lines of that concluded in 1930 between the United Kingdom and Iraq, and announced the forthcoming opening in Paris of preliminary negotiations between the authorities of the mandatory Power and a Syrian delegation with a view to the framing of this new treaty.

At the end of March the president of the committee decided to discuss with the High Commissioner the possible influence of the new situation on the execution of the Assyrian settlement plan. The High Commissioner felt able at that time to reassure completely the chairman of the committee, as he already reassured the Trustee Board before he left Beirut. In these circumstances the committee considered that it was justified in continuing to count on the normal execution of the plan.

However, the letter from the French Government mentioned above informed the committee that, owing to difficulties which it described, the prospects of carrying out the plan seemed to be seriously jeopardised. These difficulties, to which the French Government asked the committee to pay very serious attention, were of two kinds: were of a financial nature and were likely to increase the initial deficit very considerably, while other and more serious difficulties were due to the political developments in the Levant States.

Despite its ardent desire to secure the execution of a plan which, in its opinion, was likely to provide a satisfactory and final solution of the problem of the settlement of the Assyrians of Iraq, the committee was soon forced to realise that it would be useless to attempt to remedy the financial difficulties unless it were certain beforehand that the political obstacles would not prevent any solution of the problem. It therefore found it necessary to ask the French representative on the committee whether he could not, on behalf of his Government, furnish the committee with some supplementary explanations of a nature to complete the remarks contained in the letter of the 23rd June.

In deference to the committee's wishes, the French representative, at the meeting of the 30th June, made a declaration which is attached as Annex IV (b).

The committee, after having examined the position in the light of the information contained in the letter from the French Government of the 23rd June and of the explanations furnished in the above-mentioned declaration, came to the conclusion that it could no longer continue to carry out the plan for the settlement of the Assyrians of Iraq in the Ghab plain. To its deep regret, it considers that it has no option but to propose to the Council the definite abandonment of the plan.

In these circumstances the whole problem of the settlement of the Assyrians of Iraq, which there was every reason to hope was on the point of being satisfactorily solved after nearly three years of strenuous effort, arises once more. Despite this fresh setback, the committee is ready, within the terms of the mandate entrusted to it by the Council in October 1933, to continue its efforts to find a satisfactory solution for this grave question. It intends to reconsider the whole problem very fully, and proposes to lay the results of its enquiry before the Council at its next session. Meanwhile, subject to the Council's authorisation, it intends to take all such technical and administrative measures as may seem immediately necessary in view of the abandonment of the Ghab plan.

Annexes I, II and III not printed.

Annex IV.

(a)—*Letter from the French Government to the Secretary-General, dated June 23, 1936, drawing Attention to the Difficulties of carrying out the Plans for the Settlement of the Assyrians of Iraq in Syria.*

(Translation.)

Paris, June 23, 1936.

MY attention has been drawn to certain publications which have appeared in the Anglo-Saxon press and which, enumerating the difficulties in the way of the execution of the plan for the settlement of the Assyrians in the Ghab district, mentioned in particular that there was some uncertainty regarding the nature of the land to be reclaimed.

I have duly asked the High Commission of the Republic at Beirut for particulars on this point. From the information supplied, it appears that the soundings made and the analyses undertaken throughout the Ghab at the time the first preliminary scheme was drawn up, and more recently on the actual site intended for the Assyrians, did not reveal any trace of peat. I am awaiting a complete dossier on these investigations, which I propose to send to you for the information of the Committee for the Settlement of the Assyrians.

I have thought it necessary to give these explanations to the committee without delay. I should add that, while no difficulty seems to exist as regards the nature of the land, there are other difficulties to which the French Government has drawn the committee's attention from the outset, and which experience has shown to be very real.

Some of these difficulties are connected with the financing of the settlement. In the detailed execution of the plan, certain contingencies such as the terms for leasing land and the estimates for an effective campaign against malaria are likely to swell the items of the draft budget. Moreover, if reference be made to the original proposal, it will be found that it was agreed that neither the Syrian Government nor the French Government should be called upon to make any financial contribution, and that the necessary sums should be obtained elsewhere. This notwithstanding, the Syrian Government is making a contribution of 28½ million francs in respect of public works. It would be desirable, before these works are undertaken, to make sure that the costs of settlement will be effectively covered by the funds at the committee's disposal.

This question is one of particular urgency. According to the arrangements made by the High Commission, which is responsible for the execution of the work, the contracts must be awarded at the beginning of July, failing which the programme arranged for the current year cannot be carried out before the

rainy season, and a whole section of the work will have to be postponed until next year, which would involve a delay of one year in the execution of the plan.

Other difficulties of a more serious nature are due to the present state of mind in the Arab world, and the more rapid pace at which the mandatory Power has been led to allow the political evolution of the Levant States under its mandate to take place.

The increasingly uncompromising attitude of the majority elements in the Levant is a fact which is becoming obvious in many places and on which it is unnecessary to dwell. At a time when the mandatory Power is endeavouring, according to the terms of the mandate, to prepare for the emancipation of the States which it has the task of guiding towards independence, it must take steps to safeguard the minorities settled in these States against the consequences of this uncompromising attitude. It is to be feared that the settlement of the Assyrians according to a programme which will take several years to carry out and will call for large contributions from the local budgets will encounter various obstacles. Already landowners are showing little disposition to offer the Trustee Board acceptable terms, and this at a time when the current political evolution deprives the mandatory authority of part of the means previously at its disposal to create a conciliatory state of mind. Furthermore, the Assyrian immigration is arousing a press campaign of considerable liveliness, and it is to be apprehended that this matter, by drawing attention to the question of minorities, may have harmful effects on the fate of members of the indigenous minorities. From the outset, in his letter dated the 14th April, 1935 (Doc. C./Min.Ass./108), my predecessor drew M. Lopez-Olivan's attention to this danger. The present circumstances make it my duty to remind the Assyrian Committee of its existence.

At a time when this committee is called upon to take decisions the urgent character of which has been brought to my notice by the High Commission of the Republic at Beirut, I have thought it necessary to inform it of the foregoing considerations.

I have, &c.
(For the Minister),
ALEXIS LEGER.

(b)—*Declaration made to the Committee by the French Representative on June 30, 1936.*

The representative of France feels bound to call the committee's attention to the recent political developments in the Levant. The scheme for the reclamation of the Ghab and the settlement of Assyrians in that valley is attended by very serious risks, both technical and political. It has little chance of success unless the nationalist opposition to the establishment of a Christian minority in the immediate neighbourhood of the centre of Moslem resistance is kept in check by the firmness of an Administration which draws its moral authority both from the League of Nations and from its own disinterestedness and impartiality. France thought that she would still need about five years in which to prepare, in the best interests of the country, for the transfer of authority which must be the normal end of the mandate, and contemplated retaining all her powers and responsibilities during that period. It was solely on that assumption that she felt able to disregard the objections which are well known to the committee, and the programme had been drawn up accordingly. Should it be argued that the difficulties apprehended would have arisen during the period in question, it is not difficult to reply that, since the work would by that time have been completed, the material advantages that the country would have derived from the development of the area would have been so patent that, in the opinion of those best qualified to judge, they would have unquestionably offset the difficulties, and that it was not unreasonable to suppose that the Syrians, with their realist spirit, would have taken account of the results of the scheme as a whole and would have been obliged to acknowledge its beneficial character.

This process seems likely to be appreciably accelerated by new developments, of which we are obliged to take account. If, as is reasonable to suppose, the transfer of the responsibilities of government to the local Administration should substantially anticipate the expectations referred to above, the situation would inevitably be radically altered. The technical difficulties would not, of course, be in any way affected; those that have made themselves felt since the beginning

of the work, and which are essentially due to causes independent of human diligence, can no doubt be overcome. The political difficulties, however, would appear in all their force under the new conditions; indeed, they would grow more proportionately acute with the withdrawal of the salutary barrier constituted by the care of a Government determined to pursue objectively the true interests of the country and to secure a harmonious balance between them.

For these reasons the French Government considers that what seems likely to be the increased pace of the political development must henceforth prevent the effective execution of a scheme which, though difficult—indeed, risky—from a technical point of view, was well worth undertaking in view of the great and lasting advantages it would bring to the areas involved and at the same time to the Assyrian tribes which, finally settled in a fertile district, would have seen the end of their troubled existence in the Near East.

In view of these considerations, the committee will not fail to conclude that, left to itself, the local Administration would not be able to overcome difficulties which would in future be much more serious, since the political atmosphere is tending to make them substantially more acute. The operation in question can only be carried out in a calm atmosphere. France, moreover, cannot see her way to lay so heavy a mortgage on the inheritance that she bequeaths. Even if the local Government were inclined to agree to take over the obligations contracted under the conditions defined above, France regards it as a matter of conscience to advise against such a transfer.

Further, the committee is called upon to face a new situation at a time when the expenditure actually incurred is still very small. It can arrive at a decision in relative freedom, since the most important work has not yet been begun and the funds collected remain available for the purpose for which they are intended. The decision would have been far more unpleasant and painful if large sums had already been spent on works destined to remain useless.

In these circumstances, the French Government feels bound to call the committee's attention to the advisability of abandoning here and now a project which is henceforth in imminent danger of being deprived of the basis that would alone give it, so far as could humanly be foreseen, a chance of success at least equal to the risk of failure.

[E 4279/4/93]

No. 27.

Ninety-Second Session of the Council of the League of Nations.

Extract from Final Minutes of the Fifth Meeting, Public and Private, held on July 4, 1936, at Geneva.

Settlement of the Assyrians of Iraq: Report of the Committee of the Council.

(Sabih Bey Najib, representative of Iraq, came to the Council table.)

M. BARCIA presented the following report and resolution:—(1)

"The report which our Committee for the Settlement of the Assyrians has submitted to us (document C.282.M.171.1936.VII) contains detailed information on the work of the last six months in connexion with the settlement of the Assyrians of Iraq in the French mandated territories of the Levant, and on the present state of the problem.

"The Council will have learned from this document, and especially from the text of a note by the French Government which is annexed thereto, the very serious reasons which have compelled the committee to conclude that it could no longer pursue the execution of the plan for the settlement of the Assyrians of Iraq in the Ghab plain and to propose to the Council the abandonment of this plan. Despite the very great regret which the Council must feel at the necessity to abandon a plan the great advantage of which it had recognised, it can hardly do otherwise than bow before the force of circumstances and accept its committee's proposal.

(1) Document C.284.M.173.1936.VII.

"My colleagues will no doubt be glad to learn that our committee, which for nearly three years has been making such persevering efforts to find, within the scope of the mandate it received from the Council in October 1933, a satisfactory solution of the serious problem of the settlement of the Assyrians of Iraq, expresses its determination to continue its efforts with the same energy as before. The Council will recollect that it delegated extensive powers to the committee when it was set up in October 1933. It instructed the committee to consider first of all whether the settlement elsewhere than in Iraq of the Assyrians who wished to leave it 'would be possible in practice, and, if so, to take, in close co-operation with the Iraqi Government, all such steps as it might think fit with a view to the preparation and execution of a detailed scheme for the settlement, elsewhere than in Iraq, of such Assyrians as might express the desire to leave the country, it being clearly understood that such part of the Assyrian population as remained in Iraq would be regarded as a minority to which would be applicable the provisions of the Iraqi declaration on the protection of minorities, and which would, further, be bound by the obligations of loyalty to the State recalled by the Assembly in its resolution of the 21st September, 1932.' The Council considered that the committee 'might also examine, in consultation with the Iraqi Government, and on the basis of reports furnished by the latter, the measures taken by that Government in order to give full effect to the Council's resolution of the 15th December, 1932, so far as concerns any Assyrians who may wish to remain in Iraq.'

"The Council will, no doubt, consider that the terms of this mandate are still valid and may be adapted to the present situation.

"We must recognise the fact that the committee's decision to abandon the Ghab plan, which we are called upon to confirm, is likely to cause disappointment among the Assyrians of Iraq, who were entitled to hope that they would shortly be transferred to Syria, but will now still have to remain in Iraq. Nevertheless, the Council will have every confidence that the Iraqi Government will continue, in accordance with the declarations which it has made in the past, to take all the necessary steps for their security and for their welfare.

"In this connexion I should like to recall a statement made by your *rapporteur* to the Council on the 7th June, 1934: 'When the mandatory régime came to an end on the 30th May, 1932, the Kingdom of Iraq made a declaration at Bagdad containing the guarantees given to the Council by the Iraqi Government. Chapter I, article 2, paragraph 1, of this declaration reads: "Full and complete protection of life and liberty will be assured to all inhabitants of Iraq, without distinction of birth, nationality, language, race or religion."' "

"Pending any new solution which may prove to be practicable, the Assyrians must, however, continue to pursue their normal occupations in a quiet and orderly manner; they must unreservedly obey the laws of the country within which they are living, and refrain from giving any legitimate ground for complaint as to their conduct.

"The Council will note that the committee proposes to make a thorough general study of the situation created by the abandonment of the Ghab plan, and of the necessary action which it may involve and possible solutions which may appear. The abandonment of the Ghab plan will, however, necessitate a certain number of measures of an administrative and technical nature which must be taken without delay. The Council will no doubt agree to give the committee the necessary powers in this connexion and request it, in consultation with the Trustee Board, to report at the next session of the Council on the steps it may have found necessary to take in virtue of this authorisation.

"I have the honour to propose to the Council the adoption of the following resolution:—

"The Council,

"(1) Takes note of the report of the Council Committee on the Settlement of the Assyrians of Iraq and approves the proposals which it contains—in particular, that which concerns the definite abandonment of the plan for the settlement of the Assyrians of Iraq in the Ghab plain;

"(2) Approves the present report of its *rapporteur*, the representative of Spain;

"(3) Instructs its committee to continue its efforts and, in particular, to undertake a general study of the situation so as to be in a position to

inform the Council definitely whether, and, if so, to what extent, the settlement elsewhere than in Iraq of the Assyrians of Iraq who still wish to leave that country is at present practicable;

"(4) Authorises the committee to take any steps of an administrative and technical nature which the abandonment of the Ghab plan may render immediately necessary, and requests it to report to the Council such steps as it may take in virtue of this authorisation;

"(5) Reminds the Iraqi Government of the first chapter of its declaration made at Bagdad on the 30th May, 1932, when the mandatory régime was about to come to an end in Iraq, and expresses its confidence that the Iraqi Government will continue to take the necessary measures for the security and welfare of the Assyrian population;

"(6) Expresses its confident belief that the Assyrians of Iraq will continue, in their own interest, to obey loyally the law of the country, and that they will refrain from any action which might give cause for complaint regarding their conduct;

"(7) Invites the Government of Iraq to bring to the knowledge of the Assyrians living in Iraq as much as may concern them of the contents of the report of the committee and of the report of the *rapporteur*."

Sabih Bey Najib, representative of Iraq, said that the Royal Iraqi Government deeply regretted the delay in the settlement of the Assyrians resulting from the circumstances now placed before the Council. The question had for many years occupied the attention of numerous authorities; much time had been spent on it; heavy expenditure had been incurred. The Iraqi Government had been led to believe that the problem had been solved by the acceptance of an excellent scheme for settlement in the Ghab region of Syria.

The Iraqi Government had always emphasised its very earnest desire that the Assyrians should be permanently and suitably settled, in the shortest possible time, in a place where they could live in peace and tranquillity. That this had been the Iraqi Government's sole intention had been demonstrated by its readiness at all times to assist the project by administrative and other facilities to the utmost of its power. It had also made financial contributions which, having regard to the economic status of the country, had been excessively generous and made at considerable sacrifice.

The Iraqi representative took the opportunity of expressing his thanks to the Council and the League Secretariat, as well as to the States which had given their valuable assistance in connexion with the scheme, and in the meantime he earnestly hoped that they would all spare no effort to bring about a final solution of the problem. He was particularly grateful to the committee, the members of which had had no light task and had been put to much trouble and inconvenience. In that connexion he wished to pay a tribute to the chairman of the committee, M. López Oliván, for his untiring zeal in endeavouring to reach a satisfactory solution, his wisdom and tact in handling the different situations and his honourable efforts to overcome the difficulties with which the scheme had from time to time been faced.

In conclusion, the Iraqi representative could only hope and request that the Council would speedily find a solution which would prove satisfactory to all concerned. In this connexion he wished to draw the attention of the members of the Council to the remarks of the Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs at the meeting of the Fourth Committee of the sixteenth ordinary session of the Assembly, held on the 26th September, 1935, which explained the attitude of the Iraqi Government in regard to the problem. It was needless to repeat what his predecessors had always asserted—that, until a satisfactory solution had been found, the Assyrians in Iraq would continue to enjoy full security and would find the Government as concerned about their well-being as it had ever been.

M. Delbos said that France, as the mandatory Power for the countries of the Levant, had viewed favourably the execution of a plan having eminently humanitarian aims. It therefore deeply regretted that the trend of events had rendered impracticable the noble undertaking devised by the League of Nations.

As regarded the Assyrian colony settled on the Khabur, it was not for the French Government to decide upon its future. Nevertheless, if it continued to stay in the area where it was at present settled, it would, of course, enjoy the

guarantees which the mandate, or any other régime which might be substituted therefor, would always afford to the minorities.

In conclusion, he associated himself with the thanks offered by the Iraqi representative to M. López Oliván and the committee over which he presided, and to the Secretariat for the energy they had displayed in carrying out the task entrusted to them.

The President was sure he was expressing the feeling of all his colleagues in saying how deeply the Council regretted that the plan for settling the Assyrians in the mandated territories of the Levant had been found to be impracticable as a result of political developments which nobody could foresee when the plan had been adopted in September 1935. Speaking in his personal capacity as United Kingdom representative, he also wished to express the particularly keen disappointment which His Majesty's Government felt at the fact that once more, despite all the efforts of the Council Committee, under its distinguished and indefatigable chairman, M. López Oliván, a scheme which had bid fair to solve this most difficult and persistent question should have to be abandoned.

At the same time, after studying the committee's report, and in particular the very frank explanation which the French Government had been good enough to afford, the President felt no doubt at all that, in the very difficult circumstances with which it was faced, the committee had taken the wisest decision. Speaking for the United Kingdom Government, Mr. Eden added that it had always recognised the difficulties which would inevitably have had to be overcome in carrying out the complicated plan for settling the Assyrians in the Ghab area; but, at the same time, it realised that the scheme possessed many advantages and that it offered the only apparent solution of the Assyrian question in offering the Assyrians the chance of a new home in a part of the world which would suit their requirements and in material circumstances which would give them every chance of a prosperous and happy future.

It would serve no useful purpose at the present time to dwell upon the past. It was necessary to concentrate on the future and on making yet another effort to find a lasting and satisfactory solution of what had been rightly described as a "work of appeasement and humanity."

Mr. Eden was therefore particularly glad to note from the committee's report that, so far from allowing itself to be discouraged by this latest check after nearly three years of strenuous efforts, the committee intended at once to set about finding another solution for the problem. He was particularly glad to learn that M. López Oliván proposed to continue to act as chairman of the committee, and would express to him, on behalf of the Council, its gratitude and continued confidence in his able leadership.

The President was sure that the Council would agree to extend the mandate it had given to the committee and that he would be interpreting the feeling of the Council in expressing the confident hope that the committee would be ultimately successful in its most difficult task. It was necessary, unfortunately, to resign oneself to yet another period of delay in the settlement of this problem. Meanwhile, he had been very glad to hear the remarks which the representative of Iraq had made with regard to the position of the Assyrians in Iraq. He was sure the Council could rely on the Iraqi Government to guarantee the security of those Assyrians and to continue to use its best efforts to secure their welfare and contentment as far as possible.

M. Barcia thanked the President and the other speakers for their kind remarks regarding his fellow-countryman, M. López Oliván, and was glad that, through him, Spain had been able to make a contribution to this difficult task.

(The resolution was adopted.)

(Sabih Bey Najib withdrew.)

[E 4360/1575/93]

No. 28.

Mr. Bateman to Mr. Eden.—(Received July 13.)

(No. 328.)

Sir,

Bagdad, July 2, 1936.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 299 of the 20th June last, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the text of an official communiqué of the 22nd June announcing the surrender of Sheikh Shalan-al-Atiyah and the collapse of the Euphrates revolt⁽¹⁾. The communiqué ends on a note of optimism which, in present circumstances, can hardly be said to be warranted. From the military point of view, there may be room for satisfaction that the army has, on the whole, come well out of the ordeal, but there are not a few who are dismayed by the evidence of a serious breakdown in the administrative machine afforded by the Government's constant recourse to force over the past fifteen months.

2. The only positive step to be taken in the near future appears to be the disarming of the tribes in the affected area. There is no mention of a serious effort by the Minister of the Interior to sift the tribesmen's grievances and deal honestly with them. On the contrary, I hear that the new mutessarif of Diwaniyah is, with difficulty, being restrained from reopening complicated tribal land disputes, while some of his subordinates are so inept as to be a source of constant preoccupation to those whose aim is the rapid restoration of normal conditions.

3. It seems to be unfortunately true that the Minister of the Interior is a man of warped vision and vindictive disposition. He is said to be unable to appreciate any views but his own. In the present instance, his inclination to opportunist and hasty methods is causing no little concern to some of his colleagues in the Government. The Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Defence are openly critical of his methods and the Cabinet are said to be sharply divided as to the course to be taken in the immediate future.

4. In the circumstances, it is not surprising that the political atmosphere is heavy with intrigue, and rumour is busy with talk of changes in the Government.

5. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Tehran.

I have, &c.

C. H. BATEMAN.

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

[E 4361/3089/93]

No. 29.

Mr. Bateman to Mr. Eden.—(Received July 13.)

(No. 330.)

Sir,

Bagdad, July 2, 1936.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 149 of the 23rd June, I have the honour to inform you that the excitement created by the runaway marriage of Princess Azzah appears to be subsiding.

2. A week ago, when Nuri Said received me at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, he was extremely gloomy and talked pessimistically about the hopelessness of the political future. A revolver lay significantly on his table and I found it necessary to use most soothing language to bring him to see that all was not necessarily lost and that possibly he himself was partly responsible for his own dejection. Nor was he the only Minister to go through the motions of self-protection and to carry fire-arms.

3. During the last few days, however, Ministers have become less agitated and there is less talk of radical changes in the personnel of the Cabinet. The death of the Princess is no longer put forward as being the only possible solution.

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4. Nevertheless, the repercussions of this affair have added to the difficulties of the Government, whose position had already been shaken by the tribal revolts at Rumaitha and Dagharah, the closing events of which I have reported in my despatch No. 328 of to-day's date.

5. The efforts of the Prime Minister to restore King Ghazi's prestige are not meeting with the support from certain quarters which he was entitled to expect. The King is offering some resistance to the Government's plans for the reform of his household. He has, for example, refused to dismiss one, Saiyid Shakir, the Keeper of the Privy Purse, and I understand that he is trying to restore to his service a chauffeur whose notoriously immoral conduct put him at the head of the *index expurgatorius* prepared on the Prime Minister's urgent recommendation.

6. These signs of the reassertion of the King's will are important, as there are many who are watching for an opportunity to exploit the necessarily delicate situation caused by his present relations with the Prime Minister. In public life at present there is much manoeuvring for position, and the King can still play an important part in these movements.

7. In the provinces, among the outspoken tribesmen, King Ghazi's name is, I learn, frequently coupled with opprobrious epithets, and a week ago a number of crude and scurrilous handbills abusing His Majesty were in secret circulation in the Holy Cities. On the other hand, Jafar Abu Timman, who, as a puritan, was spoken of as one of King Ghazi's most vehement critics, dined amicably at the palace a few nights ago.

8. It is always rash in this country to attempt to forecast the future, and the present situation is unusually full of uncertain factors. I feel, however, that there are grounds for hoping that in a few months' time, if the affair of the Princess can be forgotten, normal conditions will be gradually restored.

9. It is with a view to this end that I have encouraged the Minister for Foreign Affairs to enquire exhaustively into the facts of the Princess's marriage before considering the possibility of further action.

I have, &c.

C. H. BATEMAN.

[E 4770/25/93]

No. 30.

Mr. Bateman to Mr. Eden.—(Received July 27.)

(No. 345.)
Sir,

Bagdad, July 10, 1936.

WITH reference to your despatch No. 433 of the 25th June, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copies of the note which, in accordance with your instructions, I handed to the Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 9th July, at the time of the exchange of ratifications of the agreement of the 31st March, 1936, concerning the transfer to the Iraqi Government of the rights of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom in respect of the ownership of the Iraqi railway system. One copy has been duly certified by me.

2. The original of the reply of the Minister for Foreign Affairs is also enclosed herein, together with English translations, one of which has been certified correct by the oriental secretary to this Embassy.

3. The law conferring the requisite powers on the board of management received the Royal assent on the 16th April last and was published in Arabic in the *Official Gazette* of the 25th April last, under the serial No. 52. The official English translation will be forwarded to you as soon as the text is published in the English version of the *Gazette*.

4. In handing my note No. 349 of the 9th July to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, I reminded him that the board of management must, under article 2 of the agreement of the 31st March, be constituted immediately and that the transfer of the railway system would not be complete until this had been done. I also reminded him that payment of the sum due to His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom must be made before the 29th July next (article 1 of the

agreement). In reply, his Excellency informed me that the constitution of the board was at present the subject of active discussion by the Council of Ministers, but that he expected a decision within the next few days. He also stated that payment of the sum of £400,000 had been duly authorised. I have since heard from Mr. Hogg, adviser to the Ministry of Finance, that payment will be made in London.

I have, &c.

C. H. BATEMAN.

Enclosure 1 in No. 30.

Mr. Bateman to Nuri Pasha.

Your Excellency,

Bagdad, July 9, 1936.

ON the occasion of the exchange of ratifications of the agreement signed by your Excellency and His Majesty's Ambassador on the 31st March, 1936, relative to the Iraqi railways, I have the honour to invite your attention to the fact that it is a condition of that agreement that the board of management referred to in article 2 shall have adequate powers to enable it effectively to control and administer the railways and that it shall continue for the period of twenty years to possess such powers.

2. I have been instructed by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom to inform your Excellency that His Majesty's Government have seen the powers which the Iraqi law No. 52 of the 16th April, 1936, conferred on the board, and that they are ratifying the agreement because they consider that these powers are adequate.

3. It follows from article 3 of the agreement that any diminution of the powers of the board during the period of twenty years from the date of the transfer of the railways would be a breach of the agreement. In these circumstances His Majesty's Government trust that the Iraqi Government will consult them if there is any question of amending the law referred to above so as to affect the powers of the board, and will not, during the period of twenty years, repeal the law or modify it in a manner which, in the view of His Majesty's Government, would undesirably diminish the powers of the board.

I avail, &c.

C. H. BATEMAN.

Enclosure 2 in No. 30.

Nuri Pasha to Mr. Bateman.

(Translation.)

M. le Chargé d'Affaires,

Bagdad, July 9, 1936.

I HAVE the honour to inform you of the receipt of your note of to-day's date concerning the powers of the board of management of the Iraqi railways.

NURI SAID.

[E 4779/481/93]

No. 31.

Mr. Bateman to Mr. Eden.—(Received July 27.)

(No. 357 E.)
Sir,

Bagdad, July 15, 1936.

I HAVE the honour to refer to my despatch No. 427 E. of the 1st August, 1935, and to inform you that I have now received from Colonel Ward an advance typewritten copy of the Administration Report of the Port of Basra, including a report on the Fao dredging scheme, for the financial year 1935-36. Printed copies of the report will be transmitted to you when they are available.

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2. Details of budget estimates and actual revenue and expenditure during the year are set forth in the enclosures in this despatch, together with comparative figures of actual expenditure in the preceding year.

3. It will be seen that the revenue of the port, while falling short by some £4,300 of that earned in 1934-35, exceeded the budget estimate by about £20,000. This excess is accounted for almost in its entirety by increased traffic revenue and miscellaneous receipts. The earnings of the traffic department exceeded expectations by £12,900, largely as a result of increased imports of materials destined for the Royal Air Force station at Dhibban and of constructional material for the Kut barrage. Miscellaneous revenue was swollen by receipts on account of the sale of surplus craft and material, for which no budget provision was made. Receipts in the Marine Department, while approaching closely the budget estimate, were lower by about £10,000 than in 1934-35. This decrease was brought about in its entirety by the reduction in dues "A" by 2 fils per gross registered ton as from the 1st April, 1935.

4. Expenditure was greater by about £4,000 than the budget estimate, and by £12,000 than that for the preceding year. This increase was due to the introduction of the new form of contract for foreign officials serving in the port directorate, in consequence of which the leave accounts of all such officials had to be liquidated.

5. The Fao bar dredging scheme shows a surplus on the year's working of £8,522, as compared with an estimated surplus of £455. Dredging dues have declined by over £40,000 as compared with 1934-35. This decrease is not due to a falling off in the number of vessels entering and leaving the port, or to a diminution of their draft, but to the reduction of 15 per cent. in the scale of dues introduced on the 1st April, 1935. Expenditure under the several headings has been within or very slightly in excess of the budget estimates, with the exception of renewals and repairs, where the over-expenditure of some £4,000 is due to the cost of dry-docking a dredger, which proved more extensive than was anticipated.

6. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Department of Overseas Trade.

I have, &c.

C. H. BATEMAN.

Enclosure in No. 31.
Port of Basra.

Port of Darfo.			
REVENUE.		EXPENDITURE.	
Actual 1934-35.	Budget 1935-36.	Actual 1934-35.	Budget 1935-36.
I.D.	I.D.	I.D.	I.D.
...	136,410	...	53,500
Marine Department	148,251	...	57,743
Traffic Department	106,681	...	51,630
Engineering Department	2,667	...	38,400
Miscellaneous	24,048	...	59,612
Central Power House	16,096	...	15,891
...	14,080	...	34,260
...	7,750
...	6,009
...	13,825
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Fao Bar Dredging Scheme.

REVENUE.				EXPENDITURE.			
	Actual 1934-35.	Budget 1935-36.	Actual 1935-36.		Actual 1934-35.	Budget 1935-36.	Actual 1935-36.
	I.D.	I.D.	I.D.		I.D.	I.D.	I.D.
Dredging Dues—				Salaries and wages	10,735	15,460	12,435
Abadan shipping	184,365	Operations	51,238	70,750	66,531
Basra shipping	12,066	Renewals and repairs	...	32,250	36,311
		General charges	18,850	23,685	23,376
Miscellaneous receipts,...	237,317	...	196,431	Minor works	...	500	...
	2,821	...	2,585		15,325		
	...			New dredger	...	142,045	138,653
					...	62,000	51,841
				Surplus	...	204,045	190,494
					...	455	8,522
Total revenue	240,138	204,500	199,016		240,138	204,500	199,016

[E 4766/18/93]

No. 32.

Note handed to the Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs by His Majesty's Charge d'Affaires at Bagdad on July 12, 1936, containing the Proposals of His Majesty's Government for a Comprehensive Settlement as between themselves and the Iraqi Government of the Questions connected with the Properties in Iraq belonging to the Sheikhs of Koweit and Mohammerah.—(Received in Foreign Office on July 27 under cover of Bagdad Despatch No. 358 of July 15.)

Your Excellency,

Bagdad, July 8, 1936.

FOR some years past, and more especially since the establishment of Iraq as an independent State, it has been the constant endeavour of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom to arrive at an agreed solution, with the Iraqi Government, of the problems arising from the properties in Iraq belonging to the Sheikhs of Koweit and Mohammerah.

2. In 1914 His Majesty's Government pledged their word that these properties would remain in the possession of the sheikhs and their descendants without being subject to the payment of taxes or imposts. These pledges have been, and continue to be, matters of no little concern to His Majesty's Government, who are anxious that arrangements should be made, with the consent and goodwill of the Iraqi Government, whereby full effect may be given to them as soon as possible.

3. Many proposals with this end in view have been discussed between our respective Governments, but have proved abortive, and His Majesty's Government have now decided that the time has arrived to make a fresh attempt, without prejudice to the views which they and the Iraqi Government have hitherto expressed, to overcome, in a practical manner, the difficulties that have arisen.

4. On this basis, as a result of prolonged and careful examination, His Majesty's Government have now prepared new proposals which involve very considerable concessions to the views of the Iraqi Government, and to which I have the honour to invite your Excellency's favourable attention.

5. The problems involved concern—

- (a) The possession of the actual areas in question.
- (b) Taxation.

6. As regards (b), the proposals of His Majesty's Government are the following: They are prepared to make no further claim against the Iraqi Government for the exemption of the properties of the two sheikhs from taxation in Iraq, provided that the Iraqi Government will, for their part—

- (a) Give a formal undertaking, in writing, to make no claim for arrears of taxation against either sheikh in respect of their properties in Iraq; and
- (b) Provide a formal written assurance that no discriminatory taxation will be imposed upon the properties of either in future.

7. As regards the possession aspect of the matter, His Majesty's Government propose, as an integral part of a comprehensive settlement, that all uncertainties should now be removed in regard to the boundaries of the sheikhs' lands in Iraq and a formal title be awarded to them, through the application, to the areas in which the lands are situated, of the procedure laid down in the Land Settlement Law of the 23rd May, 1932.

8. With this end in view, His Majesty's Government suggest that the Iraqi Government should immediately declare the areas in question as a settlement area in accordance with the law above quoted, and that a British land settlement officer should be detailed, as soon as possible, to carry out the whole procedure of land settlement as specified by the law. This would mean that, after a full and impartial investigation, including outside claims (account being taken of all the circumstances, as provided in article 13 of the law), the boundaries of the lands in question would be delimited by a decision of the land settlement officer and subsequently registered by the Tapu Department, under article 20 of the law. His Majesty's Government assume that such orders as may be necessary will be issued by the proper authorities to ensure that the sheikhs' non-Iraqi nationality will constitute no impediment or delay to the completion of the registration.

9. An obvious advantage of these proposals is that the result of their application would be to safeguard the rights of all Iraqi subjects, while preventing the recurrence of unfounded claims against the sheikhs. Article 32 of the Land Settlement Law provides that, within a settlement area, during the period of settlement, no case concerning any matter touching the settlement of rights in land shall be heard in any court other than the special court provided for in the law. His Majesty's Government are aware of the decision of the Court of Cassation delivered on the 29th October, 1934, in Appeal Case No. 8 of 1934, whereby article 32 of the Land Settlement Law was declared to apply to all suits, whether brought before or after the application of that law to the area in which the lands are situated; so that all pending suits are, by the operation of the law, transferred to the land settlement officer. I shall be grateful to be assured that the suits now pending in the Basra courts in respect of the lands of the Sheikh of Koweit will remain stayed until the transfer of the land settlement officer can take place under article 32 referred to above.

10. The possibility of further litigation against the Sheikh of Koweit would be confined to appeals to the special court set up by virtue of article 4 of the law against the decision of the land settlement officer. These are permitted within a maximum period of forty days (article 23 of the law). His Majesty's Government suggest that, for the convenience of all concerned, the special court be set up in Basra under the presidency of the president of the civil courts there.

11. His Majesty's Government fully realise that the application of land settlement to specified properties in the Basra liwa may interfere with the general course of land settlement now in operation. They are also aware that it would necessitate a special survey of the properties being carried out on a scale of not less than 1/20,000. In view, however, of the obvious advantages of the course proposed as a means of overcoming the difficulties that have arisen, they feel convinced that the Iraqi Government will not allow administrative questions of details to stand in the way. They presume that survey operations could not be begun before the end of the hot weather, and they would be glad to learn that the Iraqi Government concur in their proposals and that arrangements will accordingly be made for the survey to be undertaken as soon as possible.

12. His Majesty's Government are prepared to abide by the decisions of the land settlement officer as to the boundaries of the lands in question and by any modifications of these decisions which may result from subsequent appeals to the special court provided for by the law. They are further prepared to undertake not to make any claim against the Iraqi Government in respect of any changes which may result to the present boundaries of the sheikhs' lands in consequence of the land settlement procedure.

13. As the case of the Sheikh of Koweit is the more urgent of the two, it is proposed that land settlement procedure should be applied to his properties first, and that the application of the procedure to the properties of the Sheikh of Mohammerah should be undertaken immediately afterwards.

14. Your Excellency will, I trust, agree that His Majesty's Government have gone a long way towards meeting the Iraqi point of view, and that they are giving evidence of their confidence in the goodwill of your Excellency's Government, as well as of their own desire for a fair and lasting solution.

15. The present proposals of His Majesty's Government are intended to form a new point of departure in this complicated matter.

I avail, &c.

C. H. BATEMAN.

[E 4869/25/93]

No. 33.

Mr. Bateman to Mr. Eden. — (Received July 30.)

(No. 382.)

Sir,

Bagdad, July 24, 1936.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 188 of to-day's date, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a translation of the note from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs concerning the establishment of the Railways Board of Management in conformity with the agreement of the 31st March last.

2. I understand that the two additional Iraqi members, whose names are given at the end of the note, are intended to take the places of Iraqi members who are unable to attend board meetings. No doubt similar arrangements will be made as and when necessary to fill, from the ranks of the British advisers, the places of Colonel Ward and Mr. Hogg in case of sickness or leave.

3. The first meeting of the board was held on the 22nd July last.

I have, &c.

C. H. BATEMAN.

Enclosure in No. 33.

Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Bagdad, to British Embassy.

(Translation.)

THE Ministry for Foreign Affairs present their compliments to His Britannic Majesty's Embassy, Bagdad, and have the honour to state that, in pursuance of article 2 of the Agreement for the Transfer of Ownership of the Railways, signed at Bagdad on the 31st March, 1936, of which the ratifications were exchanged on the 9th July, 1936, the Council of Ministers resolved, at their meeting held on the 14th July, 1936, that the Railways Board of Management should be formed as follows:—

President: Muhammad Amin Zaki, Minister of Economics and Communications.

Member: Taha-al-Hashimi, Chief of the Army General Staff.

Member: Arshad-al-Umari, Director-General of Municipalities.

Member: Colonel Ward, Director-General of Port, Navigation and Railways.

Member: Mr. Hogg, Adviser to the Ministry of Finance.

Additional member: Abdul Ilah Hafidh, Director of Commerce.

Additional member: Amin-al-Umari, Director of Operations.

The Ministry avail, &c.

*Ministry for Foreign Affairs,
Bagdad, July 20, 1936.*

[E 5170/25/93]

No. 34.

Mr. Bateman to Mr. Eden.—(Received August 17.)

(No. 391.)

HIS Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Bagdad presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit to him a copy of a note, dated the 29th July, 1936, to the Iraqi Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs regarding transfer of ownership of the Iraq railway system to the Iraqi Government.

Bagdad, July 29, 1936.

Enclosure in No. 34.

Mr. Bateman to Saiyid Yasin-al-Hashimi.

Bagdad, July 29, 1936.

Your Excellency,

IN a note from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the 16th July last, His Majesty's Embassy were informed that the necessary instructions had been issued by the competent department of the Iraqi Government for the payment to His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom of the sum named in article 1 of the agreement signed in Bagdad on the 31st March last regarding the railway system of Iraq.

2. In a note from the Ministry of the 20th July last His Majesty's Embassy were notified that the board of management of the railways had been duly established in accordance with article 2 of the agreement.

3. I now have the honour, by direction of His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to inform your Excellency that the sum of £400,000 was paid on the 27th July last to His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom by the Eastern Bank, London, on behalf of the Iraqi Government and that the ownership of the railway system of Iraq has been transferred to the Iraqi Government with effect from the 27th July, 1936.

I avail, &c.

C. H. BATEMAN.

[E 5171/172/93]

No. 35.

Mr. Bateman to Mr. Eden.—(Received August 17.)

(No. 392.)

Sir,

Bagdad, July 29, 1936.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 186 of the 22nd July, I have the honour to report that Saiyid Mahmud, Naqib-al-Ashraf of Bagdad and trustee of the Qadiriya Awqaf, died in Bagdad in the early morning of the 21st July after a long illness.

2. At the funeral, which took place at 5 o'clock in the evening of the same day, King Ghazi was represented by the Master of Ceremonies. Most of the Cabinet Ministers and many members of the Diplomatic Corps attended.

3. On the 27th July Royal Iradahs were issued appointing Saiyid Asim-al-Gilani as Naqib-al-Ashraf of Bagdad, and Saiyid Rashid Ali-al-Gilani trustee of the Qadiriya Awqaf (*i.e.*, the endowments of the shrine and mosque of Sheikh Abdul Qadir-al-Gilani in Bagdad).

4. Asim is the eldest surviving brother of the late Saiyid Mahmud, and Rashid Ali, who belongs to a junior branch of the family, is the present Minister of the Interior.

5. Both of these appointments are likely to give rise to criticism. Saiyid Asim is a respected and venerable man, who, although of no great talent, will probably fill adequately the post of Naqib; but there is little doubt that the late Naqib's son—Saiyid Muhammad Jamal-al-Din—had hoped to succeed his father. For the past twenty years he has lived in India, where he has kept alive the influence of the Gilani family in Baluchistan and in the Chitral Valley. He has, I am told, married a daughter of the ruling Mehtar of Chitral. Two months ago, hearing of Saiyid Mahmud's illness, he came to Bagdad, and is now, no doubt, aggrieved that he has not been appointed to step into his father's shoes. For this reason it is not improbable that he may encourage in India criticism of his uncle's appointment. I am assured, however, that there is nothing in the Shari'ah or Civil Law which makes the post of Naqib hereditary, and that the Government have full right to appoint whomsoever they think most suitable.

6. But the feature of the new arrangements which is likely to arouse most comment is the separation of the functions of Naqib from those of the trustee of the Qadiriya endowments. This, I am informed, has rarely, if ever, happened before. The strict legality of the innovation is perhaps open to some doubt, but can, I am advised, be very strongly defended.

7. In 1927, following the death of the Naqib—Saiyid Abdul Rahman—an effort was made by a group of the Gilani family to take the administration of the endowments out of the hands of his successor, but it was not successful. The leader of this movement was Rashid Ali-al-Gilani. At that time the High Commissioner, Sir Henry Dobbs, felt that the question of the succession might have repercussions which would affect His Majesty's Government; and, having regard to the veneration in which the Shrine of Abdul Qadir is held in other Islamic countries, and particularly in India, he advised the Iraqi Government to be most careful to take no action that could be challenged as being contrary to Islamic law or tradition (see Sir Henry Dobbs's despatch, Secret A, to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, dated the 17th June, 1927).

8. His Majesty's Government also formally tendered similar advice to the late King Feisal (see telegram of Secretary of State for the Colonies to the High Commissioner No. 280 of the 3rd August, 1927).

9. In present circumstances, although it is too early to give a definite opinion, I do not anticipate that the new appointments will lead to any serious developments in Iraq. Though Saiyid Asim may resent being shorn of the trusteeship of the Qadiriya endowments, he has not the force of character necessary to contest the Government's decision. It is, indeed, almost certain that his consent to this arrangement was a condition of his appointment as Naqib. Many outsiders will be jealous of Rashid Ali's new source of wealth, but the majority of the Gilani family themselves will probably welcome his appointment as offering some hope of extricating the endowed properties from the chaos and neglect into which they have fallen through the gross maladministration of Saiyid Mahmud. Outside Iraq, the presence of Saiyid Asim as Naqib should preserve religious propriety, and, provided no hindrance is created for pilgrims to the shrine, the murids, dervishes and other adherents of the Qadiriya house should have no real cause for complaint.

10. Telegrams and petitions protesting against the new arrangements and inspired by one or other of the several groups with special material interests at stake may be sent to His Majesty's representatives in India and this country (I have already received a telegram of protest from one branch of the Gilani family), but in present circumstances I can see no good reason for intervention of any kind by His Majesty's Government. The position in 1927 was entirely different. The mandate was still in force, and the High Commissioner rightly foresaw that if anything were done to offend Islamic settlement (particularly in India), His Majesty's Government would have to shoulder the responsibility and take the blame. In these days we have no responsibility for matters of this kind and, moreover, no *locus standi* for intervention.

11. Unless I am instructed to the contrary, I propose, therefore, to ignore, as far as possible, any representations which may be made to me about the appointment of Asim and Rashid Ali or about the separation of the trusteeship from the Niqabat; and in instances where some reply seems unavoidable, to state frankly that these matters are no longer the concern of His Majesty's Government.

12. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Government of India.

I have, &c.

C. H. BATEMAN.

[E 5173/3089/93]

No. 36.

Mr. Bateman to Mr. Eden.—(Received August 17.)

(No. 394.)

Sir,

Bagdad, July 30, 1936.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 330 of the 2nd July, I have the honour to inform you that the marriage of Princess Azzah appears to have lost its attraction as a subject of public gossip and of excited political intrigue. This is probably due to the temporary absence from Bagdad of a number of influential Iraqis, including Nuri Said, the Minister for Foreign Affairs. Muzahim Pachachi has returned from Rome, but I have not heard what account he has given of his efforts to have Princess Azzah's marriage annulled. In any case, his return has been allowed to pass without undue comment, and the Rais of the Royal Diwan recently expressed to me a fervent hope that the whole affair might now be relegated to the limbo of forgotten things.

2. Meanwhile, the Prime Minister is working steadily at his task of restoring public affection for King Ghazi. On his advice His Majesty has resumed regular attendance at public prayers in the Sarai Mosque on Fridays, and he is now showing a painstaking interest in social events. His Majesty's staff are also assiduous in their calls at the houses of all distinguished invalids.

3. Intrigues concerned with the reconstruction of the Cabinet seem to have been dropped for the time being but are likely to be renewed when Nuri-al-Said returns from Egypt. His restless activity and fickle mind are constant sources of uneasiness when he is in this country.

4. As regards the situation on the Euphrates, the Prime Minister is, I think, aware of the need for constructive measures both to redress the grievances of the tribes and to alleviate the distress which has been caused by the loss of life and the destruction of villages and crops during the recent military operations. When I spoke to him about these and cognate matters a few days

ago, he told me that as soon as he was able to find time he intended to pay a personal visit of enquiry to the Diwaniyah liwa. Meanwhile, a Royal iradah was issued on the 26th July terminating martial law in the Diwaniyah liwa. Five death sentences passed by the court-martial have been commuted by King Ghazi into hard labour for life.

I have, &c.

C. H. BATEMAN.

[E 5336/481/93]

No. 37.

Mr. Bateman to Mr. Eden.—(Received August 24.)

(No. 398 E.)

Sir,

Bagdad, August 1, 1936.

IN my despatch No. 357 E. of the 15th July last, statistics were furnished showing the financial working of the Port of Basra and of the Fao Bar Dredging Scheme for the year ended the 31st March, 1936.

2. I have now the honour to transmit to you the budget estimates in abridged form of these two undertakings for the financial year 1936-37.⁽¹⁾

3. The total estimated revenue of the port is higher by some I.D. 36,000 than the estimate for 1935-36. Several factors have contributed to this increase. The inclusion of a full year's provision for sanitary dues has helped to swell the marine revenues by some I.D. 11,000. In 1935-36, although provision for three months' collection of these dues was inserted in the estimate, no dues were in fact received, as the necessary enabling legislation had not been enacted. The position is unaltered in this respect, but it is hoped that parliamentary sanction will shortly be obtained.

4. Traffic revenue is estimated to produce I.D. 6,000 more than in 1935-36, in anticipation of increased import tonnage, whilst miscellaneous revenues account for an increase of a further I.D. 6,000, derived in the main from anticipated recoveries, from the Central Power House and Central Water Purification Scheme, on account of service of capital debt.

5. On the expenditure side the estimates are also higher by I.D. 36,000. This increase is due in part to the enhanced provision made (under "Salaries") to cover the cost of the additional staff required to run the airport, and in part to the expenditure required in connexion with the airport and the Central Water Purification Scheme, which have not previously figured in budget estimates. For the rest, provision has been inserted, on a conservative scale, for increased expenditure resulting from the growing activity of the port. Provision is also made for the payment of I.D. 33,360, the thirteenth annual instalment of the capital debt, including interest due to His Majesty's Government.

6. Estimates of receipts and expenditure of the Fao Bar Dredging Scheme are both lower by approximately I.D. 32,000. On the basis of actual collections in 1935-36, it is estimated that dredging dues for the current financial year would amount to I.D. 150,000, but allowance has been made for a contemplated reduction of 3 per cent. in the scale of charges, and revenue from this source is therefore estimated at I.D. 171,000.

7. In the estimates of expenditure no provision for new dredgers, such as appeared in the estimates for the preceding year (I.D. 62,000) is inserted, although I understand that Colonel Ward has, in fact, secured the Prime Minister's consent to the purchase of a fourth dredger. All other heads show increases, the most important of which are I.D. 10,550 for renewals and repairs, and I.D. 9,500 for minor works. In the former case adequate provision has been made for the proper maintenance of the three existing dredgers. Minor works include additional beacons and lights to be installed, at an estimated cost of I.D. 2,500, in the dredged channel, and the provision at Fao of facilities (also estimated to cost I.D. 2,500) for minor repairs to and overhaul of port craft, hitherto dependent in this respect on the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company at Abadan.

8. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Department of Overseas Trade.

I have, &c.

C. H. BATEMAN

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

Mr. Bateman to Mr. Eden.—(Received August 24.)

(No. 407.)

Sir,

Bagdad, August 6, 1936.

WITH reference to paragraph 3 of my despatch No. 345 of the 10th July last, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copies of the English version of the law for the ratification of the agreement of the 31st March last regarding the Transfer of the Ownership of the Railways to the Iraqi Government.

2. The law was published in the *Iraq Government Gazette* of the 12th July, 1936 (No. 28).

I have, &c.

C. H. BATEMAN.

Enclosure in No. 38.

Extract from the Iraq Government Gazette, No. 28 of July 12, 1936.

NOTIFICATIONS, &c.

By the Council of Ministers

374.—*Law for the Ratification of the Iraqi-British Agreement regarding the Transfer of the Ownership of the Railways to the Iraqi Government—No. 52 of 1936.*

WE, King of Iraq,

With the approval of the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies, do hereby order the enactment of the following law:—

Article 1.—His Majesty the King may ratify the agreement regarding the transfer to the Iraqi Government of the rights of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom in respect of the ownership of the Iraqi Railways, signed on the 31st day of March, 1936, by the Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs on behalf of His Majesty the King of Iraq, and by the British Ambassador in Bagdad on behalf of His Majesty The King of the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland.

Art. 2.—The Iraqi State Railways shall be attached to the Ministry of Economics and Communications, and the management thereof shall be entrusted to the board of management described in the said agreement.

Art. 3.—(1) The appointment of the members of the board of management shall be made by decision of the Council of Ministers.

(2) The Council of Ministers may appoint a person to replace the president in his absence, and may appoint additional members to take the place of absent members, Iraqi or British as the case may be.

(3) In the absence of the general manager the person acting in his office shall represent him.

(4) A meeting of the board shall not be lawfully constituted unless five persons are present, of whom one shall be the president or the person appointed to replace him in his absence.

(5) The time and place of meetings and the conduct of business at meetings shall be prescribed by the board.

(6) Decisions shall be taken by majority of votes.

Art. 4.—The board of management may issue rules in respect of the following matters:—

- (a) Prescribing the classification of goods and animals and the conditions under which the different classes are received, conveyed, stored and delivered.
- (b) Prescribing classes of passenger traffic and the conditions under which passengers and their luggage are conveyed.
- (c) Prescribing the rates to be charged for all purposes provided that such rates shall not exceed the maximum rates set out in the schedule annexed to this law.
- (d) Controlling the conduct of persons upon the premises occupied by the railways.
- (e) Regulating generally the working of the railway system.

Art. 5.—The board may prescribe the acts which are regarded as railway contraventions and the punishment therefor, provided that such punishment shall be fine only, and shall not exceed 5 dinars.

Art. 6.—(1) The board shall, every year, submit estimates of receipts and expenditure to the Minister of Finance through the responsible Minister for submission to Parliament as an annex to the general budget.

(2) The board may, in their annual budget, set aside out of their profits, after making due provision for essential working expenditure of the railways, including depreciation and renewals, such sums as they think proper as a reserve for the improvement of the railways.

(3) The accounts shall continue to be submitted to the Comptroller and Auditor-General.

Art. 7.—(1) All purchases of goods and materials shall be made by the board, and all contracts shall be signed by the president and one member of the board, except such contracts or classes of contracts as may, by decision of the board, be signed by officials of the railways.

(2) No foreign official shall be employed or dispensed with without the decision of the Council of Ministers.

Art. 8.—(a) The board may delegate to the general manager any part of its powers under article 4 of this law.

(b) The general manager may delegate to officials of the railways all or any of the powers delegated to him by the board.

Art. 9.—(1) The general rules regarding the matters set out in article 4 of this law which are now in force in the Railway Administration shall remain in force until the board shall alter or replace them.

(2) The Railways Proclamation, 1919, shall stand repealed from a date two months after the coming into force of this law.

Art. 10.—This law shall come into force upon the date of the publication thereof in the *Official Gazette*.

Art. 11.—All Ministers of the State are charged with the execution of this law.

Made at Bagdad this 24th day of Muharram, 1355, and the 16th day of April, 1936.

GHAZI.

YASIN-AL-HASHIMI,
Prime Minister.

RAUF-AL-BAHRANI,
Minister of Finance.

JAFAR-AL-ASKARI,
Minister of Defence.

RASHID ALI,
Minister of Interior and Acting Minister of Justice.

NURI-AS-SAID,
Minister for Foreign Affairs.

MUHAMMAD AMIN ZAKI,
Minister of Economics and Communications.

SADIQ-AL-BASSAM,
Minister of Education.

(Published in the *Waqayi-al-Iraqiya*, No. 1508 of April 20, 1936.)

N.B.—The agreement regarding the transfer to the Iraqi Government of the rights of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom in respect of the ownership of the Iraqi Railways is published as an annexure to this *Gazette*.

THE SCHEDULE.

SECTION 1: *Goods*.—The charges set out in this section are in respect of the carriage for 1 kilom. of 1 ton of 1,000 kilog., or, in the case of goods imported on through bill of lading to Bagdad, the shipping ton. They do not include additional charges such as terminal and handling charges, crane and heavy lift charges, ferry charges, siding charges, surcharges, minimum charges, &c., which shall be charged in accordance with the goods tariff in force from time to time.

Class.	Fils.	Basra, Shuaiba, Nasiriyah, Ker- bala, Bagdad	Bagdad North, Khanakin, Kirkuk	Bagdad West Baiji
		Section, including Al Juwadain.	Section, including Hinaidi.	
Grain	...	2	2	2
"A"	...	2.34	2.86	3.91
"B"	...	2.60	6.25	6.25
"C"	...	3.39	8.59	7.81
I.	...	2.34	4.69	4.69
II.	...	3.13	6.25	6.25
III.	...	4.17	9.38	9.38
X.	...	5.99	21.09	16.41

SECTION 2: *Passenger fares*.

Third class: 1.25 fils per kilom. per passenger.
Second class: 4.5 fils per kilom. per passenger.
First class: 9 fils per kilom. per passenger.

SECTION 3: *Passengers' luggage charges*.

For every 35 kilom. or part thereof, 2.5 fils for every 5 kilog. or part thereof provided that passengers are entitled to take with them the following free allowance of luggage if the rules in force are complied with:—

Third class: 30 kilog.
Second class: 40 kilog.
First class: 60 kilog.

SECTION 4: *Parcels*.—4 fils for every 5 kilog. or part thereof for every 35 kilom. or part thereof, subject to a minimum charge of 75 fils per consignment.

SECTION 5: *Animals*.

- (a) Horses, cattle, mules, donkeys, &c., 4.5 fils per animal per kilom., subject to a minimum of 25 fils per kilom. for the vehicle used and to a minimum total charge of I.D. 1/875 per metre gauge and I.D. 3/000 per standard gauge vehicle used, subject to section 7 below.
- (b) Small animals such as sheep, goats, pigs, &c., 1 fil per animal per kilom., subject to a minimum of 25 fils per kilom. and a minimum charge of I.D. 1/875 per metre gauge and I.D. 3/000 per standard gauge vehicle used, if a special vehicle is required, subject to section 7 below.
- (c) Small animals carried in the luggage van, 1 fil per kilom., subject to a minimum charge of 75 fils.

SECTION 6.—Motor cars, lorries, tractors, carriages, carts on wheels, &c., 25 fils per kilom. per metre gauge vehicle and 31.25 fils per kilom. per standard gauge vehicle used, subject to the following minimum charges:—

Metre gauge	...	I.D. 1/875
Standard gauge	...	I.D. 3/000

SECTION 7.—The maximum rates for vehicles refer to four-wheeled vehicles, and are doubled in the case of bogie vehicles.

[E 5488/518/65]

No. 39.

Mr. Bateman to Mr. Eden.—(Received August 31.)

(No. 423 E.)

Sir,

Bagdad, August 18, 1936.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of an interesting memorandum⁽¹⁾ compiled by His Majesty's consul at Mosul, regarding freight rates and overland traffic between Mediterranean ports and Northern Iraq.

2. There is ample evidence that traffic between Mosul and Beirut and Tripoli, via railhead at Tel-Kotchek, is developing rapidly, and may in time affect the receipts, both of the Iraq railways and of the Port of Basra. Already the relatively important wool export trade, of which Mosul is the centre, has been entirely diverted to that route, and a considerable proportion of the grain produced in the Mosul area is now being despatched in the same way. Hitherto the Syrian railways have quoted a rate of 180 fr. (about 48s.) per ton for transport of grain from Mosul to Beirut, but I am reliably informed that they will very shortly introduce a reduced rate of 100 fr. (approximately 26s.). From Beirut freights to a continental European port are 12s. a ton or less. From Basra freight rates are 25s. to a continental port and 27s. 6d. to the United Kingdom, while the Iraq railways quote a rate of 700 fils (14s.) from Mosul to Basra, exclusive of port charges. It is difficult to see how any reduction of this latter figure is possible. As regards ocean shipping rates from Basra, these must always fluctuate with the demand for cargo space in India, a point which Iraqi exporters of produce, in their periodic outbursts against the alleged rapacity of foreign shipping companies, seem to be quite unable to appreciate.

3. It is not to be expected that Bagdad will lightly give up any part of her predominance in the entrepôt trade of the country, but a long view suggests that it would be wise to allow exports, at least, to flow through the most natural channel—in the case of the northern districts the Tel-Kotchek-Mediterranean routes. To combat this natural tendency, by means of a frantic cutting of transport rates, can only result in a deepening of the conviction held by the inhabitants of the northern liwas that their interests are consistently and deliberately neglected and even sabotaged by the Central Government. Even as regards imports, Bagdad can well afford to cede to Mosul her fair and natural share of the gradually expanding traffic. The semi-industrial equipment of Iraq, necessitating the importation of heavy merchandise, such as machinery, iron and steel, is likely to be confined for several years to come to Southern and Central Iraq, for which Basra is the natural port and Bagdad the natural distributing centre. Similarly, Bagdad must long remain the main importing centre of light merchandise, such as that which merchants find it profitable to import by the desert route from Haifa or Beirut to Bagdad. Such merchandise is, broadly speaking, of a luxury type, for which the demand in the northern districts is very restricted. The situation would be different, and fraught with some danger to Bagdad, were it the case that imports of light merchandise, destined for the markets of Central and Southern Iraq, could be imported via Syria and Mosul more expeditiously and at less cost than by way of the Haifa-Bagdad or Damascus-Bagdad desert routes. At present the position is that, though transport rates between Syria and Mosul are lower than those between Beirut or Haifa and Bagdad (the figures are respectively and approximately £4 and £6), goods are appreciably longer on the way, and the advantage in cost is nullified by the additional expense of transport from Mosul to Bagdad, of unloading goods at Mosul for dutying (since they cannot be sent forward under customs seal to Bagdad), of subsequent reloading, and perhaps of unloading again for passage of the pontoon bridges at Bagdad, the carrying capacity of which is limited.

4. I have not, in the foregoing appreciation, touched on the effect which the linking up by rail of Tel-Kotchek with Mosul and of Mosul with Bagdad might be expected to have on the situation. There can be little doubt that a decision will before long be taken to provide direct rail communication between Bagdad and Mosul, but it is too early to prophesy whether this will take the form of an extension of the narrow gauge line from Kirkuk, or of continuation of the broad gauge line from Baiji, following the alignment of the old Bagdad-bahn. Iraqi opinion appears at the moment to incline to the first of these

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

alternatives, on the ground that the railway would then tap a fertile grain-producing area, whereas a line direct from Bagdad to Mosul via Baiji would run for by far the greater part of its length through an uncultivated and uncultivable region. On the other hand, Colonel Ward, the Director of Railways, is strongly in favour of the Baiji-Mosul extension, as being cheaper, shorter, and easier to construct while the Iraqi Government is at present, I believe, disinclined to promote easier communications with Syria, as long as the French mandate is in force there. The adoption of either alternative will undoubtedly serve to enhance the prosperity of Mosul, but I do not consider that any change will result in the relative importance of the two towns as importing, exporting and distributing centres, as assessed in the preceding paragraph.

5. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Department of Overseas Trade, to His Majesty's consular officers at Beirut, Mosul and Basra, and to the Commercial Agent in Palestine.

I have, &c.

C. H. BATEMAN.

[E 5506/4/93]

No. 40.

Record of Informal Negotiations with the French Government regarding the Possibility of Settling the Assyrians in the Lebanon.

IT was decided on E 5107/4/93 that there appeared, from the information available, to be a definite possibility of settling the Assyrians within the Lebanese Republic, and that the best chance of success lay (despite the disadvantages inherent in such a course) in a preliminary informal approach by His Majesty's Government to the French Government. The position was accordingly explained to His Majesty's Embassy at Paris, and it was arranged that I should myself proceed to Paris on the 26th August to be available in an advisory capacity and for any detailed discussions with officials at the Quai d'Orsay which might ensue.

2. The matter was broached in the course of an interview at the Quai d'Orsay on the 26th August between His Majesty's Minister at Paris and M. Viénot, Political Under-Secretary of State charged specially with the control of French policy in the Mediterranean basin. Mr. Lloyd Thomas explained how information had reached the Foreign Office which seemed to show that there were distinct material possibilities of settling the Assyrians in the Lebanon. His Majesty's Government were most concerned at the risk that when the League Council next met no new scheme would have been evolved for settling the Assyrians, and the League might be forced to admit yet another failure. At the same time all information showed that a satisfactory final settlement of the Assyrians was as necessary as ever, since if they were left in Iraq there would continue to be a grave risk of further trouble which might easily spread throughout the Middle East. Normally, the proper procedure would be for the possibilities in the Lebanon to be raised by the Council Committee. But while the committee would obviously have to be brought in at the first possible moment to set the matter on a regular footing, the preoccupation of its president with other matters meant that the committee was virtually out of action at present. In view of the urgency of finding some new scheme before the forthcoming Council session, the Secretary of State had accordingly instructed Mr. Lloyd Thomas to raise the matter semi-officially with the French Government, and to make an appeal to the French Government, through M. Viénot personally, to agree in principle to accept the Assyrians in the Lebanon and to authorise this possibility to be examined in detail. If the French Government felt able to agree in principle in their capacity of mandatory Power, the matter might be set in motion either by a declaration by the French Government, or by the Lebanese President offering the Assyrians a home in the Lebanon, or (if the French Government thought it necessary) in response to an appeal by the committee to the French Government in accordance with the precedent of March-April 1935 which led up to the Ghab scheme.

3. M. Viénot's response to this appeal was far from unfavourable. He indicated the existence of obvious difficulties (chiefly, he seemed to think, financial) and said that he could not, of course, commit his Government until the matter had been fully considered. He seemed, however, impressed by the appeal for his

personal co-operation (in the sense of the desire which he had expressed to Lord Stanhope at Geneva at the end of June for close Anglo-French collaboration in the Near and Middle East), and also by the point that the League could not be allowed to fail in its task of finding a new home for the Assyrians. M. Viénot promised that the possibility of the Lebanon should receive the most sympathetic consideration; he thought, however, that it would be necessary for it to be formally raised with his Government by the Council Committee. Meanwhile, he was prepared to authorise that the various detailed aspects of the matter and the question of procedure should be informally discussed by myself with officials at the Quai d'Orsay.

4. Mr. Lloyd Thomas accordingly arranged with M. de Saint-Quentin, the head of the African and Levant section of the Quai d'Orsay, that I should call upon his assistant, M. Chauvel, at 4.30 on the following day. At this interview M. Chauvel appeared on the whole sympathetic to the idea of an Assyrian settlement in the Lebanon. He stated, however, that it had come as a complete surprise to the Quai d'Orsay, who had received no hint from Beirut that interest was being taken in such a solution. He seemed rather annoyed at this, the more so as in a letter which had just been received by M. de Panafieu from the League Secretariat, reporting the arrival in Geneva of the president of the Trustee Board and his enthusiasm for a settlement in the Lebanon, allusion was made to the French delegate to the Lebanese Government having given verbal approval to the idea. He questioned me closely about the source of our information, but I confined myself to saying that it had reached us through our consulate-general and had now been confirmed by the report which we, too, had received from Geneva as to the views of M. Cuénod. M. Chauvel said that the French Government naturally could not take any decision in such a matter until they had received the views of the High Commission at Beirut. He indicated, however, that a number of difficulties struck him at first sight. The Moslem minority in the Lebanese Republic were not far behind the Christians in number, and they would resent any addition to the Christian population, since they cherished the hope some day of themselves obtaining a majority. The Christians themselves were in any case far from united, and the fact that (as appeared from what I had told him) the President of the Republic was said to be in favour of introducing the Assyrians would immediately provoke the opposition of the strong section of the Maronite community, which automatically opposed every initiative of M. Eddé. Furthermore, while he thought that there probably were unoccupied lands available in the Béka and other districts, it would be difficult to prevent the formation of a price ring once the news of a settlement scheme got abroad; in any event, it would be necessary to ensure the existence of the necessary funds before embarking on any scheme.

5. M. Chauvel said that his personal feeling was that it would be difficult and, indeed, inadvisable for the French to try to impose a scheme for the settlement of the Assyrians. It would be necessary, he thought, for the Trustee Board in Beirut to work out a plan in direct secret negotiations with the native Lebanese authorities, *e.g.*, the President, the Secretary of State and the Maronite Patriarch; in the meantime, all publicity ought to be avoided. He suggested, however, that the French Government might be willing to indicate its general approval and to help in smoothing out any difficulties that might arise. M. Chauvel finally undertook to propose to M. Quentin the immediate despatch of a telegram to Beirut reporting the approach which had been made to them, asking for the High Commission's general views, and suggesting the procedure which he had outlined to me. He further mentioned that he thought it might be possible to give the High Commission a hint in the telegram that the French Government would be glad, if possible, to see a solution for the Assyrian problem in the Lebanon. M. Chauvel agreed that the Council Committee would have to be brought in as soon as possible so as to regularise the position, and he appreciated that the matter was urgent in view of the necessity for a report to the Council in September. It was decided that our discussion should be continued at a meeting on the next day, which would probably be attended by M. de Saint-Quentin, M. de Panafieu and, if possible, some representative of the High Commission at Beirut.

6. This further meeting was held at 4.30 P.M. on the 28th August, and was unexpectedly attended (in addition to M. de Saint-Quentin, M. de Panafieu and other French officials) by the French High Commissioner at Beirut himself.

[14940]

M 3

His Majesty's Minister had intended to be present for at least the first part of the meeting but was prevented from doing so at the last moment.

7. It was at once apparent that the atmosphere was far from sympathetic. In response to M. de Saint-Quentin's request I began, however, by explaining (on the lines of what His Majesty's Minister had said to M. Viénot) the great desire of His Majesty's Government to find a satisfactory solution of the Assyrian question, their belief that such a solution was now only to be found in the Lebanon, and the reasons which had led them to make a preliminary independent approach to the French Government. I recalled how M. Viénot had promised Mr. Lloyd Thomas that the most sympathetic consideration would be given to the idea of a settlement in the Lebanon, and how with his authorisation M. Chauvel and I had discussed the more detailed aspects of the matter on the previous day and (on the assumption that the French Government gave their consent in principle) the procedure which would have to be adopted to set the scheme on foot. M. Chauvel then explained the line he had taken at our conversation, which caused M. de Saint-Quentin to observe rather acidly that we had gone ahead very fast.

8. M. de Saint-Quentin then enquired whether it was in fact essential to remove the Assyrians from Iraq. He went on to mention—but with greater emphasis—the difficulties inherent in any attempt to settle the Assyrians in the Lebanon, which had already been alluded to by M. Chauvel (see paragraph 4 above). I replied that both Sir A. Clark Kerr and His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Bagdad had recently been expressly consulted on the point he had raised and that they were quite categorical that it was essential, in the interest of the future tranquillity of the Middle East, that all those Assyrians who were anxious to leave Iraq should be removed from that country. I mentioned that the Iraqi Prime Minister, who generally meant what he said, was continually declaring that the Assyrians who had voted to leave Iraq must do so at an early date; although we had done our best to impress upon him the obligations which Iraq would continue to have towards the Assyrians as a religious minority, we feared that it would, in practice, be impossible to efface the memory of the past and to find a solution for the problem within Iraq. I referred to the humanitarian aspect of the question and recalled once more the inherent danger (if the Assyrians remained in Iraq) of political trouble arising, which would not be slow to spread across the frontier into the French mandated territories. While there were obviously difficulties which would have to be overcome, it seemed to me that the idea of the Lebanon possessed definite advantages for the Lebanese as well as the Assyrians. The Assyrians would be a useful addition to the Christian elements, and as there was a reasonable chance that sufficient League funds would be available, a settlement should be well-endowed and quite different from those of the Armenians.

9. The meeting then turned to consider the material possibilities in the Lebanon, and I mentioned the areas to which our attention had been drawn as potential sites for one or more settlements. (I made the point that in the Lebanon the necessity for a compact settlement would not appear to arise.) The French officials seemed ignorant about the area on the northern slopes of the Lebanon range. M. de Martel admitted, however, that there were unoccupied lands in the Béka plain, although both he and M. de Saint-Quentin expressed doubts whether they were materially a good proposition. M. de Martel added that the lands in the Baalbek region were very poor in quality.

10. Both M. de Saint-Quentin and M. de Martel stated that it would not be practicable to extract a contribution from local revenues to an Assyrian settlement and enquired where we expected to find the necessary money. I explained the technical reason which prevented me from saying that the contribution offered by His Majesty's Government to the Ghab scheme would automatically be available for an alternative solution; I added, however, that in view of the approval given by Parliament to the general idea of Assyrian settlement it was reasonable to expect that permission would be given for the contribution to be used in the Lebanon. Similarly, I did not think it should be difficult to keep hold of the Iraqi and League contributions. We appreciated that willing administrative co-operation would be as far as the Lebanese authorities could go, and we would be more than happy if this could be obtained.

11. The High Commissioner, who seemed in an ill-humour, then embarked on a sort of tirade against the whole idea of introducing the Assyrians into the

Lebanon. He did not see why the French mandated territories should have to take the Assyrians because their presence was inconvenient in Iraq: Iraq, which had recently been emancipated, refused to give effect to her minority obligations towards the Assyrians, and it was therefore proposed to place unwelcome obligations on neighbouring territories still under mandate. He declared that any suggestion for placing the Assyrians in the Lebanon would inevitably provoke serious Moslem agitation both in the Lebanon itself and in Syria. The Syrian Nationalists (one of whose leaders, Riadh-es-Sulh, was a Lebanese Moslem) not only championed the cause of the Moslem minority in the Lebanon, but also cherished the hope of absorbing in Syria proper the outlying Moslem districts of the Lebanese Republic, if not the whole State. They would see in the introduction of a new Christian minority a direct challenge to their aspirations. As an example of the state of Moslem feeling in the Lebanon, he instanced the serious disturbances which had followed recently the publication of the telegram from M. Viénot to the Lebanese President declaring the intention of France to maintain the present boundaries of the Lebanese Republic. Moreover, although they did not seem so far to be aware that the Lebanon was under discussion, the Syrian newspapers continued to allege that the mandatory Power was pursuing its sinister designs for bringing the Assyrians into the mandated territories. The High Commissioner went on to affirm rather petulantly that the mere knowledge that any scheme for the Lebanon was under consideration would seriously embarrass the French Government in their present treaty negotiations with the Syrians, as well as in their future negotiations with the Lebanese.

12. Turning to the probable attitude of the Lebanese Christians, M. de Martel laid much stress on the division of the Maronites into two bitter factions under the President, M. Eddé, and M. Becarriah Khouri. So inclined were they to pursue personal rather than national interests that in 1932 they would have let in a Moslem as President if the French had not intervened by suspending the Constitution. He did not think M. Eddé could possibly put through an Assyrian settlement against the opposition he would encounter, and his personal position as a landowner would still further weaken his position. In any case, M. de Martel doubted whether M. Eddé would ever have the courage to announce publicly his sympathy with an Assyrian settlement, particularly on the eve of the new elections, which would probably have to take place shortly. Even if the Lebanese Government were prepared to take such a risky step M. de Martel would, if they consulted him, feel bound to advise them not to pursue the proposal, which he felt convinced they could not carry out. In any case M. de Martel contested the idea (which had been suggested by M. Chauvel) that the mandatory authorities could stand by and let the Trustee Board deal direct with the Lebanese authorities. It was true that France could not any longer impose any scheme on the local Governments; but it was also the case that the mandate would not be over for some time yet and as France remained responsible for maintaining law and order in the mandated territories she could not disinterest herself from so risky an experiment as the introduction of the Assyrians into the Lebanon.

13. M. de Panafieu next joined in the attack from his personal standpoint as French representative on the Council Committee. He thought it was difficult for any other member of the committee to put forward the idea of the Lebanon; and in view of all the objections he did not see how the French representative could do so. He had just learned of the resignation of Sr. Oliván from the service of the Spanish Government, which would presumably entail his disappearance from the committee. Deprived of its president and with the French representative unwilling to participate, he did not see how the committee could take so important a decision as to embark on an attempt to settle the Assyrians in the Lebanon. M. de Panafieu then produced (and maintained despite my protests) the ridiculous assertion that the declaration made by the French Government to the Council Committee against proceeding with the Ghab scheme applied equally to any settlement within the mandated territories, where the same political difficulties were current throughout. He further claimed that the Trustee Board had no mandate to concern itself with any new scheme and that recourse would have to be made to the League Council to extend its powers.

14. M. de Saint-Quentin appeared rather to deprecate the vehemence of M. de Martel and M. de Panafieu. He said that while it was well that I should hear all the objections and realise the anxiety felt by the High Commissioner, who would himself have to deal with the local reactions, it would be necessary before

taking any decision to await the reply of the Deputy High Commissioner at Beirut to the telegraphic request for his views, which had already been despatched. The situation was very fluid in the mandated territories at present and everything depended on the reaction of the local officials. As regards M. de Panafieu's objections, he thought that if the political and material difficulties could be overcome it would be quite possible to find some means for dealing with the question of procedure.

15. I replied that I obviously could not presume to question the appreciation of the situation the High Commissioner had furnished. At the same time, I could not help feeling that any scheme for settling the Assyrians in what was, after all, likely to continue to be a Christian State was a very different proposition to a scheme such as that of the Ghab. Naturally, the free consent of the Lebanese Government would be essential; but there did seem to be a chance of their appreciating the advantage of having a virile addition to the Christian population settled in their country under favourable financial conditions, whereas the Ghab scheme would always have had to be imposed by the mandatory Power. It seemed to me peculiar, moreover, that the Syrians could really be in a position to influence so closely what happened in the Lebanon, despite the intention to maintain the independence and territorial integrity of the Lebanese State. I recalled how M. Viénot had promised Mr. Lloyd Thomas that the idea of a settlement in the Lebanon would be sympathetically examined if and when it was raised in the committee, and I expressed the hope that despite the objections which had been mentioned the proposal would still receive favourable consideration and that the French Government would not oppose its being put forward by the Council Committee. I added that I had hoped that we might have reached agreement before I left Paris on the procedure for bringing the committee into the picture.

16. M. de Saint-Quentin assured me once more that we could rely upon the matter receiving careful consideration. The French Government could not, however, come to any conclusion until they had received a reply from the High Commissioner at Beirut, and he did not see any purpose in the committee taking any initiative (which could not in any case be shared in by the French representative) until the attitude of his Government had been decided. He proposed, therefore, that the next step should be for him to get in touch with Mr. Lloyd Thomas as soon as the French Government had decided on their reply to the approach which the Embassy had made to them, and that the matter should meanwhile be left in suspense.

17. There was obviously nothing to be gained by prolonging the exchange of views, and I accordingly agreed to M. de Saint-Quentin's proposal, while begging him to expedite the matter as far as possible in view of the urgency of reaching a conclusion in advance of the forthcoming session of the Council and Assembly of the League. After reporting the substance of the discussion to His Majesty's Minister, I returned to London on the morning of the 29th August.

J. G. WARD.

*Eastern Department, Foreign Office,
August 31, 1936.*

[E 5650/1419/93]

No. 41.

Mr. Bateman to Mr. Eden.—(Received September 7.)

(No. 441.)
Sir,

Bagdad, August 27, 1936.

THE political calm of the past few weeks was disturbed on the 12th August by the reappearance and immediate suspension of the vernacular newspaper *Sawt-al-Ahali* (*The Voice of the People*). This organ has always been noteworthy for the violence of its language and the virulence of its attacks upon the Government. Its career has consequently been chequered. On more than one occasion it has been suspended as a result of representations by His Majesty's Embassy, and on the 12th August it endeavoured to emerge from a year's enforced silence, under the control of Hikmat Sulaiman and Jafar-abu-Timmun.

2. These men, who have in the past occupied seats in the Cabinet and wield a good deal of influence, were formerly friends of the Prime Minister. Having now quarrelled with him, they signified their reappearance from comparative

obscurity by launching an attack on him and the Minister of the Interior for their share in negotiating the Railway Agreement with His Majesty's Government, which, they said, bound the Iraqi Government hand and foot to the British, and afforded evidence of the fact that their former friends had abandoned all the principles for which they stood when in opposition. By way of illustration, they declared that the Iraqi Government had entered into a secret agreement with His Majesty's Government whereby all material during the remaining period of the railway's bondage would be purchased in the United Kingdom. Hikmat Sulaiman, it will be remembered, had similarly reproached the Government in the *Bayar*, a newspaper over which he had secured control last April.

3. The Government had apparently received warning of the contents of the leading article in *Sawt-al-Ahali*. Early in the morning of the 12th August the police raided the paper's offices and confiscated all the extant copies of the issue. I am told, however, that Hikmat Sulaiman had secreted a certain number and himself sold them in the streets. However that may be, a few copies were smuggled out, and were to be had in the bazaar at 1s. each. *Sawt-al-Ahali* was promptly suspended for a further year.

4. A few days later, Hikmat Sulaiman and Jafar-abu-Timmun, both highly incensed, were received by the King, to whom they protested vigorously against the action of the Government in suppressing what they considered to be legitimate criticism. The King listened sympathetically to their complaints, but gave them no encouragement, possibly because Hikmat Sulaiman, at least, had not been as careful as he might have been in his criticism of the Hashimite family during the excitement caused by the affair of Princess Azzah.

5. It is possible that, in thus driving his critics underground, the Prime Minister may be laying up unnecessary trouble for himself during the next parliamentary session. There are many who think that the article in *Sawt-al-Ahali*—a typically forthright effort of Hikmat's—was not unfair, and that Yasin Pasha might well have withheld his heavy hand and have engaged his critics on the ground they themselves had chosen. Had the weather been less trying and the Prime Minister less tired he might have chosen to do so, but the time at his disposal is limited, and he has enough successful examples in the world to-day to show that bold courses often pay.

6. He is, however, doing all he can to allay criticism in other directions. It is not denied that, in tackling outstanding questions (including those with His Majesty's Government) empirically, Yasin Pasha has achieved no little success. Hitherto he has been inclined to neglect those smaller psychological problems that beset people in high office. There are signs that he is now setting about putting this side of his house in order, and is at last making a bid for popularity.

7. He has recently completed the tour in the Euphrates district which was contemplated in paragraph 4 of my despatch No. 394 of the 30th July last, and seems highly delighted at the cordiality of his reception in the Holy Cities of Kerbala and Najaf, where his enemies are generally reputed to be awaiting an opportunity to bring about his fall. Here he seems to have been at pains to be gracious and generous. He has made the necessary arrangements for repairs to certain mosques and shrines, and went out of his way to convey his personal condolences to the family and pupils of Naim, a leading mujtahid, who died a short time ago. These activities have given great satisfaction, and in conversation with me soon after his return, the Prime Minister seemed relieved and confident as to the future. Unfortunately, he had to admit that military action had again become necessary in the Samawa district. It appears that nomad tribesmen on the 22nd August attacked a newly-established police post in a marshy district near Khedr, between Samawa and Ur of the Chaldees. A patrol sent to aid the post was also attacked. Two policemen were killed, and as a result of punitive air and ground action, twenty-five tribesmen are said to have shuffled off this mortal coil. Air action is still proceeding, but the Prime Minister regarded the whole affair as sporadic, and as in no way part of a concerted movement.

8. As regards the future, much must depend upon the personal relations existing between Yasin Pasha and the Minister for Foreign Affairs. Nuri Pasha seems bent these days on dashing abroad, and always has a good excuse for doing so. He is, however, more "settled" of late, and seems to be genuinely anxious to turn his foreign visits to good account. The Prime Minister shares this anxiety, and although badly in need of a change of scene himself, is ready to give Nuri Pasha all the scope and support he needs. I do not think that he will try

to bask in Nuri's glory if, in fact, anything comes of the negotiations at Jerusalem, in which the Minister for Foreign Affairs is trying to bring about a *détente* between Arab and Jew, or in the unlikely event of Nuri's being successful in effecting a frontier settlement with the Iranian Government. I have the impression that the two are working in greater harmony, and that they are sticking to the bargain which they made in June with the blessing of His Majesty's Ambassador.

9. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Tehran.

I have &c.

C. H. BATEMAN.

E 6109/4/93]

No. 42.

(C. 403.M.253.1936.VII.)

LEAGUE OF NATIONS: SETTLEMENT OF THE ASSYRIANS OF IRAQ.

Report of the Committee of the Council on the Settlement of the Assyrians of Iraq.—(Received in Foreign Office, September 24, 1936.)

Geneva, September 24, 1936.

BY its resolution dated the 4th July last, the Council, having decided upon the final abandonment of the plan for settling the Assyrians in the plain of the Ghab, instructed its committee to continue its efforts and, in particular, to undertake a general study of the situation, so as to be in a position to inform the Council definitely whether, and, if so, to what extent, the settlement elsewhere than in Iraq of the Assyrians of Iraq who still wished to leave that country was at present practicable.

The committee fully realises the importance and urgency of the task entrusted to it. Nevertheless, it considers that no new proposal in this sense can be made without a thorough examination of the possibilities of the situation. It will duly submit its suggestions on this subject to the Council as soon as it has been able to arrive at concrete conclusions from such relevant information as it may be able to obtain.

2. The Council also authorised the committee to take any steps of an administrative and technical nature which the abandonment of the Ghab scheme might render immediately necessary, and requested it to report to the Council such steps as it might take in virtue of that authorisation.

In order to give effect to this resolution of the Council, the committee requested the French Government to bring the Council's decision to the notice of the High Commissioner of the French Republic in Syria and the Lebanon, and to inform him that no further contracts for works or opening of new credits for the Ghab operations were to be contemplated. The committee reserved for future settlement with the High Commissariat any questions of detail that might arise as a result of the abandonment of the Ghab scheme. At the same time it asked the Trustee Board for suggestions as to the measures of liquidation which were within the competence of that board.

The High Commissioner of the French Republic in Syria and the Lebanon immediately took the necessary steps for the stoppage of the work undertaken under the scheme for the development of the Ghab. He also proposed to the committee the financial measures that were rendered necessary by the winding up of the work. These proposals, together with the suggestions submitted by the Trustee Board as to the measures of liquidation, are now under consideration by the committee.

A detailed report on the result of these measures will be submitted to the Council as soon as the liquidation contemplated has been carried out.

3. The committee is not in a position to make suggestions to the Council at the present session for the financing of a new scheme of settlement owing to the necessarily hypothetical nature of such a question in existing circumstances. As, however, the Assembly is now examining the League's budget for 1937, which includes an item of 300,000 fr. for the settlement of the Assyrians, the committee considers that it should explain certain aspects of the question.

The Council will remember that a year ago the United Kingdom Government expressed its willingness to make, on certain conditions, an independent contribution equivalent to five-twelfths of the funds which the Council Committee might have to find to cover the cost of carrying out the scheme for the settlement of the Assyrians in the Levant territories under French mandate. This contribution, which was in no case to exceed £250,000, was conditional upon the Iraqi Government's willingness to raise its contribution to an equal amount, and upon the participation of the League itself in the financing of the scheme. As the question of this participation was outside the committee's competence, the latter referred it to the Council, which decided, on the 13th September, 1935, to request the Assembly to place this question on its agenda.

The Sixth Committee of the Assembly, considering that the scheme for settlement in the Ghab region offered the prospect of a satisfactory and permanent solution of the Assyrian problem, and recognising that, even if all the other contributions were taken into account, a considerable sum would still be required, came to the conclusion, having regard to the special nature of the question, and its humanitarian aspect in particular, the great importance which the Council has always attached to its solution, and lastly the danger, from the point of view of the tranquillity of the Near East, of postponing the decision, that favourable consideration should be given by the Assembly to the United Kingdom proposal regarding the financial participation of the League, and left it to the Fourth Committee to study its financial aspect.

The Fourth Committee, after considering the draft resolution presented by the United Kingdom delegation recommending the Assembly to undertake to furnish the credits required to carry out the scheme, over and above all the other contributions promised, did not feel able to accept the suggestion that all the expenditure involved by the proposed scheme of settlement and not covered by contributions from other sources should be charged to the League's budget. It nevertheless approved the Supervisory Commission's proposal that the total amount of the League's contribution should be fixed immediately and definitely at the final figure of 1,300,000 fr., spread over four successive budgetary years, starting with 1936, and providing for an instalment of 400,000 fr. for the first year and 300,000 fr. for each of the three following years. This proposal was adopted by the Assembly.

The Iraqi Government had meanwhile agreed to raise its previous offer, *pari passu* with the United Kingdom contribution, up to a maximum of £250,000.

The Ghab scheme was very costly, owing to the necessity of carrying out extensive drainage and irrigation works before settlement could begin. On the other hand, it would be optimistic to assume that the cost of settling the Assyrians elsewhere will not prove considerable. Any saving under the head of land reclamation might be off-set by the necessity of purchasing land (whereas under the Ghab scheme the land, once drained and irrigated, was to be handed over to the Council Committee free of charge) and by heavier expenditure on other items, such as transport.

Moreover, it should be remembered that the contribution of the Levant territories under French mandate had been earmarked exclusively for public works and promised only on account of the definite advantages that the population of the mandated territories in general would derive from the reclamation of the Ghab plain. This contribution cannot therefore be regarded as applicable to another scheme.

The Council Committee has already had, and still has, to provide for the needs of some 8,500 Assyrians provisionally settled on the Upper Khabur, under the Ghab scheme, pending a final solution. The present position of that settlement is explained in a report from the Trustee Board, to which the committee desires to draw the Council's particular attention (annex). Moreover, a search for a fresh place of settlement may involve some expenditure. These facts alone make it clear that the continued payment of at least part of the sums promised last September by the United Kingdom Government, the Iraqi Government and the League of Nations is likely to be necessary, even at the present stage.

The committee hopes to be in a position to submit to the Council, at its January session, proposals for a new plan for Assyrian settlement. In view of the importance of an early solution, any delay in the execution of such a plan must be avoided. At that moment, therefore, the committee must be able to rely absolutely on the funds which last year's decisions guaranteed for the settlement

outside Iraq of those Assyrians who still wish to leave that country. The committee has a lively recollection of the difficulties which it encountered at the outset of its task, before the contributions in question had been voted, owing to the uncertainty which existed as to what funds, if any, would be available for the settlement of the Assyrians if a suitable destination were found. It would regard the renewal of this state of uncertainty as extremely regrettable and detrimental to the accomplishment of the task entrusted to it by the Council. The committee could not usefully enter upon the preparation of any new scheme without having at least the conditional certainty of being able to rely, in their entirety, upon the undertakings entered into last year, for the benefit of the work of settling the Assyrians of Iraq, by the United Kingdom and Iraqi Governments and by the Assembly.

It is true that, while these contributions were offered in connexion with the Ghab scheme, which (with the exception of the provisional settlement on the Khabur provided for in that scheme) has been abandoned, their essential purpose was, nevertheless, to permit of a solution of the problem of the Assyrians, to provide for their welfare, and thus to contribute to the tranquillity of the Near East. The committee therefore confidently hopes that, pending a favourable solution of the problem entrusted to it by the Council, the arrangements in connexion with the contributions made last year with regard to the Ghab scheme will not be modified.

It quite realises the technical difficulty which the Governments concerned and the League of Nations may find in employing for the settlement of the Assyrians sums which were calculated on the basis of a scheme no longer in existence, and without the committee being at present in a position to submit a new scheme. What the committee asks, therefore, is that the sums promised last year for the execution of the Ghab scheme should continue to be supplied to the extent of the present limited requirements, while available in their entirety if the Council approves any new settlement plan which may be submitted to it by the committee. As the decisions to be taken in connexion with these arrangements are outside the committee's province, it feels obliged to draw the Council's attention to this situation and to request it to take the necessary steps.

Annex.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS: SETTLEMENT OF THE ASSYRIANS OF IRAQ.

(C. 403(a).M.253(a).1936.VII.)

Annex to the Report of the Committee of the Council on the Settlement of the Assyrians of Iraq (C. 403.M.253.1936.VII).

Report by the Chairman of the Trustee Board on the Position up to July 31, 1936, of the Settlement of the Assyrians on the Khabur.

(Translation.)

Geneva, September 24, 1936.

Assyrian Settlement on the Khabur.

THE Assyrian settlement lies on both banks of the Khabur, a tributary of the Euphrates, about 40 kilom. north of Hassetché, in the Upper Djésireh.

The Assyrians are dispersed by tribes in fifteen villages, spread over a length of 31 kilom., eleven of the villages being on the left bank, along the track from Hassetché to Raw-el-Ain, and four on the right bank.

The climate is dry, and has two main seasons—the hot season, lasting seven or eight months (April to October), and the cold season, lasting four or five months.

The hot season is rainless, the temperature in the hottest months being about 40° C. in the shade; it makes regular irrigation essential for all crops, for which reason the district has hitherto been practically uninhabited.

The cold season, which has a maximum temperature of 15° C. and an occasional minimum of -15° C., is the rainy season; the rainfall varies from 30 to 100 mm. in different years.

The climate is healthy and, as may be seen from the medical reports, suits the Assyrians excellently, although they were originally mountaineers.

The Khabur is a large river, fed by numerous springs in the Ras-el-Ain district; the only floods are at the end of the cold season, and are due to local rains. The water is drinkable without filtering at all seasons.

The soil on both banks of the Khabur is of a cold and clayey type, suitable for grain cultivation if irrigated; for certain market gardening products, however, it would require the addition of 15 or 20 per cent. of sand, together with organic fertilisers.

The pasturage is very extensive and adequate for all the Assyrians' live-stock.

All the villages are quite close to the Khabur. Nine of them were built in 1935, while the arrival of 2,500 more Assyrians in 1936 and a more strict tribal distribution have led to the formation of six new villages, which are now being built and are to be finished before the rainy season.

In accordance with local custom, and on account of the absence of timber, the houses are built of clay bricks and roofed with domes of the same material, wood being used only for doors and windows. The number of domes in each family dwelling varies according to its composition; in the villages built in 1935 there is an average of one dome to 4.4 persons. The kitchens and other offices are in out-houses. Except for the three pumping stations and two metal sheds for storing seeds and certain crops, all the administrative buildings are of clay bricks and of the same type.

Irrigation is provided by three permanent pumping stations (the main irrigation channels now cover a length of 7,105 metres), seven motor pumping groups, three metal norias and eighteen wooden norias.

Connected with the pumping stations are three mills, which supply the Assyrians with flour.

The metal sheds are in the villages of Tell Tamer and Tell Oumrane.

There is a hospital at Tell Tamer and an infirmary at Tell Oumrane, the staff consisting of a doctor and five attendants.

All the older villages have churches or chapels, and most of them have schools.

The administrative centre is at Tell Tamer, the higher staff consisting of an agricultural engineer, an accountant, an overseer of works and a chief mechanic. The agricultural machinery store and repair workshops are also at Tell Tamer.

Owing to lateness in sowing, due to the delayed delivery in 1935 of tractors for clearing the land, the first grain-growing year showed a deficit, but where it was possible to sow at the proper time the crops were excellent, thus confirming expectations as to quality of the soil.

The market gardens have given good results so far as the Assyrians' regular crops are concerned. Sales of melons, water melons, onions, garlic and tobacco have also been very satisfactory, and in two villages potatoes, which are grown little, if at all, in the neighbourhood, have been advantageously disposed of. As regards other vegetables, nothing can be said until the soil has been improved and the agricultural experts' instruction has borne fruit.

The pasture land has proved suitable for the live-stock brought by the Assyrians from Iraq. At present the stocks consist of 3,502 sheep, 3,991 goats, 177 cows, 144 calves, 134 oxen, 14 horses and 30 asses, or 8,019 head in all.

In some respects this first year's work cannot perhaps be regarded as altogether normal, since the majority of the Assyrians are not accustomed to tilling the soil, and those who are have had to do it under entirely new conditions; besides which, those who thought they would shortly be transferred to the Ghab area put little heart into their work. None the less, the year's experience seems to show that the settlement can be carried out as intended and without exceeding the estimates.

As regards the organisation of the settlement itself, it appears advisable—

1. To abandon communal cultivation as quickly as possible, as it does not seem suited to the Assyrian character.
2. To limit the land under grain to the minimum necessary to feed every family and to extend the area under vegetable crops as much as possible.

3. To encourage stock-breeding, especially in the case of sheep, as this seems to be the kind of farming for which the Assyrians are best fitted, and the area at present in occupation is most suitable, while it also offers excellent prospective markets (the Mosul district alone imports about 350,000 sheep a year from Syria). This, however, would require large expenditure on the purchase of ewes, because the existing stock is unevenly distributed, and many families do not own so much as a goat.

The state of the villages at the 31st July was as follows:—

Village of Tell Tchémé:—

Tribe: Tkhouma.
Number of persons: 1,104.
Number of domes: 202.
Hydraulic equipment: Motor pumping group.
Church school: Ferry.
Stock: Sheep, 640; cows, 67; goats, 1,158; calves, 43; oxen, 28; mules, 8; asses, 15.

Village of Tell Oumrane:—

Tribe: Tkhouma.
Number of persons: 1,051.
Number of domes: 184.
Hydraulic equipment: Pumping station with three groups metal noria.
Metal shed.
Mill.
Infirmary.
Two churches, one school.
Fields irrigated: 114 hectares.
Market gardens irrigated: 16 hectares.
Live-stock: sheep, 336; cows, 19; mules, 4; goats, 250; calves, 15; asses, 6; oxen, 38; horse, 1.

Village of Tell Atchach (Tell Hab) building:—

Tribe: Tkhouma.
Number of persons: 122.
Ferry.
Live-stock due in November.

Village of Tell Assafir:—

Tribe: Diz.
Number of persons: 372.
Number of domes: 109.
Hydraulic equipment: Metal noria.
Fields irrigated: 36 hectares.
Market gardens irrigated: 10 hectares.
Chapel.
Live-stock: Sheep, 444; oxen, 17; goats, 293; asses, 4.

Village of Tell Oumraf:—

Tribe: Upper Tiari.
Number of persons: 619.
Number of domes: 98.
Hydraulic equipment: 3 wooden norias.
Two chapels.
Market gardens irrigated: 10 hectares.
Live-stock: Sheep, 821; cows, 8; oxen, 2; goats, 1,025; calves, 7; mules, 13.

Village of Tell Kefdjé (building):—

Tribe: Liwan.
Number of persons: 188.
Live-stock: Sheep, 56; oxen, 4; mule, 1; goats, 7; cows, 2.

Village of Tell Djema (building):—

Tribe: Halamoun.
Number of persons: 324.
Hydraulic equipment: Motor pumping group.
Market-gardens irrigated: 12 hectares.
Live-stock: Sheep, 397; asses, 10; goats, 892; mules, 7 (due in November).

Village of Tell Tamer:—

Tribe: Upper Tiari and Lower Tiari.
Number of persons: 1,066 Upper Tiari; 47 Lower Tiari.
Number of domes: 362.
Number of houses: 11.
Hydraulic equipment: Pumping-station with three groups metal noria, three wooden norias.
Metal shed.
Mill.
Hospital.
Three chapels (two Nestorian, one Catholic), two schools.
Fields irrigated: 293 hectares.
Market-gardens irrigated: 46 hectares.
Live-stock: Sheep, 613; oxen, 24; calves, 33; mule, 1; goats, 583; cows, 35; horses, 7; asses, 2.

Village of Tell Chamran (building):—

Tribe: Marbichou.
Number of persons: 553.
Ferry.
Live-stock: Sheep, 62; oxen, 2; calves, 9; goats, 88; cows, 7.
Remainder: Sheep and goats, 366; cows, 110; asses, 17 (due in November).

Village of Tell Nazri:—

Tribe: Upper Tiari.
Number of persons: 451.
Number of domes: 94.
Hydraulic equipment: Three wooden Arabian norias.
Fields irrigated: 123 hectares (by Tell Tamer pumping-station).
Market-gardens irrigated: 24 hectares.
Live-stock: Sheep, 130; cows, 7; oxen, 3; goats, 185; calves, 7.

Village of Tell Hafan Djésira:—

Tribe: Kotchanis.
Number of persons: 306.
Number of domes: 72.
Hydraulic equipment: Motor pumping group, two wooden norias.
Fields irrigated: 84 hectares.
Market-gardens irrigated: 21 hectares.
Live-stock: Sheep, 42; oxen, 3; calves, 6; goats, 59; cows, 5; horses, 2.
Remainder: Sheep, 8; cows, 9; goats, 67; mules, 4 (due in November).

Village of Tell Hafan Chamia (building):—

Tribe: Bax.
Number of persons: 283.
Ferry.
Live-stock: Sheep, 40; cows, 17; horse, 1; goats, 17; calves, 8.

Village of Tell Maghas:—

Tribe: Gawar. Number of persons: 356.
 Tribe: Jilou. Number of persons: 215.
 Tribe: Shemzidin. Number of persons: 312.
 Number of domes built: 214.
 Hydraulic equipment: Pumping-station (three groups) in common with Tell Massas, three wooden norias.
 Fields irrigated: 130 hectares.
 Market-gardens irrigated: 43 hectares.
 Mill.
 Live-stock: Sheep, 83; oxen, 8; calves, 18; goats, 155; cows, 14.

Village of Tell Massas:—

Tribe: Barwar.
 Number of persons: 361.
 Number of domes: 83.
 Hydraulic equipment: Three wooden norias (Tell Maghas pumping-station).
 Fields irrigated: 74 hectares.
 Market-gardens irrigated: 18 hectares.
 Chapel.
 Live-stock: Sheep, 110; oxen, 5; goats, 72; horses, 3.

Village for the Sara Tribe (negotiations proceeding for purchase of land):—

Number of persons: 412.
 Live-stock: Sheep, 51; ox, 1; calf, 1; goats, 29; cows, 2. Remainder: Sheep, 82; cows, 21; mules, 3; goats, 136; horses, 9; asses 11 (due in November).

[E 6085/1419/93]

No. 43.

Mr. Bateman to Mr. Eden.—(Received September 28.)(No. 462.)
Sir,

Bagdad, September 17, 1936.

WITH reference to paragraph 7 of my despatch No. 441 of the 27th August last, I have the honour to inform you that on the 7th September the Prime Minister returned from a second tour of inspection in the southern liwas of Iraq.

2. This journey was timed to coincide with the suspension on the 31st August of the punitive operations undertaken against the tribal concentrations in the Khedr area. Though there was a certain amount of sniping up to the last moment between Rumaitha and Wawiyah, necessitating the strengthening of the defensive arrangements on the railway, air action had been successful in inducing the majority of the headmen concerned to come in and discuss their grievances.

3. The Prime Minister's final objective was Basra, whither he travelled by car via Kut, the Hai, and the Muntafiq tribal country; returning by the Tigris route via Qurna and Amara. At each important centre he was met by large tribal gatherings and seized every opportunity to renew contact with the leading sheikhs and notables. The tour gave great satisfaction in the provinces visited, not only because it afforded proof that the Government had not forgotten their existence, but also because Yasin Pasha showed an active and sympathetic interest in their welfare by giving orders for urgent municipal improvements to be put in hand without delay. As a direct result of his visit, new and much-needed hospitals will now be constructed in Nasiriyah, Gharraf and Shatra. The press is loud in its praise of the Prime Minister's energy, self-sacrifice and determination and does not fail to pay its tribute to his capacity for rapid and decisive action, which differentiates him from most of his countrymen.

4. During the course of a speech at Basra, where he opened the new Government offices, he expressed the hope that he would be spared for another ten years to devote himself to the welfare of Iraq. This passage caused a mild sensation in Bagdad, where the spectre of Yasin as dictator again reared its head and gave his opponents an excuse for contending that he was usurping the King's place. Hikmat Sulaiman was heard to make a caustic comment to the effect that, from now on, he presumed that the *mot d'ordre* would be changed, so far as the Prime Minister was concerned, from "Vive le Roi" to "Vive le moi"! This sort of criticism is not justified by the facts and leaves the Prime Minister quite cold. In his absence the Court were particularly careful to keep the King well before the public eye. His Majesty's name now appears at the head of all charitable subscription lists for good works, his devotional exercises are carefully recorded, and he is represented at all important social functions. An amusing sidelight on the assiduity of the press in this connexion arose from my last courtesy visit to the Palace. An article was allowed to appear in certain Egyptian and Syrian papers to the effect that the King had taken me seriously to task over Palestine. Nothing of the sort had, in fact, occurred, but there was no necessity to issue a *démenti*, as it was clearly nothing but an effort to enhance the Royal prestige by showing that the King was playing his part in supporting the action of his Minister for Foreign Affairs at Jerusalem.

5. The Prime Minister returned in time to take part in the celebration of the King's accession day on the 8th September. The press devoted its entire space to eulogistic articles on His Majesty, but there was no military parade this year. Various reasons have been given for this departure from custom, but I imagine that the Government, while anxious to raise the Royal stock, wisely decided not to expose the person of the King to unnecessary risk. A satisfactory feature of the rejoicings was the official quashing of the sentences passed on twenty-nine Yazidis arising out of the disturbances in the Sinjar area last year.

6. Yasin Pasha has not been alone in courting popularity in the provinces. Most of the other members of the Cabinet recently set out to fix upon a site for a new summer station in the Kurdish hills. The rigours of the journey, however, proved too much for them, and the quest ended in an inspection of the Mosul and Arbil districts, which, Mr. Edmonds informs me, did much good. The Minister of the Interior investigated the grievances of cultivators in the district and promised redress. He also gave orders for the reconstruction of the Mosul law courts.

7. Both the King and the Prime Minister contemplate a tour in the northern liwas in the near future. The latter informed me that, as regards this proposal, he was getting some amusement from the rumours spread by his adversaries to the effect that there was a difference of opinion on the question whether the King's visit should precede the Prime Minister's or *vice versa*. He said that provided he could go before he became involved in the storms and stresses of parliamentary life, it was a matter of indifference to him when he went, but that the real crux of the matter was that the King declined to move until his new aeroplane was ready for the trip. He had impressed upon His Majesty (and has asked me to do the same) that during the proposed visit he should be most circumspect and forthcoming in his talks and dealings with the local notables. It will be remembered that in 1934 the King's tour in the north left much to be desired, because of the cavalier treatment which he meted out to tribal leaders.

8. There can, I think, be little doubt that this unprecedented Government activity during the summer months affords proof that a hectic parliamentary session is expected in the autumn. For the moment Ministers appear to be buoyantly confident.

9. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Tehran.

I have, &c.

C. H. BATEMAN.

*Ninety-third Session of the Council, League of Nations.**Extract from Final Minutes of the Third Meeting held on September 25 at Geneva.—(Received in Foreign Office, September 29.)***3792. Settlement of the Assyrians of Iraq: Report of the Committee of the Council.***M. Alvarez del Vayo presented the following report and resolution:—(¹)*

"The report which our Committee for the Settlement of the Assyrians of Iraq has submitted to us indicates clearly the transitional state of this question at the present moment as a result of the abandonment of the Ghab plan. On the one hand, steps have had to be taken to wind up that plan. The committee informs us that it is examining the proposals and suggestions made to it in this connexion by the High Commissioner of the French Republic at Beirut and by the Trustees Board, and that a detailed report on measures taken will be submitted as soon as the liquidation contemplated has been carried out.

"On the other hand, the committee is devoting most careful attention to the future of the problem of the settlement of the Assyrians of Iraq and the possibilities of finding some new solution. It is not yet in a position to submit to us any concrete conclusions in this matter, and the Council will certainly agree with its committee as to the need for a thorough examination of all possibilities which may present themselves before submitting to the Council conclusions by which, according to the terms of the resolution of the 4th July, it is to be informed definitely whether, and if so to what extent, the settlement elsewhere than in Iraq of the Assyrians of Iraq who still wish to leave that country is at present practicable.

"There is, however, one aspect of the situation created by the abandonment of the Ghab plan, which, though necessitating a reference to the past, is essentially concerned with safeguarding the future. This is the question of financial participation in the expenses which the settlement of the Assyrians of Iraq will continue to call for—whether it be on a small scale, to meet the costs still involved by the settlement of the 8,500 Assyrians who have already, as contemplated in the Ghab scheme, been installed provisionally on the Upper Khabur, or, on a larger scale, to meet the costs involved by any new plan which the committee may subsequently submit to the Council. The committee explains in its report the procedure it recommends in order to maintain, on behalf of the settlement of the Assyrians of Iraq, the funds which the Governments of the United Kingdom and Iraq, on the one hand, and the Assembly of the League of Nations on the other, voted twelve months ago for the carrying out of the Ghab scheme. The Council will certainly be glad to learn, in due course, the attitude of the two above-mentioned Governments on this point.

"As regards the financial participation of the League of Nations, the decision will lie with the Assembly, which is about to discuss the annual budget of the League, in which, under Part VIII, a credit of 300,000 fr. for the settlement of the Assyrians of Iraq has been provided.

"I have the honour to propose the adoption by the Council of the following resolution:—

"The Council:

"Takes note of the report of the Council Committee for the settlement of the Assyrians of Iraq and approves the present report by the representative of Spain, its *rapporteur*;

"Expresses the hope that the United Kingdom and Iraqi Governments, so far as they are concerned, will give a favourable reception to the financial suggestions contained in the Council Committee's report;

"Decides to transmit the committee's report to the Assembly, together with an extract from the minutes of this meeting of the Council recording the discussions on the present question, in order that the competent Committee of the Assembly may consider it when the annual budget of the League of Nations is examined."

(¹) Document C. 408.M.254.1936.VII

M. Rüstü Aras did not in any way wish to oppose the conclusions of the report, but would point out that, since the Ghab scheme had been formulated, on which the Council Committee had worked so carefully, but which unfortunately had had to be abandoned, two classes of Assyrians now required settlement—those of Iraq and those of Syria—the latter, to whom the representative of France and the representative of Turkey had drawn the committee's attention during previous discussions having been settled provisionally in the frontier zone.

If the committee were successful in settling both those categories of Assyrians satisfactorily, the Council would, of course, be very glad indeed; but if that proved impossible—a contingency which *M. Rüstü Aras* did not wish to contemplate at the moment—he would draw the attention of the committee and of the Council to the necessity, since they were dealing, and rightly, with the Assyrians of Iraq, of providing also, at the earliest possible moment, for the settlement of the Assyrians on the Syrian border. *M. Rüstü Aras* had touched upon the question on the present occasion, so that the Assembly, which would be called upon to take a decision in regard to the expenditure involved by the operation, might consider the problem in all its aspects.

Mr. Eden felt sure that all the members of the Council appreciated the importance for the Council Committee of knowing that it could count on financial support in continuing, at the request of the Council, the formidable task of finding a new place of settlement for the Assyrians, now that the Ghab plan had unfortunately broken down. Those of his colleagues who had followed the question from the outset would recollect the early difficulties which had faced the committee and to which it referred in its present report. In so far as the question which the committee now submitted for the consideration of the Council concerned the United Kingdom, *Mr. Eden* was glad, therefore, to be able to inform the Council forthwith of the position of His Majesty's Government.

He would recall, in the first place, the letter which his predecessor, Sir Samuel Hoare, had addressed to the chairman of the Council Committee on the 12th September, 1935. The United Kingdom Government had always been ready to pay its fair share of a League contribution towards Assyrian settlement. Sir Samuel Hoare's letter made it clear that it was prepared to go further and to make an independent contribution on certain conditions. The letter stipulated that the scheme of settlement should be materially satisfactory and financially well regulated and that there should be a reasonable probability that the funds forthcoming from other sources when combined with the contribution of the United Kingdom Government would be sufficient to ensure the success of the scheme. Apart from those general stipulations, the offer was specifically conditional upon the contributions to be made by the Iraqi Government and by the League itself.

Under those conditions the United Kingdom Government had declared itself ready to make a contribution equivalent to five-twelfths of that part of the expense of the Ghab scheme which the Council Committee might be called upon to cover, provided that such contribution by the United Kingdom should in no circumstances exceed £250,000.

Of the contribution then offered, £60,000 had been paid, during the last financial year, into the settlement fund administered by the League. For the present financial year, a further grant of £110,000 had been voted by Parliament. That grant had been voted in relation to the Ghab scheme; its utilisation for any new scheme alternative to the Ghab would therefore require the further sanction of Parliament.

The report now before the Council showed, however, that the committee was concerned, not only about the financing of an ultimate scheme, but also about the provision, in the meantime, of funds for its continuing expenses in connexion with the provisional Khabur settlement and the search for a new permanent place of settlement.

As regards those continuing expenses, funds could, in principle, be made available from the grant already voted by the Parliament of the United Kingdom—that was to say, subject to a decision in each case by the United Kingdom Government, taken in the light of the relevant circumstances, including the proportion paid or to be paid by other contributors to the Assyrian settlement fund.

Moreover, when, as everyone hoped, a new permanent scheme was found which received the approval of the Council, the United Kingdom Government

would be prepared to recommend Parliament to agree that the balance of the contribution offered by the United Kingdom Government in September of last year should be made available for the new scheme, under the same conditions as had originally been attached to that offer.

Mr. Eden trusted that his explanation of the attitude of the United Kingdom Government, which was a proof of its desire to see the Assyrian question finally and happily settled, would be of use to the Assembly in considering the question which the Council Committee had raised.

M. Paul-Boncour observed that, in view of what had been said by the representative of the United Kingdom, he would not wish it to be thought that France did not feel a similar sympathy with, and take an equal interest in, the Assyrians.

With reference to the observations made by the delegate of Turkey, he was convinced that the Council would give the matter its most careful consideration. As far as France was concerned, it would study the problem very closely.

General Noury-al-Said wished to take the opportunity of reminding the Council that the position of those Assyrians who had voted in favour of leaving Iraq was a difficult one, both for themselves and for the Iraqi Government. The Assyrians themselves were inevitably in an unsettled state. The Iraqi Government, on its side, was faced with obvious difficulties in dealing with a large body of persons who no longer wished to remain in Iraq, and had until recently had the hope and expectation of soon leaving the country. He felt obliged to urge upon the Council the necessity of a decision at the earliest possible moment, with a view to their transfer.

The statement that had just been made by the representative of the United Kingdom was very gratifying. While the representative of Iraq was not able to bind his Government, he hastened to assure the Council that he would recommend it to make funds available, *pari passu* with the United Kingdom Government, for the continuance of the Assyrian Committee's work, and also for the execution of any ultimate plan that might be agreed upon as a final solution of the problem.

The resolution was adopted.

(General Noury-al-Said withdrew.)

[E 6286/1419/93]

No. 45.

Mr. Bateman to Mr. Eden.—(Received October 5.)

(No. 479.)

Sir,

Bagdad, September 24, 1936.

IN paragraph 5 of my despatch No. 462 of the 17th September, I had the honour to report that twenty-nine Yazidis had been amnestied on the occasion of King Ghazi's Accession Day.

2. Of the numerous Yazidis who, at the close of the rising a year ago, were sentenced by military courts to terms of imprisonment of varying length, these are the first to be released. They are mostly men reported to be in bad health or over 55 years of age. I would add that the public announcement on Accession Day wisely avoided mentioning the fact that all included in the amnesty were Yazidis.

3. I understand that the Mutessarif of Mosul is now preparing a second list of persons whose early pardon he recommends, and Mr. Edmonds tells me that he hopes that their release will follow shortly. Should the King's proposed visit to the northern liwas materialise, it is possible that the opportunity will be taken to grant a further amnesty.

4. The credit for the change in the Government's attitude towards the Yazidis is due to Mr. Edmonds, who has repeatedly urged the need for clemency. In July last, he handed Saiyid Rashid Ali a note in which, by means of comparative statistics of the sentences passed by military courts during the last two years, he was able to prove that, despite the comparative insignificance of the Yazidi revolt, those involved were treated in a far more vindictive spirit than were the Moslem rebels who took part in the Barzan and Euphrates risings.

5. Thus, while in the case of the latter the sentences inflicted amounted to an average of eight and seven years' imprisonment respectively, the average in the Sinjar was fourteen years; and whereas, in the two other districts, periods of imprisonment exceeding ten years were the exception, such sentences were the rule in the case of the Yazidis.

6. In discussing with the Minister of the Interior the best means of remedying this state of affairs, Mr. Edmonds assumed that the Government would be ready to consider a pardon applicable to persons sentenced in the other two areas as well as in the Sinjar. He suggested a formula whereby, on the expiry of one year after the termination of martial law, all but those in each area who had received the longest punishments should be released. Owing to the greater severity of the punishment inflicted on the Yazidis, such a solution would, he felt, do something to redress the balance in favour of the latter, though even so their treatment would remain relatively much more severe than that of those convicted in the Barzan and on the Euphrates.

7. It seems, however, that some doubt existed in the mind of the Minister of the Interior as to whether or not, if a general pardon was to be granted, a special law would have to be passed for the purpose, similar to that (No. 36 of 1935) whereby the tribesmen implicated in the earlier Euphrates rising were set at liberty. Some difficulty would have been experienced in introducing such legislation, and it is perhaps for this reason that the Prime Minister, to whom Saiyid Rashid Ali referred the Adviser's note, seems to have preferred another method, viz., that of progressive pardon by Royal Iradah, which had, as a matter of fact, previously been advocated by Mr. Edmonds. Provided that the pardons are generous and recur with sufficient frequency, this is perhaps as good a method as any other and may enable more Yazidis to be released. In any case, since legislation sanctioning a general amnesty could hardly pass both Houses before January 1937 at the earliest, it will be possible to secure the pardon of a proportion of Yazidis in the interval without prejudice to the possible issue of a general amnesty.

I have, &c.

C. H. BATEMAN.

[E 6316/185/93]

No. 46.

NINETY-THIRD SESSION OF THE COUNCIL, LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Extract from Final Minutes of the Third Meeting, held on September 25 at Geneva.—(Received in Foreign Office, October 6, 1936.)

Modification proposed by the Iraqi Government in its Declaration of May 30, 1932.

GENERAL NOURY-AL-SAID, representative of Iraq, came to the Council table.

M. Munch presented the following report and resolution⁽¹⁾ :—

"(1) By a communication dated the 15th June, 1936, circulated to the Council and members of the League (document C.289(1).M.222.1936.VII), the Iraqi Government requested the Council to agree to the modification of article 12 of its declaration to the League of Nations, dated the 30th May, 1932. The Iraqi Government proposes that 'hereafter the Royal Iraqi Government shall undertake to employ eight foreign jurists only instead of nine as required by article 2 of the judicial agreement between the United Kingdom and Iraq . . . referred to in the said article 12 of the declaration.' The reasons for the modification applied for are set forth in a memorandum by the Iraqi Government annexed to the communication of the 15th June.

"(2) The Iraqi Government's request is based on article 16 of its declaration to the League of Nations. By the terms of that article, the provisions contained in Chapter II of the declaration (the chapter in which article 12 occurs) 'may not be modified except by agreement between Iraq and the Council of the League of Nations acting by a majority vote.'

⁽¹⁾ Document C. 400.1936. VII.

"(3) The Council is therefore called upon to determine whether the reasons set forth by the Iraqi Government in its memorandum justify the modification asked for. According to the memorandum, this modification would not affect the working of the existing judicial system in Iraq. That system provided for eight specific posts, all of which are to be maintained. It was in the capacity of an assistant to the judicial adviser (holder of one of the eight posts mentioned above) that it was thought that the ninth jurist might be usefully employed. The Iraqi Government points out that legislative drafts are increasingly initiated by Iraqi officials in the Arabic language, and consequently the services of a foreign assistant to the judicial adviser to draft legal, and particularly legislative, documents are no longer needed. The foreign judicial adviser, moreover, has no need of an assistant to give any opinions that may be asked of him.

"(4) If my colleagues agree, I consider that the Council might adopt the following resolution:—

"The Council,

"In consideration of the communication from the Iraqi Government dated the 15th June, 1936, and the memorandum annexed thereto;

"In consideration of the provisions of the declaration made to the League of Nations by the Iraqi Government on the 30th May, 1932:

"Agrees that hereafter that Government shall employ only eight foreign jurists instead of nine."

General Noury-al-Said, representative of Iraq, wished to take the opportunity to express his gratitude for the time and trouble taken by the *rapporteur* in examining the Iraqi Government's case in support of the application before the Council. The adoption of the report by the Council would, he was sure, in no way prejudice the judicial organisation of Iraq.

M. Rüstü Aras supported the conclusions of the report.

(The resolution was adopted.)

[E 6402/4/93]

No. 47.

Record of Private Conversations regarding the possibility of Assyrian Settlement in Paraguay.—(Received in Foreign Office, October 9.)

(Confidential.)

AT the meeting of the Assyrian Committee of the Council on the 3rd October, it was agreed that, before this question was further considered, M. de Panafieu and I should have a talk with M. Cuénod, who had brought to M. de Panafieu's notice the existence of the Nansen Office report on settlement in Paraguay.

The talk with M. Cuénod took place on the evening of the 3rd October in the presence of M. Lisicky, the secretary of the Council Committee. The conversations did not advance matters much. M. de Panafieu expatiated on the dangers of leaving the Assyrians anywhere in the mandated territories. He said that settlement there was purely a façade, and it did not seem to him that there was much difference between leaving the Assyrians in Iraq and leaving them in the mandated territories once the mandate had terminated. If the Assyrians got into trouble in the mandated territories, the Council Committee would have a heavy responsibility.

I did not feel able in M. Cuénod's presence to talk specifically about settlement in the Lebanon. I frankly admitted the difficulty of leaving the Assyrians in the Khabur indefinitely, but contented myself with pointing out that the French were apparently obtaining certain guarantees for the minorities in their treaties with the mandated territories, and that, as the historical background would not be the same in the French mandated territories as it was in Iraq, there was not the same reason to anticipate trouble there as there would be if the Assyrians were left in Iraq.

As regards Paraguay, M. Cuénod was very reserved and colourless. On the one hand, he admitted that it might be best that the Assyrians should be in a country where there were no Moslems. On the other hand, Paraguay was a long way away, and he could not say what the views of the Assyrians would be about settlement there, nor could he say whether settlement in Paraguay would suit

them in practice. He could only suggest that we should get hold of the Nansen Office report and read it for ourselves.

I repeated the arguments which I had used in the committee, namely, that it was extremely doubtful whether the Assyrians would agree to go to Paraguay, even if a suitable scheme could be worked out. M. de Panafieu pointed out that if they refused to go the Council Committee would at least be absolved from further responsibility. I said I could not at all agree that the committee could so lightly divest itself of responsibility, but I doubted whether a suitable scheme could be worked out in Paraguay. In the very early days of the Council Committee it would have been excusable to approach the Government of Paraguay, but the committee had gained a good deal of experience since then. Its investigations in Brazil and British Guiana had opened its eyes to possible difficulties. These were not only material; there was the danger of the autonomous tendencies of the Assyrians to take into account. In the mandated territories of the Levant, the Assyrians might be expected in time to settle down. They would be living in conditions not very different from those to which they had been accustomed and they would be living among other minorities. In a country like Paraguay the conditions would be strange and the difficulties of assimilation greater.

M. de Panafieu asked whether it was really impossible to induce the Iraqi Government to resettle them with some form of autonomy in the north of Iraq. I pointed out that it was precisely the difficulty of securing any such autonomous settlement in Iraq that had created the problem with which the Council Committee had been grappling for three years. It was quite out of the question to expect the Iraqi Government to give the Assyrians any form of autonomy, as the Iraqi State depended for its existence on welding together the elements of which it was composed. Any special status given to the Assyrians would be claimed by other communities.

It was clearly impossible to get any further, and it was equally impossible to reject M. Cuénod's suggestion that we should examine the Nansen Office report for ourselves. M. Lisicky undertook to obtain the report.

I had afterwards a frank conversation with M. de Panafieu alone. He then told me that he thought the chances of settlement in the Lebanon were nil, and that M. Viénot had been weak in promising that the French Government would ever lend themselves to such an idea. When I pressed him to state his reasons why settlement there was impossible, he produced the argument that the Christian element in the Lebanon was divided amongst itself, and that the security of the Assyrians could not be guaranteed. I pointed out to him that from all I could learn the French Government intended to retain a greater degree of control in the Lebanon than in Syria, and that they appeared to contemplate keeping French troops there, and that the Assyrians would be much more accessible if they got into trouble in the Lebanon than they would be in Syria. M. de Panafieu did not contest any of this, and fell back on the argument that, so long as M. de Martel was in charge, there would be opposition to the idea of Assyrian settlement in the Lebanon. M. de Martel had been very much attracted by the Ghab scheme, because of the economic possibilities that it held out, but any alternative scheme for Assyrian settlement was not likely to have the same attraction for him.

On the following day I arranged to see Mr. Childs of the International Labour Office, who has had considerable personal experience of settlement schemes in South America, and has made it his business to expose more than one ramp there. He was very sceptical about the idea of settlement in Paraguay. He pointed out that M. Ehrenhold, of the Nansen Office, who had made the report to which M. Cuénod had referred, had had no practical experience of refugee settlement. He had gone out primarily with a view to finding a place of settlement for Russian refugees, and had been accompanied by two representatives of Russian organisations. These organisations, after considering the results of the investigation, had rejected the idea of settlement in Paraguay. Mr. Childs pointed out also that there were various countries in Central Europe most anxious to find an outlet for their surplus population, and it was quite certain that they would snap up any suitable project. It was perhaps a sufficient comment on the suitability of Paraguay that there had been no marked immigration from Central Europe. Mr. Childs understood that the Government of Poland had sent an official mission to Paraguay to investigate possibilities, and that, as a result of this mission, they had ceased to interest themselves in settlement in Paraguay.

It was true that there was a large Mennonite settlement in the country, but there was a very heavy death-roll among these settlers in the early days. Furthermore, although the Government of Paraguay had passed a special law giving the Mennonites special privileges, including exemption from military service, this law had not been honoured in spirit at all events.

Politically, the régime in Paraguay was unstable; the Mennonite settlement had been heavily criticised by the Opposition; and a further point to bear in mind was that there were a good many Indians wandering about in Paraguay with whom settlers like the Assyrians might easily come into conflict.

From the economic point of view, conditions were not very favourable owing to lack of a market, except by exporting goods via the Argentine. Such goods would have to compete with the similar and, indeed, better products of the Argentine itself. Subsistence agriculture might be possible, but the only chance of making money lay in cultivating crops, such as tobacco, maize and yerba maté. As M. Cuénod's experience was that the Assyrians were not good cultivators, it was doubtful how far they could succeed on these lines. M. Cuénod seemed to think that the Assyrians' strong point was sheep-rearing, but in Paraguay sheep did not and could not exist, the land being too low-lying and the climate too hot. Only a very few cattle were reared in Paraguay, and expansion on these lines would be difficult in competition with the Argentine.

J. C. STERNDAL BENNETT.

Geneva, October 7, 1936.

[E 6540/4/93]

No. 48.

Summary of Events during a Session of the Assyrian Committee of the Council of the League of Nations between September 17 and October 10, 1936.

(Confidential.)

THE proceedings at the outset were delayed by the uncertainty as to whether an Italian delegation would attend the meetings of the Council and the Assembly; the first few days were therefore spent in private conversations, and the first formal meeting of the committee was not held until the 22nd September. In the meantime, the Credentials Committee of the Assembly had decided that the Ethiopian delegation should be allowed to sit in the Assembly, and it was then clear that no Italian delegation would be coming.

2. It was a depleted committee which met on the 22nd September, the Italian and Ecuadorean representatives being absent and Sr. Lopez Oliván being replaced by Sr. d'Espla, who had no acquaintance with the question whatsoever. It was agreed that the Danish representative should for the time being act as president and that the question of electing a new president should stand over until it was known what country would replace Denmark on the Council, and therefore on the Assyrian Committee. It was expected at that time that Sweden would take Denmark's place on the committee, but the Swedes, when elected to the Council, declared that they would have too much other work to do to take part in the Assyrian Committee; the place vacated by Denmark was accordingly taken by Latvia. Meanwhile, Sr. d'Espla had been replaced by Sr. Ribas, Spanish Minister-designate at Berne; Sr. Ribas has some slight acquaintance with settlement problems, having been connected with the International Labour Office, and at the last formal meeting of the committee on the 10th October he was elected president.

3. The main questions with which the committee had to deal were—

- (a) The liquidation of the Ghab scheme;
- (b) The provisional Khabur settlement;
- (c) The financing of the continuing work of the committee and of any eventual new permanent scheme of settlement; and
- (d) The search for a new permanent place of settlement.

(a) *Liquidation of the Ghab Scheme.*

4. The Acting High Commissioner for Syria and the Lebanon had, on the 11th August, informed the Secretariat of the steps which he had taken to liquidate the Ghab scheme so far as he was concerned. He estimated the total

cost involved in the denunciation of his contract with the Régie fédérale de Travaux publics and Chemins de Fer at 410,000 French francs. To meet this he had in hand enough to cover all but 220,000 fr., and in response to his request 100,000 fr. had been remitted to him by the League. The committee had at its first meeting, however, to deal with a telegram from the Acting High Commissioner asking that the balance of 120,000 fr. might be sent forthwith. The committee decided to remit this sum while reserving the right to discuss at a later date the distribution on a proportional basis as between the League and the mandated territories of the expenses of the Ghab scheme. Before the telegram recording this decision had gone off a further telegram was received from the Acting High Commissioner to the effect that, owing to the delay in liquidation, the cost was now 150,000 fr. higher than he had anticipated. The committee decided to adhere to its previous decision to send the 120,000 fr., and decided to await a letter from the Acting High Commissioner before taking a decision regarding the extra 150,000 fr. This letter, when received, threw no further light on the situation, and the committee decided that it had no alternative but to send the money, reserving the right, however, to discuss the matter further when full details had been received.

5. So far as the Trustee Board was concerned, the liquidation resolved itself into a question of whether certain supplies should be disposed of. These supplies consisted of a consignment of rhodenacrine, a Ford ambulance, twelve heavy Ford lorries and two light Ford lorries. It was decided to retain the Ford ambulance and one of the light lorries for work on the Khabur and to agree that the other light lorry should be returned to the Ford agency. The committee also agreed that such of the rhodenacrine as was not required for the Khabur settlement should be returned to the health service of the mandated territories. As regards the heavy lorries, none of which had been used, it was agreed that, if the Trustee Board found an opportunity of disposing of them in Iraq or Syria at not less than 90 per cent. of the new price fixed by the Ford Company as a result of the devaluation of the franc, the offer should be accepted; otherwise the Trustee Board should retain the lorries until January, when it was hoped that the situation would be sufficiently clear to take a decision.

(b) *The Provisional Khabur Settlement.*

6. The committee had before it an interesting report by M. Cuénod on the position up to the 31st July of the provisional settlement on the Khabur (Document C/Min.Ass/222). M. Cuénod, who was in Geneva, was able to explain the position orally to the committee. The main point which emerged was that the Trustee Board had come to the conclusion that the communal system of cultivation ought to be abandoned in favour of individual holdings and that stock-breeding ought to be encouraged in preference to agriculture. M. Cuénod's opinion was that the Assyrians were not fitted for anything but small-scale agriculture and that they had shown themselves to be a pastoral rather than an agricultural people. Another point which emerged was that the tribal chiefs were somewhat dissatisfied with their position in the settlement, and M. Cuénod said that it would be a good thing to give them certain privileges and small allowances to compensate them for certain duties which they undertook as headmen of the villages.

7. As regards the first of these points, the committee was evidently ready to be guided by M. Cuénod as to the abandonment of communal cultivation and the substitution of individual cultivation, but it did not feel able to approve a far-reaching policy of encouraging stock-breeding, partly because of the provisional nature of the Khabur settlement, and partly because of its apprehension that such a policy might lead to conflicts with the nomad tribes. The Trustee Board was accordingly requested to study the matter further, in consultation with the local authorities, with a view to discovering the extent to which stock-breeding could be developed on the Khabur without giving rise to complications with the other elements of the population in that district. M. Cuénod was also asked to discuss with the French mandatory authorities the question of the position of the tribal chiefs in the Assyrian settlement on the Khabur, with a view to making concrete suggestions at a later stage.

8. In connexion with the discussion in the Assembly of the Mandates question, the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs pressed for the removal of the

Khabur settlement. It appeared that he was aided and abetted, if not actually instigated, by Nuri Pasha. The French showed no real signs of yielding to this pressure; but the French representative expressed in private great alarm about the future security of the Khabur settlement, and it was generally recognised that it would be unwise to maintain it indefinitely in its present place.

(c) *The Financing of the Continuing Work of the Committee and of any Eventual New Permanent Scheme of Settlement.*

9. The committee's first task under this heading was to examine the budget for 1937 prepared by the Trustee Board (C/Min. Ass/224). This amounted in all to 1,808,800 French francs. Of this 1,360,000 was for settlement on the Khabur, the remainder represented purely administrative expenses, i.e., salaries and allowances of the Trustee Board, maintenance of the Beirut office of the board, and provision for telegrams, insurance, special missions, &c. Mr. Bieler, of the League Treasury, pointed out that the administrative expenses represented about one-quarter of the whole budget, whereas they had represented one-fifteenth of the original budget for the Ghab scheme. This, of course, was inevitable as the budget provided for the temporary maintenance of machinery which had been designed for the Ghab scheme and was admittedly too large for the Khabur scheme alone. There was considerable discussion as to whether any economy could be effected in administration, but it was decided that it would be unwise to tamper with the organisation of the Trustee Board at all events until January. It was emphasised, in the observations on the budget which the committee eventually decided to despatch to the Trustee Board, that the whole question of organisation would be further considered as soon as the present transitory situation permitted. The question was raised whether the services of M. Burnier and of Sr. de las Barcnas should be retained or, alternatively, in the case of M. Burnier, whether an arrangement with the Nansen Office might not be come to, whereby the Nansen Office would pay a greater percentage than it does at present of M. Burnier's salary. M. Cuénod expressed strongly the opinion that it would be most unwise to attempt to dispense with M. Burnier's services and it was agreed to leave until January further consideration of his position and of any approach to the Nansen Office on the lines suggested above. As regards Sr. de las Barcnas it was decided to retain his services for a further two months, as it was felt that he might be useful in helping to adapt the present rather cumbersome financial machinery to the changed circumstances.

10. The budget submitted by the Trustee Board was adopted, with very slight modifications. Meanwhile, the committee had turned to the consideration of the means necessary to ensure that the contributions promised in September 1935 by the United Kingdom Government, the Iraqi Government and the League would be available not only for any new permanent scheme which might be forthcoming, but also for the continuing expenses of the committee. These continuing expenses were the 1,808,800 French francs already referred to for the Khabur settlement, the repayment to the French of some 420,000 French francs representing expenditure incurred by them on the Khabur settlement before July 1935, and the estimated cost of investigating new schemes. The committee appeared at first to be in favour of letting matters take their course on this question of finance. I felt convinced, however, that the item in the League budget for 1937 of 300,000 Swiss francs for Assyrian settlement would not go through unchallenged now that the Ghab scheme had broken down, and I anticipated that, unless the Council Committee took the initiative, the result might be a series of embarrassing questions in the Fourth Committee of the Assembly or in the Supervisory Committee as to what the Council Committee proposed as a substitute for the Ghab scheme. Conversations with Mr. Jacklin, the League Treasurer (who was extremely helpful), convinced me that the wisest course was for the Council Committee to take an initiative and to make a concrete suggestion and I accordingly proposed that a report should be submitted to the Council emphasising the necessity of maintaining the existing contributions and of devoting a proportion of them to continuing expenditure. For this purpose I took the opportunity, at the first formal meeting of the committee on the 22nd September, to draw attention to the conditions on which the United Kingdom offer of an independent contribution had been made, and to announce (with the prior concurrence of the Treasury representatives at Geneva) that His

Majesty's Government were prepared to recommend to Parliament that the balance of that contribution should be made available, on the same conditions for any fresh scheme which the Council might approve. I was also able to say that, while the grant of £110,000 already voted for this year by Parliament could not be used for any scheme alternative to the Ghab scheme without the further consent of Parliament, it could in principle be made available for the continuing expenses of the committee on the Khabur settlement and on the cost of investigating new schemes of settlement; but that all payments from it would be subject in each case to a decision by His Majesty's Government, taken in the light of the relevant circumstances, including the proportion paid or to be paid by other contributors. After this announcement the committee agreed to make a report to the Council, drawing attention to the difficulties which had faced it in the early stages of its work owing to uncertainty as to what money could be counted upon, and expressing the hope that there would be no return to this state of uncertainty, but that the contributions already promised would be maintained, in part for continuing expenses, and in their entirety for any new scheme approved by the Council. The report did not mention the announcement which I had made about His Majesty's Government's attitude, as it was felt more appropriate that this should be publicly announced by the Secretary of State in the Council itself. The committee's report came before the Council on the 25th September. The Secretary of State then made an announcement on similar lines to that which I had made to the committee. Nuri Pasha, though unable to commit his Government, said that he would recommend them to make funds available *pari passu* with the United Kingdom both for the continuance of the Assyrian Committee's work and for the execution of any ultimate plan which they might agree upon as a final solution of the problem. (The Iraqi Government had made no official communication to the League before the Assembly closed and were, in fact, raising difficulties which the United Kingdom delegation were endeavouring to overcome through the instrumentality of His Majesty's Ambassador at Bagdad.) The Council then decided to transmit the committee's report, the *rapporteur's* report and the minutes of the discussion, to the Assembly for consideration in connexion with the budget for 1937.

11. These documents were sent forthwith to the Fourth Committee of the Assembly, who passed them on without discussion to the Supervisory Committee for examination.

12. It then remained to get before the Supervisory Committee some concrete suggestion about the proportion of the League's contribution which should be made available for continuing expenses. The Council Committee had been unwilling to make any definite suggestion on the ground that it might seem to exceed its competence. There is no United Kingdom representative on the Supervisory Committee, and in the circumstances the only course was to work through the League Treasury. After discussion with Mr. Bieler, it appeared that the position was that, at the end of 1936, there was likely to be a balance in hand of about 1,500,000 French francs. Against this, the committee had to count with expenses in 1937, amounting to some 2,500,000 French francs, exclusive of the cost of any new scheme which might be discovered, but inclusive of the cost of investigating any new scheme which might be proposed. I suggested to Mr. Bieler and to Mr. Hill that the most equitable course would be for the League, His Majesty's Government and the Iraqi Government to make up this sum in the same proportions as they had contributed to the 44 million French francs which it had been anticipated that the Council Committee would itself have to find towards the financing of the Ghab scheme. This 44 million French francs was made up as follows:—

United Kingdom, £250,000 = 18,750,000 French francs.
Iraqi Government, £250,000 = 18,750,000 French francs.
League of Nations, 1,300,000 Swiss francs = 6,500,000 French francs.

This suggestion eventually found a place in the Supervisory Committee's report to the Fourth Committee. The report recommended that, in view of the attitude of His Majesty's Government and the probable attitude of the Iraqi Government, the League of Nations' contribution as voted in 1935 should in principle be maintained and that the League should contribute to the extent of 14·78 per cent. to the interim expenses.

13. Meanwhile, another aspect of the Assembly's work had threatened to jeopardise the continuance of the League's contribution towards Assyrian settlement. A fierce struggle developed first in the Sixth Committee and afterwards in the Fourth Committee over the part to be played by the League in refugee settlement, and in particular over the question whether the League should contribute 400,000 Swiss francs, as requested by the French Government, for the settlement in Paraguay of certain Saar refugees at present in France. The United Kingdom delegation found itself leading the opposition to this last proposal, a fact which angered the French delegation and which the Secretariat and a large number of the other delegations found difficult to reconcile with His Majesty's Government's attitude last year about the Assyrians. The French based their request for assistance in the settlement of Saar refugees on an alleged analogy with the Assyrian question. They argued that just as the Assyrians were a special case, where the League had a special responsibility, so the Saar refugees were a special case where the League had a special responsibility, and that on grounds of humanity and international solidarity it was right and equitable that the League should contribute. The United Kingdom delegation, on the other hand, maintained that there was no analogy between the Saar refugees and the Assyrians. The Assyrian problem was not a refugee problem, but a political problem of great importance from the point of view of the tranquillity of the Middle East. Furthermore, whereas the League was definitely responsible for the Mosul boundary decision, which had finally excluded the Assyrians from their old homes in Turkey, and the decision had been taken after a definite warning from His Majesty's Government, the fate of the Saar, on the other hand, had been decided by a plebiscite, and the League Council had no alternative but to carry out the wishes of the majority of the inhabitants themselves. The United Kingdom delegation therefore maintained the view that the Saar refugees were in no way distinguishable from other refugees and that League funds ought not to be used for the actual settlement of refugees and could only be employed for administrative expenses in connexion with such settlement. The Sixth Committee, however, decided by a narrow majority to refer the proposal to spend 400,000 Swiss francs on Saar refugees for favourable consideration in the Fourth Committee, and this proposal was also passed to the Supervisory Committee for examination. At this point M. Paul-Boncour and M. Viénot sought an interview with Mr. Malcolm MacDonald and Mr. Morrison and definitely connected up the question of the Saar refugees and of the Assyrians in the sense that they made it clear that, if the United Kingdom delegation maintained their opposition over the Saar refugees, the French would feel unable to help His Majesty's Government in the Assyrian question. After lengthy discussion within the United Kingdom delegation, a further meeting was arranged between Mr. MacDonald, Mr. Morrison, M. Paul-Boncour, M. Viénot, Mr. Strang and myself, at which the French delegates were informed of the reasons why the United Kingdom delegation felt bound to oppose the proposal to spend League funds on the settlement of the Saar refugees. The French delegates were told that it was a matter of regret to the United Kingdom delegation that the test case should have been one which concerned the French Government so closely, but that the opposition of the United Kingdom delegation was based on the fact that other delegations were supporting the French proposal in order that a precedent might be created for the very widespread use of League funds at a later stage for all the various categories of refugees which were dependent upon the Nansen Office. The French delegates appreciated this point and appeared impressed by it. Mr. Morrison then made it clear that, while the United Kingdom delegation would, on principle, have to maintain their opposition to the use of League funds for the Saar refugees, he would merely speak and vote against the proposal in the Fourth Committee. He would not, as he had at first intended, claim to go before the Supervisory Committee to press his point on them, and he would also refrain from any lobbying to gain support for his proposal among other delegations in the Fourth Committee. The French delegates were evidently pleased with this and it seemed that the matter was likely to be settled without bad blood. In the meantime, however, the Supervisory Committee had come to a surprising decision; impressed by the opposition in the Fourth Committee, they sought a compromise, but, owing to a misunderstanding, that compromise was so worded as to open the door still wider than before to the indiscriminate use of League funds for the settlement of refugees. This alarmed the French almost as much as it alarmed

the United Kingdom delegation. Eventually the United Kingdom delegation suggested an alternative wording containing various safeguards, and this wording the Supervisory Committee adopted. Even then, however, the United Kingdom delegation felt bound to oppose the principle of what the Supervisory Committee recommended, and met with so much unexpected support in the Fourth Committee that it looked as though, if the matter had been pressed to the vote, the Supervisory Committee's recommendation might have been defeated. This, however, would have been fatal so far as we were concerned on the Assyrian question and Mr. Morrison decided eventually to follow the Latvian delegation in agreeing not to press the matter to a vote, but to be content with recording dissent in the report of the Fourth Committee.

14. It so happened therefore that the battle over the Assyrian credit was fought, in fact, over the Saar refugees and, after that debate, the Supervisory Committee's report on the Assyrian question went through without a word.

(d) *The Search for a New Permanent Place of Settlement.*

15. The committee discussed this question in circumstances of some difficulty. The Iraqi delegate was continually enquiring what steps the committee was taking in this direction and it was too risky to inform him of the oral promise which Mr. Lloyd Thomas had obtained from M. Viénot, that once the treaty with the Lebanon was through the French Government would assist in working for settlement in the Lebanon. The Secretariat were aware of the position and of the necessity for the utmost discretion and eventually, though not until near the end of the session when he became president, the Spanish delegate was also informed in confidence. But in such circumstances the discussion had a complete air of unreality. The League Secretariat prepared a memorandum showing what Governments had been approached and what their replies had been and this memorandum showed that the only reply which had not been definitely negative (apart from those of His Majesty's Government and the French Government) was that of Australia. The committee appreciated, however, that Australia was unlikely to accept.

16. The main difficulty was caused by the French representative who, at the time when the French delegation were upset by the attitude of the United Kingdom delegation about the Saar refugees, pressed that the Government of Paraguay should be approached, as he had learnt semi-officially that there existed in the Nansen Office a report favourable to the settlement of refugees in Paraguay. I urged that further consideration should be given to the matter and several informal conversations followed which have been recorded separately. At the final meeting of the committee on the 10th October I said that I was quite willing to give further study to the Nansen Office report on settlement in Paraguay, but that I was very sceptical as to the suitability of the country for the Assyrians and could not therefore take the responsibility of agreeing to an approach to the Government of Paraguay at the present stage. The French representative had, by then, changed his attitude and agreed that it would be entirely premature to approach the Government of Paraguay. I had already told the committee that His Majesty's Government were still studying the possibility of settlement within the Colonial Empire and that, although I was not in a position to hold out any hopes that a suitable place would be found, I was not able to say that such a possibility was definitely excluded. As regards Australia the French representative said that he thought it would be invidious to single out the Australian Government for a further official communication and it was left that I should try to ascertain whether a further approach to the Australian Government was likely to serve any useful purpose. Beyond that, the committee left it with the League Secretariat to make such informal enquiries as they thought useful. The session thus ended in an atmosphere of complete vagueness about a future place of settlement, but everyone except the Iraqi representative and the Latvian representative, who was attending for the first time, had in mind the possibility that between now and January some concrete progress might be made towards settlement in the Lebanon. The Iraqi representative on his side clearly hoped that settlement in Cyprus would be practicable.

17. From my various conversations with M. de Panafieu, the French representative, it was clear that he was personally out of sympathy with the project of settlement in the Lebanon; and he would I think have welcomed an opportunity of getting out of the promise of help given in Paris by M. Viénot to Mr. Lloyd

Thomas. Had the Saar refugee question ended differently, the promise would almost certainly have been repudiated or evaded. It is something that it survived the Assembly meeting, but it is still extremely doubtful whether anything will ever come of it; at all events the time is not yet ripe for discussing its detailed implementation.

J. C. STERNDAL BENNETT.

*Eastern Department, Foreign Office,
October 14, 1936.*

[E 6623/4/93]

No. 49.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS: SETTLEMENT OF THE ASSYRIANS OF IRAQ.

Budget for the Year 1937, drawn up on the Basis of the Situation resulting from the Abandonment of the Ghab Plan.—(Received in Foreign Office, October 21.)

Geneva, October 17, 1936.

I.

Observations by the Committee of the Council for the Settlement of the Assyrians of Iraq on the Budget for 1937 submitted by the Trustee Board.

THE Committee of the Council for the Settlement of the Assyrians of Iraq has examined the budget for the settlement of the Assyrians for 1937, drawn up on the basis of the situation consequent upon the abandonment of the Ghab plan, which the Trustee Board had submitted to it in accordance with paragraph 2 of article 12 of the Financial Regulations (Doc.C./Min.Ass./224). The committee noted the explanations and verbal information given to it by the chairman of the Trustee Board at his interview with the committee. The committee approved this budget to the following modifications and observations:—

A. The committee took into account the abnormal situation reflected in the draft budget submitted by the Trustee Board. Following on the abandonment of the Ghab plan, and before any new solution can be propounded, the budgetary expenditure on settlement proper is no more than the cost of provisional settlement along the Khabur. This cost itself is less by 1,368,820 fr., i.e., a decrease of 50 per cent. as compared with the 2,728,820 fr. provided for this settlement in the current year. The decrease is a natural result of the advanced stage of this settlement with the resultant radical decrease in the various chapters such as building, hydraulic installations, supplies, &c.

In the same period the administrative expenditure on settlement as set out in Chapter C (General Expenditure Budget of the Trustee Board, &c.) and in Chapter A (Budget for the Beirut Bureau) has only decreased by 69,000 fr. in Section A.

Thus, the ratio between expenditure on administration and on settlement proper, which in the budget for the current year was 517,000 fr. (= article 1 (Administration) of Chapter A (Budget for the Settlement in the Ghab) ÷ Chapter C (General Expenditure Budget of the Trustee Board, &c.) to 7,285,675 fr. (= Ghab Budget less its article 1 (Administration) ÷ Khabur Budget); is, in the 1937 budget, 448,000 fr. (= Chapters A and C of the draft) to 1,360,000. Consequently, the administrative expenditure, which, in the 1936 budget, was only one-fifteenth of the total expenditure, now constitutes one-fourth of the total budget for 1937.

In view of these figures, the committee felt that it should pay particular attention to this aspect of the problem. It noted that the present administrative organisations had been conceived to deal with a far larger scheme, of which the provisional settlement along the Khabur (at present the only task of the Trustee Board and its administration) was only a minor offshoot. The committee will either have to submit to the Council of the League of Nations, at its January session, proposals for a new settlement plan, or report that no such plan seems to be possible. Only then will it be able to determine the extent to which the present administrative organisation will have to be remodelled. In view of this unsettled

situation, the committee prefers to refrain from interfering in any way with the present administrative organisation; consequently, it has approved provisionally the items for expenditure on staff in Chapters A and C of the draft budget in so far as they concern persons who are already provided for in the 1936 budget.

In view of the foregoing, this approval must not be taken to mean that the committee will not make any changes in the present administrative organisation during the whole of 1937. The organisation is only maintained until further notice; the position will be reviewed as soon as the present transitory situation allows.

Special Observations concerning the various Chapters and Articles of the Budget.

1. *Chapter A (new).*

The committee has thought it better to group the expenditure in A and C of the draft budget into one single chapter headed A "Expenditure of the Central Administration," of which paragraphs (a) and (b) of Chapter C of the draft will form article 1, Chapter A, of the draft article 2, and paragraph (c) of Chapter D of the draft article 3.

2. *Chapter A, Article 2 (Beirut Office), paragraph (a).*

As a result of the verbal explanations given by the chairman of the Trustee Board, the committee decided to invite the board to study, in conjunction with the services of the High Commissariat, a revision of the financial rules. If this revision leads to a decrease in the expenditure for which provision is at present made under (a) of article 2 (Beirut Office) of Chapter A of the budget, the committee thinks that this sum could usefully be reserved for increasing the credits provided for in article 5 (Sanitary Service) of the Khabur settlement budget.

3. *Chapter A, Article 2, paragraph (b).*

The present situation (cf. observations above in connexion with A) makes it necessary for the committee strictly to observe the principle that there can be no increase of staff paid out of the budget for the settlement of the Assyrians. Consequently, the committee can only approve the credit item "chauffeurs, orderly," in so far as it may apply to staff already paid out of the budget of the settlement of Assyrians, and it asks the Trustee Board to communicate to it the figures for this item amended in conformity with the present decision.

4. *Chapter B, Article 5 (Sanitary Service).*

Following on M. Cuenod's explanations, the committee feels that it can accept the reduced figures provided for the cost of the Sanitary Service in connexion with the Khabur settlement. It desires, however, to inform the Trustee Board forthwith that it is prepared to give favourable consideration to any reasoned request for increased credits in respect of this article of the budget, either as a result of an increase in the amount required for salaries owing to the engagement of new sanitary workers for the villages now being built, or as a result of increased requirements of supplies if any epidemic occurs. In this connexion the committee would remind the Council that it also authorises the Trustee Board to keep for the settlement along the Khabur the ambulance which the Board had proposed to sell and such part as it may deem necessary of the stock of rhodenacrine which had been bought in connexion with the requirements of the Ghab settlement.

5. *Chapter B, Article 6 (c) (Supplies, Petrol, &c.).*

In examining this item the committee noted that the question of the exemption from customs duties of petrol and other supplies imported from abroad and bought by the Trustee Board, has not yet been settled. The question had been raised by the board in its observations regarding the draft budget for the current year (see bottom page 4 of document C./Min.Ass./184). In this connexion

it had informed the committee in its letter of the 3rd April, 1936 (document C./Min.Ass./195), that the question of importation duty free was receiving consideration but could not be settled before the High Commissioner returned. As the High Commissioner has now returned to Beirut, the committee hopes that the Trustee Board will endeavour to settle this question in the near future.

The committee would remind the Council that the request for exemption from customs duties is based on article 7 of the statutes of the Trustee Board, to the effect that "The board shall be exempt from all taxes and charges, whether general or local, in respect of all operations and property of the board, and in particular all lands transferred to it or any transactions affecting such land, to the exclusion, however, of expenditure assigned by States to the execution of technical or topographical operations necessitated by their registration in the Land Register," and on the statement by the French Government signed by M. Pierre-Etienne Flandin, Minister for Foreign Affairs, on the 25th January, 1936, as follows:—

"The French Government, on behalf of the Levant States under French mandate, promises that the necessary measures shall be taken to ensure to the Assyrian Settlement Trustee Board, set up by the resolution of the Council of the League of Nations on the 13th December, 1935, shall enjoy the legal personality, powers and privileges set out in the statutes of the board."

6. Chapter B, Article 9 (c), Live-stock.

The committee has approved the credit of 50,000 fr. for live-stock, which is an increase of 400 per cent. over the credit for the previous year. It did not feel, however, that it could authorise a larger sum, although the Trustee Board, in its observations concerning the budget for 1937, expressed the opinion that this sum of 50,000 fr. might very usefully be increased if the committee of the Council thought it possible. The committee felt that the present sum might be sufficient in the present experimental stage of the provisional settlement on the Khabur. Moreover, the committee is not in favour of encouraging an intensive development of sheep-breeding in the Assyrian settlements along the Khabur until and unless it can obtain an assurance that there is no danger that an inordinate increase of the Assyrians' flocks may create difficulties with their neighbours, particularly with the nomad tribes which claim pasturage rights over the land which would be used by the Assyrians' flocks. The committee would therefore be glad if the Trustee Board would consider this aspect of the question and decide, in accordance with the competent authorities of the country, the extent to which sheep-breeding along the Khabur can be developed without causing complications with the other elements of the population of this region.

II.

Budget for the Settlement of the Assyrians for 1937, Provisionally Approved by the Council Committee.

Chapter A.—Expenditure for Central Administration.

	1937.		
	First Six Months.	Second Six Months.	Total.
<i>French Francs.</i>			
Item I.—Trustee Board.			
(a) Salaries and allowances...	142,500	142,500	285,000
(b) Miscellaneous expenditure (telegrams, insurance, special missions, &c.) ...	25,000	25,000	50,000
Total ...	167,500	167,500	335,000

	1937.		
	First Six Months.	Second Six Months.	Total.
<i>French Francs.</i>			
Item II.—Beirut Office of the Trustee Board.			
(a) Control ...	6,000	6,000	12,000
Treasury Department ...	9,000	9,000	18,000
(b) Office staff—			
Secretary-accountant ...	7,500	7,500	15,000
Shorthand-typist ...	4,800	4,800	9,600
Chauffeurs, orderly(*) ...	8,100	8,100	16,200
(c) Office expenses—			
Office ...	6,000	6,000	12,000
Travelling ...	1,500	1,500	3,000
Miscellaneous and unforeseen ...	1,500	1,500	3,000
Total ...	44,400	44,400	88,800
Item III.—Expenditure of the Council, Committee and of the Secretariat of the League of Nations ...	12,500	12,500	25,000
Total of Chapter A ...	224,400	224,400	448,800

Chapter B.—Settlement on the Khabur.

(6,242 former settlers and 2,500 transported in 1936.)

	1937.		
	First Six Months.	Second Six Months.	Total.
<i>French Francs.</i>			
Part I.—Current Expenditure.			
Article 1. Administration—			
(a) Control
(b) Office staff ...	12,300	12,300	24,600
(c) Supervision of works ...	34,200	34,200	68,400
(d) Office expenses, travelling, &c. ...	4,000	4,000	8,000
Article 2. Land
Article 3. Transport
Article 4. Supplies ...	365,000	231,125	596,125
Article 5. Sanitary service—			
(a) Staff ...	14,700	14,700	29,400
(b) Supplies ...	10,000	10,000	20,000
Article 6. Upkeep of equipment—			
(a) Staff ...	28,200	28,200	56,400
(b) Travelling ...	1,250	1,250	2,500
(c) Supplies, petrol, &c. ...	80,000	40,000	120,000
(d) Seeds ...	25,000	50,000	75,000
Article 7. Education ...	5,000	5,000	10,000
Part II.—Capital Expenditure.			
Article 8. Buildings ...	20,000	...	20,000
Article 9. Plant, live-stock, &c.—			
(a) Agricultural implements ...	16,000	...	16,000
(b) Motor lorries
(c) Live-stock ...	50,000	...	50,000
(d) Hydraulic installations ...	40,000	10,000	50,000

(*) Credit subject to a reduction (see observations on the budget B 3).

1937.			
Part III.—Unforeseen.	First Six Months.	Second Six Months.	Total.
Article 10. Miscellaneous and unforeseen expenditure—	French Francs.		
(a) Loss on 1936 harvest ...	90,000	...	90,000
(b) Miscellaneous and unforeseen ...	79,350	44,225	123,575
Total ...	875,000	485,000	1,360,000

Total Expenditure for 1937.

	First Six Months.	Second Six Months.	Total.
	French Francs.		
Chapter A ...	224,400	224,400	448,800
Chapter B ...	875,000	485,000	1,360,000
Total ...	1,099,400	709,400	1,808,800

[E 6860/1419/93]

No. 50.

Sir A. Clark Kerr to Mr. Eden.—(Received November 2.)

(No. 522.)

Sir,

Bagdad, October 21, 1936.

WITH reference to Mr. Bateman's despatch No. 462 of the 17th September last, I have the honour to inform you that the Prime Minister carried out his proposed visit to the northern liwas between the 15th and 24th September. His Excellency's tour, which included Mosul, Arbil and Sulaimani, seems to have been both popular and successful, and on his return he told Mr. Bateman that he was determined to take effective measures to relieve the poverty of the villagers, by whose low standard of living he had been painfully shocked. It is unfortunate, therefore, that this tour, which was undertaken with such good intentions, should have involved the Prime Minister in some slight passing difficulties with King Ghazi.

2. In spite of the fact that the Prime Minister consulted him before leaving Bagdad, His Majesty seems to have felt that Yasin had stolen his thunder by preceding him to the north. His Majesty's pique was prompted by Hikmat Sulaiman and others of the Opposition, but I now learn that he is entirely satisfied that Yasin's visit was a *bona fide* effort to clear the way, and to make sure that the Royal visit would not be marred by any untoward incident.

3. Early in the present week King Ghazi visited the holy cities of Kerbala and Najaf. He moved freely about amongst the fanatical populace, and was most cordially received. This would not have been possible a few months ago, and I am convinced that the King must thank the diplomacy and tact of his Prime Minister for the happy outcome of this excursion. As plans have been made for a Royal visit to Basra during the next few days, and probably, later in the year, for a journey to the north of Iraq also, it is clear that His Majesty is treading the path laid down for him by Yasin Pasha during the summer.

4. Meanwhile, arrangements are being made for the next parliamentary session, which begins on the 1st November. Seven by-elections have to be held to fill vacancies in the Chamber, and some Cabinet changes also seem likely. The Prime Minister told me soon after my return to Bagdad that recently the King had several times indicated that he thought that the time had come to reshuffle the Cabinet portfolios, and had even hinted that it was desirable that Jafar-al-Askeri and Nuri Said should resign. As new Ministers, His Majesty had spoken of Jamal Madfai and Muhammad Zaki (now President of the Chamber). Yasin

admitted that he had himself for some time thought that the Cabinet would have to be reorganised before Parliament met, but he was not prepared to turn out Nuri, whose energy and resourcefulness were great assets. Moreover, if Nuri were made to resign just after his intervention in Palestinian affairs, it would appear that the Iraqi Government did not approve of what he had done, and an unfortunate impression might be created in Palestine and other Arab countries. I said that I entirely agreed with him, and should be very sorry to see the Yasin-Nuri partnership break up.

5. I mentioned the possibility of early Cabinet changes to Nuri, and he told me that, since his return, Yasin had given him a similar account of the position, and had asked him to make suggestions for the reorganisation of the Cabinet after he had had time to get into touch with the different political leaders. Nuri explained that, owing to his son's marriage, he had not yet had time to study the situation, and in any case he would be reluctant to discuss the personnel of the Cabinet with the Prime Minister. If, however, Yasin Pasha mentioned the matter to him again, he intended to point out some of the defects of the Government's internal policy, which, he thought, should be remedied. The most conspicuous of these was the deterioration of the provincial administration, the efficiency of which had, he considered, steadily declined since the British administrative inspectors had been removed. In his opinion, it was essential to reorganise the administration of the provinces in such a manner as to restore effective British advice. From his general attitude towards the question of Cabinet changes, and from several remarks which he made to me the same evening, when he dined at the Embassy, I gained the impression that a certain coolness had developed between Nuri and Yasin.

6. Both of them dined with me again last night, and the Prime Minister told me that he had that day asked Nuri for his views about the reconstruction of the Cabinet. He had, however, found Nuri little disposed to express any at all, and this was an embarrassment to him. He depended so much upon Nuri's presence in the Government that he would be reluctant to make any changes which did not have the full approval of the Minister for Foreign Affairs. He added that he was glad to be able to tell me that King Ghazi was reconciled to Nuri's remaining in the Cabinet. Before Nuri left the Embassy I took an opportunity to tell him that I thought it imprudent of him to shirk a free discussion with the Prime Minister of so important a matter. He said that he would not do so. But I should not be surprised to find the office of honest broker falling upon me once again.

7. Another matter which I discussed with the Prime Minister soon after my return was the situation on the Euphrates. He told me that the tribes were quieter, but still restless, and that the situation continued to cause anxiety. In a little over a week after this conversation, the police, supported by the Iraqi Air Force, were obliged to undertake operations against the Safran tribe a few miles north-east of Samawa. I have not yet been able to ascertain the precise cause of this fresh outbreak of tribal disorder, but it is evidently closely connected with the disturbances at Khidr, which were reported in paragraph 7 of Mr. Bateman's despatch No. 441 of the 27th August last. The Safran are a section of the turbulent Bani Hachaim, and it appears that certain elements of the tribe were not brought to submission by the operations undertaken at the end of August. Fortunately, the disorder does not seem to be spreading, and I hear that the Iraqi aeroplanes have now been withdrawn to Bagdad, as it is considered that the police are able to deal with the situation alone.

8. As bad administration is obviously the cause of the present disturbed state of the Diwaniyah and Muntafiq liwas, the proper remedy is quiet, orderly and even-handed government, but the tendency of the Iraqi Ministers is always to use force, plus blundering political moves, as a panacea for all tribal disorders. These methods, it is true, frequently relieve the symptoms, but seldom eradicate the cause of the disease, which, after a while, usually breaks out again in an aggravated form. Nor is it the Ministers alone who act in this manner. The practice of applying political rather than administrative expedients to the solution of current problems is also common in all public departments. Ignorance and laziness are the chief causes of this state of affairs. To work out sound administrative reforms requires a degree of knowledge and experience, patience and diligence seldom possessed by Iraqi officials, and, in consequence, those in authority constantly fall back upon their inborn craft to provide solutions for

their difficulties. The result is a steady deterioration in the efficiency of the Administration, which is becoming one of the most disturbing defects in the government of the country.

9. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran.

I have, &c.

ARCHIBALD CLARK KERR.

[E 7137/1419/93]

No. 51.

Sir A. Clark Kerr to Mr. Eden.—(Received November 16.)

(No. 537.)

Sir,

Bagdad, October 31, 1936.

WITH reference to Mr. Bateman's despatch No. 479 of the 24th September last, I have the honour to inform you that a Royal Iradah has now been issued granting pardon and immediate release to a further 125 Yazidi prisoners.

2. This brings the total of those released up to 154.

I have, &c.

ARCHIBALD CLARK KERR.

[E 7080/1419/93]

No. 52.

Mr. Morgan to Mr. Eden.—(Received November 12.)

(No. 558.)

Sir,

Angora, November 7, 1936.

THE Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs informed me yesterday that the new Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs had assured the Turkish representative in Bagdad that the new Government would continue Iraq's policy of friendship with Turkey and with Great Britain, and that Iraq would always be glad to have the benefit of Turkey's advice, particularly in regard to the frontier dispute with Iran.

2. Dr. Aras said that he was about to receive the Iraqi Minister in Angora, to whom he would express appreciation of the policy of the Government of Iraq, and whom he would ask to counsel his Government to avoid any act of immoderation at home or anything that would cause complications abroad.

3. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador in Bagdad.

I have, &c.

JAMES MORGAN.

[E 7145/1419/93]

No. 53.

Sir A. Clark Kerr to Mr. Eden.—(Received November 16.)

(No. 546. Confidential.)

Sir,

Bagdad, November 2, 1936.

EVENTS in Bagdad during the last few days have moved so rapidly that I have not had, until now, the leisure to do more than to give you a hasty, and, I fear, a blurred sketch of what has happened. In the present despatch I propose to try to put before you as full a picture as I can of all that has passed, and, in another despatch, to venture some speculations upon the effects of the overthrow of the Yasin Government by the Iraqi army leaders.

2. To all but what must have been a very small group of people, the morning of Thursday, the 29th October, was nothing but the beginning of a normal Bagdad day. The Afghan Minister for War had just arrived and had been met at the station with appropriate ceremonial. Ministers, secure in office, were at their desks and about their ordinary business (which, at this season, begins at a very early hour), when, at half past 8, eleven aeroplanes flew over the town. There was nothing remarkable about their appearance, because it is the habit of the

Iraqi air force to make the day's routine flights about this time. But they were flying lower than usual, and soon were seen to be dropping handfuls of leaflets. About an hour later I learned what these leaflets contained. It was a manifesto appealing to the King, in the name of the army, to dismiss the Yasin Cabinet and to set up a new Administration under Hikmat Sulaiman. It called upon Government officials to leave their offices until the new Cabinet was formed, and it foreshadowed the possibility that the army might be compelled to take forcible measures. It was signed by General Bekr Sidqi, who described himself as "Commander of the National Forces of Reform."

3. The movement had been carefully planned and the secret well kept. Bekr Sidqi had chosen a moment when all but two battalions of the Iraqi army were gathered in the neighbourhood of Qaraghan, on the road to the Persian frontier, for the purpose of their annual divisional training. Of the two remaining battalions, one was on the Euphrates and the other was at Mosul. Bagdad, stripped of troops, lay open and defenceless. The Chief of the General Staff, General Taha-al-Hashimi, the brother of the Prime Minister, was in Angora on his way back from Europe. The air force had been called from Hinaidi to Qaraghan the day before without attracting special attention.

4. At about a quarter to 10 I received a message from King Ghazi asking me to go to see him. I lost no time in doing so. I found His Majesty in a state of great nervousness. He told me that he had had bad news which had taken him rudely by surprise. He assumed that I had already seen the leaflet, but there was more than that. Hikmat Sulaiman had brought him a letter from Bekr Sidqi and Abdul Latif Nuri, the generals commanding the two divisions now engaged in manoeuvres, which made the same demands as those in the leaflet, and which added that, if King Ghazi did not acquiesce in them, Bagdad would be bombed from the air in three hours' time. His Majesty described the helpless condition of the capital and asked for my advice, making it clear to me that he thought that any idea of resistance should be dismissed. I asked him whether he had said or done anything which might give colour to the belief that the movement had his approval. He assured me that he had not. I asked whether he felt that his authority was strong enough to check the movement if he allowed it to become known that he was opposed to it. He said that he did not think so. I asked if he had consulted his Ministers. He said that he had seen Yasin Pasha about half an hour before and had found him half minded to resign. I then made to His Majesty a few obvious remarks about the disastrous consequences that had in most countries followed the excursion into politics of the army, and I advised him to lose no time in getting into touch with the two generals and in stopping them from making anything like a triumphal entry into Bagdad, the possible effects of which I did not care to forecast. This suggestion seemed to commend itself to him.

5. At this moment Yasin and Nuri arrived. Yasin showed no signs of emotion. Nuri was clearly on the edge of an explosion. The whole situation was quickly re-examined. Yasin admitted at once that he, too, had been taken by surprise. He was aware that some sections of public opinion were hostile to his Government, but the last thing he had foreseen was that attack would come from the army, least of all from Bekr Sidqi. He said that he had just had a conversation by telephone with Bekr Sidqi, and had asked him what all the fuss was about. He had explained that he was ready to resign directly he knew that he no longer enjoyed King Ghazi's confidence, but His Majesty had given him no indication that this confidence had been lost. Bekr Sidqi had replied that the movement, of which he was at the head, was being carried out with the knowledge and the approval of King Ghazi. Here His Majesty winced a little, and denied with emphasis the truth of this statement. Yasin then began to weigh up the chances of resistance. There was clearly still a lot of battle left in him. He glanced at and rejected an idea that King Ghazi, with the Government, should abandon Bagdad and withdraw to the provinces, where they would have time to gather together some forces with which to meet the army. King Ghazi then suggested that, if Yasin Pasha resigned, he might be able, as time went on, to procure the fall of his successor, and His Majesty hinted that such a fall would be agreeable to him. Meanwhile, Yasin had been pulling his forelock, which is always a sign that he finds himself in a difficulty. He then suggested that, before he was called upon to take a decision, His Majesty should send for Hikmat and enquire what his intentions were. If Hikmat could show that they were generally in the

interests of the country, Yasin would willingly yield up his place. King Ghazi then asked that Hikmat should be sent for, and, somewhat to my surprise, I learned that he was already waiting in the palace. I thought the time had come for me to withdraw, and I did so, arranging with Yasin and Nuri that, on their way back from the palace, they should call at the Embassy and tell me the results of Hikmat's conversation with King Ghazi.

6. When I reached the Embassy, I was told that a flight of five aeroplanes had dropped four bombs in the neighbourhood of the "sarai." The shooting had been good. Three bombs had fallen near the Prime Minister's office and the Ministry of the Interior, and one in the river. It was now about midday. Yasin and Nuri did not come to the Embassy, and at about 1 o'clock I heard that the Government had resigned and that the usual Iradah had been issued empowering Hikmat to form a Cabinet. It seemed that the bombs had done their work. Meanwhile, I had got into touch with the Air Officer Commanding and discussed with him the defence scheme and how best to put it into effect in the event of serious trouble breaking out in the capital. After that there was nothing to be done but to wait upon events.

7. By about 5 in the evening the first advance units of Bekr Sidqi's force began to reach Bagdad unobtrusively and without incident, and by 7 o'clock he was in the "sarai" with Hikmat Sulaiman. Shortly afterwards, I received a message from the new Prime Minister to the effect that his Cabinet had been formed, and that he wished to maintain the present friendly relations with His Majesty's Government and hoped to have the support of the Embassy. As somewhat alarmist reports were reaching me about the state of the town, I drove through the main streets, where everything appeared to me to be quiet and normal. An organised demonstration of welcome to Bekir Sidqi's troops round about the North Gate had, it seems, passed off without incident.

8. That evening I was giving one of my dull routine dinner-parties. In the middle of it I was told that Nuri and another were in the house and wanted urgently to see me. I found that they had slipped across the river in a row-boat and had come in by the water gate. Nuri, however, had been seen and recognised by the sentry. He was in a state of acute nervous excitement. He told me that after I had left King Ghazi that morning, His Majesty had sent Jafar-al-Askari to the two generals with a letter and instructions to try to dissuade them from coming into Bagdad. When Jafar reached the advance guard, he had been met by Ismail-al-Tohallah (the man who carried out the massacre at Simel), who had taken Jafar off the main road into the desert and had shot him. Nuri had had this information from one Ahmed-al-Manassifi, the secretary to the Ministry of Defence, whom he had now brought with him to the Embassy. In his turn Ahmed had had it from Bekr Sidqi and his officers. But there was more than this. It was the intention of a group of these officers that night to murder Yasin, Rashid Ali and Nuri himself. Nuri had been able to warn Yasin, who was now in hiding in the town, but he had not been able to get into touch with Rashid Ali. He asked whether he himself might sleep the night at the Embassy. He had evidently come prepared to do so, because he had brought a small piece of luggage with him. I clearly could not refuse this request, but I saw to it that Ahmed-al-Manassifi got out of the house as discreetly and as quickly as possible. He had obviously come unwillingly, and he wanted no speeding. It needed some little play-acting to be able to deal with Nuri and my dinner-party at the same time, but I understand that none of my guests appreciated that anything very unusual was afoot.

9. It seemed to me that no time should be lost in getting into touch with the new Prime Minister, in acquainting him with the plot and in using such influence as I might have to prevent its being put into effect. For this purpose I asked Mr. Edmonds to come at once to the Embassy, and I explained the situation to him. At my request he went immediately to Hikmat's house with a message from me to the effect that murders such as I understood now to be planned, coming on top of the shooting of Jafar-al-Askari, which I should be obliged to report to you, would create so deplorable an impression in London that I could not foresee the consequences. The first would probably be the rupture of relations with His Majesty's Government. At the same time I urged the Prime Minister to take instant measures to protect the lives of the three men concerned. It was about 1 o'clock when Mr. Edmonds returned, with an emphatic assurance from Hikmat that he would not allow any of the late Ministers to be harmed, and that he was

taking the precaution of posting police guards on their houses. At the same time he expressed appropriate horror at the murder of Jafar, adding, however, that he was in no way responsible for it, as it had taken place before he had accepted office. The fault lay with the King for his thoughtlessness in allowing Jafar to go to meet the army in its present temper.

10. Meanwhile, I had sent Nuri to bed, for he was on the verge of a collapse, but, before doing so, I staged a little scene designed to suggest to the sentry who had seen him arrive that Nuri was leaving by the same way as he had come, and, while the sentry's attention was re-engaged, Nuri got quickly back into the house again. This was, I confess, somewhat "book for boys," but it was clearly in tune with Nuri's state of mind.

11. Early on the morning of the following day, the 30th, I received a visit from Mr. Edmonds, who came with a message from the Prime Minister which reiterated his assurances of friendliness and his wish that I should co-operate with him. The urgency of satisfying myself beyond doubt that Yasin, Nuri and Rashid Ali should be put beyond the reach of danger prompted me to ask him to receive me, and I called upon him in the course of the morning. I was with him for about two hours. I went to him, I confess, full of prejudice, and I found myself, somewhat to my dismay, disarmed by his obvious desire to be friendly and by the earnestness and the apparent sincerity with which he begged for my support. The assurances which he gave me of his belief in the necessity of close and friendly relations between His Majesty's Government and Iraq and of his desire to have help and guidance from myself left, on the face of them, nothing to be desired. He forestalled the observations which I was about to make concerning the folly and the dangers of the way in which he had come into office by saying that he himself could see what was in my mind. There was no one who regretted these circumstances more than himself, or who appreciated more than he did the dangers inherent in the part played by the army, but he could promise me that his first preoccupation would be to put the army back into its proper place. He would not remain a day in office if he failed to do this. I was not, however, deterred from saying what I had meant to say, and I said it with all frankness, and added that the whole circumstances of his coming into office would be bound to make the worst possible impression in London. I said that His Majesty's Government could hardly fail to assume that what, in fact, had been set up in Iraq was a military dictatorship, and that I should welcome any sign that he could give me to show this was not so. He again assured me that he hoped and believed that, if he were given time, he would be successful in his efforts to make the army revert to its normal functions, and he again said that, if he were not successful, he would not remain in office. I then spoke of the murder of Jafar, and he said, with obvious sincerity, that he was as shocked and as grieved as I. He also deplored the dropping of bombs in Bagdad, which had resulted in the injury of several innocent people. I went on to explain that the main object of my visit to him had been to satisfy myself that he was taking adequate measures to protect the lives of members of the ex-Cabinet. He begged me to believe that he was doing everything possible. He said that he would have liked to have been able to give me a guarantee of their safety, but that he regretted he could not do so while feeling ran so high in Bekr Sidqi's force. He had thought, and I instantly agreed, that the best course would be to get them quietly out of the country as quickly as possible. He had been in touch with Yasin and Rashid Ali. The attitude of Yasin had given him some moments of anxiety because that morning Yasin had thrown open his house and had received visits from representatives of some of the Euphrates tribes, but he had now heard that, as a result of a visit to King Ghazi, Yasin had consented to go and to take Rashid Ali with him. Hikmat was therefore making arrangements for them to leave Bagdad that night. Every precaution would be taken for their safety, which he thought he could promise. He had not, however, been able to get into contact with Nuri, and he was somewhat concerned about this. It had occurred to him that it might be possible that I could do so (he clearly knew that Nuri was in the Embassy, but was too good-mannered to show it). If by any chance I were able to do so, it would be a help to him if I could advise Nuri also to leave Iraq and could make arrangements for his departure.

12. I spent most of the rest of the day with Nuri, who was in a distressing state of nervousness, but so soon as plans were concluded with the Air Officer Commanding for his departure by aeroplane to Egypt, he recovered his spirits

and he began to talk freely, if still a little wildly, about the crisis. I shall not weary you with an account of what he said, except to tell you that he was insistent in the expression of the belief that King Ghazi was privy to Bekr Sidqi's movement, and that he said that this was also the conviction of Yasin. I had watched King Ghazi very closely while he, with his Ministers, was discussing the affair on the morning of the day before, and I am bound to say that I, too, gained the impression that it came as no surprise to His Majesty.

13. Shortly before midnight, Nuri was conveyed, with his family, quietly to Hinaidi, whence he left for Egypt before dawn on the 31st October. I was glad to hear about 10 o'clock of his arrival at Amman, and it was with great relief that I learned early in the afternoon of the safe passage over the Syrian frontier of Yasin and Rashid Ali. That day I saw King Ghazi again and I found His Majesty almost cock-a-hoop. He readily acquiesced in my suggestion that suitable provision should be made for Jafar's widow and that she should be sent to join her children, who were at school in Egypt.

14. A copy of Bekr Sidqi's manifesto is enclosed herein.

15. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioner at Jerusalem and to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran.

I have, &c.

ARCHIBALD CLARK KERR.

Enclosure in No. 53.

Extract from the Iraq Times, October 30, 1936.

"To the Noble Iraqi Nation,

"THE army, which is composed of your sons, has lost patience with the present Government, who have been concerned only with their own personal interests, disregarding the public welfare. The army has therefore appealed to His Majesty the King to dismiss the present Cabinet, and to replace it by another composed of sincere citizens under the leadership of Sayid Hikmat Sulaiman, who is held in the greatest esteem and respect by the public.

"By this appeal we have no desire except to improve your condition and the country's welfare, and we have therefore no doubt that you will co-operate with your brothers, the personnel of the army and their officers, with all your power—as the power of the people is always supreme.

"To our brother officials we say: We are only your brothers and colleagues in the service of the State, which we all wish to be one having regard for the interests of the public. We expect you to do your duty by non-co-operation with the oppressive Government, and by leaving your offices until a new Cabinet, of which you will be proud, is formed. It is possible that the army may be compelled to take certain forcible measures, through which harm might unavoidably come to those who do not conform with this sincere appeal.—AL FARIQ BEKR SIDQI, *Commander of the National Forces of Reform.*"

[E 7147/1419/93]

No. 54.

Sir A. Clark Kerr to Mr. Eden.—(Received November 16.)

(No. 548. Confidential.)

Sir,

Bagdad, November 4, 1936.

I HAVE the honour to refer to my despatch No. 546 of the day before yesterday, in which I attempted to describe to you the events which led up to and immediately followed upon the replacement of Yasin-al-Hashimi by Hikmat Sulaiman as Prime Minister of Iraq.

2. The overthrow of Yasin, and still more the way in which it was brought about, leave a situation full of disturbing possibilities. As I have informed you in my telegrams, its worst feature is the entry of the army into politics. That force should have been used to upset the late Government is no new thing. In the spring of 1935 Yasin himself resorted to force in order to oust his predecessor.

We must, I fear, assume that this is a practice that has come to stay. But in 1935 it took a different form. It was, as it were, one section of the people against another. It had an almost popular quality about it. To-day it has been the deliberate use of the army, which should at no time be more than an instrument of government, and, in using it, those responsible appear at first glance to have made it their master.

3. The large body of supporters of the late Cabinet, either from conviction or for reasons of expediency or spoil, are bewildered by the swiftness and stunned by the weight of the blow. The partnership of Yasin and Nuri, so long as it held together, seemed to be unassailable from without, in that it kept in check the swing of influences which had discomfited Governments in the past. The tribes were cowed and quiescent. The already diminished powers of the palace had been almost destroyed by the crisis of last June. The Opposition seemed insignificant and inarticulate. So far as could be seen, no other weapon than intrigue lay at hand for him who wished to attack the Government. This had been tried and it had failed, for Yasin and Nuri still held together. Yasin had even hinted at ten years of office, and Nuri was making more modest but no less confident plans for what was to be done a year hence. No one could foresee that the army would turn and savage the breast that had suckled it so tenderly. From it, indeed, Yasin had seemed to draw a great part of his strength. His brother was at its head. It had always been ready to do his bidding, and it had done it well. And upon it he had spent almost a fourth part of the income from the State. He had pushed forward and pampered its senior general. But he had not reckoned with what we must for the present regard as Bekr Sidqi's personal ambitions, and to-day it seems to be these that have now driven him into exile in Syria.

4. The situation which Yasin left behind him is still confused and uncertain, more particularly in so far as the army itself is concerned. It is not yet possible to say to what extent the army as a whole is with the movement which brought Hikmat Sulaiman to power. For the purposes of his march on Bagdad, Bekr Sidqi gathered round him the field and company officers of the two divisions upon whom he knew he could count, and thus created a composite force of something just under 1,000 men. The rest of the army was left in ignorance of what was happening. I have it from the King of Iraq that even the men of what Bekr Sidqi calls his "Forces of Reform" were not told by their officers of what they were about until they were almost at the gates of Bagdad. A large part of the officers left behind at Qaraghan were Jafar or Taha men whom Bekr Sidqi had not thought fit to take into confidence. That he was able to carry with him his fellow divisional general, Abdul Latif Nuri, now Minister of Defence, was no great achievement, for, although a close friend of Jafar, Abdul Latif is not, I understand, of those who would have stomach for a fight on such an occasion.

5. It is not unnatural, therefore, that there should be much speculation whether the army will now become a compact unit under the control of Bekr Sidqi, by the submission and co-operation of the friends of Jafar and Taha, or whether these officers will have the strength and the courage to resist him. Whichever choice they make, the situation will remain disquieting, for resistance might well mean civil war and submission would probably mean their gradual elimination and the putting of Bekr Sidqi into a position from which he could make his influence supreme if he wished to do so. And that would probably promise dangers almost as grave.

6. Meanwhile, Bekr Sidqi has won over to himself the Iraqi air force. But with it he has taken into his arms one who is, in the view of those who claim to know, the very man who, in his turn, will overthrow Bekr Sidqi himself. I refer to Mohamed Ali Jawad (the dropper of the bombs), now Director of the Air Force. He is said to be still more ambitious than and probably as ruthless and unscrupulous as his new chief. This is, therefore, a union which seems to have the elements of much trouble while it holds together, and still more when it breaks up.

7. At the same time both these men have exposed themselves to the revenge of those whom they have chased from office and from Iraq. With the senseless murder of Jafar as a precedent, it is not hard to guess the form that this revenge might take. Nuri left Bagdad breathing hate and vendetta against Bekir Sidqi and Mohamed Ali, and Nuri is not a man to forget or forgive. I have no reason

to believe that Yasin's sentiments were any milder, while the means at the disposal of Rashid Ali, if he cared to use them, would be more than enough for any purpose of this sort that he might have in mind. This would be enough to explain the alleged eagerness of Bekr Sidqi's young officers to dispose once and for all of these three men. It would also explain why to-day the possibility of the sudden disappearance of Bekr Sidqi is discussed as something quite natural. The murder of Jafar may, indeed, be found to have set a fashion which may bring with it much trouble for the future of Iraq.

8. Above all this Hikmat Sulaiman seems to sail with a composure and a determination which are impressive. Elsewhere I have reported to you that he has told me that at all costs he will oblige the army to resume its normal and appropriate place in the polity of the country, and that he himself will not submit to any form of domination by Bekr Sidqi. This was the main burden of a two hours' talk which I had with him when he came to the Embassy yesterday. In reply to the sustained doubts which I expressed, he begged me earnestly to believe that this was his unshakable resolve, and he said that by the end of the present week I should see the first effects of his efforts. What I shall watch for keenly is the return to their units of the component parts of the "Forces of Reform."

9. I have no reason to doubt the sincerity of the Prime Minister or, indeed, his fixity of purpose, but I am by no means convinced that he will be successful. All that I have heard of Bekr Sidqi leads me to think that it might need a tougher man than Hikmat Sulaiman to put him down. At the same time I am advised that he could not have ventured upon his march on Bagdad with any hope of success unless he had been sure of the support of such men as Hikmat Sulaiman and Jafar-abu-Timman, who could carry with them a large volume of public opinion. But I confess that I do not at present think that much comfort may be drawn from this. Bekr Sidqi may well have seen in co-operation with these two good men a passing means of advancing his own career, which, broadly speaking, began with the grizzly triumph of Simel, moved on to still further bloody glories on the Euphrates and has now come to its present dazzling success. If he escapes the vengeance of the many powerful enemies he has made for himself and is given time to consolidate his position, the way to supreme power lies open to him. We still have to learn that he is not the man to take it—the final step. All this is probably to put things at their worst, but it suggests possibilities not so remote that we can afford to set them aside.

10. Now, perhaps, the time has come to look about for some encouraging features in the situation. They are, I am bound to say, slender, and for them we must turn to the new Prime Minister. If there is value in the claim that Bekr Sidqi could not have succeeded without civilian support, there may be some hope that, before Bekr Sidqi has had time to consolidate his position, Hikmat Sulaiman may be able to gather strength enough to make his own predominant. He has certainly started well enough, and he has been acclaimed by the fickle Iraqi people with what has the air of being spontaneous enthusiasm. Such as is known of his programme has won wide popular support. It is a beautiful Utopia. But some of its features are so rich in promise of antagonism from vested interests that the very programme itself might well be the undoing of Hikmat.

11. So far as we are concerned, his attitude has been more than correct. He has gone out of his way to give satisfaction and to declare his friendship. He has accepted and acted upon every suggestion I have made to him. He has assured me that he will honour the treaty of 1930, the railway convention and all other agreements concluded between His Majesty's Government and Iraq. And this is not ungratifying from one who, in the past, has been the harshest critic of all these instruments. But his obvious eagerness to please may be no more than a sign of weakness. I cannot say as yet. In any case, as I believe that in him lies our only present hope of escaping a military dictatorship, I think that, so long as he pursues his policy as declared to me, he should have our support.

12. These reflections upon the present position of the new Prime Minister lead me to examine the causes which have combined to bring him into partnership with a man like Bekr Sidqi. His last effective appearance in politics was in the company of Yasin and Rashid Ali, when Ali Jawdat was overthrown in 1935. Why should he have turned against them? The answer to this question may perhaps be found in the difference between his outlook on life and that of the leaders of the late Government. Hikmat Sulaiman has shown no desire to enrich

himself. His agnosticism, his indifference to pan-Arab ideals, his contempt for nepotism are all in sharp contrast to the fanaticism, the narrow nationalist views and the acquisitiveness of Yasin and Rashid Ali. So soon as the common cause which had united him and them had been crowned with success, these essential differences of character quickly brought the three of them into conflict and drove Hikmat Sulaiman out into a cold aloofness. Of late, however, his growing irritation against the Government had become more and more marked. He had begun to gather about him a number of men, including Jafar-abu-Timman, who shared his disliking for the constant use of martial law, the abuses in the distribution of State lands, the provocative display of wealth, in the shape of houses and motor cars, by high Government servants and so on. All those to whom fortune had denied such blessings as these were ready to rally round him, but their awe of the Government kept them dumb.

13. It is to be assumed that it was at this stage that he took the course of turning for help to Bekr Sidqi, who, either because he shared these views, or more probably because he saw a chance of gratifying his personal ambitions, threw in his lot with Hikmat Sulaiman. It was a dangerous course, but it is to be presumed that a man like the new Prime Minister did not take it without forethought.

14. While I hope that what I have written above, speculative though it be, may serve to present to you an outline both of the causes of the recent upheaval and of what it may lead to, I feel that it would be wrong to end on too pessimistic a note. If the new Government are lucky, they may succeed in serving Iraq well. If they are not, the generals may take over. But even that may not prove to be so disastrous as we, with our inborn dislike of militarism, naturally fear.

15. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioner at Jerusalem and to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran.

I have, &c.

ARCHIBALD CLARK KERR.

[E 7479/1419/93]

No. 55.

Sir A. Clark Kerr to Mr. Eden.—(Received December 1.)

(No. 561. Confidential.)

Sir,

Bagdad, November 15, 1936.

YOU will, I feel sure, have wished to get more than the scanty information I have hitherto been able to send you about the murder of General Jafar-al-Askari. But even now, more than a fortnight after the crime, it is still impossible to obtain any details of what happened. Those who may be blamed for it are naturally reticent, while others seem to prefer not to discuss it. As time has passed, however, a few facts have come to light, which should perhaps be put on record.

2. In my despatch No. 546, which I had the honour to address to you on the 2nd November, I stated that the King of Iraq had sent Jafar out to meet the two generals. When I saw His Majesty some days later, he denied somewhat fretfully that this was so. He said that it had been Jafar himself who had insisted upon going. King Ghazi had twice begged the general to refrain from so foolhardy an enterprise, but Jafar had confidently asserted that he could prevent the army from coming into Bagdad. When His Majesty had seen that Jafar was at all costs bent upon going, he had given him a letter addressed to Bekr Sidqi and had sent one of his aides-de-camp with him.

3. When giving me this version of the story, King Ghazi turned again and again for confirmation to Rustam Haidar, who was present at the audience, and I got the impression that His Majesty's conscience was by no means easy. But whatever the truth, it is generally believed in Bagdad that Jafar went out at the instance of his sovereign.

4. From another source I have heard that, not content with King Ghazi's letter, Jafar was imprudent enough to send out ahead of himself telegrams and messages, addressed to his personal friends amongst the senior officers of the two divisions, urging them to disassociate themselves from the movement, and that these messages were intercepted by Bekr Sidqi. From the head of the British military mission, who saw Jafar just before he started, I have learned that Jafar set out full of confidence that he could give "those silly swine" a lesson.

5. When Jafar reached the point of the advance guard, he found the road so blocked with armed cars that his own motor car could not pass. He was here met by an officer, who told him that Bekr Sidqi wished to see him, and invited him to get out of his own motor car and to pass through the block on foot. King Ghazi's aide-de-camp wished to go with him, but was told to wait where he was for Jafar's return. It seems that Jafar left His Majesty's letter and his revolver in his own motor car and went with the officer. From the far side of the armed cars he was driven into the desert and shot. He never got as far as Bekr Sidqi. He was buried where he fell, and a determined silence is kept concerning the whereabouts of his grave.

6. A search for the motive for so senseless a crime suggests that it was fear lest Jafar's presence amongst the troops might spoil Bekr Sidqi's plan. More than once of late in tight corners on the Euphrates Jafar had been known, by the sheer force of his personal appeal, to tip the scale and to turn angry men from war to peace. This fear must have been still further kindled by the messages which had been intercepted. One may well imagine that Bekr Sidqi and the officers of his small force must have been in desperate mood. If their movement had failed, they would have emerged from it as rebels. It has been only its success that has made them the liberators of the country from the tyranny of Yasin.

7. As to the identity of the murderer there seems to be little doubt. When I asked King Ghazi who it was, His Majesty replied, without an instant's hesitation, that it had been Ismail-al-Toballah.

8. It was not until many days after that the crime was accepted in Bagdad as a fact. That Jafar had not returned from his excursion was generally known, but it was widely assumed that he was being held prisoner by the army at Qaraghan. The slowness with which the truth leaked out had the effect of mitigating a little the shock to the public mind. Nevertheless, as is natural, the crime has made a most painful impression. There were inevitably those who said that it was a not unjust retribution for the much-machine-gunning which Jafar had done in his time. But on the whole they were few.

9. General Abdul Latif Nuri did not hear of Jafar's death until he and Bekr Sidqi had reached Bagdad. I understand that he was moved to tears.

10. Mr. Edmonds tells me that, when Hikmat Sulaiman was told of the murder, he refused to form a Cabinet, and that great pressure had to be brought upon him to dissuade him from throwing his hand in. When, a day or two after, I urged him to make suitable provision for Jafar's widow and to help her to join her children in Egypt, he told me that he had already made arrangements for this, and that he was finding appropriate employment abroad for Jafar's brother, Tahsin-al-Askari, who had hitherto been Director-General of Irrigation.

I have, &c.

ARCHIBALD CLARK KERR.

[E 7351/1419/93]

No. 56.

Sir A. Clark Kerr to Mr. Eden.—(Received November 25.)

(No. 565.)

Sir,

Bagdad, November 20, 1936.

WITH reference to my telegrams and despatches concerning the present political situation in Iraq, I have the honour to report that a new party has been formed to support Hikmat Sulaiman's Government. It is called the "Popular Reform League." The secretary is Kamil Chadirji, the Minister for Economics and Communications, and the founders include Yusuf Iz-ul-Din, the Minister for Education, Abdul Qadir Ismail, a man who, in the past, has shown leanings towards communism, and Muhammad Salih-al-Qazzaz, who for some time has been active as a leader of workmen's movements (Iraq Personalities, No. 58).

2. I enclose herein a copy of the league's programme as published in its official organ, the daily newspaper the *Ahali* (the *People*). You will see that there is a noticeably Red tinge about many of its items, and that it adds considerably to the discord of incompatible ideals which seem to inspire the members of the new Government. Speculation about the future becomes, therefore, all the more difficult. It is hard enough to find a common political purpose

for men of such different types as the ambitious and, to judge from his past, ruthless soldier, General Bakr Sidqi, and the Voltairian Republican, Hikmat Sulaiman, but to conceive a formula which will cover both their views and those of the men who have put together this patchwork of ultra-modern schemes of social reform is a well-nigh impossible task. Moreover, even if the Prime Minister succeeds in establishing agreement between men of such divergent political outlook, I find it hard to believe that the present Cabinet has enough knowledge or experience to be able successfully to give effect to these far-reaching reforms.

3. It should, however, be remembered that, although the Popular Reform League has been created to support the Government, the Government have not pledged themselves to adopt the full programme of the league. Until they do so the programme may only be regarded as a list of visionary hopes designed presumably to win popular support.

4. As he has described them to me, the Prime Minister's own plans seem to be far less ambitious. His first intention, he tells me, is to test his theories about the distribution of land among the peasants on the Abu Gharaib Canal, where new irrigation works have made fit for cultivation about 80,000 masharas (some 20,000 hectares) of land. This land he wants to divide among peasants at the rate of about 25 hectares a family, and, through the Agricultural Bank, he hopes to be able to arrange loans to provide them with enough capital for such seed and plough cattle as they may need. He also intends that simple but sanitary houses should be built for them. If the Abu Gharaib scheme is a success, it will be applied later on to other areas restored to cultivation by new canals. He has now warned me that he may soon ask me for the help of experts to carry out this work.

5. Another plan, which is evidently dear to him, is the improvement of the education of girls. He thinks that the present teaching is too theoretical, and he hopes to introduce into the girls' schools more practical training in housekeeping, mothercraft and domestic hygiene.

6. These plans are commendable enough, but for many reasons they may prove difficult to work out. Much money will be required, and powerful opposition may be expected to come from vested interests. To meet the first of these difficulties the Prime Minister has told me frankly that he will, if necessary, ask for the help of His Majesty's Government to enable the Iraqi Government to raise loans, and to overcome the second he relies on the popular support which he hopes his schemes will rally round him.

7. He may be over optimistic, but his aims are certainly praiseworthy, and, to my mind, it is better that he and his colleagues should discover from experience the obstacles which lie in the way of the realisation of their plans rather than that they should be deterred from attempting to carry them out by discouraging warnings and cautious criticism.

8. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran

I have, &c.

ARCHIBALD CLARK KERR.

Enclosure in No. 56.

The Programme of the Popular Reform League.

Its Aims.

TO endeavour, by means of political, social and economic reforms, to safeguard the public interests and to ensure the progress of the individual members of the community and to put down exploitation.

How these Aims will be Achieved.

1. *Foreign Policy.*

The cultivation of closer relations between all Arab countries and the development of intercourse between the peoples' organisations in those countries. The strengthening of friendly relations with the neighbours of Iraq and other foreign countries on the basis of mutual equality.

2. Internal Policy.

(a) The strengthening of the internal organisation of the State through the further development of the army and the air force, through the military training of members of popular organisations and the reform of the police in order that these forces may be fit and ready to defend the country against any external aggression.

(b) The grant of full opportunity for the free expression of thought and the exercise of all progressive democratic liberties.

(c) The spread of culture among all classes of the people in a just manner.

3. Economic Policy.

To endeavour to raise the standard of living of the people and to ensure to every person the means to obtain the moral and material necessities of life. To ensure to all, in addition, such luxuries as the wealth of the nation may make possible.

(a) The nationalisation of the means of transport, correspondence and communication, of water-supply and electric power, and the organisation by Government enterprise of such technical undertakings as the country may require to safeguard the peace and happiness of the people.

(b) The creation of a national bank for the practical control of the finances of the country.

(c) The grant of a monopoly of all land, agricultural and other loans to the national bank in order that the people may be saved from the oppression of the money-lenders. The enactment of laws to punish those who extort exorbitant rates of interest.

(d) The imposition of a sliding-scale of taxation on all incomes and inheritances, so that the State may have the means necessary to enable it to carry out essential reforms.

(e) The reclamation of waste land and its distribution to the peasantry in order that they may directly enjoy its fruits, and the organisation of co-operative enterprise among these people.

(f) The building of model villages, the filling in of swamps, and the protection of the peasantry from the ill effects of marshes.

(g) The annulment of oppressive agricultural laws and customs and the enactment of laws to ensure the progress of agriculture, the welfare of the peasants and their protection from exploitation.

(h) The reduction of the salaries of highly paid officials and the just treatment of junior officials and employees.

4. Education.

To make elementary education compulsory; to stamp out illiteracy by the creation of institutions for culture and enlightenment—public libraries, cinemas, theatres, concert halls. The development of physical culture through special clubs, and assistance for the poor to continue their education through night schools.

5. Health.

(a) To ensure that first consideration is given to preventive medicine and that curative medicine receives second consideration. The general increase of health institutions in all parts of the country, and the increase of public gardens and of children's playgrounds.

(b) To build up healthy dwellings by the following means:—

(i) The planning of towns according to the principles of public health, the building of healthy dwellings and their lease at low rents to officers and soldiers, workmen and minor officials and those in need.

(ii) To combat intoxication, which harms the health of the public, and the encouragement of marriage.

6. The Workers.

The enactment of laws to protect the workers, to guarantee their rights, to ensure their progress and to restrict working hours to a maximum of eight hours a day. To encourage trade unions and workmen's organisations and to fix a minimum wage for workers of all kinds.

7. The Lives of the People.

(a) To enact laws in conformity with modern civilisation to regulate personal status.

(b) To endeavour to bring about the liberation of the women while at the same time preserving the principles of family life.

[E 7375/1419/93]

No. 57.

Mr. Morgan to Mr. Eden.—(Received November 28.)

(No. 572.)

Sir,

Angora, November 17, 1936.

I HAVE the honour, with reference to my despatch No. 558 of the 7th November regarding the foreign policy of the Iraqi Government, to report that M. Naji Shevket, the Iraqi Minister here, has informed me that, after the *coup d'Etat*, he impressed on Hikmet Suleyman, the new Iraqi Prime Minister, who is one of his relatives, the vital necessity of taking no action to disturb the relations between Iraq and Great Britain on the one hand, and Iraq and Turkey on the other. Hikmet Suleyman welcomed this advice, and authorised M. Naji Shevket to issue a communiqué, which was published by the Anadolu News Agency on the 8th November, and of which I enclose a copy. It contains assurances that no such disturbance of relations will take place as a result of the change of Government in Iraq. According to M. Naji Shevket, other diplomatic representatives of Iraq abroad have been informed of the terms of the communiqué by their Government.

2. The Iraqi Minister described Hikmet Suleyman as a sensible man of moderate views, who, however, would prefer to resign, rather than have to react energetically against a policy which others might force on him, and of which he might not approve.

3. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Bagdad.

I have, &c.

JAMES MORGAN.

Enclosure in No. 57.

Communiqué published by the Anadolu News Agency, November 8, 1936.

("L'Irak restera toujours ami avec la Turquie," dit un communiqué du Ministre de l'Irak à Ankara.)

Ankara, 7. A.A.—De la Légation de l'Irak:

La Légation de l'Irak à Ankara, constatant qu'à la suite du dernier changement de Cabinet à Bagdad, la presse turque publie des nouvelles puisées à différentes sources au sujet de la politique étrangère du nouveau Cabinet, prie l'Agence Anatolie de vouloir communiquer la déclaration ci-dessous:

"La Légation de l'Irak en exposant et en affirmant à nouveau à l'opinion publique turque que le maintien et le renforcement des relations sincères existant entre les deux pays amis et voisins, qui s'appuient sur des sentiments fraternels mutuels et la communauté de leurs intérêts, constituent l'une des bases essentielles de la politique étrangère de l'Irak et que celle-ci ne sera nullement affectée par le changement du Gouvernement intérieur, elle s'estime convaincue d'avoir accompli l'un de ses plus importants devoirs.

"L'Irak continuera en même temps à conserver ses relations d'amitié cordiale avec son alliée l'Angleterre et s'efforcera à maintenir et à développer les liens d'amitié et d'intérêt l'unissant à tous ses voisins."

[E 7506/973/93]

No. 58.

Sir A. Clark Kerr to Mr. Eden.—(Received December 1.)

(No. 580.)

Sir,

Bagdad, November 26, 1936.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 567 of the 21st November, I have the honour to report that Dr. Schacht returned to Bagdad by air from Tehran on the 25th November and left again for Europe on the following morning.

2. Dr. Naji-al-Asil told me this morning that, among others, he and the Minister for Finance had been invited to dinner at the German Legation to meet Dr. Schacht.

3. They had had a conversation with him which had lasted for nearly two hours. Dr. Schacht had opened by saying that though he had not come with any concrete proposals, he hoped, by his visit to Bagdad, to be able to do something to improve trade between Germany and Iraq. Jafar-abu-Timman had then pointed out the big adverse balance of Iraq's trade with Germany and had complained of the great difficulty which Iraqi merchants experienced in obtaining payment for goods sold to Germany. Dr. Schacht had replied elusively and had suggested that Germany could probably help Iraq by credits. He had heard that the Iraqi Government had many schemes for irrigation and other public works on hand. Germany would be willing to offer unlimited credit for the material required for these works—as much as £5 million, or even £10 million if necessary.

4. The Minister for Finance was not, however, to be put off in this easy manner and stuck to his point, which was that Germany should buy more goods in Iraq (had not Iraq many raw materials for sale and was it not always said that Germany so badly needed raw materials?) and quicker payment for the goods actually sold to Germany.

5. Dr. Schacht had tried to explain that it was easy for the English to pay promptly, because they took so much oil out of Iraq on which they made profits which enabled them to pay for Iraqi goods. If Germany could create a really profitable field for the employment of German capital in this country, German merchants would be able to pay just as quickly as English merchants. Jafar-abu-Timman had not accepted this theory, but had argued that the oil had nothing to do with the way in which British merchants paid for imports from Iraq. The oil company was a separate concern, and the more oil that was exported the more the Iraqi Government received in royalties.

6. Dr. Schacht had then talked about railways. The Iraqi Government, he knew, wished to extend their railway system. Germany would be willing to provide rolling stock, rails and so on at very favourable rates and on long credit. At this point, Dr. Grobba had asked whether it was true that a gentleman's agreement existed between Iraq and Great Britain to the effect that all the railway material required by Iraq should be bought in the United Kingdom. Dr. Naji had replied that he had not yet had time to study the papers connected with the agreement for the transfer of the railways, but he understood that some such undertaking had been given by the late Government in return for the sale of the existing railway system at a very low price.

7. Dr. Schacht had then suggested that perhaps the best plan would be to form an Anglo-German consortium to meet Iraq's requirements for the major works which the Government had projected, but neither of the Iraqi Ministers had taken up this idea.

8. Dr. Naji told me that he had been surprised to find that there was nothing of what he understood to be the Hitler manner about Dr. Schacht, who was more like an elderly professor. He had not been much impressed by Dr. Schacht and said that he thought that Jafar-abu-Timman easily had the best of the argument.

9. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Berlin.

I have, &c.

ARCHIBALD CLARK KERR.

[E 7657/25/93]

No. 59.

Sir A. Clark Kerr to Mr. Eden.—(Received December 9.)

(No. 583.)

Sir,

Bagdad, December 2, 1936.

WITH reference to your despatch No. 555 of the 20th August, which contained a record of a conversation with Colonel Ward dealing with the future development of the Iraq Railways, I have the honour to inform you that on the 29th November the Prime Minister, Hikmat Suleiman, presided at the ceremonial laying of the first rail of the Baiji-Mosul-Tel Kocheh extension. He was accompanied by the Minister of Economics and Communications, Colonel Ward and a number of notabilities both from Bagdad and Mosul.

2. The ceremony was a simple one, and the work which it inaugurated is largely symbolic in that the available construction materials are only sufficient to complete a further 7 miles of permanent way. Considerations of a political nature certainly prompted Hikmat Suleiman to provide a striking example to illustrate his repeated assertion that the new Government are one of deeds rather than words, but I believe that he has this project seriously at heart and that he will make a serious effort to complete as quickly as possible the link between Bagdad and the railway systems of the west. His action also settles a question which previous Governments seemed unwilling to face—whether the railway linking Bagdad and Mosul should go direct from Baiji or by the alternative Kirkuk route. Colonel Ward himself favoured the more direct Baiji alignment, which possesses the additional advantage of being of the same gauge as the system with which it will connect in the north.

3. The existing line from Bagdad to Baiji is 130 miles in length, Baiji to Mosul is a further 112 miles, while 68 miles separate Mosul from Tel Kocheh. Not far short of 200 miles of new track will therefore have to be laid.

4. A short time ago the Prime Minister discussed with Colonel Ward the requirements for the new construction, and assured him that the necessary funds would be found. He stated that, should it prove difficult to arrange a foreign loan, he would suspend all other development projects and devote the whole of the oil revenues to the railway extension scheme. At his request, Colonel Ward submitted an estimate of the cost of the projected development in the next two years, details of which are given in an enclosure to this despatch. Of the £2,695,000 total expenditure foreseen, about 1½ million is on account of the Baiji-Tel Kocheh extension, the balance being the cost of a railway bridge and other works in the Bagdad area. In view of the tendency for the prices of steel and other constructional material to rise, Colonel Ward has provisionally placed orders for large quantities of rails at present prices; the provision of sleepers will probably prove more difficult and they will now cost considerably more than they would have done some months ago. Colonel Ward has requested authority to place immediate orders for the whole of the necessary materials on the understanding that credits will not be required until the various shipments are actually received. Even so, it will be seen from the enclosure that in 1937 alone a sum of at least £750,000 will be required for the northern extension.

5. As reported in my despatch No. 580 of the 26th November, Dr. Schacht, during his passage through Bagdad, found opportunity to talk to the Minister of Finance and offered him a credit which would amply cover the cost of the railway extension. He also enquired whether any arrangement existed whereby Iraq had undertaken to purchase railway material in the United Kingdom and, when this was admitted, suggested that it might be advantageous to arrange for an Anglo-German consortium to handle the orders.

I have, &c.

ARCHIBALD CLARK KERR.

Enclosure in No. 59.

Iraqi State Railways: Statement of Capital Programme Works.

Baiji-Mosul-Tel Kocheh, Kirkuk and Dibbis Lines—	Total dinars.	Year 1937. Dinars.	Year 1938. Dinars.
Rails	400,000	300,000	100,000
Sleepers	300,000	200,000	100,000
Banking (earthworks, bridges, culverts and ballast) ...	400,000	250,000	150,000
Station buildings	180,000	90,000	90,000
	1,280,000	840,000	440,000
Surveys	30,000	20,000	10,000
Land
Fencing	30,000	20,000	10,000
Telegraph	6,000	6,000	...
Plant and tools	10,000	10,000	...
Rolling-stock (includes ballast trucks)	180,000	150,000	30,000
	1,536,000	1,046,000	490,000
General charges	124,000	62,000	62,000
Total	1,660,000	1,108,000	552,000
Bagdad Area—			
Shedding	120,000	50,000	70,000
Roads	15,000	5,000	10,000
Buildings	300,000	150,000	150,000
Bridge	600,000	170,000	430,000
Total	2,695,000	1,483,000	1,212,000

NOTE.—If considered necessary, 30 per cent. of the first year's allotment could be carried forward.

[E 7808/1419/93]

No. 60.

Sir A. Clark Kerr to Mr. Eden.—(Received December 16.)

(No. 597.)

Sir,

Bagdad, December 11, 1936.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 565 of the 20th November, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith an extract from the *Iraq Times* of the 9th December containing a translation of the programme which has been issued by the Government through the press bureau.

2. This programme differs widely from that of the Popular Reform League and, according to the preamble, includes only such projects as can be carried out in the near future.

3. Nevertheless, the programme is only a little less ambitious and comprehensive than those habitually issued by previous Governments and it seems unlikely that more than a small part of it will ever be carried out.

4. In accordance with precedent, the programme opens with a definition of the Government's attitude towards Great Britain and the declaration of policy made under this head is, I think, satisfactory. It indicates, however, that, as the Prime Minister has more than once suggested to me, the Government intend to obtain all the benefits which they can from the Treaty of Alliance.

5. The programme of administrative reforms and improvements contains nothing which calls for special comment, but it is possible that the financial items, which deal with the revision of the income-tax law, the supervision of banks and the introduction of legislation for the employment of insurance money in Iraq, cover plans likely to cause difficulties for British commercial interests. I shall, therefore, watch carefully the action taken by the Government in these matters.

6. Under the heading "Justice," a complete overhaul of the judicial system and basic laws of the country is adumbrated, but, bearing in mind the years which have already been spent in vain efforts to produce a new criminal code, it seems unlikely that the present Government will be able to redraft all the civil, commercial and criminal laws in the manner suggested.

7. The "Defence" paragraphs reveal little, but the proposed reconciliation of civil and military needs in important economic schemes foreshadows, I fear, an increasing use of the military veto on many projects for the improvement of internal communications. Even under the late Government the Ministry of Defence were developing a tiresome habit of objecting on strategic grounds to the construction of many roads needed for the opening up of the remoter districts.

8. The economic plans of the Government contain nothing noteworthy, but you will observe that this Cabinet, like their predecessors, favour the construction of a Government oil refinery within Iraq. Mr. Catherall's report on this subject has not yet been compiled and it is probable that the Government may be given pause when they become acquainted with the cost of such a project.

9. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran.

I have, &c.

ARCHIBALD CLARK KERR.

Enclosure in No. 60.

Extract from the Iraq Times dated December 9, 1936.

Translation of "Programme of Policy" issued by Cabinet of Saiyid Hikmat Sulaiman.

THE new Cabinet undertook responsibilities at a time when the people had been reduced to despair. It came to power to do away with the previous state of affairs, and to start a new era of general reform in every sphere of the life of the nation.

This programme, therefore, includes only such undertakings as are to be carried out forthwith or in the near future, in accordance with the principles laid down, as follows:—

Foreign Policy.

The Cabinet proposes:—

1. To strengthen the co-operation between Iraq and Great Britain, and to continue efforts to ensure that all possible financial, economic and military benefits are derived from the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of Alliance.

2. To strengthen the ties of friendship and co-operation between Iraq and the Turkish Republic, and to use every endeavour to hasten the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between Iraq, Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan.

3. To continue the friendly relations between Iraq and Iran, and employ every means to strengthen them, and to settle all outstanding questions between the two countries.

4. To strengthen brotherly relations with the Kingdom of Ibn Saud and with the other Arab States; and to maintain and cement the friendly relations between Iraq and all other States.

Internal Administration.

The amendment of the Civil Servants Law, the Disciplinary Law, and all regulations relating to the engagement and promotion of officials, with a view to

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ensuring the creation of a civil service on the principles observed by all other civilised nations, taking into consideration the following points:—

1. That special care should be taken to select for Government appointments only educated youths of good character.
2. To ensure that they carry out their duties efficiently.
3. That the promotion of officials appointed on these lines should be carried out in a regular and impartial manner.
4. The settlement of all disputes among the tribes, whether such disputes arise through land or other questions, with complete impartiality.
5. The settlement of the nomadic tribes who have no lands, by giving each family sufficient land to ensure their livelihood, and to introduce the legislation necessary for this purpose.

Health.

To increase the number of hospitals and medical institutions; to engage sufficient doctors to meet the country's needs; to raise the scientific standard of the Medical College, the Midwifery School, the Health Officials School, and the Pharmacy School; and to enlarge these institutions in order to increase the number of graduates.

To establish new medical units and special institutions in order to combat diseases which threaten the existence of the nation, such as venereal disease, malaria, and others; to promote child welfare institutions, and to raise their standard by placing them in charge of trained women capable of teaching mothers correct methods of caring for their children.

Prisons.

To introduce the latest reforms in the prison system; to educate and train the prisoners so that, when, released, they may become useful citizens; and to improve conditions in the reformatory schools.

Municipalities.

To improve conditions in the municipalities; to increase the number of public parks, gardens, and sports grounds; to supply municipalities with all the technical assistance required in order to ensure proper town-planning, and an adequate supply of drinking water and electric light in every town and village; to improve labour conditions by encouraging labour unions and by constructing houses for the labouring classes.

Police.

To raise the standard and capacity of the police force so that it will be able to perform its duties in the most efficient manner.

Finance.

To prepare a permanent cadre for officials in conformity with the country's requirements.

To improve the financial administration so that all the revenues of the State are collected without undue loss of time or giving rise to complaint.

To consolidate the system of financial inspection to ensure effective supervision.

To prepare a general programme of capital works, each of which shall be completed in its allotted time.

To amend all out-of-date financial laws, especially those relating to taxation and, more particularly, income-tax, in order to make it more equitable and logical; to take steps to replace, in time, the present land system by a cadastral system; to take measures to improve the internal and external trade of Iraq in order to balance them as far as possible.

To open spinning and weaving factories to supply the army, the police, and students with their clothing requirements.

To expand the Agricultural and Industrial Bank so that it may be capable of fostering industrial schemes, and improving the quality of Iraqi products.

To supervise the activities of banks, companies, and other economic institutions, and to introduce legislation to ensure the development of Iraq's resources through the employment of insurance money in Iraq.

To settle the land question on principles of equity and public interest, and to divide State lands which are still uncultivated among the people in such a way as to preserve the rights of individuals.

Justice.

To ensure equality before the law and to administer justice impartially; to strengthen the spirit of independence and impartiality in administering the law; to reconsider the system of appointing and promoting judges, as well as all questions connected with their transfer and discipline; to raise their standard and broaden their legal knowledge.

To reconsider the laws connected with the constitution of the courts; to reform the present laws of procedure, and the civil, commercial and criminal laws, in a manner consistent with the sound development of the country.

Defence.

To lay down fixed rules for the expansion of the army and, more particularly, the air force, and to increase its strength on the most modern lines in order to make it capable of defending the integrity of the country.

To rely as far as possible upon the country's own resources in providing for the needs of the army, and, when important economic schemes are undertaken (such as the construction of roads, bridges and factories, and the establishment of air and other transport companies), to reconcile civil and military needs.

To strengthen the co-operation between the different sections of the community and the army and to popularise military training.

Economic Sphere.

To pay special attention to productive schemes which increase the country's wealth, such as the undertaking of large irrigation schemes; the improvement of the country's principal roads; the construction of important bridges; the improvement of means of transport and communication; the introduction of reforms in the agricultural administration; the improvement of the quality of Iraq's products; the expansion of afforestation; the improvement of the quality of livestock and measures to combat their diseases; to carry out all schemes which are necessary for the expansion of industry; the construction of an oil refinery; and to develop generally the country's resources.

Education.

To popularise education among the younger generation; to raise the standard of educational missions abroad, and limit their training to branches of knowledge which are essential for the rapid development of the country.

To expand education in the villages; to improve industrial education; to abolish secondary school fees; to improve the general knowledge and capacity of teachers of both sexes; to build the required number of Government schools on modern lines; to ensure a proper system of examinations; and to lay down a permanent programme for all branches of education.

To hasten the construction of the new Iraqi Museum.

[E 8034/45/93]

No. 61.

Sir A. Clark Kerr to Mr. Eden.—(Received December 29.)

(No. 599.)

Sir,

Bagdad, December 12, 1936.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 511 of the 15th October, I have the honour to inform you that the Royal Air Force cantonment at Mosul (with the exception of the Supply Depot area) was formally handed over on the 2nd December, by a specially appointed board of officers, to the representatives of the Iraqi Government.

2. In accordance with the terms of the Treaty of Alliance of 1930, the cantonment was handed over as a "going concern," i.e., complete with water plant, electric light, &c. Other available material, the transfer of which had not been provided for by the treaty, was disposed of at a price fixed between Air Headquarters and the Royal Iraqi Air Force.

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3. I understand that the atmosphere on the occasion of the transfer was most cordial and that it was carried out with full military ceremonial. The Iraqi military district commander inspected the levy troops still left at Mosul (they set out for Dhibban next day), and friendly greetings and good wishes for the future were exchanged between the British and Iraqi officers concerned. Air Headquarters have supplied me, for transmission to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, with a copy of the proceedings duly signed by the members of the board and by the Iraqi representatives.

I have, &c.

ARCHIBALD CLARK KERR.

[E 8035/518/65]

No. 62.

Sir A. Clark Kerr to Mr. Eden.—(Received December 29.)

(No. 601.)

Sir,

Bagdad, December 16, 1936.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 46 of the 9th December to His Majesty's High Commissioner at Jerusalem, relative to the signature, on the 14th December last, of a Customs Agreement between Iraq and Palestine, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the undermentioned documents:—

- (1) Certified copies of my note of the 14th December to the Minister for Foreign Affairs containing the text of the agreement.
- (2) The original Arabic text of the reply from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the same date.
- (3) Certified English translations of the Minister's note and annex.

2. The agreement is due to come into force on the 14th February, 1937.

3. I am sending a copy of this despatch and copies of the documents Nos. (1) and (3) to His Majesty's High Commissioner for Palestine.

I have, &c.

ARCHIBALD CLARK KERR.

Enclosure 1 in No. 62.

Sir A. Clark Kerr to Saiyid Naji-al-Asil.

Your Excellency,

Bagdad, December 14, 1936.

IN accordance with instructions from His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, I have the honour to inform you that, with a view to facilitating trade between Palestine and Iraq, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland propose, in virtue of the provisions of article 18 of the mandate for Palestine, the conclusion of a special Customs Agreement in the terms set out in the annex to this note.

2. If the Government of Iraq agree to this proposal, the present note, with its annex and your Excellency's reply to that effect, will be regarded as constituting the formal agreement between His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Government of Iraq with effect from the 14th February, 1937.

I avail, &c.

ARCHIBALD CLARK KERR.

Annex to Enclosure 1 in No. 62.

1.—(a) The Government of Palestine will in due course accord free zone facilities to the Government of Iraq within the Haifa Port, for goods consigned to or from Iraq or passing through Iraq in transit, the limits of such zone to be determined later on by agreement between the two parties. The rights accorded to the Iraqi Government in the said zone shall, subject to the provisions of paragraphs (c) and (d) of this article, be exercised by the latter in independence of the Palestinian authorities.

(b) The Iraqi Government shall have the right, if they deem it convenient, to appoint customs officials of their own in the free zone, and such officials shall have the right to import directly free of customs duty articles required by them for their personal consumption and the consumption of their families living with them.

(c) The Director of Customs, Palestine, or his deputy shall have right of access at all times to the free zone, and he may, if he deems it necessary to do so, authorise the police to enter the said zone.

(d) Before the establishment of an Iraqi Free Zone within the port of Haifa, regulations to govern the general administration of the free zone shall be drawn up by an agreement between the Customs Administrations of Palestine and Iraq.

(e) Until such time as free zone facilities have been provided, goods consigned to or from Iraq or passing through Iraq in transit shall be entitled to free storage in the port area for a period not exceeding twenty-eight days.

(f) Until such time as free zone facilities have been provided, the Government of Palestine are willing to place at the disposal of the Iraqi Government accommodation (sheds) for storage in the existing port.

2.—(a) Subject to the provisions of paragraph (b) of this article, the Government of Palestine agree, with effect from the date of entry into operation of the present agreement, to reduce to the extent set out below the rates of customs duty on the following commodities of Iraqi origin imported into Palestine by the Bagdad-Haifa land route:—

Commodity—	From.	To.
	Mils per kilogramme.	Mil per kilogramme.
Rice	1½	¾
Rice, unhusked	1	½
Dates, fresh	1	½
Dates, dried	5	
Dates, compressed	1½	

(b) The Palestine Government shall, however, be free to raise or lower the duty on rice on the understanding that Iraqi rice imported into Palestine by the Bagdad-Haifa land route shall be subject to 50 per cent. only of the general Palestine duty on rice in force at any time.

(c) Barley and ghee of Iraqi origin imported into Palestine by the Bagdad-Haifa land route shall be exempt from duty, subject in the case of barley to such temporary measures of general application as may be necessary to protect the Palestine crop and subject in the case of ghee (samneh) to any restrictions that may from time to time be applicable to samneh imported from Syria.

The regulations at present in force (which apply to goods imported from Syria) respecting the importation into Palestine of butter, samneh, artificial butter (margarine) or artificial samneh are reproduced below for the information of the Iraqi Government:—

“1.—(a) The importation into Palestine of butter, samneh, artificial butter (margarine) or artificial samneh which do not conform to the specification set out below shall be prohibited.

“‘Butter’ shall mean the substance generally known as butter made exclusively from cream or milk, or both, with or without the addition of salt and containing not more than 16 per cent. of water and not more than 8 per cent. of salt.

“‘Samneh’ shall mean the substance generally known as samneh and shall contain no fat other than the fat of milk.

“‘Artificial butter (margarine)’ shall mean any article of food, whether mixed with butter or not, which resembles butter, but is not genuine butter as defined above. Artificial butter (margarine) shall contain not more than 10 per cent. of butter fat.

“‘Artificial samneh’ shall mean any article of food, whether mixed with samneh or not, which resembles samneh, but is not genuine samneh as defined above; artificial samneh shall contain not more than 10 per cent. of butter fat.

[14940]

"2.—(b) Every consignment of imported butter, samneh, artificial butter (margarine) and artificial samneh shall be accompanied by an invoice giving the true description and origin of the goods, and the packages or containers shall bear a marking indicative of the true nature of the contents thereof."

(d) The Government of Palestine will not during the period of the present agreement alter the duty at present imposed on the following imports without giving the Iraqi Government six months' notice of their intention to do so:—

Name of Import.	Present Duty.
Animals (live)	Free.
Eggs	20 mils per 100 eggs.
Eggs (without shell)	12 per cent. <i>ad valorem</i> .
Fish (fresh)	5 mils per kilog.
Hides, raw and dried	Free.
Tanned hides	30 mils per kilog.
Meat (frozen and chilled)	Free.
Chickens (live)	Free.
Chickens (frozen)	12 per cent. <i>ad valorem</i> .
Linseed	Free.
Cotton, raw	Free.
Ground nuts, decorticated	Free.
Ground nuts, unshelled	2.5 mils per kilog.
Wool, raw	Free.

3. Transport undertakings using the Bagdad-Haifa land route shall be entitled in Palestine to the following exemptions or privileges subject to observing the conditions specified in relation thereto:—

(a) Exemption from import duty of motor vehicles and tyres and tubes imported direct to Palestine by the company or withdrawn from customs on a delivery order in its name, provided that such motor vehicles and tyres and tubes are not used for local transport in or between Palestine and Transjordan.

(b) Exemption from import duty of petrol provided that the company obtains its requirements from stocks in bond and the motor vehicle tanks are filled under customs supervision and sealed by a customs officer. The seals must be inspected at the frontier at the Palestine Customs Office and found intact. Similarly, on the inward journey the tanks shall be sealed at the frontier at the Palestine Customs Office and inspected at the bonded store and found intact.

(c) Reduced licence fees under the Road Transport Ordinance as indicated hereunder:—

(i) Public vehicles—	Mils.
Not exceeding seven persons, including the driver ...	200
Exceeding seven persons, including the driver ...	500
For every seat over seven ...	50
(ii) Commercial vehicles with four wheels, not including tractors for haulage—	
1. Where the carrying capacity does not exceed 1,000 kilog. ...	500
2. Where the carrying capacity exceeds 1,000 kilog., but does not exceed 1,500 kilog. ...	L.P.
3. Where the carrying capacity exceeds 1,500 kilog. ...	1
(iii) Commercial vehicles with six wheels ...	3
(iv) Tractors used for haulage ...	1

(d) In respect of goods imported and exported in transit, by whatsoever enterprise, a special rate of wharfage dues, viz., 5 mils per package weighing not more than 150 kilog. gross, provided all packages are suitably marked as in transit and are subject to check in such a manner as the Director of Customs may think fit.

4.—(a) The Iraqi Government will continue to maintain the road between Bagdad and Ramadi and the desert road up to the frontier of Transjordan in a manner adequate to meet transport requirements.

(b) The Government of Palestine, in co-operation with the Government of Transjordan, will undertake the repair of the Jisr-al-Majami-Irbid-Mafrak section and arrange for it to be maintained in a manner adequate to meet transport requirements, and will take all practical steps to arrange for the maintenance of the roads to be constructed through the lava zone east of Mafrak up to the frontier of Transjordan.

5. The present agreement shall remain in force for an experimental period of three years from the date of its entry into force. The question of its renewal for a further period shall be examined six months before the expiry of the experimental period, when the question of concluding a trade agreement between Palestine and Iraq shall be simultaneously considered. In default of any arrangement to the contrary, this agreement shall lapse at the end of the said period of three years.

Enclosure 2 in No. 62.

Saiyid Naji-al-Asil to Sir A. Clark Kerr.

Your Excellency,

Bagdad, December 14, 1936.

WITH reference to your note of to-day's date, I have the honour to inform you that, with a view to facilitating trade between Iraq and Palestine, the Government of Iraq agree to the conclusion of a special customs agreement in accordance with article 18 of the mandate for Palestine in the terms set out in the annex to this note.⁽¹⁾

2. In accordance with the proposal in paragraph 2 of your Excellency's note, I have the honour to inform you that the present exchange of your Excellency's note referred to with this my note will be regarded as constituting a formal agreement between the Government of Iraq and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom with effect from the 14th February, 1937.

I avail, &c.

NAJI-AL-ASIL.

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

CHAPTER III.—SYRIA.

[E 4121/1403/89]

No. 63.

Consul-General Havard to Mr. Eden.—(Received July 4.)

(No. 56 E.)

Sir,

Beirut, June 24, 1936.

ECONOMIC conditions in the Lebanon and Syria during the quarter ended the 31st March, 1936.

1. Finance.

The budget situation of the different States on the 31st December, 1935, was as follows:—

State.	Revenue. £ Syr.	Expenditure. £ Syr.	Excess of—	
			Receipt. £ Syr.	Expenditure. £ Syr.
Syria ...	6,016,975	6,082,820	...	65,844
Alexandretta ...	748,815	688,412	60,403	...
Jebel Druze ...	209,632	174,876	34,756	...
Latakia ...	1,294,493	1,045,482	249,011	...
Lebanon ...	4,072,163	3,995,859	76,304	...
	12,342,078	11,987,449	420,474	65,844

The state of the accounts of common interest on the 31st December, 1935, were as follows:—

	£ Syrian.
Receipts ...	8,323,654
Expenses ...	7,283,554
Excess revenue ...	1,040,100

There are, however, still some expenses outstanding which have to be met from the funds in hand, and it is likely that the whole of the excess revenue will be required to meet them.

The final customs receipts for the last quarter of 1935 were £ Syr. 2,279,842. The approximative receipts for March quarter 1936 are £ Syr. 1,713,162.

The value of notes in circulation was as follows:—

	£ Syrian.
December 31, 1935 ...	15,040,000
January 31, 1936 ...	14,065,000
February 29, 1936 ...	14,290,000

2. Foreign Trade.

The total value of foreign trade for the first quarter of 1936 shows a reduction compared to the last quarter of 1935, but an increase compared to the first quarter of 1935.

The returns for the first quarter of the year are usually below average, but the figures would have been better this year had it not been for the fifty days' strike and disorders in the towns of Syria.

	March Qtr. 1936.	December Qtr. 1935.	March Qtr. 1935.
Total imports ...	8,120,165	12,737,538	7,675,365
Total exports ...	4,573,414	6,532,051	3,612,050
	12,693,579	19,269,589	11,287,415

Imports (commerce spécial) total £ Syr. 5,957,614.

The share of the four leading countries in the special import trade of Syria for March quarter 1936 were:—

	£ Syrian.
France ...	840,500
Germany ...	659,665
United Kingdom ...	632,398
Japan ...	590,056

Exports (commerce spécial) £ Syr. 2,306,500.

The figures for the four leading countries, clients of Syria, were:—

	£ Syrian.
Palestine ...	696,612
United Kingdom ...	374,215
France ...	283,291
Egypt ...	207,736

Transit Trade.

The value of the transit trade during March quarter was £ Syr. 2,162,551. The principal shares in this trade by country of origin were:—

	£ Syrian.
Iraq ...	1,366,022
Turkey ...	407,429
U.S.A. ...	111,494
United Kingdom ...	57,488

The figures for Iraq and especially for Turkey include the value of a large number of live-stock. The Iraq figures also include the value of the crude oil passed through the pipe-line.

3. Industry (Lebanon).

During the first quarter of 1936, Lebanese industry suffered both in sales and in production from the long-drawn-out strike of the bazaars in all Syrian towns. This strike lasted for more than fifty days and only finished in the first week in March. From then onwards there was a reaction and sales and production increased.

The principal Lebanese industries and their output for the March quarter were as follows:—

Alcohol ...	25,700 kilog.
Biscuits ...	18,000 kilog.
Beer ...	327,000 litres.
Chocolates ...	50,000 kilog.
Jams ...	25,000 kilog.
Halwa ...	115,000 kilog.
Farinaceous foods ...	150,000 kilog.
Cement ...	29,000 tons
Silk textiles ...	6,000 metres
Matches ...	4,000,000 boxes
Brushes ...	120,000

Industry (Syria).

Although the bazaars were closed for nearly two-thirds of March quarter, and trade was non-existent, a certain amount of work was going on behind closed doors in view of the Damascus fair which was scheduled to stimulate the production of national industries as well as to increase the export of Syrian agricultural produce. Its other aims are to develop commercial relations with neighbouring countries and to encourage the tourist traffic. A number of countries agreed to participate and stands were taken by the representatives of several foreign firms.

some of them bringing their exhibits from Tel-Aviv fair. Several United Kingdom products were exhibited, one of the outstanding individual exhibits being a display of agricultural and milling machinery by a well-known United Kingdom firm.

4. Commerce.

A dominant factor in this quarter has been the fifty-day strike in all towns in Syria proper. The effects of this strike were to bring about almost a complete trade standstill and a loss of confidence which had a bad effect on credit. The export trade of Syria—notably that of Aleppo and Damascus—was restricted and large stocks of wool, skins and wheat remained unsold and weighed heavily on the market. As regards imports, the effects of the strike have been felt considerably by Beirut—the principal importing centre for the mandated States—where stocks remained on hand causing importers to reduce and even countermand their orders for fear of adding to their commitments. Trade with the interior was paralysed, and merchants there were unable to honour their engagements and unpaid bills accumulated. Finally, the holders of bills were obliged to grant renewals, and the banks were persuaded to help ease the situation by prolonging credit facilities. Fortunately, the strike ended at the beginning of March, and for the rest of the quarter trade was brisk and the situation was gradually being restored. At one time the outlook was exceedingly bad, but there was a remarkable spirit of co-operation between all parties and the banks which enabled the Syrian merchants to tide over the danger. In effect, the number of bills protested during the quarter was below the average.

5. Agriculture.

The favourable atmospheric conditions which prevailed during the last quarter of 1935 were not entirely maintained during the first quarter of 1936. Rainfall was considerably below that of the corresponding quarter of 1935 and was, in fact, somewhat below the usual average fall; the mean temperature was also higher. There was an extremely violent gale on the 12th and the 13th February, and damage was caused to plantations on the coast. Alternate days of heat, and hail and sleet, accompanied by violent changes of temperature during March, caused havoc to fruit blossoms. In the interior of the country conditions were more favourable and it is expected that the grain harvest, whilst not equalling that of last year, will yet be above the average.

For the Lebanon the area under grain cultivation shows little change, whilst the area under vegetable and fruit cultivation shows a slight all-round increase.

Statistics of citrus exports for the season up to the 15th March show that during the period from October 1935, 316,242 cases of fruit were exported against 183,619 for the preceding season of 1934-35.

As for south Syria, the area under grain cultivation has been increased; 150,300 hectares of wheat as against 144,830 in 1935, and 98,200 hectares of barley as against 81,200 in 1935. Vegetable cultivation is likewise on the increase.

In north Syria there is an all-round reduction in the areas planted in both grain and vegetables. Cattle and flocks have prospered from the normal winter conditions and the lambing season was very good. The general flock condition is excellent and a complete recovery from the bad years of 1932 and 1933 has been effected.

I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioner in Palestine and to His Majesty's consuls at Aleppo and Damascus.

I have, &c.

G. T. HAVARD.

[E 4232/4232/65]

No. 64.

United Kingdom Delegate to Foreign Office.—(Received July 8.)

(No. 51.)

THE United Kingdom delegate to the League of Nations presents his compliments, and has the honour to transmit copies of a record of a conversation between Lord Stanhope and M. Viénot on the 1st July, respecting the situation in the Near East, of which a copy has been sent to His Majesty's Ambassador, Paris.

*United Kingdom Delegation,
Geneva, July 6, 1936.*

Enclosure in No. 64.

*Record of a Conversation between Lord Stanhope and M. Viénot on
July 1, 1936.*

LORD STANHOPE received a call on the 1st July from M. Viénot, Under-Secretary of State at the Quai d'Orsay, charged specially with the affairs of the Mediterranean Basin. At Lord Stanhope's request Mr. Ward, of the Eastern Department, was also present.

2. M. Viénot said that he believed that His Majesty's Government and the French Government should keep in as close touch as possible in matters concerning the Levant, and he had therefore come in order to give Lord Stanhope an idea of the evolution which the French were now proposing to give to their policy in the territories of the Levant at present under French mandate. He hoped that in return Lord Stanhope would be able to give him some indication of the policy of His Majesty's Government in Egypt and Palestine.

3. M. Viénot explained that it was the policy of the French Government to put an end to their very unsatisfactory experiences in the territories of the Levant under French mandate. The French Government had sunk a great deal of money in Syria and had only reaped trouble in return; they were determined to put an end to a situation where, in the event of difficulties in any other part of the world, they would be immediately faced with the risk of disturbances in Syria. M. Viénot hoped that a draft Franco-Syrian treaty would be agreed upon within the course of the next month or two with the Syrian nationalist delegation at present in Paris. Once this basis had been achieved it was intended that elections should take place in Syria with a view to the formation of a National Government which would have the necessary authority to sign and ratify the treaty. Subsequently the treaty would be brought before the League of Nations and the process of evolution would be complete when Syria was finally admitted as a member of the League; the whole process would, however, probably take two or three years.

4. Turning to the details of the proposed Franco-Syrian treaty, M. Viénot said that the French Government had been much embarrassed by the precedent of the Anglo-Iraqi treaty of 1930. The French did not feel able to follow this precedent closely, particularly as the Anglo-Iraqi treaty contained no provision for the protection of minorities; the Syrians always disputed the introduction of any provision which did not figure in the Anglo-Iraqi treaty.

5. Nevertheless, the French were insisting on inserting in their treaty with the Syrians practical guarantees for religious minorities in Syria. The unity of Greater Syria would be conceded (with the exception, of course, of the Lebanese Republic), but present separate minority territories—the State of Latakia and the Jebel Druze—would continue to retain the measure of autonomy which they at present enjoyed. The difference would be that the mandate over these two territories would be transferred formally from France to the new Syrian State. M. Viénot added, however, that the French Government proposed to keep land garrisons in both the State of Latakia and the Jebel Druze (he suggested that

the retention of a strong French force in the Jebel Druze would be a source of satisfaction to the British authorities in Palestine and Transjordan), and it appears, therefore, that the transference of the French mandate over these two territories to the Syrians will not exclude a considerable measure of French control.

6. M. Viénot said that although the majority of the Lebanese favoured French annexation or a continuance of the present régime, the French Government had felt obliged to institute a similar constitutional change in the State of Greater Lebanon. It was accordingly intended that as soon as agreement had been reached over the Syrian treaty, a similar treaty settlement would be negotiated between the French and a Lebanese delegation. The French proposed, however, to continue as at present to maintain military occupation of the country, and they had resisted an attempt by the Syrians to curtail the present frontiers of the Lebanese Republic on the south-west, *i.e.*, the neighbourhood of Sidon.

7. M. Viénot was not very explicit as to the French proposals in regard to the present sanjak at Alexandretta, but it appeared from his remarks that it will be embodied in the new Syrian State with the retention of its present measure of administrative autonomy.

8. M. Viénot said that a condition of the settlement which the French were proposing was a new understanding with the Turks in regard to the Syro-Turkish frontier. The French were intending to keep a strong detachment of their air force at a point near that frontier with a view to controlling it or defending it at need. He added that apart from the garrisons to be maintained in the two mandated territories of Latakia and Jebel Druze, the only forces in Greater Syria after the new treaty would be air squadrons stationed on conditions very similar to those in the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty.

9. In reply to a question whether it was intended that Greater Syria should depend on Lebanese ports or create a new port of its own, M. Viénot declared that the present system of a common customs fund for all the mandated territories would be continued and the customs receipts would continue to be divided up between Syria and the Lebanon.

10. Turning to the situation in Palestine, M. Viénot said that the French had told the Syrian nationalists categorically that the negotiation of a treaty was contingent upon their refraining from any form of intervention in the affairs of Palestine. The French had further put pressure on the Syrians to use their influence with the Palestinian nationalists to stop the present troubles in Palestine, and he knew for certain that two members of the present Syrian delegation in Paris had in fact acted in this sense. M. Viénot added that the French Government had very good reason to believe (although they could not formally prove it) that Italian money was behind the disturbances in Palestine.

11. M. Viénot then asked Lord Stanhope whether he could give him any information about British policy in Palestine and Egypt, in particular about the future location of British military forces in Egypt in the event of the proposed Anglo-Egyptian treaty being concluded.

12. Lord Stanhope replied that as regards Palestine His Majesty's Government were of course unable to contemplate any step which would give the appearance that they were bowing to coercion and that any settlement of the so-called grievances of the Arab population would have to await the re-establishment of public order.

13. Lord Stanhope said that His Majesty's Government were as anxious as ever to conclude a treaty with Egypt, and he informed M. Viénot that Sir Miles Lampson had just returned to his post and would shortly be resuming his negotiations with the Egyptian nationalists. It was difficult to say in advance what would be the exact location of British troops in the event of the treaty being concluded, but in general it was proposed that Cairo should be evacuated and that all troops should be withdrawn in a few years to within the Suez Canal zone, with the possible exception of one or more battalions which would remain for some years longer in the vicinity of Alexandria. In reply to a question by M. Viénot, Lord Stanhope said that it was not proposed to make any change in the present situation in the Sudan.

14. Before leaving M. Viénot said that he was very anxious to put an end to the antagonism which had poisoned the relations between the British and French officials in the Near East after the war. He thought that the greater

part of the resentment had already disappeared, but he was determined to instruct all the French officials in that area to see that in future there was nothing but cordiality and co-operation between them and their British confrères. He thought that the collaboration between the British officials in Palestine and Transjordan and the French officials in the mandated territories ought in any case to be greatly facilitated by the high personal qualities of the Deputy French High Commissioner at Beirut, M. Meyrier, and of the French consul-general at Haifa.

*United Kingdom Delegation,
Geneva, July 2, 1936.*

[E 4804/195/89]

No. 65.

Acting Consul-General Furlonge to Mr. Eden.—(Received July 28.)

(No. 69.)

Sir,

Beirut, July 20, 1936.

I HAVE the honour to report that since the President of the Lebanese Republic received on the 20th June the telegram from M. Viénot affirming the willingness of the French Government to negotiate with the Lebanon a treaty on analogous lines to that now being negotiated with Syria, two main questions have been exercising the minds of the local population. These are the return to some form of Constitution, and the future territorial limits of the Lebanon.

2. The first is prompted by the necessity of substituting a Chamber on constitutional lines for the provisional Chamber instituted by the High Commissioner's decrees of 1934 (see Beirut despatch No. 1 of the 5th January, 1934). On receipt of the telegram, the President took a popular step by consulting as many influential bodies as possible, including the Chamber of Deputies, the journalists, the heads of Government departments, the religious heads and the Chamber of Commerce, as to the form of Constitution they would prefer. On the 7th July the Chamber of Deputies at an unofficial *séance* adopted a resolution calling for the restoration of the 1926 Constitution which was suspended by "Arrêté" No. 55/LR of the 9th May, 1932; and while other projects have been mooted, such as the adoption of a Constitution "on American lines" such as is said to have been personally favoured by the High Commissioner, it seems probable that the latter on his return will be officially asked to restore the 1926 Constitution, after which a new Ministry would be formed to dissolve the present Chamber and hold elections for a new one on the basis of the 1926 Constitution; that is to say, with a Deputy per 20,000 electors instead of, as at present, one per 50,000. There seems no reason to believe that the Constitution if restored will prove itself any less expensive, or any less open to corruption, than at the time of its suspension.

3. The second question is much thornier. Deep anxiety had been caused in the Lebanon in the early part of June by rumours that the Syrian Nationalists in Paris were demanding, as a condition of their acceptance of the draft Franco-Syrian treaty, that the four cazas including the port of Tripoli which had been added to the Lebanon in 1920 should be returned to Syria. Telegrams of protest were despatched by President Eddé and various bodies to the High Commissioner in Paris and to the Quai d'Orsay, and Mgr. Mubarak, Maronite Archbishop of Beirut, who was then in Paris attending a religious conference, obtained an interview with M. Blum on the subject. M. Blum, though apparently a little hazy on the geography of this country, gave a reassuring reply to the archbishop; and the telegram from M. Viénot mentioned above, which stated categorically that the frontiers of the Lebanon would be maintained where they were fixed on the 31st August, 1920, served to allay the anxiety of the Lebanese politicians.

4. On the Moslem elements in the Lebanon, however, this pronouncement had the opposite effect, and during the last fortnight a steadily growing opposition on their part has become vocal, particularly in Tripoli and Sidon, in which towns they are in a considerable majority. On the 10th July, it is true, the four Sunni Moslem Deputies published a letter in the press thanking France "for preserving the territorial integrity of the Lebanon," but they were promptly disowned by

the executive committee of the Beirut Moslem Community, who on the 15th July addressed a letter to the *délegué général* affirming their unalterable resolve to form part of Moslem Syria. On the 12th July a Moslem demonstration at Sidon in favour of union with Syria was badly handled by a Christian gendarmerie officer and resulted in an ugly little riot in which four demonstrators met their deaths and several were wounded. Sidon has since been on strike as a sign of protest and Tripoli followed suit for three days last week. Moslem opinion in these two districts is clearly hardening against retention in the Lebanon.

5. The situation in the territory of the Alaouites remains confused. Latest indications are that a majority of the population are in favour of union with Syria on a federal basis, and in this aspiration will no doubt be aided by the Syrian Nationalists in Paris.

6. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioners in Jerusalem and Cairo, and His Majesty's consular officers in Damascus and Aleppo.

I have, &c.
G. W. FURLONGE.

[E 5375/464/89]

No. 66.

Acting Consul-General Furlonge to Mr. Eden.—(Received August 25.)

(No. 82.)

Sir,

Beirut, August 18, 1936.

I HAVE the honour to report that in April last the French High Commission promulgated a decree, No. 60/LR of the 13th March, for the regulation of religious communities in this country. This decree has caused some perturbation amongst these bodies, and I accordingly enclose the text herewith.⁽¹⁾ I would venture to draw attention to the following points:—

2. The decree establishes a distinction between those communities which enjoy jurisdiction over their members in matters of personal status ("communautés à statut personnel"), and the more newly—or schismatically—formed communities ("communautés de droit commun"), the members of which are justiciable in these matters before the civil courts. The former category includes all the more important Christian communities, the Sunni and Shiah Moslems, and the Jews.

3. Articles 4 and 5 of the decree impose an important measure of control by the Government over the internal organisation of the recognised communities, a control which has not previously been exercised under the present régime, but had a counterpart in the *firman* system in pre-war Turkish times. This control is reinforced by the provisions of article 23, under which the "recognition" of a community can be annulled in the event of its offending against existing laws or the other provisions of the decree. A community deprived under this article of its recognition reverts to the status of a "communauté de droit commun," and thus loses its jurisdiction over its members in matters of personal status.

4. A further and most important provision, from the point of view of the old-established communities, is that contained in article 13, to the effect that a body seceding from a community as the result of a schism has a right to a proportion of the property of that community.

5. The special mention of the Lebanese Protestant community contained in article 22 appears to arise from the fact that this community (as pointed out in the penultimate paragraph of the memorandum enclosed in Damascus despatch No. 10 to the Foreign Office of the 10th January last) has jurisdiction over its members in matters of personal status in the Lebanon, but not in Syria, and has accordingly been classed generally as a "communauté de droit commun," but in

⁽¹⁾ Annex 1 of Enclosure only printed.

the Lebanon has been accorded some of the powers properly belonging to a "communauté à statut personnel."

6. Article 10 lays down that in matters of personal status, foreigners, even if forming members of one of the recognised "communautés à statut personnel," are governed by the provisions of their national law.

7. The decree is generally held to have been called forth by the situation resulting from the recent schism in the Greek Orthodox Church (see Damascus despatch No. 49 of the 28th May last to the Foreign Office). It is, however, not improbable that it is partly designed to curb the political activities of the Maronite Patriarch, whose attitude at the time of the institution of the tobacco monopoly in the Lebanon, and more recently in connexion with the troubles in Syria caused no little embarrassment to the mandatory authorities. It would seem also to offer a useful lever to these authorities in directing the great influence possessed by the religious chiefs over the mass of the people in accordance with the wishes of the former.

8. I understand that it has aroused strong opposition on the part of the heads of nearly all the important Christian and Moslem communities, and that as a result of their protests to the *Délegué Général*, a modification of certain articles has been promised on the High Commissioner's return.

9. I am sending a copy of this despatch and enclosure to his Excellency the High Commissioner in Palestine, and without enclosure to His Majesty's consul at Aleppo and to the acting consul at Damascus.

I have, &c.
G. W. FURLONGE.

[Annex 1 of enclosure only printed.]

Annex 1.

Liste des communautés jouissant d'une reconnaissance de droit ou de fait.

Communautés chrétiennes :

Patriarcat maronite.
Patriarcat grec orthodoxe.
Patriarcat catholique melkite.
Patriarcat arménien grégorien (orthodoxe).
Patriarcat arménien catholique.
Patriarcat syrien orthodoxe.
Patriarcat syriaque ou syrien catholique.
Patriarcat assyro-chaldéen (nestorien).
Patriarcat chaldéen.
Eglise latine.

Communautés musulmanes :

Communauté sunnite.
Communauté chiite (djaafarite).
Communauté alaouite.
Communauté ismailieh.
Communauté druze.

Communautés israélites :

Synagogue d'Alep.
Synagogue de Damas.
Synagogue de Beyrouth.

Records of Leading Personalities in Syria and the Lebanon.

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Chapter I.—SYRIAN PERSONALITIES (Damascus and Aleppo Consular Districts).

Mehmet Ali Bey-al-Abed.—Born 1874. A son of Ahmet Izzet Pasha-al-Abed, the power behind the throne of "Abdul the Damned." Of Kurdish extraction (which he is anxious to forget). A prudent pan-Arabist. At one time was employed in the Ottoman Foreign Ministry, and for six glorious weeks was Turkish Minister in Washington. Spent the war in Switzerland and on the Côte d'Azur encouraging, at a safe distance, the Allied cause. Was elected President of the Syrian Republic in 1932 as a neutral. Has two good-for-nothing sons and an intelligent but indiscreet daughter who, by pan-Arab zeal and advanced nymphomania, worries her parents, and by outspoken affection for the English (especially unmarried British liaison officers!) offends the French. A wily old man who, like Mr. Jingle, "hides the grin of cunning beneath the mask of friendship." (April 1936.)

Suleyman Sylvain Abouchar.—Born about 1890. Greek Orthodox. Son of Naaman Bey Abouchar. Received his secondary education as a civil engineer in the United States. Chief engineer of the Public Works Department. Has had experience in Mexico. Speaks French and English. Intelligent, capable, straight. Very hot-tempered and dislikes being contradicted. (May 1936.)

Michel Akras.—Maronite Archbishop of Aleppo. Born 1877. Educated in the Maronite College at Beirut. Concealed certain British consular archives during the war. Francophil. (July 1936.)

Naim Antaki.—Born 1900. Educated in the American University at Beirut. Of the Greek Orthodox communion. Lawyer, and formerly worked with Maître Louis Ziadé. An extreme Nationalist politician, making no secret of his antipathy to the French. Has visited India. (July 1936.)

Mar Ignatius Aphram I.—Syrian Orthodox (Jacobite) Patriarch of Antioch. Born 1884. Educated by the Dominicans at Mosul and received into the Roman Catholic communion. Subsequently reverted to his original church and was ordained in it. A travelled and cultured man who avoids partisanship. Resides at Homs during the summer. (July 1936.)

Dr. Yussef Araactingi.—Born about 1885. Educated at Jesuit College in Beirut. Director of Public Health. In the Turkish Army Medical Corps during the war. A mine of inaccurate information on Bedouin and Syrian customs and folk-lore. A poor doctor but an ardent Francophil. (May 1936.)

Najib Armanazi.—Born about 1900. From Hama. Docteur en Droit ("à titre d'étranger") of Paris. Was private secretary to President Abed, and so anathema to Taj-ed-Dine, who persuaded de Martel to oblige Abed to get rid of him. Now 100 per cent. Nationalist. Of no account at the moment, but probably has a political future. (May 1936.)

Emir Adel Arslan.—Born about 1890. A Druse. Was pro-Turk in the war and enjoyed a kaimakamship in the Lebanon. Member of the Party of Independence 1919-20. Took an active part in the rebellion of 1925-26, and has not been amnestied. Expelled from Egypt in 1931 after anti-Italian agitations. Now lives in Iraq and is believed to have acquired Iraqi nationality. His name seems to have entirely dropped out of Arabian politics. Has visited the United Kingdom during the past two years, where he has business interests. Figures on the Palestine Black List. Is inclined to be pro-British. (May 1936.)

Emir Shakib Arslan.—Born about 1882. Druse. Brother of Adel (*q.v.*). Was a kaimakam of the Shouf in the Lebanon during the war. Collected £700 for war fund of General Officer Commanding Damascus. Proposed the disarmament of the Maronites. Wrote violent anti-British articles in the *Sharq* newspaper of Damascus. Is credited with recommending to Jemal Pasha the hanging of the Syrian Nationalists. At present member of the Syrian Nationalist delegation at Geneva. With Ihsan Jabri publishes at Geneva an incendiary and puerile journal called the *Nation Arabe*. Has been bought lock, stock and barrel by Italian Intelligence Service, for whom he will be as ineffectual as ever. Figures on the Palestine Black List. Intelligent, self-seeking, treacherous. (March 1936.)

Hashem-al-Atassy.—Born about 1865. Of Homs; good landed family. Prime Minister and President of the Constituent Assembly under Feisal, and President of the Constituent Assembly of 1928. Went to Mecca to be one of the three mediators in conflict between Imam Yahia and Ibn Saud. Succeeded Hanano as leader of the Syrian Nationalist bloc in January 1936. Led the Syrian delegation that went to Paris in March 1936 to negotiate a Franco-Syrian treaty after the disturbances of January-March 1936. A Nationalist who tempers courage with discretion. (April 1936.)

Abdul Ghafar Pasha-al-Atrash.—Born about 1880. A Druse from Jebel Druse (Suweida). Took part in rebellion of 1925 together with Nesib and Sultan Atrash. True to the Druse tradition of having a member of the family in each camp, Abdul Ghafar discovered French sympathies when the rebellion failed, and was one of the first to offer his submission. Beyond the three members of the Atrash family, it is doubtful whether any Druse took an interest in the broader questions of Syrian unity, or in anything except his own affairs. Is now actively co-operating with French Intelligence Service in Syria in encouraging the idea of Druse autonomy and non-inclusion in Syrian Republic. Has little influence. (May 1936.)

Sultan Hamoud Atrash.—Born about 1875. A Druse from Jebel Druse. Leader of the Druse revolt in 1925. One of the very few Druses whose interest in politics is more than parochial. Still a rebel. Has always been in revolt against one Government or another. Has a special hatred of the French. Not amnestied. Said to be at Qaraet-il-Milh in the Jauf Oasis. Little heard of to-day in Syria. (May 1936.)

Atta Bey-al-Ayyoubi.—Born about 1877. Head of the old and well-to-do Damascus family of Ayyoubi; claims to be Ansari. Was Mutessarif of Lattakia and Kaimakam of Rasheya in the time of the Turks. Director of the Ministry of the Interior under Haqqi-al-Azm 1921-24, and Minister of Justice under Subhi Bey Barakat 1924-25. Has gained the reputation of being honest. Affects pro-Turkish sentiments and is thought pro-French by the Nationalists. Entered abortive elections December 1931 on Sheikh Taj-ed-Dine's list, but did not stand in those of 1932. Made Minister of Justice under Taj-ed-Dine's Government, March 1934. Nominated by French to be Prime Minister to replace Taj-ed-Dine after the disturbances of the spring of 1936. Is on the board of directors of the National Cement Company. In Turkish times he was an Arabphobe—this has not been forgotten by the pan-Arabists. A pleasant person and an experienced administrator. Generally liked. (May 1936.)

Raouf-al-Ayyoubi.—Born about 1880. Cousin of Ata-al-Ayyoubi (*q.v.*). Mutessarif of Damascus and Administrative Inspector 1922-25. Minister of the Interior on reshuffling of Damad's Ministry 1927. Man of no consequence politically. (December 1935.)

Abd-al-Kader-al-Azm.—Born about 1885. Azm family of Damascus and Hama. Brother of Shefik Bey-al-Azm, who was hanged by the Turks as a traitor during the war. Rich landed proprietor. Director of the medical and law schools. Minister of Finance under the Damad 1927. Discouraged student demonstrations during political troubles of winter of 1931. Anxious to keep his post. He is the father-in-law of Abdul Rahman Shahbandar (*q.v.*). Good manners and good reputation. (December 1935.)

Haqqi-al-Azm.—Born about 1875. President of the Conseil d'Etat. First Governor of the State of Syria (1921-24). One of the French nominees for 1932 elections and accepted by the Nationalists. Made Prime Minister in the first Parliament (1932). Found his Cabinet too much for him and resigned in 1934, when he was replaced by Taj-el-Dine, the High Commissioner's appointee. He was one of the original members of the "Arab Club," but to-day manages to compress his Nationalist ideals within a French frame. Owns cotton lands in Egypt which, although heavily mortgaged, yield him a modest income. A wise old man but spineless. (May 1936.)

Khaled-al-Azm.—Born about 1895. Son of Mohamed Pasha-al-Azm. Does not take an active part in politics except an occasional intervention in agricultural matters. Member of the municipal council. Managing director of the National Cement Factory. A mild pan-Arabian. Enjoys considerable popularity. Has pronounced pro-German sympathies. (March 1936.)

Nazih-al-Muayyad-al-Azm.—Born about 1896. Brother-in-law of Dr. Shahbandar. A rebel leader in 1925, but pro-French before that date. Prepared to work with Rikabi or Shahbandar or Haqqi-al-Azm against Nationalists in Syria, and has a cordial dislike for the Syrian Party of Independence in Egypt. Changes his mind every twenty-four hours. Was sentenced to death by court-martial in 1926 in his absence, but had already fled the country. He was pardoned in 1931. Now said to be in the service of the Imam Yahia. (April 1936.)

Wasseq-al-Muayyad-al-Azm.—Born about 1885. Administrator of the Liwa and president of the Municipality 1929. Was in Turkish diplomatic service and occasionally Chargé d'Affaires in Madrid until 1919; from 1923 Director of Public Domains. Minister of Agriculture under Damad 1926, and Minister of the Interior after the split 1927. Appointed Director of Police 1928. Promoted Director of Cadastral Survey Department 1934. Hopes to be first Syrian Minister in Paris. Married to an Englishwoman of lower middle classes who is a devoted mother to his children. Heavily in debt. Starves his family to maintain his mistresses. A prig; for ever boasting of his achievements. (April 1936.)

Fozi-al-Bakri.—Born about 1880. Was president of the Arab Club in Turkish times. Was condemned *in absentia* by Turkish court-martial in 1916. Eldest son of Ata Bey-al-Bakri, landed family claiming descent from the second Caliph. During the war the Emir Feisal stayed in his house. After fleeing before Turkish retribution he joined in the Arab revolt 1917. Took leading part in the 1925 rebellion, but was specially amnestied at Taj-ed-Dine's request in 1928. Failed in the 1932 parliamentary elections. Overshadowed in politics by his younger brother, Nassib-al-Bakri (*q.v.*). A xenophobe. (May 1936.)

Nassib-al-Bakri.—Born about 1885. Younger brother of Fozi-al-Bakri. Acted at one time as honorary Chancellor to the Shereef (afterwards King) Hussein. Joined in Arab revolt 1918. Chief secretary of Feisal after occupation. One of the leaders of the 1925 revolt. Amnestied with his brother. Elected to Syrian Parliament as moderate Nationalist. An ardent supporter of pan-Arabism. His selfishness is too obvious for him to enjoy the full confidence of the Nationalist Wafd. But the gross political blunder of the French authorities in banishing him to Hassetchi in January 1936 raised him at once to the pedestal of a popular hero who had suffered for the cause. Because of this he has, at present, considerable political influence. Owns some property in Palestine. As far as his Nationalist sentiments allow, appears Anglophil. (March 1936.)

Husni Barazi.—Born about 1882. A Kurd. Son of Suleyman Agha Barazi of Hama. Rich landed family. Minister of the Interior under Damad 1926. Deported on suspicion of assisting rebels in July 1926. Member of Constituent Assembly 1928. Has hitched his chariot to Taj-ed-Dine's star. Opposed by Nationalists in elections of 1932 and was not elected. He was, however, included in the Taj-ed-Dine Government in March 1934 as Minister of Education, and resigned with the Government in February 1936. His wife is the Syrian protagonist of "feminism" among Moslem women. She attended the Women's Congress in Istanbul in 1934. He is an agreeable intriguer. (March 1936.)

Negib Agha Barazi.—Born about 1862. A Kurd. A landlord of Hama. Moderate in politics, but elected in 1932 as Nationalist Deputy. The wealthiest inhabitant of Hama. A political nonentity. (March 1936.)

Sheikh Barjes-bin-Hudeib.—Born about 1876. Bedouin chief. Head of Sba's tribe, which is so peace-loving that the Syrian Treasury pays it no subsidy to keep the peace. (May 1936.)

Mustapha Barmada.—Born about 1885. From Aleppo. Governor of that town in 1921-22 and senior member of the Bar. Nationalist. Does not appear in politics nowadays. Of no account, not even among his colleagues of the Bar. (March 1936.)

Fakhri Baroudi.—Born 1893. Rich Damascene family. Strong Nationalist. Narrowly escaped execution in 1925-26. Leader of local youth and *intelligentsia*. Deputy in 1932, and a man of sincere convictions. Possesses considerable rhetorical powers in low Arabic which the crowd understands. Was exiled by the French during the 1936 troubles; this only served to increase his political popularity. Unbalanced and rather a windbag. (March 1936.)

Abud Combaz.—Born 1890. Native of Aleppo. Greek Catholic. Served with the Foreign Legion and took part in the Verdun fighting in 1916. Professional letter-writer. Said to be a police-spy. Has recently organised a body of Christian young men known as the "Whiteshirts" as a counter-movement to the Nationalist private militia known as the "Steelshirts." (August 1936.)

Sheikh Dahham-al-Hadi.—Born about 1896. Bedouin chief. Deputy-head of Al Jarba-Shummar confederation. He is the first cousin of Sheikh Meizan (*q.v.*), paramount chief of the confederation. (May 1936.)

Antoine Eddeh.—Born about 1895. Greek Catholic by religion. Chief secretary of the Municipality of Damascus. Specially appointed by the mandatory Power to exercise effective control of the whole administration. He draws a higher salary than his chief, Tewfik-el-Haiyani, the Muhafez. The Nationalists are for ever seeking to have him displaced as his influence is feared and alleged to be pro-French. A man of considerable ability and an indefatigable worker. (May 1936.)

Haj Sami Sayem-el-Dahr.—Born 1896. Wealthy industrialist, and head of a weaving business. President of the Aleppo Chamber of Industry. Has contributed largely to the Nationalist party funds. (July 1936.)

Salim Djambart.—Born 1873. Merchant. President of the Aleppo Chamber of Commerce. Formerly Syrian Minister of Public Works, but resigned in 1933 since he was not prepared to endorse M. de Martel's draft treaty. A steady influence amongst the Nationalists. (July 1936.)

Michael Elian.—Born 1900. Professed Nationalist. Spendthrift. Trimmer. (July 1936.)

Mgr. Antoine Faraj.—Born about 1884. Greek Catholic Vicar Patriarchal. Damascene. An intriguer, without influence. (March 1936.)

Emir Fa'ur-bin-Mahmoud-al-Fa'ur.—Born about 1900. Chief of the El Faal Bedouin (Sedentary), near Lake Hula. Friend of Emir Said Jezari. The lands of his tribe are astride the Syria-Palestine frontier. (March 1936.)

Said-al-Ghazi.—Born about 1895. Lawyer. Lost his popularity with the Nationalists by supporting Taj-ed-Dine. Pressed for Nationalist participation in 1932 elections. When negotiations with High Commissioner's delegate came to a

deadlock owing to a superfluous National list (Ihsan Sherif insisting on standing) Said-al-Ghazi withdrew his own candidature. Reputation enhanced by not being a party to the subsequent deals. Withdrew a second time in favour of Afif-al-Sulh in July by-election. Included in Ata Bey-al-Ayyoubi's Cabinet as Minister of Finance in March 1936. Good-natured, intelligent, comfortably off. Too colourless to be either useful or dangerous. (March 1936.)

Lutfi Haffar.—Born about 1890. Textile merchant. Minister of Public Works under the Damad 1926, and deported for Nationalist sympathies some months later. Member of the Constituent Assembly 1928. One of the present Nationalist leaders; has a reputation for a knowledge of economics. Accepted post as Administrator of Ain Fijeh waterworks. Deputy 1932. A moderate Nationalist of ability. (March 1936.)

Tawfik Haiyani.—Born about 1895. From Aleppo. Kaimakam of Douma in 1925 and Mutesarif of Hauran since 1930. Secretary to the Syrian Government after the dismissal of Sheikh Taj-ed-Dine. Acting Governor of Damascus during the elections of April 1932. President of the Municipality of Damascus 1936. He is a keen official but has no friends at court. (April 1936.)

Yussuf-al-Hakim.—Born about 1875. Greek Orthodox from Lattakia. Brought up in the Ottoman magistrature. Was president of the Cour de Cassation but accepted interim portfolio as Minister of Justice under Damad 1926 at instance of the French High Commissioner, who promised to keep his original post for him, which was done. Still working for Damad's return as Prince of Syria. Not a bad fellow. Intelligent. Tries to hunt with the Nationalist hounds while running with the French hare. (March 1936.)

Aref Halbouni.—Born about 1870. President of the chamber of commerce. Rarely interferes in politics. Nationalist in feeling. Popular and has some influence which he exerts rarely but wisely. (March 1936.)

Said Hamzeh.—Born about 1870. A prosperous merchant and landlord in the Ghouta. Nationalist, but had personal ties with Shaikh Taj-ed-Dine. Member of the Chamber of Agriculture. (March 1936.)

Shakir-al-Hanbali.—Born about 1880. Lawyer. Mutesarif of Damascus 1924. Minister of Education under Damad 1926-27. Minister of Justice 1930. Acting Minister of the Interior 1932. Disliked by the Nationalists. Now out of office. Professor in the Syrian School of Law. Intelligent, moderate, of no moment. (March 1936.)

Abu Hudah Hassibi.—Born about 1891. Landlord. Elected a Deputy in 1932 elections as French nominee. (May 1936.)

Ahmad Hassib-al-Hassibi.—Born about 1865. Naqib-al-Ashraf. Large properties in Katana district. Appointed President of the Municipality by his brother-in-law, Rikabi, but proved incapable. Chief of committee collecting money for relief of Arabs in Palestine after troubles in 1929. Pious. Avoids politics at present. Distinguished manners. Unpopular. Of no account. (April 1936.)

Subhi Hassibi.—Born about 1895. Son of Ahmad-al-Hassibi. Agricultural engineer. Acting President of the Municipality 1925. Was at one time president of the Agricultural Bank. Now Director of the Locust Bureau. Was a member of the Constituent Assembly 1928. Strong Nationalist but not noisy. Keen on his job, intelligent and a good fellow. (April 1936.)

Grégoire Hindie.—Armenian Catholic Archbishop of Aleppo. Born 1895. Educated in the Armenian Seminary in Rome. Member of a wealthy Aleppo family with political connexions. A brother was at one time Minister of Finance. Professedly Francophil. (July 1936.)

Henri Hindie.—Born 1899. Partner in Hindie Frères, one of the more considerable Aleppo business houses. Formerly Syrian Minister of Finance. Francophil. (July 1936.)

Edmond Homsy.—Born 1897. Son of Albert Homsy, a private banker with interests in Egypt, and reputed to be a very rich man as wealth goes in Aleppo. The father is Roumanian consul here, and during the war was, it is said,

exceedingly intimate with Jemal Pasha, Commander-in-chief of the Vth Army Corps, with whom he did lucrative business; successively he has shown warm pro-Turkish, pro-German, pro-British, pro-Arab and pro-French sentiments.

The son as a young man spent a few months in Switzerland, and a few months as an undergraduate at Oxford. He is of pleasant address, reputed indolent, and untried in public affairs. (July 1936.)

Rashid-al-Hussami.—Born about 1881. A lawyer. Ex-procureur général of the Court of Cassation. Nationalist in feeling but does not appear in politics. Has returned to the bar. Well respected and popular. (April 1936.)

Hussein-al-Ibishi.—Born about 1890. A Kurd. Son of Ahmad Aga-al-Ibishi. Well known in Cairo as dealer in race-horses. Married sister of Abdulrahman Yussef and inherited large properties near Hijane, which he farms. Hunted big game with Yussef Kemal. Takes no part in politics, but in close touch with Bedouin. Sportsman. Has had a succession of bad years with his farm, is rather short of money, has grown disheartened and seems to be going steadily downhill. (April 1936.)

Nuri-al-Ibishi.—Born about 1895. Younger brother of Hussein. Was at Cirencester Agricultural College. Very like his brother, in whose continued misfortunes he shares. (April 1936.)

Hassan Fuad Ibrahim Pasha.—Born 1866. Medical practitioner and expert in forensic medicine. Influential member of the Nationalist party; fanatically anti-French. Apt to attribute Syrian difficulties to the separation from Iraq and Palestine. (July 1936.)

Yussuf-al-Isa.—Born about 1880. Greek Orthodox from Jaffa. Deported by the Turks. Editor of *Alif Ba*. Leader of anti-Zionist demonstrations 1929. Syrian Monarchist in 1931-32. Thought to have been the author of a forged manifesto, said to be by Hanano, in elections of 1931. Failed in 1932 elections. Able journalist. Probably, like his kind in Syria, for sale. Has lately shown a disposition to see the wisdom of controlling his Anglophobia, which seems now to be less pronounced. His newspaper has the largest daily circulation of any Syrian paper (3,000 to 4,000). (April 1936.)

Sa'adullah-el-Jabri.—Born 1890. An extreme Nationalist, who helped to organise armed opposition to the French in 1920 and has worked against them ever since. (July 1936.)

Emir Ja'far-al-Jezairi.—Born about 1895. Conservateur du Musée Arabe. Son of Emir Taher. Nationalist sentiments, but does not appear in politics. Cultivated, honest, but of no account. (April 1936.)

Emir Said-al-Jezairi.—Born about 1872. Head of the family. Proud of descent from Abd-al-Qader. Takes himself very seriously and likes to be called "Altesse." Pretends to aspire to the presidency or Kingship of Syria. Headed electricity boycott, Italian boycott and Hedjaz railway agitation during the summer of 1931. Has properties in Palestine and so likes to keep in with the British authorities. Up to the neck in debt. Narrowly escaped being sold up in 1931. His son tried to murder him in 1934, because of his supposed stinginess. Not very clever, nor entirely sane. Rather a joke with everyone. (April 1936.)

Emir Taher-al-Jezairi.—Born about 1875. Cousin of Emir Said. Moderate Nationalist, but does not enter political arena. Imprisoned by French in 1926, but subsequently released without trial. A nonentity who takes himself very seriously. (April 1936.)

Ata-al-Kassem.—Born about 1884. Mufti of Damascus. Unpopular and corrupt even for a mufti. (April 1936.)

Abdurrahman Kayali.—Born 1890. Educated in the American University at Beirut. Married into the Mudarres family. King Feisal's chamberlain at Damascus. Prominent Nationalist and inclined to preach moderation. His influence is probably less than might be expected. Intelligent, but not masterful. (July 1936.)

Sheikh Abdul Qader Keyhani.—Born about 1875. Of Hama. Descendant of 14th century namesake. Rich and respected family. Had a legal training in

Constantinople. Deputy under Turkish régime. Minister of Agriculture under Taj-ed-Dine 1928-29. Nationalist. (April 1936.)

Nessib Keyhani.—Born about 1896. Of Hama. *Deputé* for Douma. Non-party. French nominee. Has almost succeeded in dissipating the sufficiency his father left him. (April 1936.)

Sheikh Abd-al-Qader-al-Khatib.—Born about 1880. Ex-Inspector-General of Waqfs. Member of the Constituent Assembly 1928. Preacher in Ommayad Mosque. First proclaimed caliphate of King Hussein. Supporter of Taj-ed-Dine. Appointed Director of Awqaf of Damascus 1930. Accused of responsibility for election riots in December 1931 through barefaced interference with the poll. Suspected of embezzlement of Awqaf funds. Dismissed from Awqaf in 1932. Lives a life of ease in retirement. (April 1936.)

Behij-al-Khattib.—Born about 1900. *Inspecteur-Général*, Ministry of the Interior. Said to have helped to manipulate December 1931 elections, and was ordered to take a holiday during the repetition. Returned to his position in the Ministry of the Interior. Appointed Mutesarriff at Deir-az-Zor in the hope that the loss of status would provoke his resignation, but on the contrary it led to his advancement to the highest post in the Ministry. An able and industrious official, but the Nationalist party is after his blood for the energy (excessive they think) he showed in suppressing street disorders during the general strike of 1936. His brother, Sheikh Fuad-al-Khattib, is in the service of Emir Abdullah in Transjordan and is said to supply the French with confidential information of happenings in Transjordan, notwithstanding the fact that the British authorities helped him to escape the fury of the French when they entered Damascus in 1920. Crafty and dangerous. (April 1936.)

Zeki-al-Khattib.—Born about 1890. Not known before the elections for the Constituent Assembly 1928. Lawyer. Nationalist Deputy in 1928 and 1932. Inflammatory speech on the 20th December, 1931, contributed largely to the troubles of that day. Elected *Deputé* in 1932 elections. Has increased his influence in Nationalist councils, but he is not entirely trusted. He likes to be cock of his own roost. (April 1936.)

Faiz-al-Khoury.—Born about 1891. Greek Orthodox. Professor of Roman law. Educated by Irish Presbyterian Mission and at Beirut and in France. Originally Protestant, but was converted to Orthodoxy in 1925 as latter community has representative in Chamber and Protestants have not. Elected to the Constituent Assembly 1928 as mouthpiece for his brother Farès. Nationalist, probably xenophobe. Nationalist Deputy in 1932. Great following among university students. Played a leading part in the first session of Parliament and again during the general strike of 1936. Tempers his ambition with prudence. (April 1936.)

Farès-al-Khoury.—Born about 1870. Protestant. Educated American College at Beirut. Was a dragoman at the British consulate, Damascus, from 1899 to 1909. Lawyer. Minister of Finance under Feisal, when he discreetly lined his pockets. Minister of Public Instruction under Damad, 1926. Deported some months later on suspicion of assisting rebels, thus winning martyr's crown of glory and confidence of Moslems. Well off. Chairman of board of directors of National Cement Company. Professor of the School of Law. Legal adviser to the municipality. Took leading part in the general strike of 1936. Went to Paris in March 1936 as member of the Nationalist delegation to negotiate a Franco-Syrian treaty. Brother of Faiz. A prudent, skilful and unscrupulous politician. (May 1936.)

Mustafa-el-Kosseiri.—Born about 1880. Is a considerable landowner in the Antioch neighbourhood, a Deputy for that place, and president of the Chamber of Industry of the sanjak. A cousin of Subhi Barakat. Turkish-speaking with a fair knowledge of Arabic. Of good reputation amongst his neighbours, and not an extremist. (July 1936.)

Nazem Koudsi.—Born 1906. Lawyer. Hot-head. Active during troubles in February 1936. (July 1936.)

Sheikh Abdul Aziz-bin-Kueishish.—Born about 1890. Bedouin chief. Deputy-head of the Feda'an tribe in the Upper Jezira (Amir Mujhem, *q.v.*, is the paramount chief). More pugnacious than the paramount chief, whose successor he will probably become. (May 1936.)

Mohammed Kurd-Ali.—Born 1875. Formerly editor of *Muqtabas*, but handed over to brother on accepting office under the French. Minister of Public Instruction under Haqqi-al-Azm 1921 and Taj-ed-Dine 1928-30. During war wrote ferocious leaders against British and French, and in 1921 was foolish enough to visit Jemal Pasha in Berlin and was dismissed by the French. Was made president of the Syrian Académie arabe, but was removed from the office in 1934 on the ground of the insufficiency of his knowledge of the Arabic language. Was Minister of Public Instruction till 1932. Now in Egypt seeking admission to the Arab Academy of Egypt. Pompous turncoat. (April 1936.)

Mustafa Bey Kusseiri.—Born 1876. Of Antioch. One of the leading personalities of Antioch. Minister of Public Works in Ata-al-Ayyoubi's 1936 Cabinet. Has never mastered the Arabic language, but can make himself understood in it. In company with the majority of the inhabitants of the Muhafaza of Antioch he speaks Turkish. Well respected in Antioch, little known outside. A trifle unctuous. (May 1936.)

Kyrillos IX, Mughabghab.—Born about 1858. Greek Catholic Patriarch. Lebanese, formerly Bishop of Zahlé. Generally considered anti-French. Tried to remove Greek Catholic priests from seminary of St. Anne at Jerusalem (*Pères blancs*), without success. Unpopular with his flock and the French High Commission, who pointedly gave Légion d'Honneur to his vicar-general. Spends half his time in Egypt and half in Syria and Lebanon. Has recently earned hostility of Moslems on account of his efforts, which were unsuccessful, to get the Christian churches to combine to send a delegation to France in March 1936 to protect the interests of the "minorities" in connexion with the Franco-Syrian treaty negotiations. A Vicar of Bray. (May 1936.)

Yussef Liniado.—Born about 1872. Jew. Banker. Deputy in 1928 and 1932. No party, but Zionist in feeling. Never opposes the Nationalists. Chameleon. (April 1936.)

Said Mahasin.—Born about 1885. Poor Damascus family. Educated Constantinople. Lawyer. Minister of the Interior under Taj-ed-Dine. Rigged elections to the Constituent Assembly 1928; was attacked by Nationalists and jettisoned by Taj-ed-Dine. Now become a Royalist. Member of the Damascus bar. His Royalist activities were the consequence of his personal objection to Taj-ed-Dine. Professor of Civil Law in the Syrian University. One of the best lawyers in Damascus (a partner of Sami Maidani, *q.v.*). Keeps as free of politics as his ambitions, which are tawdry, permit. (April 1936.)

Sami Maidani.—Born about 1895. Son of Sadiq Maidani, wheat merchant in the Maidan. Studied law in Germany and has a German wife. A professor in the School of Law. Formerly member of the Municipal Council. Entered 1932 elections as Independent and received only twenty votes. A sound lawyer who now keeps out of politics. Has pronounced German sympathies. (April 1936.)

Haidar Mardam Bey.—Born about 1900. Wealthy landlord. Son of Sami. Was secretary to Feisal. Now chief secretary to the municipality. Dismissed from the municipality on pretext of his lack of knowledge of French language, but more probably because of his Francophobia. Married a Christian woman. Pleasant and open-minded. (April 1936.)

Jemil Mardam.—Born about 1890. Cousin of Sami Pasha. Nationalist. Member of the Constituent Assembly 1928, and member of various deputations sent by the Constituent Assembly to the French High Commissioner. Deputy in 1932 and Minister of Finance. Formed and led a party of Syrian Arabs to try to effect a settlement between Ibn Saud and Imam Yahia in 1934. His counsel carries great weight in the Nationalist party. Was member of the Nationalist delegation that went to Paris in March 1936 to negotiate a Franco-Syrian treaty. Popular and ambitious. A skilful politician of agreeable personality. (May 1936.)

Sami Pasha Mardam.—Born about 1860. Rich landlord. Avoids politics. Enjoys general respect, but is of little account politically. (April 1936.)

Nebih-el-Martini.—Born 1884. "Administrator" of Aleppo, still generally referred to as the Vali. Began his career as a clerk in a Turkish police office. Held various administrative positions, and was mutessarif at Deir-ez-Zor during the British occupation. Appointed Vali of Aleppo in 1925. Unreliable. (July 1936.)

Sheikh Meizan-bin-Abdul Muheisen.—Born about 1899. Bedouin chief. Head of the Al-Jarba-Shummar Confederation, mainly settled in the Jezira. (May 1936.)

Bedi-al-Muayyad.—Born about 1870. Rich landlord. Educated at Constantinople. Deputy for Damascus under Turkish rule. President of the Representative Council 1921-22. Minister of Justice to Haqqi-al-Azm 1921-24. Minister of Agriculture and Acting Minister of Public Works under Sheikh Taj-ed-Dine, and Minister of the Interior when Taj-ed-Dine was dismissed. Took a holiday in Paris and was made a great fuss of by the Quai d'Orsay. Held office in Taj-ed-Dine's Ministry in 1935 and retired with it after the general strike of 1936. (April 1936.)

Mohamed Khalil Mudarres.—Born 1894. Member of a family of wealthy landowners. Industrialist. Moderate Nationalist. (July 1936.)

Amir Mujhem-bin-Muheid.—Born about 1886. Bedouin chief. Head of the Feda'an tribe in the Upper Jezira. Generally respected. (May 1936.)

Habib Na'asaneh.—Syrian Catholic Archbishop of Aleppo. Born 1894. Educated in the Jesuit College at Beirut, and a man of some culture. Francophil; on good terms with his Patriarch. (July 1936.)

Mohammed Nahas.—Born about 1890. Ex-Turkish officer. Ex-Director of Finance at Damascus. Director of Finance of Ibn Saud for about two years. (April 1936.)

Rahmo Nahmad.—Born 1876. Well-to-do business man. Head of the Israelite community in Aleppo. (July 1936.)

Damad Ahmed Namy.—Born about 1885. Circassian origin. Grandfather was Emir Mahmoud, and Governor of Tripoli. Father was Fakhro Bey and had large estates in Beirut. Ahmed Namy was son-in-law to Abdul Hamid, and retains, rather questionably, the title of Damad, although divorced. Became Chief of State of Syria 1925-26 at a critical moment and worked conscientiously at a policy of conciliation. The French High Commissioner dropped him without ceremony and replaced him by Taj-ed-Dine. Supported Nationalists in the Advisory Council 1931. Has lately been sedulously cultivating de Martel. Still clings to the hope of being made King of Syria. Has far less political influence than he thinks. Well meaning, perhaps a little fatuous. (April 1936.)

Hamdi-al-Nasr.—Born about 1885. Damascene. Started as a clerk in the Finance Department and has risen to the post of Directeur général. Was Minister of Finance under Damad 1925, and left with him in 1928 and returned to his Government office. An intelligent and conscientious civil servant. (April 1936.)

Sheikh Nawwaf-al-Salih-bin-Sharkh.—Born about 1880. Bedouin chief. Head of the Hadidi tribe, one of the largest and wealthiest of the Syrian desert. Sheikh Nawwaf was educated in the tribal school at Constantinople. An astute and benevolent ruler. (May 1936.)

Raphael Nimr.—Greek Orthodox Archbishop of Aleppo. Born 1877. Educated in the Balamand Monastery, near Tripoli. On bad terms with his Patriarch. An intriguer. (July 1936.)

Sherif-al-Nuss.—Born about 1880. One of the leading merchants in Damascus. Avoids politics. Member of the chamber of commerce and the board of the National Cement Company. Like most Syrians, he is Nationalist in sentiment. Influential, good Moslem. (April 1936.)

Mahomet Aref Quwatli.—Born about 1875. Landlord. President of the Chamber of Agriculture. Old-fashioned country squire, fond of shooting. Keeps out of politics, and has suffered losses through his family's connexion with the rebellion. Has one son, Saadi, aged 26, a pleasant but spineless lad. (April 1936.)

Shukri Quwatli.—Born about 1890. Landlord. Nationalist during the Feisal régime and anti-French. Removed himself to Palestine on the French occupation, but returned later. During the rebellion of 1925 afforded every assistance to the rebels (except, of course, personal participation in fighting), for which he was sentenced to a term of imprisonment by court-martial. He fled to Palestine and was amnestied in 1931, and again returned to Syria. Interested in his farm and a "National" fruit-preserving project. Vice-president of the Nationalist bloc. Sincere extremist so long as his personal safety is not involved. Has decided German sympathies. A shifty chauvinist. (April 1936.)

Sheikh Rakan-bin-Murshed.—Born about 1905. Bedouin chief. Head of the small but predatory El Kmasah-Saba'a tribe, which is usually encamped in the Salimiyeh district. A sheikh after the novelist's heart. (May 1936.)

Sheikh 'Id Rawaf.—Born about 1898. Consul of Hejaz and Nejd at Damascus 1930-33. Now occupies a position in Saudi Arabian Government. One time camel merchant in Damascus. (April 1936.)

Masher Reslan.—Born about 1880. Ex-Prime Minister in Transjordan. Deputy of Homs in the Constituent Assembly 1928. Deputy in 1932 and Minister of Justice and Education, unemployed in subsequent Governments. A typical type of Turkish-trained Arab official. (March 1936.)

Khalil Rifaat.—Born about 1880. Educated at Constantinople. Lawyer. President of the Criminal Court of the First Instance, under Feisal and Haqqi-al-Azm. Director of police under the Damad. Superseded by Wasseq-al-Muayyad, his enemy. Now procureur général to the Courts of Cassation and Appeal. Good reputation. (April 1936.)

Mahomet Ali Ridha-al-Rikabi.—Born about 1860. Educated at Constantinople. Good Damascus family. Under Turkish régime was Vali of Basra. General in Turkish army. Commandant at Bagdad and, at outbreak of war, Vali of Medina. Transferred to Jerusalem to command of troops. Is said to have been reduced to President of Municipality at Damascus. In 1918, after fall of Nazareth, deserted to British forces, entered Damascus with them, and was made a Commander of the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire. Appointed Military Governor of Syria by Feisal and Prime Minister on departure of British troops. Disputes with French led to their dismissing him in 1921. Removed to Transjordan and became Prime Minister to Abdullah 1922-23. Quarrelled with Mr. Philby (then British representative at Amman) 1923 and went to Palestine. Put up for Representative Council without success. After a period of apparent inactivity, intrigued unsuccessfully to become Prime Minister of Syria under Damad. Anti-French and anti-British, too. Cordially hated in Damascus. Never forgets an offence or misses an opportunity to pay off old scores. Put up as candidate in 1931 elections, but was not returned. Avaricious, unscrupulous and past-master of Turkish methods of intrigue. (May 1936.)

Macarios Saba.—Greek Catholic Archbishop of Aleppo. Born 1873. Educated at Ain Traz, in the Lebanon. Was a patriarchal vicar in Egypt, where he is said to have accumulated a competence. One brother, Costaki Saba, is a Nationalist Deputy. Another, Amin, is employed in the Banco di Roma at Aleppo. The Greek Catholics were at one time the largest Christian community in Aleppo, and their archbishop is regarded as dean of the archiepiscopal body in that town. (July 1936.)

Rushdi-al-Safadi.—Born about 1875. Educated at Constantinople. Hussein's commander in the Taif fighting, smartly defeated by Ibn Saud. President of the municipality, Damascus, 1925-26. Kaimakam of Idlib in 1932. Promoted to be Mutessarif of Euphrates district in 1935. Has property in Amman and poses as a lover of England. No particular politics. If pro anything, pro-Rushdi. (April 1936.)

Georges Sahnoui.—Born about 1885. Greek Catholic of humble extraction. Successful merchant (building materials). Was a Nationalist. Member of Constituent Assembly. Member of the firm of Mikhail Sahnoui et Fils, who are agents of the Shell Oil Company. His brother Jean was appointed Spanish honorary vice-consul in 1936. Clever and pushing. (April 1936.)

Riza Said.—Born about 1875. Educated in Constantinople and Germany. Specialist in eye diseases. Minister of Public Instruction under Haqqi-al-Azm 1921. Rector of Syrian University until he was removed in 1936 from the office by the French on account of his Nationalist sympathies. A pedant with political ambitions which are not likely to be realised. (April 1936.)

Sheikh Abdel Kader Sarmini.—Born 1865. Lawyer practising in the Shari' Court. Prominent Nationalist, but not extremist. Son, Zafar, condemned to term of imprisonment for incitement in February 1936. (July 1936.)

Emir Fawwaz Sha'alan.—Born about 1907. Grandson of Nuri and prospective successor. Spends much of his time in the Damascus cabarets. Tendency to consumption. Not without qualities. Has a strong following in the Rualla, whom he commands during their Razzias. Treacherously slew his rival and cousin, Farhan-bin-Mashur, near Palmyra in April 1935. Has married both his sisters into Ibn Saud's family, one to Ibn Saud himself, and the other to the Amir Saud. These matches are looked upon by the Bedouin as having a political significance in connexion with the Wadi Sirhan grazing lands and the Jauf Oasis. May yet become the force in the desert that his grandfather was; he, too, is for sale. (April 1936.)

Emir Nuri Sha'alan.—Born about 1860. A treacherous blackguard who has committed enough crimes to merit being hanged many times over. Murdered his brother in order to take his place as sheikh of the tribe. Chief of the Rualla Bedouin, and nominated in 1932 Deputy for the Bedouin in the Syrian Parliament. Assisted Feisal 1918. Superlative ruffian, completely and frankly venal; boasts of having sold himself in turn to Turks, Arabs, British and French. Still for sale, but to-day not worth his price. To please Ibn Saud he pretends to have become a Wahabi. Commander of the Legion of Honour. Grows of less and less account as his grandson Fawwaz increases his influence among the tribesmen. Still rather a "bogey-man" in Damascus. (April 1936.)

Dr. Abdul Rahman Shahbandar.—Born about 1885. Extremist. "Star" student at Beirut American Protestant College (1905 to 1910). Connected by marriage with the Azm family. One of the principal figures in the rebellion of 1925 and sentenced to death by court-martial. Fleed to Egypt, where he now practises medicine, with success, in the Syrian and Lebanese colonies of Cairo. He is the spiritual head of the Syrian Nationalists and very popular (except, of course, with the Nationalist leaders). His exile has made him seem greater than he was when in Syria. For many who have never seen him he is superhuman. His inflexibility and undoubted sincerity, coupled with his rhetorical talents, combine to make him a formidable political personage. Employed the skill he acquired at a foreign educational missionary institution to modernise the practices of desert law by amputating under anaesthetic, with due regard for asepsis, hands of Syrians condemned by the rebels' tribunal for assisting the French in 1925. He introduced the novel method of first dislocating the wrist before severing the hand from the arm in the single stroke required by tradition. He stated in 1932 that he would never take advantage of an amnesty from the French, but in 1936 he tried to get it in order to join, if not lead, the Nationalist deputation in Paris. To the relief of the Nationalist leaders his application was not favourably received by the French, who fear he might become a Zaghul to plague them. Intelligent, but obsessed by his own opinion. (May 1936.)

Tawfiq Shamie.—Born about 1880. Greek Orthodox. Head of Feisal's political bureau. One of the leaders of the People's party 1924, but for having supported Taj-ed-Dine in 1928 Nationalists have now dropped him. Minister of Public Works under the Damad 1926, and Minister of Public Works under Taj-ed-Dine 1928-29. Minister of Finance 1931, but unemployed since elections; in the meantime ekes out a modest existence as a broker, waiting for something to turn up. Well educated, speaks English and French. (April 1936.)

Ihsan Sherif.—Born about 1892. Lawyer. French degree ('à titre d'étranger'). Secretary of the People's party 1924. Member of the Constituent Assembly 1928. One of the most uncompromising Nationalists. Insisted on standing for elections in 1932, thus nearly spoiling the agreement with the High Commissioner's delegate. Nationalist Deputy 1932. A man of sincere convictions, with a violent temper. (April 1936.)

Mousallam Sioufi.—Born about 1885. One of the leading merchants in Damascus. Member of the chamber of commerce and director of the National Cement Company. Nationalist sentiments, but steers clear of active politics. (April 1936.)

Mgr. Iyunis Stati.—Born about 1884. Of Homs. Syriac Catholic Bishop of Damascus. Unlike his predecessor he is not a fanatical Christian, that is to say, he can bear the sight of Christians not members of his Church. Is an ardent defender of the "minorities" cause. Generally esteemed. (April 1936.)

Afif-al-Sulh.—Born about 1890. Originally from Beirut. Lawyer, but does not practise. Active Nationalist. Interested in politics and opposed the Turks before the war. Sent on a mission by M. de Jovenel to Jebel Druse in 1926 to negotiate with leaders of the revolt. One of the leading Nationalists willing to co-operate with the French for the independence of Syria. Organiser of the Nationalist party in 1927. Hated by Dr. Shahbandar and his party. Accused of giving the names of the Arabs hanged by Jemal Pasha, but no proof forthcoming. Deputy of Damascus. Took an active part in organising the general strike in January 1936, was exiled by the French, but was released with the others in March of the same year. (April 1936.)

Ardavazt Surmeyan.—Armenian Gregorian Archbishop of Aleppo. Born 1892. Educated in the Gregorian College at Constantinople. A travelled man of the world and an energetic shepherd of his flock. (July 1936.)

Alexandros Tahhan.—Born about 1867. Damascene. Greek Orthodox Patriarch, elected by the Damascene vote. Bishop of Tripoli before his election. has been criticised for his weak handling of the Epiphanius revolt in the Orthodox Church in 1935, which led to the formation of an independent Greek Orthodox Church of Latakia in 1936. Does not interfere in politics. Not popular outside Damascus. Pleasant and cultivated. (April 1936.)

Sheikh Taj-ed-Dine-al-Hassani.—Born about 1885. Algerian origin (Telemesen family). Son of Badr-ed-Dine. Haqqi-al-Azm appointed him Qadi of Damascus on account of his father's popularity; had no other qualifications. Became ally of Jemil Elchi and Wasseq-al-Muayyad when the Damad's Ministry split in 1927. Persuaded by the High Commissioner that he could secure a subservient majority in the Constituent Assembly and distributed much of the secret funds to rig the elections, but without success. Formed the Government in 1929, entirely subservient to the French. Frankly stated in 1928 that he was prepared to take office on any terms and as representative of any party that would support him. Always busy feathering his nest. Apt to be oriental towards women when drunk, and has caused embarrassment at official dinners and receptions. Succeeded in maintaining himself until his illicit interference caused election riots in December 1931, when M. Ponsot served him up as a sacrifice to public resentment. Insisted on standing as a candidate against French wishes and spent a good deal of money, but failed hopelessly. Dropped out of favour in 1932. Received a gratuity of 400,000 fr. when he lost his post, but won his way back with M. de Martel, for whom possibly the sheikh's tub-thumping had a special attraction. Was appointed Prime Minister by the High Commissioner in 1934, and his partial and corrupt administration led directly to the general strike in 1936. Was forced to resign in March 1936 and fled to France in a complete funk, his life having been threatened by the Nationalists. Returned in May, but does not leave his house except in the company of a policeman detailed for the protection of his person. Uneducated, completely venal, prepared to truckle to anybody. (May 1936.)

Jemil-al-Ulshi (Elchee = Ambassador).—Born about 1880. Damascene of modest extraction. Major in the Turkish army. Was Feisal's liaison officer in

Beirut, and is credited, quite wrongly, with playing into the hands of the French. On the French occupation of Damascus succeeded Ala-ed-Din as Prime Minister, but was dismissed after a few months. Attached himself to Taj-ed-Dine, who appointed him Minister of Finance 1928 and Minister of Interior 1930. Lined his pockets well. Was included in the Taj-ed-Dine Government 1934. No longer of any account. (March 1936.)

Mohammed-al-Useimi.—Born about 1870. Iraqi from Basra. During the war was in Bagdad and removed to Turkey on its occupation by His Majesty's forces. After the war he returned to Aleppo and was deported to Egypt by British. Returned to Damascus 1920 and employed by French in Bedouin questions. Applied himself to gun-running to Iraq 1922-23. Since then has been engaged in drug smuggling. Pretentious, mean, tricky. (April 1936.)

Sheikh Yahya Zamaita.—Born about 1875. Damascene. Sheikh Imam in Turkish army during war and was chief disciple to Badr-ed-Din. Exerts a certain influence among simpler sections of the people and political agent to Taj-ed-Dine. Since death of Badr-ed-Din had been trying, not yet with success, to establish himself as leader of the ulema. Shrewd and intelligent. (April 1936.)

Mohammed Said-al-Yussef.—Born about 1899. A Kurd, and landowner. Son of Abdurrahman Pasha and hereditary chief of Kurds in Syria and Palestine. He received his education in Austria and Germany during the war in company with many young Syrians who, for political reasons, were made much of by the German authorities. Speaks German and some French and English, and affects the pose of the perfect man about town. Had great influence among Kurds owing to his position, but has now lost it. Not a bad fellow. Has a German wife. (April 1936.)

Louis Ziade.—Born 1886. Prominent member of the Aleppo bar. Ambitious, insinuating manners, prefers to settle cases out of court. (July 1936.)

Chapter II.—LEBANESE PERSONALITIES (Beirut Consular District).

Sobhi Aboul-Nasser.—A Moslem of Beirut. Born about 1880. Is Director of Interior. In pre-war days was an official in the Turkish Administration. Member of a well-known Beirut family. (December 1935.)

Nejib Aboussouan.—A Palestinian Christian by origin. Born about 1875. Practised as a lawyer in Jerusalem before the war. From 1923-33 was first president of the Lebanese Supreme Court of Appeal. In 1929 was Minister of Justice. Was, and still is, a candidate for the presidency of the Lebanese Republic. Honest and capable. (December 1935.)

Auguste Pasha Adib.—A Maronite, born about 1860. Is an ex-official of the Egyptian Ministry of Finance. On retiring from the Egyptian service he returned to the Lebanon and was appointed Secretary-General to the Lebanese Government. In 1926 was appointed Prime Minister of the First Lebanese Republic. In the following year he represented the Lebanese Government in the negotiations regarding the partition of the Ottoman public debt. At the end of 1927 he resigned. He is now an old man and has abandoned politics. (December 1935.)

Mgr. Pierre Antoine Arida.—Maronite Patriarch. Born about 1865. Owing to the number of Maronites in the Lebanon is the most influential ecclesiastic in the country. The ancient traditional friendship between the Patriarch and the French has been somewhat impaired of late owing to the attitude adopted by Mgr. Arida towards certain economic measures taken by the mandatory authorities, notably in the case of the tobacco monopoly 1935. (December 1935.)

Emir Rafik Arslan.—A Druse. Born about 1900. Director of Agriculture. Was a Deputy in all previous Parliaments. (December 1935.)

Emir Khalil Bellama.—A Maronite. Born about 1878. Of the Lebanese family the Emirs Bellama. Son of Emir Yousseff Ismail and grandson of the Emir Haidar (cf. Churchill's book on the Lebanon). Practised as a lawyer in

Cairo for twenty years, now retired. Well off. Is a candidate for the presidency of the Lebanese Republic. (December 1935.)

Ahmed Berjawi.—A Shia Moslem. Born about 1888. Is administrator of Mount Lebanon. Is an ex-judge and was once chief of police in Beirut. (December 1935.)

Abdullah Beyhum.—A Beirut Moslem. Born about 1871. A well-to-do merchant before the war, but his business suffered badly during the war period and he was obliged to make a composition with his creditors. When the Senate was created, he was appointed a Senator and after the amalgamation of both Houses, became a Deputy. Appointed Secretary of State in 1933, which post he still holds. Is not a dominant character, but generally liked. (December 1935.)

Assad Bustany.—A Maronite. Born about 1890. Chief of the secret police. Honest and hardworking. (December 1935.)

Emir Fayek Chehab.—A Maronite. Born about 1875. A direct descendant of the Emir Beshir Chehab. Chief of the Lebanese State Secretariat. (December 1935.)

Emir Jemil Chehab.—A Maronite. Born about 1895. Is Director of Finance. Full of zeal and tenacity and consequently unpopular. (December 1935.)

Emir Khaled Chehab.—A Moslem. Born about 1893. Minister of Finance in 1927. Deputy in former Parliaments and President of the present Parliament. (December 1935.)

Omar Daouk.—A Moslem of Beirut. Born about 1874. Is president of the Beirut Chamber of Commerce. Is the largest and richest landowner in Beirut. (December 1935.)

Emile Edde.—A Maronite. Born about 1883. A Beirut lawyer with a good practice. Was a member of the Lebanese deputation to Paris in 1919 to beg for a French mandate. Was president of the Representative Council of the Grand Liban. Became president of the Council of Ministers in 1929 and held, in addition, the portfolios of Interior and of Public Health. He tried to realise economies, lost popularity, and resigned. Is now one of the more favoured candidates for the presidency of the Lebanese Republic. Is clever and energetic, but too impulsive. His relations with the mandatory Power are very cordial. (December 1935.)

Hussein Bey El Ahdab.—A Moslem of Beirut. Born about 1870. Was Governor of Beirut under the pre-war Ottoman Administration. In 1921 appointed Administrator of Beirut and president of the municipality. In 1928 was Minister of Finance and Minister of Public Works and Agriculture from 1928-31. During his tenure of office at the Ministry of Public Works showed energy and capacity—especially as regards road-making. Was afterwards accused of irregularities in the Ministry. Has held no office since. (December 1935.)

Colonel Sheikh Khalil El-Khazen.—A Maronite. Born about 1878. Belongs to a leading family in the Lebanon. Is senior native officer commanding the Lebanese gendarmerie. Happy-go-lucky and full of humour. (December 1935.)

Sheikh Beshara Bey El-Khoury.—A Maronite. Born about 1890. A lawyer by profession. In 1925 was appointed president of the civil section of the Court of Appeal. Minister of Interior in first Lebanese Cabinet 1926. Prime Minister and Minister of Education in 1927, and Prime Minister and Minister of Justice and Education in 1928. After a short interval, again became Prime Minister in May 1929, as well as holding the portfolios of Interior and Public Health. He resigned before the end of the year. Was a strong candidate for the presidency of the Lebanese Republic in 1931, but was beaten in the final ballot. Became a Deputy in 1933 in the present Parliament. Is a rival of Emil Eddé for the next vacancy in the presidency of the Republic. This rivalry has degenerated into a bitter hostility which, fanned by their partisans, has vented

itself in much mutual recrimination in the local press and has not enhanced the personal prestige of either principal. Beshara-el-Khoury is a capable lawyer, and has sound views, but is not a dominant character. He is somewhat effusive. (December 1935.)

Sheikh Sami El-Khoury.—A Maronite. Born about 1895. Is Director of Justice in the present Lebanese Administration. A brother of Beshara Bey-el-Khoury. (December 1935.)

Habib Pasha El-Saad.—A Maronite. Born about 1860. Was President of the Lebanese Council under the Ottoman régime. Exiled to Adana during the war. In 1920 was president of the Administrative Council when he denounced some of his colleagues to the French as being partisans of Feisal, for which they were exiled. Was again President at a later period and then Secretary-General of the Government of the Great Lebanon. In 1928 he was made President of the Council and Minister of Justice. Has been a Deputy, either elected or nominated, in nearly every Parliament. Appointed President of the Lebanese Republic for one year in December 1933 and his tenure was prolonged for a further year in December 1934. He is typical of the old school of officials brought up under the Ottoman régime. His present post is a sinecure, and he was evidently put there by the mandatory authorities as a reward for past services, since it is clear that he is too aged to work. (December 1935.)

Riad El-Solh.—A Moslem of an old and influential family of Sidon. Born about 1892. His father Ridha Bey-el-Solh had held various administrative posts under the pre-war Turkish régime, and it was doubtless for this reason that the son, although known to be an adherent of the Arab movement, was not molested during the war. Riad Bey is very intelligent, a born politician and is looked upon generally as one of the most influential leaders of the Arab National movement. He has visited Geneva several times with Ishan Jabri and Shekib Arslan and is in touch with the Arab leaders in Iraq and Palestine and with Saudi Arabia. Clever and persuasive and ready to use his own private means in the Arab cause. He has considerable influence in Moslem circles. Was exiled to Kameslieh in the spring of 1935 on the accusation of having encouraged the taxi-drivers' strike in Beirut. After a couple of months of exile he was permitted to return. He is by profession a lawyer, and is in practice at Beirut. (December 1935.)

Dr. Nicolas Fayad.—A Greek Orthodox. Born about 1885. Director of Posts and Telegraphs. Is a doctor of medicine and practised in Alexandria until 1931 when he returned to Beirut and was appointed a Greek Orthodox Deputy in the Chamber. Speaks well. (December 1935.)

Dr. Kamel Gargour.—A Greek Catholic. Born about 1890. Director of Public Health since 1929. Capable surgeon and doctor. (December 1935.)

Sheikh Mustafa Ghalaini.—A Moslem. Born about 1895. Cadi of the Lebanese Republic. Studied under various well-known Moslem divines as well as at Al-Azhar. Well versed in the Arabic and Turkish languages and in theology. Before his appointment as Cadi was well-known as a poet and orator. In 1910 when one of the ulema, he taught in various schools of Beirut and was also part-editor of the newspapers the *Ittihad-el-Osmani* and the *Mufid*. Later on he published an Arabic review entitled the *Nibras*. Was a member of the Committee of Union and Progress. Jemal Pasha appointed him military chaplain on the Palestine front during the war when his special task was to fan the religious fanaticism of the Turkish troops. In 1919 he entered the service of the late King Feisal and was tutor to the children of Feisal and Abdullah. He also contributed anti-French articles to the press. With the departure of Feisal, Mustafa Ghalaini went to Egypt and Transjordan finding employment at police headquarters in the latter country. Is said to have been a close friend of Moureiwed, who organised the attack on General Gouraud on the Kuneitra Road. During 1922 he occasionally visited Beirut where his presence usually coincided with local troubles and he was eventually expelled on the suspicion that he was implicated in the murder of Assad Bey, Director of the Interior. He returned secretly to Beirut in 1924, but was arrested and deported. General Sarrail cancelled the deportation order in 1926. Elected president of Beirut Moslem Council in 1928. In 1929 he was active in organising anti-Zionist propaganda

and demonstrations and was in close touch with Amin-el-Husseini, the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem. When the Cadi Kasti died in 1933, he was appointed Cadi of the Lebanese Republic and has since refrained from politics. He is now on good terms with the mandatory authorities. (December 1935.)

Sobhi Haider.—A Shia Moslem. Born about 1885. Is Director of Public Instruction. Has formerly been Director of Finance and Agriculture. (December 1935.)

Georges Haimari.—A Maronite. Born about 1899. Was formerly chief of the Cabinet to the Governor of the Grand Lebanon and later to the President of the Lebanese Republic, a post he still holds (1935). Has a reputation for honesty and for eschewing political intrigue. Is generally liked. (December 1935.)

Sheikh Hussein Hamadi.—A Druse of Baakline (Lebanon). Born about 1875. Is grand Sheikh-ul-Akl of the Druses. (December 1935.)

Gabriel Kabbaz.—A Greek Catholic. Born about 1898. Editor and proprietor of the French paper the *Orient*, published in Beirut. Is a Deputy in the present Chamber (1935). His newspaper is pro-French, and he is generally believed to receive a subvention from the mandatory Power. Is the usual type of oriental journalist and inclined to confuse licence with liberty. (December 1935.)

Sheikh Tewfik Khaled.—A Moslem. Born about 1880. Appointed in 1931 Mufti of the Lebanese Republic. (December 1935.)

Khalil Kseib.—A Greek Orthodox. Born about 1880. President of the Press Association of Beirut and editor of the Arabic daily paper *Saut-al-Ahrar*. A somewhat stupid individual who carries no weight with the staff of his paper, which is run by the sub-editors. The paper is widely read, but, unfortunately, it lacks supervision, with the result that its news is often unreliable. Its general tone is pro-French. (December 1935.)

Musa Moubarak.—A Maronite. Born about 1903. Is chief of the Secretariat of the French High Commissioner's delegate to the Lebanese Government, and is thus the channel of communication between the High Commission and the Lebanese Government. Is an intelligent and active young man. (December 1935.)

Musa Nammour.—A Maronite. Born about 1882. A lawyer with a certain following. Was a Deputy from 1926 to 1929, being once President. Was also at times Minister of the Interior, of Justice, and of Finance. Since 1929 has held no Government post. Now runs the Arabic newspaper *Al-Bilad*. Is said to be unpopular with the mandatory authorities. His honesty is doubtful. (December 1935.)

Izzed Din Omari.—A Moslem of Iraqi origin. Born about 1880. Was for several years president of the Criminal Court of First Instance. Afterwards he was administrator of Mount Lebanon and is now Chief of Police. Intelligent and cunning. (December 1935.)

Dr. Ayoub Tabet.—A Protestant. Born about 1882. Deputy in the present and in the last two Chambers. Minister of Interior and of Public Health in 1928, when he tried to make improvements. Although a Doctor of Medicine by profession, he does not practise. An energetic and honest man. Lived in United States before and during the war, and during the period 1914-18 was an active French propagandist. Whenever the question arises of giving the presidency of the Chamber or the Secretaryship of State to a representative of the religious minorities, Dr. Tabet's name is generally mentioned. (December 1935.)

Selim Tacla.—A Greek Catholic. Born about 1893. Administrator of Beirut and president of the municipality. Began his career as a judge and has been a provincial administrator and Director of the Interior. Clever and active. (December 1935.)

Pierre Trad.—A Greek Orthodox. Born about 1873. A lawyer and ex-leader of the Bar. Succeeded the late M. Debbas as President of the Chamber for the first year of the present Parliament, but was not a candidate for the second term. Clever and bright talker. Cherishes the hope that he may become President of the Republic some day. (December 1935.)

Gibran Tueni.—A Greek Orthodox. Born about 1892. Formerly Minister of Public Education. Editor and proprietor of the Arabic daily paper *An-Nahar*. He is a clever journalist, and his paper, which is often critical of the mandatory Power, has a wide circulation. An intelligent but somewhat unscrupulous man. (December 1935.)

Obituary.

Charles Debbas.—Died in Paris, August 1935.

Chapter III.—FRENCH OFFICIALS IN SYRIA AND THE LEBANON.

Achard, Ismael-Georges.—Born about 1889. Assistant delegate, appointed October 1935. He is a member of the French Oriental Secretary Service ("Secrétaires-interprètes"). Before coming to Damascus he was acting vice-consul at the French consulate in Jerusalem. A pleasant official, with a knowledge of Arabic that is too pure to be understood locally. (May 1936.)

Baron, Lieutenant-Colonel.—Chief of the High Commissioner's Military Cabinet. Had previously served under M. de Martel at the French Embassy at Tokyo. Married. Aged about 46. (December 1935.)

Bouchède, Paul.—Born about 1887. Is Director of the Sûreté Générale and inspector-general of police. Seconded from the French Sûreté Générale and has been in Beirut since 1925. Friendly and helpful. (December 1935.)

Collet, Commandant Robert.—Born 1891. Chief Political Officer and Commander of the Circassian Regiment. Ranker officer with a magnificent record for bravery in the field. Lately has been under a cloud owing to his backing of the now disgraced Taj-ed-Dine. Has an English wife and is therefore inclined to be Anglophobe as a protection against French criticism. A pleasant person and helpful. (May 1936.)

Dewatre, Lieutenant.—Aide-de-camp to the High Commissioner. A young cavalry officer who, though somewhat casual, appears to discharge his duties satisfactorily. Underwent a vacation course at Cambridge in the summer of 1935 to learn English. (December 1935.)

Fain, Guy François-Joseph.—Born 1898. Appointed delegate of the High Commissioner for the Syrian Republic in November 1935. Was previously head of the Bureau Politique at the Haut Commissariat in Beirut. Is a member of the French Foreign Service, in which he holds the rank of second diplomatic secretary. Wisely avoids the mistakes of his predecessors, who failed to observe the convention that infallibility is the privilege of seniority. His insistence on his title of baron (which, like the High Commissioner's noble appellation of comte, is not consecrated in the official *Annuaire Diplomatique*, nor, of course, in *Gotha*) gets on the nerves of his democratic colleagues, with whom he does not rub along very easily. Has a decorative English wife, who, unfortunately, is not a success. A pleasant official. (April 1936.)

Fauquenot, Emile, M.B.E.—Born 1893. Adviser to the Ministry of the Interior. Is a member of the French Colonial Service, in which he holds the rank of "chef de bureau." Is liked by Syrian officials, but looked askance at by his compatriots on account of his, it is said, too hearty espousal of the Syrian cause. Both he and his wife were in the French espionage service during the war. For their assistance to British prisoners of war they were each made members of the Order of the British Empire. Untrustworthy. (May 1936.)

Huntziger, General.—Born in 1879. Is General de Corps d'Armée. Arrived in Beirut on the 13th April, 1934, to take up his post as Commander-in-chief of the French troops in the Levant. A colonial soldier who served with distinction on the staffs of the 24th Division and the IInd Army Corps in France and later in Salonica. He commanded the French Army Corps in China in 1924, became Inspector-General of Colonial Troops in 1928 and chief of the French military mission in Brazil in September 1930. Promoted major-general in 1933 and to his present rank in 1935. A smart, dapper figure, with a pleasant, open face and kindly smile. Generally liked. Married. (December 1935.)

Kieffer, Louis.—Born in 1899. A student of the Paris School of Oriental Languages, he failed to enter the French consular service. Was formerly employed in the commercial secretariat of the French Embassy in Moscow. Transferred to Beirut a few years ago and is now Acting Director of the Political Cabinet of the French High Commission. Writes poetry and lacks personality. Wife is a Russian. (December 1935.)

Lafond, Pierre.—Born in 1897. Belongs to the French consular service. Has been in the country since 1926; was previously in Tunis. Was first employed in the High Commission, then was French consul in Beirut before being transferred to Tripoli as delegate of the High Commissioner. Transferred to Beirut at the end of 1934 and appointed High Commissioner's delegate to the Lebanese Government. Is perhaps not a strong personality, but is socially very agreeable and generally liked. Married. (December 1935.)

Lagarde, Ernest.—Born about 1884. Secretary-General at the French High Commission. Is an official of the French diplomatic service and has served, amongst other places, in South America and with M. de Martel in the Far East, arriving in Beirut shortly after his chief. Will shortly leave for Paris, where he has been appointed Director of the Department dealing with League of Nations affairs with the rank of Minister Plenipotentiary, second-class. A broad-minded man of talent and charm, and generally liked. His one failing seems to be want of punctuality. Is a widower. (December 1935.)

De Martel, Damien, Joseph, Alfred, Charles (Count).—High Commissioner for the Levant States under French mandate. Born the 27th November, 1878. Appointed High Commissioner in July 1933 and arrived on the 12th October. He was previously French Ambassador in Tokyo. During the two years that M. de Martel has been High Commissioner he has endeavoured to persuade the inhabitants of these territories to cease dabbling in politics and to collaborate with him in trying to foster local well-being and progress by means of economic measures. Having suspended the Syrian Parliament shortly after his arrival, he has steadfastly refused to talk politics and has devoted most of his time to laying the foundations of an economic revival. Whilst he has received little or no help from the native element—they, in fact, bitterly opposed at least one of his plans—he has stuck to his purpose with silent determination and has allowed nothing to deter him from pursuing steadily a work which he is convinced—and rightly—will ultimately be to the good of the States confided to his care. M. de Martel possesses both ability and determination. He has, moreover, a sense of humour and can be sociable and agreeable when he likes. He unfortunately appears to have no hobby, and to relieve his "ennui" he frequents cafés and cabarets. He has also rather too openly thrown his cap at the feet of the Russian wife of a foreign consular official, and although it may only be a platonic friendship mingled with, on his part, a sense of protection, it has set numerous tongues wagging, and, in what is after all an oriental atmosphere, has not redounded to the good of his personal prestige and reputation. Speaks English. Mme. de Martel, who is a niece of Mme. Aimé de Fleriau, arrived here last winter. She is intensely keen on horse racing, and her colours are to be seen regularly at the weekly races. Mme. de Martel is enormously liked and finds life in Beirut agreeable. Speaks English perfectly. (December 1935.)

Noiret, General E.—Born about 1887. Arrived in Beirut in October 1935 as Brigadier-General Commanding the Troops in the Lebanon and Inspector-General of local native troops. (December 1935.)

Pechkoff, Commandant.—A Russian. Born about 1895. Said to be the son of Maxim Gorki. Was employed by the French in the Lebanon at the close of the war, but went to the Far East where he fell in with M. de Martel, who brought him back to Beirut when appointed High Commissioner, and gave him employment in his Military Cabinet. At the end of 1934, appointed Administrator of South Lebanon, with residence at Sidon. A pleasant person and seemingly capable. Married. (December 1935.)

Périer, Philippe.—Born in 1899. A member of the French consular service, the elder son of the late Jean Périer, formerly commercial attaché to the French Embassy in London and later French Minister in Mexico City. Posted to the French High Commission in 1930. Is now chief of the Bureau diplomatique and

thus the principal channel of communication with the High Commission. A quiet, pleasant and well-intentioned young man, but is somewhat over-worked. Partly educated in England and talks English fluently. Married. (December 1935.)

Reclus, O.—Born about 1882. Counsellor at the High Commission for Economic Affairs. Belongs to the Tunis Administration and holds the rank of assistant secretary-general in that service. Is a hard worker and appears to be capable, but he has a difficult situation to deal with, and thus has acquired the reputation of being stiff and difficult. Socially is most agreeable. Married. (December 1935.)

Rivet, Admiral Leon.—Born about 1885. Arrived in Beirut in July 1934 to take up his post as Rear-Admiral Commanding the Levant Naval Division. Served on the Inter-Allied Commission in Berlin after the war. A friendly, agreeable, and popular man. Speaks English. Married. (December 1935.)

Valluy, Claude.—Born 1892. Adviser to the Ministry of Finance. Has a great reputation among both French and Syrians as an administrator. Has made Syria his career. Betrothed to a Syrian-Christian lady from Aleppo. His first wife, who died last year, was from the Lebanon. A keen official who should, but may not, go far. (May 1936.)

Seyrig, Henri.—Born about 1897. An archaeologist. Came to Beirut in 1929 from the French school in Athens. Was also at New College, Oxford. Is Inspector-General of Archaeology. A pleasant and cultured man. Married. (December 1935.)

Vasselet, Paul.—Born about 1890. Is an official of the French Ministry of Public Works. Since 1921 has been employed in the High Commission and has risen to be Inspector-General of Public Works and Controller of Concessionary Societies (railways, transport, port, &c.), and thus wields great influence. Is unpopular with the native element, who accuse him of strangling local enterprise for the profit of the concessionary companies. Married. (December 1935.)

[E 5529/74/89]

No. 68.

Acting Consul-General Furlonge to Mr. Eden.—(Received September 2.)

(No. 84 E.)

Sir,

Beirut, August 27, 1936.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 77 E. of the 8th August regarding the customs duties levied on goods of Japanese origin imported into the French mandated territories of the Levant, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the text of Decree No. 167/LR of the 19th August,⁽¹⁾ which supersedes Decree No. 157/LR of the 3rd August and promulgates the Syro-Japanese commercial agreement of the 29th July last as from that date. The text of the notes exchanged between the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the Japanese Embassy at Paris, in which the terms of the agreement are laid down, is annexed to the decree.

2. Under the terms of the agreement, Japanese cotton yarns and piece-goods, and silk and rayon piece-goods, can only be exported to these territories under licences granted by the respective exporters' associations, under the control of the Japanese Government. The cost of these licences will be 3 per cent. *ad valorem* levied on the c.i.f. price of the goods exported. The proceeds of this levy will form a fund for the encouragement of imports of Syrian and Lebanese goods into Japan, the fund being distributed amongst the importers of such goods in accordance with the recommendations of a committee composed of representatives of the cotton and silk and rayon exporters' associations and of the importers concerned. Japanese goods will receive most-favoured-nation treatment in the French mandated territories, whose goods will receive similar treatment in Japan.

3. The agreement is valid for one year and will be tacitly assumed after this to be prolonged for further periods of one year at a time, in default of

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

denunciation by either party six months before the expiration of any yearly period.

4. The lines followed by the agreement had already been foreshadowed in local circles, and there is much criticism of the bad bargain which, it is considered, France has made for the mandated territories in order to reap benefits for herself in her own agreement with Japan. It is pointed out that no obligation is laid upon Japan to purchase Syrian or Lebanese goods, in return for the perpetual benefit of the normal customs tariff which she has gained for her own goods, and that it is the Syrian and Lebanese consumers of Japanese textiles who will be paying the extra 3 per cent. in return for the entirely hypothetical benefit to their own exports.

5. I am sending a copy of this despatch and enclosure to the Department of Overseas Trade and his Excellency the High Commissioner in Palestine, and without enclosure to His Majesty's consul at Aleppo and the acting consul at Damascus.

I have, &c.

G. W. FURLONGE.

[E 5884/688/89]

No. 69.

Mr. Morgan to Mr. Eden.—(Received September 17.)

(No. 474.)

Sir,

Istanbul, September 12, 1936.

I HAVE the honour, with reference to Sir Percy Loraine's despatch No. 198 of the 10th April, regarding the Turkish attitude towards Syrian affairs, to inform you that the Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs, in the course of conversation recently, told me that he had discussed with the President of the Turkish Republic, the Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the recently concluded Franco-Syrian Agreement.

2. Nuri Pasha stated that he found the Turks anxious that the Syrians should not insist on refusing home rule to Alexandretta; he had been asked to do what he could to see that the district of Alexandretta remained autonomous and was not absorbed in the Syrian State, and to use his influence with Syrian leaders to that end.

3. The Turkish press of to-day publish the news that the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs, in conversation with journalists who were seeing him off by steamer on his way to Geneva, expressed the hope that the Franco-Syrian Agreement would provide for local autonomy for Alexandretta and Antioch, of which the majority of a population of 280,000 persons, was described by Dr. Aras as being Turkish.

4. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's representatives at Paris and Bagdad, and to His Majesty's consul at Aleppo.

I have, &c.

JAMES MORGAN.

[E 6183/688/89]

No. 70.

Mr. Morgan to Mr. Eden.—(Received October 1.)

(No. 489.)

Sir,

Istanbul, September 26, 1936.

I HAVE the honour, with reference to my despatch No. 474 of the 12th September regarding the recently signed Franco-Syrian Agreement, to inform you that the whole local press is daily devoting a great deal of space to the future of Alexandretta and Antioch.

2. All the newspapers, while congratulating Syria on obtaining her independence, remind her that France, in 1921, took an engagement to grant local autonomy to the Alexandretta region, and to recognise the right of the

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Turkish population there to special treatment. The signature of the recent agreement does not release either France or Syria from that engagement. If any change is to be made in the status of the Sanjak of Alexandretta, it can only be done by agreement between Turkey, France and Syria. Turkey which dislikes the mandatory system will not view with any favour an attempt to substitute a Syrian mandate over Alexandretta and Antioch for a French one. Nor will Turkey be silent if Syria attempts to give the Turks in the autonomous sanjak "minority treatment." They are entitled, since 1921, to special treatment, and any whittling down of their rights would justify a demand on the part of the Turks of the sanjak for the intervention of the League of Nations or for the inclusion of the sanjak in the Turkish national boundaries, and its union to the motherland.

3. Indignation was worked up by the papers when a member of the Syrian delegation, which had halted for a time at Istanbul on its way from Paris to Syria, told reporters that Syria would give Alexandretta and Antioch the same treatment as France had given them. The newspapers pointed out that France had never kept her promises to Turkey about the Turks of the sanjak. Their life and culture had not been allowed to develop on Turkish lines. It was true that they had special schools, but these were staffed by Kurdish revolutionaries, Circassians, reactionary clerics and anachronistic supporters of obsolete alphabets. It was true, also, that they had school books from Turkey, but the picture of Atatürk had been removed from them. Syria must therefore not give the Turks of the sanjak the treatment which France had given them, but the treatment which France had been under obligation to give them. The Turks of the sanjak were looking forward to full local autonomy. If they are disappointed in this, or even—according to most of the newspapers—if they are not disappointed in this, they will look forward eagerly to the return of the sanjak to Turkey, and Turkey, on her side, will not be indifferent to their yearnings, nor unmindful of their rights.

4. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris and to His Majesty's consul at Aleppo.

I have, &c.

JAMES MORGAN.

[E 6468/195/89]

No. 71.

Consul Parr to Mr. Eden.—(Received October 13.)

(No. 53.)

Sir,

Aleppo, October 5, 1936.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 10 of the 10th March last, I have the honour to report that the Syrian delegation returned from Paris on Sunday, the 27th September, and the occasion was celebrated by the Nationalist party in Aleppo by elaborately staged demonstrations designed to advertise the solidarity and the spontaneity of nationalist sentiment in Northern Syria, and the organisation and discipline of the various bodies of private militia which have been brought into being here in the course of the last few months. On the whole, the spectacle was not particularly convincing from either point of view, but, to the credit of the organisers, it must be said that their time-table was followed without very great delays, and that they succeeded in bringing a very large number of villagers into Aleppo (perhaps between 30,000 and 40,000), and arranging for them to remain in the town for upwards of twenty-four hours without confusion or disorder.

2. It had been announced that the text of the treaty was to have been read at an open-air meeting in the course of the afternoon. For some reason or other this was not done. It was explained that all the accounts of the treaty which had been published in the press were misleading, and that the actual text would be issued simultaneously in France and in Syria on a date which was still to be determined.

3. So far as I can learn, only one allusion to Palestine was made in the course of the public addresses delivered here. A member of the delegation

pointed out that it was in the nature of things that a mandate would not be given up except under the threat of force, that Syria sympathised with Palestine, but that one drowning man could not hope to help another in like case before he had himself struggled to safety (not a very inspiring metaphor).

4. The salient fact of the present situation is the assumption that executive authority has already passed into the hands of the Nationalists. Police arrangements while the delegation was in Aleppo appeared to be very largely in their hands, and the actual police, although in evidence in the European quarters, were scarcely to be seen in other parts of the town. Since the days of the general strike last February the Nationalists had had their own organisation in the various quarters for dealing with local administrative matters. They have also established their own tribunal, to which are referred, in an increasing degree, civil disputes and complaints of any but the gravest crimes. No secret is made of their intention to boycott the native administration set up under the French mandate, and, indeed, there has been a certain amount of agitation in the local press to the effect that those Syrians who have accepted posts under the French should be penalised when independence is obtained. The Vali of Aleppo, for instance, was only invited to various functions on Sunday at the insistence of one of the members of the delegation, and, even so, was relegated to an obscure place. On the other hand, services to the cause of independence are to be generously rewarded. I have some reason to believe, for instance, that a man at present undergoing a sentence of penal servitude for the murder of a British subject in 1929 is being given special privileges by the native prison officers in view of his former services to the Nationalists, and was even allowed to go out in order to be present at the railway station when the delegation arrived from Paris. I have asked the French authorities to investigate this story, but there are various signs that their grip on the administration has weakened. The next few years, indeed, are likely to be very difficult from the point of view of a foreign consul. During the probationary period his official relations presumably will continue to be with the French, who themselves are likely to find the natives increasingly obstructive and recalcitrant. Subsequently he will have to deal direct with the natives, who will be in a position, for the first time, to give free play to their anti-European sentiment in any matters for complaint which may arise. That such matters will arise, will in fact be provoked, seems likely to any detached observer of developments; while the truculent bearing and immaturity of the private militia on which the Nationalists depend, and their exceedingly loose discipline, do not afford any great measure of comfort for the future.

5. I am sending copies of this despatch direct to the acting consul-general at Beirut and to the acting consul at Damascus.

I have, &c.

ROBERT PARR.

[E 6610/195/89]

No. 72.

Consul Parr to Mr. Eden.—(Received October 20.)

(No. 56.)

Sir,

Aleppo, October 13, 1936.

I HAVE the honour to report that on Sunday, the 11th October, a disquieting clash took place here between Moslems and Christians which has resulted in eight deaths and between 140 and 150 injuries. The disturbance arose in what is known as the Sunday market. There is more than one version of its occasion, but, on balance, the probability is that this was a dispute over the price of vegetables. (As I have reported elsewhere, retail prices in Aleppo have been advanced to figures which cannot be justified by the recent depreciation of the franc.) On the other hand, the Nationalists suggest that the genesis of the quarrel lay in the deliberate provocation by members of the "White Ensign" militia, a Christian body which has been brought into being as a reply to the "Steel-Shirts" militia which the Nationalist party itself maintains. They

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suggest also, in a manifesto circulated yesterday, that the authorities had connived at the disturbances, and talk in Nationalist and other native circles has been busy with the names of various political adventurers who might be supposed to derive personal advantage from a state of tension here. There is another rumour too, which would not be worth repeating were it not a striking instance of the political credulity here, which asserts that various French officials were privy to the business.

2. Unfortunately the disturbances have occurred at a time when practically the whole French garrison was away on manoeuvres, and no troops could be brought to the scene for a couple of hours. Dr. Khayali, the leader of the Nationalist party in Aleppo, despatched his "Steel-Shirts" to restore and maintain order, and it seems likely that his prompt intervention averted what might have been a serious massacre. He acted with decision and effectiveness, and it is a pity that the wording of the broad-sheet which he issued yesterday should be of a nature to modify the good impression made by his behaviour during the actual crisis.

3. On the whole the rioting, although unpleasant, may have a salutary effect. It is a striking index of the anti-Christian passions latent in this town, which various subsidiary incidents throw into stronger relief. On the day of the disturbances an Italian was stopped in a public place at some distance from the quarter where the fighting had taken place and asked what was his religion. On his replying that he was a Christian he was slashed across the face with a knife. On the Monday morning an Armenian coffee-house keeper, a harmless individual of no importance, was clubbed to death in the street, and there is a rumour which I have not been able to confirm, that there have been other instances of the same kind. Apparently, also, a disturbance between Christians and Moslems had taken place at Deir-ez-Zor three days earlier.

4. An unsuccessful attempt was made last night to blow up the house of a local politician reputed to have French sympathies, but it seems unlikely that the situation will become serious again in the near future. Troops are being brought back to Aleppo, and the moderate-minded on both sides are endeavouring to assuage the excitement.

5. I am sending copies of this despatch direct to the acting consul-general at Beirut and to His Majesty's consul at Damascus.

I have, &c.
ROBERT PARR.

[E 6898/1403/89]

No. 73.

Acting Consul-General Furlonge to Mr. Eden.—(Received November 3.)

(No. 97 E.)

Sir,

Beirut, October 22, 1936.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith a report on economic conditions in the Lebanon and Syria during the quarter ended the 30th June, 1936. I much regret the delay in despatching this report, which is due solely to the fact that the necessary statistical information was not issued by the Economic Section of the French High Commission until the 19th October.

2. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Department of Overseas Trade, his Excellency the High Commissioner for Palestine, His Majesty's consul at Damascus, and the acting consul at Aleppo.

I have, &c.
G. W. FURLONGE.

Enclosure in No. 73.

Economic Conditions in the Lebanon and Syria during the Quarter ended June 30, 1936.

I.—Finance.

THE budget situation of the different States on the 30th April, 1936, was as follows:—

State.	Revenue.	Expenditure.	Excess of—	
			Revenue.	Expenditure.
	£ Syrian.	£ Syrian.	£ Syrian.	£ Syrian.
Syria	1,102,405	1,225,556	...	123,151
Alexandretta	146,058	181,525	...	35,467
Djebel Druze	34,515	56,393	...	21,878
Alaouites (Lattakia)	251,821	218,305	33,516	...
Lebanon	1,016,646	896,482	120,164	...
	2,551,445	2,578,261	153,680	180,496

The state of the accounts of common interest on the 31st May, 1936, was as follows:—

	£ Syrian.
Receipts	2,977,120
Expenditure	2,951,803
Excess revenue	25,317

Customs receipts during the second quarter of 1936 were approximately £ Syrian 1,549,888, as compared with £ Syrian 1,726,986 (approximately) during the first quarter of 1936 and £ Syrian 1,924,595 (approximately) during the second quarter of 1935.

The value of the notes in circulation was as follows:—

	£ Syrian.
March 31	14,565,000
April 30	14,815,000
May 31	14,815,000
June 30	15,215,000

II.—Foreign Trade.

The foreign trade figures for the quarter show little decline on last year's, the decrease of trade with Palestine being to some extent compensated by good business in agricultural exports. They are as follows:—

	Second Quarter, 1936.		Second Quarter, 1935.	
	Quantity in Metric Tons.	Value in £ Syrian.	Quantity in Metric Tons.	Value in £ Syrian.
Imports	125,588	6,813,063	127,000	6,685,039
Exports	58,631	2,785,658	30,949	2,752,664

The four leading supplying countries were:—

	£ Syrian.
France, with imports valued at	1,175,361
United Kingdom, with imports valued at	761,730
Japan, with imports valued at	744,635
United States of America, with imports valued at	484,851

The five leading customers for exports were:—

	£ Syrian.
France	502,278
Palestine	1,140,117
Egypt	177,160
United States of America	168,349
United Kingdom	163,272

Re-exports totalled £ Syrian 83,562 during the quarter, as against £ Syrian 55,180 during the corresponding quarter of 1935.

The value of goods in transit totalled £ Syrian 2,100,304, as against £ Syrian 3,119,359 during the corresponding quarter of 1935. These figures, however, include the value of the oil pumped through the Iraq Petroleum Company's pipe-line to Tripoli, which amounted to £ Syrian 1,327,758, as against £ Syrian 2,306,133 in the second quarter of 1935, and thus accounted almost entirely for the drop. The four leading countries sending goods in transit were:—

	£ Syrian.
Iraq (including the oil, as above)	1,454,552
Turkey	175,035
United Kingdom	109,651
United States of America	99,080

while the four countries which took most of these goods were:—

	£ Syrian.
France	1,094,690
Iraq	348,036
Palestine	191,443
United Kingdom	145,940

The figures include 26,714 head of live-stock, which were imported from Iraq and Turkey and exported chiefly to Palestine.

The shipping visiting the principal Syrian ports was as follows:—

	Second Quarter, 1936.		Second Quarter, 1935.		First Quarter, 1936.	
	Number.	Total Tonnage.	Number.	Total Tonnage.	Number.	Total Tonnage.
Beirut	256	584,257	243	565,494	243	553,018
Tripoli	145	354,826	140	280,933	148	354,127
Alexandretta	86	126,899	76	110,914	77	120,438
Latakia	21	17,993	10	10,457	15	15,394

III.—Industry.

The troubles in Palestine adversely affected certain industries, especially in the Lebanon, which, deprived of this outlet for their products, found themselves obliged to accumulate stocks. This applied most severely to the Lebanese biscuit, jam and farinaceous food manufactures, which had to cut down their production by half, and less so to the Lebanese chocolate, sweetmeat, brush and scent manufactures. The Damour match factory produced 3 million boxes during the quarter, as against 4 million boxes during the preceding quarter; the Cheka cement factory maintained its production, but more with the idea of resuming exporting in the future than because of present demand. The Arida spinning factory at Tripoli was also affected, but hopes to be able to utilise its stocks in the weaving factory which it has recently added to its works.

Syrian industries were less affected, and some of them, notably the artificial silk weaving industry, were able to increase their output in preparation for the Damascus Fair.

IV.—Commerce.

The reopening of the Syrian markets towards the end of March, after the fifty-day strike, brought little benefit to local merchants, as it almost coincided

with the outbreak of the serious troubles in Palestine, which endured throughout the quarter under review. The resulting impediment to Syro-Lebanese trade with Palestine caused heavy losses to the merchants, which were aggravated by the non-payment as they fell due of many bills on Palestinian merchants. The Damascus Fair also proved disappointing; few Egyptians or Palestinians came, and native visitors, though numerous, placed few orders.

Some compensation came from the unusually heavy demand from overseas for Syrian cereals, vegetables and oil which began to be felt during the quarter. By the end of June the prices of maize and durra had risen by 15 per cent. and that of other products was also beginning to rise.

The summer season in the Lebanese hill stations showed signs of suffering from the Palestine situation, and up to the end of June only 1,313 visitors had arrived, as against 1,898 in the corresponding period of 1935.

V.—Agriculture.

Weather conditions this year have been, on the whole, unfavourable. In the coastal region the subnormal rainfall of the first quarter of the year was followed by exceptionally heavy rains in May, which affected winter crops, especially cereals, and favoured the spread of insect pests. The Lebanese wheat harvest was expected to be 20 per cent. below the estimate. In the interior the rainfall has been throughout below normal, and at the end of the quarter the harvest seemed likely to be below the average. The Hauran, Jebel Druze and Damascus districts (where not irrigated) in particular suffered from lack of rain, and the situation in the first-named, where winter crops had given practically no yield, had become grave by the end of June. Northern Syria and the Homs and Hama districts had suffered less, and the Euphrates and Jezira regions had developed excellently. Fruit crops promised well throughout, and the silkworm industry, favoured in the Alaouites and in Syria by the remission of the "dime" tax on silk, has been satisfactory. Live-stock have benefited from the good pasturage produced by the late and heavy May rains.

The areas under seed and the estimated yield of the more important crops are as follows:—

	1936.		1935.	
	Area in Hectares.	Estimated Yield in Quintals.	Area in Hectares.	Estimated Yield in Quintals.
Lebanon—				
Wheat	66,900	250,000	67,500	300,000
Barley	32,000	260,000	32,000	280,000
Potatoes	4,700	280,000	4,400	265,000
Syria (Southern)—				
Wheat	150,300	1,100,000	144,800	1,875,000
Barley	98,200	1,000,000	81,200	1,478,000
Alaouites—				
Wheat	50,000	275,000	47,000	250,000
Barley	26,000	190,000	25,000	200,000
Jebel Druze—				
Wheat	54,560	100,000	51,550	150,000
Barley	36,000	50,000	29,890	65,000
Alexandretta—				
Wheat	31,000	300,000	31,000	240,000
Euphrates and Jezira—				
Wheat	84,400	1,200,000	71,380	1,024,820
Barley	31,050	500,000	29,700	445,900
Sorgho	18,750	...	18,105	160,650

Up to the 31st May, 1936, exports of lemons and oranges since the 1st September, 1935, amounted to 235,954 and 95,249 cases respectively, totals only surpassed in 1930. It is doubted whether markets will be found for so great an exportation next season, though hopes are entertained that the Spanish troubles will increase the demand for Lebanese oranges.

VI.—Public Works.

The work of enlarging the port of Beirut was restarted in the spring. The levelling of the new Beirut aerodrome proceeds apace, the earth extracted being conveyed by light railway to the port and used in the work there. Tripoli aerodrome is already in use, and it was hoped in September to start the construction of a taking-off track 600 metres in length and 40 metres wide. The irrigation works in the Homs district are proceeding satisfactorily, and the draining of the Amouk marshes is being carried out by the removal, now partially completed, of barrages which had accumulated across the bed of the Orontes. Operations are also being started on the Jebel salt-lake, south-east of Aleppo, with a view to substituting scientific salt extraction for the native processes formerly employed.

Beirut, October 22, 1936.

[E 6753/195/89]

No. 74.

Acting Consul-General Furlonge to Mr. Eden.—(Received October 28.)

(No. 98.)

Sir,

Beirut, October 23, 1936.

I HAVE the honour to report that the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies met last week for the purpose of considering the forthcoming Franco-Lebanese treaty negotiations, and after some discussion elected a delegation of seven persons to represent them. The delegation comprised members of all the principal religious communities of the Lebanon. Notable amongst them was Bechara-el-Khoury, the unsuccessful candidate for the Lebanese presidency at the last election and the leader of the official Opposition, who had recently staged a reconciliation with President Eddé for the avowed purpose of defending Lebanese independence against the real or imagined threat of absorption in the Syrian Republic.

2. The French negotiators consist of the High Commissioner, the Secretary-General, two members of the High Commissioner's secretariat and an officer specially detached by the French War Office for the purpose.

3. Negotiations began on the 20th October, and the Lebanese delegation seem confident that the terms of the treaty will be agreed and initialled within a fortnight. The general impression appears to be that the treaty will then be presented to, and ratified by, the Lebanese Chamber as at present constituted, and that there is a strong probability that the process will be complete by the 15th November, *i.e.*, well before the expected ratification of the Franco-Syrian treaty.

4. This surprisingly speedy development in the situation appears to be due entirely to Lebanese fears of the design, which they believe the Syrian nationalists to harbour, of by some means securing the incorporation of the Lebanon, or at least that part of it (including Tripoli) which was added to it in 1920, in the new Syrian State. The local politicians seem to feel that they must at all costs secure the consolidation of the independent status of the Lebanon as it exists at present before the Syrian State comes into being. The two difficulties adverted to in my despatch No. 69 of the 20th July, namely, the lack of constitutional basis for the present Chamber, and the latent opposition of the Lebanese Moslems to separation from Syria, still subsist; lawyers are already questioning the competency of the provisional Chamber elected by virtue of the High Commissioner's decree No. 1/LR of the 2nd January, 1934, to conclude so far-reaching a measure as the treaty, while a strong Moslem deputation was received by the High Commissioner on the day before the negotiations started, and protested that the negotiating Lebanese delegation did not represent the Lebanese Moslems, who desired unity with Syria; but, so far as can be seen at present, it seems likely that the general urge for haste will suffice to brush these objections aside. The deputation, at any rate, received short shrift from the High Commissioner, who is stated to have replied that the Lebanese negotiators were fully representative, and that the French Government were determined to honour its oft-repeated engagement to maintain the territorial integrity of the Lebanon.

5. I am sending copies of this despatch to his Excellency the High Commissioner for Palestine, to His Majesty's consul at Damascus and to the acting consul at Aleppo.

I have, &c.

G. W. FURLONGE.

[E 6949/195/89]

No. 75.

Mr. Lloyd Thomas to Mr. Eden.—(Received November 5.)

(No. 1416.)

HIS Majesty's representative at Paris presents his compliments to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit to him a copy of a memorandum from the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs, dated the 30th October, 1936, enclosing a copy of the draft text of the Franco-Syrian Treaty Settlement, initialled at Paris on the 9th September, 1936.

Paris, November 3, 1936.

Enclosure in No. 75.

Memorandum from the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

L'AMBASSADE de Grande-Bretagne a bien voulu demander au Ministère des Affaires étrangères communication du projet de traité franco-syrien d'amitié et d'alliance dont le texte a été signé à Paris le 9 septembre dernier.

Déférant au désir ainsi exprimé le Ministère a l'honneur de remettre sous ce pli à l'Ambassade le document dont il s'agit, qui vient d'être rendu public.

Paris, le 30 octobre 1936.

Draft Text of the Franco-Syrian Treaty, initialled in Paris, September 9, 1936.

PROCÈS-VERBAL.

La délégation française et la délégation syrienne, après avoir examiné en commun, conformément à l'accord du 1^{er} mars 1936, les diverses questions relatives à l'établissement d'un traité d'amitié et d'alliance entre la France et la Syrie, sur les bases de complète liberté, souveraineté et indépendance, ont arrêté, à la suite des négociations poursuivies à Paris, les termes des documents ci-joints qui constituent le texte du Traité d'Amitié et d'Alliance et de ses annexes, soit :

- 1 convention militaire,
- 5 protocoles,
- 11 échanges de lettres.

Ce texte sera soumis à la ratification du Parlement syrien par le Gouvernement de la République syrienne aussitôt qu'un Gouvernement parlementaire aura été constitué en Syrie.

Fait à Paris, en deux exemplaires, le 9 septembre 1936.

P. VIENOT.
D. DE MARTEL.

HACHEM ATASSI.
F. KHOURY.
JAMIL MARDAM BEY.
SAADALLAH-EL-DJABRY.
M. CHAHABAI.
HOMSY.

Traité d'Amitié et d'Alliance entre la France et la Syrie.

Le Gouvernement de la République française et le Gouvernement de la République syrienne,

Vu l'intention exprimée par le Gouvernement français devant la Société des Nations de conclure, en tenant compte de l'évolution déjà accomplie, un traité avec le Gouvernement syrien;

Considérant les progrès réalisés dans la voie de l'affermissement de la Syrie comme nation indépendante;

Vu l'accord des deux Gouvernements pour réaliser, suivant un programme bien précisé, toutes conditions propres à assurer l'admission de la Syrie à la Société des Nations, dans un délai de trois ans, à dater des formalités de ratification,

Ont convenu à cet effet de conclure un traité d'amitié et d'alliance pour définir, sur les bases de complète liberté, souveraineté et indépendance, les relations qui subsisteront entre les deux Etats après la cessation du mandat, et d'en fixer, dans les conventions, protocoles, et lettres annexes qui font partie intégrante du traité, les conditions et modalités d'application.

A cette fin, son Excellence le Président de la République française et son Excellence le Président de la République syrienne, ont délégué comme leurs plénipotentiaires:

qui, s'étant communiqué leurs pouvoirs et les ayant trouvés en due forme, ont conclu ce qui suit:

ARTICLE 1^{er}.

Il y aura paix et amitié perpétuelles entre la France et la Syrie.

Une alliance est établie entre les deux Etats indépendants et souverains en consécration de leur amitié et des liens qui les unissent pour la défense de la paix et la sauvegarde de leurs intérêts communs.

ARTICLE 2.

En toute matière de politique étrangère de nature à affecter leurs communs intérêts, les deux Gouvernements conviennent de se consulter pleinement et sans réserve.

Au regard des Puissances étrangères, ils s'engagent à adopter une attitude conforme à leur alliance et à éviter toute action de nature à compromettre leurs relations avec les autres Puissances.

Chaque Gouvernement accréditera auprès de l'autre un représentant diplomatique.

ARTICLE 3.

Les deux hautes parties contractantes prendront toutes mesures utiles pour assurer, au jour de la cessation du mandat, le transfert au seul Gouvernement syrien des droits et obligations résultant de tous traités, conventions et autres actes internationaux conclus par le Gouvernement français en ce qui concerne la Syrie ou en son nom.

ARTICLE 4.

Au cas où un différend entre la Syrie et un Etat tiers engendrerait une situation de nature à créer un risque de rupture avec cet Etat, les deux Gouvernements se concerteraient en vue du règlement du différend par les voies pacifiques, conformément aux stipulations du Pacte de la Société des Nations ou de toute autre convention internationale applicable à un tel cas.

Si malgré les mesures prévues au paragraphe précédent l'une des hautes parties contractantes se trouvait engagée dans un conflit, l'autre haute partie contractante lui prêterait immédiatement appui en qualité d'alliée. En cas de menace imminente de guerre, les hautes parties contractantes se concerteraient immédiatement pour prendre les mesures de défense nécessaires. L'aide du Gouvernement syrien consistera à fournir au Gouvernement français sur territoire syrien toutes facilités et toute assistance en son pouvoir, y compris l'usage des voies ferrées, cours d'eau, ports, aérodromes, plans d'eau et autres moyens de communication.

ARTICLE 5.

La responsabilité du maintien de l'ordre en Syrie et celle de la défense du territoire incombent au Gouvernement syrien.

Le Gouvernement français accepte de prêter son concours militaire à la Syrie pendant la durée du traité suivant les prévisions de la convention annexe.

En vue de faciliter au Gouvernement français l'exécution des obligations qui lui incombent aux termes de l'article précédent du présent traité, le Gouvernement syrien reconnaît que le maintien permanent et la protection en toutes circonstances des voies de transit aérien du Gouvernement français qui empruntent le territoire syrien, sont dans l'intérêt de l'alliance.

ARTICLE 6.

Le présent traité est conclu pour une durée de vingt-cinq ans.

Les conventions et accords annexes d'application auront la même durée que le traité lui-même, à moins qu'une durée moindre ne soit stipulée dans l'acte, ou à moins que les hautes parties contractantes ne soient d'accord pour les reviser afin de tenir compte des situations nouvelles.

Les négociations pour le renouvellement ou la modification du traité seront ouvertes, si, à partir de la vingtième année de son application, un des deux Gouvernements le demande.

ARTICLE 7.

Le présent traité sera ratifié et l'échange des ratifications effectué aussitôt que possible.

Il sera communiqué à la Société des Nations.

Ce traité entrera en vigueur, en même temps que les conventions et accords annexes, au jour de l'admission de la Syrie à la Société des Nations.

ARTICLE 8.

Dès l'entrée en vigueur du présent traité, le Gouvernement français sera déchargé des responsabilités et obligations qui lui incombent, en ce qui concerne la Syrie, du fait tant de décisions internationales que d'actes de la Société des Nations.

Ces responsabilités et obligations, dans la mesure où elles subsisteraient, seront automatiquement transférées au Gouvernement syrien.

ARTICLE 9.

Le présent traité est rédigé en français et en arabe; ces deux textes sont officiels, le texte français faisant foi.

Au cas où une contestation s'élèverait au sujet de l'interprétation ou de l'application de ce traité, et où cette contestation n'aurait pu être réglée définitivement par voie de négociation directe, les hautes parties contractantes conviennent de recourir aux procédures de conciliation et d'arbitrage prévues par le Pacte de la Société des Nations.

Fait à Damas, en quadruple exemplaire, le

Convention militaire.

ARTICLE 1^{er}.

Le Gouvernement syrien, se substituant aux autorités françaises, prend sous sa responsabilité les forces militaires constituées, avec les charges et les obligations y afférentes.

ARTICLE 2.

Les forces armées syriennes doivent comprendre au minimum une division d'infanterie, une brigade de cavalerie et les services correspondants.

ARTICLE 3.

Le Gouvernement français s'engage à accorder au Gouvernement de la République syrienne, à sa demande, les facilités ci-après, les dépenses devant en incomber au Gouvernement syrien :

(a) Mise à la disposition du Gouvernement syrien d'une mission militaire pour son armée, sa gendarmerie, sa marine ou son aviation militaire.

Le rôle, la composition et le statut de la mission seront déterminés d'accord entre les deux Gouvernements avant l'entrée en vigueur du traité d'alliance.

Etant donné qu'il serait désirable que l'entraînement et l'instruction fussent identiques dans les armées des deux hautes parties contractantes, le Gouvernement syrien s'engage à n'engager que des Français en qualité d'instructeurs et de spécialistes.

Les instructeurs ou spécialistes seraient demandés au Gouvernement français et relèveraient, au point de vue de l'administration et de la discipline générale, du chef de la mission militaire.

Les officiers de la mission militaire française pourront être appelés à exercer temporairement un commandement effectif dans les forces armées syriennes, sur demande adressée au représentant du Gouvernement français et agréée par lui. Dans ce cas, ces officiers relèveront du commandement normal de l'unité à laquelle ils seront affectés pour tout ce qui touche à l'exercice du commandement qui leur est confié.

(b) Envoi dans les écoles, centres d'instruction et corps de troupes français et à bord des bâtiments de guerre français de tout le personnel des forces armées syriennes que le Gouvernement syrien aura jugé nécessaire de faire instruire en dehors de la Syrie, étant entendu toutefois que le Gouvernement syrien conserverait la liberté d'envoyer dans quelque autre pays les membres de ce personnel que les écoles et centres d'instruction français précités ne seraient pas en mesure d'accueillir.

ARTICLE 4.

Pour faciliter l'exécution des obligations de l'alliance, le Gouvernement syrien adoptera pour ses forces armées un armement, un matériel et, dans la mesure nécessaire, un équipement du même modèle que ceux en usage dans les forces armées françaises.

Le Gouvernement français accordera toutes facilités au Gouvernement syrien pour que ce dernier puisse assurer en France la fourniture aux forces armées syriennes des armes, munitions, navires, avions, matériel et équipement du modèle le plus récent.

ARTICLE 5.

En vue de répondre aux dispositions du troisième alinéa de l'article 5 du traité, le Gouvernement syrien s'engage à mettre pour la durée de l'alliance à la disposition du Gouvernement français des emplacements pour deux bases aériennes.

Ces emplacements seront choisis par le Gouvernement français, en des points dont l'éloignement des quatre grandes villes ne saurait être inférieur à 40 kilom. environ.

Provisoirement, le Gouvernement français est autorisé à utiliser comme bases les aérodromes de Nérab et Mezzé. Le transfert aux nouveaux emplacements s'effectuera dès que les nouvelles bases auront été aménagées dans les mêmes conditions de construction et d'équipement que les anciennes, qui deviendront la propriété du Gouvernement syrien, à charge pour ce Gouvernement de supporter les frais de cette opération.

Indépendamment de ces bases et en attendant que les forces aériennes syriennes soient en mesure d'assumer la charge de l'entretien des terrains d'atterrissage actuellement équipés, le Gouvernement français accepte d'apporter son concours à l'entretien de ces terrains, étant entendu que ce concours ne porte aucune atteinte aux droits de propriété du Gouvernement syrien sur ceux-ci.

Le Gouvernement syrien s'engage à fournir, à la demande et aux frais du Gouvernement français et aux conditions qui feront l'objet d'un accord entre les hautes parties contractantes, des gardes spéciaux, pris dans ses propres troupes, qui coopéreront avec les forces françaises chargées d'assurer la sécurité, l'équipement et l'entretien des bases aériennes et avec les spécialistes des forces aériennes

françaises provisoirement affectés à l'équipement et à l'entretien des terrains d'atterrissage susvisés.

Le Gouvernement français consent à maintenir des troupes au Djebel-Druze et aux Alaouites pour une durée de cinq années à compter de l'entrée en vigueur du traité.

Les points de stationnement de ces troupes seront définis par un accord entre les deux Gouvernements.

Le Gouvernement syrien laissera à la disposition du Commandement français, qui en assumera l'entretien et l'instruction, les unités stationnées dans ces régions; il facilitera le recrutement des éléments locaux nécessaires pour assurer le maintien de ces effectifs.

Il est spécifié que le maintien des forces françaises en ces divers points ne constitue pas une occupation et ne porte pas atteinte aux droits souverains de la Syrie.

ARTICLE 6.

Le Gouvernement syrien accordera toutes facilités possibles pour l'entretien, l'instruction, les déplacements, les transports et les communications des forces françaises, soit autour des points où elles stationnent, soit en transit entre ces points, ainsi que pour le transport, l'emmagasinage de tous les approvisionnements et équipements nécessaires à ces forces. Ces facilités comprennent l'usage des routes, chemins de fer, voies navigables, ports, quais, aérodromes, plans d'eau, le droit de survol et l'utilisation des réseaux télégraphiques, téléphoniques et radiotélégraphiques. En aucun cas, il ne pourra être établi de tarif de discrimination à l'encontre du Gouvernement français.

Les navires de guerre français auront licence générale de pénétrer et de séjourner dans les eaux syriennes et de visiter les ports syriens, étant entendu que le Gouvernement syrien recevra notification préalable des visites aux ports syriens.

Le Gouvernement syrien mettra à la disposition du Gouvernement français tous emplacements et locaux nécessaires aux besoins des forces françaises.

Les modalités d'application de cette disposition, ainsi que les différentes questions relatives tant au domaine militaire français qu'à celui dont il a l'usufruit, feront l'objet d'accords particuliers. L'exécution de ces accords ne devra entraîner pour le Gouvernement français aucune aggravation des charges actuellement existantes.

ARTICLE 7.

En exécution de l'article 5 du Traité d'Alliance et sous réserve des modifications que les hautes parties contractantes conviendraient d'y apporter par la suite, le Gouvernement syrien s'engage à assurer aux forces françaises et aux militaires ou marins français isolés ainsi qu'aux employés civils français et leurs familles se trouvant sur le territoire syrien en vertu de l'alliance, les privilèges et immunités dont ces militaires, marins et civils jouissaient en Syrie lors de l'entrée en vigueur de la présente convention.

ARTICLE 8.

Le Gouvernement syrien s'engage à reprendre, à entretenir et à garder les terrains d'aviation créés par l'autorité française en Syrie, à la date d'entrée en vigueur du Traité d'Alliance, ou ceux dont la création serait jugée nécessaire, par les hautes parties contractantes, à la sécurité aérienne (en dehors des établissements et terrains mentionnés à l'article 5); les conditions de reprise feront l'objet d'accords particuliers.

Les aéronefs des forces françaises auront, d'une façon générale, le droit de survol du territoire syrien, sous réserve de l'observation des mêmes règles de circulation qu'en France, en particulier en ce qui concerne le survol des agglomérations et lieux de réunion fréquentés. Ils auront la jouissance des terrains d'aviation et plans d'eau du territoire syrien. Le Gouvernement français pourra conserver ou créer sur ces terrains des installations dont l'établissement et l'entretien seront à sa charge.

Le Gouvernement français pourra confier les magasins et ateliers conservés ou créés à des spécialistes des forces aériennes détachés à cet effet.
Toutes facilités seront accordées par le Gouvernement syrien pour l'entretien de ces établissements et de leur personnel.

Echange de Lettres No. 1.

Le Président du Conseil de la République syrienne au Haut-Commissaire de la République française.

En me référant à l'article 1^{er} de la Convention militaire, j'ai l'honneur de faire savoir à votre Excellence que le Gouvernement syrien considère les droits acquis par les officiers, sous-officiers et militaires syriens des troupes spéciales comme faisant partie des charges et obligations visées par cet article.

Le Haut-Commissaire de la République française au Président du Conseil de la République syrienne.

Se référant à l'article 1^{er} de la Convention militaire, votre Excellence a bien voulu me faire connaître par une lettre en date de ce jour que le Gouvernement syrien considère les droits acquis par les officiers, sous-officiers et militaires syriens des troupes spéciales comme faisant partie des charges et obligations visées par cet article.

J'ai l'honneur de prendre acte de cette obligeante communication.

Protocole No. 1.

Se référant à l'article 7 de la Convention militaire, les hautes parties contractantes sont d'accord pour décider de fixer, avant l'entrée en vigueur du traité et en se conformant aux arrangements intervenus dans des circonstances similaires, les privilèges et immunités auxquels se réfère l'article susvisé.

Echange de Lettres No. 2.

Le Président du Conseil de la République syrienne au Haut-Commissaire de la République française.

Comme suite au traité signé en date de ce jour, j'ai l'honneur de porter à la connaissance de votre Excellence qu'en considération de l'amitié et de l'alliance étroite existant entre nos deux pays, le Gouvernement syrien recrutera en France les conseillers techniques, magistrats et fonctionnaires étrangers dont il jugera utile la présence en Syrie.

Le Haut-Commissaire de la République française au Président du Conseil de la République syrienne.

Par une lettre en date de ce jour, votre Excellence a bien voulu me faire connaître les intentions du Gouvernement syrien relativement à l'emploi de fonctionnaires étrangers en Syrie. J'ai l'honneur de prendre acte de cette obligeante communication.

Echange de Lettres No. 3.

Le Président du Conseil de la République syrienne au Haut-Commissaire de la République française.

Me référant à l'article 2 du traité que nous avons signé à la date de ce jour, j'ai l'honneur de faire savoir à votre Excellence que le Gouvernement syrien demande au Gouvernement français de bien vouloir assurer la protection des

ressortissants et des intérêts syriens, conformément aux usages internationaux suivis en ces matières, partout où le Gouvernement syrien ne serait pas directement représenté.

Le Haut-Commissaire de la République française au Président du Conseil de la République syrienne.

Répondant à la lettre de votre Excellence en date de ce jour, j'ai l'honneur de lui faire savoir que pour accéder au désir exprimé par le Gouvernement syrien et conformément aux usages internationaux suivis en ces matières, le Gouvernement français acceptera volontiers d'assurer la protection des ressortissants et des intérêts syriens, partout où le Gouvernement syrien ne serait pas directement représenté.

Echange de Lettres No. 4.

Le Haut-Commissaire de la République française au Président du Conseil de la République syrienne.

En me référant à l'article 2 du traité que nous avons signé en date de ce jour, j'ai l'honneur de porter à la connaissance de votre Excellence que le représentant diplomatique du Gouvernement de la République française en Syrie aura qualité d'Ambassadeur.

Le Président du Conseil de la République syrienne au Haut-Commissaire de la République française.

En réponse à votre lettre en date de ce jour, j'ai l'honneur de faire savoir à votre Excellence que le Gouvernement syrien, désireux de marquer sa satisfaction à la suite de la nomination du représentant de la République française en qualité de premier Ambassadeur en Syrie, décide que son rang de préséance par rapport aux représentants des autres Puissances restera conféré à ses successeurs.

Le Gouvernement syrien tient, à cette occasion, à porter à la connaissance de votre Excellence que le représentant diplomatique de la Syrie auprès du Gouvernement de la République française aura rang de Ministre plénipotentiaire pendant la durée du présent traité.

Echange de Lettres No. 5.

Le Président du Conseil de la République syrienne au Haut-Commissaire de la République française.

J'ai l'honneur de confirmer à votre Excellence que le Gouvernement syrien assurera le maintien des garanties de droit public stipulées dans la constitution syrienne en faveur des individus et des communautés et donnera plein effet à ces garanties.

Le Haut-Commissaire de la République française au Président du Conseil de la République syrienne.

Par une lettre en date de ce jour, vous avez bien voulu me confirmer que le Gouvernement syrien assurera le maintien des garanties de droit public stipulées dans la constitution syrienne en faveur des individus et des communautés et donnera plein effet à ces garanties.

J'ai l'honneur d'accuser réception de cette obligeante communication et de remercier votre Excellence des assurances qu'elle contient.

Echange de Lettres No. 6.

Le Haut-Commissaire de la République française au Président du Conseil de la République syrienne.

J'ai l'honneur de communiquer ci-joint à votre Excellence le texte des Arrêtés Nos. et en date du portant transfert au Gouvernement syrien des prérogatives de souveraineté sur les territoires de Lattaquieh et du Djebel-Druze et établissant le régime spécial administratif et financier de ces territoires.

Ces textes donnent effet à l'accord intervenu à Paris en ce qui concerne, tant le rattachement de ces deux territoires à l'Etat de Syrie, que l'opportunité de maintenir à ces mêmes territoires un régime spécial administratif et financier conformément aux principes définis par la Société des Nations.

Le Haut-Commissaire de la République française,

Vu l'Acte de Mandat du 24 juillet 1922;

Vu le décret du 23 novembre 1920 fixant les pouvoirs du Haut-Commissaire;

Vu le décret du

Attendu qu'un accord a été réalisé à Paris entre le Gouvernement français et la délégation qui avait été chargée d'établir les bases d'un traité à intervenir entre la France et la Syrie;

Attendu que cet accord comporte le transfert au Gouvernement syrien des prérogatives de souveraineté dont l'exercice avait été réservé au Haut-Commissaire par l'Arrêté No. 3113 du 14 mai 1930 et la définition des modalités du régime spécial en matière administrative et financière que le Gouvernement syrien entend assurer au territoire de Lattaquieh, conformément aux principes définis par la Société des Nations;

Arrête :

Article 1^{er}. Le territoire de Lattaquieh fait partie de l'Etat de Syrie.

Art. 2. Ce territoire bénéficie, au sein de l'Etat de Syrie, d'un régime spécial administratif et financier dont les modalités sont définies dans le règlement ci-annexé.

Art. 3. Sous la réserve des dispositions de ce règlement, le territoire de Lattaquieh est régi par la constitution, les lois et les règlements généraux de la République syrienne.

Art. 4. Le présent arrêté et le règlement y annexé entreront en vigueur en lieu et place des textes régissant antérieurement ces matières, dès ratification du traité franco-syrien.

Le Haut-Commissaire de la République française,

Vu l'Acte de Mandat du 24 juillet 1922;

Vu le décret du 23 novembre 1920 fixant les pouvoirs du Haut-Commissaire;

Vu le décret du

Attendu qu'un accord a été réalisé à Paris entre le Gouvernement français et la délégation qui avait été chargée d'établir les bases d'un traité à intervenir entre la France et la Syrie;

Attendu que cet accord comporte le transfert au Gouvernement syrien des prérogatives de souveraineté dont l'exercice avait été réservé au Haut-Commissaire par l'Arrêté No. 3114 du 14 mai 1930 et la définition des modalités du régime spécial en matière administrative et financière que le Gouvernement syrien entend assurer au territoire du Djebel-Druze conformément aux principes définis par la Société des Nations;

Arrête :

Article 1^{er}. Le territoire du Djebel-Druze fait partie de l'Etat de Syrie.

Art. 2. Ce territoire bénéficie, au sein de l'Etat de Syrie, d'un régime spécial administratif et financier dont les modalités sont définies dans le règlement ci-annexé.

Art. 3. Sous la réserve des dispositions de ce règlement, le territoire du Djebel-Druze est régi par la constitution, les lois et les règlements généraux de la République syrienne.

Art. 4. Le présent arrêté et le règlement y annexé entreront en vigueur en lieu et place des textes régissant antérieurement ces matières, dès ratification du Traité franco-syrien.

Nota bene.

Il est entendu que le régime spécial administratif et financier visé à l'article 2 des projets ci-dessus sera celui dont bénéficie actuellement le Sandjak d'Alexandrette.

Il est constaté toutefois que le texte de l'article 8 du Règlement organique du Sandjak d'Alexandrette est établi en fonction d'un mode de gestion appelé à être modifié et que l'article susvisé doit être réadapté pour faire apparaître les prérogatives du Gouvernement syrien en ce qui touche les recettes et dépenses auxquelles cet article se réfère.

Il est constaté que, bien que le régime dont bénéficient actuellement les Gouvernements de Lattaquieh et du Djebel-Druze soit analogue à celui que définit l'article 8 susvisé, les Règlements organiques de ces deux Gouvernements ne comprennent pas de dispositions correspondant à cet article.

En conséquence, il est entendu que, pour réserver l'avenir, le règlement à annexer à l'arrêté ci-dessus ne comportera pas d'article correspondant à l'article 8 du règlement du sandjak.

D'autre part, le texte correspondant au troisième alinéa de l'article 4 du Sandjak d'Alexandrette s'inspirera de la rédaction suivante :

"2. Les sommes attribuées à titre de répartition de surplus des recettes figurant actuellement au compte de gestion, après défalcation des dépenses générales intéressant l'ensemble de l'Etat de Syrie et prises en charge par le budget général de la République syrienne."

Le Président du Conseil de la République syrienne au Haut-Commissaire de la République française.

Par une lettre en date de ce jour, votre Excellence a bien voulu me communiquer le texte des Arrêtés Nos. et en

date du portant transfert au Gouvernement syrien des prérogatives de souveraineté sur les territoires de Lattaquieh et du Djebel-Druze et établissant le régime spécial administratif et financier de ces territoires.

J'ai l'honneur de faire savoir à votre Excellence que le Gouvernement syrien, après avoir pris connaissance de ces textes, les estime conformes à l'accord intervenu à Paris en ce qui touche ces matières.

Protocole No. 2.

Les hautes parties contractantes constatent leur accord sur les points suivants :

Afin de préparer le transfert au Gouvernement syrien des pouvoirs de législation et de gestion actuellement exercés par le représentant de la France, pour le compte de la Syrie, en matières économiques et financières, le Gouvernement syrien est prêt à entrer en négociations dès la ratification du Traité franco-syrien pour régler les questions pendantes entre la Syrie et le Liban.

Le Gouvernement français pour sa part est prêt à assurer le transfert susvisé conformément à tout règlement résultant de ces négociations.

Au cas où le règlement ne comporterait ni existence d'un organe commun à la Syrie et au Liban, ni modalités de collaboration entre les administrations syriennes et libanaises, le Gouvernement syrien n'établira pas, à l'encontre du Liban, sous condition de réciprocité, de régime discriminatoire par rapport aux autres Etats détachés de l'ancien empire ottoman.

En cas d'absence d'organe commun, le Gouvernement français transférera directement au Gouvernement syrien les pouvoirs de législation et de gestion actuellement exercés par le représentant de la France, pour le compte de la Syrie, en matières économiques et financières.

Echange de Lettres No. 7.

Le Président du Conseil de la République syrienne au Haut-Commissaire de la République française.

J'ai l'honneur de porter à la connaissance de votre Excellence que le Gouvernement syrien est disposé à conserver aux établissements d'enseignement, d'assistance et de bienfaisance étrangers, ainsi qu'aux missions de recherches archéologiques, le bénéfice du régime actuel des œuvres et des antiquités.

Le Haut-Commissaire de la République française au Président du Conseil de la République syrienne.

Par une lettre en date de ce jour, votre Excellence a bien voulu me faire connaître les intentions du Gouvernement syrien relativement au régime des œuvres et des antiquités en Syrie.

J'ai l'honneur de prendre acte de cette obligeante communication.

Protocole No. 3.

Les hautes parties contractantes s'engagent à négocier, dès ratification du Traité franco-syrien, une convention universitaire.

Echange de Lettres No. 8.

Le Président du Conseil de la République syrienne au Haut-Commissaire de la République française.

Au moment où les relations avec la France vont être réglées par un traité d'amitié et d'alliance, j'ai l'honneur de porter à la connaissance de votre Excellence que, sous réserve des modifications qui seraient apportées, d'accord entre les hautes parties contractantes, pour tenir compte des conditions économiques et financières existant en Syrie, aux concessions et conventions intéressant les finances de l'Etat ou des collectivités publiques, le Gouvernement syrien s'engage à respecter les droits acquis institués au nom de la Syrie et pour son compte, au bénéfice des personnes physiques et morales françaises.

Le Haut-Commissaire de la République française au Président du Conseil de la République syrienne.

Par une lettre en date de ce jour, votre Excellence a bien voulu me faire connaître que, sous réserve des modifications qui seraient apportées, d'accord entre les hautes parties contractantes, pour tenir compte des conditions économiques et financières existant en Syrie, aux concessions et conventions intéressant les finances de l'Etat ou des collectivités publiques, le Gouvernement syrien s'engage à respecter les droits acquis institués au nom de la Syrie et pour son compte, au bénéfice des personnes physiques et morales françaises.

J'ai l'honneur de prendre acte de cette obligeante communication.

Echange de Lettres No. 9.

Le Président du Conseil de la République syrienne au Haut-Commissaire de la République française.

Au moment où les relations entre la France et la Syrie vont se trouver définies par un traité d'amitié et d'alliance, j'ai l'honneur de donner l'assurance à votre Excellence que le Gouvernement syrien maintiendra la parité monétaire existant entre la monnaie syrienne et la monnaie française.

Le Haut-Commissaire de la République française au Président du Conseil de la République syrienne.

Par une lettre en date de ce jour, votre Excellence a bien voulu me donner l'assurance que le Gouvernement syrien maintiendra la parité monétaire existant entre la monnaie syrienne et la monnaie française.

J'ai l'honneur de prendre acte de cette obligeante communication.

Echange de Lettres No. 10.

Le Haut-Commissaire de la République française au Président du Conseil de la République syrienne.

En vue de fixer la situation respective des ressortissants français en Syrie et syriens en France, j'ai l'honneur de porter à la connaissance de votre Excellence que le Gouvernement français est prêt à négocier avec le Gouvernement syrien une convention d'établissement.

Cette convention portera confirmation du *modus vivendi* établi par le décret du Président de la République française en date du 25 avril 1935.

Il sera en outre précisé :

1. Que les ressortissants de l'une des hautes parties contractantes jouiront du traitement de la nation la plus favorisée en ce qui concerne l'accès auprès des tribunaux de l'autre partie, tant pour réclamer que pour défendre leurs droits à tous les degrés de juridiction établis par les lois;

2. Qu'en ce qui concerne l'accès et le séjour, les ressortissants syriens bénéficieront dans les colonies françaises du traitement accordé aux ressortissants de la nation la plus favorisée.

Le Gouvernement français assurera ce traitement aux ressortissants syriens, personnes physiques ou sociétés, qui sont ou seraient admis à s'établir sur le territoire des colonies françaises, sous réserve de l'observation des lois d'ordre public ou de sûreté, ainsi que de la législation locale.

Le Gouvernement français recommandera au Gouvernement tunisien de ne pas établir de discrimination à l'encontre des ressortissants syriens, en ce qui concerne leur accès et leur séjour en Tunisie et d'accorder également aux ressortissants syriens, personnes physiques ou sociétés, établies sur le territoire tunisien, le bénéfice des droits communs aux ressortissants des diverses Puissances, sous réserve de l'observation des lois d'ordre public et de sûreté ainsi que de la législation locale.

De même les ressortissants des colonies et protectorats bénéficieront en Syrie du traitement accordé aux ressortissants de la nation la plus favorisée.

Le Président du Conseil de la République syrienne au Haut-Commissaire de la République française.

Par une lettre en date de ce jour, votre Excellence a bien voulu me faire part des conditions dans lesquelles le Gouvernement français était prêt à négocier avec le Gouvernement syrien une convention d'établissement.

J'ai l'honneur de faire part à votre Excellence que le Gouvernement syrien, d'accord avec le Gouvernement français sur les termes de cette lettre, prend acte de cette obligeante communication.

Protocole No. 4.

Les hautes parties contractantes s'engagent à entrer en négociations, après ratification du traité, pour définir, dans le délai fixé pour l'admission de la Syrie à la Société des Nations, un régime judiciaire s'inspirant de l'accord du 1^{er} mars 1936 et propre à concilier le souci de protection des intérêts étrangers avec les progrès accomplis par le Gouvernement syrien dans l'organisation de la justice.

Le Gouvernement français prêter son plein appui au Gouvernement syrien pour assurer, dans ce même délai, la mise en application de ce régime.

En attendant la conclusion de cette négociation et dès la ratification du traité, sera mis en œuvre un programme de réforme comportant :

1. Application du principe de l'unité de juridiction par le groupement des juridictions.
2. Réduction dans le cadre des magistrats français.
3. Définition de l'intérêt étranger, de manière à remédier à certains abus, tels que la fictivité et le détournement de juridiction par la création d'un intérêt étranger en fraude de la loi.
4. Suppression de la clause attributive de compétence entre ressortissants syriens.

Echange de Lettres No. 11.

Le Haut-Commissaire de la République française au Président du Conseil de la République syrienne.

En vertu des décisions de la Société des Nations, le Gouvernement français était autorisé à demander au Gouvernement syrien de participer aux frais d'entretien de ses forces militaires et fondé à s'entendre avec lui en vue du remboursement de toutes les dépenses encourues par lui pour l'organisation de l'administration, le développement des ressources locales et l'exécution des travaux publics en Syrie.

J'ai l'honneur de faire savoir à votre Excellence que le Gouvernement français, tenant compte de la prochaine accession de la Syrie au statut d'Etat pleinement indépendant, a décidé, à l'occasion de la signature du Traité d'Alliance, de ne pas demander le remboursement de ces dépenses.

Seuls feront l'objet d'un remboursement les divers immeubles et installations remis au Gouvernement syrien et dont le prix sera évalué par une commission arbitrale mixte au moment où s'effectuera la remise.

Le Président du Conseil de la République syrienne au Haut-Commissaire de la République française.

Par une lettre en date de ce jour, votre Excellence a bien voulu me faire connaître les intentions du Gouvernement français en ce qui touche les dépenses civiles et militaires encourues par la France en Syrie.

Le Gouvernement français, tenant compte de la prochaine accession de la Syrie au statut d'Etat pleinement indépendant, a décidé, à l'occasion de la signature du Traité d'Alliance, de ne pas demander le remboursement de ces dépenses.

Seuls feront l'objet d'un remboursement les divers immeubles et installations remis au Gouvernement syrien et dont le prix sera évalué par une commission arbitrale mixte au moment où s'effectuera cette remise.

J'ai l'honneur de prendre acte de cette obligeante communication.

Protocole No. 5.

Se référant au quatrième alinéa du préambule du traité, les hautes parties contractantes tiennent à préciser que leur intention est de consacrer les deux premières années du délai de trois ans que stipule ce texte à la mise en place de toutes les institutions syriennes destinées à assurer la reprise par le Gouvernement syrien des responsabilités qu'assume actuellement le représentant de la France pour le compte de la Syrie, la troisième année du délai susvisé étant destinée à l'adaptation de ces institutions à l'exercice de ces responsabilités.

Se référant, par ailleurs, au Protocole No. 2, les hautes parties contractantes considèrent que les négociations prévues au deuxième alinéa de ce texte doivent aboutir dans un délai d'une année à compter de la date à laquelle elles seront engagées.

Les hautes parties contractantes feront toutes diligences pour que ces négociations s'ouvrent à une date aussi proche que possible du 1^{er} janvier 1937.

Au cas où le règlement résultant de ces négociations ne comporterait pas l'existence d'un organe commun, les hautes parties contractantes conviennent de limiter à six mois le délai supplémentaire consacré à l'organisation des administrations syriennes auxquelles seront transférées les attributions économiques et financières actuellement exercées pour le compte de la Syrie par le représentant de la France.

[E 6988/195/89]

No. 76.

Consul Mackereth to Mr. Eden.—(Received November 6.)

(No. 79.)

Sir,

Damascus, October 27, 1936.

THE reception of the Franco-Syrian treaty draft by the Syrian public has so far been mainly favourable. The Moslems remain suspicious about the military convention, in which the Christians see their only ray of hope. The Druses seem to feel in no need of protection, but the Alawiyye express mixed feelings. First, relief that they are not to be immediately handed over to the tender mercies of Islamic Syria. Then, fear that, as their economic lot is inevitably bound up with the interior, the presence of a French military contingent, with all the intrigue that is bound to surround it, will embitter their present fairly sweet relations with the Sunnis.

2. Hashem-al-Atassi issued a justificatory exhortation to the Syrian people on the day the text was published. I enclose a translation of his manifesto, which, notwithstanding its heroic tone, is cleverly composed for its audience both in and out of Syria. The mingled harmony of soft explanation and self-satisfaction in a minor key is constantly modulated by major dominants on independence, unity and nation. In this manner it is no doubt hoped to develop that which to-day scarcely exists, namely, a corporate national consciousness, and at the same time to stress, but not overmuch, the ideal of a wider Arab brotherhood, so little appreciated by the masses.

3. When passing through Turkey, on the way back from their Parisian triumphs, the Syrian delegation had the rude shock of learning from the official Turkish emissaries, who had been sent to offer formal courtesies, that Turkey still had her eyes firmly fixed on the Alexandretta Sanjak. The Nationalist leader and his companions must then have realised with Poet-Laureate Masefield that "the days that make us happy make us wise."

4. Preparations for general elections, the date of which is still unfixed, are going ahead. Meanwhile, opposition to some of the terms of the treaty is being zealously cultivated by Subhi Barakat and his friends. Subhi Barakat's defection, which was foretold in Damascus report for the 31st March last (paragraph 14), may become a grave matter unless Fakhri Baroudy's "Iron Shirts" are able to use successfully the kind of influence that wearers of political blouses elsewhere have made notorious. Subhi Barakat, Zeki-al-Khattib and Dr. Shahbandar, who tenders his advice from a safe distance, are supported by other place-seekers in the Nationalist party, and by those whose occupations will disappear when the treaty is ratified.

5. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's representatives in Beirut and Jerusalem.

I have, &c.

GILBERT MACKERETH.

Enclosure in No. 76.

Translation of a Manifesto issued by Hashem-al-Atassi, Leader of the Syrian Wafd.

O Noble Syrians!

YOU have fought the most blessed of fights. You have borne on high the banner of liberty and independence, and Allah hath loaded you with his favours. He hath given you this day, one of the most glorious of all your days. It will ever remain one of the most remarkable in Arabian history. To-day, in making

public the treaty, we reach the end of the first and hardest stage in our struggle for independence. This independence, the foundations of which have been cemented by this pact, establishes your legitimate hopes, opens wide for you the gates of liberty. It clears the way wherein you will discover only justice and equality.

Our present treaty proclaims our relations with the French Government on a basis of law and equity inspired by the principles of our great ally—France, the free and the democratic.

This treaty provides the opportunity for Syrians to display their talents in full light of day. It opens a vast field for the exercise of the genius and the competence that history has recognised in them. As covenanters with France the Free, Syrians are from to-day henceforward called to fulfil their historical mission in the service of general peace and civilised humanity. This treaty, the plinth of sovereignty and independence, has consolidated the bonds of unity. By the terms of this treaty we shall possess a national army to defend our institutions from within and from without. The maintenance of French forces at two points in the country until our national army is formed is not in any way derogatory to our sovereignty and independence. These forces stay by our full consent in your land for only a limited time. They will not interfere in our affairs and will have no link with our national life. If at the sunrise of our independent life we feel the need, in certain technical matters, of specialists and of experts, we shall ask our generous friend and ally to provide them to help us in our undertakings. Such experts will merely have a purely advisory capacity. The Constitution established in 1928 by the Constituent Assembly safeguarded, within the framework of existing laws, the rights of individuals and of collectivities. This charge, as written in the Constitution, we have assumed and we have consecrated it by the treaty. Thus, there cannot be in Syria either privileged classes or persons enjoying particular privileges. All Syrians are in law equal, without distinction other than merit and devotion.

Also, certain articles of the Constitution drawn up by the Constituent Assembly provided in matters of administration a special regimen, in harmony with their cultural and social states, for certain districts. The aim of these provisions is to guarantee the tranquillity and the felicity of the Syrian people within the framework of the laws.

We hope the application of this system will encourage those who are still without the fold of unity to come inside.

There will be but one justice throughout Syria. The Arabic language alone will be used for pleading in the courts under the ensign of justice and equality, where the safeguard of foreign rights will be taken into consideration.

I cannot, when taking this hasty glance at the treaty, but admire, and be grateful for, the noble attitude of the free men of France in foregoing the refund of the cost to them of the mandate, which reached many thousands of millions of francs. They understood our delicate financial position, and granted us our economic liberty, which is, as everyone knows, the pillar of national renaissance and the foundation of political liberty. Also are we free to fix and administer our customs duties in such manner as will best suit the economic welfare of Syria.

There you have some of the advantages that this treaty, which, as you will perceive, O Syrians, is the act of liberty, of sovereignty, and of independence, that has been sealed by the struggles of the nation and the blood of its innocent martyrs.

The Syrian deputation to whom you have confided the labour of this achievement is proud and overjoyed in its happy conclusion of this blessed end, and it trusts you will be in the times to come, as you were in those gone by, as the emblem of patience and perseverance, and as the symbol of sacrifice and devotion.

Forget not that the treaty is not the end but only a means towards national prosperity and happiness.

O Syrians!

The whole world has its eyes fixed on you to-day. We quail not. No suspicion and no doubt assail us that this nation will not prove to the east and to the west that it is worthy of independence and able to protect and defend it

by the ways it will follow in the new era. We have no illusions, for we would not mislead anyone about the difficulties and the dangers of the new epoch, full of obstacles and hidden reefs. Great efforts will be required to fight against covetousness, disputes, secret designs of critics, and disruption.

O Syrians!

To-day is your day. Arise as one man and defend your independence and your liberty with unity and solidarity. Thrust out selfishness and hate. We are proud of you before the nations, and from on high we proclaim that it was your fighting and your patience that obtained this magnificent result.

There, indeed, was a great victory, which has hardened your faith in your rights and strengthened you in your convictions.

O Syrians!

Be you attentive, vigilant and ever remain on guard. The international political situation is filled with dangers; our nation can only consolidate its position by closing its ranks during these difficult days. Do I appeal, therefore, to your unity and to your solidarity, I appeal to your spirit of sacrifice and of devotion. For verily other days will follow to-day, and ultimate success is to those who have patience.

[E 6599/195/89]

No. 77.

Summary of the Main Provisions in the Draft Franco-Syrian Treaty.

Settlement (initialled in Paris on September 9, 1936) as compared with the Anglo-Iraqi Settlement of 1930.

THE Franco-Syrian settlement comprises a main Treaty of Alliance and a Military Convention, corresponding to the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty and its Military Annexure. But the Syrian settlement further contains eleven exchanges of notes and five protocols as against five exchanges of notes in the Iraqi precedent. In general, it is more detailed and covers more ground than the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930 and its connected documents (though there is nothing so detailed as the Anglo-Iraqi Financial Agreement).

Main Features of the actual Treaty of Alliance.

2. The main treaty is, broadly speaking, on similar lines to the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930. It provides for independent Syria to take over on the formal termination of the mandate the international responsibilities and obligations incurred by the former mandatory Power in respect of Syria (in so far as they continue to be applicable) while providing for a close military alliance between the two parties for a period of twenty-five years (articles 1, 3, 6, 8). As in the case of the Iraqi treaty, provision is made for close diplomatic consultation between the French and Syrian Governments on foreign political matters affecting their common interests, and both parties engage themselves to adopt an attitude in conformity with their alliance and to avoid any action likely to compromise the relations of the other party with third countries (article 2). Supplementary Exchange of Notes No. 4 provides, after the Anglo-Iraqi precedent, for a French Ambassador to Syria (with perpetual precedence) and for a Syrian Minister Plenipotentiary to France.

3. The Iraqi precedent is followed closely in the provision that, in the event of any dispute arising between Syria and a third State of a nature to lead to a rupture, the two Governments are to concert together with a view to its settlement by pacific means in conformity with the stipulations of the League Covenant or any other applicable international engagements. Should, however, one of the parties become engaged in a conflict despite the attempt to settle the dispute pacifically, the other is pledged immediately to come to its assistance. The Iraqi treaty is again followed closely in the further provision that the two

parties will concert defensive measures in the event of an imminent risk of war, the assistance of the Syrian Government to France being to furnish on Syrian territory all facilities and assistance in their power, including the use of railways, rivers, ports, aerodromes and other means of communication (article 4). (The Syrian treaty differs, however, from the Iraqi one inasmuch as it does *not* make the provisions of the military alliance subject to the overriding obligations of the League Covenant and the Kellogg Pact.)

4. The treaty goes on to provide, like the Iraqi settlement, that the Syrian Government are responsible for the maintenance of order in Syria and for the defence of Syrian territory (article 5); but that the French Government are ready to lend military assistance to Syria during the currency of the treaty, in accordance with the annexed military convention. Unlike the Iraqi treaty, the Syrian treaty leaves to the subsidiary military convention all details of the military facilities to be given on Syrian soil to facilitate the execution by France of her obligations as an ally, and it merely mentions, following the Iraqi precedent, that the Syrian Government recognise that the permanent maintenance and protection of the aerial communications of the French Government through Syria are in the interests of the alliance (article 5). (The Iraqi treaty provided for the "permanent maintenance and protection in all circumstances of the essential communications of His Britannic Majesty"; but in subsequent confidential correspondence the Iraqi Government were informed that these communications were, in fact, confined to the air.)

Provisions of the Detailed Military Convention.

5. This convention corresponds to the Annexure which forms an integral part of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty. The Syrian convention is, however, considerably more detailed and deals, unlike the Annexure, with the future military organisation of the Syrian armed forces. The organised local military forces are to be taken over by the Syrian Government (article 1) and are to comprise, as a minimum, a division of infantry, a brigade of cavalry and the necessary ancillary services (article 2). The convention follows the Iraqi precedent in laying down—

- (1) That the French Government shall accede to the request of the Syrian Government for a military mission for the Syrian army, gendarmerie, navy or military air force (article 3).
- (2) That any military instructors or specialists required by the Syrian Government shall be recruited in France (article 3).
- (3) That Syria shall send the personnel of her armed forces abroad only to France for instruction (provided that the required facilities are obtainable there) (article 3).
- (4) That Syria shall adopt for her forces armament, material and equipment so far as is possible of the same pattern as that used in the French forces (article 4).
- (5) That the French Government shall grant all possible facilities for the acquisition by Syria of the latest type of arms, munitions, ships, aeroplanes, &c. (article 4).

But it goes further than the Iraqi precedent in providing for the possibility that such French officers shall be able to exercise temporary executive command of Syrian forces.

6. Article 5 of the convention covers the arrangements for the retention in the future of French forces on Syrian territory. It embodies the provision (which figured in the main Anglo-Iraqi Treaty) that the ex-mandatory shall possess for the duration of the alliance a right to maintain two air bases on Syrian soil, which, as in the case of Iraq, are to be established well away (40 kilom.) from any big town. In the meantime, France is accorded the right to continue using the air bases at Aleppo (Nirab) and Damascus (Mezza); unlike the Iraqi precedent, it is merely provided that the transfer to the new bases shall take place when their preparation has been completed and at the cost of the Syrian Government. (This is more onerous than the Iraqi precedent, although the Syrian Government are apparently to acquire the old aerodromes for nothing as a set-off. In the case of Iraq, His Majesty's Government can only recover a small part of the cost of new construction by way of payment for the buildings at the evacuated bases.) The

French Government will continue to maintain the existing landing grounds in Syria until the Syrian authorities are in a position to do so.

7. The precedent of the unlucky and hitherto unfulfilled article 4 of the Anglo-Iraqi annexure is followed in the provision that Syria will provide, at the request and at the expense of the French Government and under detailed conditions to be fixed, special guards for the protection of the air bases from among the Syrian armed forces. (From the fact that provision is made for co-operation between these guards and French "security" troops, it seems that French land forces may also be retained at the bases, which would be contrary to the Anglo-Iraqi settlement.)

8. This article also records the right of the French Government to maintain land garrisons in the territories of Jebel Druze and Lattakia for a period of five years from the entry into force of the treaty (see also under *Minority Provisions* below). The place of location of these troops is to be defined by agreement between the two Governments. It is further provided that the local French commander shall take control of native military units stationed in the two territories and encourage recruitment for them among the local populations.

9. The convention goes on to provide (article 6) for the facilities which are to be accorded to the French forces in Syria: these are broadly on the same lines as in the Anglo-Iraqi Annexure and comprise "all possible facilities" for the movement, training, transit and maintenance of the French forces in Syria. Following the Iraqi precedent, French warships are to have the right to navigate in Syrian waters subject to prior notification; but (unlike the vague provision for training facilities in the Anglo-Iraqi annexure) French aircraft are specifically allowed the right to fly anywhere over Syrian territory provided they observe the customary rules of air navigation. They are to be allowed unrestricted use of all landing grounds and stretches of water, and the French Government will have the right to construct depôts on the landing grounds and maintain personnel there.

10. Special detailed agreements are to be negotiated as regards the provision of sites for the use of the French forces and on other detailed questions connected with the material requirements of the French forces.

11. It is provided in general terms, similar to those employed in the Anglo-Iraqi annexure, that French military officials employed in Syria, by virtue of the alliance, shall continue to enjoy the "privileges and immunities" (i.e., legal and economic) which they already possess; but this provision is here specifically applied to French civilian officials as well. It is laid down in Supplementary Protocol No. 1 that a detailed agreement shall be negotiated in due course to define exactly these privileges and immunities (a course which was not attempted in the case of the Iraqi settlement), apparently on the broad basis of the position prevailing in Iraq. (NOTE.—The French have already asked us privately for all relevant information on this point.)

Minority Provisions.

12. Before the text of the treaty settlement was available it seemed likely from what they themselves told us that the French were proposing to insert some real practical guarantees for religious and racial minorities in Syria. The settlement as actually initialled, however, is disappointing in this respect, and it seems that the French have given way to a great extent to the opposition of the Syrian Nationalists, which was based on the fact that the Anglo-Iraqi precedent contained no specific minority guarantees, these being left for inclusion in the Iraqi Government's declaration to the League of Nations of May 1932.

13. The main minority "safeguard" in the Syrian settlement is Exchange of Notes No. 5, which provides, in general terms, that the Syrian Government will assure the maintenance of the constitutional guarantees contained in the Syrian Constitution in favour of individuals and communities. The Syrian Constitution forms part of the organic law of the territories under French mandate, promulgated in 1930, in accordance with article 1 of the mandate for Syria and the Lebanon: the articles of the Syrian Constitution to which this exchange of notes apparently refers are Nos. 5-28, which guarantee, in general terms and after the best liberal traditions, the freedom and rights of the individual and the equality of all races and religions in Syria. These guarantees for what they are worth, will be applicable to *all* the inhabitants of independent Syria.

14. The future of the present autonomous minority territories of Lattakia and Jebel Druze form the subject of the sixth exchange of notes. Independent Syria is to resume full sovereignty over both territories by means of decrees, published by the High Commissioner, revoking their former special autonomous Constitutions and providing that their future shall be governed by the Constitution and laws of Syria proper, subject to the establishment of a special administrative and financial régime on the lines of that at present enjoyed by the autonomous Sanjak of Alexandretta. (The present régime in the sanjak, which is to serve as the model, provides for a measure of local control over the appointment of subordinate administrative officials, the establishment of an administrative council with a majority of elected members with the power to vote a local budget, and limited financial autonomy, both as regards receipts and expenditure. The governor (mutessarif) and the judges are, however, appointed by the head of the Syrian State, within whose sovereignty the sanjak is included.)

15. A practical safeguard for the minorities in the Jebel Druze and Lattakia is the provision in the military convention for the retention for a period of five years from the entry into force of the treaty of French land garrisons (see under the military convention above). But limitation of this guarantee to only five years precludes any lasting benefit to the minorities.

16. There is no direct mention in the treaty of the continuance of the existing special semi-autonomous régime in the Sanjak of Alexandretta with its Turkish-speaking majority. (NOTE.—The Turkish Government have already expressed alarm over its future.) Its maintenance appears, however, to be covered legally by the obligation on Syria to respect international obligations entered into on her behalf by the former mandatory Power (article 3 of the main treaty): among those engagements is the Franco-Turkish Treaty of 1921, article 7 of which provides that a special administrative régime shall be set up in the sanjak, that Turkish shall be the official language and that every facility shall be given for the development of the Turkish culture of the inhabitants.

17. A further small concession to minorities may be contained in the Exchange of Notes No. 1 which provides that rights acquired by all Syrian officers, n.c.o.'s and soldiers in the Syrian "special forces" (apparently the various irregular formations recruited by the French largely from among Circassians and Armenians) shall be respected as part of the obligations inherited by the Syrian State.

Economic Provisions.

18. There had been indications that the French intended to try to maintain the organisation known as the "fonds d'intérêt commun," which besides other subordinate activities takes charge of the common customs organisation throughout the whole of the mandated territories and shares out the profit among the various territories. The only reference in the treaty settlement to the future of this organisation is, however, in Protocol No. 2, which provides that, as a preparatory measure to the transfer to the Syrian Government of the economic and financial powers at present exercised by the High Commissioner, the Syrian Government shall enter into negotiations with the Lebanese Government after the ratification of the treaty, with a view to settling the future economic and financial relations between the two States. In the event of the agreement resulting from these negotiations not providing for a common customs organisation such as exists at present, nor for any system of customs collaboration between the two administrations, the Syrian Government engage themselves, on condition of reciprocity, not to make any sort of discrimination against the Lebanon as compared with other States formerly comprised in the Ottoman Empire.

19. Even if a common customs organisation is not maintained the French Government are bound to transfer to the Syrian Government the economic and financial powers at present exercised by the High Commissioner (who at present controls the "fonds d'intérêt commun").

20. Protocol No. 5 fixes maximum time limits for the necessary negotiations between French, Syrians and Lebanese.

21. Exchange of Notes No. 9 provides for the maintenance of monetary parity between the French and Syrian currencies.

22. The future of the powerful French concessionary companies—such as the "D.H.P." Railway Company—appears to be rather vaguely safeguarded in Exchange of Notes No. 8 (see (c) in paragraph 24).

Judicial Régime.

23. Protocol No. 4 obliges the contracting parties to negotiate, after the ratification of the treaty but before the expiry of the three years interval preliminary to the admission of Syria to the League of Nations, a judicial régime calculated to reconcile the obligation to protect foreign interests with the progress accomplished by the Syrian Government in the organisation of justice. The French Government will do their best to help the Syrian Government to put this new régime into application before the expiry of the preliminary period. Meanwhile, and without waiting for the new judicial agreement, a programme of judicial reform is to be set on foot, including reductions in the cadre of French judges and the prevention of legal abuses such as the creation of a fictitious "foreign interest." (This protocol suggests that the object is to follow the Anglo-Iraqi precedent and to put into force a new judicial régime compatible with Syrian independence which, like the Anglo-Iraqi Judicial Agreement of 1931, could, if necessary, be formally adopted and maintained by the League of Nations as furnishing the necessary judicial guarantees to foreigners.)

Miscellaneous Provisions.

24. The French Government have been successful in bringing within the framework of the treaty settlement the following matters of particular interest to themselves which were not dealt with in the Anglo-Iraqi settlement:—

- (a) Protocol No. 3 provides for the negotiation of a university convention between the two Governments (presumably designed to encourage Syrian students to come to France).
- (b) Exchange of Notes No. 7 provides that the Syrian Government shall maintain the "present régime" in favour of foreign educational and benevolent institutions, and in favour of foreign archaeological expeditions in respect of their works and of antiquities they discover.
- (c) Exchange of Notes No. 8 provides that the acquired rights in Syria of French subjects and French corporate bodies shall be maintained, subject to any modifications which may be introduced by common agreement in any concessions and conventions concerning the finances of the State or of public corporations to take account of economic or financial circumstances. (This is presumably intended to cover the future of the French concessionary companies—though it is hard to see, e.g., how the "D.H.P." Railway Company will be able to use the customs revenue in future to recover its deficit.)
- (d) Exchange of Notes No. 9 provides for monetary parity between France and Syria (see under economic provisions above).
- (e) Exchange of Notes No. 10 records the intention of the two Governments to negotiate an establishment convention on broadly defined most-favoured-nation lines. The convention will cover the position of Syrians in French colonies and in Tunis.
- (f) Exchange of Notes No. 3 records the undertaking of the French Government to protect Syrian nationals in foreign territory where there are no Syrian representatives. (Although no provision to this effect was included in the Anglo-Iraqi settlement, a corresponding arrangement was subsequently established by ordinary diplomatic correspondence between His Majesty's Government and the Iraqi Government.)

25. In addition to the above, Exchange of Notes No. 2 provides that the Syrian Government shall recruit in France any foreign technical advisers, judges and officials whom they may require. These notes correspond to the third exchange of notes attached to the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty; the latter, however, merely provides that British subjects shall normally be engaged, and that if suitable British subjects are not available other foreigners may be approached. The Franco-Syrian notes, on the other hand, appear to give France something like a monopoly of foreign expert posts in Syria.

26. As a set-off to these concessions in favour of French interests, Exchange of Notes No. 11 records the renunciation by the French Government of their right by virtue of articles 2 and 15 of the mandate for Syria, to claim from the Syrian Government a share of the cost of maintaining the French garrison in Syria, and of the cost of establishing the local administration, developing local resources and executing public works. The only exception is to be the payment by Syria of an agreed price for certain buildings and plant.

Arrangements for bringing the Treaty Settlement into Force, for Revision, &c.

27. Following the Anglo-Iraqi precedent, the treaty is to be signed in French and Arabic, the French version prevailing, and is to be valid for twenty-five years. As in the case of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, it is provided: (1) that any difference between the parties as to the application or interpretation of the treaty, which cannot be settled by direct negotiation, shall be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of the League Covenant; (2) that negotiations for the renewal or modification of the treaty may be initiated by either party after the twentieth year (articles 6 and 7). (There is no specific provision, as in the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, that a new treaty shall provide for the continued protection of the French "essential communications," but the position is, of course, different, since Syria is not a corridor for France in the same way as Iraq is for Great Britain.)

28. Unlike the Anglo-Iraqi settlement, it is expressly provided (article 6) that the exchanges of notes and protocols annexed to the treaty shall, like the military convention, possess the same duration as the main treaty, in default of an express provision to the contrary.

29. The procedure for bringing the treaty settlement into force is prescribed by a covering protocol, signed at Paris on the 9th September by the principal negotiators, and by article 7 of the main treaty. The draft texts are to be submitted by the Syrian Government to the approval of the Syrian Parliament as soon as a parliamentary Government has been established in Syria (which means, in practice, after new elections). The treaty and annexed documents will then be signed by plenipotentiaries at Damascus, the treaty will be ratified, and the exchange of ratifications will take place as soon as possible. The treaty and annexed documents are to enter into force the day of the admission of Syria to the League of Nations, which (it is laid down in the preamble to the main treaty) is to take place within a period of three years from the date of the exchange of ratifications.

30. It is provided in article 7 of the treaty that it shall be "communicated" to the League of Nations. (This presumably means that, following the precedent of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, the whole settlement will be presented as a *fait accompli* to the Permanent Mandates Commission, and through it to the Council of the League. It will therefore be difficult for the League to alter its provisions, although it will presumably be able to supplement the guarantees to foreigners and minorities in the treaty by means of some declaration such as that extracted from Iraq in May 1932 as a condition of admission to the League.)

31. Subsidiary Protocol No. 5 records, with reference to the preamble of the treaty, the intention of the parties to devote the first two years of the intermediate period of three years before the admission of Syria to the League to the establishment of the Syrian "institutions" necessary to enable the Syrian Government to take over from the French High Commissioner the responsibilities which he at present exercises on behalf of Syria. The third year of the intermediate period is apparently to serve for the training of these new institutions in the exercise of their new functions.

J. G. WARD.

*Eastern Department, Foreign Office,
November 6, 1936.*

[E 7301/688/89]

No. 78.

Mr. Morgan to Mr. Eden.—(Received November 23.)

(No. 567.)

Sir,

Angora, November 14, 1936.

I HAVE the honour, with reference to your despatch No. 511 of the 13th October, to transmit to you the accompanying copies (all that are available) of a publication⁽¹⁾ which has been received from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs on the subject of Alexandretta and Antioch, and which, I understand, has also been communicated to other foreign missions at Angora.

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

2. It will be seen that this publication, after reciting the various treaty provisions and other documents on which the Turkish case rests, reproduces the text of a note on the subject addressed to the French Government by the Turkish Ambassador at Paris on the 10th October (pp. 17-19), which may not yet have come to your notice. Copies of this communication are separately enclosed.

3. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris.

I have, &c.

JAMES MORGAN.

Enclosure in No. 78.

La Note remise en Date du 10 Octobre 1936 par Son Excellence Suad Dadas, Ambassadeur de Turquie à Paris, au Ministère des Affaires étrangères de la République française, relativement à la Question d'Alexandrette et d'Antioche.

M. le Ministre,

ME référant aux déclarations faites dernièrement au Conseil de la Société des Nations par M. Viénot et Dr. Rüstü Aras, et conformément aux instructions de mon Gouvernement, je viens prier votre Excellence de bien vouloir prendre les dispositions nécessaires en vue de décider s'il ne conviendrait pas au Gouvernement français d'arriver à la conclusion avec les délégués des populations en grande majorité turques, de la région d'Alexandrette et d'Antioche, d'un traité analogue à celui signé par la France avec les représentants de la Syrie, et en voie de conclusion avec ceux du Liban.

Le Gouvernement de la République estime qu'en dotant ces régions d'un régime susceptible d'assurer à leurs populations la possibilité de se gouverner elles-mêmes, la France se conformerait tant à l'esprit général du Pacte de la Société des Nations et des dispositions relatives aux mandats du type A, qu'à l'esprit et à la lettre des conventions franco-turques de 1921 et de 1926.

En effet, dès la fin de la guerre, la France a assumé un mandat sur l'ensemble de l'entité géographique que représentent les territoires détachés de l'ancien Empire ottoman et placés sous son autorité. La mission qui lui a été ainsi confiée avait pour but de chercher par tous les moyens à élever ces populations à un degré de maturité suffisant pour être aptes à se gouverner un jour librement et indépendamment. Cette mission, la France l'a accomplie dans des conditions souvent difficiles et en usant des méthodes d'administration variées suivant les circonstances.

L'expérience acquise pendant ces différents essais a décidé le Gouvernement français à établir dans les régions englobant la Syrie et le Liban proprement dits, des souverainetés distinctes et à abandonner l'idée d'une fusion syro-libanaise.

En jugeant cette méthode de séparation la plus conforme aux intérêts des populations placées sous sa tutelle, la France n'a en réalité agi que dans l'esprit du mandat sans aucun autre engagement de sa part vis-à-vis d'une Puissance tierce.

Or, parmi les territoires du Levant sous mandat français, il existe une région au sujet de laquelle la France a, dès le début, assumé un engagement d'ordre international. En adoptant la décision d'élever la Syrie et le Liban au rang d'États indépendants et souverains, la France a estimé que les populations de ces deux pays étaient devenues aptes à se diriger elles-mêmes et à s'affranchir de sa tutelle. Mais ce jugement, la France l'avait consigné dans une convention internationale en ce qui concerne les populations turques d'Alexandrette et d'Antioche. Ce qu'elle décide pour la Syrie et le Liban elle doit *a fortiori* l'adopter pour les territoires turcs qui lui furent confiés sous certaines conditions expresses.

En s'attachant à la lettre des conventions de 1921 et de 1926, son Excellence M. Viénot a parlé d'autonomie devant le Conseil de la Société des Nations. Or, la large autonomie consacrée par lesdits traités se rapportait à une période où la gestion française s'étendait indifféremment sur tout le territoire et englobait toutes les autonomies locales créées par la France, telles que celles de Syrie, du Liban, des Alaouites et du Djebel Druze. L'engagement international assumé

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par la France n'avait certainement pas pour but de diminuer le droit des populations turques, reconnues dès 1921 capables de se gouverner elles-mêmes et détachées de la Turquie sous cette seule condition de reconnaissance.

Cette autonomie s'entendait donc dans le cadre du mandat français et non dans celui de l'indépendance syrienne. L'incorporation faite dans son temps d'Alexandrette et d'Antioche à la Syrie constitue un acte d'autorité qui peut être expliqué par les exigences de l'administration mandataire, mais qui ne peut, au détriment des deux conventions franco-turques, former un droit acquis au bénéfice de la Syrie, aujourd'hui candidate à un régime indépendant.

Aussitôt que la France, dans un geste de généreuse abnégation, met fin à sa tutelle pour ériger des peuples arrivés à maturité au rang de nations indépendantes, il est incontestable que les considérations qui ont présidé pendant le mandat à la gestion des régions d'Alexandrette et d'Antioche doivent automatiquement faire place à un régime de liberté et de souveraineté complètes, conséquence logique des traités de 1921 et 1926. L'évolution subie par la Syrie et le Liban dans le cadre du mandat français doit par une assimilation juste et équitable être étendue à Alexandrette et Antioche; et l'indépendance octroyée à la Syrie et au Liban après la tutelle à laquelle ils étaient soumis doit être reconnue à Alexandrette après la large autonomie dont cette région était conventionnellement bénéficiaire.

La politique française de paix, d'entente et de fraternité entre les peuples, fera sans conteste de cette région à population turque un trait d'union entre la France, la Turquie et la Syrie, créant ainsi un élément nouveau de concorde dans cette partie de l'Asie qui lui est liée par tant de liens d'amitié sincère.

En priant votre Excellence de bien vouloir me faire connaître les dispositions que le Gouvernement français se proposerait de prendre à l'égard de cette question, je vous réitère, &c.

[E 7315/195/89]

No. 79.

Acting Consul-General Furlonge to Mr. Eden.—(Received November 23.)

(No. 103.)

Sir,

Beirut, November 17, 1936.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 10 of the 13th November reporting the signature on that date of the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance between France and the Lebanon, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the French texts of the treaty and its annexes, which form an integral part of the treaty and which comprise a military convention, five protocols, and twelve exchanges of letters.

2. The majority of the articles of the treaty and of the annexed protocols and exchanges of letters reproduce word for word the corresponding items of the Franco-Syrian treaty. I attach a table showing briefly where the main differences are to be found.

3. As in the case of Syria, the treaty is concluded for a period of twenty-five years. Similarly, the text implies that within three years of the date of its ratification the Lebanese Republic will apply for membership of the League of Nations and that France will sponsor her candidature.

4. The military convention, however, shows important differences. As for Syria, France provides a military mission for the Lebanon (the members of which may be called upon to assume command of Lebanese units) and training for Lebanese military students, in return for freedom of movement in the Lebanon for her troops. But the lower limit of the Lebanese armed forces is to be fixed at one mixed brigade, as opposed to a division of infantry and a brigade of cavalry in the case of Syria, while by article 5 of the treaty, which is explained and defined by article 5 of the military convention, France is to maintain naval, military and air units in the Lebanon for an as yet unspecified period. In this instance the helplessness and the desire for French protection, which are felt and freely admitted by most thinking Lebanese, have happily coincided with the French wish for a Levantine base for her Mediterranean forces.

5. So far as the civil provisions of the treaty are concerned, an important item is contained in Exchange of Letters No. 6 (*bis*), which foreshadows a unification of the fiscal régime and a programme of administrative reform, comprising

the grant of wider powers to municipalities and the creation of local advisory and executive councils.

6. The fiscal reform measure is long overdue. The existing system, an inheritance from Turkish days, is responsible for many discriminations and injustices, notably as regards the incidence of the *temettu* or professional tax. It is to be hoped that the revised system will sweep away the Ottoman basis of taxation to replace it by one on more western lines.

7. The reference in Exchange of Letters No. 6 (*bis*) to the creation of local councils, combined with the assurances in Exchange of Letters No. 6 of equality of treatment and of opportunity for all, are clearly intended to placate those Moslem elements, especially at Tripoli, which have been conducting a campaign against their inclusion in the Lebanon. The effect of these measures cannot, of course, be judged until the regulations are published, though it is doubtful whether any measures on these lines would suffice to appease the recalcitrant Moslem devotees of union with Syria.

8. Exchange of Letters No. 4 provides for the appointment of Lebanese attachés to French missions at places abroad where the number of Lebanese residents warrants this measure. The provision is a necessary one in view of the size and importance of the Lebanese colonies in North and South America and in many other parts of the world.

9. The two clauses of chief interest to British subjects and institutions in the Lebanon are Exchange of Letters No. 7 and Protocol No. 4. The former maintains all the existing privileges of foreign educational, charitable and archaeological institutions. The latter provides for a reorganisation of the judicial system by negotiation after ratification of the treaty, but is vaguer than its Syrian counterpart as to what changes are envisaged in the Mixed Courts régime.

10. Exchange of Letters No. 9, which confirms the existing parity between the Syrian pounds and the French franc, is noteworthy in view of the recent agitation in certain local commercial circles for a revaluation of the former in terms of the franc in order to mitigate the serious effects of the devaluation of the latter on the economic life of the country.

11. So far as I can judge, there do not appear to be serious grounds for objection on the part of His Majesty's Government to any of the terms of the treaty. It is, however, difficult to contemplate with any satisfaction the emergence of an independent Lebanon in its present state of development. Little confidence can at present be felt in either the energy, the competence, or the disinterestedness of the Lebanese governing classes, and the withdrawal of the French element in the administration cannot but be followed by deterioration of government and governed.

12. The reception of the treaty has been stormy. Tripoli has already been more or less closed for the past month as a protest against its retention in the Lebanon. In Beirut, Christian rejoicing on the 13th and 14th November was followed on the night of the 15th by a serious clash between Moslem malcontents and Christians (mostly Armenians), during which much damage was done in the town, several cars burnt, and a number of persons injured. On the morning of the 16th a Moslem was killed in a street affray, the town was closed, and troops with armoured cars carried out continual patrols to avoid the possibility of further disturbances. To-day, when the Chamber meets to discuss ratification, much excitement prevails and further disorders are not unlikely. It is to be hoped that the long-smouldering hostility between Moslems and Christians will not burst into open flame as a result of the passions roused by the treaty. The natural indolence of the Beirut inhabitants, however, suggests that after a few days of excitement and military measures the population will accept the situation with resignation.

13. I am sending a copy of this despatch and its enclosures to His Majesty's High Commissioner in Palestine, His Majesty's High Commissioner in Egypt, His Majesty's Ambassador at Bagdad and (without the first enclosure) to His Majesty's consul at Damascus.

I have, &c.

G. W. FURLONGE.

Text of the Franco-Lebanese Treaty of Friendship and Alliance, signed on November 13, 1936.

LE Gouvernement de la République française et le Gouvernement de la République libanaise,

Vu l'intention exprimée par le Gouvernement français devant la Société des Nations de conclure, en tenant compte de l'évolution déjà accomplie, un traité avec le Gouvernement libanais;

Considérant les progrès réalisés dans la voie de l'affermissement du Liban comme nation indépendante;

Vu l'accord des deux Gouvernements pour réaliser, suivant un programme bien précisé, toutes conditions propres à assurer l'admission de l'Etat libanais à la Société des Nations, dans un délai de trois ans, à dater des formalités de ratification;

Ont convenu à cet effet de conclure un traité d'amitié et d'alliance pour définir les relations qui existeront entre les deux Etats, après la cessation du mandat, sur les bases de complète liberté, souveraineté et indépendance et d'en fixer, dans les conventions, protocoles, et lettres annexes qui font partie intégrante du traité, les conditions et modalités d'application.

A cette fin son Excellence le Président de la République française et son Excellence le Président de la République libanaise ont convenu ce qui suit :

ARTICLE 1^{er}.

Il y aura paix et amitié perpétuelles entre la France et le Liban.

Une alliance est établie entre les deux Etats indépendants et souverains en consécration de leur amitié et des liens qui les unissent pour la défense de la paix et la sauvegarde de leurs intérêts communs.

ARTICLE 2.

En toute matière de politique étrangère de nature à affecter leurs communs intérêts, les deux Gouvernements conviennent de se consulter pleinement et sans réserve.

Chacune des hautes parties contractantes s'engage à ne pas adopter à l'égard des Etats tiers d'attitude incompatible avec l'alliance, et à s'abstenir de tout accord incompatible avec le présent traité.

Chaque Gouvernement accrédiitera auprès de l'autre un représentant diplomatique.

ARTICLE 3.

Les deux hautes parties contractantes prendront toutes mesures utiles pour assurer, au jour de la cessation du mandat, le transfert au seul Gouvernement libanais, des droits et obligations résultant de tous traités, conventions et autres actes internationaux conclus par le Gouvernement français en ce qui concerne le Liban ou en son nom.

ARTICLE 4.

Au cas où un différend entre le Liban et un Etat tiers engendrerait une situation de nature à créer un risque de rupture avec cet Etat, les deux Gouvernements se concerteraient en vue du règlement du différend par les voies pacifiques, conformément aux stipulations du Pacte de la Société des Nations ou de toute autre convention internationale applicable à un tel cas.

Si, malgré les mesures prévues au paragraphe précédent, l'une des hautes parties contractantes se trouvait engagée dans un conflit, l'autre haute partie contractante lui prêterait immédiatement appui en qualité d'alliée. En cas de menace imminente de guerre, les hautes parties contractantes se concerteraient immédiatement pour prendre les mesures de défense nécessaires. L'aide du Gouvernement libanais consistera à fournir au Gouvernement français sur territoire libanais toutes facilités et toute assistance en son pouvoir, y compris l'usage des voies ferrées, cours d'eau, ports, aérodromes, plans d'eau et autres moyens de communication.

ARTICLE 5.

La responsabilité du maintien de l'ordre au Liban et celle de la défense du territoire incombent au Gouvernement libanais.

Le Gouvernement français accepte de prêter son concours militaire aérien et naval au Liban pendant la durée du traité, suivant les prévisions de la convention annexe.

En vue de faciliter au Gouvernement français l'exécution des obligations qui lui incombent aux termes de l'article précédent du présent traité, le Gouvernement libanais reconnaît que le maintien permanent et la protection en toutes circonstances des voies de communication du Gouvernement français qui empruntent le territoire libanais sont dans l'intérêt de l'alliance.

ARTICLE 6.

Le présent traité est conclu pour une durée de vingt-cinq ans, et renouvelable par tacite reconduction pour une égale durée.

Les conventions et accords annexes d'application auront la même durée que le traité lui-même, à moins qu'une durée moindre ne soit stipulée dans l'acte, ou à moins que les hautes parties contractantes ne soient d'accord pour les reviser afin de tenir compte des situations nouvelles.

Les négociations pour des modifications éventuelles à apporter au traité seront ouvertes si, au cours de la vingt-quatrième année de son application, un des deux Gouvernements le demande.

ARTICLE 7.

Le présent traité sera ratifié et l'échange des ratifications effectué aussitôt que possible.

Il sera communiqué à la Société des Nations.

Ce traité entrera en vigueur, en même temps que les conventions et accords annexes, au jour de l'admission du Liban à la Société des Nations.

ARTICLE 8.

Dès l'entrée en vigueur du présent traité, le Gouvernement français sera déchargé des responsabilités et obligations qui lui incombent, en ce qui concerne le Liban, du fait tant de décisions internationales que d'actes de la Société des Nations.

Ces responsabilités et obligations, dans la mesure où elles subsisteraient, seront automatiquement transférées au Gouvernement libanais.

ARTICLE 9.

Le présent traité est rédigé en français et en arabe, ces deux textes sont officiels, le texte français faisant foi.

Au cas où une contestation s'élèverait au sujet de l'interprétation ou de l'application de ce traité, et où cette contestation n'aurait pu être réglée définitivement par voie de négociation directe, les hautes parties contractantes conviennent de recourir aux procédures de conciliation et d'arbitrages prévues par le Pacte de la Société des Nations.

Convention militaire.

ARTICLE 1^{er}.

Le Gouvernement libanais, se substituant aux autorités françaises, prend sous sa responsabilité les forces militaires constituées, composées d'éléments libanais, avec les charges et les obligations y afférentes.

ARTICLE 2.

Les forces armées libanaises doivent comprendre au minimum une brigade mixte et ses services.

ARTICLE 3.

Le Gouvernement français s'engage à accorder au Gouvernement de la République libanaise, à sa demande, les facilités ci-après, les dépenses devant en incomber au Gouvernement libanais.

(a) Mise à la disposition du Gouvernement libanais d'une mission militaire pour son armée, sa gendarmerie, sa marine ou son aviation militaire.

Le rôle, la composition et le statut de la mission seront déterminés d'accord entre les deux Gouvernements avant l'entrée en vigueur du traité d'alliance.

Etant donné qu'il serait désirable que l'entraînement et l'instruction fussent identiques dans les armées des deux hautes parties contractantes, le Gouvernement libanais s'engage à n'engager que des Français en qualité d'instructeurs et de spécialistes.

Les instructeurs ou spécialistes seraient demandés au Gouvernement français et relèveraient au point de vue de l'administration et de la discipline générale du chef de la mission militaire.

Les officiers de la mission militaire française pourront être appelés à exercer temporairement un commandement effectif dans les forces armées libanaises, sur demande adressée au représentant du Gouvernement français et agréée par lui. Dans ce cas, ces officiers relèveront du commandement normal de l'unité à laquelle ils seront affectés pour tout ce qui touche à l'exercice du commandement qui leur sera confié.

(b) Envoi dans les écoles, centres d'instruction et corps de troupes français et à bord des bâtiments de guerre français de tout le personnel des forces armées libanaises que le Gouvernement libanais aura jugé nécessaire de faire instruire en dehors du Liban.

ARTICLE 4.

Pour faciliter l'exécution des obligations de l'alliance, le Gouvernement libanais adoptera pour ses forces armées un armement, un matériel, et, dans la mesure nécessaire, un équipement, du même modèle que ceux en usage dans les forces armées françaises.

Le Gouvernement français accordera toutes facilités au Gouvernement libanais pour que ce dernier puisse assurer en France la fourniture aux forces armées libanaises des armes, munitions, navires, avions, matériel et équipement du modèle le plus récent.

ARTICLE 5.

En vue de répondre aux dispositions du deuxième alinéa de l'article 5 du traité, le Gouvernement français s'engage à maintenir sur le territoire libanais, jusqu'à nouvel accord des deux hautes parties contractantes, des éléments des forces françaises de l'armée de terre, de l'air et de la marine, stationnées au Levant.

Les conditions particulières de ce stationnement et la collaboration entre les forces françaises et libanaises feront l'objet d'accords périodiques entre les deux Gouvernements.

Il est spécifié que le stationnement de forces françaises en territoire libanais ne constitue pas une occupation et ne porte pas atteinte aux droits souverains du Liban.

ARTICLE 6.

Le Gouvernement libanais accordera toutes facilités possibles pour l'entretien, l'instruction, les déplacements, les transports et les communications des forces françaises, soit autour des points où elles stationneront, soit en transit entre ces points, ainsi que pour le transport, l'emménagement de tous les approvisionnements et équipements nécessaires à ces forces. Ces facilités comprennent l'usage des routes, chemins de fer, voies navigables, ports, quais, aérodromes, plans d'eau, le droit de survol et l'utilisation des réseaux télégraphiques, téléphoniques et radiotélégraphiques.

En aucun cas, il ne pourra être établi de tarif de discrimination à l'encontre du Gouvernement français.

Les navires de guerre français auront licence générale de pénétrer et de séjourner dans les eaux libanaises et de visiter les ports libanais, étant entendu que le Gouvernement libanais recevra notification préalable des visites aux ports libanais.

Le Gouvernement libanais mettra à la disposition du Gouvernement français tous emplacements et locaux nécessaires aux besoins des forces françaises.

Les modalités d'application de cette disposition, ainsi que les différentes questions relatives tant au domaine militaire français qu'à celui dont il a l'usufruit, feront l'objet d'accords particuliers.

ARTICLE 7.

En exécution de l'article 5 du traité d'alliance, et sous réserve des modifications que les hautes parties contractantes conviendraient d'y apporter par la suite, le Gouvernement libanais s'engage à assurer aux forces françaises et aux militaires ou marins français isolés, ainsi qu'aux employés civils français et à leurs familles se trouvant sur le territoire libanais en vertu de l'alliance, les privilèges et immunités dont ces militaires, marins et civils jouissaient au Liban lors de l'entrée en vigueur de la présente convention.

Echange de Lettres No. 1.

Le Président de la République libanaise au Haut-Commissaire de la République française.

En me référant à l'article 1^{er} de la convention militaire, j'ai l'honneur de faire savoir à votre Excellence que le Gouvernement libanais considère les droits acquis par les officiers, sous-officiers et militaires libanais des troupes spéciales comme faisant partie des charges et obligations visées par cet article.

Le Haut-Commissaire de la République française au Président de la République libanaise.

Se référant à l'article 1^{er} de la convention militaire, votre Excellence a bien voulu me faire connaître par une lettre en date de ce jour que le Gouvernement libanais considère les droits acquis par les officiers, sous-officiers et militaires libanais des troupes spéciales comme faisant partie des charges et obligations visées par cet article.

J'ai l'honneur de prendre acte de cette obligeante communication.

Protocole No. 1.

Se référant à l'article 7 de la convention militaire, les hautes parties contractantes sont d'accord pour décider de fixer, avant l'entrée en vigueur du traité et en se conformant aux arrangements intervenus dans les circonstances similaires, les privilèges et immunités auxquels se réfère l'article susvisé.

Echange de Lettres No. 2.

Le Président de la République libanaise au Haut-Commissaire de la République française.

Comme suite au traité signé en date de ce jour, j'ai l'honneur de porter à la connaissance de votre Excellence qu'en considération de l'amitié et de l'alliance étroite existant entre nos deux pays, le Gouvernement libanais recrutera en France les conseillers techniques, magistrats et fonctionnaires étrangers dont il jugera utile la présence au Liban.

Le Haut-Commissaire de la République française au Président de la République libanaise.

Par une lettre en date de ce jour, votre Excellence a bien voulu me faire connaître les intentions du Gouvernement libanais relativement à l'emploi de fonctionnaires étrangers au Liban. J'ai l'honneur de prendre acte de cette obligeante communication.

Echange de Lettres No. 3.

Le Président de la République libanaise au Haut-Commissaire de la République française.

Me référant à l'article 2 du traité que nous avons signé à la date de ce jour, j'ai l'honneur de faire savoir à votre Excellence que le Gouvernement libanais demande au Gouvernement français de bien vouloir assurer la protection des ressortissants et des intérêts libanais conformément aux usages internationaux suivis en ces matières, partout où le Gouvernement libanais ne serait pas directement représenté.

Le Haut-Commissaire de la République française au Président de la République libanaise.

Répondant à la lettre de votre Excellence, en date de ce jour, j'ai l'honneur de lui faire savoir que pour accéder au désir exprimé par le Gouvernement libanais et conformément aux usages internationaux suivis en ces matières, le Gouvernement français acceptera volontiers d'assurer la protection des ressortissants et des intérêts libanais, partout où le Gouvernement libanais ne serait pas directement représenté.

Echange de Lettres No. 4.

Le Président de la République libanaise au Haut-Commissaire de la République française.

En attendant l'entrée en vigueur du présent traité, j'ai l'honneur de porter à la connaissance de votre Excellence que le Gouvernement libanais, désireux d'établir une liaison plus étroite entre les émigrés libanais et la métropole, demande au Gouvernement français son accord sur la création de postes d'attachés libanais auprès des représentants diplomatiques et consulaires de la République française, dans les villes de l'étranger où les intérêts libanais justifient cette mesure.

Il lui demande également de vouloir bien lui prêter tout son appui pour la défense des intérêts divers des émigrés.

Le Haut-Commissaire de la République française au Président de la République libanaise.

Répondant à la lettre de votre Excellence en date de ce jour, j'ai l'honneur de lui faire savoir que pour accéder au désir exprimé par le Gouvernement libanais, le Gouvernement français est d'accord pour que des postes d'attachés libanais soient créés auprès des représentants diplomatiques et consulaires français, dans les villes de l'étranger où les intérêts libanais justifient cette mesure.

D'une manière générale, le Gouvernement français prêterait tout son appui pour la défense des intérêts divers des émigrés.

Echange de Lettres No. 5.

Le Haut-Commissaire de la République française au Président de la République libanaise.

En me référant à l'article 2 du traité que nous avons signé en date de ce jour, j'ai l'honneur de porter à la connaissance de votre Excellence que le représentant diplomatique du Gouvernement de la République française au Liban aura qualité d'Ambassadeur.

Le Président de la République libanaise au Haut-Commissaire de la République française.

En réponse à votre lettre en date de ce jour, j'ai l'honneur de faire savoir à votre Excellence que le Gouvernement libanais, désireux de marquer sa satisfaction à la suite de la nomination du représentant de la République française en qualité de premier Ambassadeur au Liban, décide que son rang de préséance

par rapport aux représentants des autres Puissances restera conféré à ses successeurs.

Le Gouvernement libanais tient, à cette occasion, à porter à la connaissance de votre Excellence que le représentant diplomatique du Liban auprès de la République française aura rang de Ministre plénipotentiaire pendant la durée du présent traité.

Echange de Lettres No. 6.

Le Président de la République libanaise au Haut-Commissaire de la République française.

J'ai l'honneur de confirmer à votre Excellence que le Gouvernement libanais est disposé à garantir l'égalité des droits civils et politiques entre tous ses ressortissants sans distinction aucune.

Il est également disposé à assurer une représentation équitable des différents éléments du pays dans l'ensemble des emplois de l'Etat.

Le Gouvernement libanais assurera dans la répartition des dépenses d'utilité publique une juste proportion entre les différentes régions.

Le Haut-Commissaire de la République française au Président de la République libanaise.

Par une lettre en date de ce jour votre Excellence a bien voulu me faire connaître que le Gouvernement libanais est disposé à garantir l'égalité des droits civils et politiques entre tous ses ressortissants sans distinction aucune, à assurer une représentation équitable des différents éléments du pays dans l'ensemble des emplois de l'Etat et à assurer dans la répartition des dépenses d'utilité publique une juste proportion entre les différentes régions.

J'ai l'honneur de prendre acte de cette obligeante communication.

Echange de Lettres No. 6 bis.

Le Président de la République libanaise au Haut-Commissaire de la République française.

J'ai l'honneur de confirmer à votre Excellence que, pour donner effet aux stipulations de l'Echange de Lettres No. 6, le Gouvernement libanais assurera le plus tôt possible, et en tout cas avant l'entrée en vigueur du traité, l'unification du régime fiscal.

Dans le même esprit le Gouvernement libanais est également disposé à appliquer à l'ensemble du territoire de la République un programme de réformes administratives comportant :

1. L'octroi aux municipalités d'attributions plus étendues.
2. La création de conseils de districts, habilités à étudier les questions d'intérêt local.

Suivant l'importance des matières, lesdits conseils pourront soit donner leur avis, soit se prononcer définitivement.

Leurs décisions définitives seront suivant des cas à déterminer soumises ou non à l'approbation du Gouvernement central.

Lesdits conseils seront notamment consultés sur les affectations de la part du budget des dépenses intéressant leur district.

Le Haut-Commissaire de la République française au Président de la République libanaise.

Par une lettre en date de ce jour votre Excellence a bien voulu me faire connaître que, pour donner effet aux stipulations de l'Echange de Lettres No. 6, le Gouvernement libanais assurera le plus tôt possible, et en tout cas avant l'entrée en vigueur du traité, l'unification du régime fiscal et que dans le même esprit il est disposé à appliquer à l'ensemble du territoire de la République un programme de réformes administratives.

J'ai l'honneur de prendre acte de cette obligeante communication.

Protocole No. 2.

Les hautes parties contractantes constatent leur accord sur les points suivants :

Afin de préparer le transfert au Gouvernement libanais des pouvoirs de législation et de gestion actuellement exercés par le représentant de la France, pour le compte du Liban, en matières économiques et financières, le Gouvernement libanais est prêt à entrer en négociations dès la ratification du traité franco-libanais pour régler les questions pendantes entre le Liban et la Syrie.

Le Gouvernement français pour sa part est prêt à assurer le transfert susvisé conformément à tout règlement résultant de ces négociations.

Au cas où le règlement ne comporterait ni existence d'un organe commun au Liban et à la Syrie, ni modalités de collaboration entre les administrations libanaises et syriennes, le Gouvernement libanais n'établira pas, à l'encontre de la Syrie, sous condition de réciprocité, de régime discriminatoire par rapport aux autres États détachés de l'ancien empire ottoman.

En cas d'absence d'organe commun, le Gouvernement français transfèrera directement au Gouvernement libanais les pouvoirs de législation et de gestion actuellement exercés par le représentant de la France, pour le compte du Liban, en matières économiques et financières.

Echange de Lettres No. 7.

Le Président de la République libanaise au Haut-Commissaire de la République française.

J'ai l'honneur de porter à la connaissance de votre Excellence que le Gouvernement libanais est disposé à conserver aux établissements d'enseignement, d'assistance et de bienfaisance étrangers, ainsi qu'aux missions de recherches archéologiques, le bénéfice du régime actuel des œuvres et des antiquités.

Le Haut-Commissaire de la République française au Président de la République libanaise.

Par une lettre en date de ce jour, votre Excellence a bien voulu me faire connaître les intentions du Gouvernement libanais relativement au régime des œuvres et des antiquités au Liban.

J'ai l'honneur de prendre acte de cette obligeante communication.

Protocole No. 3.

Les hautes parties contractantes s'engagent à négocier, dès ratification du traité franco-libanais, une convention universitaire.

Echange de Lettres No. 8.

Le Président de la République libanaise au Haut-Commissaire de la République française.

Au moment où les relations avec la France vont être réglées par un traité d'amitié et d'alliance, j'ai l'honneur de porter à la connaissance de votre Excellence que, sous réserve des modifications qui seraient apportées, d'accord entre les hautes parties contractantes, pour tenir compte des conditions économiques et financières existant au Liban, aux concessions et conventions intéressant les finances de l'État ou des collectivités publiques, le Gouvernement libanais s'engage à respecter les droits acquis au nom du Liban et pour son compte, au bénéfice des personnes physiques et morales françaises.

Le Haut-Commissaire de la République française au Président de la République libanaise.

Par une lettre en date de ce jour, votre Excellence a bien voulu me faire connaître que, sous réserve des modifications qui seraient apportées d'accord entre les hautes parties contractantes, pour tenir compte des conditions économiques et financières existant au Liban, aux concessions et conventions intéressant les finances de l'État ou des collectivités publiques, le Gouvernement libanais s'engage à respecter les droits acquis institués au nom du Liban et pour son compte, au bénéfice des personnes physiques et morales françaises.

J'ai l'honneur de prendre acte de cette obligeante communication.

Echange de Lettres No. 9.

Le Président de la République libanaise au Haut-Commissaire de la République française.

Au moment où les relations entre la France et le Liban vont se trouver définies par un traité d'amitié et d'alliance, j'ai l'honneur de donner l'assurance à votre Excellence que le Gouvernement libanais maintiendra la parité monétaire existant entre la monnaie libanaise et la monnaie française.

Le Haut-Commissaire de la République française au Président de la République libanaise.

Par une lettre en date de ce jour, votre Excellence a bien voulu me donner l'assurance que le Gouvernement libanais maintiendra la parité monétaire existant entre la monnaie libanaise et la monnaie française.

J'ai l'honneur de prendre acte de cette obligeante communication.

Echange de Lettres No. 10.

Le Haut-Commissaire de la République française au Président de la République libanaise.

En vue de fixer la situation respective des ressortissants français au Liban et libanais en France, j'ai l'honneur de porter à la connaissance de votre Excellence que le Gouvernement français est prêt à négocier avec le Gouvernement libanais une convention d'établissement.

Cette convention portera confirmation du *modus vivendi* établi par le décret du Président de la République française en date du 25 avril 1935.

Il sera en outre précisé :

1. Que les ressortissants de l'une des hautes parties contractantes jouiront du traitement de la nation la plus favorisée en ce qui concerne l'accès auprès des tribunaux de l'autre partie, tant pour réclamer que pour défendre leurs droits à tous les degrés de juridiction établis par les lois.

2. Qu'en ce qui concerne l'accès et le séjour les ressortissants libanais bénéficieront dans les colonies françaises du traitement accordé aux ressortissants de la nation la plus favorisée.

Le Gouvernement français assurera ce traitement aux ressortissants libanais, personnes physiques ou sociétés qui sont ou seraient admis à s'établir sur le territoire des colonies françaises, sous réserve de l'observation des lois d'ordre public ou de sûreté, ainsi que de la législation locale.

Le Gouvernement français recommandera au Gouvernement tunisien de ne pas établir de discrimination à l'encontre des ressortissants libanais en ce qui concerne leur accès et leur séjour en Tunisie et d'accorder également aux ressortissants libanais, personnes physiques ou sociétés, établies sur le territoire tunisien, le bénéfice des droits communs aux ressortissants des diverses Puissances, sous réserve de l'observation des lois d'ordre public et de sûreté ainsi que de la législation locale.

De même les ressortissants des colonies et protectorats bénéficieront au Liban du traitement accordé aux ressortissants de la nation la plus favorisée.

Le Président de la République libanaise au Haut-Commissaire de la République française.

Par une lettre en date de ce jour, votre Excellence a bien voulu me faire part des conditions dans lesquelles le Gouvernement français était prêt à négocier avec le Gouvernement libanais une convention d'établissement.

J'ai l'honneur de faire part à votre Excellence que le Gouvernement libanais, d'accord avec le Gouvernement français sur les termes de cette lettre, prend acte de cette obligeante communication.

Protocole No. 4.

Les hautes parties contractantes s'engagent à entrer en négociations, après ratification du traité, pour définir, dans le délai fixé pour l'admission du Liban à la Société des Nations, un régime judiciaire propre à concilier le souci de protection des intérêts étrangers avec les progrès accomplis par le Gouvernement libanais dans l'organisation de la justice.

Le Gouvernement français prêterait son plein appui au Gouvernement libanais pour assurer, dans ce même délai, la mise en application de ce régime.

Echange de Lettres No. 11.

Le Haut-Commissaire de la République française au Président de la République libanaise.

En vertu des décisions de la Société des Nations, le Gouvernement français était autorisé à demander au Gouvernement libanais de participer aux frais d'entretien de ses forces militaires et fondé à s'entendre avec lui en vue du remboursement de toutes les dépenses encourues par lui pour l'organisation de l'administration, le développement des ressources locales et l'exécution des travaux publics au Liban.

J'ai l'honneur de faire savoir à votre Excellence que le Gouvernement français, tenant compte de la prochaine accession du Liban au statut d'Etat pleinement indépendant, a décidé, à l'occasion de la signature du traité d'alliance, de ne pas demander le remboursement de ces dépenses.

Seuls feront l'objet d'un remboursement les divers immeubles et installations remis au Gouvernement libanais dont le prix sera évalué par une commission arbitrale mixte au moment où s'effectuera la remise.

Le Président de la République libanaise au Haut-Commissaire de la République française.

Par une lettre en date de ce jour, votre Excellence a bien voulu me faire connaître les intentions du Gouvernement français en ce qui touche les dépenses civiles et militaires encourues par la France au Liban.

Le Gouvernement français, tenant compte de la prochaine accession du Liban au statut d'Etat pleinement indépendant, a décidé, à l'occasion de la signature du traité d'alliance, de ne pas demander le remboursement de ces dépenses.

Seuls feront l'objet d'un remboursement les divers immeubles et installations remis au Gouvernement libanais et dont le prix sera évalué par une commission arbitrale mixte au moment où s'effectuera cette remise.

J'ai l'honneur de prendre acte de cette obligeante communication.

Protocole No. 5.

Se référant au quatrième alinéa du préambule du traité, les hautes parties contractantes tiennent à préciser que leur intention est de consacrer les deux premières années du délai de trois ans que stipule ce texte à la mise en place de toutes les institutions libanaises destinées à assurer la reprise par le Gouvernement libanais des responsabilités qu'assume actuellement le représentant de la France pour le compte du Liban, la troisième année du délai susvisé étant destinée à l'adaptation de ces institutions à l'exercice de ces responsabilités.

Se référant par ailleurs au Protocole No. 2, les hautes parties contractantes considèrent que les négociations prévues au deuxième alinéa de ce texte doivent aboutir dans un délai d'une année à compter de la date à laquelle elles seront engagées.

Les hautes parties contractantes feront toutes diligences pour que ces négociations s'ouvrent à une date aussi proche que possible du 1^{er} janvier 1937.

Au cas où le règlement résultant de ces négociations ne comporterait pas l'existence d'un organe commun, les hautes parties contractantes conviennent de limiter à six mois le délai supplémentaire consacré à l'organisation des administrations libanaises auxquelles seront transférées les attributions économiques et financières actuellement exercées pour le compte du Liban par le représentant de la France.

Enclosure 2 in No. 79.

Table of Comparison between Franco-Lebanese and Franco-Syrian Treaties.

<i>Article of Franco-Lebanese.</i>	<i>Corresponding Article in Franco-Syrian.</i>	<i>Main Points of Difference, if any.</i>
TREATY.		
1	1	None.
2	2	The phrase "... s'abstenir de tout accord incompatible avec le présent traité " is used instead of "... éviter toute action de nature à compromettre leurs relations avec les autres Puissances."
3	3	None.
4	4	None.
5	5	Military, naval and air assistance is specified in place of air assistance only, but " means of communication " is used instead of " aerial transit routes."
6	6	" 24th year " is used instead of " 20th year."
7	7	None.
8	8	None.
9	9	None.
MILITARY CONVENTION.		
1	1	Minor.
2	2	One mixed brigade is laid down instead of a division of infantry, a brigade of cavalry, &c.
3 (a)	3 (a)	None.
(b)	(b)	No mention is made, as in Syrian treaty, of possibility of military students being sent elsewhere than France.
4	4	None.
5	5	Totally different. Specifies retention of French naval, military and air units in Lebanon, &c.
6	6	Minor.
7	7	Minor.
8	8	Minor.

Article of Franco-Lebanese.	Corresponding Article in Franco-Syrian.	Main Points of Difference, if any.
PROTOCOLS.		
1	1	None.
2	2	None.
3	3	None.
4	4	Is less precise than in Franco-Syrian treaty and gives no indication of form which revised judicial organisation may take.
5	5	None.
EXCHANGES OF LETTERS.		
1	1	None.
2	2	None.
3	3	None.
4	No counterpart.	
5	4	None.
6	5	Is more precise as regards equality of treatment for all citizens.
6 (bis)	No counterpart.	
7	7	None.
8	8	None.
9	9	None.
10	10	None.
11	11	None.

[E 7488/195/89]

No. 80.

Consul-General Havard to Mr. Eden.—(Received December 1.)

(No. 108.)

Sir,

Beirut, November 24, 1936.

WITH reference to Mr. Furlonge's telegram No. 11 of the 18th November, I have the honour to report that the extraordinary session of the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies, convened on the 17th November, unanimously voted the ratification of the Franco-Lebanese Treaty after a brief debate in which hardly a word of criticism was heard. The Tripoli Deputy alone absented himself from the session and, I understand, sent a telegram of protest to the President.

2. On the 19th November the Lebanese Chamber, in an ordinary session, re-elected the Emir Khalid Shehab (a Sunni Moslem) as its president and Negib Bey Osserrane (a Shiah) vice-president.

3. The military control instituted in Beirut as a result of the disorders of the 15th and 16th November was successful in obviating any further large-scale rioting, though sporadic acts of violence continued until the 18th November. Most Christian shops were reopened on that day, and by the 20th conditions were again normal.

4. The events which followed the disorders showed that in many quarters the danger of a revival of religious antagonisms in the Lebanon had been widely recognised. Delegations representing Moslems and Christians met, and, after expressions of friendship, issued a manifesto denying that the riots had had any religious character. Two Syrian Nationalist leaders, Jamil Mardam and Saadallah Jabri, came to Beirut with the expressed intention of exerting a calming influence on their Lebanese co-religionists, and when the High Commissioner, who had received a telegram from M. Viénot expressing regret that inter-sectarian disorders should have followed the signature of the treaty, showed it to two prominent Beirut Moslems and warned them that the French Government would consider further Moslem opposition to the treaty as merely a religious manoeuvre and would act accordingly, they were at pains to explain that the rioters had been irresponsible youths and in no way reflected Moslem opinion. The combined effect of these various measures has undoubtedly quietened the Beirut Moslems, and further trouble from them is, I consider, now unlikely.

5. In Tripoli, however, which (as already reported) had been on strike for a month as a protest against its forthcoming inclusion in the Lebanon, the news of

the Beirut riots, distorted by hearsay into the form of "a massacre of Moslems by Christians," had a disastrous effect on the already dissatisfied Moslem majority. On the 18th November a large demonstration hoisted Syrian flags on the mosques, though without disorder. On the 19th the French *délégué* called up three of the Moslem leaders and read them M. Viénot's telegram referred to above. Despite this, a demonstration after the midday prayer came into violent collision with police and troops, and at least three demonstrators were killed and many injured. The three principal Moslem leaders were at once arrested by the French authorities and imprisoned in Beirut. The arrest caused another fierce riot the same evening in Tripoli, which lasted some three hours and resulted in a further three or four persons being killed and many injured. Firing continued during the night, and next day the town was isolated and patrolled by the military authorities. No further disorders have since occurred, but two of the three sections of the town are still closed and patrolled by troops; the third, which includes the port, has been largely unaffected by the strike and disorders, and the loading of the citrus crop, which is at present in full swing, has not been interfered with. Efforts are being made by the High Commissioner and Lebanese President to convince the Tripolitains that they have nothing to fear from the interpretation which will be given to the treaty, but it seems improbable that the hard and fanatical Moslem majority of Tripoli will be as easy to appease as have been the softer Beirutis.

6. I understand that a commission has now been appointed by the Lebanese Government to consider the question of administrative reform, in pursuance of exchange of letters No. 6 (bis) annexed to the treaty. The commission is expected to devote its attention first and foremost to the Tripoli area.

7. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Excellency the High Commissioner for Palestine and His Majesty's consul at Damascus.

I have, &c.

G. T. HAVARD.

[E 7611/688/89]

No. 81.

Sir P. Loraine to Mr. Eden.—(Received December 7.)

(No. 591.)

Sir,

Angora, December 2, 1936.

I HAVE the honour, with reference to my telegram No. 190 of the 2nd December on the subject of the difference which has arisen between the French and Turkish Governments respecting the Sanjak of Alexandretta, to transmit to you herewith—

(1) Copies of the second Turkish white book containing the texts of notes exchanged with the French Government on the 10th November and the 17th November.⁽¹⁾

(2) An account, published by the Turkish official news agency, of the statement made by the Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Grand National Assembly on the 27th November.⁽¹⁾

2. A spirited debate followed this statement, in the course of which several Deputies, amid much cheering, strongly criticised France's treatment of the Turkish population of the sanjak. Others threatened to take the sanjak by force whatever the decision of the League Council. Others, again, described the sanjak as Turkey's Alsace-Lorraine and demanded the immediate abolition of the unnatural frontier which separated Turk from Turk; the annexation of the sanjak to the motherland, and the creation of a new national frontier from the Orontes to the Euphrates. At the close of the debate the Assembly gave its approval of the Government's decision to accept the reference of the dispute to the Council of the League of Nations.

3. I am sending a copy of this despatch (less the first enclosure) to His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris.

I have, &c.

PERCY LORAINE.

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

[E 7613/195/89]

No. 82.

Consul MacKereth to Mr. Eden.—(Received December 7.)

(No. 82.)

Sir,

Damascus, December 1, 1936.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 79 of the 27th October (paragraph 4), I have the honour to inform you that the Syrian general elections were completed, with the exception of the constituencies of Dera'a and Kuneitra, yesterday by the return of every candidate nominated by the Nationalist bloc.

2. Generally the elections were held in the completely calm atmosphere of public apathy. Only at Dera'a and Hassetcheh were there any incidents. At Dera'a one village prevented the collegiates (of the first electoral college) of a neighbouring village registering their votes for reasons connected with the pasturage of goats.

3. Parliament will meet on the 21st December, when the Franco-Syrian Treaty will be tabled for ratification.

4. Copies of this despatch are being sent to His Majesty's consul-general in Beirut and His Majesty's High Commissioner in Jerusalem.

I have, &c.

GILBERT MACKERETH.

[E 7876/195/89]

No. 83.

Acting Consul Davis to Mr. Eden.—(Received December 18.)

(No. 62.)

Sir,

Aleppo, December 10, 1936.

WITH reference to Mr. Consul Parr's despatch No. 56 of the 13th October last, I have the honour to report that the elections in the district of Aleppo and the Euphrates for the new Assembly to which the Franco-Syrian Treaty is to be submitted have now been completed. A list of the new Deputies is enclosed herewith.⁽¹⁾

2. As was anticipated, members of the Nationalist party have been exclusively elected. Each of the 501 electors chosen as a result of the primary elections was approached by the Nationalists and handed a printed list of the candidates of that party for whom he was required to vote. This form of canvassing was so successful that out of the 501 voting papers handed in, six were cancelled on technical grounds and the remaining 495 were unanimously in favour of the Nationalist party's nominees.

3. The only district in which the elections have not been completed is Al Jazira where there was such strong opposition to the Nationalist candidates that the Government was obliged to postpone the elections.

I have, &c.

A. W. DAVIS.

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

[E 7877/688/89]

No. 84.

Acting Consul Davis to Mr. Eden.—(Received December 18.)

(No. 65. Confidential.)

Sir,

Aleppo, December 12, 1936.

I HAVE the honour to report that on the 30th November last, on the occasion of the secondary elections in the Sandjak of Alexandretta, serious disturbances took place at Antioch. It is reported that some pro-Turkish elements had made plans for a widespread rising on this occasion, but a hot-headed assault by young demonstrators on the houses of three newly-elected Moslem Deputies in Antioch precipitated a climax before the leaders were ready. The civil authorities there immediately called in the troops. Order was quickly re-established after three persons had been killed and seventeen seriously wounded.

2. For some days after the incident Antioch and its district was patrolled by cavalry, tanks and armoured cars were stationed in the principal centres, and machine-guns were posted in the bazaars. From 7 o'clock in the evening onwards no movement was allowed in the streets.

3. There is a great deal of discussion and surmise locally regarding the future of the sandjak. Many Syrian Nationalists profess to believe that the question has already been settled between France and Turkey and that the reference to the League of Nations is a mere formality designed to render the bitter pill of dismemberment less unpalatable. They have accordingly sent some of their best men to Geneva to watch the proceedings of the League in the interests of the Syrian Republic. Dr. Abdul Rahman-el-Kayali, newly-elected Deputy for Aleppo, left this town yesterday for Tripoli to fly to Europe by the Air France. He is accompanied by Hassan Jbara, Director of Finance at Alexandretta, a prominent member of the Alaouite community, and they are to be joined by Ihsan-el-Jabri and the Emir Shakib Arslan, two of the principal advisers of the Syrian delegation during the recent treaty negotiations in Paris.

4. Turkish consular representatives in this area have shown great interest in the recent events at Antioch. My Turkish colleague here, Haki Bey, left on the 9th December for Antioch, where he met Faridoun Bey, the Turkish consul-general at Beirut. They returned together to Aleppo in the evening of the 11th. It is reported that Faridoun Bey is going on to Angora to report.

5. Certain Turkish papers have been banned in Antioch and Alexandretta to avoid inflaming local feeling, which is already sufficiently intense. They have, in fact, been publishing sensational accounts of the atrocities inflicted on the Turkish inhabitants of the sandjak.

6. From a conversation I had yesterday with General Noiret, Officer Commanding Troops in Northern Syria, it would appear that the military authorities are on the alert on the Turco-Syrian frontier and that the troops have been reinforced. He stated to me that his chief anxiety was that any decision to be taken should be taken quickly. He did not anticipate any "ungentlemanly" action on the part of the Turkish Government itself, but he did entertain apprehensions lest ignorant Turkish subordinates in charge of frontier garrisons should through excess of zeal involve themselves in awkward incidents, or unauthorised firebrands on the Turkish side should seize the opportunity to display their patriotism and at the same time collect a little loot by an excursion into Syrian territory. He added that any such unwelcome visitors would find everything very nicely prepared for their reception.

I have, &c.

A. W. DAVIS.

[E 8079/195/89]

No. 85.

Consul MacKereth to Mr. Eden.—(Received December 30.)

(No. 87.)

HIS Majesty's consul at Damascus presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, with reference to Damascus despatch No. 78 of the 26th October, 1936, has the honour to transmit to him a copy of an extract from the *Echos de Syrie* of the 13th December respecting Alawit territory.

Damascus, December 13, 1936.

Enclosure in No. 85.

Extract from the Echos de Syrie of December 13, 1936.

Le Rattachement des Alaouites à la Syrie: l'Arrêté réglant les Modalités de ce Rattachement.

LE Haut-Commissaire de la République française,
Vu l'Acte de Mandat du 24 juillet 1922, vu le décret du 23 novembre 1920 fixant les pouvoirs du Haut-Commissaire;
Vu le décret du 16 juillet 1933;

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Attendu qu'un accord a été réalisé à Paris entre le Gouvernement français et la délégation qui avait été chargée d'établir les bases d'un traité à intervenir entre la France et la Syrie;

Attendu que cet accord comporte le transfert au Gouvernement syrien des prérogatives de souveraineté dont l'exercice avait été réservé au Haut-Commissaire par l'arrêté No. 3114 du 14 mars 1930, et la définition des modalités du régime spécial en matière administrative et financière que le Gouvernement syrien entend assurer au territoire de Lattaquieh, conformément aux principes définis par la Société des Nations,

Arrête :

Article 1^{er}. Le territoire de Lattaquieh fait partie de l'Etat de Syrie.

Art. 2. Ce territoire bénéficie, au sein de l'Etat de Syrie, d'un régime spécial administratif et financier dont les modalités sont définies dans le règlement ci-annexé.

Art. 3. Sous la réserve des dispositions de ce règlement, le territoire de Lattaquieh est régi par la Constitution, les lois et les règlements généraux de la République syrienne.

Art. 4. Le présent arrêté et le règlement y annexé entreront en vigueur en lieu et place des textes régissant antérieurement ces matières, dès ratification du Traité franco-syrien.

D. DE MARTEL.

Beyrouth, le 5 décembre 1936.

Règlement organique du Territoire alaouite.

Article 1^{er}. Le régime spécial dont est doté, dans la République syrienne, le territoire de Lattaquieh dans ses limites actuelles, en matière administrative et financière, est réglé par les articles suivants.

Pour assurer l'application de ce régime, le Mohafez, nommé par le Président de la République, et le Conseil administratif du territoire sont investis des pouvoirs spéciaux ci-après définis.

Art. 2. Le Président de la République nomme les magistrats. Il nomme, sur la présentation du Mohafez, les caïmakams et les chefs des services centraux du territoire.

Le Mohafez, en vertu de la délégation permanente du Président de la République syrienne, nomme les autres fonctionnaires. Il nomme également les mudirs.

Le Mohafez exerce le pouvoir réglementaire pour les matières qui sont de sa compétence en vertu du présent règlement.

Art. 3. Le Conseil administratif est composé d'au moins treize membres élus suivant le mode de scrutin en vigueur dans l'Etat, et de quatre membres nommés. Ces derniers sont choisis par le Président de la République sur une liste de propositions établies par le Mohafez, sur laquelle sont portés les présidents des chambres de commerce et d'agriculture et d'autres notables du territoire.

Les membres du Conseil sont élus, ou nommés, pour quatre ans. Le Conseil est renouvelable par moitié.

Art. 4. Le budget du territoire comprend en recettes :

- (1) Le produit de tous impôts d'Etat, taxes et revenus de toute nature perçus sur le territoire et la perception est régulièrement autorisée;
- (2) Les sommes attribuées à titre de répartition de surplus de recettes figurant actuellement au compte de gestion, après défalcation des dépenses générales intéressant l'ensemble de l'Etat de Syrie et prises en charge par le budget général de la République syrienne;
- (3) Des fonds de concours ou des contributions qui lui sont versées, soit par des Etats ou collectivités publiques, soit par des particuliers.

Le budget du territoire comprend en dépenses :

- (1) Toutes les dépenses des services publics sur son territoire;
- (2) Une contribution aux dépenses d'administration générale de l'Etat égale à 5 pour cent du total des recettes ordinaires du territoire;
- (3) Le service des emprunts contractés par le territoire ou à son bénéfice;
- (4) Le service des pensions.

Art. 5. Le projet de budget est préparé par le Mohafez, assisté des chefs de service et soumis avant le 1^{er} octobre à l'examen du Ministre des Finances.

Dans le délai d'un mois, celui-ci fait connaître ses observations sur l'application des lois et règlements généraux de l'Etat et leur répercussion sur les recettes et les dépenses, ainsi que sur toutes mesures propres à assurer l'équilibre des finances du territoire.

Art. 6. Le Mohafez convoque le Conseil administratif au plus tard le 15 novembre, pour examen du projet de budget. La durée de cette session ne dépasse pas quinze jours.

Le budget voté par le Conseil administratif est promulgué par le Président de la République avant l'ouverture de l'exercice.

Art. 7. Les projets d'emprunts et de concessions intéressant le territoire et engageant ses finances sont préparés, présentés, délibérés, conclus et accordés dans les mêmes conditions que le budget.

[E 8024/195/89]

No. 86.

Consul MacKereth to Mr. Eden.—(Received December 29.)

(No. 88.)

Sir,

Damascus, December 21, 1936.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 82 of the 1st December, concerning the Syrian elections, I have the honour to inform you that Parliament met this morning when the President of the Republic, subjected to minatory insinuations from the Nationalist bloc, tendered his resignation after failing to obtain assurances of protection from the French authorities. He thus made room for Hashem-al-Atassy, who was elected with acclamation in his stead.

2. The new President called upon Jamil Mardam to form a Government. This he did; taking himself the offices of President of the Council and Minister of National Economy. Saadullah-al-Jabri obtained the portfolio of Minister of Internal and External Affairs, Shukri Quwatli taking those of Finance and Defence and Abdurrahman-al-Kayali Justice and Education. Fares-al-Khoury was unanimously elected President of the Chamber (Speaker).

3. The four members of the new Government are all in the middle forties and each has distinguished himself by persistent and bitter opposition to the mandate and the mandatory.

4. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's representatives in Bagdad, Jerusalem, Beirut and Aleppo.

I have, &c.

GILBERT MAC KERETH.

CHAPTER IV.—GENERAL.

[E 4109/94/31]

No. 87.

Sir R. Vansittart (for the Secretary of State) to His Majesty's Representatives at Jeddah (No. 71), Bagdad (No. 121) and Cairo (No. 397).

(Confidential.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, July 4, 1936.

FOLLOWING for your confidential information only:—

"On 16th June acting on instructions, Saudi Minister spoke of Ibn Saud's anxiety about situation in Palestine and difficult position in which His Majesty found himself as he was receiving repeated requests not only from his own people, but from Arabs elsewhere, to support Arab cause in Palestine. Minister having expressed Ibn Saud's desire to do anything possible in conjunction with His Majesty's Government to ameliorate present troubles, he was told that if His Majesty was able to use his influence to persuade Arabs to abandon campaign of violence he would be doing service not only to His Majesty's Government but to Arabs themselves.

"On 23rd July the Minister communicated orally an offer by Ibn Saud to take the initiative in concerting action with the Kings of Iraq and the Yemen to urge on Palestine Arabs in their own interests advisability of cessation of present disturbances. Such action would be based on recent assurances by Secretary of State for the Colonies that grievances of Arabs would be thoroughly examined as soon as disorders cease. Before taking it Ibn Saud wished to assure himself of concurrence of His Majesty's Government.

"Saudi Minister was informed on 4th July that His Majesty's Government appreciate and gladly accept Ibn Saud's offer."

[E 4109/94/31]

No. 88.

Mr. Eden to Mr. Calvert (Jeddah).

(No. 172.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, July 7, 1936.

YOU will already be aware from previous correspondence of the interest which the King of Saudi Arabia has recently shown, through his Minister in London, in the settlement of the present troubles in Palestine. It may be useful to summarise in the present despatch the conversations on this subject which have taken place with Sheikh Hafiz Wahba.

2. On the 16th June the Minister called at the Foreign Office to express the anxiety which King Ibn Saud felt regarding the situation in Palestine and to explain that the King was being inundated with telegrams and representations from Arabs, not only in his own dominions, but elsewhere, upbraiding him for not supporting the Arabs of Palestine. The Minister said that the King felt obliged to return some reply to these representations, but wished to do so only in consultation with His Majesty's Government. Furthermore, King Ibn Saud desired to do anything that might be possible, in conjunction with His Majesty's Government, to ameliorate the present troubles.

3. The intention of His Majesty's Government to send a Royal Commission to Palestine, once order had been restored, was then explained to the Saudi Minister, who was informed that, if King Ibn Saud were able to use his influence to persuade the Arabs to abandon their campaign of violence, he would indeed be doing a service not only to His Majesty's Government, but to the Arabs themselves.

4. Sheikh Hafiz Wahba called again at the Foreign Office on the 23rd June to say that he had informed King Ibn Saud in this sense and that His Majesty had replied that, after considering the matter, it would, in his opinion, be

preferable that action should be taken not merely by him alone, but by him in conjunction with the King of Iraq and the Imam of the Yemen. King Ibn Saud did not propose to tell these two potentates that he was acting otherwise than on his own initiative, but he did not wish even to make such a proposal at Bagdad or Sanaa unless it received the full concurrence of His Majesty's Government. What King Ibn Saud had in mind was that the three rulers should advise the Arabs of Palestine that it would inevitably be against their best interests if they continued the present disturbances, and His Majesty thought that such representations might be based on the recent assurance of the Secretary of State for the Colonies that the grievances of the Arabs would be thoroughly examined as soon as the disorders ceased.

5. On the 3rd July the Saudi Arabian Minister was asked to call again at the Foreign Office and was then informed by Sir L. Oliphant that His Majesty's Government appreciated to the full and gladly accepted the offer of King Ibn Saud to take the initiative in concerting joint action with the King of Iraq and the Imam of the Yemen to secure, if possible, the cessation of the Arab rising in Palestine.

6. Sir Lancelot Oliphant added that he feared that the fact that ten days had elapsed since the Minister had last mentioned the matter might have been misconstrued at Mecca. The Minister interjected that this was in fact the case, and that he had received a further message from King Ibn Saud on this point. Sir Lancelot Oliphant continued that the Minister, knowing this country well, would appreciate the overwhelming calls on the time of Ministers; that this had been a matter not merely for the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, but also for the Secretary of State for the Colonies, and that in fact it had only been possible for the matter to be considered on the 1st July. Sir L. Oliphant therefore requested the Minister to be so kind as to explain that the delay was in no sense due to lack of appreciation. This Sheikh Hafiz Wahba readily promised to do.

7. The Minister then went on to say that King Ibn Saud had recently received various reports that the Bedouin, both in Saudi Arabia and in Transjordan, were threatening to take action and to make demonstrations on behalf of the Arabs in Palestine. His Majesty had already deprecated such action, and had issued orders to his local Governors that any demonstrations or troubles of this nature should be suppressed. In saying this, he wished His Majesty's Government to know that, in the course of such local action, the arrest might be inevitable not only of some of his own subjects, but also of citizens of Transjordan who might cross into Saudi Arabian territory, either to foment agitation or the despatch of Saudi Arabian subjects to Palestine.

8. Telegrams and messages had been reaching King Ibn Saud from all quarters, including Palestine, urging him to intervene on behalf of the Arabs in Palestine, *vis-à-vis* of His Majesty's Government. He had consistently replied, that, while appreciating the difficulties of the situation, he felt it would be impossible for the British Government to yield to popular clamour expressed in the shape of disorders, and that the first thing for the Arabs to do was to cease their lawlessness. To this the Arabs of Palestine had replied that they had at the outset no quarrel with His Majesty's Government, but only with the Jews. Further developments placing them in opposition to His Majesty's Government had only arisen to their utmost regret. King Ibn Saud had pointed out that, in his opinion, His Majesty's Government were at heart real friends of the Arabs, and had again counselled the cessation of hostilities, saying that, while the position and attitude of His Majesty's Government were entirely clear, he could not say the same of the action of the Arabs. He had concluded his messages by saying that if the Arabs of Palestine really desired him to intervene on their behalf, they must furnish him with far more data on their grievances than he at present possessed. Up till now, the only points which they had mentioned to him were the release of those who had been convicted as prisoners since the outbreak; the remission of communal fines recently imposed; and the cessation of Jewish immigration. On these points, King Ibn Saud had replied that, in his opinion, the first thing necessary was submission, as until this had taken place, the above-mentioned points could not be considered by His Majesty's Government. Indeed, he himself would not wish them to yield to threats and disorder. He had since received a reply that, as already stated, it was only with the utmost reluctance that the Arabs had joined issue with His Majesty's Government, and that, were he to receive assurances of a satisfactory nature on the above three points, the Arabs would at once stop all disorder.

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9. The Minister added that he had imparted the above information in order to complete the picture and to carry out his instructions. He concluded by promising to report immediately to King Ibn Saud the message given to him at the beginning of the interview.

10. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioner at Cairo and to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Bagdad.

I am, &c.

ANTHONY EDEN.

[E 4327/94/31]

No. 89.

Sir M. Lampson to Mr. Eden.—(Received July 9.)

(No. 661.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, July 8, 1936.

IN conversation with Prince Regent last Sunday His Royal Highness referred with some feeling to the question of Arabs in Palestine. His Royal Highness made it clear that his sympathies were keenly aroused, as were those of all his countrymen. Could nothing be done to terminate the present lamentable state of affairs?

2. I replied that I quite understood his feelings, which were, in fact, in large measure shared by every thinking Englishman. But it was difficult to know what could be done in face of the present campaign of violence. It was clearly not within my direct province, but speaking entirely personally and unofficially I had long been wondering whether a way out could not be found by a sort of general truce, e.g., that as a first condition the campaign of violence must completely stop when we on our part would announce that all immigration (including Arab) would be temporarily suspended pending the arrival of the Royal Commission, which would go into all the rights and wrongs of both sides. I emphasised that this was entirely my own thought, and that there was no vestige of higher authority behind it.

3. I have long felt and still feel that the above might offer a reasonable way out of the present *impasse* which seemingly gets no better. And I am interested to learn that in a talk yesterday with the oriental secretary Amin Abdel Hadi suggested more or less the same thing.

(Repeated to Jerusalem.)

[E 4367/3217/31]

No. 90.

Sir M. Lampson to Mr. Eden.—(Received July 22.)

(No. 724.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Cairo, July 22, 1936.

FOLLOWING is gist of resolution voted by Chamber of Deputies, 20th July:—

"The Chamber expresses deep regret for Palestinian events and its sympathy with the Palestinian nation, which is sacrificing its sons for freedom and honour. The Chamber hopes that the present state of affairs will end in accordance with the principles of justice, so that the country may enjoy peace."

(Repeated to Jerusalem.)

[E 4627/94/31]

No. 91.

Mr. Eden to Mr. Calvert (Jedda).

(No. 192. Confidential.)

Foreign Office, July 29, 1936.

Sir,

IN my despatch No. 172, of the 7th July, I informed you of the events leading up to the acceptance by His Majesty's Government on the 3rd July of an offer made by King Ibn Saud to take the initiative in concerting action with the Kings of Iraq and the Yemen to secure, if possible, the cessation of the Arab rising in Palestine.

2. The following developments have since taken place:—

3. On the 6th July the Saudi Arabian Minister communicated to the Foreign Office a suggestion that King Ibn Saud should also approach the Amir Abdulla of Transjordan and Prince Mahomed Ali, the Prince Regent of Egypt, on the ground that the former was the closest neighbour of Palestine and had already had some contact with the Arab leaders in that country, and the latter was the head of an important Arab country to which the Palestine Arabs had thought it necessary to send a special delegation.

4. Sheikh Hafiz Wahba also mentioned that King Ibn Saud might see fit to instruct Fuad Bey Hamza, who was then on holiday in Syria, to proceed to Palestine and speak on his behalf to the Arab leaders there, in which event he expressed the hope that the High Commissioner for Palestine would offer the necessary facilities.

5. After consultation with the High Commissioner for Palestine and His Majesty's High Commissioner at Cairo, His Majesty's Government decided that there was no objection to King Ibn Saud bringing the Amir Abdulla within the orbit of his proposed concerted action, but that it was desirable on general grounds that Egypt should not be brought into collective action in Palestine and Arab affairs. A message was accordingly conveyed to the Saudi Arabian Minister on the 9th July to the effect that His Majesty's Government entirely agreed to participation by the Amir Abdulla, but were not in favour of Prince Mahomed Ali or any Egyptian being approached.

6. It was not necessary on that occasion to give any reply about the suggested visit to Palestine of Fuad Bey Hamza, which presented a question of some delicacy, as the Saudi Minister stated that Fuad Bey Hamza might have to come to Europe for reasons of health, and that other channels might therefore be adopted.

7. On the 13th July the Saudi Arabian Legation conveyed to the Foreign Office a suggestion that Ibn Saud might direct either Shukri Quwatli, then in Syria, or Sheikh Kamil-al-Kassab, at present in Palestine, to establish contact with the Arab leaders and convey to them whatever representations King Ibn Saud might have to make. In response to this suggestion, the Saudi Minister, who called by request at the Foreign Office on the following day, was informed that, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, the effect of King Ibn Saud's action *vis-à-vis* of the Arabs in Palestine would be much greater were it confined to a communication direct from King Ibn Saud himself than were it done through the intermediary of a representative of His Majesty who might be in, or going to, Palestine.

8. The Minister was then asked whether he could indicate when King Ibn Saud was likely to communicate with the Amir Abdulla. Sir A. Wauchope had enquired whether he was at liberty to mention the matter to the Amir, but His Majesty's Government had felt that it might be regarded as a breach of confidence were the High Commissioner to appear to know of the impending communication before it had reached the Amir. The Minister expressed appreciation of this attitude, and said that he thought His Majesty's Government might take it for certain that King Ibn Saud had already communicated with Amir Abdulla. Subsequently, however, on the 17th July Sheikh Hafiz Wahba wrote to say that King Ibn Saud had not yet been able to communicate with the Amir Abdulla owing to the difficulty of preserving the secrecy of the communication when the only method available to him was by open telegram, the alternative of communicating through His Majesty's Government being obviously unsuitable.

9. While, therefore, the position *vis-à-vis* of the Amir Abdulla is still uncertain, the Saudi Minister, at his interview at the Foreign Office

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on the 14th July, stated that King Ibn Saud had received replies from the King of the Yemen and the King of Iraq. The Imam Yahya had said that he would be prepared to co-operate with King Ibn Saud if His Majesty's Government would give a promise that immigration would be stopped. It was not clear whether by that he meant that immigration should be stopped immediately or merely before the departure from London of the proposed Royal Commission.

10. King Ghazi's answer was to the effect that he would co-operate with King Ibn Saud provided that—

- (i) His Majesty's Government were to promise a cessation of immigration until the Royal Commission had reported, and
- (ii) His Majesty's Government would discuss with the Arabs of Palestine (a) a limitation of immigration, (b) the sale of Arab lands, and (c) the establishment of a national (*i.e.*, Arab plus Jewish) Government.

11. According to the Saudi Minister, King Ibn Saud himself felt that the whole of King Ghazi's second proviso was out of place. King Ibn Saud was convinced that the proposed commission would, in any circumstances, do justice to the Arab case. As regards King Ghazi's first proviso, however, King Ibn Saud hoped that His Majesty's Government would agree to suspend immigration until the eventual findings of the Royal Commission were announced. He felt that if His Majesty's Government were to announce this as their decision, as a concession to the three Arab Kings who were their friends, such a decision would not be interpreted as a concession to mob violence by the Arabs in Palestine, and he asked that he might be informed whether His Majesty's Government were prepared to take this step.

12. After further consideration of the matter by His Majesty's Government, the Saudi Minister was asked to call here on the 20th July, and was informed that His Majesty's Government were not prepared to make any pronouncement regarding Jewish immigration until the disorders had ceased, so that law and order could be restored. If, however, King Ibn Saud would in the meantime continue to exercise any moderating influence on the Arabs, this would be much appreciated by His Majesty's Government, who thanked him for his offer of good offices, and might pursue the matter further with him at a later date. The Minister said that he would report this to King Ibn Saud, and expressed his own view that this reply would certainly cause King Ghazi and the Imam Yahya to refuse to pursue any joint action with King Ibn Saud in connexion with Palestine.

13. In reply to an enquiry whether His Majesty's Government were considering separately the questions referred to in the interview of the 3rd July, namely, those of the release of prisoners, the remission of communal fines and the stoppage of Jewish immigration, the Minister was informed that these demands had been regarded as a joint stipulation, and that in view of the attitude of His Majesty's Government regarding immigration, the need for pursuing the other two points was doubted. The Minister said that he shared this view.

14. As regards Fuad Bey Hamza, in view of whose health King Ibn Saud had suggested two other names as his representative to talk with the Palestine Arabs, the Minister was informed that the High Commissioner for Palestine had been consulted, and had replied that he would very greatly prefer Fuad Bey Hamza to the other two nominees. The suggestion was then put to the Saudi Minister, with which he agreed, that, in view of the prevailing uncertainty, it might be better for Fuad Hamza to come to Europe forthwith for his cure, which, according to Sheikh Hafiz Wahba, might only last about three weeks, instead of waiting on the chance of arrangements being made for a visit to Palestine at some indeterminate date.

15. On the 27th July the Saudi Minister addressed to Sir Lancelot Oliphant a letter, of which a copy is enclosed, (1) to the effect that King Ibn Saud would continue to use all his influence with the Arab leaders.

16. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioner at Cairo and to His Majesty's Chargé at Bagdad.

I am, &c.

ANTHONY EDEN.

(1) Not printed.

[E 4872/94/31]

No. 92.

Mr. Eden to His Majesty's Representatives at Cairo (No. 479), Bagdad (No. 150) and Jedda (No. 77).

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, July 30, 1936.

MY telegram No. 76 to Jedda of 29th July: Palestine.

The Secretary of State for the Colonies announced in the House of Commons on the 29th July the appointment of a Palestine Royal Commission of six members, with Lord Peel as chairman, Sir Horace Rumbold as vice-chairman, and following terms of reference:—

"To ascertain the underlying causes of the disturbances which broke out in Palestine in the middle of April; to enquire into the manner in which the mandate for Palestine is being implemented in relation to the obligations of the mandatory towards the Arabs and the Jews respectively; and to ascertain whether, upon a proper construction of the terms of the mandate, either the Arabs or the Jews have any legitimate grievances upon account of the way in which the mandate has been, or is being, implemented; and if the commission is satisfied that any such grievances are well founded, to make recommendations for their removal and for the prevention of their recurrence."

Mr. Ormsby-Gore indicated that the departure of the commission for Palestine would depend upon the cessation of disorder there. As regards the suggestion that there should be a temporary suspension of immigration while the commission was carrying out its enquiry, Mr. Ormsby-Gore referred to a reply given in the House on 22nd July to the effect that he could not at present make any statement as to the intentions of His Majesty's Government beyond saying that their decision would be taken in due course on the merits of the case and that there was no question of it being influenced by violence or attempts at intimidation.

(Addressed to Cairo, No. 479; Bagdad, No. 150; and Jedda, No. 77.)

[E 5060/94/31]

No. 93.

Sir M. Lampson to Mr. Eden.—(Received August 11.)

[By Air Mail.]

(No. 76. Saving.)

(Telegraphic.) *En clair.*

Alexandria, August 4, 1936.

MY telegram No. 661.

In course of a general conversation this morning the Prince Regent reverted to events in Palestine. He and his countrymen were increasingly distressed and anxious that the present *impasse* should be surmounted. Doubtless Great Britain could in the long run overcome the Arab agitation, but what about the legacy of hate and mistrust that would be left behind?

2. His Royal Highness seemed well aware that discussions were going on amongst the heads of neighbouring Arab States—he mentioned in particular Saudi Arabia and Iraq. He believed that Abdullah in Transjordan was also becoming concerned, and this was borne out by the fact that only two days ago one Hassan Khaled, a Transjordanian notable, had been lunching with His Royal Highness and had told him that, though on his way to England where he had a house near Oxford, the said Hassan had just had a telegram from Emir Abdullah summoning him at once back to Transjordan for consultation.

3. Continuing, His Royal Highness said it had been suggested to him that a possible way out of the present vicious circle was that the Jews should take the initiative in suggesting the suspension of all immigration pending investigation by the Royal Commission. His Royal Highness had been informed that the Jewish community in Palestine were finding that conditions of life were becoming difficult, that living supplies were getting scarce, and that in their own interest

they might prefer to see a temporary suspension of immigration if that would stop the present campaign of violence.

4. I record the above for what it may be worth. There is probably nothing new in it. It is, however, true that Egyptian sympathy for the Arabs in Palestine increases rather than decreases.

5. Copy sent to Jerusalem.

[E 5207/94/31]

No. 94.

Sir M. Lampson to Mr. Eden.—(Received August 18.)

(No. 953.)

Sir,

Ramleh, August 12, 1936.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of your telegram No. 489 of the 5th August calling for an appreciation of the repercussions of the Palestine question on Egypt.

2. (1) *The Attitude of Public Opinion in Egypt towards the Situation in Palestine.*—Egypt both geographically and psychologically is much isolated from its neighbours, and its sympathy for the Arab world has always had to be artificially stimulated. Of course the religious bond of Islam in itself could not but stir up considerable sympathy with the Arab cause at the very beginning of the recent disorders. For some time, however, the Egyptians, absorbed in the Anglo-Egyptian treaty negotiations, did not display a violent interest in the Palestinian struggle. The presence in Egypt, however, of Palestinian notables and, more particularly, of a notorious Palestinian agitator, Mohamed Ali-al-Taher, gradually gave increased and highly coloured publicity to what was going on in Palestine. A considerable amount of feeling was aroused against what was regarded as a gross injustice being done to the Arabs of Palestine by Great Britain. A certain amount of anti-Jewish feeling was provoked by the spectacle of this long-drawn struggle of a Moslem people against Great Britain and Zionism. Some apprehensions were felt by the local Jews, but, fortunately, after some manifestations of local anti-Jewish feeling there seems to have been no more agitation against the Jews in Egypt itself. Moreover, the increased interest of Egypt in the concluding stages of the Anglo-Egyptian treaty negotiations seems, to a certain extent, to have distracted the Egyptians from the spectacle of Palestinian affairs.

3. However, there can be no doubt that all educated and uneducated opinion in Egypt is convinced that Great Britain is committing a cruel injustice to a neighbouring Moslem country. Particularly keen expression to this feeling has been given both by the Regent and the Prime Minister. There is no doubt that the Egyptian authorities, in the interest of the Anglo-Egyptian treaty negotiations, have definitely tried—and with considerable success—to control manifestations of Egyptian feeling against British policy in Palestine. It is possible that Egypt, preoccupied with its own affairs, may be restrained in the future from strong agitation in favour of the Palestinian Arabs. On the other hand, Egypt has long aspired to exercise a moral and cultural influence over the Moslem nations of the Near East. This desire will probably be increased when her full independence is consecrated by the Anglo-Egyptian treaty settlement. It will be exceedingly difficult for her to remain deaf to appeals from her Palestine co-religionists. As long as the latter remain in a state of revolt against Britain there will always be the danger that Egyptian Governments will be forced to display an active interest in Palestine affairs. This interest will keep alive the feeling in Egypt that Great Britain is tyrannising over a Moslem nation. While this feeling may not lead to any serious trouble in Egypt, it will always be a factor influencing Egyptian public opinion against England.

4. (2) *Political Connexions between Palestine and Egypt.*—These connexions are of a very loose character. The Egyptian is inclined to look on the Arab as an uncivilised person, and the Arab is inclined to despise the Egyptian for lack of moral fibre. These temperamental differences and the desert between the two countries have long isolated them from one another politically. Ever since the War there have naturally been attempts to harp on the community of interest between Eastern nations struggling against European imperialism. Hence the frequent exchange of telegrams between Nationalist leaders in Palestine

and Egypt on the occasion of alleged oppressions by Great Britain or triumphs of the Nationalist causes. But this solidarity has rarely translated itself into practical forms.

5. As regards the pan-Arab movement, it has in Egypt been a very academic business, fostered by men of letters and a few old-fashioned religious pundits. Young Egypt, which has emerged from the secondary schools during the last quarter of a century, has its eyes turned to the West and, though it may pay lip-service at times to pan-Arabism, it does not really take it seriously. It may therefore be said that the pan-Arab movement has very little real strength in Egypt.

6. As regards the risk of Egyptian intervention in Palestine affairs, I do not think it at all likely that the Egyptian Government would go further than to make informal representations to us in favour of the Palestinian Arabs, on the lines of those already made during the last few months, but perhaps increasing in intensity if the Palestine Arabs are at any given moment able to excite greater attention among the Egyptian public.

7. (3) *The Reactions of Developments in Palestine on the Relations of Great Britain and Egypt.*—The disorders in Palestine have already led to a press campaign against Britain at a time when otherwise Egyptian opinion was extraordinarily friendly to us. This campaign, while throwing a shadow over Anglo-Egyptian relations for the moment, was not effective enough to disturb them seriously. As regards the future, it is unlikely that reactions will be much stronger, unless Arab propaganda is better organised than at present, and unless Egypt's own interests should create discord between us. However, as indicated before, it is impossible that the relations between Great Britain and a Moslem centre like Egypt should not be affected for the worse by continual and genuine feeling that we are oppressing a neighbouring Moslem nation.

8. If by any chance the negotiations for an Anglo-Egyptian treaty settlement were to break down at the last moment or if serious differences were to arise over the implementation of the treaty, the Palestinian factor might play a more serious part in Egypt. In other words, if the relations between Egypt and England were to deteriorate for reasons connected with Egypt's own interests, it is more than probable that Palestinian agitators would find in Egypt a fertile soil for their propaganda and that the Egyptians themselves would be only too glad to make a pretext of our action in Palestine to excite Egyptian public opinion against Great Britain.

9. In short, the continuance of the Palestinian conflict must to a less or greater extent react disadvantageously on Anglo-Egyptian relations, interfering with their smooth course when they are good and intensifying their unsatisfactory character when they have, at any given moment, deteriorated for causes not connected with Palestine.

10. I have forwarded copies of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioner at Jerusalem, His Majesty's Ambassador at Bagdad and His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Jedda

I have, &c.

MILES W. LAMPSON.

[E 5420/94/31]

No. 95.

Consul Parr to Mr. Eden.—(Received August 27.)

(No. 46.)

Sir,

Aleppo, August 20, 1936.

IN accordance with your instructions I have the honour to submit a memorandum dealing with the interdependence of the outbreaks in Syria and Palestine against the Mandatory Powers that have taken place during the course of this year, in which I have endeavoured to estimate the trend and the strength of the insurrectionary movements, and their actual and possible reactions on British prestige as viewed by public opinion in Northern Syria.

2. An observation which can with greater propriety be included in this despatch than in the memorandum itself relates to the publicity to be given to the proceedings of the Royal Commission. Its investigations and its report will receive the closest attention from the local press and are likely to be subject to

much misrepresentation and distortion. To obviate this it might be worth while to arrange for reports of such of the meetings of the commission as are public to be fully and accurately translated into French and Arabic and to be made available as early as possible to newspaper editors. If necessary these should be paid for the publicity. As regards the report it would be of value if French and Arabic translations were available for distribution in Syria as soon as it is published in London. I recognise that the expense incurred would be considerable, but British prestige has suffered greatly during the past few months in this part of the world, and the steps I suggest would do something to vindicate our position.

3. I am sending copies of this despatch direct to the acting consul-general at Beirut and to the acting consul at Damascus.

I have, &c.

ROBERT PARR.

Enclosure in No. 95.

Memorandum on the Interdependence of the Outbreaks in Syria and Palestine during 1936.

A NECESSARY preliminary to any attempt to estimate the degree of interdependence between the disturbances of 1936 in Northern Syria and those in Palestine, and the possibilities of their development, is a short review of the forces which go to make up public opinion in Aleppo and its districts and the material on which they must work. In such a review the Sanjak of Alexandretta must be considered separately since its traditions and aspirations cut it off sharply from Arab opinion in the interior.

2. The figure for the settled population in North Syria proper, that is to say in Aleppo and its dependent rural districts, is given as 600,000, of whom the city of Aleppo itself includes over a quarter of a million. The village inhabitants are at an extremely low level of development; probably more than 90 per cent. are wholly illiterate, while none of the remainder could be fairly described as educated. They have no influence on the formation of opinion. In Aleppo it is claimed that 60 per cent. of the people, say 156,000, are literate, but such a figure must be modified before fixing any basis on which the factors that go to shape Moslem opinion can be estimated. A large allowance must be made for the proportion of Christians in the literate population. Recently a statement appeared in a local paper to the effect that Christian elements amount to one-half of the total urban population. This may have been an overstatement, but the proportion is certainly large. The Armenians in the city alone number some 40,000. Moreover, both the various Christian communities and the Jews have been much more energetic in promoting the education of their children than the Moslems, and must furnish a large proportion of the total figure for literates. Some light is thrown on the proportion for the Moslems by the figures of newspaper sales. The different vernacular sheets have a joint circulation of only about 4,000. When due allowance has been made for the trading classes, which tend to stand aside from political controversy, a comparatively small nucleus of professional men and students remains to form and guide opinion in the mass of Moslem illiterates.

3. The individuals composing this nucleus would not command any great measure of respect outside Syria. In general their education has been shoddy and their experience limited: their outlook is correspondingly insufficient. Their force lies in their influence over an almost wholly uninstructed mob, of which they are the only present guides. The mass of this Moslem population consists of people whose standard of life is very low. Their predominant characteristics are avarice and self-sufficiency. From the latter springs a reluctance to regard any quality in a Christian or a foreigner except force, an attitude that alike encourages and derives encouragement from their traditional religious intolerance. As recently as the close of the eighteenth century official permits for the burial of non-Moslems were drawn up in language of virulent hatred, and it is doubtful whether there has been any effective mellowing of opinion since that time. The last Christian massacre in Aleppo took place less than eighteen years

ago, and at a time when British troops were actually in occupation. (The punishment exacted has not yet been forgotten.) Their other outstanding quality, avarice, must be taken into account in considering any political demonstration in Aleppo. The requisite kernel of hooligans can be assembled for a very small fee. In 1929, when the Damascus mob demonstrated in favour of the Palestine insurgents, the French administrator in charge of the town observed that it would have demonstrated just as readily to applaud the Anglo-Jewish development of that country. Such an incident might well have taken place at Aleppo in February last when economic grievances were widely alleged in support of the agitation against the French.

4. Working on this material the leaders of opinion have been able to invoke and develop the following ideas. Syria and Palestine have always been regarded as integral parts of a greater racial and economic entity. The presence of European administrations in the two regions has been resented. That resentment apart, Palestine had been until recently looked on as enjoying enviable prosperity, particularly by comparison with the economic stagnation in the French Mandated Territories. When, however, the Palestine rising followed on the apparent cession to violence by the French at the beginning of March, everything was done to emphasise the blood-tie between the inhabitants of the two countries, fantastic stories were circulated of "oppression" and "persecution." Great Britain was represented as a "colonising" Power of unscrupulous rapacity, and one, moreover, that had recently been humbled by Italy and that would be forced to give way before firm opposition just as France had given way before the Syrians. A further reflection, that has come into play as the passage of time brings suspicion that their success over the French has not been so complete as they had at first supposed, is the possible effect of a set-back for Great Britain in Palestine on the eventual settlement between Syria and France.

5. Of active hostility to the Jews themselves there is not much sign. The nationalist leaders have seen fit to warn the population against any harrying of the Israelite community in Aleppo, but this may have been done simply for the sake of making a magnanimous gesture that might be invoked to their credit at some future time. Jewish business houses have continued their operations undisturbed, and no movement to boycott them as such has been apparent. On the other hand, the Islamic record is not a clean one in respect of hostility towards the Jews, and violence against them might be provoked if the Moslem leaders were to imagine any advantage in such a course.

6. This rousing of public opinion in Northern Syria is, no doubt, largely artificial. It is true that anti-Zionist demonstrations took place in Damascus in 1925, when an attempt was made to mob the late Lord Balfour, and again in 1929, but their recurrence does not necessarily divest them of their artificial character. The European is a dog to be beaten, and in the case of Great Britain to protest against Zionism, or to assert that the Islamic holy places in Jerusalem are dishonoured, is a very handy stick, although every Moslem who has travelled to Jerusalem is aware that there are no grounds for such an assertion. How far public opinion thus roused may be formidable is another matter. Subscriptions are being collected to maintain the movement in Palestine, but do not yield very much. There have been proposals to bring pressure on Great Britain by a trade boycott, but without general response. It has been stated in the press that agitators from Damascus are active in Palestine, and this may be correct, but armed intervention is out of the question unless sections of the Beduin should decide to cross the border in the hope of loot. The attractiveness of such expeditions, however, cannot be great under present conditions and would only be likely to appeal, if at all, to the Damascus tribes since the zones of migration and general activity of those in Northern Syria incline too far to the east. There is, on the other hand, much to indicate that the Moslem leaders in the two countries are in frequent correspondence and are doing all that they can to establish and emphasise identity of aim between the factions they control. It is probable that, but for the fear of prejudicing the negotiations actually in progress at Paris, the example of the insurrection in Palestine would have moved the Syrians to a further outbreak against the French both for their own immediate purposes and to advertise their proclaimed solidarity with their brethren in the south.

7. There is much glib talk of the formation of a single Arab State to include Iraq, Transjordan, Palestine and Syria. It is pictured as a component

in an Arab federation which would comprise in addition Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the various Moslem lands of North Africa. The degree in which such conceptions might eventually be realised is questionable. It may be argued that the Arabs possess unity of language, of blood and of religion and that they inhabit territories which constitute a geographical and an economic entity. On the other hand, their common culture amounts to little if compared with what is connoted by that phrase in reference to the European conception of nationality, while it is only by stretching terms that the Arabs can be said to have a common history. That they will be able to build up any true national coherence for a long time to come is exceedingly doubtful. Their revolt against the Turks in the last war was engineered and carried through only with difficulty, and by a man of outstanding personal force who was able, moreover, to give subsidies on a lavish scale. But for Colonel Lawrence the movement would have amounted to very little, and Colonel Lawrence was an Englishman. It seems probable that if, in the course of events, native States were to be established free of European guidance and protection they would speedily be reduced to ineffectiveness by the ambition and greed of their politicians, for the lack of any correcting force of national consciousness and any real spirit of obedience to the common need. Attempts to achieve the wider federation envisaged might be expected to fail for similar reasons. Differences would grow to disputes and disputes, in the absence of European control, to raids and to war, and with war would come the temptation for other Powers to intervene. It seems unlikely, moreover, that even a prolonged period of European co-operation would enable the Arab populations to reach a degree of culture and prosperity sufficient for them to maintain their position as a member of the family of nations. Account must be taken of their manifest incapacity for administration, while the meagreness of their country's natural resources will always be an obstacle to their development.

8. Such considerations, of course, would be rejected out of hand by the politicians who aspire to establish these various Arab States, whose interest is not to speculate on the inherent difficulties of their task but to whip up racial and religious prejudice to serve their immediate aims. To this end they make great play with the numbers of the Moslem world and the essential unity of Islam. The last is probably a false assumption. Islam is intrinsically an aggressive creed, and the prejudice which it fosters can be used to great effect locally, but that it could ever again be welded into a single political force is improbable. The spread of communications and the diversity of mankind must weaken it in the long run. Even to-day, in a period when there seems to be a certain quickening of interest in religious activity amongst Moslems, there are few signs that the Islamic world as a confessional body is sincerely concerned over the Zionist question. That it may become so in the future is all the less likely. There are other things to do.

9. The appeal to pan-Arab motives carries more conviction, and will continue for a longer time. For the reasons already set out it is an appeal which, in the opinion of the writer, must ultimately fail, but at present it serves the ambitions and in some cases, it is only fair to record, the youthful ideals of an educated class which is on the increase in all the countries affected. A rising economic tide might be expected to sweep off many of them to more profitable employment, but a certain number both of idealists and of placemen would be left. For these, it is to be hoped, responsible and interesting administrative work would be found; otherwise the recurrent outbursts of disaffection will inevitably continue and the eventual choice will lie between repression and the abandonment of these countries in all their rawness and impotence to be, only too probably, a menace to the stability of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. They would become a breeding-ground for difficulties much as the Balkans were for the generation preceding the war.

10. The problem as it presents itself in the Sanjak of Alexandretta is simpler. It is confidently believed that sooner or later Turkey will resume possession of this territory, and such an event would be more palatable to its inhabitants than their incorporation in a nationalist Syria. They regard themselves as distinct from the Arabs, whom they do not like, and they are inclined to view the progress of events in Palestine with indifference or at least without direct concern.

11. That these events may prove of indirect concern to the territories under French Mandate, however, is recognised throughout. Their upshot may

do much to determine the fate of the negotiations now proceeding in Paris, and some opinion inclines to believe that the French Government is deliberately playing for time in order that its proposals may not be made public until the Arab cause has sustained a reverse in Palestine. It is, indeed, very probable that disappointment over those negotiations would lead to another armed rising in Syria; still more so should it occur whilst the Palestinian Arabs are still apparently holding their own against the British forces. France and Great Britain are the joint enemy, and their several failures or successes redound to the credit or the discredit of both. Both peoples are stated to be effete and largely amenable to Jewish influences. France is regarded as subservient to Italy, while it is not easy to describe, without using language of apparent extravagance, the extent to which Great Britain has lost prestige in this country as a result, in the first place, of her failure to arrest Italy and, in the second, of her failure up to now to suppress the insurrection in Palestine. The combined impression of these two set-backs has been enormous. Certain organs of the press have even prophesied that Great Britain will be forced to negotiate before law and order have been restored. It is also suggested that she is deliberately refraining from the use of sufficient force to quell the insurrection in order to have a valid excuse for abandoning a task that is beyond her powers. The settlement of the Egyptian question is attributed to fear of Italy.

12. In French circles there is considerable uneasiness for the outcome of the situation. It is felt that the Iraqi Treaty weakened the position of the two Powers as regards their Arab dependencies, and that any statement or action which could in any way be interpreted as a concession to the present campaign of violence would still more weaken the front and leave the road open for further troubles in the near future. It is held that in any case we are faced with a very difficult situation in the Arab countries, and that this will inevitably grow worse if the methods pursued against us meet with apparent success. The justice of such reflections really turns on the degree of political wisdom possessed by the Arab leaders. If the estimate of this given above is correct it is clear that every point scored will be exploited assiduously to excite further efforts to render the presence of France and Great Britain in Syria and Palestine impossible. Eventual success would create a very dangerous situation for the non-Moslem minorities in both countries, and might, in the long run, lead to a state of affairs requiring a renewal of armed intervention by European Powers.

Aleppo, August 20, 1936.

[E 5444/94/31]

No. 96.

Mr. Newton to Mr. Eden.—(Received August 28.)

(No. 899.)

Berlin, August 26, 1936.

Sir,

WITH reference to your despatch No. 934 of the 6th August I have the honour to transmit herewith a memorandum on the Jewish question in Germany, together with an annex giving a very brief account of the more important regulations covering the levy of emigration tax and the transfer of property by emigrants.

2. I would also draw your attention to the memorandum by the Passport Control Office, enclosed in Sir Eric Phipps's despatch No. 103 of the 20th January last, summarising in convenient form the Zionist proposals for the planned emigration of Jews from Germany to Palestine.

I have, &c.

B. C. NEWTON.

Enclosure in No. 96.

The Jewish Question in Germany.

POINT 4 of the National Socialist party programme reads as follows: "None but members of the nation may be citizens of the State. None but those of German blood, whatever their creed, may be members of the nation. No Jew, therefore, may be a member of the nation."

Before and after the war the Jewish community in Germany not only amassed wealth as bankers and financiers, but tended to monopolise the learned professions, medicine, the law, the theatre, the press and the creative arts. Excluded from the army and navy, their industry and their intellectual and artistic gifts helped them to dominate in the spheres open to them. After the war the eastern German frontier remained open for some months to Jewish immigration, and by 1925 the presence of some 10,000 immigrant Jews in Berlin had aroused serious misgivings. A number of financial-political scandals lent colour to the Nazi theory that Marxism, Judaism and corruption were synonymous terms, and from 1930 the National Socialist party found a ready response to their vigorous anti-Jewish campaign. Herr Hitler personally is fanatical in his hatred of the Jews, believing that they are a contaminating and disruptive influence in a nation. The war cry of his movement was: "Germany awake: perish Jewry."

A few figures will show the preponderance of "non-Aryans" in certain professions. In 1931 out of 3,450 lawyers in Berlin, 1,925 were Jews. In Breslau the numbers were 285 and 192, and in Frankfurt 659 and 432 respectively. In Berlin the number of Jewish doctors was 52 per cent., while in most towns the average was 30 per cent. Fifteen Jewish bankers are stated to have held 718 directorships in banks and commercial undertakings. Of theatre directors 50.4 per cent. were Jews. Although the Jews formed only about 1 per cent. of the total population, there was a widespread feeling that they blocked the approaches to all the leading positions in the State, monopolising them for themselves.

When Herr Hitler became Chancellor, the Jews became the object of popular attack. The better-known Jewish politicians, pacifists and journalists had to fly for their lives. Many crossed the French, Dutch and Czech frontiers, and a great many were incarcerated in prisons and camps. Jews of the highest international reputation in the worlds of science, art, music and literature were publicly insulted or maltreated, and those in a financial position to do so left the country in great numbers. Thousands of doctors and lawyers—harmless, hard-working people for the most part—suffered personal ill-treatment. A not inconsiderable number of Jews must have lost their lives during the period of unrest.

The Nazi Government proceeded in due course to regularise the disabilities already imposed in practice. On the 7th April, 1933, a law over-riding articles 128 and 129 of the Constitution and removing "non-Aryan" civil servants was summarily passed. (The new law furnished a very important definition by stating that a "non-Aryan" was a person one of whose parents or grandparents was "non-Aryan." Persons who were in the civil service before the 1st August, 1914, or who had a satisfactory war record or had lost a son or father in the war, were, however, exempted. The new law led to the dismissal of thousands of officials, including many distinguished scientists, doctors and university professors. On the other hand, the authorities had to conform to the general principle of the law and to allow those Jewish lawyers who had served in the war to practise. The definition of the term "Aryan," coupled with the "Veterans' Clause," henceforth became the more or less general criterion for the treatment of Jews throughout the country. Lawyers and doctors who were in practice before August 1914 and who had fought or lost a father or son were readmitted in theory, though in practice they met with resistance.

On the 22nd April, 1933, a law was passed restricting the number of Jewish panel doctors. On the 25th April a law curtailing the number of students to be accepted by schools, other than elementary schools, was passed. On the 15th July a law was passed authorising the revocation of naturalisation certificates issued after the 9th November, 1918.

In March 1934 the law of the 7th April, 1933, was made applicable to the armed forces, so as to bring them into line with the other public services, but the number of officers and men affected was insignificant.

At the end of 1934 and in the beginning of 1935, in view of the impending Saar plebiscite, moderation was the order of the day, and the Jews were amongst those who profited from this state of affairs. As soon as the plebiscite was over, however, the Nazi party began to show its teeth and an anti-Jewish campaign was launched which assumed even larger proportions.

By May it had become clear that a widespread anti-semitic drive was in progress. Action against the Jews was partly official and partly unofficial. The

following were some of the more important official declarations and measures. According to a decree issued in February 1934 no Jewish dentist, whether a front-line fighter or not, might henceforth be admitted as a panel dentist. By a decree of the Minister of the Interior issued in February, candidates for the medical and dentistry professions must be of Aryan origin. Aryans married to non-Aryans were also barred. By decision of the president of the Literary Chamber of Culture, published in March, no non-Aryan apprentice could be admitted to the publishing trade. According to an order issued on the 27th April by the Minister of the Interior, Jews were forbidden to fly the national or swastika flags. On the 27th April in an interview to the press the Minister of the Interior stated that Jews would be excluded from German citizenship and from the holding of any public office.

Unofficial action against the Jews was intense and widespread. The *Stürmer*, Herr Streicher's notorious organ, extended its sales all over the country largely by means of the support of local Nazi formations. The Franconian notice: "Jews not wanted here," began to appear in almost every village. Jews were excluded from swimming baths, restaurants and public places of entertainment. The clients of Jewish shops were boycotted and persecuted. Pressure was exercised against the employment of Jewish doctors, lawyers and stockbrokers. Jewish hawkers and newspaper retailers were obliged to close down. The windows of Jewish shops were broken or disfigured with offensive placards. Speeches by Dr. Goebbels, the Statthalter Sprenger, Herr Streicher, Gauleiter Grohé and lesser party leaders excited the anti-Jewish passions of the masses. The Jews were members of the human race, said Dr. Goebbels, but it was equally true that the flea was an animal.

Berlin, owing to its unwieldy size and to the fact that it is the capital, is less under the influence of party bosses than any other town in Germany. It consequently was not engulfed by the anti-Jewish wave for some time, but the party was determined that it should not escape. On the 16th July and on the following days, Jewish premises and individuals were attacked by small bands of rioters. On the 15th August Herr Streicher spoke for the first time in Berlin, and in the course of a long harangue accused Queen Victoria of having ennobled the Jew Disraeli under the title of Lord Gladstone. At the end of August Herr Hinkel, the representative of Dr. Goebbels in matters relating to Jewish cultural activity, issued regulations which had the effect of confining the Jews to a cultural ghetto. On the 10th September a decree was issued by the Minister of Education designed to achieve as complete a racial separation as possible in all German schools from the school year of 1936.

By the beginning of September there were signs of a reaction against unbridled party violence and of a desire to put anti-Jewish measures on a legal basis. Not only Dr. Schacht, but even Nazi leaders such as Gauleiter Wagner, of Silesia, and Herr Streicher himself, pronounced themselves against isolated action. The stage was thus set for Government intervention.

This took the form of the promulgation on the 13th September, 1935, of the Nuremberg laws, which deprived the Jews of the rights of citizenship, and forbade them to marry or live with Aryans, employ Aryan servants or fly the national flag. In a public speech at Nuremberg on the 16th September Herr Hitler claimed that the new legislation would form a basis which would enable the German people to find some tolerable relationship towards the Jews. Should this hope not be fulfilled, he continued, and should the Jewish agitation in Germany and abroad continue, a further examination of the position would have to be made. If the State apparatus proved inadequate, the party would find means of solving the problem.

If the Jews thought that Herr Hitler's words meant that they would be afforded a reasonable opportunity of earning a living, events showed them to have been grievously mistaken. The promised administrative measures did not appear for over two months. Meanwhile, the effect of the Nuremberg legislation was to give the stamp of official approval to anti-Semitic agitation and to increase the pressure on the Jews. Doctors employed in hospitals were dismissed, Aryan business men were prevented from doing business with Jews, and a large number of public servants were removed from their posts.

Eventually, on the 14th November, after a delay due entirely to the difficulty of evolving an acceptable solution, the Government issued the expected regulations for the application of the Nuremberg laws. The regulations provided, *inter alia*,

that, in general, Jews were persons three or more of whose grandparents were of fully Jewish blood. The German population was divided into two classes, citizens and nationals. The first were to be issued with a patent of citizenship ("Reichsbürgerbrief"), which entitled them to a citizen's rights. The Jews could not be German citizens and were relegated to the second class; they could not exercise the right to vote nor hold any public office. The conditions under which Jews or persons of mixed Jewish and Aryan blood could marry were closely defined. As a concession, it was laid down that Aryan female servants over 35 years of age already in Jewish employment could remain on, but Jews were still forbidden to engage Aryan female servants under 45 years of age.

On the 22nd November the Minister of Economics issued an order compelling Jewish official brokers to give up their appointments in all German stock exchanges.

A second executive regulation, dated the 21st December, was published on the 23rd December. It defined the word official and the public offices which Jews are not permitted to fill. As officials are regarded all Reich officials, with the exception of notaries public, all categories of officials of the States, municipalities and municipal corporations, officials of corporations in public law and employees of authorities engaged in social assurance; also teachers in State schools, professors and members of armed forces. The regulation further extends the definition of holders of public offices which Jews may not fill to all persons performing magisterial or authoritative functions. Finally, it is laid down that doctors in charge of public hospitals and consultants ("Vertrauensärzte") must leave their posts by the 31st March, 1936. An exception is made for Jewish hospitals.

Until the present time, no regulations have appeared laying down the conditions under which Jews may trade. The matter is reported to be the subject of much controversy, but, whatever the issue, experience has shown that the law lags behind realities, and every day that passes enables its amateur interpreters to win fresh ground from which it proves difficult to dislodge them. The Jews look forward to the future not only without hope, but in the conviction that further persecution, and perhaps even expropriation, is in store for them. The most serious aspect is the outlook for the children. Not only are their early years poisoned by their treatment as pariahs, but they have no prospects. The universities and the professions (armed forces, civil service, railways, municipal offices, public health, law, teaching, stockbroking, journalism, theatre, film art) are closed to them. Even in commerce and banking, although Jews have in many cases been retained, it is usually considered safer not to engage a young Jew. Moreover, the Nazis are not allowed, and the public are not encouraged, to have commercial relations with Jews; and the number of Jews in Germany is not sufficient to enable Jews to live in a Nazi-constructed Ghetto on Jewish custom alone, particularly since a large number of the richer Jews have left. Even if no further persecution is in store, and this is doubtful, the present situation is such that there is no doubt that, to the rising generation of Jews, emigration offers the only prospect of a free and useful life.

Annex.

German Emigration Regulations. Emigration Tax, Transfer of Property.

1. *Emigration Tax.*

Every emigrant who, according to the last taxation assessment, possessed more than 50,000 reichsmarks, or who, since 1931, had an income in one year of more than 20,000 reichsmarks, must pay 25 per cent. of the last assessed value of his property as emigration tax.

2. *Transfer of Money.*

In the case of emigration to Palestine, after payment of the Emigration Tax, up to 50,000 reichsmarks may be released for transfer. In the case of emigration to Italy (which is comparatively rare), up to 50,000 reichsmarks may be released for transfer, but the emigrant is required to pay a further 30 per cent. of this amount to the Deutsche Golddiskont-Bank. In the case of emigration to most

other countries, no money is released for transfer upon payment of the emigration tax. In the first two cases amounts above 50,000 reichsmarks, and in the last case the total amount, must be paid into a blocked mark account. After the emigrant's final emigration, he may realise the blocked marks abroad. The present quotation is about 23 per cent., so that, in addition to the Emigration Tax ("Reichsfluchtsteuer") of 25 per cent., a further loss of 77 per cent. on his remaining assets is entailed.

3. *Transfer of Merchandise.*

The transfer of merchandise by an emigrant for sale abroad is, in principle, forbidden.

4. *Transfer of Real Estate.*

An emigrant may exchange his real estate in Germany for real estate abroad. Where this entails no payment, no permission of the Foreign Exchange Office ("Devisenstelle") is necessary. Permission must, however, be obtained if payment is entailed or if mortgages are taken up. Such applications usually receive favourable treatment.

5. *Trade Protection Rights.*

Only in very exceptional cases may the foreign proceeds from trade protection rights, no matter whether derived from outright sale or from current receipts, be released to an emigrant for transfer. Only such very exceptional cases come into question as are expressly subject to the decision of the Reich Office for the acquisition of foreign exchange ("Reichsstelle für Devisenbeschaffung") and not to that of the local foreign exchange offices ("Devisenstellen").

[E 5437/320/31]

No. 97.

Mr. Shone to Mr. Eden.—(Received August 28.)

(No. 345.)

Sir,

Berne, August 21, 1936.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 336 of the 17th August, I have the honour to submit the following account of the World Jewish Congress, which met at Geneva from the 8th to the 15th August. The account is based on articles which have appeared in various Swiss newspapers. The latter have admitted some difficulty in reporting the speeches, as so many were made in Yiddish.

2. An article "from Jewish sources" in the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* discussed the congress before it met in critical terms. According to this article, the political object of Zionism still remained what it was when Rabbi Herzl organised the first Zionist Congress in Bâle in 1897, namely, the establishment of a legally assured home for the Jewish people in Palestine, although the Zionist movement and its foundations had undergone alterations since that date. The founder of the Zionist Congresses meant them to become the tribune of the whole Jewish people, but to-day they were in reality only Palestine Congresses. They represented about a tenth of Jewry, admittedly the most active part, but there were large Jewish circles, more or less one-half of the 16 million Jews existing, who even to-day did not subscribe to Zionism, although they might recognise the practical results it had achieved. In a small work which Dr. Nahum Goldmann, the representative at Geneva of the Jewish Agency for Palestine, had written by way of introduction to the Jewish World Congress, almost everyone could find what he sought. The liberally-minded Jews found the fight for democracy and the League of Nations described as one of the chief aims of the congress; there were excellent phrases about the worship of the State and the sacred rights of religious and national minorities. Even Jews who had been contaminated by National Socialist ideas found a long apologia for hatred of their race, and even for the brutality which accompanied it as an unavoidable accompaniment of

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modern development. The article concluded by saying that a World Jewish Congress which took into account the actual problems and difficulties confronting the Jews in different countries and which was inspired by a regard for realities rather than a mystical ideology would have easily united all the Jews in the world. As it was, however, the Geneva Congress, instead of being a complement of the Zionist Congresses, would be but a poor copy of them; and large numbers of Jews who would have rallied to a World Congress on the practical lines indicated above would still withhold support from one which seemed to aim at a form of social revolution.

3. The congress, which was attended by some 300 delegates from thirty-two countries, was presided over by Rabbi Stephen Wise, who read at the opening meeting on the 8th August messages of goodwill from Lord Robert Cecil, MM. Béranger and Paul-Boncour, Dr. Weizmann of the Zionist Organisation, and others. He regretted the absence of Jewish delegates from Germany and the Soviet Union, and he declined to believe that the Russian Jews were lost to Israel. (The *Bund* pointed out that Jews from Turkey and Hungary were also not represented at the congress—the former, probably, because they felt so assimilated in Turkey that they had no need of a world Jewish organisation, and the latter because they had to be careful. The same newspaper also remarked on the opposition between communism and Zionism, of which evidence had been furnished by the fact that Jewish Communists in Palestine had made common cause with the Arabs in revolt.) Dr. Wise welcomed the representatives from Palestine, and congratulated them on not having had recourse to violence to defend themselves. Non-violence, he said, was the Jewish weapon against the Third Reich—the boycott—and it would have been more effective if Christianity had also rallied to it. The aim of the congress was to reunite the Jews of the Diaspora and to better their lot by an effective solidarity. Dr. Wise did not have in mind a super-State, nor even a national Jewish State, but he demanded equality of rights for the Jews, who must organise themselves. There were not French, English, German or American Jews, but only Jews. The present congress was not a Parliament, but it ought to become one. (The *Bund* observes, in this connexion, that it was only in France and Australia that delegates to the congress had been elected; in other countries they had been nominated by Jewish organisations.)

4. The opening session ended with speeches by various Swiss, including M. William Rappard, who said that the Jewish victims of persecution were in good company in many countries where freedom of ideas was no longer tolerated, and by Dr. Goldmann, who said that there should be no thought of creating a ghetto in Germany. Equality of rights for Jews must be established there and elsewhere; the reconstruction of the national home in Palestine did not imply the abandonment of the principle of equality of rights, because, unless it were supported by a strong Jewry in the Diaspora, a Jewish Palestine could not fulfil its proper function. Dr. Goldmann said the struggle between communism and Zionism was absurd, and he hoped for a favourable evolution of the Soviet attitude; as for nationalism, it was only immoral and destructive when carried to excess.

5. The congress next heard reports by Professor Lestschinsky of Vilna on the situation of the Jews in Central and Eastern Europe, by Dr. Jefroykin of Paris on social assistance, by Dr. Tartakower of Lodz on emigration problems, and by Dr. Kubowitzki of Brussels on the future organisation of the Jewish community. Professor Lestschinsky said that some 5 million Jews had been economically ruined and virtually deprived of their rights. Of the 530,000 Jews who lived in Germany at the beginning of 1933, only 400,000 now remained there; 100,000 had fled and were dispersed in more than sixty countries. More than 20 per cent. of the German Jews were compelled to seek charitable assistance. In Austria the situation of the Jews was beginning to resemble that in Germany; in Lithuania, Latvia, Poland and Roumania the Jews were subjected, if not yet by legal measures, to loss of caste and poverty. In the two former countries 25 per cent., and in the two latter 35 per cent., had to have recourse to charity. Dr. Jefroykin urged that Jewish World Organisations for assistance should be set up, the costs of which should be borne by Jewish bodies throughout the world. Dr. Tartakower assessed the yearly requirements of Jewish emigration at 200,000 (120,000 for Poland alone). He demanded increased facilities for Jewish emigration. The Jewish organisation concerned with emigration should be

affiliated to the World Congress, which should take up the question with Governments and the League of Nations. Dr. Kubowitzki proposed that the congress should be elected every four years on a strictly democratic basis, and that it should meet every two years. A central executive should be appointed, consisting of four sections, to deal with political matters, social-economic matters, organisation information and propaganda, and finance, respectively, with a council to meet every six months.

6. The congress then elected a presidium, with Judge Mack of New York as honorary president, and Messrs. Wise, Goldmann, Brodt, Davis, Fischer, Jefroykin, Mossinson, Lipsky and Saly Mayer (the representative of the Swiss Jews) as members. Five American Communists were refused admittance to the congress in view of the attitude of the Communists in connexion with the disturbances in Palestine, despite a speech by Councillor J. L. Fine, J.P., representing Jewish workers in the United Kingdom, in favour of their admission.

7. At a subsequent meeting of the congress, at which the situation in Palestine was discussed, the importance of Jewish emigration to Palestine was emphasised by several speakers, the attitude of the Arabs was deplored, and the mandatory Power was subjected to some criticism, particularly by Mr. N. Baron, described as a representative of Jewish workers in the United Kingdom. The resolution adopted by the congress in regard to Palestine was subsequently presented to me for submission to His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom by a delegation of the congress and transmitted to you, Sir, in my despatch No. 226 of the 17th August. During the debate in the congress, Mr. Locker, who was a member of the delegation which called upon me, is reported to have emphasised the desire of the Jews in Palestine to live in amity with the Arabs. The Rev. M. L. Perlzweig, also a member of the delegation, is reported to have expressed his belief that His Majesty's Government would honour engagements they had given to fulfil the obligations of the mandate.

8. In addition to the resolution with respect to Palestine, the congress adopted resolutions in favour of continuing the boycott of German goods, of establishing a central office for organising the fight against anti-Semitism, of restoring equality of rights for Jews in Germany, and of extending aid to Jewish refugees from Germany. The last resolution also urged Governments to allow such refugees to exercise professions or work in the countries in which they had taken refuge. A statute for the Jewish World Congress was also adopted on the lines proposed by Dr. Kubowitzki (see paragraph 5 of this despatch), and a budget of 75 million dollars was voted, of which the Jews in the United States of America are to contribute 50 per cent., those in the United Kingdom 10 per cent., and those in France and other countries sums varying from 5 per cent. to 1½ per cent. Dr. Wise was elected president of the Executive Committee of twelve, Dr. Goldmann president of the Administrative Committee of thirty, Mr. Lipsky, president of the Central Council of seventy to eighty members, which is to meet every six months, and Mr. Louis Sturz, president of the Finance Committee. The Administrative Committee then met to appoint central bureaux in Paris, Geneva and the United States. It was stated that the organs of the congress would not interfere in the internal affairs of the Jews in different countries, the various Jewish bodies in which would retain full independence in relation to the congress.

9. I have the impression that the Swiss press has not paid so much attention to the World Congress as to the Zionist Congress at Lucerne last year. The *Bund*, in a leading article written after the congress had concluded its labours, said that it had accomplished far more than had been expected of it at the start, a view which is also reflected in other newspapers. Emphasis is laid on the elasticity of the organisations set up by the congress, and it seems to be anticipated that more may come of the congress than was forecast in the article in the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, summarised in paragraph 2 of this despatch.

10. The *National-Zeitung* of Bâle announces that a small Zionist Congress will meet in Zürich from the 25th August to the 1st September, and will be followed by a meeting of the Administrative Committee of the Jewish Agency for Palestine.

I have, &c.
TERENCE SHONE.

Consul Ogden to Mr. Eden.—(Received August 31.)

(No. 63.)
Sir,

Damascus, August 22, 1936.

IN accordance with your instructions, I have the honour to transmit herewith a brief memorandum on the reaction of the inhabitants of this consular district towards the present situation in Palestine.

2. I have attempted to give an appreciation of the present temper of the average Syrian in this area. The future is charged with so many possibilities, dependent on so many diverse influences, that it is impossible to predict the probable course of events with certainty. I am, however, of the opinion that the proceedings of the Royal Commission on Palestine should be given the fullest publicity.

3. I am sending copies of this despatch, together with its enclosures, to His Majesty's consul at Aleppo and to the acting consul-general at Beirut.

I have, &c.

F. C. OGDEN

Enclosure in No. 98.

Memorandum on the Reactions in the Damascus District to the Palestine Disturbances.

IN an attempt of this nature to form an appreciation of the effects of the Palestine disturbances on the Damascus district it is, perhaps, not irrelevant to draw attention first of all to the differences existing between the Damascus district, comprising the southern half of Syria proper, including the territory of the Jebel Druze, when compared with the northern part of Syria on the one hand and the Lebanese Republic on the other. Aleppo to the north is further distant from Damascus than is Jerusalem to the south. Although a good road exists, there is still comparatively little interchange of population, and the average Damascene, whose fortunes take him to Aleppo, more often than not feels like a stranger sojourning in a strange land. Not so does he feel towards Jerusalem and the land of Palestine, which he still calls Southern Syria. From the days of Roman domination before the dawn of the Christian era the histories of Jerusalem and Damascus have been closely interwoven. Racially, the Arabs of Damascus and Palestine are closely related and their sympathies are mutual. The Lebanon again, with its large westernised Christian population, must present a very different picture from the predominantly Moslem and purely oriental Damascus.

The Disturbances of 1936.

2. It is easy to confuse the objects of the two risings which have taken place this year in the mandated territories of the Levant, the one in Syria and the other in Palestine. The first was purely and simply a revolt against the mandatory Power with the object of obtaining for Syria complete independence. The Palestinian rising does not appear to be primarily directed against Great Britain, but against the Jews, and has as its principal aim the suspension of Jewish immigration. During the Syrian disturbances in the earlier part of the year little assistance was forthcoming from the Arabs of Palestine, whilst such help as was received came indirectly and paradoxically from the Jews, in whom the Syrian merchant found a ready purchaser for the goods and produce which he was unable, on account of the strike, to dispose of in Syria. This lack of support was due, not to the absence of sympathy, but to an apathetic partial understanding of Syrian aims, as nebulously presented by the Syrian Nationalist leaders. A similar attitude has been adopted in general by the Syrian towards the Palestine dispute. He feels that racial affinities compel him to express his support for the Arab cause, and he genuinely wishes to see some satisfaction accorded to the Arabs of Palestine. On the other hand, the fact that the point at issue does not immediately affect him permits him to look at the question with a more critical eye. The educated Syrian Arab realises, and will often admit, that the Palestinian Arab landowner has little reason for complaint if he voluntarily sells his land to the Jews for a sum many times its market value. But his reaction

is "there may be no legitimate grounds for complaint, but, even so, we still do not want to see the Jews the masters of Palestine." Behind this is an *arrière-pensée*. It is that the Jews, if once strongly entrenched in Palestine, will eventually establish first economic and then political control over Syria. Legislation, so thinks the Arab, will be helpless before the power of wealth. The Jews are wealthy, the Arabs are poor, and he sees the Arab going to the wall.

On the other side of the picture he sees a prosperous Palestine due to Jewish gold, and compares it with the poverty of his own country. The merchant of Damascus and the landowner also realise that, with the advent of the Jews to Palestine, markets have been opened to them which were non-existent before; and so they are torn between fear and cupidity. The result has been that, whilst openly proclaiming their sympathy with their Palestinian brethren and holding meetings to discuss a boycott of British goods as a practical gesture of solidarity to their cause, goods have continued to be despatched to Palestine and no organised boycott of British goods has as yet materialised.

Syrian Politics.

3. In the early part of the year the Syrian people rose against the French and demanded independence. They were promised a treaty on the lines of the Anglo-Iraqi treaty, and in March a deputation left Damascus for Paris to conduct negotiations with the French Government. Despite the delegation's protracted absence and news of the many difficulties being encountered, the Syrians are hopeful that an agreement will yet be reached. The effect of these negotiations on the attitude of Syrians towards the Palestine dispute cannot be overstressed. The leaders of the Wafd or Nationalist party realise that any open interference on their part in the affairs of Palestine would incur the displeasure of the French and would almost certainly prejudice the conclusion of the hoped-for treaty. Moreover, they see that, whilst they have nothing to gain from such interference, they can also expect no help from Palestine in the event of Syria revolting against the French. They are aware that the British Government would not tolerate any active participation on the part of the Palestinian Arabs against the mandatory Power in Syria. At the same time, the Syrians are anxious to preserve the goodwill of Great Britain. They have no quarrel with the British, for whom, in fact, they still entertain the greatest respect. The memory of Lawrence and Feisal still lives. Towards the Jew *du pays*, with whom he has lived and worked for centuries, the Arab of Damascus shows no active animosity. But he is at the present day intensely nationalist, and an immigrant, be he Jew or Assyrian, is a foreigner and an interloper. Here, therefore, is another bond of sympathy with the Arabs of Palestine. The Syrian argues that, as the French have stopped Assyrian immigration into Syria, the British Government should bow to the wishes of the Arabs of Palestine and stop Jewish immigration, or at least curtail it substantially. That the two questions are essentially different does not matter to the Arab, to whom logic is of little consequence.

The Pan-Arab Movement.

4. Much has been said about the pan-Arab movement. But it is in reality, in its extreme form, only the idea of dreamers and food for philosophers. To the man in the street it means less than nothing. A united Arab Empire dominating the whole African and Asiatic littorals of the Mediterranean and the vast peninsula of Arabia appears something unattainable, even were it desired. What is believed to be a practical possibility, and what the more enlightened Arab politicians hope to see, is an alliance or confederation of independent Arab States. Some would go further and include all independent Moslem States. But all stress independence as the *sine qua non* of membership of such a confederation. For the Syrian politician, therefore, the paramount consideration is the independence of Syria, and if, in the race for that national respectability which independence is popularly believed to confer, it is a case of the devil take the hindmost, the Syrian's pride leads him to hope that he will manage to reach the tape a head at least in front of his Palestinian brother. As an idea the pan-Arab movement exists; as a vital force it is destroyed by the weaknesses inherent in a feudal patriarchal system, jealousy and distrust. The Syrian Arab regards the Iraqi as inferior to him in culture, in fact as little better than the Bedu whom he despises, except when he can make use of him for his own political ends. The Saudi Arab he considers a poor unenlightened person to be treated

with a tolerant condescension. The one possible cementing factor—the Moslem religion—in itself provides elements of further disruption. Sunni hates Shiah, both despise the Ismaili, whilst the Wahabi considers himself the only really true follower of the Prophet.

Trend of Future Developments.

5. From this mass of conflicting influences and interests which affect the Syrian attitude towards the Palestine disturbances it would be rash to prophesy that any one influence or group of influences will determine future developments. Newspaper propaganda has been active and Great Britain has been mercilessly pilloried. Reports of events in Palestine have been distorted to an extent which, to a European, appears ludicrous. But the Arab mind is attuned to overstatement and, where a report of a skirmish involving a couple of casualties would leave him absolutely cold, a circumstantial account of a battle in which three-score men were killed and several aircraft shot down would cause him to be faintly interested. The influence of the vernacular press may perhaps be gauged from the fact that whilst, after the promise of a Franco-Syrian treaty in March, almost all the processions of jubilant Arabs stopped before the consulate, for no apparent reason, to cheer King Edward, not a single hostile demonstration has taken place since the outbreak of the Palestine disturbances, despite the violent pronouncements of the Arab press.

6. As regards intervention in Palestine, any concerted armed intervention is impossible. Individuals or groups of individuals are reported to have gone, and may continue to go, to join the rebels. But they belong mostly to the hot-headed riff-raff of the town, probably unemployed, who would join in a scrap anywhere against anybody, and they can scarcely be said to represent the people. There is, however, the danger that some of the nomadic Bedu tribes, scenting loot, may throw in their lot with the rebels. Also the Haurani cultivators, suffering great distress from the complete failure of their crops, may be tempted to join up with their Arab brethren. From the Jebel Druze there is little to be feared, unless the Franco-Syrian treaty negotiations should fail and the Druzes unite with the Syrians in revolt against the French. In such an eventuality it is possible although unlikely that they might make common cause with the Palestinian Arabs.

British Prestige in Syria.

7. Since the end of the Great War the prestige of Great Britain in Syria has remained at a very high level. Anti-British demonstrations, it is true, have occasionally taken place, but they have seldom, if ever, been spontaneous, and have had little effect on Syrian regard for the British. The severest blow has been dealt by the Abyssinian war and it will take many years for British prestige in Syria to recover from this reverse. The Arab dislikes the Italian, in fact almost despises him, and, although the nationalist Arab may inveigh against British imperialist policy, he sees it as a benevolent imperialism which he is prepared to tolerate rather than the arrogant imperialism of Italy, which he fears. It is scarcely an exaggeration to say that every Syrian Arab fully expected Great Britain to oppose the Italian conquest of Abyssinia at whatever cost. Her failure to do so he regards as a betrayal, whilst the vernacular press tells him that it is the beginning of the disintegration of the British Empire. The Palestine disturbances have not helped to change this opinion and the longer they continue the stronger the feeling will grow. In the main the average Arab around Damascus has implicit faith in British justice and impartiality. He wants to see the disturbances in Palestine brought to a speedy end, and provided he is presented with a reasonable argument which he will not bother to understand, but which will help him to save his face, he will be satisfied.

Finally, the recent conclusion of the Anglo-Egyptian treaty has helped beyond measure to rehabilitate Great Britain in the eyes of the Arab. He sees in it an expression of that justice in which he has been taught to believe, and he will be ready to accept any solution of the Palestine question which does not entirely ignore Arab pretensions in that country, even though it may not satisfy them in their entirety.

F. C. OGDEN.

Damascus, August 21, 1936.

[E 5484/94/31]

No. 99.

Mr. Bateman to Mr. Eden.—(Received August 31.)

(No. 422.)

Sir,

Bagdad, August 17, 1936.

WITH reference to your telegram No. 169 of the 6th August last, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a report compiled by Captain V. Holt, M.V.O., oriental secretary to this Embassy, on the repercussions in Iraq of the events in Palestine which have followed the establishment of a Jewish national home in that country.

2. The report has been made as objective as possible, and the expressions of opinion which it contains are those of people who, either directly or indirectly, have been in touch with the question for the past eighteen years.

3. My talks with Iraqis over the last few months—and especially with those young men who will one day rise to political prominence—lead me to think that we have been fortunate to have escaped, for so long in Iraq, from serious trouble as a result of the repeated disorders in Palestine. This is due to the restraining influence of the elder statesmen in the Iraqi Government, most of whom are, I believe, now persuaded of the fairmindedness and liberality of British policy, and have no desire to see disturbed the cordial relations existing between Iraq and Great Britain. At the same time there can be no escaping the conclusion that Iraqis of Arab blood are genuinely convinced that their kinsmen in Palestine are not getting a square deal, and there can be no guarantee that the Government will be able effectively to withstand the pressure of opinion should the present disturbances in Palestine be continued indefinitely. The Prime Minister's warning to His Majesty's Ambassador was, I believe, uttered in all sincerity.

4. It will be clear to you that the publication of certain parts of the enclosed memorandum might cause great embarrassment to the Iraqi Government. I therefore have the honour to request that, should it be used for any purpose other than for the confidential information of the Royal Commission, it should be subjected (if anything in the nature of publication is contemplated) to careful scrutiny and editing.

5. In writing it, Captain Holt felt—and I agree—that if prepared in a form suitable for publication, much useful material would have had to be excluded, and this would have robbed it of much of its usefulness.

I have, &c.

C. H. BATEMAN.

Enclosure in No. 99.

Report on the Repercussions in Iraq of the Creation of a National Home for the Jews in Palestine.

I.—The Past.

THE Iraqis who took part in the Arab revolt against Turkey, which was led during the Great War by King Husain and his son, King Faisal, have naturally continued to follow closely the affairs of the countries for the independence of which they fought. They have also stimulated a similar interest among their friends. It is only in recent years, however, that there has been evidence in this country of a deep and general public interest in the affairs of the Arabs of Palestine and their position in regard to the creation of a Jewish national home.

The Balfour Declaration of November 1917 passed almost unnoticed in Iraq, where, at that time, Turkish and British armies were still fighting and the future was full of uncertainties. Similarly, the anti-Jewish rioting in Jerusalem during the Easter of 1920 and in Jaffa in May 1921 were scarcely heeded by the general public, preoccupied as they were, on the first occasion, with Iraq's struggle for independence, and on the second with the election of a King. Nevertheless, even in those early days the press found space for events in Palestine, and gave prominence to the protests which the Supreme Arab Committee telegraphed to His Majesty's Government. In the following years, from 1923 to 1928, there were no serious disorders in Palestine to attract the attention of the outside Arab

world. The political leaders and the mass of the people in Iraq were too occupied with their own affairs to be much concerned with events elsewhere. The press continued to publish all news of importance regarding the anti-Zionist movement, but it was not until 1928 that there were any popular manifestations of sympathy with the Palestine Arabs and their grievances against the Jews.

On the 8th February, 1928, the late Lord Melchett (then Sir Alfred Mond), a distinguished British supporter of Zionism, came on a private visit to Bagdad. His arrival was made the occasion for a sudden angry and riotous anti-Zionist demonstration, and the press poured out impassioned articles denouncing the Balfour Declaration, the Zionists and all their works. No events of special importance had occurred in Palestine at that time to excite popular feeling, and the demonstrations must be attributed, in the main, to the work of agitators who wished to embarrass the relations of the Iraqi Government with the Residency, and to the fact that there was a movement on foot among the Jews to give Lord Melchett a hearty welcome. Many Bagdadis were quite determined that no Zionist leader should be given a popular ovation in their city, and to them the best way to defeat the plans of the Jews seemed to be to go to the other extreme. The outburst died down as suddenly as it had come to a head, but it focussed public attention on, and marked the beginning of a more sustained and closer interest in, the progress of Zionism in Palestine. In the following year, the disturbances which occurred in Palestine during the last week of August again excited public opinion. The first development was the formation of a Committee of Protest, headed by prominent political leaders, including Yasin-al-Hashimi (at present the Prime Minister in Iraq), who had, fortunately, enough experience and foresight to realise that serious disturbances would harm the interests of their own country. Under the direction of this committee a number of public meetings were held to protest against Zionism and to declare the support of the Arabs of Iraq for their brethren in Palestine. For a few days there were alarms and excursions in Bagdad, and it was found necessary to reinforce the police. Some minor clashes with demonstrators occurred, and a few men were injured. Telegrams of protest were sent by various religious and political bodies to the Prime Minister in England, copies of which were despatched to the League of Nations. There were also signs of excitement in the provincial towns, and a small demonstration was made outside the British consulate at Basra. In Mosul, however, attempts to hold processions were a failure. The movement, which was discouraged by King Faisal, did not maintain its first momentum for long, and by the middle of September it had ceased to be a threat to law and order. Two months later, further trouble was caused by the trial of those Arabs in Palestine who were charged in connexion with the disturbances, but no demonstrations were held, and by the end of the year leaders of public opinion in Iraq were once more absorbed in the affairs of their own country.

In the autumn of 1931 the deliberations of the Moslem Congress at Jerusalem, although not directly concerned with the Zionist question, brought about a revival of interest in the position of the Arabs in Palestine. The Congress was attended by eight unofficial Iraqi delegates, whose work received wide publicity in the Iraqi press. But as no untoward incidents marked the proceedings of the Congress there was no serious agitation in Iraq.

In 1933 the public in Iraq followed keenly the efforts of the Arabs in Palestine to stem the tide of Jewish immigration and the sale of Arab lands to the Jews. The press was especially violent in its denunciation of Zionism and, as the year passed, the agitation carried on in Bagdad developed threatening proportions. In the summer, the affair of the Wadi Hawarith in Palestine and the alleged unjust eviction of Arabs from land acquired by the Jewish National Fund led to the usual outbreak of protest meetings and telegrams to His Majesty's Ambassador, and there was talk of a boycott of Jewish trade. These manifestations of sympathy had scarcely begun to subside before the disturbances in Palestine of October and November and the strikes of that period fanned the embers of racial passion once more into flame. Letters protesting against alleged outrages by the British authorities and the tyranny of Zionism were addressed to His Majesty's Ambassador by the leading religious and political societies and the press trumpeted appeals to the whole Arab world to help their brethren. Demonstrations were organised under the auspices of a new body called the Palestine Defence Committee, but were prohibited by the Government, who kept a firm hand on the situation. In November 1933 the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem,

Haji Amin-al-Husaini, passed through Bagdad on his way back to Jerusalem after a tour through India, Afghanistan and Persia. In a conversation with the Ambassador, which naturally touched on the question of Zionism, His Eminence said that he did not doubt the desire of the British people to do justice to the Arabs, but he feared the great influence of the Jews throughout the world. They were everywhere rich and powerful, while the Arabs were poor. The Jews would soon be in the majority in Palestine and then the Arabs, dispossessed of their lands and overwhelmed by the economic power of the Jews, would be reduced to the status of a helot minority. No doubt he voiced similar sentiments among his Arab friends in Iraq.

In July 1933 King Faisal paid a State visit to London and, *inter alia*, discussed Zionism and the future of the whole Arab race with the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. The following extract from a record made by Sir Francis Humphrys of one of his conversations with His Majesty, is of interest:—

"His Majesty then spoke of Palestine and went over the ground which he had covered in several previous talks. He referred to the rising tide of Jewish immigration and to the steady deterioration of the political, social and economic situation of the Arabs. He emphasised in particular the economic plight of the Arabs in Transjordan and the indignation which was being aroused throughout the Arab world by the sale and lease of land in Transjordan to the Jews. He felt sure that if this were not checked there would be a further outbreak of fighting between the Arabs and the Jews. To his mind the solution of the problem required four main measures: the relief of economic distress in Transjordan; the entire prohibition of the sale or lease to the Jews of land east of the Jordan; the setting up of a representative Government, such as had originally been proposed by Sir Herbert Samuel; and a definite limitation of Jewish immigration. I asked whether he thought that the Arabs would now co-operate in working a representative form of government. He said that he was confident that they would, provided that they were given adequate representation and that a final limit was set to the flood of Jewish immigration. This last measure he thought absolutely essential; otherwise, in the near future, the Arab would either be squeezed out of Palestine or reduced to economic and social servitude.

"I also asked whether he felt more concern for the situation in Palestine or for that in Transjordan. He replied that he considered that it was the situation in Transjordan which called for the most urgent attention. The Arabs would never permit the Jews to penetrate into Transjordan without a struggle and unless the movement which had begun were stopped, bloodshed would certainly result.

"His Majesty explained that it was with great diffidence that he entered into detail regarding matters which, strictly speaking, were quite outside his own sphere, and he was aware that by so doing he laid himself open to the suspicion of seeking personal aggrandisement. This was not so. His great desire was to maintain the most friendly relations with His Majesty's Government and he knew that this would be difficult if a serious struggle were to break out between the Arabs and the Jews. It was this fact that made him feel that it was his duty to inform His Majesty's Government of his apprehensions for the future."

During 1934 and 1935 the quiet which prevailed in Palestine induced a corresponding decline in anti-Zionist feeling in Iraq. Unhappily, minor incidents more than once stirred up a frothy agitation, which, although it led to no serious disorders, was symptomatic of the latent strength of popular feeling. In the autumn of 1934 a number of posts in the public services in Iraq were abolished. Among the officials involved were some Jews. Several of these raised an outcry that they had been dismissed because of their race, and they succeeded in inspiring in the press in England a number of articles which accused the Iraqi Government of persecuting the Jewish minority in Iraq. A violent anti-Jewish and anti-Zionist campaign ensued in the Iraqi press and the Government were obliged to intervene to prevent street demonstrations against Zionism. In 1935 popular feeling was calmer, but the Iraqis' inherent hatred of Zionism was revealed in the summary deportation of two Jewish school-teachers, who were charged with being Zionist propagandists, and the local semi-official representative of the Jewish Agency

was so plagued by the police that he left the country. Mr. Ben Zvi, a distinguished official of the Zionist Organisation of Palestine, who visited Iraq in the summer, also came under suspicion of being a propagandist in spite of *bona fides* furnished by the High Commission in Jerusalem. On returning to Iraq from Persia, he was immediately put to great inconvenience by the Iraqi police, who seized his passport. It was only after the urgent personal intervention of His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires with the Prime Minister that his passport was returned and he was allowed to depart in peace.

It should also be recalled that, in September 1934, the Iraqi delegate to the League of Nations, in a speech before the Sixth Committee of the Assembly, raised the question of Jewish immigration into Palestine and expressed the hope that it would not be allowed to prejudice the rights of the native Arab population. This speech was very cordially welcomed by the Iraqi press.

II.—The Present.

At the beginning of 1936 the announcement of the High Commissioner's proposals for the setting up of a Legislative Assembly brought Palestine once more into prominence in the Iraqi press, and the reaction of the Palestine Arabs to these proposals was followed with interest by the literate public. About the same time a prominent Palestinian publicist, Emil Ghaury, visited Iraq and established close contacts in political circles. In the spring parties of Iraqi notables and politicians and of students toured Palestine, and at the entertainments given in their honour, had frequent opportunities to pledge the support of their countrymen to the Arabs of Palestine in their struggle against Zionism.

The disturbances in Palestine, which began with a series of clashes between Jews and Arabs in the neighbourhood of Tel Aviv in April, at once brought to a head all the bitter feeling which had been fermenting during the past. The Palestine Defence Society was resuscitated and began to organise support for the Arabs. They also published every evening broadsheets giving the latest news from Palestine. The eagerness with which these were snapped up in the streets showed how deeply the public were interested in the progress of the struggle.

In May a deputation of Senators and Deputies visited His Majesty's Ambassador and handed to him a memorandum in which they expressed the grave anxiety of Iraq concerning the situation. Their spokesman expressed the conviction that the national political and economic rights of the Palestinian Arabs could only be safeguarded by a limitation of Jewish immigration; he begged Sir Archibald Clark Kerr to inform His Majesty's Government accordingly. He said that it was natural that the Arabs of Iraq should take the greatest interest in the fate of the Arabs in adjacent countries and that, in consequence, any events which brought distress to their neighbours and brothers must also deeply stir public feeling in Iraq. As Iraqis they were most anxious to safeguard and strengthen the good relations which existed between their own country and Great Britain, but he feared that failure to find an early solution of the problem created by the Zionist intrusion in Palestine would react most unfavourably on popular sentiment in Iraq.

Other memoranda of protest (some of which were couched in unrestrained language and contained references to atrocities committed by the British forces in Palestine) were received from a large number of clubs and societies from different parts of the country. Many of these were repeated to the League of Nations and to the heads of other diplomatic missions in Bagdad.

Demonstrations and public meetings were wisely forbidden by the Government, but days of mourning and flag days were organised and subscription lists opened in many towns to collect funds for the victims of the struggle. Several thousand pounds were collected in this way and sent to Palestine. In June a representative of the Supreme Arab Committee in Palestine visited Iraq, and enthusiasm for the Arab cause was stimulated at the meetings which were held in his honour by the principal political organisations of Bagdad.

The attitude of the Government was throughout correct and helpful. Public excitement was checked and attempts to vent on Iraqi Jews the popular feeling against Zionism were promptly suppressed. The press was also effectively restrained from exciting mob passions and from publishing violent attacks on His Majesty's Government. In general the Prime Minister and the Minister for

Foreign Affairs refrained from discussing the situation with His Majesty's Ambassador, but early in May, when he was receiving a large number of urgent requests for help from all kinds of organisations interested in the Arab struggle in Palestine, the Prime Minister (Yasin-al-Hashimi) spoke formally on the subject to Sir Archibald Clark Kerr. His Excellency said that in his opinion, the vital issue was that of Jewish immigration. The Arabs in Palestine foresaw that, if it continued without limitation, they would rapidly be reduced to the position of an impotent minority under the sway of an alien people whose intellectual and financial resources were far superior to their own. It was the dread of this fate which was now driving them to desperation. He explained that he well understood the difficulties of His Majesty's Government and knew that strong influences were being brought to bear upon them from many quarters to find room for the Jews now fleeing from Germany. Nevertheless, he thought it his duty to give His Majesty's Ambassador a friendly and serious warning that, in spite of the goodwill which the Arabs as a whole felt towards the British, His Majesty's Government would see the present happy state of harmony between the two peoples much damaged if a solution of the Palestinian problem were not soon found. For reasons of internal policy and for the sake of their good relations with His Majesty's Government, upon which they set great store, the Iraqi Government did not, he said, desire to be drawn into taking any action in the matter, but they might not be able indefinitely to resist the pressure that was being brought upon them to champion the Arab cause.

In July, as the result of a proposal made by King Abdul Aziz of Saudi Arabia (Ibn Saud) that some sort of joint *démarche* should be made by Iraq, Saudi Arabia and the Yemen, with a view to help the restoration of normal conditions in Palestine, the Prime Minister broached the subject again with His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Bagdad. He explained that he had discussed King Abdul Aziz's proposal with the Saudi Chargé d'Affaires and had prepared a draft memorandum which, he thought, might be communicated jointly by the Iraqi and Saudi Arabian Governments to His Majesty's Government. He would not, however, proceed further with this idea before he knew how His Majesty's Government would react to it. The gist of the memorandum was an appeal to His Majesty's Government to suspend Jewish immigration until such time as the proposed Royal Commission had made their report, this being the only condition on which Yasin Pasha felt that he could entertain a hope of successful intervention. To intervene unsuccessfully would, in his opinion, be worse than useless.

He added that with the clouds gathering on the political horizon in Europe, the present was surely no time for British troops to be forcing the Arabs in Palestine into sullen submission and weakening a link in the chain of Arab friendliness that extended from the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean.

This conversation was reported to His Majesty's Government and Mr. Bateman was instructed to inform the Prime Minister that His Majesty's Government were not prepared to make any pronouncement regarding Jewish immigration into Palestine until disorders ceased and law and order could be restored. At the same time, His Majesty's Government appreciated the attitude which the Iraqi Government had taken in this matter and would be grateful for any further moderating influence which the Prime Minister could bring to bear on the Arabs. At the time of writing this report (15th August, 1936) it seems likely that, in view of this reply, the idea of a joint *démarche* by the two independent Arab kingdoms will be dropped.

III.—Zionism and the Pan-Arab Ideal.

The incidents which have been related above were in the main ebullitions of the popular feelings of sympathy and anger which have been provoked in Iraq by events in Palestine during the past seven years. They were echos of events elsewhere and formed no part of an organised and sustained agitation against the policy of His Majesty's Government in Palestine in the name of Arabian political rights.

The pan-Arabian movement is the dream of rulers and statesmen and has little in common with the instinctive reactions of the crowd. Nor has the policy of the pan-Arabs ever been so hostile to the Jewish national home as are the passions of the people when aroused by stories of the sufferings of fellow Arabs in

Palestine. The ambition of the Hashimite family was to bring the Hejaz, Palestine, Syria and possibly Iraq under the rule of princes of their House. But King Faisal, the protagonist of the Hashimite revolt, was, from the beginning, willing to accommodate the Jewish national home as a small privileged enclave within the empire which he hoped to see united under the rule of his family. This was the basic idea of the so-called Faisal-Weizmann understanding of 1919, and in later years, when discussing the ideals of the pan-Arabs with His Majesty's representative in Bagdad, King Faisal frequently declared his conviction that the problem of reconciling the Arabs to Zionism would be solved if only the Arab countries could all be brought within some kind of federation. It was, he said, the prospect of becoming a subject minority within the limits of Palestine which exasperated the Arabs. If Palestine were united with Syria and Iraq, that threat would be removed and he foresaw no difficulty in arranging for the satisfactory development of the Jewish national home in Palestine if this unity were achieved. King Faisal constantly urged that this was the only way for His Majesty's Government to give effect to their pledges to both the Arabs and the Jews. Since the King's death in 1933, the pan-Arab ideal has undergone considerable change. A Confederation under the Hashimite House has ceased to be a practical policy. The leaders now seem to understand that their first task is to establish a common sympathy and a community of ideals among the different Arab peoples. They no longer aim at uniting the whole race under one ruler or ruling family, but think more in terms of a close federation which might perhaps stretch some day from the Persian border to the Atlantic. With the present situation in Palestine, the pan-Arabs *per se* are not especially concerned. They are more intent on closing the ranks of the already independent Arab States. They feel that they can afford to wait to deal with Palestine later, when Iraq, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and possibly Syria (because the pan-Arabs have always been more interested politically in Syria than in Palestine) have organised a common front. Their ideas about Zionism are probably similar to those of the late King Faisal, and there is good reason to believe that Nuri-al-Said, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, while in London during the present summer, discussed tentatively a solution on these lines with Dr. Weizmann, to whom he offered considerable concessions for the Jews within a pan-Arab federation of States.

IV.—Reaction of Developments in Palestine on the Relations between His Majesty's Government and the Government of Iraq.

The preceding paragraphs will have shown that, up to the present time, events in Palestine have not seriously harmed the relations of His Majesty's Government with the Government of Iraq. This fact is due to the strong ties of goodwill and friendship which have been created by the liberal and understanding policy of His Majesty's Government in this country, to the good sense of the Iraqi statesmen themselves, and to the confidence which still prevails that somehow British statesmanship will find a fair solution of the problems of the Arabs and the Jews in Palestine.

As Arabs, the Iraqi Ministers and others in authority no doubt sympathise keenly with the Arabs in Palestine, but as statesmen they appreciate the importance for their country of good relations with Great Britain. During the current year they have frequently stated, in informal conversations, that they deplored the disorders in Palestine not only because they were causing suffering to the Arabs but because they feared the ultimate repercussion of these events on the relations between the Government of Iraq and Great Britain and on the sentiments of the Arabs towards the British people.

If, however, the struggle in Palestine is prolonged, patience in Iraq is likely to become exhausted. The statesmanship of the Iraqi Government and their goodwill towards Great Britain may then no longer be strong enough to withstand the pressure of popular feeling, and serious difficulties may result for His Majesty's Government in this country.

V.—The Iraqi Government, Zionism and the Jews in Iraq.

The growth of Zionism has caused a bitterness of Arab feeling towards the Jewish community in Iraq which did not previously exist. The wiser and more experienced Jews, while probably sympathising with the general aims of the

Zionist movement, openly deplore the unfortunate repercussions which it has had on their position in this country. They appreciate that the feelings of the Arabs are exacerbated by Zionist propaganda and they have no desire that it should be conducted here. There is considerable apprehension among them concerning the future. They fear that the tension arising from the struggle of the Arabs in Palestine is likely to strengthen rather than diminish Arab ill-will towards them, but confidence has to some extent been restored by the firm way in which the present Government have put down any attempt by extremists to stir up excitement against the Iraqi Jews. They would greatly benefit from a satisfactory eradication of the causes of the present struggle between Arabs and Jews in Palestine.

VI.—Summary.

1. Although the leaders of the pan-Arab movement in Iraq have been interested in the political destiny of Palestine since the days of the war, popular agitation in support of the Arabs in Palestine is of comparatively recent growth.

2. Reaction in Iraq to events in Palestine has always taken the form of a popular agitation in support of the Arabs in their struggle against the Jews.

3. These agitations have been due to—

(a) A natural racial sympathy with fellow Arabs and a hatred of the idea that they should ever be dominated by the Jews;

(b) A conviction that they *will* be dominated by the Jews unless immigration is limited.

4. The attitude of the Iraqi Government in regard to the Jewish question in Palestine has always been friendly and correct. They have never supported any anti-Zionist movement in Palestine. Neither have they initiated or encouraged any outbreak of popular agitation in Iraq. On the contrary, they have effectively restrained popular agitation within reasonable limits.

5. The political pan-Arab movement has had practically nothing to do with anti-Zionist feeling in Iraq (or, so far as can be seen from here, in Palestine) and the pan-Arab leaders would be willing to include, in a united Arabia, a Jewish national home in Palestine with special political and other privileges.

6. The position of the Jewish minority in Iraq has been impaired by the prolonged struggle between the Jews and the Arabs in Palestine in spite of the measures taken by the Government to repress public demonstrations of ill-feeling towards them. For this reason Zionism is, in a measure, unpopular among the Jews of this country.

[E 5474/94/31]

No. 100.

Mr. Calvert to Mr. Eden.—(Received August 31.)

(No. 244. Confidential.)

Jedda, August 11, 1936.

Sir,
I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith a brief memorandum, in which I have attempted an appreciation of the reactions in Saudi Arabia to the present situation in Palestine.

I have, &c.

A. S. CALVERT.

Enclosure in No. 100.

Memorandum on the Reactions in Saudi Arabia to the Situation in Palestine.

EVENTS in Palestine would appear to have reached a stage at which it may be useful to attempt an appreciation of the situation, which now engages such widespread and deepening attention throughout the Arab world, particularly in regard to its repercussions in the neighbouring, if not adjacent, country of Saudi Arabia. It is, however, a little difficult to estimate the influence of present disturbances in Palestine on this country as a whole from Jedda, a point on the

perimeter of the kingdom, and to gauge the reality of the sympathy for the Arabs of Palestine awakened in the component parts of this country.

2. Public opinion in Saudi Arabia may hardly be said to exist, and where, as in the urban populations of the Hejaz, a rudimentary form occasionally manifests itself, it is generally nebulous and largely inarticulate. In the Holy Cities of the Hejaz and in the more strictly mercantile community of Jedda, no very real interest has, it is believed, been aroused by the present discontents of the Arabs in Palestine. This may perhaps be due to the large non-Arab elements in these centres, *e.g.*, Indian, Javanese, African, &c., which have been long established here and which the annual pilgrimage has brought to these shores, as much as to the general lack of concern for matters which lie beyond the narrow horizon of these people. Although this lack of interest may be true as a general statement, it is also true to say that events in Palestine are followed very closely by a minority of the better-educated Arabs in the towns of the Hejaz, particularly by those in governmental and official employ. These limited circles are definitely of an Arab nationalist character and much of the activity they display is generated by Syrians, who, as you are aware, are a small but powerful coterie well-entrenched in the Government of this country and with considerable influence on Ibn Saud himself, to which a further reference will be made later in this memorandum.

3. In religious centres, both in the Hejaz and in Nejd, it may be expected that the sympathy evoked amongst the leading clerical authorities would be more of a religious, than an Arab nationalist, nature, in view of the appeal that Jerusalem makes to Moslem sentiment as the "First Qibla of Islam." But there may be something in the view—more especially as regards the Hejaz, where Arab nationalism finds it more difficult to take root and where Great Britain, as the world's leading Moslem Power, has always been regarded with good feeling—that faith is retained in the fundamental justice of British rule and its tradition of scrupulous regard for religious beliefs of whatever kind.

4. The use of the wireless set has very greatly increased in the past year, particularly in the coastal centres of the Hejaz, to which it is officially, though not actually, restricted, and the news is followed very closely by those interested, particularly the bulletins broadcast from Cairo and Jerusalem. Public opinion may, therefore, in so far as it exists, be influenced by this agency, but a much more powerful factor is the foreign press, chiefly Egyptian and Syrian. With all this, the fact remains that the Hejaz has so far betrayed no great emotion over the crisis in Palestine and no noticeable readiness to respond to the appeals for help from Arab leaders in that country. It is true that a fund was established early in June for the relief of the Arab victims of the troubles in Palestine; that subscriptions have been and are still being collected at Jedda, Mecca and Medina; that a sum of £E. 500 was recently remitted to Jerusalem for distribution; that the names of prominent subscribers, including a junior member of the Royal family, several Ministers and a number of high officials and prominent personages, have been announced; but locally the results are stated to be disappointing and it is said that pressure has in some instances been brought to bear to overcome reluctance, which is said to be fairly general, to subscribe. The local press, which consists of two weekly news-sheets, published in Mecca, has confined its interest in the Palestine situation very largely to the publication at frequent intervals of the results of the efforts of the subscription committee in regard to this fund, an abstention from a more general treatment of the topic which is somewhat remarkable in the case of one paper in view of the connexion of certain prominent Syrians here with its management.

5. Looking somewhat further afield, it may be said with some confidence that, if sentiment in the towns of the Hejaz has not been deeply stirred, it seems certain that in the intervening desert areas the majority of the tribes and the scattered sedentary population have proved even less accessible to the appeal of the present difficulties of their fellow-Arabs in Palestine. This generalisation, however, is likely to be less true of the northern districts of the Hejaz, as well as of the northern areas of Nejd in proximity to the Transjordan frontier, and I have been interested to see it stated in a recent Intelligence Report from Palestine that reports of the disturbances in that country had now penetrated into the Hejaz and that tribes and towns across the frontier from Transjordan were beginning to show a marked interest. The report added that propaganda was also reported to have reached as far afield as Kaf and Jauf.

6. Appeals from Arab leaders in Palestine, however, have not been entirely without reaction in this country. At the end of April last, Sheikh Yusuf Yasin, the Acting Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, approached Sir Andrew Ryan with a request from the King for advice. Ibn Saud had received from Haj Amin Husseini a telegram asking for his assistance in the struggle against British Zionist policy. In approaching the subject, Sheikh Yusuf Yasin emphasised Ibn Saud's desire to take his cue from His Majesty's Government in international questions, and to avoid anything, in regard to affairs in the East, which might disturb relations with His Majesty's Government, and, moreover, asserted the King's desire not to interfere in the affairs of Palestine. Ibn Saud was anxious to consult His Majesty's Minister as to the best means of reconciling the above with the maintenance of his prestige in the Arab world. Sir Andrew Ryan, whilst refusing to be drawn into a positive expression of opinion, stated the personal view that the King would neither increase his friendship with His Majesty's Government nor his prestige in the Arab world by concerning himself in any way with the affairs of Palestine. Sheikh Yusuf did not revert to this subject again, and on the only other occasion when the subject of Palestine cropped up in conversation with me, he disclaimed any up-to-date knowledge of Palestine affairs. Since, of course, Ibn Saud has taken further action with His Majesty's Government, but through the Saudi Minister in London, so that it will have been possible in the Foreign Office to form, with greater distinctness than I am able here, an impression of the present attitude of the Saudi ruler. I would, however, venture to note here that Ibn Saud appears, in his recent approach to His Majesty's Government, to be animated by intentions which are consonant with his expressions of goodwill towards the British Government and to be less immoderate in his views than the authorities in Iraq and the Yemen. It is at least satisfactory that he has agreed, upon the breakdown of his *démarche* in London, to continue to exercise his influence in a sedative and assuaging sense, and strictly to repress, within the borders of his own kingdom, any tendency on the part of Arab nationalists to take action to demonstrate their solidarity with their brethren in Palestine.

7. Upon consideration of the foregoing elements in the situation in this country, I am of the opinion that the risk of active intervention in Palestine from Saudi Arabia is small, for Ibn Saud's interests in remaining on friendly terms with His Majesty's Government are too great for him to hazard for the more than doubtful advantages of playing a boldly interventionist rôle, as a leader of the Arab world, in Palestine. It is true that he has definite pan-Arab leanings, but it is believed that these are of somewhat recent growth, as two or three years ago, it was thought that he was inclined to hold a little aloof from the enthusiasms of some of his advisers. More recently, perhaps, his views have taken on a more definitely pan-Arab tinge, probably under the influence of his numerous Syrian advisers. He is, none the less, strong enough on a question of this nature to follow his own policy, rather than one which might betray the promptings of his immediate advisers.

8. In conclusion, it may once more be doubted whether the events in Palestine, as far as they have gone, have stirred this country at all profoundly, except in certain restricted but admittedly influential circles. Should the situation deteriorate much more, it may be difficult for Ibn Saud to refrain from attempting again, through His Majesty's Government, to come to the aid of his brother Arabs, but I am unable to believe that he would imperil his relations with the British Government by yielding to the appeals of the extreme elements in pan-Arabism. It is with considerable diffidence that I express the view that relations between Great Britain and Saudi Arabia, in my judgment, are not likely to be seriously impaired, but clearly a just and satisfactory solution of the present difficulties in Palestine would be most welcome generally and would contribute to even happier relations between the two Governments.

A. S. C.

Jedda, August 11, 1936.

Acting Consul-General Furlonge to Mr. Eden.—(Received August 31.)

(No. 81. Confidential.)

Sir,

Beirut, August 14, 1936.

WITH reference to your telegram No. 10 of the 6th August, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a brief appreciation of the repercussions on the Lebanon of the present situation in Palestine. In forwarding it, I wish to record the great assistance I have derived in its compilation from the local knowledge of Mr. R. de C. Baldwin, British vice-consul at this post.

2. I am sending a copy of this despatch and enclosure to His Majesty's consul at Aleppo and to the acting consul at Damascus.

I have, &c.

G. W. FURLONGE.

Enclosure in No. 101.

Memorandum on the Repercussions in the Lebanon of the Situation in Palestine.

I.—Attitude of Public Opinion.

IN the Lebanon it is usually safe to assume that the Christian and the Moslem sections of the population will regard any subject from different points of view. Of the Palestinian question, which is so largely bound up with religion, this is particularly true, and the viewpoints of these two communities on it must be considered separately.

2. The Lebanese Christians, who form rather more than half the total population, are concerned commercially rather than politically with Palestine. They have, on the whole, benefited largely from the Jewish influx into Palestine, for prosperity there has brought them increased trade and a flow of Palestinian visitors to their hill stations. Many of the more influential were, moreover, the absentee landlords of large tracts of land in Palestine, acquired during Turkish times, and have disposed of them at high prices to Jews. Nevertheless, many of them, perhaps stirred by reports from Palestinian Christians, had begun to reflect on the consequences of an eventual Jewish hegemony in Palestine, and to wonder if perhaps Jewish immigration had not gone far enough. The troubles of the last few months, with their resulting restriction of trade and curtailing of profits, have profoundly disturbed them. They feel that, in failing to restore calm, His Majesty's Government have been guilty of a lack of statesmanship, for, they argue, small concessions at the outset and a better appreciation of the feelings of the Palestinian Arabs could have speedily brought about the end of hostilities.

3. Amongst the Lebanese Moslems, who are little inferior in numbers to the Christians, more than one viewpoint has been noticeable. All are, at least outwardly, wholly on the side of their Palestinian co-religionists. The younger element, excitable, sentimental, and mostly ardently nationalistic, have watched with increasing apprehension the continued influx of Jews and of Jewish capital into Palestine, which they feel cannot but in the end oblige His Majesty's Government, despite its pledges to the contrary, to recognise Jewish domination there as a *fait accompli*; in support of this belief, they point to the frequent utterances of Zionist orators on the determination of the Jews to control the country. They resent the prospect profoundly, for it conflicts not only with their religious and racial pride, but with the ideal which most hold (see paragraph 5 below) of an ultimate Arab-controlled confederation of all Near Eastern countries. In their view, the Palestine Arabs must now or never protest with all the means in their power against the continuance of Jewish immigration.

4. The older Moslems are less vehement. They partake of the general Moslem sympathy for the Palestine Arabs and express it as loudly as their juniors; but their natural cupidity causes them to place commercial considerations above political, and, like the Lebanese Christians, they are not slow to recognise the material benefits of Jewish immigration in increased trade between Palestine

and this country. It is noteworthy that two influential Lebanese Moslem families are at present in negotiation with Jewish organisations to sell them land in the Lebanon.

5. Of active expressions of sympathy between any Lebanese and the Palestine Arabs there has been surprisingly little. The shops shut for three days in Sidon and for one in Beirut in May as a protest against British policy in Palestine. Various Moslem associations have addressed protests through this consulate-general to the Government of Palestine, and the Arabic press has been vitriolic on the subject. Collections have been made to send relief to the Arab "victims of the revolt." Traders attempting to bring goods in or out of Palestine have been attacked and stopped on many occasions. The mildness of this reaction must be ascribed partly to the desire not to fall out with Great Britain (see paragraph 7), but chiefly to the absorption of the country as a whole with the question of its own future; the prospect of negotiations with France has distracted Lebanese attention from all external affairs.

II.—Political Connexions between Palestine and the Lebanon.

6. Between Palestine and the Christian elements in the Lebanon the connexion is mainly commercial. Between the Arab leaders in Palestine and the Lebanese Moslems, however, is a strong bond of sympathy, due not only to their racial and religious affinities, but also to their mutual sense of Arab solidarity. Among the younger Lebanese Moslems the pan-Arab ideal is strong and widespread. By it they do not in general visualise any sort of unified Arab State, at any rate in the near future, for they realise that present political conditions in Arab countries render the realisation of any such ideal impracticable. Their aim is more for some sort of federation of Arab countries, which shall be linked racially and culturally and shall pursue a common foreign policy; the recent treaty of friendship concluded between Iraq and Saudi Arabia, the countries which they look to as eventual leaders of the federation, was hailed with much satisfaction amongst them as an important step towards its realisation. The older and more economic-minded Moslems hold the same ideal, but are more concerned with the commercial advantages which they expect to derive from some sort of customs agreement between the members of the federation, on the analogy of the benefits they have already drawn from the Syro-Palestine Customs Convention. The Christian communities are likewise not averse from the ideal of an Arab federation. Situated as they are on the fringe of the Moslem world and linked economically with predominantly Moslem communities, their chief preoccupation is to maintain their corporate existence while deriving all possible economic benefits from their situation. Adherence to an eventual federation with a mutual customs agreement would, they hope, best serve their purpose.

7. Amongst all communities, however, it is still felt that the realisation of any such federation can only come about by the help of Great Britain, the only Great Power with sufficient influence throughout the Near East, for France is influential in too limited an area, and Italy is feared and disliked for her Abyssinian adventure. Despite their dislike of her present policy in Palestine, the most ardent Moslem nationalists feel that they cannot afford to be on bad terms with Great Britain, the more so at the present time, when they are faced with the prospect of long and difficult negotiations with the French. In the present circumstances, the possibility of active intervention on the part of any pan-Arab or other body in the affairs of Palestine cannot be discounted.

III.—British Prestige.

8. If the wild talk against Great Britain increasingly current amongst all Lebanese (Moslems in particular) were to be taken as an index of the present state of British prestige in this country, the only conclusion which could be drawn would be that it had never been so low. There can be no doubt that uninformed local opinion persistently regarded the events in Abyssinia as a straight fight between Great Britain and Italy, and their outcome lowered Great Britain in all Lebanese eyes. Immediately afterwards came the events in Palestine, in which the policy of His Majesty's Government has been unpopular with all, and hated by many sections of opinion. On all sides is now heard that Great Britain has broken her pledges to the Arabs at the insistence of Jewish financiers in London

and has for ever forfeited the good opinion of the Arab world; and while certain sections, chiefly Christian, consider that her failure to deal with the Palestinian situation shows her to be effete, others see in it the more sinister explanation that her aim can only be to induce a situation favourable to her annexation of Palestine. Great Britain is certainly more unpopular in Arab eyes than she has been for many years back.

9. The hard words directed so freely against her must not, however, be taken too seriously in the Lebanon. The vast mass of the population are concerned wholly with matters of personal gain, and in the matter of principle and policy their likes and dislikes are expressed in big words which are seldom translated into corresponding action. A boycott of British goods has been tried more than once on previous occasions as a protest against some action or other of Great Britain and has fallen into abeyance after a day or two of half-hearted compliance; no better fate is likely to attend any future boycott on the Palestinian question. Even the most ardent nationalists have an underlying feeling that Great Britain is well-disposed towards Arab aspirations and hope that at no distant date she may help to realise them. Their attitude at present seems more like that of a child whose venerated father has suddenly and incomprehensibly beaten him; he is resentful and a little bewildered that the injury should have been done to him, but would not wish to change his father for anyone else's. A British diplomatic success in Europe or Egypt, or above all a solution satisfactory to Moslem opinion of the Palestinian situation, would result in no great space of time in as much verbal enthusiasm for Great Britain amongst Lebanese as is at present shown against her.

Beirut, August 14, 1936.

[E 5530/94/31]

No. 102.

Sir R. Hoare to Mr. Eden.—(Received September 2.)

(No. 267. Confidential.)

Sir,

Bucharest, August 29, 1936.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch No. 206 of the 6th August on the subject of the Jewish question, and to enclose a report based partly on my personal impressions and partly on information obtained for me by His Majesty's consular officers here and at Galatz and by the *Times* correspondent, who has a good general knowledge of conditions in Roumania.

I have, &c.

R. H. HOARE.

Enclosure in No. 102.

The Jewish Question in Roumania.

(Confidential.)

THE Jews are about 5 per cent. of the total population of Roumania, i.e., 800,000 to 1 million, of whom about 250,000 to 300,000 in the old kingdom, 300,000 to 350,000 in Bessarabia, and the balance in Transylvania and Bukovina. Anti-Semitic propagandists assert that after the war there was a large influx of Jewish refugees, but this is untrue.

Some 3,600 Jews emigrate annually to Palestine. Jews are prepared to assert that, were the restrictions imposed by the Palestinian authorities less stringent, this figure would be greatly increased. This may or may not be true; but it appears to be a fact that, though there is some lag, very few applications for immigration permits under the various categories are refused, and it looks as if the demand did not greatly exceed the supply. The general impression is that the Roumanian Jew emigrates to Palestine mainly because he has reason to hope that he can prosper there, and not because he is in despair over conditions in Roumania.

It is quite impossible to make positive statements. Thus a leading Roumanian Jew asserts that "the German Jew knows better than to try to settle

in this country. The life of the Roumanian Jew is a disaster. The Jew in Germany knows exactly what he is up against and orders his life accordingly." Whereas His Majesty's consul-general at Galatz writes that "bitterness is felt that hundreds of German Jews can freely enter and settle in Roumania and obtain Roumanian nationality quickly and without difficulty."

Personally, I see no reason to believe either the Jewish statement or Mr. Marriott's, which deliberately reproduces the "talk of the town."

There is, of course, an endemic anti-Semitism, more especially in the towns; it ebbs and flows; to-day it is flowing with a following wind fanned by all the little Hitlers, Mussolinis and Francos who, under the impulse of current events, are inclined to believe that a good patriot is the man who beats a Jew at suitable intervals.

By "endemic anti-Semitism" I mean an almost unconscious reaction against the fact that, given an absolutely fair field, the Jew would sweep the board and the Roumanian would be left to hew the wood and draw the water. By a spasmodic prostitution of administration the balance is more or less maintained. Such Jews as are high-minded no doubt suffer acutely, as there is the daily presence, or at least the daily fear, of some offence intolerable between equals.

Before the war the Jew in England was quite definitely an Englishman. To-day, partly, I suppose, under economic pressure, and partly because half the world believes that black or blue shirts are the things to wear, the East End London Jew is becoming more Jew than English and is arousing the antipathies which are causing some preoccupation to the Home Secretary. Conversely, "patriotic" Roumanian students are by direct and indirect means being led to believe that Jewish competition ought, in their own interests and in those of the Roumanian fatherland, to be eliminated or circumscribed, and so we witness a more or less constant agitation for proportional ethnic admission to the universities and sporadic beatings of Jews, and when I have occasion to make representations on behalf of a specific Jewish interest, members of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, while receiving my representations sympathetically, convey to me, in suitably guarded and tactful terms, the hope that in the interests of the Jews concerned I will be careful to give no colour to any suggestion that Great Britain or any other foreign authority has been invoked to protect the interests of Roumanian citizens.

Somehow or other the Jew has got to learn how to become a citizen of a country; he must eschew class politics (His Majesty's consul-general at Galatz believes that 90 per cent. of the Communists in his district are Jews), and he should try to believe that it is possible to put an ordinary business deal through with a Christian. It is not always easy to achieve this act of faith, because it is not easy to get a deal put through except by a Jew. I was gossiping recently with a very senior official who has a property in Moldavia, where the percentage of Jews is very great. He maintained that there was no ill-feeling between Gentile and Jew, and, said he, "it would not occur to me or to anybody else to try and sell my crop except through a Jew; if I tried to use a Christian, I know that the crop would remain on my hands more or less indefinitely."

There is in Roumania a collection of political ragtag and bobtail who aspire to office largely on an anti-Semitic platform. I cannot imagine them in office, but it may well be that some of the Jews can. I think that these fears should be borne in mind because fear is the father of folly, and that, if it be decided to restrict immigration into Palestine, authority should be reserved to relax those restrictive measures in the event of unexpected or dramatic developments in countries, such as Roumania, where there is an important Jewish minority.

In general, the position of the Jew in Roumania to-day is similar to that of the Greek or Armenian (if the fear of actual massacre be excluded) under Abdul Hamid, or of the Jew in Germany before the rise of Hitler. He is—collectively—an inferior being; given equality of work and brains, it is more difficult for him to take his degree in law or medicine than it is for a Christian, and yet the richest man in Roumania is a Jew, as is one of M. Titulescu's closest friends, and a high percentage of the leading lawyers, doctors and journalists are also Jews.

R. H. H.

[E 5584/94/31]

No. 103.

Colonial Office to High Commissioner, Jerusalem.—(Communicated to Foreign Office and repeated to Bagdad (No. 174) and Cairo (No. 543).)

(No. 454 Secret.)

(Telegraphic.)

Colonial Office, September 3, 1936.

HIS Majesty's Government have had under careful review the whole situation in Palestine in the light of the latest discussions and developments.

They have resolved—

- (1) To reaffirm their previous decisions that order must be restored and British authority re-established in the country.
- (2) That no decision should be taken at present regarding temporary suspension of permanent immigration into Palestine.
- (3) That intensive measures designed to crush that resistance should be taken and that for this purpose troops in Palestine should be reinforced by a division, less artillery, and that at appropriate moment martial law should be applied either to whole country or to selected parts.
- (4) That measures adopted should not at present include any extension of existing authorisation of air bombardment.

[E 5611/94/31]

No. 104.

Mr. Eden to His Majesty's Representatives at Bagdad (No. 179); Jedda (No. 89); Cairo (No. 551); and Beirut (No. 15).

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, September 5, 1936.

MY immediately preceding telegram.

Following is text referred to:—

"Disorders broke out in Palestine in April of this year which, after rioting at Jaffa and elsewhere which was quickly suppressed, took the form of a declaration by a committee of Arab notables of a general strike of a definitely political character for aims inconsistent with the mandate, and pursued by methods which directly challenge constituted authority. There have been widespread acts of murder and other outrages by gangs of armed terrorists. Apart from attacks in which British soldiers, airmen and police as well as many Arabs and Jews have lost their lives, the activities of these armed gangs have included repeated attempts to disorganise means of communication, the cutting of telegraph and telephone wires, the derailing of trains, and attempts to prevent the roads from being used by traffic. Considerable material damage has been done affecting seriously the economic life of the country, and several attempts have been made to damage and set fire to the oil pipe-line between Haifa and Iraq. An important result of the strike has been the practical closing of the port of Jaffa, although happily the port of Haifa has hitherto been little affected.

"Active steps were at once taken by the Palestine Administration for the protection of life and property and for the suppression of disorder, and during the months following the outbreak of the disturbances the Palestine garrison has been considerably reinforced. In spite, however, of the greatest forbearance exercised by the British authorities, with the full approval of His Majesty's Government, whose chief concern has been to restore peace between the different communities in Palestine by measures which would entail the smallest possible amount of suffering and loss of life, the political strike has continued, accompanied by outrages and guerilla warfare. Widespread intimidation has been used by those responsible for the continuance of these disorders with the object of compelling at any rate the passive co-operation of the Arab population at large. In short, the situation which has been created is a direct challenge to the authority of the British Government in Palestine.

"On the 18th May, the then Secretary of State for the Colonies announced in the House of Commons that His Majesty's Government had decided that it was desirable that a full enquiry on the spot should be undertaken, but that the first step must be the re-establishment of law and order; and that after order had been restored it was their intention to advise His Majesty to appoint a Royal Commission, which would, without bringing into question the fundamental terms of the mandate, investigate the causes of unrest and any alleged grievances either of Arabs or Jews.

"On the 29th July the personnel of the Royal Commission was announced in the House of Commons, together with its terms of reference, which are as follows:—

"To ascertain the underlying causes of the disturbances which broke out in Palestine in the middle of April, to enquire into the manner in which the mandate for Palestine is being implemented in relation to the obligations of the mandatory towards the Arabs and the Jews respectively; and to ascertain whether, upon a proper construction of the terms of the mandate, either the Arabs or the Jews have any legitimate grievances upon account of the way in which the mandate has been, or is being, implemented; and if the commission is satisfied that any such grievances are well founded, to make representations for their removal and for the prevention of their recurrence."

"The Royal Commission will undertake its duties at the earliest possible moment, but, as has already been stated, order must be restored in Palestine before the commission begins its enquiry there. This is a condition essential to enable it to perform its duties effectively. Unhappily, however, the Arab leaders have taken up the position that they will not end the strike until fundamental changes have been introduced by the British Government in its policy with regard to Palestine; and notwithstanding the announcement of the personnel and terms of reference of the Royal Commission, the strike has continued, accompanied by outrages of varying degrees of intensity in many parts of the country. All efforts to introduce a reasonable spirit of accommodation have hitherto failed.

"Well-disposed Arab rulers and notabilities in neighbouring countries have from time to time expressed willingness to use their influence in attempts at conciliation. The King of Saudi Arabia offered to use his good offices, acting in concert, if their co-operation could be secured, with other Arab rulers. Unfortunately conditions have continued to be such that it has not been found possible to make any successful progress by this means. A public-spirited attempt has also been made by His Highness the Amir of Transjordan, but this likewise has proved fruitless. A further recent initiative in the same direction has been taken by General Nuri Pasha-es-Said, Foreign Minister for Iraq. Protracted discussions by him with the Palestine Arab leaders have led to no satisfactory result, for the Palestine Arab leaders issued on 31st August a manifesto declaring that they would continue the strike until their aims had been attained.

"Despite General Nuri Pasha's intervention, daily outrages and other instances of grave disorder have continued unabated, and after a careful review of the whole situation His Majesty's Government are satisfied that the campaign of violence and threats of violence by which the Arab leaders are attempting to influence the policy of His Majesty's Government cannot be allowed to continue and that more rapid and effective action must now be taken in order to bring the present state of disorder to an end with the least possible delay. With this end in view, it has been considered essential to send further substantial reinforcements to Palestine. An additional division of troops is accordingly being sent there. In view of the size of the reinforcement, and of the additional responsibilities entailed, it has been decided that the supreme military control in the country shall be entrusted to a lieutenant-general. The officer selected for the command is Lieutenant-General J. G. Dill, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., late Director-General of Military Operations and Intelligence at the War Office.

"His Majesty's Government deeply regret that such decisions should have been forced upon them. Great Britain accepted the mandate for Palestine upon terms which involve responsibility for the welfare of all sections of the population of Palestine. They regard this responsibility as

a trust which they have no choice but to carry out. In this connexion it is appropriate to recall that, in their report to the Council of the League of Nations in 1930, the Permanent Mandates Commission stated that, in their view, the following two assertions accurately expressed what it conceived to be the essence of the mandate for Palestine:—

- “(1) That the obligations laid down in the mandate for Palestine in regard to the two sections of the population are of equal weight; and
- “(2) That the dual obligations imposed upon the mandatory are in no sense irreconcilable.

“His Majesty's Government are fully in accord with the sense of this pronouncement at Geneva and it is their earnest desire to carry out a policy of impartial justice to both Arabs and Jews and to work for the peace and progress of a country so specially dear to both races.

“It has been the constant aim of British policy to secure and maintain relations of friendship and confidence with the Moslem peoples. For this reason, apart from all others, they would have wished to avoid, by all possible means, the course of action which has now been forced upon them. But no Government, least of all a Government exercising mandatory responsibilities, can allow themselves to be deflected from their course by violence and outrage. It is still their hope, however, that when those who are disturbing the peace of Palestine have been brought to realise that their present actions are inimical to the true interests of all sections of the population and to the country as a whole, and that the Mandatory Government is determined to exercise its authority with impartiality and justice, it will be possible for the Royal Commission to proceed to Palestine to ascertain whether any legitimate grievances or fears for the future exist on the part of either Arabs or Jews, and to make recommendations for their removal with a view to establishing more cordial and peaceful relations between all concerned. His Majesty's Government are convinced that these objects are attainable within the framework of the mandate which they have no intention of abandoning.

“It is the confident hope of His Majesty's Government that the Royal Commission will make recommendations which will enable His Majesty's Government to bring finality to a situation of doubt and fear on both sides, and that, out of the tragic misunderstandings and disorder of the last five months, a lasting settlement can be reached.”

[E 5634/94/31]

No. 105.

Sir H. Kennard to Mr. Eden.—(Received September 8.)

(No. 394.)

Sir,

Warsaw, September 4, 1936.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith a memorandum on the Jewish problem in Poland, with special reference to the question of emigration to Palestine, which has been prepared by Mr. Speaight, second secretary to this Embassy, in accordance with the instructions contained in your despatch No. 268 of the 6th August.

I have, &c.

H. W. KENNARD.

Enclosure in No. 105.

Memorandum on the Position of the Jews in Poland, with Special Reference to the Question of Immigration into Palestine.

THERE are at present about 3½ million Jews living in Poland, constituting roughly 10 per cent. of the total population of the country. Virtually, the whole of these are to be found in the former Russian and Austrian provinces and they are the most numerous in Eastern Galicia and in the provinces bordering upon the Soviet Union; in Warsaw they constitute about 25 per cent. of the population,

in Cracow, Lemberg and Vilna well over 30 per cent. and in many of the smaller towns near the Soviet border as much as 70, 80 or even 90 per cent. Unlike in most other European countries with a Jewish problem, the large majority of Polish Jews belong to the depressed classes. It is true that the number of Jews in the medical and legal professions in Poland is disproportionately large and that, with the exception of the army, there is not a single trade or calling that does not number Jews amongst its most influential members. These, however, account for only a fraction of the 3½ million; the rest live in conditions of almost Asiatic squalor and earn a livelihood by petty trading or through certain handicrafts, especially tailoring (they are never to be found working on the soil and seldom in large factories). They are conspicuous in every town and large village in Central and Eastern Poland, where they have for hundreds of years enjoyed a virtual monopoly of all stages of the middle-man's business. In Warsaw and a few large towns there is competition from merchants and dealers of Polish race and in some districts of Eastern Galicia Jewish intermediaries tend to be eliminated through the development of agricultural co-operatives; but, on the whole, the Jewish middle-man (or rather a whole series of middle-men) forms the essential go-between through whom alone the peasant can dispose of his produce and obtain such commodities as he is obliged to purchase. Another feature of the Jewish question in this country is that, while the higher class Jews endeavour to adapt themselves to Polish life and usually mix on equal terms with Poles, the Jewish proletariat remains completely unassimilated, retaining its own customs, dress and even language (the Ghetto Jews speak bad Polish to Poles, but always Yiddish amongst themselves) and taking no part or interest whatever in the life of the Polish community.

2. In the years before the war, and even during the first decade of Polish independence after 1918, it may be said that the Jews in this country were, on the whole, content with their lot. So far as their proletariat was concerned, its monopoly of trade in the small towns and country districts was not seriously challenged, whilst the educated Jew found ample scope for his activities in big business and the professions. Moreover, the small surplus who wished to seek their fortunes elsewhere had no great difficulty in emigrating to Western Europe, America and (later) Palestine. Recently, however, various factors have contributed towards making the position of the Jews less secure.

3. In the first place there is the tendency of the peasants (especially the younger generation) to seek a livelihood in the country towns, which have in the past been regarded as a Jewish preserve. This is due partly to the spread of education, but even more to the overcrowding of the countryside resulting from the stoppage of emigration to the United States, Canada and France. The depressed state of Polish agriculture has also a certain importance in this connexion, but the tendency would probably continue in normal times as well, for, unless some unexpected opportunities for increased peasant emigration occur, the high Polish birth-rate means that the rural areas will continue to be overpopulated whatever the state of the market.

4. Secondly, there is the effect of the depression on the Jews themselves. Those who are dependent on trade with the peasants for their means of existence have been especially hard hit by the fall in agricultural prices; and this just at a time when trade was flourishing in Palestine and there seemed to them to be unlimited scope for Jewish enterprise there.

5. But perhaps the most important factor is the growth of anti-Semitism in Poland. Until about a year ago the relations between the poor Jews and the peasants and proletariat of Polish race were not unsatisfactory; each section despised and failed to comprehend the other, yet there was, on the whole, mutual toleration and Jew-baiting was only a sporadic occurrence. The better-class Jews were similarly tolerated, and in the earlier days of the republic were not only ubiquitous in business and the professions, but to be found even in the highest ranks of the Civil Service. There has, however, always been a certain amount of anti-Semitic feeling in the *intelligentsia* and especially amongst the students, to whom the Jews appeared, by reason of their greater proficiency in business and the professions, as an alien race which had managed to secure more than its due share of the more profitable positions in the State and was continually absorbing the wealth of the country without giving back anything in return. Partly for economic reasons and partly through the example of the German Nazis, the anti-Semitic tendencies of these sections of the population have increased very

markedly during the last twelve months. The National Democrat party, the principal organisation of the Right-Wing Opposition which has a large following amongst the *intelligentsia*, has developed a bitter and slanderous campaign against the Jews in its press and elsewhere. Anti-Jewish riots and attacks on individual Jews, sometimes directly provoked by the party's extremists, have been a frequent occurrence for months past in all parts of the country, and wild scenes have been witnessed from time to time at the universities. Political propaganda and, even more, economic distress have spread the feeling amongst the peasants as well in the depressed areas, especially in former Russian Poland, where the Jewish element is very numerous, and there have been several serious clashes between Jews and peasants, involving loss of life on both sides.

6. The Government still adhere to the tradition of toleration of the Jews which they have inherited from Marshal Pilsudski, and their spokesmen have condemned the behaviour of the National Democrats in the strongest terms. In view, however, of the insecurity of their own position, the increasing pressure put upon them by the Right Wing of the Opposition and their own desire to replace the uneconomic multiplicity of middle-men in the countryside by a more rational system of agricultural marketing, it seems unlikely that they will be able to maintain this impartial attitude for much longer. Indeed, they have already been induced to make a successful attack on one of the most profitable of the Jewish monopolies, namely, the slaughter-house business; for centuries all beef and veal consumed in the former Russian and Austrian provinces has been slaughtered by Jews in the ritual manner, but from next year they will only be allowed to kill meat for the use of their own race, the remainder being slaughtered by more scientific methods.

7. The one possible solution of the Jewish problem which at present is finding support from parties with the most divergent views is that of emigration. The National Democrats make it an important point in their programme that Poland can never become prosperous or thoroughly westernised until she has expelled her Jewish population. Supporters of the régime do not, in public at least, put the matter so crudely; but they do realise that the unassimilable mass of the Jewish proletariat is a drag upon national progress, which, though less evident in times of prosperity, becomes intolerable during an economic crisis. For this reason the Polish Government are at present more than ever anxious to promote Jewish emigration and lose no opportunity of encouraging Jewish ambitions in this direction. As an example of the Government's policy it may be mentioned that when in last July M. Grynbaum, a member of the Zionist Executive Committee and a former leader of the Polish Zionist movement now resident in Palestine, delivered an address in Warsaw on the necessity for increased emigration to Palestine, his attitude was warmly supported in an inspired article in the *Gazeta Polska*, which further urged that, owing to the restrictions on the emigration of poor Jews to Palestine, they should seek openings in other countries which still had need of working-class immigrants to develop their resources. The Government are also genuinely anxious to overcome the difficulties which, owing to the currency restrictions, Jewish emigrants are experiencing in exporting capital to Palestine, and it is understood that conversations have been opened by the Polish Embassy in London with a view to finding the necessary "Devisen" for this purpose by means of a clearing agreement for Polish-Palestinian trade.

8. Before considering the attitude of the Jews themselves towards the question of emigration, a distinction must first be drawn between those who, irrespective of other considerations, consider it the sacred duty of Jewry to build up its national home in Palestine and those who in normal circumstances would be happy enough to continue living in Poland in the same squalid conditions as their fathers before them, but are impelled by present-day economic and social conditions to seek a securer and more profitable existence elsewhere. The Zionists, who form the first category, are the more vocal and the better organised, since their supporters belong mostly to the *intelligentsia*, but the latter is by far the more numerous, including as it does, the bulk of the Jewish proletariat; and as at present only Palestine offers a favourable opening for colonisation, the result is that the demand for permission to emigrate to that country is far in excess of the largest quota which the Palestine Government are likely to allow at any date in the near future, even by the most optimistic estimates.

9. The distinction between these two sections of the Jewish population is not clear-cut at the moment, since thousands of Jews for whom, in happier times,

Zionism would have little appeal, are being attracted into the Zionist camp owing to the fact that its organisation, which virtually controls emigration to Palestine, provides them with the easiest means of getting out of Poland. It might become important again if conditions of life for Jews in this country improved to such an extent as to remove the economic and social motives for emigration, or if adequate openings for Jewish colonisation occurred elsewhere than in Palestine. In either of these eventualities the number of potential emigrants to Palestine would certainly shrink, although, even so, it would probably still exceed the country's capacity of absorption. Unfortunately, however, neither eventuality is likely to be realised. From what has been said in the preceding paragraphs of this memorandum, it is clear that the various factors responsible for the growing desire of the Jews to escape from Poland are not merely passing phenomena; for, even if the economic situation in Poland should improve, the rationalisation of commerce and agriculture and the growth of anti-Semitism are likely to ensure that the number of potential emigrants to Palestine will increase rather than the contrary.

10. With regard to emigration elsewhere, this is a policy which, as was seen in paragraph 7 above, is encouraged by the Polish Government and the annexed table shows that since the war many thousands of Jews have been settled in other overseas countries, especially in South America. At present, owing to the reduction in the quotas of immigrants allowed by most of these countries, this opening is only available for a tiny fraction of the total potential Jewish emigrants, but if suitable homes could be found for them in any country where there was a prospect of making a livelihood, even in unfavourable climatic conditions, it is certain that many thousands of lower-class Polish Jews would be as ready to go there as to Palestine. The prospect of finding any such outlet, however, can only be regarded as remote.

11. In the circumstances, it is not surprising that the Polish Jews should pin their faith on Palestine, or that the cuts in the immigration quota effected by the Palestine Government this year and the possibility of a total stoppage of immigration for an indefinite period should be viewed by them with grave misgivings. Events in Palestine, coming on top of the various economic and social developments described above, have had a very unsettling effect upon the whole of Polish Jewry, and His Majesty's Embassy is at present being bombarded by every Jewish community in the country with strongly-worded protests against the "betrayal" of Jewish interests by His Majesty's Government. The Jewish race is, of course, peculiarly susceptible to mass hysteria and it is characteristic that they should alienate the sympathy of impartial observers by exaggerating their grievances and hurling the wildest accusations in all directions. Nevertheless, the grievances genuinely exist and there is no doubt that the Jewish question in Poland will become increasingly serious unless some outlet is found before long for increased Jewish emigration.

Annex to Enclosure.

Statistics of Jewish Emigration from Poland.

(Compiled from the Publications of the Polish Statistical Office.)

	1929.	1930.	1931.	1932.	1933.	1934.	1935.	1936 (1st half).
To Palestine ...	1,881	2,378	1,535	2,879	10,344	12,674	24,758	6,234
To European countries	2,004	(no figures given)	1,509	1,350	1,656	990	454	
To United States of America ...	6,259	3,241	649	905	777	871	735	
To Canada ...	2,678	3,051	141	242	350	511	541	
To the Argentine ...	3,892	4,882	2,476	1,335	1,313	1,472	2,022	
To Brazil ...	2,765	1,168	753	931	1,390	1,360	1,060	

[E 5672/5672/93]

No. 106.

Mr. Bateman to Mr. Eden.—(Received September 8.)

(No. 430.)

Sir,

Bagdad, August 21, 1936.

DURING the course of a recent conversation Nuri Pasha told me that he had been reflecting on the new situation created by the impending signature of a treaty of alliance between Great Britain and Egypt. He seemed to think that, as Egypt would soon be the ally of Great Britain, Iraq and Egypt could be considered, for defence and other purposes, as allies of each other.

2. He went on to say that, in view of recent developments in the Mediterranean and Abyssinia, it behoved the countries of the Near East to act together as far as possible in withstanding Italian aggression. In his mind it was clear that His Majesty's Government had determined on a stronger line in the Mediterranean, and he believed that joint action by Iraq and Egypt, in the promotion of a forward Arab policy in the Near East, would be of no little assistance to Great Britain in this connexion. Egypt would now have a great opportunity to increase her influence in Yemen and the Hejaz, while eventually she might be destined to play an important part all along the north coast of Africa. Iraq could be a co-partner in this movement—in the Eastern Mediterranean and Arabia—and he himself was all in favour of getting busy without loss of time.

3. His idea was that, for a beginning, the relations between Egypt and Iraq should be strengthened in the following particulars:—

- (a) The improvement of communications by land, sea and air.
- (b) The adoption of a common military doctrine, aided by the use of the same text books, works of reference and words of command in the Iraqi and Egyptian armies.
- (c) Closer cultural intercourse.

4. As the new Egyptian Minister seems imbued with similar ideas, I should not be surprised if in the near future Nuri Pasha makes some definite suggestions in the above sense to the Egyptian Government. He said that he had, when in London in the spring, spoken in somewhat similar terms to Sir Lancelot Oliphant, who had told him that it would be well to wait until the signature of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of Alliance had become a *fait accompli*.

5. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioner at Cairo and to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Jeddah.

I have, &c.

C. H. BATEMAN.

[E 5753/320/31]

No. 107.

Sir G. Warner to Mr. Eden.—(Received September 11.)

(No. 368.)

Sir,

Berne, September 8, 1936.

WITH reference to the last paragraph of Mr. Shone's despatch No. 345 of the 21st August last, I have the honour to report that the ordinary Swiss newspapers have paid little or no attention to the Zionist Congress which has just met in Zurich.

2. A fuller account of the proceedings at the congress was contained in the *Jüdische Presszentrale*, published in Zurich. According to this newspaper, Dr. Chaim Weizmann, Dr. Ben Gurion, Mr. Locker and many other speakers urged that Jewish immigration to Palestine should not be suspended even during the sessions of the Royal Commission which is to investigate the situation in Palestine. In particular, Dr. Ben Gurion emphasised that the present situation could not be compared with those of 1921 and 1930. The Jews had regarded the suspension of immigration, after the disturbances of those years, as a hardship and an act of injustice, but the position in 1936 was even worse; not only were the possibilities of immigration into other lands far more restricted now than then, but the suspension of immigration now would inevitably appear as a

concession to, and indeed a justification of, the terrorist methods adopted by the Arabs. He feared that the Arabs would resort to such methods again as soon as immigration was resumed. A number of speakers also alluded to the forbearance which the Jews in Palestine had displayed in circumstances of great provocation.

3. The *Jüdische Presszentrale* also gave, in a leading article, the gist of a manifesto issued by the Zionist Committee of Action which made similar demands with regard to immigration, condemned the activities of the Arabs as directed against Great Britain as well as against the Jews in Palestine, blamed the Palestine Administration for failing to ensure peace and security owing to indecision and weakness in the face of terrorism, and, while paying tribute to the bravery of the British officers and soldiers who had fallen in Palestine, urged that full rights of self-defence should be accorded to the Jews. The manifesto also emphasised the desire of the Jews to live in peace and co-operation with the Arabs on a basis of equality as regards rule, and called upon the mandatory Power to fulfil its obligations to establish in Palestine a national home for the Jews, who had done so much to contribute to the economic and cultural development of the country.

4. In a further leading article by Mr. Meir Grossmann, described as a member of the Committee of Action, the same newspaper set out the following demands on the part of the Jews:—

- (1) Arming of the Jischuw.
- (2) Arrest of the Arab leaders, including the Mufti, and investigation into their activities and their financial connexions.
- (3) Removal of British officials who, by their friendly attitude towards the Arabs and lack of foresight, had contributed to the present situation.
- (4) Dismissal of all Arab officials and investigation by the judicial authorities of their share in the present disturbances.
- (5) Suspension of all "Arabianisation" of the Palestine Administration.
- (6) Establishment of a special school in England for officials of the Palestine Administration on the lines proposed by Colonel Wedgwood.
- (7) Compensation for Jewish losses due to the disturbances.
- (8) Immediate introduction of public works and of measures for the revival of trade and industry.
- (9) Modification of the import duties which were ruining the industry of Palestine.

5. I presume that the resolutions passed at the congress (the *Jüdische Presszentrale* says there were thirty-six of these, of which ten related to Palestine and seemed to have been concerned with financial, economic and cultural matters) will be communicated in due course to His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom.

I have, &c.

G. R. WARNER.

[E 5831/381/65]

No. 108.

Mr. Kelly to Mr. Eden.—(Received September 15.)

(No. 1039.)

Sir,

Ramleh, September 4, 1936.

MR. BATEMAN'S despatches No. 436 and 430 to you of the 25th and the 21st August, respectively, are of considerable interest from the point of view of Anglo-Egyptian relations.

2. It has generally seemed hitherto that Egyptian interest in the neighbouring Arab States has been superficial, and there have been various reasons to support this view. The unique dependence of Egypt on the Nile, and the relative unimportance of trade relations with Near Eastern neighbours has tended to create geographical isolation. The governing classes in politics and commerce have been drawn mainly from Turkish, Coptic or fellahien sources (Ziwer, Makram and Nahas are typical examples in the political sphere), and the modern Bedouin Arab is usually either half starved in the desert or an object of jealousy in the "cultivation" owing to his ancient fiscal privileges. The religious motive (which, in any case, acts in a contrary sense in the case of the Copts, and of the Syrians who play such a large rôle in the conduct of the press) has been apt to

cut both ways, as was shown by the recently ended dispute with the Wahabee Kingdom and the resentment caused in Egypt by a dispute as to the disposal of funds contributed for the Mosque of Omar at Jerusalem. The religious bond with its product of common Islamic culture is there, an immense latent force, but it has been temporarily obscured. Chief among the factors making for isolation must, however, be counted the long modern association with England and the absorption of Egyptian interest in the treaty question and everything connected with the activities, real or imaginary, of the Residency. The whole emphasis has been laid on Egyptian nationalism in the strict sense, and racial and, still more, religious, motives have been entirely ignored.

3. There are definite signs of a changing outlook in this respect, and there is no doubt whatever that but for the treaty negotiations this change would have become very manifest in connexion with affairs in Palestine. In addition to the concentration of public interest on the treaty, the negotiations also gave Nahas Pasha a very strong inducement to meet us more than half-way in taking active steps to smother the attempted agitation, which, had it not been firmly handled, and had it not been for the successful issue of the treaty negotiations, might have developed into a situation resembling that at the end of last year. Nahas, however, took every opportunity of passionately advocating the Arab cause in private conversation, using on one occasion the phrase "we, too, are Arabs." He is not; but, as the prevailing doctrine in Germany illustrates, the importance assumed by racial myths need not bear any relevance to the degree of truth contained in them, and there is, of course, much Arab blood in the fellaheen. It will be remembered also that the extremely moderate, sensible and highly westernised Dr. Hafez Afifi Pasha made a very determined effort to secure the reception of some Palestine Arab delegates at the Residency in June with a view to mediation being set on foot in Cairo. It is unfortunately far from certain that there will not be a revival of this agitation when the numbing effect of the signature of the treaty has worn off and the students reassemble next month.

4. Among secondary examples of the growing interest in neighbouring Arab States may be cited the spontaneous popular welcome given last year to the Amir Saud (followed by Ali Maher's settlement of the religious dispute), but more considerable future significance may attach to the appointment as Minister in Iraq and Persia of Abdul Rahman Assam who, as described by Mr. Bateman, "achieved a conspicuously higher standard of thought and eloquence than those of the Iraqis present." Although Abdel Rahman Assam was perhaps the most effective contributor to the campaign inaugurated in July 1935 by Takla's *Ahram* for treaty and Constitution, he is personally very well disposed to Great Britain, though at the same time a fanatical enthusiast for Arab unity. For this ideal he fought for years side by side with his fellow Arabs in a desperate campaign—prolonged till it was more than hopeless—against the Italians in Tripoli. Before his recent appointment he frequented and influenced an interesting group of younger Egyptian professional men or rentiers who met periodically in each other's houses, and though out and out Nationalists habitually included in their gatherings several English officials and university teachers who had obtained their confidence on an unpolitical basis. Both at one of these private parties, which I attended as a guest, and on several other occasions, Abdel Rahman Assam developed to me at length his ideal of an Arab Commonwealth of Nations able to defend themselves against imperialist aggression and working in close alliance with the British Empire which would, in return, find that section of its communications doubly assured. He insisted that it was first essential for His Majesty's Government to settle with Egypt if only because that country was the only one in the Near East with an important Arabic press, instancing the wide circulation of his own paper, *Ahram*, in Syria and Palestine. I have dealt at some length with his views first as he is a man of real character and attractive personality with the restless independent nature of the true Arab. His mind works (unlike the Egyptians) on military lines—last year at the height of his press campaign it was always the idea of a military alliance which interested him primarily, not of the treaty as traditionally visualised by the Wafd—and further, because his views were well known to those by whom his appointment as Minister to Bagdad was made. Moreover, the views developed by Nuri Pasha, as reported by Mr. Bateman, tally so closely with those of Abdel Rahman that it would be interesting to know whether Nuri Pasha held them before Abdel Rahman's arrival in Bagdad.

5. However vague and theoretical the new gospel of Arab solidarity may be when it comes to concrete action (and I am well aware of the volatile and unco-ordinated mentality of the "bird-witted Arabian"—Doughty's expression, I think—a tendency observable in the history of his politics as of his religion), I nevertheless feel that it is a sufficiently definite and shaping state of mind to be a factor with which to reckon. Even though it may remain only a state of mind, it may make the difference between a wave of friendly or a wave of hostile emotion towards ourselves in all these parts.

6. It is a factor which might now be turned to our advantage with the help of the Anglo-Egyptian treaty (an indispensable preliminary), and there is, after all, nothing intrinsically fantastic in the vision of a Near Eastern "Little Entente" headed by Egypt and working in close harmony with His Majesty's Government. But it is a double-edged weapon which, in the event of its not being turned to our advantage, may contain elements of serious trouble.

7. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Chargés d'Affaires at Bagdad and Jedda.

I have, &c.

D. V. KELLY,

Acting High Commissioner.

[E 5902/94/31]

No. 109.

Sir H. Kennard to Mr. Eden.—(Received September 18.)

(No. 406.)

Sir,

Warsaw, September 16, 1936.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 394 of the 4th September, I have the honour to inform you that considerable interest has been shown by the Polish press in the programme put forward recently by the New Zionist Organisation for the solution of the Jewish problem in this country through the wholesale emigration of Jews to Palestine. The New Zionists are a recently-formed more radical branch of the Zionist movement, and are at present attracting much support amongst the Polish Jews.

2. This programme was propounded by the leader of the movement in Poland, a M. Zabotyński, in an article in the Conservative newspaper *Czas*. After stating that economic facts, even more than the growing anti-Semitism of the Aryan races, are rapidly making it impossible for the Jews in Eastern Europe to continue to play their proper rôle in the life of the community, he comes to the conclusion that nothing short of the creation of a Jewish State in Palestine on a much larger scale than has hitherto been attempted can afford any definite solution of the problem. With this object in view, he says, the New Zionist movement has worked out a ten years' plan for the colonisation of Palestine, during which period about 1½ million Jews would enter the country, chiefly from the Eastern European States. No details of the plan are given, but it appears from the article that it would also involve considerable changes in the internal administration of the country and, amongst other things, the creation of a purely Jewish armed force for the purposes of defence. The whole scheme, according to M. Zabotyński, will shortly be submitted to the Jewish National Assembly, His Majesty's Government and the League of Nations.

3. A further article in the same paper by another New Zionist deals in greater detail with the question of emigration under the ten years' plan. At the present moment, it says, only about 400,000 Jews, representing 2·5 per cent. of the total Jewish population of the world, are living in Palestine. This state of affairs it considers unnatural, and it suggests that emigration must at least be developed to such an extent as to put the Jews in roughly the same position as the Irish, some 27 per cent. of whose total number are at present living in Ireland. The article explains that the figure of 1½ million emigrants during the next ten years had been arrived at after careful calculations, and, in order to show that emigration on such a scale is a practical proposition, the example of the repatriation of the Greeks from Asia Minor to Greece after 1922 is quoted. A predominant part in this scheme of emigration would be played by the Polish Jews, who even in present circumstances represented about 41 per cent. of the total Jewish emigration to Palestine; indeed, it was envisaged that half of the

1½ million should come from Poland, which would thus obtain an annual quota of 75,000. Since the natural increase of the Polish population was 12 per 1,000 and of the Jewish 10 per 1,000, emigration on this scale beginning in 1937 would have the following effect on the total population of the country:—

Year.	Total Population.	Jewish Population.	Percentage of Jews.
1936	33,791,000	3,212,000	9.5
1946	37,201,000	2,792,000	7.5

4. In commenting on these articles the *Czas* states that it has published them in order to initiate an open debate on the question of finding a solution for Poland's Jewish problem. It then expatiates upon the essential unity of views between the Jews, who see that they must leave the country in order to avoid persecution and loss of employment, and the large section of Polish opinion, which considers that they must be removed from the country both because there will be no place for them in its future economic structure and because their predilection for revolutionary political activities represents a menace to the State. Its conclusion is that both parties should co-operate in trying to find better outlets for Jewish emigration, which may provide the only possible solution of the problem.

5. The attitude of the New Zionists finds strong support in the *Kurjer Poranny*, whose views are generally considered to represent those of the present Government. Dealing with the *Czas* articles in connexion with the decision of His Majesty's Government to take stronger measures to suppress the present disorders in Palestine, the paper states that the future of that country is of much more than theoretical interest to Poland, since the settlement there of Polish Jews, which was at present absorbing almost the whole of the natural surplus of her Jewish population, was of vital importance to Poland from an economic point of view. In the circumstances the question arose whether Poland should adopt a purely passive attitude towards the present developments in Palestine, which might well result in the Jewish national home having nothing more than a purely theoretical existence. Poland, the paper suggests, would be all the more justified in intervening in the Palestine disputes, seeing that her own requirements are identical with those of the Jews themselves. It then summarises the Polish attitude as follows: "The Balfour Declaration exists and Great Britain declares herself willing to fulfil her obligations resulting from this declaration. The question of a Jewish Palestine should therefore be solved in a way which would guarantee to the Jews self-sufficiency from the point of view of both territory and population, for only a self-sufficient Jewish State would be in a position to resist the attacks of Arab Chauvinists. Such a solution can only be obtained through an increase in Jewish emigration to Palestine, for unless the Jews are in a majority in the country, the Jewish State will remain a mere illusion; and Great Britain, with her fondness for half measures, might be only too apt to encourage this state of affairs." In the circumstances the *Kurjer Poranny* considers that the Polish Government should support the programme of the New Zionist Organisation, and it suggests that a joint declaration might be made by all States interested in the Jewish problem, urging upon His Majesty's Government the importance, from the point of view of Central and Eastern Europe, of the adoption of a policy in Palestine on the lines of the programme of the New Zionist Organisation. The article then concludes as follows: "Either the Balfour Declaration must be made of real value for the Jews, or else the few hundred Jews now in Palestine must continue to live under an Arab terror without any prospects of an improvement in their economic situation. Our interest is to make Palestine a real national home for Jewry."

6. The *Gazeta Polska* also stated recently in the course of a review of the political situation in Palestine that Poland stood firmly by the Balfour Declaration, and there seems little doubt that even if the views expressed in the preceding paragraph are not officially inspired, the Polish Government regard the continuance of Jewish immigration as a matter which directly concerns this country. Indeed, the Minister for Foreign Affairs told me last week that his Government was much perturbed by the recent developments in Palestine, and that he was instructing the Polish Ambassador in London to explain to you their interest in the question. I understand from the Polish press that Count Raczynski has already carried out these instructions.

7. Apart from the specific question of Jewish immigration, the internal situation in Palestine is being followed with much interest in Poland, and even the organs of the National Democrat party, which is the principal stronghold of anti-Semitism here, show more sympathy with the Jews than with the Arabs, since they, too, realise that a prosperous Jewish Palestine means an easing of Jewish competition in their own country. An interesting explanation of the present crisis was given by the *Kurjer Poranny* in its leading article of yesterday. It maintained that if the British military authorities had had their own way, the Arab revolt would have been quelled long ago, since they had worked out a drastic plan of campaign for restoring order. The civil authorities, however, were reluctant to make a display of force and, as a result, the Arabs had been allowed a free hand for so long that the situation had now become really serious and British prestige had been weakened. The article concluded by observing that with Gibraltar threatened from Spain and with Palestine in ferment, there was much uncertainty as to Britain's future in the Mediterranean, and added that no one could yet say whether, even with her colonial experience, she would be able to find a way to restore her position.

I have, &c.
H. W. KENNARD.

[E 5915/94/31]

No. 110.

British Delegation, Geneva, to Mr. Eden.—(Received September 19.)

[By Telephone.]

(No. 111. L.N.)
(Telegraphic.)

Geneva, September 19, 1936.

(Part 1.)

FOLLOWING from Lord Cranborne:—

"Nuri Pasha, before leaving for Paris on evening of 18th September for private discussions with Sir H. Samuel and Lord Winterton, made most earnest representations to me regarding desirability of seizing opportunity which he feels sure exists at present moment of bringing about cessation of disorder in Palestine without employment of force, which, though certain to attain its immediate object, will in his view engender a bitterness amongst the Arabs which will make a real solution impossible.

"2. Nuri began by making observations almost identical with those recorded in paragraphs 2, 3, 4 and 5 of Constantinople telegram No. 123 to Foreign Office. He took the line that His Majesty's Government had misjudged importance of manifesto of 31st August issued by Supreme Arab Committee that members of that committee were anxious to stop the strike, but for fear of being shot by their own extremists could not retreat from the doubtless foolish position which they had taken up without some face-saving device which they could represent as balancing abandonment of the demands which they had hitherto put forward and that the promise of good offices by Iraqi Government would provide necessary device.

"3. Nuri explained that Palestinian Arabs were at their wits' end because they felt they were at present without friends. They were, moreover, desperate, because of their conviction they would end by losing their country to the Jews. They had seen the proceedings of previous commissions of enquiry rendered null and void by Jewish pressure. They had thus lost confidence in His Majesty's Government and believed that any recommendations of Royal Commission favourable to the Arabs would again be set aside on account of Jewish pressure. But a guarantee of Iraqi interest would give them reason to hope that such pressure would be to some extent counter-balanced. Nuri felt sure, therefore, that without any promise or indication (of which he professed to see the impracticability) of specific concessions, Iraqi Government had it in their power to bring the disorders to an end by an appeal to trust in the sense of fair play of His Majesty's Government in conjunction with promise by Iraqi Government to use their good offices with His Majesty's Government.

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"4. In a preliminary conversation with Mr. Sterndale Bennett, Nuri indicated that Iraqi Government would feel unable to make such an appeal unless they received concurrence of His Majesty's Government or were satisfied that His Majesty's Government had no objection. He did not press for any commitments as to measures which His Majesty's Government would take when disorder ceased, but urged they should at least let it be known they would accept the eventual findings of Royal Commission. It was explained to him that it was unfortunately impossible in existing circumstances for His Majesty's Government to promise this or run the risk of misconstruction which would be placed on acceptance by them of any degree of responsibility for an appeal by any outside Power. They could only leave it to Iraqi Government to decide whether or not to make an appeal to Palestinian Arabs to create in their own interests conditions in which the Royal Commission would function.

"5. In a subsequent conversation with me, lasting nearly an hour and a half, Nuri's earnest and strong feelings resulted in his remarks being so disjointed that it was a matter of utmost difficulty to understand what he really proposed and what he really wanted His Majesty's Government to do. My understanding, however, and that of Mr. Bennett, who was present, is that he now contemplates an appeal by King Ghazi to Palestinian Arabs on the King's own responsibility and without anything in the nature of prior concurrence by His Majesty's Government, to cease disorders so that Royal Commission can get to work and to place their trust in fairness of His Majesty's Government and friendly interest of Iraqi Government. He would like to know, however, whether if such an appeal were issued and if it were successful His Majesty's Government would desire Iraqi Government to continue their mediation. When asked what he had in mind by mediation at that stage, he replied action on basis 'agreed upon at Jerusalem.'"

(Part 2.)

"By this it appeared that he had in mind paragraph 2 of draft letter quoted in Palestine telegram No. 656 to Colonial Office. It was explained to him that terms of that draft letter had never been accepted by His Majesty's Government and that point D appeared, in any case, to be based on misapprehension as to future procedure. Nuri at once expressed his willingness to cancel point D, but I made it clear that the other points also created difficulties for His Majesty's Government and that I could not express definite views about them.

"6. Nuri then was understood to say, though his language was exceedingly obscure, that all he would ask was that, if His Majesty's Government wished Iraqi Government to mediate after disorders ceased, they should now let him know in advance and *purely privately* that they were prepared, once disorders had ceased, to accept mediation either (a) in regard to immediate measure designed to promote good feeling in Palestine and a favourable atmosphere for an ultimate settlement, or (b) in regard to ultimate settlement after Royal Commission had reported, or (c) in regard to both (a) and (b). Whether he proposed to pass on His Majesty's Government's reply to the Arabs now, to give them necessary encouragement to call off the strike, or whether he wished merely to be able on his own account to guarantee to the Arab leaders that Iraqi Government would be in a position to exercise overt influence with His Majesty's Government was far from clear. Persistent efforts by me to elucidate this point were unsuccessful.

"7. As an alternative, if His Majesty's Government were not prepared to give him any indication on above lines, Nuri said he would be ready to recommend his Government to proceed with appeal without any commitment whatever on part of His Majesty's Government, provided only that the latter clearly understood that, if and when disorder was called off as result of an Iraqi appeal, Iraqi Government would, in fact, wish to make representations in favour of Palestinian Arabs.

"8. I told Nuri that His Majesty's Government much appreciated the efforts which he had already made, and felt keen regret they should have been wrecked by unfortunate manifesto of 31st August. But however wrongly that manifesto might have represented the real feelings of the Arabs, there could be no doubt that its issue and increase in outrages that followed had,

in fact, created a situation which His Majesty's Government could not tolerate. In their view any appeal to the Arabs which implied or suggested possibility of any concessions by His Majesty's Government would create a dangerous impression and would still further complicate matters. The only sound course was that the Arabs should cease disorders unconditionally, so as to prevent further bloodshed and to make it possible for Royal Commission to go to Palestine to enquire into their grievances. But attitude which His Majesty's Government had taken up made it to my mind impossible for them to enter into any commitment in regard to an appeal to this effect. They had come to definite decision. The strikes must be called off and outrages cease unconditionally. I could hold out no hope that this decision would be modified. While sympathising with much that Nuri had said about the fears and difficulties of the Arabs and appreciating his desire to help, I could do no more than report to His Majesty's Government what he had said.

"9. My impression is that Nuri will take no further action until he hears reaction of His Majesty's Government to the various suggestions recorded above, but he is anxious for early as possible reply, as he is receiving frequent telegrams from Palestinian Arabs pressing him for advice. He intends to return to Geneva from Paris on 21st September."

[E 5922/94/31]

No. 111.

British Delegation, Geneva, to Mr. Eden.—(Received September 19, 1936.)

[By Telephone.]

(No. 112. L.N.)

(Telegraphic.)

Geneva.

FOLLOWING from Lord Cranborne:—

"(Personal.)

"General impression which I derived from conversations recorded in my immediately preceding telegram is that, while we ought not, of course, to antagonise Nuri, we should confine our dealings with him on Palestine question to narrowest possible limits. He conveyed his ideas to me in so confusing and unintelligible a manner that I was often left to infer what he really meant, and I cannot help feeling he is so worked up and so desirous of playing a preponderating mediatory rôle that he may, without necessarily conscious intent, present to Arabs a dangerously garbled version of anything that may be said to him orally on our side. Detailed discussions with him are therefore, in my opinion, to be avoided.

"Although Nuri did not refer to participation of Ibn Saud or other Arab rulers and Governments in the appeal which he has in mind, I have some reason to think that he is turning over possibility of inviting Ibn Saud to take separate and similar action. However that may be, I think it would be in our interest to ensure that Ibn Saud and Nahas Pasha should be accurately informed of any reply that we may return to Nuri and of any action which Iraqi Government may decide to take."

[E 5985/94/31]

No. 112.

Mr. Bateman to Mr. Eden.—(Received September 21.)

(No. 233.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Bagdad, September 21, 1936.

JERUSALEM telegraph No. 717 to Colonial Office.

Minister of the Interior, who is acting for the Prime Minister during his temporary absence in the north, sent for me last evening and said that Supreme Arab Council in Palestine had some four days ago informed King Ghazi, both direct and through Iraqi Legation at Cairo, that after consulting High

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Commissioner, Jerusalem, they had reached the conclusion that only way of ending the present *impasse* was for the three Arab Kings to issue a declaration for publication.

Nuri Pasha, who was consulted by telegraph, advised that declaration should be either collective or individual and simultaneous. If the latter, he suggested a text for Iraq of which the following is a literal translation:—

"The Iraqi Government have requested His Majesty King Gazi to be graciously pleased to issue a declaration in favour of discontinuance of strike in Palestine and to approach King Ibn Saud with a view to the issue of an identical declaration designed to put an end to further bloodshed, relying upon the good intentions of His Majesty's Government to realise the legitimate claims of the Palestinian Arabs.

Minister of the Interior showed me, in the presence of Mr. Edmonds, the Arab text of a telegram received from Ibn Saud on 17th September, saying that he had informed you of a similar approach made by Supreme Arab Council to him, and adding that, while he could make no promises to either side, he was willing to associate himself in a general declaration with King Gazi and the Imam of the Yemen and is content to leave the drafting to Iraqi Government. This was received after Nuri Pasha's draft, which would, of course, have to be amended accordingly.

The Iraqi Government now wish to know *most urgently* the views of His Majesty's Government on the following points:—

- (a) Do His Majesty's Government favour intervention of King Gazi on the lines proposed?
- (b) Have you any views regarding text of declaration? (At present Nuri Pasha's draft is only one on paper.)
- (c) If His Majesty's Government consider that last phrase of Nuri Pasha's formula is too committal for publication, will they give Iraqi Government some such assurance and (in words of Minister of the Interior) say in effect "trust His Majesty's Government and go ahead"?

As regards (c), I must explain that Council of Ministers are very perturbed and apprehensive at rapidly rising tide of anti-Jewish feeling here. A leading Jew (a friend of the Prime Minister) was shot dead in the main street of Bagdad last Thursday night. Minister of the Interior emphasised to me that the Government are taking every possible measure to suppress demonstrations and to control the papers. On 28th September [*sic*] they suspended a violent Moslem organ, but they cannot guarantee lives of individual Jews against activities of Moslem fanatics. They are most anxious to avoid crisis in the United Kingdom at present time arising from allegations of bad treatment of minorities, but continued sitting on the press safety-valve will progressively weaken their position. If only to avoid complications with His Majesty's Government, therefore, they are most anxious that Palestine situation shall be liquidated with all speed. On the positive side they would like to gain some credit for working in harmony with His Majesty's Government and in the spirit of the alliance.

Minister of the Interior added that Nuri Pasha was due to meet Lord Winterton and Sir H. Samuel on 19th September in Paris and that Iraqi Government are awaiting his report of his interview. Before all else, however, they wish to know the views of His Majesty's Government on questions put in paragraph 4 above.

In view of leading part played by Nuri Pasha hitherto and in order to enhance prestige of King Gazi (a point which you will agree is most important), Iraqi Government are keen that King Gazi should head the list of peacemakers in Palestine.

At my interview with His Majesty this morning he showed intense interest in recent developments in Palestine and asked me to endeavour to get your reply to this telegram within the next two days.

(Repeated to Jerusalem, No. 31.)

[E 5985/94/31]

No. 113.

Sir R. Vansittart to British Delegation, Geneva.

(No. 71.)
(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, September 22, 1936.

FOLLOWING for Secretary of State from Sir R. Vansittart:—

"Meeting of Ministers this morning considered Palestine situation in light of Geneva telegrams Nos. 111 and 112 of 19th September, and of approach made to Foreign Office on 16th September by Saudi Chargé d'Affaires (record of which you saw before leaving for Geneva) regarding request for intervention received by King Ibn Saud from Supreme Arab Committee. You will remember that Ibn Saud said that he would be prepared to appeal to Palestine Arabs to abandon strike and campaign of violence if His Majesty's Government would be prepared, after cessation of violence, to grant a general amnesty. He asked for views of His Majesty's Government as soon as possible.

"2. Ministers agreed that Nuri's proposals to Lord Cranborne, as reported in paragraph 6 of Geneva telegram No. 111, were unacceptable, and that Lord Cranborne's reply as reported in paragraph 8 was therefore correct. But they felt that Nuri's alternative proposal reported in paragraph 7 (*i.e.*, that he should recommend his Government to proceed with appeal to Palestine Arabs to abandon strike and campaign of violence, without any commitment whatever on part of His Majesty's Government, provided only that it was clearly understood that, if and when disorder was called off as result of appeal, 'Iraqi Government would in fact wish to make representations in favour of Palestine Arabs') offered a more hopeful line for reply both to Iraqi and to Saudi overtures.

"3. They therefore considered that reply might be given to Nuri when he returns to Geneva, and to Saudi Chargé d'Affaires immediately, to the effect that His Majesty's Government must maintain their position to give no undertaking of any kind about the future in advance of a cessation of the strike and of the campaign of violence, but that they will raise no objection to an appeal by the Arab rulers, and that if, in response to such an appeal, the strike and campaign of violence are brought to an end, and the Royal Commission is thereby enabled to go out to Palestine, it will, of course, be open to the Arab rulers concerned to make any representations they wish to make on behalf of the Palestine Arabs. Any such representations from the Arab rulers must, however, be made through the diplomatic channel in London. This reply should be so worded as to cover any possible representations in regard to the period before the arrival of the commission, thus going as far as His Majesty's Government are prepared to go to meet Ibn Saud's point about an amnesty.

"4. Since this conclusion was reached, I have received Bagdad telegram No. 233 of 21st September, which has now been repeated to you. We propose, subject to your concurrence, to reply (a) that His Majesty's Government will raise no objection to a declaration on the lines proposed, on behalf of King Ghazi, and of King Ibn Saud (and possibly on behalf of the King of Egypt, of the Amir Abdullah, and of Imam of the Yemen, if, as seems probable, they wish to participate); and (b) and (c) that the last two lines of the proposed declaration (see paragraph 3 of Bagdad telegram No. 233) should be amended to read 'relying upon the sense of justice of His Majesty's Government and their declared intention impartially to observe all their obligations.' His Majesty's Government would have no objection to King Ghazi heading the list (see penultimate paragraph of Bagdad telegram) if the other rulers concerned agree.

"5. As regards final sentence of Geneva telegram No. 112, Ibn Saud would, of course, be informed, in reply to Saudi representations of 16th September. Egyptian Chargé d'Affaires enquired orally on 21st September whether there were any developments which he could communicate to Nabas Pasha, and was told that Nuri was in touch with you at Geneva, but that the situation was still unchanged. If you concur in action now proposed, I will see that he is kept fully informed.

"6. I shall be grateful for your views as soon as possible. This telegram has received the concurrence of the Secretary of State for the Colonies, and if you also agree we will act accordingly."

(Addressed to Geneva for the Secretary of State. Repeated to Bagdad, No. 197; Jerusalem, No. 513; Jedda, No. 96; and Cairo, No. 574, for information only and pending further instructions.)

[E 5860/94/31]

No. 114.

Mr. Eden to Sir R. Bullard (Jedda).

(No. 97.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, September 23, 1936.

MY telegram No. 71 to Geneva of 22nd September: Proposals of Ibn Saud and Nuri Pasha in regard to mediation in Palestine.

On 16th September Saudi Chargé d'Affaires communicated orally substance of telegram received by Ibn Saud for Mufti of Jerusalem, which was to effect that in consideration of statement of policy recently issued by His Majesty's Government the Supreme Arab Committee "had decided unanimously and with pleasure to accept the mediation of Ibn Saud and welcomed such mediation."

Before sending reply Ibn Saud sought views of His Majesty's Government, and wanted to know what His Majesty's Government were prepared to do to facilitate a settlement. If His Majesty's Government were prepared, after cessation of violence, to issue a general amnesty it would help a rapid and peaceful settlement. Failing this, if His Majesty's Government could "tell him something" of what they would be prepared to do for the Arabs, it would make all the difference and might enable him to bring about a peaceful settlement, otherwise he could not hope for success.

The Chargé d'Affaires was informed in reply that Ibn Saud's attitude was greatly appreciated and that his representations would be considered, but it was at the same time made clear that the position remained as defined in statement of policy of His Majesty's Government, and the first essential was a cessation of strikes and violence and there could be no prior bargaining.

Above is for your information only.

[E 6053/94/31]

No. 115.

Mr. Bateman to Mr. Eden.—(Received September 25.)

(No. 236.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Bagdad, September 24, 1936.

ON receipt of Geneva telegram No. 122 to you, I explained carefully to the Minister of the Interior to-day the events of the past week, beginning with Lord Cranborne's talk with Nuri Pasha at Geneva on 18th September, and showing how the form of Royal appeal set out in paragraph 4 of your telegram No. 197 followed naturally from Nuri Pasha's second alternative proposal to Lord Cranborne.

2. The Minister replied by reminding me that neither of Nuri Pasha's suggestions had received the concurrence of Iraqi Government. Speaking personally, he feared that the refusal of His Majesty's Government to give some hint that they would do all possible to "realise" the legitimate demands of the Palestine Arabs would cause disappointment here.

3. I pointed out that as a lawyer himself he could not help agreeing that this would be tantamount to deciding the case before it came into court. The position was that the Supreme Arab Council, by taking the law into their own hands and encouraging violence, had got themselves into a mess and had put themselves beyond the pale. They were now asking Arab rulers to save their faces, and His Majesty's Government, by expressing their willingness to listen to the proposed appeal, were going out of their way to save the further trouble which Palestinian Arabs were inviting and which would undoubtedly fall upon them if the violence campaign was not soon called off. It was a greater step further forward than any yet taken and than Arabs had any right to expect.

The Arab rulers would do well to fall in with it if they had any real consideration for peace in Palestine. His Majesty's Government were approaching the limit both of their patience and of their concessions.

4. The Minister thanked me warmly and promised to convey the formula proposed by His Majesty's Government and my explanations to the Prime Minister at once.

(Repeated to Geneva, No. 6; Jerusalem, No. 32; Jedda, No. 7; and Cairo, No. 5.)

[E 6010/94/31]

No. 116.

Sir R. Vansittart (for the Secretary of State) to Sir R. Bullard (Jedda).

(No. 101.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, September 25, 1936.

MY telegram No. 82 to Geneva of 24th September: Palestine.

Saudi Chargé d'Affaires has been informed this morning, in reply to his enquiries of 16th September, that His Majesty's Government, while greatly appreciating the attitude taken up by King Ibn Saud, can only maintain the position they have taken up, that is, that they can give no undertaking of any kind about the future, in advance of a cessation of the strike and of the campaign of violence in Palestine. Provided, however, that this is clearly understood, and that there is no question of the strike being called off in anticipation of some *quid pro quo*, His Majesty's Government will raise no objection to the Arab rulers addressing an appeal to the Arabs of Palestine to cease the strike and the campaign of violence; and if, in response to such an appeal, the strike and violence are brought to an end, and the Royal Commission is thereby enabled to go out to Palestine, it will, of course, be open to the Arab rulers to make to His Majesty's Government any representations they wish on behalf of the Palestine Arabs, provided that these are made through the diplomatic channel. It was again emphasised, however, that His Majesty's Government could give no indication of the attitude they would adopt towards any such recommendations, and that there must be no question of King Ibn Saud feeling that, if he succeeded in getting the strike called off, he would then be entitled to expect that any representations he wished to make would be acceded to.

2. The Chargé d'Affaires asked whether it would be possible for King Ibn Saud to "make recommendations" at once, or whether he would have to wait for the findings of the commission. In the latter event he feared that the issue might be prejudged before the representations could be considered. He was told that any representations would obviously have to be made before the Royal Commission produced its report. The proper time for the friends and supporters of the Arab cause to put forward their case would be between the cessation of violence and the findings of the commission.

3. The Chargé d'Affaires asked whether it would be in order for Ibn Saud, once violence had ceased, to make an appeal for clemency, or for the temporary cessation of immigration while the commission was sitting. He was told that, while His Majesty's Government would certainly be ready to hear anything Ibn Saud had to say after violence had ceased, and to give any such appeal their careful consideration, the difficulties in the way of either an amnesty or temporary suspension of immigration were likely to prove formidable, and that it must be clearly understood that His Majesty's Government could at present say nothing which might lead Ibn Saud to hope that such an appeal would meet with a favourable response.

4. Mr. Zada was then informed of the substance of paragraphs 1 to 4 of Bagdad telegram No. 233 of 21st September and of my telegram No. 199 to Bagdad of 24th September. He was grateful for being kept so fully informed, but said that, speaking personally, he feared that the words "their declared intention impartially to observe all their obligations" in the amendment which His Majesty's Government had proposed to the Iraqi formula, though perfectly proper in a declaration from His Majesty's Government, might lead to some difficulty with the Arabs in a statement emanating from Arab rulers and intended to reassure the Arabs that Arab rights would be respected, since it might be read

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as emphasising the obligations of His Majesty's Government towards the Jews. He ventured therefore personally to suggest the following alternative: "Relying upon the goodwill of His Majesty's Government and their declared intention to see justice done."

5. He was told that His Majesty's Government had merely suggested a variant for a formula proposed by the Iraqis, but that it was naturally for the Arab rulers to devise whatever formula they thought best, bearing in mind the overriding consideration that His Majesty's Government could give no undertakings of any kind, and that it would make the situation worse rather than better if any false hopes were to be raised.

6. It was further pointed out to him that if the Arab rulers brought about an unconditional cessation of violence they would be acting in the best interests of the Arabs themselves, since a continuance of the present campaign—which could not in any case succeed—would only injure the Arab position.

7. In reply to a further question, Mr. Zada was told that His Majesty's Government would have no objection to the King of the Yemen participating in the appeal if he wished to and if the other Arab rulers agreed, but that it must be made clear to him that His Majesty's Government could enter into no commitment of any kind.

8. The *Chargé d'Affaires* did not revert to Ibn Saud's suggestion of 16th September that Fuad Bey Hamza should be authorised to go to Palestine. (Addressed to Jedda, No. 101. Repeated to Geneva, No. 91; Bagdad, No. 201; Jerusalem, No. 525; and Cairo, No. 581.)

[E 6062/94/31]

No. 117.

British Delegation, Geneva, to Sir R. Vansittart.—(Received September 26.)

(No. 124. L.N.)

(Telegraphic.)

Geneva, September 25, 1936.

MY telegram No. 122.

Following from Secretary of State:—

"I saw Nuri Pasha 24th September. He began by referring to his conversation in Paris with Sir H. Samuel and Lord Winterton. Sir H. Samuel had made certain proposals. He did not tell me their nature, but I gathered he did not regard them as very helpful. Nuri Pasha had on his side urged that immigration into Palestine should be so regulated that Jewish population should not at any time exceed one-third of Arab population. He had also warned Sir H. Samuel against over-industrialisation of Palestine.

"2. We then passed to the immediate question of bringing to an end present disorders in Palestine. I said I would speak to him with complete frankness. From information which had reached me from Bagdad I understood there was now a proposal that an appeal should be issued to Palestine Arabs by the King of Iraq in conjunction with Ibn Saud and possibly other Arab rulers. His Majesty's Government would have no objection to such an appeal. Quite the contrary. It was in the general interest that disorders should cease and that Royal Commission should be able to begin its work. But His Majesty's Government could not enter into any kind of bargain or give any undertaking whatever as to what was to happen when disorders had ceased. In circumstances such as now existed no Government could do that. His Majesty's Government had, however, shown in their relations with Iraq and by their recent agreement with Egypt that they were disposed to give Arabs a square deal.

"3. Nuri Pasha professed to recognise that any undertaking on our part was out of the question and claimed that he had always made this clear to the Arabs of Palestine. He explained, however, that Supreme Arab Committee was in a difficult position, having declared it would not call off the strike until immigration had been suspended, and committee must be able to point to something which would balance the abandonment of this claim. Some indication that Iraqi Government would take up their case with His Majesty's Government would provide the necessary way out.

"4. I tried to divert Nuri Pasha from pursuing this line of thought by reading to him passage in paragraph 3 of your telegram No. 71: 'His Majesty's Government must maintain their decision to give no undertaking of any kind about the future in advance of cessation of strike and of campaign of violence, but that they will raise no objection to appeal by Arab rulers.' Nuri Pasha, however, pressed for some assurance that His Majesty's Government would listen to representations from Iraqi Government once strike had been called off and that we would agree to Iraqi intervention on the line of draft letter quoted in Palestine telegram No. 656 to Colonial Office. In particular, he urged me to say there would be no objection to his giving evidence before Royal Commission. I made it clear that draft letter to which he had referred had never been accepted by His Majesty's Government, and that, indeed, it would be impossible for them to accept some of the points involved. I saw difficulty in proposal which related to Nuri Pasha's appearance before Royal Commission. We were always ready to consider in a friendly manner anything which Iraqi Government might wish to say to us, but any undertaking at this stage to agree to any particular action on their part once disorders had stopped might only lead to the creation of misunderstanding and charge of bad faith if for any reason we found ourselves when the time came unable to grant the requests which they might make to us. I begged Nuri therefore not to pursue this aspect of the question further, but to trust to the sense of fair play of His Majesty's Government. Essential thing was that disorders should stop. If Arab rulers could accomplish this by issuing an appeal, we should welcome their action, but there could be no discussion at this stage of what was to happen when disorders had ceased. Important result would be that Royal Commission would then go to Palestine and prepare the way for a settlement.

"5. Nuri appeared to take all this in good part."

(Repeated to Bagdad.)

[E 6095/94/31]

No. 118.

Mr. Bateman to Mr. Eden.—(Received September 28.)

(No. 240.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Bagdad, September 27, 1936.

YOUR telegram No. 101 to Jedda.

Prime Minister received a telegram yesterday from Supreme Arab Council at Jerusalem saying they would be grateful for King or Iraqi Government to issue an appeal through *Supreme Arab Council* calling off strike disorder if Iraqi Government for their part were confident that after violence had ceased the following would happen:—

- (a) General amnesty would be declared.
- (b) Jewish immigration would be suspended on arrival of Royal Commission and pending conclusion of its labours.
- (c) Mediation would take place on the basis suggested by Nuri Pasha.

2. With regard to (b), Prime Minister suggested that perhaps arrival of commission could be timed to coincide with arrival of last batch of those Jews now on the way or whose passages had been booked, and that there should be no further immigration while the commission was sitting.

3. In reply, I gave the Prime Minister substance of your answers to similar questions raised by Saudi *Chargé d'Affaires* in London and pointed out that new move appeared to be nothing but another attempt to extract some promises in advance of cessation of disorders. This time, however, Supreme Arab Council were trying to put the onus on the shoulders of the Governments who were being asked to make appeal. These Governments would be assuming an unwarrantable responsibility and would be doomed to disappointment if they paid attention to further tiresome approaches of this kind.

(Repeated to Geneva, No. 7, Jerusalem, Cairo and Jedda.)

[E 6133/5508/31]

No. 119.

British Delegation, Geneva, to Sir R. Vansittart.—(Received September 29.)

[By Air Mail.]

(No. 62. Saving.)

(Telegraphic.) *En clair.**Geneva, September 27, 1936.*

FOLLOWING from Secretary of State:—

"Council on 26th September considered report by its *rapporteur* (Roumanian representative) on work of Permanent Mandates Commission at its 29th session.

"After congratulating French representative on successful outcome of negotiations with Syria and thanking Turkish representative for his references to policy of His Majesty's Government, I made statement on Palestine on lines already agreed with Colonial Office, regarding appointment of Royal Commission and military measures taken to bring present disorders to an end so that the commission could begin its work. I regretted that, owing to inevitable delay in commencement of Royal Commission's work, His Majesty's Government would not be able at the autumn session of the Permanent Mandates Commission to furnish information for which that body had asked on causes, circumstances and significance of recent disturbances. I expressed conviction that Mandates Commission would appreciate desirability of awaiting outcome of Royal Commission's recommendations.

"M. Orts, representing Mandates Commission, pointed out that for lack of information from the mandatory Power regarding events of 1936 so far as they related to facts contained in 1935 report for Palestine, Mandates Commission had been unable to fulfil its task in regard to that report to its own satisfaction. He hinted at desirability of special session of Mandates Commission, failing which he observed that commission would not be called upon to give opinion on Palestine troubles until it examined the 1936 report in June 1937.

"I replied briefly to the effect that, while appreciating the preoccupations of the Mandates Commission and desirous of facilitating its task as far as possible, His Majesty's Government were faced with most serious situation in Palestine, and had to consider their responsibility as the Power charged with the administration of the country and the maintenance of order there. I could, therefore, only repeat view of His Majesty's Government that statements on present disorders and their causes would be inappropriate while whole question was *sub judice* and premature in any case until Royal Commission had investigated facts.

"*Rapporteur*, in expressing hope that order would soon be established and enquiry of Royal Commission brought to successful conclusion, suggested that Council should confine itself to taking note of my statement, M. Orts's observations and my reply.

"*Rapporteur's* report was then adopted."

[E 6166/94/31]

No. 120.

British Delegation, Geneva, to Sir R. Vansittart.—(Received September 30.)

(No. 137. L.N.)

(Telegraphic.)

MY telegram No. 124.

Geneva, September 29, 1936.

Following from Secretary of State:—

"2. I received message yesterday evening from Nuri Pasha to the effect that Iraqi Government saw difficulty in present circumstances in issuing proposed appeal to Palestine Arabs and that he had decided to return to-night to Bagdad via Constantinople and Jerusalem. He asked for further interview with me which took place to-day.

"3. Nuri Pasha then said that as a result of communication from His Majesty's *Chargé d'Affaires*, which must have been that reported in Bagdad telegram to Foreign Office, No. 236, Yasin Pasha had concluded that no concession would be made by His Majesty's Government when violence ceased in Palestine, and that, therefore, it was useless to continue idea of an appeal. Nuri Pasha was still prepared, however, to pursue that idea if he could be given some indication for his purely private information of what His Majesty's Government were likely to do if violence ceased. He appreciated that His Majesty's Government could not commit themselves and took the line that it would be sufficient if he could be informed whether in the event of violence ceasing it was personal intention of myself or of Secretary of State for Colonies to recommend certain concessions, *e.g.*, some kind of amnesty if only of limited nature and suspension of grant of new immigration certificates for Palestine, while not interfering with validity of those already promised. He emphasised that any indication of this sort which I could give him would not be passed on to the Arabs. He was prepared to promise that. He simply wanted indication for his personal encouragement, as he would be taking risk in recommending that idea of appeal should be pursued in the present circumstances. I explained once more that it was quite out of the question for His Majesty's Government to give an undertaking of any kind in advance of unconditional cessation of disorder in Palestine, and that we had had to return the same reply to a similar approach by Ibn Saud. The Government had as yet taken no decision on the point he had raised, and it was impossible for me or any other member of the Cabinet to give any personal undertaking.

"4. Nuri Pasha asked what, in that case, was my advice to him. Should appeal be proceeded with either by the three Arab kings or by him personally (I am informed privately and in strict confidence that he has recently been contemplating resignation as Minister for Foreign Affairs in order to exercise his influence in Palestine as a private individual without embarrassing the Iraqi Government); or should idea of appeal be dropped.

"5. I said that I really could not take responsibility of advising him on this point. The cessation of disorder would certainly be in the interests of the Arabs themselves and no doubt such an appeal would be particularly effective if it came from the three Arab kings. But it was entirely for the Arab kings to decide and any appeal must be issued on their own responsibility.

"6. Nuri continued to press for some encouragement and repeated a point which he has frequently made that Supreme Arab Committee must have some reason to which they could point for abandoning the attitude which they had hitherto taken up. I said that this was the precise difficulty. No assurance could be of any use unless it could be passed on to the Supreme Arab Committee and anything which led that body to think if they called off the strike certain concessions would be made, would be fatal. His Majesty's Government could not contemplate anything but unconditional cessation of disorder.

"7. In reply to further pressure from Nuri Pasha, I pointed out that when violence ceased, Royal Commission would go out to Palestine. I suggested that the Arab rulers should consider the question of appeal not from the point of view of what else His Majesty's Government might do when violence ceased, but from that of whether it was in the interest of Arabs of Palestine that order should be restored and machinery of settlement set up. It was clearly in everyone's interest, including Arabs of Palestine, that violence should cease, and if Arab rulers decided to issue their appeal they could therefore be held to be doing a service to the Arabs and to the cause of peace. But I could give absolutely no promise or indication whatever of what His Majesty's Government would do should appeal be successful. I repeated that there had been so far no decision. I could only ask Nuri Pasha once more to trust to the determination of His Majesty's Government to give a square deal to both parties. Such was, I begged him to believe, their determination. Once the violence ceased, situation would have to be considered in the light of that determination. I could only ask Arab rulers to judge us by our record in Iraq and Egypt, and it was for them to decide on action they would take.

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"8. Nuri Pasha left me in a state of great indecision, but my impression is that he will recommend that appeal by Arab kings will be proceeded with. He has since sent me a message to say that he proposes to stay for two days in Jerusalem on his way to Bagdad, but that, as it is most important that he should be in Bagdad as soon as possible so as to make sure that Pasha Yasin really understands the situation, he may stay for a shorter time in Jerusalem, possibly returning there after a visit to Bagdad."

(Repeated to Constantinople, Bagdad and Jerusalem (direct from Geneva (unnumbered)).)

[E 6196/94/31]

No. 121.

Mr. Bateman to Mr. Eden.—(Received October 1.)

(No. 244.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Bagdad, October 1, 1936.

MY telegram No. 240 and my telegram No. 21, Saving.

Prime Minister told me to-day that, as a result of further communication received from the Supreme Arab Council, he had instructed Iraqi consul at Haifa by telephone to go to Jerusalem and ascertain whether Husseini was of a more amenable frame of mind. If so, I gathered that there is a possibility of King Ghazi making an early appeal to the Council on non-committal lines suggested in paragraph 4 of your telegram No. 197.

2. Prime Minister explained that Nuri Pasha was urging Iraqi Government to take what risk there was in issuing such an appeal, but that they were hesitating because, unless they could be reasonably sure that some good would come of it, the remedy might be worse than the disease. As the Prime Minister was inclined to argue that even Royal Commission would find it impossible to evolve a just and lasting solution, I said that it was futile to waste time in trying to anticipate what the commission would or would not do or what would happen after they had reported. The one thing certain in the whole unhappy business was that, unless and until violence was called off, the Royal Commission could do nothing at all and each day lost in parley was a nail in the Arabs' coffin.

3. Finally, the Prime Minister asked for an Arab text of your proposals for the Royal appeal. On receiving it, he made exactly the same comments as did Saudi Chargé d'Affaires to you on 25th September concerning the words "their declared intention impartially to observe all their obligations." I replied as in paragraph 5 of your telegram No. 201, stressing the point that, whatever was said, there must be no implication of prior promises.

(Repeated to Jerusalem, Geneva, Jedda and Cairo.)

[E 6296/94/31]

No. 122.

Sir A. Clark Kerr to Mr. Eden.—(Received October 5.)

(No. 250.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Bagdad, October 5, 1936.

MY telegram No. 246.

I have now been furnished with actual text in Arabic. Revised translation reads as follows:—

"To our sons, Arabs of Palestine! We have been much distressed by present situation in Palestine, and in agreement with our brother Kings and the Amir we appeal to you to restore tranquillity in order to prevent further bloodshed, relying on the good intentions of British Government and their declared desire to see that justice is done.

"Be assured that we shall continue our endeavour to help you."

The translated text given in my telegram under reference was received over the telephone and was repeated to you immediately, in view of urgency of the matter. Slight differences are of no importance, in view of paragraphs 4 and 5 of your telegram No. 101 to Jedda.

(Repeated to Jerusalem, No. 35; Geneva, No. 9; Jedda, No. 11; and Cairo, No. 8.)

[E 6223/94/31]

No. 123.

Sir R. Vansittart (for the Secretary of State) to His Majesty's Representatives at Bagdad (No. 223), Jedda (No. 116) and Alexandria (No. 607).

(Secret.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, October 7, 1936.

QUESTION is under consideration of possible deportation from Palestine of Mufti of Jerusalem, who appears to have been evil genius of Palestine Arabs throughout recent troubles, and who now appears to be losing credit locally. Various local problems which would arise if Mufti were deported are now under urgent discussion with High Commissioner, but it would also be useful to have any confidential indication you can give of probable reaction which his deportation might produce in country to which you are accredited.

Please telegraph your views. You should, however, give no indication at this stage that this step is in contemplation.

(Addressed to Bagdad, No. 223; Jedda, No. 116; Alexandria, No. 607. Repeated to Jerusalem, No. 570.)

[E 6372/94/31]

No. 124.

Sir A. Clark Kerr to Mr. Eden.—(Received October 8.)

(No. 252.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Bagdad, October 8, 1936.

YOUR telegram No. 218.

Prime Minister informs me that Ibn Saud agrees to text of appeal and will make it at once.

King Ghazi's message goes off to-night and Prime Minister hopes that Abdulla's will also be in Jerusalem to-morrow.

Mufti already has text of appeal and will issue it after it has been shown to the Supreme Committee.

Prime Minister has been informed of terms of statement which Arab Committee will issue with appeal and is satisfied that these are unobjectionable (see paragraph 5 of my telegram No. 245).

From telephone conversation with Cairo, Prime Minister has gained the impression that the Egyptian Government do not wish to join in the appeal (Repeated to Jerusalem, Cairo, Jedda and Geneva.)

[E 6374/94/31]

No. 125.

Sir A. Clark Kerr to Mr. Eden.—(Received October 8.)

(No. 253.)

(Telegraphic.)

Bagdad, October 8, 1936.

YOUR telegram No. 223.

Although on account of his intrigues with the Italians Mufti of Jerusalem is not personally popular with the Iraqi Government, it is with him that Yasin Pasha has negotiated King Ghazi's appeal, and there can be no doubt that his deportation at this moment would create most unfortunate impression.

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If after some days it is clear that the appeal has failed, less offence would be given to the Iraqi Government by deportation.

Reaction on public opinion is hard to forecast, but I expect Government's task of holding extremist agitation in check would become more difficult.

(Repeated to Jedda, Cairo and Jerusalem.)

[E 6400/94/31]

No. 126.

Mr. Kelly to Mr. Eden.—(Received October 8.)

(No. 927. Secret.)

(Telegraphic.)

Alexandria, October 8, 1936.

YOUR telegram No. 607.

Possibility of deportation has already been suggested both in the press and in conversation amongst Egyptians, and though it would certainly provoke unfavourable comment which we would naturally prefer to avoid, I do not think reaction would be very serious. If it really hastened the restoration of order in Palestine, any passing outburst might be worth while, as it is the interminable prolongation of Anglo-Arab fighting which is dangerous. As far as I can ascertain, no real sentiment of sacrilege would be aroused here. I assume there would be no risk of the Mufti turning up in Egypt, which might be disastrous.

(Repeated to Bagdad, Jedda and Jerusalem.)

[E 6350/94/31]

No. 127.

Sir R. Vansittart (for the Secretary of State) to Sir R. Bullard (Jedda).

(No. 118.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, October 8, 1936.

JERUSALEM telegram No. 790 to Colonial Office of 7th October: Palestine.

His Majesty's Government fully appreciate the efforts which King Ibn Saud and the Iraqi Government have been making to convince Palestine Arabs in their own interest of folly of continuing strike and campaign of violence and do not wish to render this task more difficult. But if disorders continue, it will be essential to adopt more active military measures. Although continuance and serious nature of disorders is making it a matter of increasing urgency for His Majesty's Government to take this step, they feel it is only right to give King Ibn Saud and the Iraqi Government due notice that it is in contemplation. But it cannot be longer deferred, and they will therefore be obliged, unless the strike and the campaign of violence are called off and disorders do, in fact, effectively cease before 14th October, to authorise the issue of a proclamation on that date delegating to the General Officer Commanding in Palestine the special powers provided under the recently issued Palestine Martial Law (Defence) Order in Council, and a more active policy of military measures will then be put in hand.

2. His Majesty's Government greatly hope that the Arabs of Palestine will realise before that date that it is to their own best interest to stop the strike and to put a complete end to the campaign of violence. The possibility cannot, however, be ignored that, while the strike may be called off, acts of violence by irresponsible elements will to a greater or lesser extent continue. In that event it will still be necessary to take strong and active military measures to deal with those responsible for or taking part in such acts of violence, and for this purpose the military authorities will still need the special powers referred to above, though the extent to which they will be applied will naturally depend on the extent and character of the disorders.

3. Should the strike and campaign of violence be called off, but should disorders still continue or be resumed, so as in the opinion of His Majesty's Government to render the issue of these special powers still necessary, His Majesty's Government will endeavour to give King Ibn Saud and the Iraqi Government due notice of their intentions. Meanwhile, they wish to make the position clear in advance so that there may be no risk of their action being misinterpreted in the event of their unfortunately finding themselves obliged to

issue special powers to the military authorities and to authorise more active military measures at a time when the Arab rulers may still be continuing their efforts to bring the more moderate elements among the Palestine Arabs to adopt a wiser and more far-sighted policy.

4. You should immediately explain the position to the Saudi Government on the above lines. A communication in this sense is also being made to the Saudi Minister to-day and this telegram is being repeated to Bagdad and Cairo with instructions to Sir A. Clark Kerr and to Mr. Kelly to make a similar communication, *mutatis mutandis*, to the Governments to which they are accredited.

(Addressed to Jedda, No. 118. Repeated to Bagdad, No. 224; Jerusalem, No. 573; Cairo, No. 609; and Geneva, No. 136.)

[E 6417/94/31]

No. 128.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received October 9.)

(No. 115.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, October 9, 1936.

YOUR telegram No. 116 of 7th October.

Our means of sounding public opinion extremely limited, but I cannot think that deportation of Mufti would make much difference to this part of Arabia, except perhaps in small religious and Nationalist circles in Mecca. Almost exclusive interest of Hejaz town is exploitation of pilgrims, especially at this season. If, as Transjordan thinks, there is effervescence among Northern tribes, that is presumably due to traditional contempt for the Jews and love of raiding, which are now perhaps exceeded in force by the new idea of Arab solidarity. These feelings do not require deportation of Mufti to raise them to maximum. As to Ibn Saud, his policy with regard to Palestine is, I imagine, based on major considerations which would be little affected.

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 11; Residency, Alexandria, No. 6; and Jerusalem, No. 12.)

[E 6453/94/31]

No. 129.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received October 13.)

(No. 117.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Jedda, October 13, 1936.

YOUR telegram No. 118 of 8th October.

Ibn Saud thanks His Majesty's Government for their appreciation of his efforts and for giving him notice about the measures which might have to be taken if disorders continued in spite of the appeal. He hopes that such measures will not be necessary. His trust in the justice and clemency of His Majesty's Government gives him confidence as to the future of Palestine and its people.

(Repeated to Jerusalem. Copies, by bag, to Cairo and Bagdad.)

[E 6588/94/31]

No. 130.

Mr. Butler to Mr. Eden.—(Received October 19.)

(No. 450.)

Sir,

Gulhek, October 1, 1936.

IN view of the volume of pan-Arab feeling that has been aroused in Iraq, Egypt and other Near Eastern countries by the present situation in Palestine, it may be of some interest to you to know that in this country there is apparently no disposition to take sides in the conflict. News items are reported fairly regularly by the Fars Agency, and the local press occasionally contains translations of articles that have appeared in the foreign, not excluding the British, press. But the news is reported objectively, the articles are anodyne, and no suggestion ever appears that any special sympathy exists for one side or another. Even the news value of Palestine is far less great than that of far-off Spain.

2. I have carefully examined the hypothesis that the Iranian Government are endeavouring to be thoroughly correct and neutral, and are stifling the expression of strongly-held feelings; but I am convinced that this is not the

case, and that no repression or censorship is, in fact, necessary. The explanation of this rather curious state of disinterestedness lies, I think, in the fact that there is no pro-Moslem feeling in any circle that matters, and that the anti-Arab feeling which undoubtedly exists in this country is almost exactly balanced by a similar prejudice against the Jews. Even before the nationalistic spirit became active in this country, the Persians looked down on the Arabs, and to-day this feeling is proportionately accentuated. The movement for purifying the Persian language has for its main plank the eradication of Arabic words, and there are many active young Nationalists who regard the Arab conquest as the *fons et origo* of all Persia's troubles. Jews are also Semites, and so are more or less anathema to the modern Iranian; and although there have been Jewish colonies at Isfahan, Hamadan and elsewhere for many centuries, and though the Jews are envied for their business acumen, I think on the whole that they are as much disliked as the Arabs.

3. The attitude of the Iranians towards the rival claims in Palestine thus seems to be one of indifference, and even in Khuzistan, which from its geographical situation and ethnographic composition might seem to be more interested, His Majesty's vice-consul at Khorramshahr reports a complete absence of any pan-Arab or pro-Moslem propaganda. If Iranians are interested in the situation at all, I believe it is only to watch how it reacts upon the British position in the Near East.

4. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, No. 227, to His Majesty's Ambassador at Bagdad, No. 75, to his Excellency the High Commissioner of Palestine, No. 630/4/36, to His Majesty's consul at Ahwaz, No. 56, and to His Majesty's vice-consul at Khorramshahr, No. 15.

I have, &c.

NEVILLE BUTLER.

[E 6970/94/31]

No. 131.

Mr. Eden to Sir R. Bullard (Jedda).

(No. 124.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, November 7, 1936.

FOLLOWING is an extract from statement by Secretary of State for the Colonies in the House of Commons on 5th November:—

"As the House is aware, Royal Commission is leaving for Palestine to-day, and His Majesty's Government have carefully considered whether or not there should be temporary suspension of immigration while commission is carrying out its enquiries. They have decided that temporary suspension of immigration would not be justifiable on economic or on other grounds. It is the view of His Majesty's Government that, if any drastic departure from the immigration policy hitherto pursued were now to be introduced in advance of the findings of Royal Commission, this would involve an alteration in existing situation and might be held to prejudice enquiries of Royal Commission, which will be directed, among other matters, to the very important question of immigration generally.

"At the same time, His Majesty's Government have thought it right in present circumstances obtaining in Palestine to ask High Commissioner to take conservative view of the economic absorptive capacity of the country. He has accordingly recommended that the six-monthly Labour Immigration Schedule, which was due to be issued last month, should be fixed at 1,800 certificates: this recommendation has been approved by His Majesty's Government. This figure compares with schedule of 8,000 in April 1935; 3,250 in October 1935; and 4,500 in April 1936. The new schedule of 1,800 certificates includes a special allotment of 300 certificates to provide for registration as immigrants of the German-Jews in possession of a capital of £1,000 already in Palestine, who will have been unable as yet to transfer from Germany the qualifying capital within a prescribed period of twelve months. The total increase, therefore, in the Jewish population resulting from this schedule will not exceed 1,500."

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 246, and Cairo, No. 656.)

[E 8028/381/65]

No. 132.

Sir M. Lampson to Mr. Eden.—(Received December 29.)

(No. 1383. Secret.)

Cairo, December 17, 1936.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a note on Near Eastern Affairs written at Khartum by Mr. E. S. Attiyah, the Sudan Government Intelligence Officer, after a visit he paid to Egypt, Palestine and Syria during last summer.

2. Mr. Attiyah was educated at Victoria College, Alexandria, from which he graduated to Brazenose College, Oxford.

3. Mr. Attiyah's report dwells first on the weakening of Great Britain's position in the Eastern Mediterranean owing to the general native interpretations of Italy's successful Abyssinian adventure and to Spanish developments. However, he believes that the majority of thinking people in these parts view with apprehension the possibility of a British eclipse, and would still be prepared to support Great Britain in any conflict between her and the Fascist Powers, provided a solution of the Palestine problem could be found acceptable to the Arabs. The failure to find such a solution must, he thinks, involve a recrudescence of armed hostility on a larger scale, involving other Arab lands.

4. He then suggests that, in addition to the settlement of the Palestinian question in a manner acceptable to the Arabs, Great Britain and France, in order to make more secure Arab co-operation, might sponsor the creation of some sort of Arab federation under their aegis. This, I may record, is an old dream which seems no more practicable now than seventeen years ago.

5. I need not dwell on Mr. Attiyah's picture of Egypt after the signature of the treaty. It is, on the whole, an accurate one, but it has already been presented to you in frequent reports from Mr. Kelly and myself.

6. The statement regarding the persecution of the Copts must be taken with a grain of salt. Many Moslems, on the contrary, are complaining that, owing to Makram's position, Copts are at present being favoured at the expense of Moslems. This is, indeed, an obsession with the Prince Regent, who never fails to allude to it in his conversations with me.

7. With reference to the suggestion that Ahmed Maher was excluded by Nahas from the dinner given by the ex-Khedive to the latter at Carlsbad, it is possible that the exclusion was only due to the fact that Abbas Hilmi Pasha has not been on good terms with the Maher family generally. I draw this inference from certain information given me here by one of the ex-Khedive's intimates.

8. Mr. Attiyah's impressions regarding Egyptian intentions towards the Sudan are reassuring. He thinks that the Egyptians will lay stress on Egypto-Sudanese fraternisation rather than on a more active Egyptian share in the Condominium.

9. With regard to the more important part of Mr. Attiyah's note, namely, that dealing with the Palestine question, I have on several occasions during the present year touched on its dangers to our position generally in the Near East. There appears to be a consensus of opinion among competent observers that the Arabs will not acquiesce peacefully in any solution of the question which does not assure a continuance of Arab predominance in Palestine. If His Majesty's Government are unable to admit such a solution, then it would seem advisable to be prepared beforehand for the consequences. If, after the Royal Commission's report, His Majesty's Government feel compelled to adopt a solution unacceptable to the Arabs, it is generally anticipated that there will be a recrudescence of trouble either in the near future or later when the Arabs have recovered from the strain of last summer's struggle, and that the reactions in neighbouring Arab countries will be wider and stronger than during the conflict now suspended by a sort of truce.

10. It will be remembered that only an amelioration of Anglo-Egyptian relations through the negotiations for, and subsequent conclusion of, an Anglo-Egyptian treaty, together with an easing of the Anglo-Italian tension through our unavoidable acquiescence in the Italian victory in Abyssinia, enabled us to withdraw troops from Egypt in order to provide essential reinforcements for Palestine. The events of this year seem to show that we have not enough forces available to deal with serious trouble in more than one quarter at the same time.

No doubt any such limitation will be present to the minds of His Majesty's Government in determining their future policy in the Near East.

11. Even supposing, however, that Arab exhaustion were to preclude an immediate resumption of the armed struggle, an unsettled Palestine would still remain a permanent factor of disturbance in Arab lands, and even in Egypt. This factor will always be weighing in the scales against co-operation with us among numerous elements who otherwise would, as Mr. Attiyah points out, be only too anxious to co-operate with us if we could give them a chance. Moreover, it would seem probable that Moslem countries of the Near East, excluding Turkey, must, sooner or later, be drawn into collective or separate action in favour of the Palestinian Arabs. For it must be remembered that these countries are not only actuated by a sense of Moslem or Arab solidarity, but also by real apprehensions that a Jewish absorption of Palestine would inevitably involve overflows of Jews and Jewish influences into neighbouring countries.

12. It would not be safe to rely much on local factors tending to pre-occupy Arab States with their own local nationalisms and thus to indispose them to co-operate with the Arabs of Palestine. Factors such as the establishment of the new régime in Iraq by *coup d'Etat* and the traditional isolation of Egypt may operate for a time against co-operation with the Palestinian Arabs, but in the long run the Moslem States of the Near East cannot remain indifferent to an Arab eclipse in Palestine.

13. Here I would invite attention to Reuters' telegram of the 12th December from Jerusalem, according to which the Arab leaders in Jerusalem propose to summon a congress representative of all Arab countries in the Near and Middle East to meet in Cairo, and that Auni Bey Abdul Hadi is understood to be leaving for Cairo to discuss the project with Mustapha-el-Nahas Pasha. I have telegraphed to His Majesty's High Commissioner in Palestine to ask if he can confirm this; but have at present not received his reply.

14. The Prince Regent asked the oriental secretary on the 13th December whether he had any other information on the subject, and, on receiving a negative answer, said that he too had none. He added that, though a couple of days ago he had had a long conversation with Nahas on many different subjects, including that of the treaty with Saudi Arabia, the Prime Minister had made no mention of any idea of such a congress here. His Royal Highness concluded, therefore, that the Egyptian Government had had no previous knowledge of the project.

15. I need hardly dwell on the inconvenience of such a congress in Cairo. But we must remember that Nahas, in addition to a certain vanity which is pushing him to seek a prominent rôle in this Arab drama, cannot afford to be too unsympathetic to appeals of Egypt's Moslem neighbours. Egyptians, proud of their recent independence and their predominant economic and cultural rôle in the Near East, have long been proclaiming the necessity of Egypt's playing a more active part in co-operation with Arab lands. Administrative measures even have been contemplated for this purpose, e.g., formation of an Oriental Section in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs for organisation of propaganda in the East. Even a well-disposed Egyptian Government would find it difficult to evade playing a part in a struggle so intensely interesting to the Arab and Moslem world. Their opponents, always on the look-out for pretexts to promote their partisan aims, would be quick to seize on what they would no doubt qualify as subservience to the British and betrayal of Moslem interests. The Government would probably find it difficult not to make some sort of gesture in favour of the Arabs, with a view to silencing the clamour of their opponents.

16. The situation indicated above, while disquieting to us from the point of view of our relations with the Arab States and Egypt, becomes even more disturbing in view of the powerful assistance which it is affording to Italy in her propaganda and penetration in Arabian lands and even Egypt.

17. His Majesty's Government are fully informed of the propaganda, deliberately hostile to us, conducted by Italy in all these lands. The dangerous possibility of Italy establishing herself in Saudi Arabia, through the training and controlling of Saudi aviation, has formed the subject of correspondence with His Majesty's Minister at Jedda (see correspondence ending with your despatch No. 1132 of the 2nd December, 1936). Equally notorious is the Italian penetration of the Yemen, through her agents disguised in civil functions (e.g., doctors)—through her intrigues in view of the succession of the old and sick Imam—through her provision of arms and financial facilities—through the reality of the

menace she presents to the Yemen since the establishment of her East African Empire. It is possible that the Imam's death is not so near as is repeatedly predicted, but his eventual disappearance is likely to afford an opportunity for much fishing in troubled waters, caused by rivalries among the Imam's sons and certain tribal elements. Italy will, no doubt, make the most of any opportunities afforded to her by any internal confusion in the Yemen.

18. It is obvious that all this Italian effort will be greatly facilitated by the continuance and development of Arab hostility to Great Britain, owing to an unsettled situation in Palestine. The Arabs are aware of the Italian danger to themselves, but despair is a bad counsellor, and, if the choice were to appear to them to lie between the Zionist absorption in Palestine, with its menace to the Arab world generally, and of co-operation with Italy against Great Britain and France, who, after all, are in the position of standing in the way of Arab aspirations, it is greatly to be feared that the second alternative might appear to them the least fatal.

19. It is not within my province to express opinions regarding the internal problem of Palestine, and it is only on the external reactions to that problem that I am venturing to dwell. Whatever may be the necessities of the Palestinian issue, I would earnestly urge that, anyhow, it be not examined in isolation from our whole position in the Near East, and that we consider carefully whether we have the means of maintaining our position in the Near East against an Italian thrust facilitated by Arab co-operation, based on despair of us and an apprehensive respect of Italian power as demonstrated by the conquest of Abyssinia.

20. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioner for Palestine, His Majesty's Ambassador at Bagdad, and His Majesty's Minister at Jedda.

I have, &c.
MILES W. LAMPSON,
High Commissioner.

Enclosure in No. 132.

Note by the Sudan Government Intelligence Officer, dated October 31, 1936, on Impressions and Information gathered during his Visits to Egypt, Syria and Palestine in the Summer of 1936.

(Secret.)

THERE have been three predominant topics of interest in the Near East this summer:—

- (a) The Italo-Abyssinian affair and its termination;
- (b) The Palestine troubles; and
- (c) The treaties between England and Egypt and between France and Syria.

The treaties are the only bright spot in an otherwise very gloomy picture.

2. I am sorry to state that as a result of the Italo-Abyssinian business British prestige has suffered an extremely severe set-back in the Near East. Italy's bold and successful adventure is regarded everywhere as a serious reverse for the British Empire; for the League aspect of the matter is considered to be nothing more than an elaborate piece of window-dressing designed to camouflage an essentially Imperialist duel between Britain and Italy—and for the first time the Arab and Islamic world has seen the British Empire successfully challenged over a big issue in and around the Mediterranean basin. The Spanish civil war, coming immediately on top of the Italian victory in Abyssinia, and implying (as it seems to most observers to imply) another Fascist triumph to the detriment of British and French democracy, has unfortunately enhanced the newly created impression of England's vulnerability, so that many people in Egypt, Palestine and Syria are wondering whether really England's supremacy in the Mediterranean basin and the East is not approaching its end. Everywhere one comes across feelings of insecurity and fear—chiefly experienced by intelligent and thinking persons, for in spite of all the clashes that have occurred since the war between Near East nationalism and British policy, there are few thinking individuals in that part of the world who do not still believe that British

ascendancy is the ultimate preserver of order and stability in the East, and who (provided Great Britain is willing to satisfy some of their deepest aspirations) would not dread the prospect of its being seriously challenged.

3. In order, however, that the Moslem peoples of the Near East should give their support to England in any conflict that might break out between her and the Fascist Powers, one imperative condition must be fulfilled—namely, the solution (if a solution can be found at this stage) of the Palestine problem in a manner acceptable to the Arabs. For Palestine has definitely become the focus of Arab-Moslem feeling all over the Near East—the treatment of her problem will react profoundly in Syria, Transjordan, Iraq, Arabia and even Egypt.

4. The Arabs of Palestine, supported by their co-religionists in all the neighbouring Arab States, are now determined to fight to the death against the policy embodied in the Balfour declarations. They have made up their minds that they will not allow their country to become a national home for the Jews, absorbing more and more Jewish immigrants, and coming more and more under Jewish political control. The strike they carried out, and the determined self-sacrificing desperation that was behind it, and that one saw in every Arab one spoke to in Palestine this summer, is a fairly clear indication of this back-to-the-wall resolve.

The cessation of the strike is nothing more than an armistice. The country for the time being was tired; 20,000 troops had arrived in Palestine, and the orange export season was at hand. If the strike was allowed to ruin this season the country would have been financially weakened to a disastrous degree. Moreover, the Royal Commission seemed to offer a chance which the leaders on the advice of the Arab King decided to take. Should, however, the British Government refuse to modify their policy—in other words, should they decide to uphold the policy of the Balfour declaration, it is practically certain that the trouble will break out again—probably on a larger scale, involving the active co-operation of the Arabs in Iraq, Transjordan, &c.

5. In order, however, to gain the goodwill of the Arabs of the Near East to an extent that would make Britain's position among them really secure in the none too improbable event of another European war, a more comprehensive and constructive policy than the mere pacification of Palestine is required. The Arabs still cling ardently to their dream of an Arab State, or, at least, a federation of Arab States. They bitterly remember that England promised to help them achieve this ideal during the war, and accuse her of having betrayed them at the conclusion of it. It is certain that if another war breaks out, while the Arabs are still feeling as they are to-day, they will refuse to believe any more promises, and, while harbouring no love for Italy or Germany, will pursue a purely opportunist line and seize the occasion to realise their long-cherished ambitions in whatever way they can do so. To-day there is not a single Arab in Palestine who has any love for Italy. Yet it is an open secret that the Palestine revolt has been helped by Italy with money and arms.

6. In view of all this one wonders whether it would not be possible for Britain and France, acting jointly (since it is the two of them that control the destinies of the Arabs—and since, moreover, it is more than likely that they will find themselves once again fighting a common battle in the event of another war), to sponsor the creation of some sort of an Arab State Federation under their ægis. France has now signed a treaty with Syria—England has a treaty with Iraq. Palestine is, of course, the chief difficulty, but if that was overcome, even perhaps without the co-operation of France, Britain might be able to do something along these lines.

Egypt and the Treaty.

7. As was to be expected, the treaty has on the whole been well received in Egypt. The opposition to it among some of the minority groups (one can scarcely call them parties) is of a largely factious nature—although there are a number of individual politicians and journalists in the ranks of the minority who are imbued with the constitutional necessity of organising an opposition immediately in the interests of democratic government, and who not unnaturally see in the treaty the first legitimate target for their criticism.

8. The Sudan part of the treaty is regarded as being rather vague, and there is considerable confusion of thought as to how it will be implemented, e.g., number of troops to be returned, number of Egyptians to be employed in

administrative posts in the Sudan, the exact functions of the senior Egyptian officer, &c.

9. The post of Inspector-General of Egyptian Irrigation is likely to go to Abd-el-Qawi Bey Ahmed, who from our point of view (as well as from the Egyptian) would be an excellent choice. I saw Abd-el-Qawi Bey himself, and he told me privately that he was hoping to get the appointment, the only consideration militating against him being the fact that he was not a Wafdist. As, however, the Wafd is somewhat poor in first-class men of the type of Abd-el-Qawi Bey, Nahas will have to recruit a few servants from outside the Wafd ranks, and Abd-el-Qawi Bey may well be one of them.

10. The minority groups, as well as patriotic individual observers, view the future with considerable misgivings. They rightly hold that the next few years will be a decisive period in Egypt's history. The responsibility for what happens in Egypt can no longer be laid on the British Government. It is now exclusively held by the Egyptians themselves, and everything depends on how the Wafd is going to conduct itself. The omens are none too good, but one, of course, must make allowances for the initial period. Everywhere one hears of disquieting signs—and often one hears them from intelligent and disillusioned Egyptians. In the first place, the Copts are being persecuted, and this in spite of the prominent part they have played in the Wafd, and of the fact that they have two Ministers in the Cabinet, one of whom, Makram Pasha, is known to dominate Nahas. Nahas himself is not fanatical, but there is still a good deal of fanaticism among his followers, and Makram is too careful of his position and popularity to take any risks on behalf of his co-religionists.

Again private influence, nepotism and corruption are extremely rife, and that old evil, the unjust distribution of irrigation water in the provinces, is becoming very acute; every Deputy who owns agricultural land uses his influence over the local irrigation authorities to obtain preferential treatment, and sometimes the Deputy's wishes are confirmed by an order from the Minister.

11. It is, of course, only human that the Wafd, reaching the land of milk and honey after so many years in the wilderness, should desire to enjoy some personal refreshment on their arrival. One must not forget that, even in enlightened European democracies (the few that remain of them), party followers have to be rewarded on the attainment of office by their party; or that in France, for instance, the private influence of the Deputies is often scandalously exerted for personal ends. The British are too often inclined to judge conditions in the East by the admittedly austere standards of public life in England. Their perspective would be more correct and their outlook more tolerant if they adopted America or France as a standard of comparison. A much more serious danger is the existence of the new student organisations.

12. Wearing coloured shirts, these bodies of unruly young men have now definitely learned the Fascist secret of imposing an *imperium in imperio* by means of organised terrorism. I heard during my stay in Cairo that several opponents of the treaty had been threatened by the Blue Shirts (Wafdist) with physical violence if they aired their views too freely; while Makram, I was told, was believed to be in danger of being assassinated by the Green Shirts, who held him responsible for the treaty of which they did not approve.

13. The split in the Wafd itself (Nahas and Makram *versus* Maher and Nokrashi) is more acute than it ever has been. Abd-el-Qawi Bey told me that when Nahas, Makram and Maher were at Carlsbad this summer after the signing of the treaty, the ex-Khedive sent a message to Nahas inviting the three of them to dinner, Nahas's answer was that he and Makram would be pleased to dine with Effendina, but that Maher need not be with them, and, in spite of the Khedive's espousals, the venerable leader insisted on ruling out the President of the Chamber of Deputies.

It is quite likely that this split will one day come to a head, in which event both factions will probably try to establish a dictatorship with the help of the Blue Shirts. Maher and Nokrashi will not come into the open yet, as they realise that the magic of Nahas's name with the masses would be too much for them at the present stage; but if the people become dissatisfied through maladministration, and Nahas begins to lose in office the halo which he developed in opposition under the blows of Sidky's policemen, then those two masters of secret organisation and the political plot (it is Nokrashi actually who controls the party machinery of the Wafd) might decide to strike at their leader.

14. The chief trouble with Egypt is that its political and civil life is still controlled by that old clique of politicians who were either brought up in the traditions of the corrupt Turkish school or received their training in the demagogic days of the Nationalist movement. A new generation of public-spirited civil servants is beginning to appear, but it is still small, and it will be some time before it displaces the older clique. The most outstanding personality of this new generation is Amin Osman, the new Under-Secretary for Finance, who before long will be in the Cabinet.

The Egyptian Attitude to the Sudan under the New Régime.

15. For some time to come, at least, the official Egyptian attitude to the Sudan will, I believe, be correct. Nahas means to behave himself and create a good impression; and it is unlikely that the implementation of the treaty will cause us any trouble. The Egyptians will now concentrate on developing ties with the Sudan—visits, financial help to schools, possibly (though not very likely) economic projects, &c. Occasionally, of course, we may have embarrassing incidents, outbursts of indiscretions, &c., such as may very likely attend on the proposed visit to us this winter of 100 Egyptian students.

There will be at the beginning, that is to say, a good deal of fraternisation, repeated emphasis on the ties that bind the two countries together, &c. As, however, the Sudanese themselves would not welcome any suggestion that the treaty has given Egypt new rights in the Sudan, and as the Egyptians are anxious not to appear to their darker cousins to be claiming any sort of right over them, they will, I think, exercise caution and restraint. The Egyptians have been made to realise (by the *Fagr* articles, by Sheikh Ahmed Othman-el-Qadi's conversations in Egypt, &c.), that any over-insistence by them on their share in the Condominium would stress their character as rulers in Sudanese eyes; and that the Sudanese would resent their appearance in this rôle. Hence the stress, from their side, will be not so much on their active share in the Condominium as on fraternisation under the protection of the Condominium.

And personally, I believe that any excess of interest they show in the Sudan during the next few years as a result of the treaty will gradually decrease as the novelty of the new régime wears off.